Tag: nepal china

Seven Years Since Nepal’s Transit Deal with China, No Shipment Has Moved

Many say third-country trade via China is now a pipe dream for Nepal at a time when even bilateral trade with the north has been difficult.

Seven years after signing of the Trade and Transit Agreement with China that gives Nepal access to seven Chinese ports for third country trade, not a single shipment has moved.In the wake of a “punitive” Indian blockade after Nepal refused to delay the promulgation of constitution, then Prime Minister K.P. Sharma Oli in April, 2016, paid an official visit to China where two sides signed an agreement that gives Nepal access to four Chinese sea ports in Tianjin, Shenzhen, Lianyungang and Zhanjiang, and three land ports in Lanzhou, Lhasa and Shigatse for third-country imports.The agreement also allowed Nepal to carry out exports through six dedicated transit points between Nepal and China.

The two sides expressed satisfaction on the conclusion of the Agreement on Transit Transport and directed authorities to immediately start negotiation to develop a protocol which will be an integral part of the agreement, according to the text of the agreement signed on April 23, 2016 in Beijing.

Later, during the state visit of the then President Bidya Devi Bhandari to China in April 2019, the protocol on implementing the Transit and Transport agreement was signed after delegation-level talks between Bhandari and her Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping.

Then Minister for Foreign Affairs Pradeep Gyawali and Chinese Minister for Transport Li Xiaopeng signed the agreement on behalf of their respective governments.

Officials at the Ministry of Industry, Commerce and Supplies said that not a single shipment has moved between the two countries in the seven years. After failing to implement the protocol, the Nepali side has requested China to convene a meeting to implement the protocol, and is awaiting a response from Beijing.

“We had sent a request some four months ago for a joint meeting in order to implement the protocol, but there has so far been no response from the Chinese side,” said a joint secretary at the ministry.

The deal came on the heels of a months-long border blockade imposed by New Delhi after Nepal adopted its new constitution without incorporating several Indian concerns.

The hardships created by the Indian border blockade made Nepal find ways to diversify its trade and transit with other countries.

Oli was hailed for turning north to break Nepal’s near-complete dependency on the southern neighbour for third-country trade. It’s now seven years since the agreement’s signing and over two years since the protocol was signed, but Nepal and China have yet to develop the standard operating procedure (SOP) for implementing the transit agreement.

One of the ideas behind the trade and transit agreement was to bring petroleum products from Kazakhstan via a pipeline from China.

Former Nepali ambassador to China Mahesh Maskey said, “We were confident that we can deal with Kazakhstan.”

But Nepal received negligible amounts of petroleum products after signing the deal with China and that also stopped soon. And there was no discussion on importing petroleum products from Kazakhstan.

“We were planning to import at least 30 percent of Nepal’s petroleum requirement by a pipeline from Kazakhstan via China. The remaining 70 percent would be imported from India since it would be costlier to import directly from China. We also considered importing fuel from Mongolia. Later we signed the protocol with China, but I don’t know why it remains unimplemented,” said Maskey who was Nepal’s ambassador in Beijing when the two countries signed the landmark trade and transit agreement in 2016.

For decades, Nepal has relied solely on India for its third-country trade, for various reasons including historical relationship, open border and road connectivity. But this dependence on India has on several occasions led to shortages in Nepal whenever there are any disruptions on the border.

Some months after the protocol’s signing, the Covid pandemic spoiled all trade prospects with China, the official at the Ministry of Industry, Commerce and Supplies said. “Now we are thinking of resuming talks with China to explore the viability of using these ports, but no date has been fixed for a meeting,” the official said.

“Also we were not clear about what we would export through China and what we would import from third countries,” said Maskey, adding that the prospect of importing petroleum products via China had become slim after the construction of a 69-km Raxaul-Amlekhgunj petroleum pipeline.

Nepali officials were also confident that after signing up to China’s Belt and Road Initiative, Nepal could trade via China with other BRI-member countries.

“We had also agreed to set up special economic zones in Kerung and Nuwakot districts in order to facilitate bilateral and third-country trade via China. Why these agreements and understandings are not moving ahead, I have no idea,” said Maskey.

During Oli’s China visit in 2016, the two sides agreed to explore establishing cross border economic cooperation zones along existing frontier posts and to speed up work on other frontier ports and trading points. The establishment of special economic zones and negotiations for free trade agreements are also part of the BRI.

Not a single consignment has arrived after four years of signing of the protocol to the trade and transit agreement, former commerce secretary Purushottam Ojha said. “At least we should bring one consignment, either from Japan, South Korea or Kazakhstan.”

Ever since the pandemic began, even bilateral trade between Nepal and China has tapered off. There was negligible cargo movement. The Nepal-China border has two main trade points, both of which were frequently shut. Most recently, the Rasuwagadhi-Kerung border resumed operation on April 1 and Taopani border will do so on May 1.

“Once we bring a consignment from a third country via China, then we will have a more exact knowledge about things like cargo movement, insurance, mode of transport, and logistics. For this, the government should take the support of the Federation of Nepalese Chambers of Commerce and Industry,” Ojha said.

Many say third-country trade via China is now a pipe dream at a time when even bilateral trade with the north has been difficult.

Also read: India in South Asia: ‘Vishwaguru’ Slogans Meet Regional Realities

Strong political will is a must to implement such agreements.

“No foreign or commerce minister gave much interest in implementing the protocol in the past four years,” another official at the commerce ministry said. “Nepali traders and those involved in freight forward business feel uncomfortable bringing goods via China due to several reasons.”

There has been no progress at all, Prakash Karki, former president of Nepal Freight Forward Association said. “Bilateral trade with China has resumed but it will take some time, probably years, for third-country trade via China.”

“Traders and people in freight forward business are comfortable importing via Indian ports, namely Kolkata and Vishakapatnam. Trade points with China are now open for bilateral trade, but we are not sure when third-country trade will begin,” said Karki.

Some officials who were actively engaged in negotiations with the Chinese side in the lead up to the signing of the Trade and Transport Agreement say sluggish development in the seven years is disheartening.

Former joint secretary Rabi Sainju has held a series of negotiations with Chinese officials.

“We have to develop the infrastructure on our side and we should immediately arrange for pilot consignments via China,” Sainju said.

“It is disheartening that not a single consignment has arrived in the past seven years and we could not even hold any discussions on how to move forward,” said Sainju. The single virtual meeting during the time of COVID-19 did not yield any positive outcome.

“On the one hand, the government could not push for the agreement’s implementation, and on the other, it could not boost the confidence of the private sector. As a result, the private sector is not ready to bring consignments from China,” said Sainju.

Some people envision Nepal’s development as a transit country between India and China, added Sainju. “Before that I see the prospect of developing Nepal as a trans-shipment country between India and China because doing business via Nepal will significantly reduce shipment costs and time for these countries.”

Sainju, who was the key official while negotiating the protocol with China in 2019, spoke of how Nepal can add value to the goods imported via China and export them to India, which in turn would boost Nepal’s revenues and create new jobs.

Anil Giri is a reporter covering diplomacy, international relations and national politics for The Kathmandu Post. Giri has been working as a journalist for a decade-and-a-half, contributing to numerous national and international media outlets.

This article first appeared on Kathmandu Post and has been republished with permission. Read the original here.

‘India in Nepal’: From Jawaharlal Nehru to Narendra Damodardas Modi

New Delhi’s escalating interventionism rankles Kathmandu and flies against India’s self-interest in a stable and successful neighbour. Timid when confronting world powers, New Delhi is actively working on manufacturing consent in Kathmandu.

This is part one of the two-part ‘India in Nepal’ series. 

As with other diplomatic missions of India, the tagline used by the Indian Embassy at Lainchaur, Kathmandu, is ‘India in Nepal’, meant to describe cooperation in economic, developmental and cultural spheres. Were it that the involvement of India ‘in’ Nepal were that benign, for it is a relationship that since the 1950s has been marked by intervention in politics and governance. And there have been no lessons learnt by New Delhi over numerous escapades of micro- and macro-management – both covert and overt – as a result of which Nepal has evolved as a sullen neighbour when it should be the friendliest of all.

Over the last half-year since the November 2022 general elections and subsequent formation of government and election of a new president, New Delhi’s involvement has attained fever pitch. The fulfilled desire has been a ‘manageable’ coalition of the Nepali Congress (NC) and Maoist parties and confirmation that the former got its choice of the new President of the Federal Republic. Although meddling has been the rule, the past half-year reminds of Indian activism in the final days of Constitution writing in 2015.

