Diplomacy

16 Indians Serving in Russian Army Missing, 12 Others Dead: MEA

There have been 126 cases involving Indians “who were either serving in the Russian armed forces or had been associated with them,” the MEA said.

New Delhi: Russia has said that 16 Indians are missing, in addition to the documented deaths of 12 others who were working with the Russian army, the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) reported.

Earlier this week, 32-year-old Binil T.B., a resident of Kerala, was identified as the latest Indian casualty in the ongoing Ukraine-Russia conflict. Another Indian, Jain T.K., sustained injuries in the same drone attack in which Binil was killed.

Providing an update during the weekly briefing on Friday (January 17), MEA spokesperson Randhir Jaiswal shared the latest figures.

“As of today, we have recorded 126 cases involving Indians who were either serving in the Russian armed forces or had been associated with them. Among these, 96 individuals have already returned to India,” he said.

Jaiswal also confirmed that 12 Indian nationals had died, while 18 are still serving in the Russian military. Of these, 16 have been classified as missing by Russian authorities.

“We are actively engaging with the Russian authorities to expedite the release and repatriation of those who remain there,” he added.

In the last six months, Prime Minister Narendra Modi had raised the demand for the return of the Indians workers twice with Russian President Vladimir Putin, once during a bilateral visit in July and again at another meeting on the sidelines of the BRICS summit in October.

In August 2024, external affairs minister S. Jaishankar informed parliament that a total of 91 Indian nationals had been recruited into the Russian army.

At the time, he noted that eight had died, 14 had been discharged or returned with government assistance, and 69 were still awaiting release.

At that time, Jaishankar also highlighted the challenges in bringing back Indians from Russia, attributing the difficulties to employment contracts they had signed.

“We do not necessarily agree with those contracts … In many instances, there is evidence suggesting that our nationals were misled. They were told they were going for other jobs, but were subsequently deployed with the Russian army,” he said.

India Navigates Relations With Taliban Amid Tensions With Pakistan

From a previously cautious stance toward the Taliban, India’s seemingly proactive diplomacy can be understood through the prisms of strategic pragmatism and strategic opportunism.

Despite the absence of official diplomatic relations with the Taliban-led Afghanistan administration, India’s high-level engagements with the former insurgent group reflect a changing diplomatic approach. The January 8 meeting between foreign secretary Vikram Misri and Afghanistan’s interim foreign minister Amir Khan Muttaqi in Dubai centred on people-to-people contact, humanitarian assistance, development programmes, the health sector and the rehabilitation of refugees. This approach largely aligns with New Delhi’s consistent diplomatic strategy under previous Western-backed governments in Kabul. Following the engagement, the Taliban termed India a “significant regional and economic partner.”

Earlier, in November 2024, a delegation led by J.P. Singh, joint secretary in the Ministry of External Affairs responsible for Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran, visited Kabul and met with Taliban ministers, including the acting defence minister Mullah Mohammad Yaqoob Mujahid. The meeting coincided with the Taliban’s appointment of an acting consul in the Afghan consulate in Mumbai the same month.

Strategic pragmatism and opportunism

From a previously cautious stance toward the Taliban, India’s seemingly proactive diplomacy can be understood through the prisms of strategic pragmatism and strategic opportunism. The first entails adopting a nuanced approach aimed at balancing national interests while setting aside ideological absolutism and the second refers to leveraging opportunities while keeping Pakistan firmly in the calculation. Notably, the timing of this month’s meeting, occurring amidst strained relations between the traditional allies, Pakistan and the Taliban, can widely be perceived as India’s willingness to exploit these tensions. To put things into perspective, New Delhi on January 6 “unequivocally” condemned the Pakistan Air Force’s (PAF) aerial strikes in Afghanistan’s Paktika province on December 24. This was the second time since March 2024 that Pakistan carried out cross-border airstrikes in Afghanistan.