Delhi Durbar

Nepali citizens have been granted the boon of short memory in order to cope with earth-shaking developments that occur with appalling regularity – ‘people’s war’ to palace massacre, earthquake, cloudbursts and blockade. Amidst all this, there is risk of New Delhi’s strong-arm tactics being regarded as part of a ‘new normal’ by Kathmandu’s civil society custodians, who in any case are limiting themselves to whispered grumblings.

B.P. Koirala. Photo: Wikipedia/Public domain

Before India’s Independence, there was an arrangement between the Rana oligarchs and British rulers that Nepal would remain sovereign but subservient, and the arrangement worked well for satraps on both sides. The British support for the Ranas shogunate was the reason Bisweshwor Prasad Koirala (‘BP’) and fellow revolutionaries decided to make common cause with the Quit India freedom-fighters. They agitated together, shared bread in jail, with the Nepali leaders confident that Indian self-rule would end the era of deference to Delhi Durbar.

Upon Jawaharlal Nehru becoming prime minister, and while the revolutionaries were still fighting the Ranas, Koirala witnessed a fellow rebel transform into head of government with revised geopolitical and interpersonal calculations. While among his peers Nehru had stood up for Nepal’s sovereign status in 1947, Koirala discovered that the expectation nevertheless was of a country under Indian umbrella and hegemony.

Koirala’s rude awakening was in 1950 when he landed in New Delhi on a DC-3 Dakota aircraft with money looted from Rana customs at the Birgunj border. He was surprised to be greeted at Safdarjung Airport by a military cordon ordered by Nehru, and was escorted to the Prime Minister’s presence at Teen Murti House.

 

BP Koirala with Jawaharlal Nehru. Photo: Author provided.

In Atmabrittanta: Late Life Recollections (1998) , Koirala recalls a livid Nehru confronting him, and how Nehru was transforming from revolutionary to prime minister, with attendant exigencies.

In January 2023, American researcher Daniel W. Edwards reproduced in the Nepali Times weekly a document from the US Department of State Archives, the US Consul General in Calcutta reporting on an October 15, 1953 conversation with Koirala. At that time, BP’s elder half-brother Matrika Prasad Koirala was prime minister as Nehru’s choice. BP confides that Nehru had turned cold on him over two meetings that August:

“At both meetings when [Koirala] endeavored to point out to Nehru the errors which the Indians were committing in Nepal in the implementation of their policy, he was cut off short and told that because of geographic location Nepal was going to have to develop under the aegis of the Government of India. BP tried to point out that Nepalis were slowly but surely developing a nationalist spirit, that this nationalist spirit could be channeled into agreeable Indo-Nepal relations which could be mutually beneficial to both countries… BP claims to have very drastically revised his opinion of Nehru over the past year and a half. He said that in mid-1951 he had been warned by Jai Prakash Narayan that he, BP, was putting much too much trust in Nehru for the good of Nepal. Narayan had continued with a softening remark to the effect that one must not put that much trust in any foreign nation’s prime minister, for countries, like people, are still antagonistic toward each other and try to take advantage.”

Robes in the almirah

Nepal’s struggle since 1947 has been to keep New Delhi out of its affairs, while the latter’s unrelenting effort has been to try and elbow in. The uprising of Nepal’s citizenry against the Ranas was not allowed a democratic denouement when Nehru foisted the so-called ‘tripartite agreement’ (which Koirala claimed never happened) leading to a hodgepodge government of Ranas and the Nepali Congress which prevented the country from starting on a clean slate.

From the get-go of Independence, as they turned towards Nepal, New Delhi’s new rulers donned the viceregal robes left behind in the almirah. There were some successes on the part of Kathmandu, such as getting New Delhi to evacuate 18 military listening posts on its territory and ending the practice of an Indian advisor attending cabinet meetings, but New Delhi never stopped trying to be the major-domo of Nepali raajkaaj.

BP Koirala with Jayaprakash Narayan. Photo: Author provided.

India’s sway over Nepal can to some extent be ascribed to the pusillanimity of Kathmandu’s party leaders.

During times of political chaos, as between 1950 and King Mahendra’s coup d’état of 1960, they sought Delhi’s favours to get to be head the government. With the royal regime holding politics in its grip for three decades after 1960, New Delhi had less of a leeway, but as the Panchayat autocracy collapsed to the People’s Movement of 1990, the Indians got back to playing favourites among parties and factions. 

At the beginning of the democratic era after 1990, even with B.P. Koirala having passed away, the stature of Nepal’s leaders limited the potential for Indian meddling. That these leaders had participated in the Indian freedom struggle provided a security umbrella against excessive bureaucratic and intelligence manoeuvring – a modicum of decorum was maintained. The passing of Girija Prasad Koirala in 2010 removed the last tall leader.

Kathmandu’s political class became fixated on New Delhi as power broker. This was self-inflicted harm, for the relationship was much more dignified and equal earlier with Calcutta, Benaras and Patna. Delhi-centricism became the rule, as exemplified by the NC’s Sher Bahadur Deuba, who as many-time prime minister is besotted with pleasing the south. 

Prime Minister Narendra Modi with his Nepal counterpart Sher Bahadur Deuba in New Delhi on April 2, 2022. Photo: Twitter/@narendramodi.

In the case of the sitting PM Pushpa Kamal Dahal, New Delhi retains even stronger leverage, going back to his time in Noida safe houses during the conflict years.

For his present-day value, New Delhi apparatchiks seem willing to ignore Dahal’s opportunistic anti-Indianism of the past, as the person who derided India as ‘bideshi prabhu’, and in the waning years of the conflict got Maoist cadre to prepare for an Indian invasion by digging tunnels at the border (‘surung yuddha’). Perhaps the Indian ‘handlers’ always knew they had Dahal in their grip, and indeed the full blown entry of Indian ‘agencies’ into Nepali affairs was only possible when the Maoists came above ground in 2006.

Also read | Nepal: Will Madhes Remain an Influential Factor after the November Elections?

Through the agencies, New Delhi has in particular sought to control the political leadership of Tarai-Madhes, worked to influence Kathmandu by way of manufacturing consent in the plains, and once even pushed the nonsensical ‘ek madhes ek pradesh’ agenda (a 500×20 mile autonomous strip meant as an Indian buffer). Adventurism peaked in 2015 when then Foreign Secretary S. Jaishankar came as PM Modi’s special envoy to stall the promulgation of the constitution. Turning off their mobile phones to evade calls from Lainchaur (where the embassy is located), the framers succeeded in adopting the document. A version of that affair was repeated when present Foreign Secretary Vinay Kwatra arrived in early February 2023, ostensibly for bilateral talks with his counterpart Bharat Raj Poudel, but meeting the entire political spectrum including one-on-one’s with PM Dahal.

Vinay Kwatra with PM Dahal. Photo: PTI/File

While Foreign Secretary Kwatra (till recently ambassador to Nepal) has had the run of Kathmandu, Shanker Sharma, the Nepali ambassador at Barakhamba Road in New Delhi, has been cooling his heels since May 2022 and is yet to be granted formal audience with Minister of External Affairs, Jaishankar. Also to be noted is the fact that Nepal’s previous ambassador Nilamber Acharya was among those targeted by the Indian authorities through the Pegasus spyware that hacked his mobile phone.

New Delhi Media and civil society

The Indian government, whether run by the Congress or Bharatiya Janata Party, would not make repeated errors in next-door policy if Raisina Hill did not keep such tight control over the press and intelligentsia with its strictures and press notes. The subservience of media gatekeepers to South and North Block diktat leaves Nepal, along with Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, suffering from intrusion that might otherwise have been softer. If anything, as a prominent Delhi editor wrote in a slightly different context, journalists are ‘force multipliers’ when it comes to India’s geostrategic interests.

Up to the 1970s, Indian papers had senior journalists assigned to Kathmandu, sage intellectuals and litterateurs from the Hindi heartland who knew Nepal for its history and complexities. ‘Nepal studies’ in New Delhi is today manned by academics and researchers who bend with the wind wafting down from the Hill, and former ambassadors who cannot depart too far from the official line. The weak scholarship is surprising, given the importance of Nepal due to the open border, the country adjoining the Ganga heartland, its valuable water resource, the Himalayan ridgeline with China/Tibet on the other side, the cultural intertwining, and the fact that Nepal is the seventh-largest remittance sending country to India, providing income to the poorest in adjacent states.

It is fear of being tarred ‘anti-national’, more so by the self-aggrandising Hindutva ideologues, that has the commentators and academics toeing the statist line. Along the way, the Delhi press scaremongers about Chinese influence on Nepal, to the extent that the larger Indian public is convinced that Kathmandu has sold out to China. As for the slew of protocols that were signed between Kathmandu and Beijing in 2016 on trade, transit, transmission lines, etc., beyond the right of a country to do right by itself, the fact is that they were facilitated by the Indian Blockade of 2015.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi with President Xi Jinping of China and Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal ‘Prachanda’ of Nepal in the sidelines of the 2016 BRICS summit. Photo: Twitter/@ashoswai

The journalists in Patna in particular have over the years been used by the ‘agencies’ to plant stories of third country infiltration into the Ganga heartland via Nepal, mostly false but receiving enthusiastic media uptake. The extreme editorial leeway allowed exceptionally on Nepal matters was exemplified by a Hindustan Times staffer’s op-ed suggesting at the time of Nepal’s constitution-writing that New Delhi use both “overt and covert tools” at its command to bring Kathmandu to heel, adding: “There is little point in being a regional power if you do not exercise it at decisive moments.”

Some online media portals do defy the official dictation on regional geopolitics, and the questioning spirit also picks up as you go southward and eastward from New Delhi, but not nearly enough. Demanding obeisance from journalists and analysts makes for a blindfold that keeps Indian authorities from perceiving the breadth and depth of Nepali opinion. New Delhi think tanks and conclaves have little time for independent-minded Kathmandu commentators, tilting towards individuals who will not rock the Indian boat. Lately, South Block has taken to patronising individuals and organisations that do not have weightage, or even name recognition, in Kathmandu.

The broadcasts of India’s satellite channels on Nepal have to be seen and heard to be believed, in terms of liberties taken. The primary concern of Indian journalists in the immediate aftermath of the April 2015 earthquake was to glorify New Delhi’s relief efforts. Or take the retired ambassador frothing at the mouth, demanding a doubling down on the ongoing blockade, for Kathmandu having the temerity to defy diktat on the Constitution. Then there was the time in June-July 2020 when Indian channels were going wild about the lady ambassador of China having laid a “honey trap” for then PM KP Oli. It should not be forgotten that in Nepal viewers watch Indian television, and supercilious coverage solidifies the image of the ‘ugly Indian’.

Every monsoon, it is a constant for Indian politicians and commentators alike to slam Nepal for ‘sending’ floods into Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, which to begin with shows ignorance of both geography and river morphology. Nepal is said to open the floodgates of dams to inundate the plains even though it does not have reservoirs that can do that, and the two barrages on the Kosi and Gandaki by the border are manned by Indian government personnel.

Open border

Certainly, New Delhi feels the vulnerability of the open border, a frontier that is unique to the two countries but could be misused by third parties to infiltrate the populous underbelly of India. Similarly, India fears Chinese escapades over Nepal’s Himalayan ridgeline, a geostrategic paranoia that harks back to the 1962 debacle. But these two factors in themselves do not justify the continuing programme of intervention: throughout, Kathmandu has been accommodating with regard to the borer apprehensions, and every political scientist knows that modern-day warfare makes New Delhi’s Himalayan obsession redundant.

Further on the unrestricted border, it is Nepali society that has suffered immeasurably more than the other way around from the visa-free passage. Many of the Maoists who picked up gun against parliamentary democracy in 1996 were trained in India and went back and forth with ease for a full decade. Indian territory was in large part the base of operations for the insurgency, for logistics, safe houses, conclaves of commissars and commanders, and entry-escape routes – to what extent can only be known when the Indian officials involved or the Maoists themselves write their memoirs.

Also read: The Kalapani Imbroglio: Has India Pushed Nepal Too Far?

In this reading, it is Nepal that has been grievously infiltrated and not the other way around. The best one Indian ambassador could do back in the conflict years, when asked by this writer about Maoists using Indian territory was to respond ingeniously: “Listen, India is such a large country, how do you expect us to find them?!”

Without doubt, the open border is meant for use by Nepali and Indian citizens and not third-country nationals, and on this matter no Indian authority can accuse Kathmandu of not cooperating to prevent misuse. Further, the Nepal-India border should be the prototype for what should ultimately be the India-Pakistan and India-Bangladesh frontiers in a future peaceful Southasia when animosities subside, as they must. For this reason, too, the New Delhi establishment would be advised not to constantly use the open border as a battering ram against Kathmandu.

All You Need to Know as Nepal Goes to the Polls

This is the first time in Nepal’s parliamentary history that elections will be held after the completion of an entire term of the parliament. Yet there is large-scale disillusionment and people have felt that these polls, too, will bring in the same old political leaders.

New Delhi: Nepalis will vote today, November 20, to elect their representatives for the parliamentary and provincial assemblies amidst rising disenchantment over the fact that it is the same old faces who are standing for elections this time around.

Here is a quick primer on the numbers – and the issues at hand – of the elections.

In numbers 

More than 17,988,570 voters can vote to directly select candidates for 165 seats in the House of Representatives and 330 seats in the seven provincial assemblies. Those who will occupy the remaining 110 and 220 seats in the HoR and PC, respectively, will be selected from a list of Proportional Representation candidates submitted to the Election Commission by political parties ahead of the polls.

Around 50.8% of the electorate are men, while women account for 49.2% or 8.8 million. There are also 185 members of the LGBTQI community registered as voters.

For the 165 seats to the House of Representatives, there are 2,412 candidates, including 225 women in the fray. For the provincial assembly, 3,224 candidates are standing for election in the ‘First Past The Post’ seats.

At the polling booth, Nepali voters will be handed four ballot papers. The first one is for the direct election of a candidate to HoR, followed by one to select the political party for PR seats. The exact same process applies in the case of the elections to the provincial assembly as well.

Officials from the election commission work to set up polling station a day ahead of the general elections, in Bhaktapur, Nepal November 19, 2022. Photo: Reuters/Navesh Chitrakar

Are people enthusiastic about the elections?

This is the first time in the country’s parliamentary history that elections will be held after the completion of an entire term of the parliament. It is also only the second parliamentary election under the 2015 constitution.

There is large-scale disillusionment and people have felt that the elections would bring in the same old political leaders. This led to a new crop of younger, independent candidates entering the electoral battlefield, attempting to fire up voters.

Nepal’s voter turnout is usually high. But in the local elections held in May this year, the turnout was 64%, which was the lowest since the 2008 constituent assembly elections, which saw 61.8%.

The turnout at the 2017 parliamentary and provincial elections was 68.63%.

Also read: Favourites, Alliances, Numbers: All the Questions Ahead of Nepal’s November Polls Answered

When will the results be declared?

Not for some time.

Counting is a complicated process, with four ballot papers of each voter for two types of seats and bodies requiring counting.

Stating that he was very concerned about the “sluggish vote count”, Chief Election Commissioner Dinesh Kumar Thapaliya told The Kathmandu Post last week that all the results would be out by December 8. However, the results of the election to the direct ‘First Past The Post’ seats will be out first, “within three days of counting beginning,” he added. All the rest of the counting for the proportional seats will also finish by the end of November.

After that, the Election Commission will have to divide the PR seats among parties based on their vote percentage and publish the names from their previously submitted lists.

The “sluggish” counting has indeed been criticised, with a former CEC putting the blame on the complexity of the ballot papers and frequent challenges raised by political parties due to narrow margins of victory.

Who are the key players in the elections?

As explained by Kamal Dev Bhattarai for The Wire, the fight to form the next government would be between two alliances, one led by the Nepali Congress and another by the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist–Leninist).

The members of the NC-led electoral alliance are the CPN (Maoist Center), CPN (Unified Socialist), Socialist Party Nepal and other fringe parties, sometimes called the ‘democratic-left’ alliance. CPN-UML leads the second alliance, and its members are the Upendra Yadav-led Janata Samajbadi, the royalist Rashtriya Prajatantra Party and other smaller parties.  

Besides, a slew of smaller parties and independent candidates have jumped into the fray, hoping to cash in on voters’ rising antipathy for mainstream political leaders.