India’s condemnation highlighted that Pakistani airstrikes had reportedly resulted in civilian casualties, including women and children. This signals India’s evolving approach towards Afghanistan.The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan further stated that dozens of civilians were killed in the airstrike that was reportedly aimed at targeting the camps of Tehreek-e-Taliban-e-Pakistan, an anti-Pakistan group operating on both sides of the border. By condemning the PAF’s actions, New Delhi is seemingly positioning itself as a responsible regional actor before the international community, while countering Islamabad’s deteriorating influence in Kabul. From a broader perspective, the incident signals India’s approach of leveraging humanitarian and ethical diplomacy to build goodwill with the Taliban administration without extending an official recognition.

While reports of backchannel talks between Indian officials and the Haqqani Network, an influential faction within the Taliban, have surfaced, New Delhi is unlikely to establish official communication channels with the bloc. This hesitance will be rooted in India’s bloody history with the Haqqani Network, which has been responsible for high-profile attacks on Indian assets in Afghanistan, including the 2008 bombing of the Indian Embassy in Kabul. Such a move could be detrimental to the government’s staunch anti-terrorism positioning at home and abroad; the US Department of State continues to offer a $10 million bounty for information leading to Sirajuddin Haqqani, who currently serves as the acting interior minister of Afghanistan. The Haqqani faction’s overt ties to Pakistan’s intelligence agencies further complicate any potential diplomatic outreach by India. Back in 2011, Admiral Michael Mullen, former chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, had termed the Haqqani faction as a “veritable arm of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence agency.”

Despite Sirajuddin’s recent attempts to portray himself as a moderate, palatable leader in comparison to the hardliners in the group, these factors render formal engagement highly unlikely. In that context, Muttaqi’s association with the traditional Kandahari faction in the Taliban and designation as foreign minister positions him as the ideal interlocutor for nations adopting a cautious approach.

Leveraging internal Taliban divisions and power struggles

To project itself as a regional stabiliser, India must consider expanding its influence through soft power, in line with its long-standing approach of focusing on development and security issues rather than ideological disparities vis-a-vis Afghanistan. While adopting cautious diplomacy, New Delhi should closely monitor the internal divisions within the Taliban and remain prepared for evolving power dynamics within the Pashtun-dominated Taliban administration. This is particularly crucial given the emerging differences between the Haqqani and Kandahari factions of the group, especially following the high-profile assassination of Khalil Ur-Rahman Haqqani, Afghanistan’s interim minister for refugees, on December 11, 2024. While the Islamic State–Khorasan Province (IS–KP), a staunch rival of the Taliban, claimed responsibility for the suicide bombing that killed him, elements within the Haqqani faction have levelled allegations against the central Taliban leadership in Kabul of colluding with IS–KP.

As differences between the factions are expected to persist, even exacerbate, particularly over power-sharing, resource distribution and territorial control, India must broaden its scope of engagement should the opportunity emerge to influence policy decisions and Afghanistan’s future governance. Concurrently, India’s ability to capitalise on the currently-strained relations between Pakistan and the Taliban could help mitigate Islamabad’s influence in Kabul, thereby strengthening its own geopolitical position in the region while securing security assurances against the use of Afghan territory by ideologically aligned groups like Lashkar-e-Tayyiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed operating in Jammu and Kashmir.

Aishwaria Sonavane is a research analyst for Pakistan Studies at the Takshashila Institution. Her work focuses on counter-militancy, security, foreign policy, military-political nexus and defence, with a broader regional emphasis on Afghanistan, India and Pakistan. She tweets @aishwaria_s.

Ethnic Tribes Caught in the Crossfire as Free Movement Regime With Myanmar Nears End

While aimed at curbing insurgency, smuggling and illegal immigration, the move to terminate the Free Movement Regime (FMR) has sparked concerns among tribal communities whose lives and economies are deeply tied to cross-border ties.

On January 2, 2024, Union home minister Amit Shah declared the central government’s commitment towards restricting free movement of people with Myanmar by erecting a fence along the 1,643-km border. The defined border passes through the states of Manipur (398 km), Mizoram (510 km), Nagaland (215km) and Arunachal Pradesh (520 km), with a maritime boundary located by the Bay of Bengal.

In September 2023, the Manipur government appealed to the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) to nullify the Free Movement Regime (FMR) and fence the entire international border between the two countries. The appeal serendipitously aligns with the central government’s avowed concerns about the FMR being exploited by insurgents to escape to Myanmar after carrying out attacks on Indian soil. The FMR agreement, reached between the two countries in 2018, remains suspended since September 2022, amply expressing that anxiety.

Historical context and exploitation of the FMR

The 1948 Burma Passport Laws and the Passport (Entry into India) Rules of 1950, later amended by the MHA, allowed the “hill tribes, who is either a citizen of India or the Union of Burma and who is ordinarily a resident in any area within 40 km (25 miles) on either side of the India-Burma frontier” to enter India without a passport or visa. Yet, this did not thwart the governmental imperative to track and regulate such tribes with mutually common customs and ways of lives, and who frequently travel across the border.

The government hence drew up a list of 62 items permissible for border trade at a concessional duty rate of 5%, regular or normal trade being allowed via Land Customs Station in Moreh (Manipur) and Zokhawthar (Mizoram). Each individual was allowed to carry as much ware as could fit in a head load. While the Myanmar government permitted Indians to remain in Myanmar for a maximum of 24 hours, the Indian government stipulated that Myanmarese nationals may stay in India for 72 hours. However, not much else is known about the specifics of the actual terms and conditions of border control and cooperation between the two countries.

While it is true that the FMR helped the tribes maintain their age-old bonds across the national borders, unfortunately, the Indian government’s apprehensions are well-founded. The FMR arrangements have been repeatedly exploited by certain Indian groups to carry out anti-social actions in India. Cadres of various rebel groups would enter Myanmar to receive armed training and then return to India to carry out operations, escaping back to Myanmar afterwards. This was the pattern set by the Nagas in 1956, Meiteis in 1964 and the Mizos in 1966. The central government claims that the existence of FMR and a weakly monitored border allowed the rebels to intensify their operations, endangering national security. The cumulative heft of the insurgencies of the Naga, the Meitei and the Zo ethnic groups compelled the Indian government to review the FMR’s terms and restrict these tribes’ unfettered cross-border mobility.

Evolution of border policies

Consequently, in August 1968, the MHA instituted a “permission system” for crossing the Myanmar border, requiring individuals from both countries to carry permits from their respective nations in order to cross over. This stipulation remained in force for the next 40 years. Nevertheless, since the 1990s and the early 2000s, the security situation in the Northeast has significantly deteriorated due to a sharp rise in rebel activities across the international border, matched by similar increments in drug trafficking and gun smuggling.

India decides to further limit the FMR’s span to 16 km in 2004, and only allow ethnic tribes residing within this limit across the two borders, to cross the international boundary through the three officially recognised locations of Pangsau, Moreh and Zokhawthar in the corresponding states of Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur and Mizoram. In the absence of a formal agreement on the free movement of hill tribes across their shared border with Myanmar at the time, the Indian government developed a Memorandum of Understanding to be discussed with the Myanmar government. The Agreement on Land Border Crossing was ratified on May 11, 2018, as part of the Narendra Modi government’s Act East policy, formalising the hitherto informal provisions of the FMR arrangements. However, in the face of a tenacious ethnic conflict in Manipur since May 2023, the central government announced on January 2, 2024, its decision to scrap the FMR. This was predictably received by most ethnic tribes across the borders as a grave intrusion in their customary ways of lives which pivot around free movement across the region.

Impact on tribes and local economies

The decision to scrap the FMR shows that the security imperative has spanned the entire policy spectrum on the matter, eschewing the historical and humanitarian aspects. For the tribes residing within the FMR limits on the Myanmar side, health and education are more easily accessible across the border in India. Further, the local economies and livelihoods on both sides are going to be impacted negatively, cross-border trade being the pivot of these low-income economies. The governments of Mizoram and Nagaland have expressed their opposition to the decision on these conspicuous grounds, contending that it will have utterly adverse effects over the social, cultural and economic landscape of the region at large. The Manipur government, however, no longer keen on sweating it out at the policy drawing boards trying to hammer out a mechanism that is permissive yet highly surveillant, has chosen instead to go with the easier blanket measure, favourably citing the influx of refugees after the coup of February, 2021.