Also read: Interview | ‘Monarchy in Nepal Will Mean More Respectful Ties With India, China’: RPP Leader

What are the critical issues for voters this time?

According to Reuters, voters have rising energy and food prices on their minds as the economy slows down. This year, the economy is slated to grow at 4.7%, compared to 5.8% last year, as per the Asian Development Bank.

There are also concerns about the lack of jobs, with a majority of Nepali workers making a beeline for overseas employment. Both the main parties have made promises to create hundreds of thousands of jobs yearly.

Besides, political stability is also a concern. The political volatility over the last five years occurred despite the pre-election Left alliance winning the majority in the 2017 elections. While the parliament has completed its full term, CPN-UML’s K.P. Oli Sharma did try to get it dissolved twice when he was prime minister, before the Supreme Court restored the house.

Who will likely form the next government?

In Nepal, all opinion and exit polls are banned under the election code of conduct.

However, as per internal assessments by parties and security agencies, reported by The Kathmandu Post, Nepali Congress is likely to emerge as the single largest party. It also won the most vote in this year’s local elections. According to some calculations, it could win around 100 to 110 parliamentary seats, compared to 63 in 2017. The CPN-UML’s tally is projected to come down from 121 in 2017 to double figures, dropping to around 75 to 80 seats.

As Nepal Heads to Polls, Here’s What Major Parties Are Saying About Foreign Policy

While foreign affairs may not be the top priority in elections, Nepal’s location, sandwiched between two Asian giants, means that it remains a significant undercurrent in domestic politics.

Kathmandu/New Delhi: In two weeks, over 17 million Nepali voters choose their representatives in the federal and provincial assemblies. It marks a momentous milestone in Nepal’s parliamentary democracy, as these will be the first polls to be held after the entire five-year tenure.

While foreign affairs may not be the top priority in elections, Nepal’s location, sandwiched between two Asian giants, means that it remains a significant undercurrent in domestic politics.

In the last elections in 2017, the Left alliance of Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist–Leninist) (CPN-UML) and the Maoist Centre brought K.P. Oli back as prime minister with a big majority. According to analysts, Oli’s victory was based on a hardline nationalist platform during the 2017 election campaign that came against the backdrop of the five-month-long ‘blockade’ at the Indian border in 2015. 

Five years on, the 2022 general elections are being held amidst a new landscape in Nepal’s foreign policy terrain.

After his 2017 victory, Oli began his term with an outreach from New Delhi. But by 2020, relations dipped to a nadir after the Oli government issued a new political map, which included territories – Lipulekh, Limpiyadhura, and Kalapani – controlled by India. This map was subsequently enshrined in the constitution. Later that year, a patch-up between Oli and India began with a much-commented visit of the Indian spy chief to the Nepali capital.

After Oli was voted out by parliament and the Nepali Congress-led coalition came to power, relations smoothened between the two neighbours. In the run-up to his ouster, Oli softened towards New Delhi and made an effort to woo the Hindu vote.

The India-Nepal border. Photo: PTI/Files

A key characteristic of Nepal’s diplomatic terrain has been the deliberate low profile maintained by the India mission in Kathmandu over the last few years. Instead, the Chinese embassy became the most visibly active diplomatic mission, with the Chinese ambassador flitting from meetings with one senior politician to another.

Not surprisingly, the political controversies in the diplomatic universe have shifted from being India-centric to Nepal’s relations with the US, a reflection perhaps of Chinese sensitivities over a larger American footprint in Kathmandu.

A hard-won success of the Deuba government was the ratification of a $500 million infrastructure grant by the US as part of the Millennium Challenge Corporation Nepal Compact. Just as the ruling coalition obtained parliamentary approval in February 2022, police used teargas and water cannon to disperse protestors, who claimed it would undermine Nepali sovereignty.

But, Deuba was forced to withdraw from the US’s Strategic Partnership Program (SPP) under pressure from alliance partners, who claimed it would lure Nepal into a military alliance. China publicly commended the Nepal government for the decision.

The manifestoes of political parties, released last week, do not have any big surprises, cleaving to their traditional outlook on Nepal’s relations with the wider world. 

Nearly all of them refer to the 2015 Nepali constitution’s enshrined principles on conducting international relations for an elected government.

  1. Pursuing an independent foreign policy considering national interest to be of utmost importance, on the basis of the UN Charter, non-alignment, principle of Panchasheel, international law and universal norms, and by remaining active to defend the sovereignty, indivisibility, national independence and national interest. 
  2. Entering into treaties and agreements on the basis of equality and mutual interest, by reviewing past treaties.

Further, under directive principles, the Nepali state has to maintain relations with the outside world “based on sovereign equality, protecting sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and national interest of the country, and promoting national prestige in the international community”.

India’s former ambassador to Nepal, Ranjit Rae, indicated that coalition dynamics usually moderate the ideological positions on foreign policy articulated in manifestoes.   

“There is a distinction between what one says in the manifesto and what they do once they are in a coalition government. Because there have to follow the manifesto of the coalition, rather than that of individual parties. Individual parties may have a wish list, but they will have to compromise in a coalition,” Rae told The Wire.

Here is what four major Nepal’s major national political parties presented as their key foreign policy stances in their Nepali-language manifestos.

Nepali Congress (NC)

Nepal’s largest political party, as per membership, leads a five-party coalition to the elections. It had only won 23 direct election seats in the 2017 elections but added 40 more seats under the proportional representation system. Perceived to be close to India, the centrist party’s chances have been buoyed by its performance in the local elections in May, where it received the largest amount of votes. NC is contesting 91 FPTP [first past the post] seats. 

On foreign policy direction

In its election manifesto, the ruling NC has pledged to adopt an independent and balanced foreign policy in line with the United Nations charter, the country’s long-standing non-alignment policy and the principles of Panchsheel. Similarly, the party has opposed joining any military alliances and blocs. Nepali soil will not be allowed to be used against any neighbouring country, the party added.

The document also talks about bolstering regional organisations such as the South Asian Association for Regional Organisation (SAARC) and The Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC).  

On India

Regarding the border dispute with India, the party specifically highlighted that Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba had taken up the issue with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi during his visit to New Delhi in April this year.

The party manifesto further added that it would take a decisive step to resolve the existing border disputes with both India and China. There is, however, no separate mention of the new political map that triggered a row with India.

Nepal PM Sher Bahadur Deuba with Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Credit: Reuters

Nepal Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Photo: Reuters

On China 

The NC manifesto mentions that there is a border dispute with China in the Humla district and that it will seek a resolution through diplomatic means.

On the Belt and Road Initiative, NC says it is committed to its implementation based on national necessity and priority, as it was signed with China in 2017 under the NC-led government. 

The NC manifesto states that priority will be given to economic diplomacy with a preference for grants rather than commercial loans. 

What it means: With a public perception of being friendlier to India, NC has tried to straddle the middle path in the manifesto. While the document doesn’t mention the political map, NC voted in favour of the constitutional amendment in 2020, just like all other political parties in Nepal.

The NC has reminded that it led the coalition when Nepal signed the BRI agreement in May 2017. At the same time, it is the only party that has referred to a border dispute with China and reiterated the preference for grants rather than loans. During the Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi’s visit to Kathmandu in March, no new project on BRI was inked.

Nepal’s former ambassador to the US, Suresh Chalise, criticised the NC manifesto for “perplexingly overlooking” the importance of “tourism diplomacy” to stem the loss of revenue while pledging to lessen dependence on remittances. “It places Nepal’s relations with immediate neighbours China and India in the same basket but enigmatically ignores Nepal’s relationship with the United States,” he told The Wire.

Communist Party of Nepal-Unified Marxist Leninist (CPN-UML)

Nepal’s principal communist opposition party has entered the hustings with a loose alliance with Madheshi and royalist parties. A two-time prime minister, Oli will likely get the top post if the coalition wins.

On foreign policy direction

The main opposition CPN-UML’s election manifesto states party would have an independent and balanced foreign policy with a priority on neighbouring countries. The party has further noted that it would adopt an approach of ‘amity with all, enmity with none, to foster a relationship based on sovereign equality. It also reiterates the constitutional principles for conducting foreign policy.

On China

UML refers to the Transit and Transport Agreement with China and the party’s initiatives to open up more border points with China. 

UML refers to the Indian and Chinese railway projects in the manifesto. The document also promises that the construction of the Birgunj-Kathmandu and Rasuwagadi-Kathmandu railway lines will be initiated. 