The claims of manifold increase in smuggling from across the border into India are doubtlessly true. Manipur chief minister Biren Singh said that since the war on drugs campaign was launched in 2018, a total of around 19,135 acres of illegal poppy cultivation has been destroyed and around 297 drug smugglers have been convicted. The chief minister added that more than 50% of the poppy crop in the state has been eradicated thanks to the “war on drugs,” which is still going strong under Modi’s “Nasha Mukt Bharat” campaign. In 2021–22, illegal poppy cultivation was discovered on 28,598.91 acres in the state; however, in 2023–24, that number was reduced to 11,288.07 acres, according to Singh.

Also read: Chaos Over Border Passes at Mizoram-Myanmar Border, Free Movement Regime Rules Tightened

The situation is further compounded by a stretch of 500 km of highly susceptible border that runs along Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur and Mizoram, through forests and undulating terrain, much of it unfenced. In Manipur, only about 6 km have been fenced so far. The assumption that the negative impact that will inevitably follow the scrapping of the FMR will most likely give further impetus to cross-border smuggling is, therefore, not a stretch.

The need for a balanced approach

Since the coup in February, 2021, the junta has launched a sustained campaign against the Zo ethnic tribes (Zomi-Kuki-Mizo) people, pushing the multitude across the country’s western border into India, largely in Manipur and Mizoram. In Mizoram, cross-border solidarity has paved the way for setting up camps for 40,000 refugees, despite protests from the MHA.

Biometrics have made it considerably easier to identify illegal migrants. In 2023, 2,500 illegal immigrants were identified in Manipur. In September 2022, 5,500 illegal immigrants were apprehended at the Moreh border itself, 4,300 being returned to Myanmar. The Manipur government has repeatedly blamed local village chiefs of colluding with the immigrants in setting up settlements for the latter. An eviction drive against such settlements became the flashpoint between Zo ethnic tribes and government forces, leading to violence across the state. In its navigation of the border situation, New Delhi needs to reevaluate and reform the FMR rather than terminate it. Strategic policies ought not to include either sweeping measures or ones that place social, economic and cultural aspects outside the scope of governmental deliberations.

Langthianmung Vualzong is an alumnus of Special Centre for the Study of Law and Governance, Jawaharlal Nehru University.

During Dissanayake’s Beijing Trip, Sri Lanka Bags $3.7bn Investment From Refiner Sinopec

Sri Lanka and China did not mention the end of the former’s moratorium on visits by foreign research vessels but indicated commitment to ‘maritime cooperation’.

New Delhi: Sri Lanka has secured a $3.7 billion investment from Chinese oil refiner Sinopec during President Anura Dissanayake’s state visit to Beijing. Colombo has termed the deal the country’s “largest foreign direct investment to date”.

While a joint statement issued on Thursday (January 16) made no mention of the end of Sri Lanka’s moratorium on permissions to foreign research vessels to visit the country – a matter of concern in New Delhi – the two sides said they were committed to continuing “maritime cooperation”.

Dissanayake arrived in China on Tuesday for his second foreign visit after being elected president of Sri Lanka in September. He met Chinese President Xi Jinping and premier Li Qiang among other dignitaries.

An announcement by Sri Lanka’s President’s Media Division said the $3.7 billion investment by the state-run Sinopec will fund an oil refinery in the Hambantota area in the country’s south.

This “state-of-the-art” refinery is to have a capacity of 200,000 barrels a day and is expected to export “a substantial portion” of its output, the official communique also said.

In 2017, Colombo leased the Hambantota port to the state-owned China Merchants Port Holdings after Sri Lanka was unable to hold up its end of loan repayment commitments, fanning fears in New Delhi over the port’s potential use for military purposes.

India has also been concerned by the presence of Chinese research vessels in Sri Lankan waters. Following protests from New Delhi and Washington, Colombo had announced a one-year moratorium on permission to foreign research vessels, which was to end this month.

The joint statement issued during Dissanayake’s Beijing visit on Thursday did not mention the moratorium but said that Sri Lanka and China “share the desire to continue maritime cooperation” and “hold regular bilateral consultations on maritime affairs”.