On India

It noted that “Nepali territory” at Lipulekh, Limpiyadhura and Kalapani will be protected and added that border disputes will be resolved.

The UML manifesto also stated that all treaties would be reviewed and amended to protect Nepal’s welfare, and new treaties would be signed based on necessity.

What it Means: While the initial years of Oli’s term had a more pronounced “pro-north” lean, IDSA research fellow Nihar Nayak pointed out that there had been an ‘U-turn’ from 2021. “Equidistant policy is the standard declared practice, but operationally, they have engaged with south,” he said.

UML has cited the trade and transit agreement and railway projects with China, but none have been operationalised. The Chinese border points with Nepal, closed for nearly two years due to the earthquake and covid-19 pandemic, have re-opened but keep on closing at frequent intervals for various reasons.

There is also no likelihood of a resolution of the border dispute with India, with New Delhi not showing giving any signal of engagement on the matter besides routine border meeting.

At a rally on November 5, Oli was clearly ready to cash in on the nationalist card, raising the issue of Kalapani and the new political map. “We issued the national map [incorporating the Kalapani area]. The Parliament endorsed it, unanimously. I am here to guarantee that [the area returns to Nepal],” he said.

Nepal’s Prime Minister Khadga Prasad Sharma Oli. Photo: Reuters/Navesh Chitrakar

Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist Centre (CPN-MC)

Maoist Centre, led by Pushpa Kamal Dahal ‘Prachanda’, had earlier contested the 2017 elections as a pre-poll alliance with UML, with a near two-thirds majority. But after the Supreme Court dissolved MC’s merger with UML, Dahal joined forces with Nepali Congress and other partners to oust Oli. It will be contesting 48 seats.

On foreign policy direction

The CPN (Maoist Center) has explained in detail in the foreign policy section that looking at the current geopolitical situation, friendly and proximate relationships will be maintained with both neighbours.

Providing a more conceptual view, the Maoist party observed in the manifesto that a “new cold war” was already being felt, and it is a big challenge for Nepal. The country will be freed from all sorts of foreign military activities and will be declared a zone of peace, the manifesto stated. Nepal will not become a part of any bilateral or multilateral military alliances.

On India

The Maoist party has said that open borders with India shall be controlled and regulated. The party has clearly stated that the Peace and Friendship Treaty of 1950, the Tripartite Agreement of 1947, and other treaties related to trade and treaties with India should be reviewed and if necessary cancelled.

The party has also pledged to address the problem of Gorkha soldiers, whose recruitment to the Indian Army was suspended at Kathmandu’s request after the introduction of the Agnipath tour-of-duty scheme. 

What it means: Regulation of open borders and review of the 1950 treaty with India is a long-standing position of the Maoist Centre, which Prachanda had reiterated during his visit to New Delhi earlier this year. The ruling Indian political party, BJP had invited him to India, which was perceived as an outreach from the Indian establishment to keep its options open.

As an ideologically driven party, MC has faced internal dissent in recent months over stances taken by the leadership over foreign policy. The decision to support the parliamentary ratification of the MCC compact in parliament, albeit with an interpretative declaration, led to visible frustration, as the party had earlier threatened to quit the Deuba government over the matter. 

The support of Prachanda had been crucial to the Deuba government’s foreign policy agenda. Therefore, with the MC not in a mood to give support to another controversial US initiative, Nepal had to formally withdraw from the Department of Defense-run Strategic Partnership Program.

Commenting on the importance of the manifesto, former Indian envoy Ranjit Rae pointed out that for communist parties, documents are very important, “as this is the line they disseminate internally and is absorbed by cadres”.

Communist Party of Nepal-Unified Socialist (CPN-US)

Formed in 2021 after a split from CPN-UML, the CPN-US became the fourth-largest political party with 25 seats in the House of Representatives. The party founder, former prime minister Madhav Kumar Nepal, joined hands with the NC-led ruling coalition and is also jumping into the election as part of the pre-poll alliance. It is contesting 20 seats.

Madhav Kumar Nepal. Photo: Wikimedia Commons/De Utudanuki – Trabajo propio CC BY SA 3.0

On foreign policy direction

In its election manifesto, CPN (Unified Socialist), a member of a five-party coalition, says that it wants to establish a cordial relationship with neighbouring countries based on international law, the UN Charter, Panchsheel, and policy of non-interference. Unlike other parties, the party has only a brief section on foreign policy 

What it means: In line with other Left parties, Madhav Kumar Nepal had been the focus of the Chinese ambassador’s meeting to have a unified communist front in Nepal. But, it obviously didn’t work.

Former prime minister Madhav Kumar Nepal had been at the forefront of the faction that had wanted to oust Oli from the party leadership, which led eventually the latter to propose the dissolution of the parliament in December 2020. However, the Kathmandu Post reported that one year later, Madhav Kumar Nepal’s coalition experience has not been smooth.

As a splinter party from CPN-UML, it is expected that Madhav Kumar Nepal’s party largely has a similar ideological position on foreign policy, especially on sovereignty and military alliance. Just like MCC, CPN-US had earlier opposed the MCC compact but changed its mind later. However, it remained opposed to the SPP. 

Incidentally, Nepal had been Oli’s choice for a special envoy to India to discuss the border issue, but it never took off, as per media reports.

China To Donate Two Million Additional COVID-19 Vaccines to Nepal

Nepal foreign minister Narayan Khadka on Tuesday held a telephonic conversation with his Chinese counterpart Wang Yi with a focus on further ramping up bilateral relations.

Kathmandu: Nepal foreign minister Narayan Khadka on Tuesday held a telephonic conversation with his Chinese counterpart Wang Yi with a focus on further ramping up bilateral relations, including COVID-19 vaccine cooperation and border management among others.

According to a statement issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China has decided to donate additional two million Vero cell vaccines to Nepal to fight against the COVID-19 pandemic.

“During the conversation, the two leaders discussed the entire gamut of bilateral relations, including COVID-19 vaccine cooperation, trade and commerce, development cooperation and border management.”

Last month, the Nepal government decided to form a committee to look into the border issues with China in the northern Himalayan region of the country.

The committee will study the problems related to the Nepal-China border from Limi Lapcha to Hilsa of Namkha rural municipality in Humla district, government spokesperson Gyanendra Bahadur Karki said on September 2.

China had reportedly encroached on Nepali land and built nine buildings in Humla last year.

The two foreign ministers also discussed the progress of different development projects, return of Nepali students to China for the continuation of their studies, increasing the number of containers of fertilisers and other goods and their shipment through Tatopani/Zhangmu and Rasuwagadhi/Kerung border points and resumption of regular air services between Nepal and China, according to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

“The two foreign ministers agreed to work closely on issues of common interest and to further promote friendly and long-standing bilateral relations and cooperation between the two countries,” it said.

Foreign minister Khadka also reiterated Nepal’s One China policy and appreciated the Chinese government for continuous support for Nepal’s economic development.

Minister Wang also extended an invitation to Khadka to visit China at a mutually convenient date.

(PTI)

India Has Few Friends Among Nepal’s Rulers and Even Fewer Among the Youth. But That Can Change

Former ambassador to Nepal Ranjit Rae’s book ‘Kathmandu Dilemma: Resetting India-Nepal Ties’ stands out for its vision of future ties that go beyond the political relationship.

Most Indians – including those who follow geopolitical affairs – would not know of Jaya Singh Dhami. On July 30, 33-year-old Dhami, a migrant worker returning home to Darchula, a Nepali town that borders Kumaon, fell to his death while crossing the Mahakali river on what is locally known as a tuin, or a metal cable strung across a river. Local eyewitnesses allege officers of the Sashastra Seema Bal (SSB), the Indian paramilitary arm that monitors India’s borders with Nepal and Bhutan, were responsible for Dhami’s death. Protests were held in Kathmandu, and an effigy of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi burnt. After the South Block spokesperson said Delhi had not received any official communication regarding the incident, Nepal sent a diplomatic note in which it asked Delhi to investigate SSB involvement and ‘take necessary legal action against those involved’ and ‘provide compensation to the family of the victim.’

While Dhami’s death has been covered without break in the Nepali media, it has barely made a dent in the Indian papers, giving us a sense of how each country views the other. For Nepal, India is a behemoth, a giant neighbour with whom it has inextricable links. Delhi is never out of Kathmandu’s calculus, and so deep is the obsession that even fictional accounts by former Indian spies are taken as gospel truth.