It also featured an assurance from Colombo that it would “never allow its territory to be used for any anti-China, separatist activities”.

During Dissanayake’s state visit to New Delhi last month – his first as president – he said he had assured Prime Minister Modi that his government “will not allow our land to be used in any way in a manner that is detrimental to the interests of India”.

Asked at a press conference a week before Dissanayake left for Beijing whether India and Sri Lanka had discussed the moratorium, Indian high commissioner to Colombo Santosh Jha said they had not, The Hindu reported.

But given Dissanayake’s “categorical” statement while in India as well as his alliance’s election manifesto, Jha added: “We take Sri Lanka for its word … we completely trust Sri Lanka to take the right actions in that regard.”

The IMF’s $2.9 billion bailout program to Sri Lanka in light of the country’s economic crisis requires it to complete debt restructuring and debt reworking with creditors including India and China.

The former had during the economic crisis outdone China in offering currency swaps, lines of credit and assurances to Colombo, which contributed to the IMF’s approving its bailout program.

Dissanayake and his government will therefore need the goodwill of India and China – both of which are vying for influence in the island country – so that Sri Lanka can fully recover from the crisis.

In Beijing, the Sri Lankan side “expressed its desire for the early implementation of the agreed debt restructuring plan together with Chinese financial institutions”, the joint statement said.

It added that China for its part would “maintain friendly communication with other creditors” to help Colombo overcome its financial difficulties.

The central banks of both countries renewed their currency swap agreement, the statement noted.

The two sides also agreed to enhance bilateral cooperation with regard to China’s Belt and Road Initiative infrastructure investment program.

They signed a plan, as per the joint statement, to “upgrade China-Sri Lanka high-quality Belt and Road cooperation and jointly open up new space for win-win development of higher standard, stronger resilience and greater sustainability”.

Beijing “reiterated its commitment to an independent foreign policy of peace”, while Sri Lanka underscored its “commitment to an independent non-aligned foreign policy”.

‘Really Positive First Step’: US Envoy Garcetti on Indian Probe Outcome

The probe recommended legal action against a former Indian intelligence officer implicated in a murder-for-hire case in the US.

New Delhi: The US has welcomed the recommendation by an Indian inquiry committee to initiate legal action against a former Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) officer implicated in a murder-for-hire case in the US, outgoing ambassador to India Eric Garcetti said on Thursday (January 16), adding that Washington looks forward to further steps in the matter.

The Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) issued a statement a day earlier, indirectly acknowledging the involvement of an Indian government official in the US case alleging an attempt to assassinate a pro-Khalistan lawyer.

A high-level government committee recommended “legal action” against “an individual”, according to the MHA’s press release.

It also highlighted systemic and procedural weaknesses within the government that require rectification, suggesting the RAW officer acted independently.

The announcement came just five days before Donald Trump is to begin his second term as president.

In an interview with The Times of India, the outgoing US envoy described the findings as “a really positive first step”.

He stated: “We welcome it. It delivered what the private interactions I had with Indian officials promised. We said changes should be made to ensure this doesn’t happen again and people should be held accountable.

“It’s not the destination though. The report would be first to say that. It says it’s recommending a process for prosecution. And just like in our system, facts come out and things happen. But this is substantive. It moves the ball forward and we look forward to steps in the future”.

Garcetti was responding to a question about the Indian probe, which suggests it was a ‘lone wolf’ operation.

He denied any knowledge about the Canadian government’s claim that more senior Indian government officials, including home minister Amit Shah, may have been involved.

“I believe both of our countries have independent criminal justice systems, which are outside our intelligence systems and have to pursue facts that can hold up in a court of law. I don’t want to speak for Canada. I know it to be the case in America. My friends in Canada would say they have a similar system. I think often we see connections that don’t exist,’’ said Garcetti.

Describing outgoing US President Joe Biden as the “most pro-India president in US history,” Garcetti also called Modi the “most pro-US PM.”