On the other hand, for most of India, Nepal is just another neighbouring country that is not very fond of it. For the Indian media, Kathmandu is another friend-turned-foe guided by the red hand of Beijing, as it declared during the 2020 Kalapani dispute. Thus comes the inevitable question – ‘Why don’t they like us?’ – which Modi himself asked former Indian ambassador to Nepal Ranjit Rae after the 2015 earthquake.

Ranjit Rae
Kathmandu Dilemma: Resetting India-Nepal Ties
Vintage Books (September 2021)

Ambassador Rae’s eminently readable Kathmandu Dilemma: Resetting India-Nepal Ties begins with this question. Rae was the envoy during the most fractious period in bilateral ties in the past three decades, when the 2015 constitution was promulgated in Nepal and India had imposed an ‘unofficial’ blockade citing security reasons because of the protests in the Madhes (this reviewer will agree to disagree over the semantics of the blockade). His account of this period is the first by any Indian official and doesn’t hesitate in identifying shortcomings on both sides – the virulent anti-Indian nationalism that remains a common staple of Nepali politics, and Delhi’s own short-sightedness in the country. As Rae writes, Delhi can have ‘multiple strategic objectives’ that often lead to ‘mutually conflicting policy approaches’ [p. 96]. For example, after the 2015 low in relations, when K.P. Oli grew closer to China, Delhi began to fret. It warmed up to the Oli government and ‘jettisoned’ the Madhesi cause, hoping Nepal ‘will step back from its embrace of China. In reality, this has not happened.’ [p. 97]

The book covers a gamut of bilateral issues in the 21st century such as the political mainstreaming of the Maoists, the 2020 Kalapani territorial dispute, the economic possibilities and lost opportunities, and whether the time has come for a revision of historical treaties. Sprinkled with personal anecdotes as well as reasoned analysis, where Kathmandu Dilemma stands out is not as much in its recollection of history as much as in its vision of future ties that go beyond the political relationship.

For instance, he notes that India needs to develop a new framework that will allow state governments bordering Nepal and Bhutan to directly engage with the respective countries to create ‘more informed and direct’ channels of communication between the concerned ministries on both sides. At present, ‘[i]ssues raised by Nepal, even if they pertain to the state governments, are sent by the embassy to the commerce and external affairs ministries in Delhi. They then further liaise with the state governments. This complicated channel of communication is time consuming.’ [p. 153]

Further, he proposes a radical new solution that can ease the gap in communication: ‘[W]e could even think of direct cooperation between the border provinces of Nepal with our state governments.’ [p. 154] Such a step would go a long way in defusing issues on the border.

Nepal has not been able to hitch a ride on the Indian economic growth bus, and Rae is correct in asserting that Kathmandu’s flip-flops have led to potential foreign investments not materialising in the country. He is also correct in that the apprehensions towards Indian hydropower projects in Nepal emanate from the suspicion that Nepal is being short-changed. But he also argues Delhi must ‘facilitate rather than hamper economic cooperation and trade between countries such as Nepal and Bhutan with Bangladesh that are linked through land and riverine borders with India’ [p. 151], a rare admission for a former diplomat by itself. Although Rae asks India Inc. why it has been reluctant to invest in Nepal, one suspects the answer is easy enough. Nepal has not shown itself to be keen on foreign investment despite our leaders’ speeches suggesting otherwise.

Where Rae’s proposals stand out is his argument that Delhi must show more flexibility towards Kathmandu’s aspirations in the modern era. Nowhere is this more significant than in his recommendation that the 1950 treaty which governs bilateral relations must be revised along the lines of the revision of the India-Bhutan treaty. That India may be unhappy with the Eminent Persons Group report on treaty recommendations is a tantalising admission, especially since Rae doesn’t say why. However, despite acknowledging that Nepal’s drift towards China is not entirely palatable to Delhi, Rae argues ‘India should not view every Nepalese agreement with China as adversely impacting Indian security, especially when we ourselves have substantial cooperation with China’ [p. 214], as long as Nepal has kept Indian security interests in mind. Rae’s proposal that perhaps China and India could jointly work on a project together in Nepal in the future, as they have done in Afghanistan, will be welcomed in Kathmandu, although the domestic backlash such a project would face in India under current circumstances would prevent any further thoughts on that.

There is, without doubt, a foundational imbalance in the way bilateral ties are currently imagined by the respective countries. Rae’s proposals – and his balanced reading of ties – can provide a measured approach to how the relationship can be reimagined. The difficulty perhaps lies in how politics plays out domestically in both countries, and how well the establishment responds to these suggestions. Anti-Indian nationalism forms a bedrock of oppositional politics here in Nepal, and Oli’s new political map may have provided ammunition for such nationalism for years to come. Although a political solution to the territorial dispute would be the best possible outcome, as Rae says, permanent irritants in a relationship can be politically expedient as well [p. 129].

Activists holding placards protest against India during the Kalapani dispute, near the Indian Embassy in Kathmandu, Nepal, May 12, 2020. Photo: Reuters/Navesh Chitrakar

Rae, however, does not imagine a relationship that assumes geographical continuity between the two countries, which may also provide a framework for future cooperation in an era of climate change and extreme weather events. For instance, a Nepali MP from a Himalayan district had told me some years ago that he’d prefer replicating development policies from Ladakh, Sikkim or Himachal Pradesh, regions with similar ecologies. So perhaps the future of ties need not be restricted to border states or provinces either.

Further, while Rae highlights the civilisational connection between the two countries and the political friendships that drove ties in the previous century, one of the key weaknesses of India in Nepal today is that it has few friends among the ruling elite today, and even fewer among the youth. The political friendships of the past are but memories one recalls at public functions. And few Nepalis go to India to study today; the US and Australia are preferred destinations, while more and more students go to China every year. Delhi must find a way to appeal itself to this influential and large section of the population. Nepal is also seeing the rise of a new elite, burgeoned by new local governments and the devolution of power. So Delhi may wish to find new friends in the new republic as well.

But these are minor quibbles in a text that otherwise is a comprehensive and honest account of a unique bilateral relationship. Kathmandu Dilemma must be read by the foreign policy establishment in both countries to realise that India-Nepal ties go beyond political and economic interests. It is a rare nuanced take that provides a template for Delhi to win back friends in the country, and for Kathmandu to get over its insecurities about Indian ambitions.

Amish Raj Mulmi is a Nepali writer and a publishing professional. 

Neighbours May Have Concerns, but No Interference Accepted: Nepali Foreign Minister

A day after co-chairing the Joint Commission Meeting with Indian external affairs minister, Pradeep Gyawali met reporters and answered questions about China’s role in Nepal.

New Delhi: Nepal’s close neighbours may have “concerns”, but the government does not accept interference from outside, Nepalese foreign minister Pradeep K. Gyawali said on Saturday.

A day after co-chairing the Joint Commission Meeting with Indian external affairs minister, Gyawali met with reporters, where he answered questions about China’s role in Nepal.

Following the dissolution of the lower house of parliament by Prime Minister K.P. Oli, the ruling Nepal Communist Party is likely to be split, with the rival camp under Pushpa Kamal Dahal having severe differences with Oli.

As per Nepalese media reports, China has been very active in trying to avert the split, with the Chinese envoy having hectic parleys with all factions. China had also sent a high-level delegation to Nepal to “assess” the political situation.

During the media interaction, Gyawali was asked on China’s enhanced activity in Nepalese polity.

“Nepal’s relation with both countries (India and China) is excellent. We never compared relations with others. We never accept interference in our domestic politics… We are able to settle our problems ourselves. Yes, being close neighbour, there may be some concerns, questions, but we never accept interference from external side,” he said.

This time, India has kept a very low-profile and worked hard to give the perception that it is not interfering in Nepalese politics.

However, just before Gyawali’s trip, Dahal had accused Oli of splitting the ruling party and dissolving parliament at “the direction of India”.

When asked about Dahal’s remarks, Gyawali dodged the question, stating that as foreign minister outside the country, he represents all of Nepal, including Dahal and the divided party faction.

Incidentally, the Nepalese foreign minister did not meet with the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi before leaving for Kathmandu on Saturday afternoon. Modi had a busy schedule due to the roll-out of the vaccination drive. Earlier in the day, Gyawali had called on the Indian defence minister Rajnath Singh.