“And when President Biden said this is the most important country to me when he asked me to take this position … I think he proved it,” Garcetti said. “Things like iCET, envisioning IMEEC … or the work we are doing in Fiji or southeast Asia or Africa is not just additive but also multiplicative. That legacy will be an amazing foundation for the Trump administration to further build on but will also stand on it as the brightest chapter.”

While Trump’s call to impose tariffs on India could pose a challenge to ties, Garcetti viewed it as more of a negotiating tactic.

“If we want to outcompete our main competitors … want to have a China-plus one strategy, it’s not enough to have good intentions. We have to reduce tariffs further. We have to create a corridor that is trusted between our technologies,” he said. “The way I hear it from the president-elect, it’s an invitation to sit down at the table, not a threat to start a trade war.”

On the US focus on human rights violations and the treatment of minorities, Garcetti emphasised the need for both countries to tackle misinformation and foster inclusion.

However, he clarified that the US wasn’t trying to lecture India.

“That’s for the Indians to determine. India says we will not comment on you and please don’t comment on us. America says we are going to comment on you, please do comment on us. We have a slight difference there,” he remarked.

He also praised India’s democratic vibrance, adding, “There have been moments when I have been blown away by the vibrancy of the Indian democracy. There are fair, free elections that are an example for others.”

Reflecting on some of the more challenging issues he faced during his tenure, including India’s ties with Russia and the murder-for-hire case, Garcetti acknowledged that while not all conversations were easy, there was nothing the two sides couldn’t resolve.

“Sometimes we have to disagree on things. But we resolved our trade disputes. We are navigating through criminal cases – both what happened to Indian diplomats in San Francisco and in terms of what happened to American citizens like in the Pannun case,” he said.

“Democracies are complex, diverse populations are difficult to manage, but it reminds me of America a few decades ago. If we put our minds together, there’s nothing we can’t do.”

India Welcomes Gaza Ceasefire Agreement

‘We hope this will lead to a safe and sustained supply of humanitarian assistance to the people of Gaza.’

New Delhi: India has welcomed the announcement of a ceasefire agreement in Gaza.

On January 16, the US, Egypt and Qatar announced that the countries had overseen an agreement between Israel and Hamas have to a phased ceasefire and hostage-release deal following months of negotiations.

In a short statement, the Ministry of External Affairs expressed hope that the agreement for the release of hostages and the end of conflict “will lead to a safe and sustained supply of humanitarian assistance to the people of Gaza.”

The MEA’s statement mentions neither Israel, nor Hamas – the Palestinian outfit – by name.

“We have consistently called for release of all hostages, ceasefire, and return to a path of dialogue and diplomacy,” India said.

While the ceasefire agreement has brought celebrations to Palestine, Israel’s attacks have continued, reports say.

In September last year, India had notably abstained from a widely supported United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution calling for an end to Israel’s occupation of Gaza and the West Bank within a year.

India had earlier abstained from a resolution by the UN Human Rights Council that called for an immediate ceasefire in Gaza and an arms embargo on Israel.

US Removes Export Controls For Three Indian Entities to Further Civilian Nuclear Cooperation

The entities are the IREL (India) Limited public sector undertaking, the Indira Gandhi Atomic Research Centre and the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre.

New Delhi: The US government on Wednesday (January 15) said it removed three Indian government entities from its export controls list in order to enhance civilian nuclear cooperation between the two countries.

This comes after US national security adviser Jake Sullivan while visiting New Delhi on January 6 announced the Biden government’s decision to remove restrictions on Indian entities in the list to allow for deeper civilian nuclear cooperation.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) has delisted the IREL (India) Limited (formerly Indian Rare Earths Limited) public sector undertaking, the Indira Gandhi Atomic Research Centre and the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre from the US commerce department’s ‘Entity List’ export controls database.

Following an inter-agency review, the BIS decided to delist the three entities in the interests of “reducing barriers to advanced energy cooperation, including joint research and development and science and technology cooperation, towards shared energy security needs and goals”, it said.

The move will allow for “closer cooperation between the United States and India to secure more resilient critical minerals and clean energy supply chains”, BIS official Matthew Borman said, adding that this was in line with the “overall ambition and strategic direction” of the US-India relationship.