Before leaving, Gyawali asserted that India and Nepal had made a “common commitment” that the remaining segments of the boundary will be settled soon. “In which modality, it is under discussion”.

“Sanctity of the border is extremely important to make it secure. Demarcation is extremely important,” he added.

Gyawali also called for the Eminent Persons Group report, which was completed in 2016 to revise the 1950 treaty of friendship and peace “should be submitted, studied thoroughly and implemented gradually”.

We Will Get Territories Back From India: Nepal’s PM Oli

In an address to the upper house of parliament, Oli claimed that he had the courage to bring up the territorial issue with India, while previous governments had kept quiet.

New Delhi: Even as he announced the Nepali foreign minister’s upcoming visit to New Delhi, Nepal Prime Minister K.P. Sharma Oli asserted on Sunday that Kathmandu will get the disputed territories of Kalapani, Limpiyadhura and Lipulekh back from India.

In an address to the National Assembly, Nepal’s upper house of parliament, Oli claimed that he had the courage to bring up the territorial issue with India, while previous governments had kept quiet.

“Kalapani, Limpiyadhura and Lipulekh which are located east of the Mahakali River belong to Nepal as per the Sugauli Treaty. We will get them back through diplomatic talks with India,” he stated, as reported by Republica newspaper.

He reiterated that the Nepali government had never attempted reclaim the territories after India stationed its soldiers during the India-China war in 1962.

“Some people are restless because my government issued the new political map incorporating the encroached Nepali territories. In fact, our rulers hesitated to speak against the Indian encroachment. Now, we [government] are working to get back these territories,” Oli said.

This is the first time that Oli has spoken about the dispute with India following the dissolution of the lower house of parliament last month. The mid-term elections are scheduled to be held in April and May this year.

Also read: Nepal’s Constitution Is in Danger as Oli Moves Closer to Authoritarianism

The Nepali prime minister claimed that ties with the country’s two giant neighbours – India and China – had reached new heights under his government.

In fact, relations between India and Nepal had been at a low since 2019 following Oli government’s objection to India building a border road. Thereafter, Nepal issued a political map incorporating the disputed territories, which was then embedded in the national emblem through a constitutional amendment.

However, there had been a thaw in ties in the last quarter of 2020, with Indian foreign secretary Harsh Vardhan Shringla visiting Kathmandu in November.

“We are working to deepen ties with India based on sovereign equality. In fact, we want to deepen the relationship with India in true sense and we should not hesitate to raise our issues of genuine concerns with India,” Oli said in his address on Sunday.

He also publicly announced that Nepali foreign minister Pradeep Gyawali will visit India on January 14 to “discuss the boundary and other matters”.

Nepal Needs Less Hysteria Over Geopolitics, More Global Support for Its Young Democracy

Rather than focus on China’s interests in the Himalayan country, India must seek to empathise with Nepal and encourage it to consolidate its gains as a growing democracy.

Indian foreign secretary Harsh Vardhan Shringla’s two-day official visit to Nepal which concluded on November 27, was highly anticipated in the Himalayan country as it was regarded as a harbinger for an improvement in India-Nepal relations.

Shringla’s visit came within weeks of the Indian Army chief General M.M. Naravane’s visit to Kathmandu. For the most part, Shringla, an unassuming diplomat often speaking in Nepali, reassured Nepal about India’s enduring interest in keeping the engagement between the two countries normal, tabling for bilateral discussions the rancorous boundary and other issues that have recently adversely impacted relations and emphasising cooperation and connectivity. But will the India-Nepal relationship continue to be subject to the belief that China has made aggressive inroads into Nepal?

An exaggerated narrative

Even as excitement over the Indian foreign secretary’s visit built up, the Kathmandu Post, a leading English language daily in Nepal, ran a headline on November 21 that read: “Not to be left behind, China also sending top official to Nepal after visits from India”. The story reported on an unconfirmed (at the time) visit to Nepal by senior Chinese ministers in the near future. The headline and the story were representative of the broader narrative on Nepal, where everything is cast in terms of the competing interests of India and China and to a lesser extent, the US. China’s state councillor and defence minister Wei Fenghe did visit, arriving in Kathmandu on November 29 for a day-long visit just two days after Shringla departed Nepal, and he will carry on to Pakistan and Bangladesh thereafter.

Every domestic political development in Nepal, including a bitter internal power feud within the Nepal Communist Party (NCP), the current ruling party, is routinely dissected for any hint of foreign influence – real, perceived or outright illusionary. Development projects supported by India, China and often the US are assessed in terms of geo-political interests: an airport funded by one versus a railway by another, counterbalanced by transmission lines from the third. The misunderstood context of Nepal’s development paradigm, the absence of consensus among the major political players and the centralisation of power in a federal framework help fuel this discourse.

Nepali politicians across all parties routinely exploit the geopolitical narrative to shift focus from their own failings. In June, for instance, as the feud within the NCP was just surfacing, Nepal Prime Minister K.P. Sharma Oli publicly accused India of plotting to oust him in a charge that implicated top leaders within his own party. For both the ruling and opposition parties, mixing domestic political fault lines with foreign affairs has strengthened the possibility of making Nepal a ‘geostrategic hotspot’ in South Asia.

The resulting composite view of this narrative is of Nepal as a playground for competing foreign interests in an increasingly volatile geopolitical arena. Beneath this narrative, however, are some 30 million Nepalis in flesh and blood, attempting to direct the course of their collective destiny.

Nepal’s Prime Minister K.P. Oli (right) and Pushpa Kamal Dahal. Photo: Reuters

The forgotten Nepali

Analysts in India, China, the US and other parts of the world who are shaping engagements with Nepal must place the stethoscope on the heart, not on the head, and listen to the heartbeat of Nepal. Nepali aspirations are unbounded and are struggling to be realised within a young but fragile democratic republic. A post-conflict national conscience is yet to come to terms with a tormented history. Pervasive and corrosive corruption has stifled hope. Millions of Nepalis have no choice but to toil in distant foreign places to eke a living. Underneath all this, the fire of change that could undermine Nepal’s recent democratic gains burns dangerously.

The Nepali conscience remains haunted by a bloody decade-long conflict that toppled the monarchy and ushered in a new federal democratic republic. Fourteen years ago, Nepal concluded a Comprehensive Peace Agreement that ended the conflict. A process for transitional justice that would investigate the conflict-era human rights abuses was part of the deal. But it took nine years to establish the Commission of Investigation on Enforced Disappeared Persons and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Of the approximately 2,500 complaints of disappearance and 63,000 cases in the truth commission, only a miniscule fraction has been investigated. Leadership of the commissions comes via political appointments. Jostling has already begun for the posts of commissioners, though fresh appointments will only be made in February. There is no end in sight for the transitional justice process.

A new constitution that ushered in a federal democratic republic with a highly devolved power structure was a direct result of the conflict. The peace agreement was its implicit foundation. The constitution and subsequent elections offered hope and unleashed Nepali aspirations across the country. While the formal structures of government are in place, the supporting institutions and spirit of the constitution have failed to germinate in an acerbic environment where there is a peace agreement, but no resolution. Without truth and reconciliation for victims of the conflict, Nepal remains at war with itself. Without truth and reconciliation, Nepal’s bold constitution remains a fragile achievement.

Nepali aspirations have been stifled by a surge in corruption that pervades almost every aspect of society. In a recent report (Citizens’ Views and Experiences of Corruption, Global Corruption Barometer 2020), Transparency International found that 58% of Nepalis thought that corruption had increased in the last 12 month, the highest increase among the 16 Asian countries that had been surveyed. In public perception, corruption is not only rampant across public procurement, but has also seeped into service delivery at the lowest levels of government. There is an overwhelming sense that this pervasive corruption is politically sanctioned and protected. Several movements led by civil society have attempted to fight back but failed to generate adequate support. A sense of public resignation has begun to creep in, eroding public confidence in government and institutions.

Even while posting a robust annual average growth rate of 7.3% over the last three years, Nepal’s economy exhibited several vulnerabilities – a disproportionately large reliance on remittance, for example. In 2019, Nepal’s total remittance income was $8.6 billion or 27% of the GDP and approximately 11.6 times its total exports. The pandemic has exposed this vulnerability: with remittance income expected to drop to $1.2 billion, Nepal’s economy will be deprived of its largest foreign exchange earner.

There was always a darker social cost to the remittance economy. Images of body bags arriving with the bodies of overseas workers routinely echo through the national consciousness. Every day, thousands of Nepalis shuffle through the border exits, headed to overseas work destinations with an air of resignation – it may be dangerous or risky abroad, but at least there is a living to be made. Populist political rhetoric plays upon this national consciousness with all parties promising to create jobs and opportunities at home. To those Nepalis abroad and those eking out a living at home, Nepal’s young federal democratic republic has yet to deliver on the aspirations it set loose.

Far below geopolitics in Nepal, the heartbeat of the Nepali tells a different story: of the erosion of public trust from pervasive corruption; unfulfilled aspirations from the lack of economic opportunities; the failure to achieve truth and reconciliation for the victims of the conflict. All of these are fertile grounds for dissenting groups that are seeking reversal on some element of the constitution. There is the pro-monarchy, pro-Hindu group that seeks a return of the monarchy and the Hindu state. Maoist splinter groups, though some have been outlawed, are seeking an overthrow of the entire system. There are traces of secessionist movements across Madhesh (the part of the terai populated by Indian immigrants), though the largest such movement was brought into the mainstream several years ago. Where these forces will end up is unclear. But these fires are simmering in pockets across Nepal, feeding off the discontent that is building up. It won’t take much for the fires to flare up and engulf the whole country.

Harsh Shringla with Nepal Prime Minister K.P. Sharma Oli. Photo: Twitter/IndiaInNepal

The failure of the political leadership is not all nefarious. It is also a reflection of the individual capacities of men and women stretched to the limit as they deal with many elements of their country’s history colliding and exploding simultaneously. Nepal’s chaotic, dishevelled foreign policy is in part an expression of these many undercurrents. Buffeted by these deep internal challenges, its political leadership appears overwhelmed by the demands of an increasingly complex geopolitical region. Nepal appears uncertain how to play its hand and balance its interest. India, China, and the world perhaps expect too much from a Nepal that is still struggling to come to terms with its own demons.

For 30 million Nepalis, this is the very best shot for Nepal and for themselves that they have ever had. India must seek to empathise with Nepal, provide it the space and support it needs to consolidate the gains of the young democracy. It must seek to broaden the touch points between Nepal and India, reaching out not only to government but also civil society and encourage the flow of business across borders. It must speak to all the people of Nepal, as much as it speaks to the political leadership of Nepal. India must lead the world to listen to the forgotten Nepalis. This is what centuries of a shared history with Nepal now requires of India.

Bishal Thapa is an economist and columnist; Atul K. Thakur is a policy professional and columnist. They can be reached at bishal_thapa@hotmail.com and atulmthakur@gmail.com.

Here’s Why Nepal PM K.P. Sharma Oli Is Now Keen to Mend Ties With India

It just so happens that both countries can no longer afford to prolong disagreements, whether over the border or otherwise.

Kathmandu: Nepal Prime Minister K.P. Sharma Oli, who had until recently faced pressure from party leaders to quit as prime minister and party chairman, seems to have managed intra-party rifts for the time being, thus securing his position for the remaining two and half years of the government’s five-year term.

An intra-party taskforce has come up with a suggestion that Oli focuses on government matters and party chairperson, Pushpa Kamal Dahal Prachanda, holds executive rights in party affairs.

A statement released by Prachanda last week has indicated that Oli will remain as prime minister for the full five-year term. As a solution to the intra-party rift, Oli’s role in party affairs will be curtailed, federal and provincial cabinets may be reshuffled to accommodate leaders from rival camps and the party will scrutinise the functioning of the government more.

Now that disagreements within the party are done with, Oli’s next priority is to improve ties with India. On August 15, Oli held a phone conversation with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi to greet the latter on the occasion of India’s 74th Independence Day. The conversation initiated by Oli ended the period of total communication breakdown that had erupted after boundary disputes between the two countries.

India’s Independence Day offered a moment to be seized, and dialogue between the two countries resumed. Both leaders share a good rapport. Two days after the talks at prime ministerial level, Nepal and India held a mandated meeting of oversight mechanism, to review development projects funded by India.

Also read: India-Nepal War of Words Continues Over Offers, Non-Offers of Border Talks

The mechanism was formed four years ago to identify the bottlenecks in development projects and settle them fast.

Nepal has also extended the deadline for Small Development Projects (SDPs) with investment from the Indian Embassy by three years. This had been pending since Nepal entered its federal setup. The SDPs are regarded as one of India’s most successful development projects in the neighbourhood and began in Nepal in 2003.

India has also provided 10 ventilators to the Nepal Army.

These developments come as a huge sigh of relief for those who want to see cordial relationships between the two countries. Both sides seem visibly keen to normalise bilateral relations.

Why is Oli keen to repair relations with India?  

First, opposition parties have started raising the pitch on how Oli has been failing to talk with India on border issues.

Nepal's Prime Minister Khadga Prasad Sharma Oli (L) shakes hands with his Indian counterpart Narendra Modi in New Delhi, India, February 20, 2016. Credits: Reuters/Adnan Abidi/File Photo

Nepal’s Prime Minister Khadga Prasad Sharma Oli (L) shakes hands with his Indian counterpart Narendra Modi in New Delhi, India, February 20, 2016. Credits: Reuters/Adnan Abidi/File Photo

An intra-party panel formed to resolve internal disputes has reportedly suggested that Prime Minister Oli talk with India immediately on border isssues. All opposition parties including Madhes-based parties had notably supported the constitution amendment on the map that had been initiated by government. 

Now, they are of the view that Oli should demonstrate his diplomatic skills to settle disputes with India.

Opposition parties are also blaming him for damaging ties with India with his provocative statements. Even foreign policy observers have been vocal with their belief  that Oli has threatened people-to-people relations between the two countries. Even a section of leaders of the ruling Nepal Communist Party (NCP) have expressed disappointment with some of Oli’s statements.

Also read: Nepal PM Oli Says ‘Ayodhya’ Was in Nepal; Kathmandu Issues Clarification

This seems to have had an effect on Oli.

Second, Oli is quite aware that the border issue is time consuming to resolve and that it should not affect overall bilateral relations. There are several issues between two countries which demand regular and constant touch between the two, like the COVID-19 crisis for one.

Nepal is heavily dependent on India for the supply of day-to-day essentials. 

Finally, along with criticism over how he handled the COVID-19 crisis, Oli has faced flak for the manner of his dealings with major powers like India, China and United States.

Due to the intra-party rift, the future of America’s US $ 500 million grant to Nepal under the US Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) is uncertain. As per the agreement between two countries, the agreement should have come into effect from June but that deadline was missed and no fresh decision has been made. To get this grant endorsed by the parliament, Oli will have to settle the dispute within his party, although opposition parties are ready to support the government in this matter.

Though Oli is known to lean towards China, there has not been much progress when it comes to selection of projects under China’s Belt and Road Initiative.

Also read: When China Chips Are Down, ‘Diamonds’ in India’s ‘Necklace’ of Allies Lack Sparkle

It is not like India-Nepal ties were particularly cordial even before the map issue. Oli is perceived as having failed to convince India to receive the report of the Eminent Person’s Group (EPG) report which was finalised in 2018. India in 2018, refused to receive the EPG report citing the busy schedule of Prime Minister Narendra Modi. This is still pending. Oli is thus keen to get his foreign policies on track.

India is also likely to reciprocate to Oli’s call for resumption of dialogue between two countries. China’s growing presence and engagement with South Asian countries even in the time of the COVID-19 crisis is likely to push India towards its ‘neighbourhood first’ policy.

In his Independence Day speech, Modi had said, “Neighbour is not just one with whom there is sharing of borders but also one with whom our heart stays connected.”

Also read: The Kalapani Imbroglio: Has India Pushed Nepal Too Far?

Recently, Indian Foreign Secretary Harsh Vardhan Shringla visited Bangladesh amid the COVID-19 crisis and he is likely to visit other South Asian countries as well. Since assuming office, Shringla has not visited Nepal. India also cannot afford to ignore Nepal as there are several development projects funded by India which need to be expedited. Modi himself is facing criticism within India that his neighbourhood first policy has not yielded the desired result. 

In conclusion, there is no alternative to both Nepal and India other than to settle issues related to trade, transit, water resources, floods, development projects, the submission of the EPG report and the border. These problems might prove difficult to tackle in the future.

Kamal Dev Bhattarai is a Kathmandu-based journalist.