Sullivan while speaking in New Delhi had said that the amendment to the export controls list would allow the affected entities to enter into deeper collaboration with the US, its private sector, and its scientists and technologists in order to further civilian nuclear cooperation.

His announcement came just two weeks before the day president-elect Donald Trump and his government are set to take over the reins in Washington.

He also acknowledged that the vision for civilian nuclear cooperation as laid out in 2005 by former US president George W. Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh had not yet been fully realised.

Apart from the presence of Indian entities on US export control lists, a primary challenge for US firms in developing nuclear power plants in India is often identified as India’s civil nuclear liability law, which permits plant operators to seek legal recourse against suppliers in the event of an accident.

In its press release on Wednesday, the BIS also announced it was adding 11 Chinese entities to the Entity List, citing activities detrimental to US national security and foreign policy interests.

Ten of these entities were sanctioned for their advancement of the Chinese military’s modernisation through the “development and integration” of advanced AI research, while the other was added to the list for its involvement in developing a technology that will aid in the production in China of advanced integrated circuits for military use.

Modi Govt Concedes ‘Individual’ Official’s Role in Pannun Plot, Probe Calls For Legal Action Against Him

The press release was not issued by the MEA, as has been the case with all the previous press releases on the subject, or the National Security Council Secretariat which deals with intelligence agencies in the PMO. It was released by the MHA, which has not been publicly involved in the matter so far.

New Delhi: Days before Donald Trump is inaugurated as the US president, the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) has issued a statement indirectly accepting the involvement of an India government official in a US case accusing him of attempting to assassinate a pro-Khalistani lawyer.

A high-powered government committee has recommended “legal action” against “an individual,” the press release, issued by the MHA says. It also accepts weaknesses in systems and procedures in the government system in such matters that need to be fixed, suggesting the former Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW) officer acted independently.

A MHA release

This is the first public acceptance by the Indian government of the role of its official and systems in the alleged murders which first came to light in 2023 after a statement by the Canadian prime minister in parliament. The press release was not issued by the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), as has been the case with all the previous press releases on the subject, or the National Security Council Secretariat which deals with intelligence agencies in the Prime Minister’s Office. It draws in the Union home ministry which has not been publicly involved in the matter so far, despite Canadian officials naming home minister Amit Shah as the high-ranking Indian official who allegedly ordered the transnational killings.

The vaguely worded press release states that a high-powered enquiry committee has submitted its report – nearly 14 months after it was set up by the Indian government – on activities of some organised criminal groups and terrorist organisations, which undermined the security interests of both India and the United States. The Narendra Modi government was forced to order the probe in November 2023 under pressure from the Biden administration when the US Department of Justice went public regarding the attempt by Indian officials, with the help of criminals, to kill pro-Khalistan campaigner Gurpatwant Singh Pannun in New York.

“After a long enquiry, the Committee has submitted its report to the Government and recommended legal action against an individual, whose earlier criminal links and antecedents also came to notice during the enquiry. The Enquiry Committee has recommended that the legal action must be completed expeditiously,” stated the MHA’s press release.

The home ministry, however, did not name the individual against whom legal action should be initiated, and sought to distance the Government of India from the actions of a former intelligence officer, Vikash Yadav, who is indicted by the US for his alleged role in a plot to murder Pannun.

In an indictment in October, the US Justice Department announced criminal charges against Indian government employee Vikash Yadav in connection with an alleged foiled plot to kill a Sikh separatist leader living in New York City. Yadav, who authorities say directed the New York plot from India, faces murder-for-hire charges in a planned killing that prosecutors have previously said was meant to precede a string of other murders in North America. Yadav is a former Indian CRPF official who served in the R&AW.

Although the press release neither named Yadav nor confirmed his status as a government official, reports indicate that an Indian inquiry committee travelled to the US in October 2024 as part of the investigation. A US State Department media note at the time mentioned the Indian committee’s active probe into “the individual who was identified last year in the Department of Justice’s indictment as an Indian government employee who directed a foiled plot to assassinate a US citizen in New York City”.

Canada

Similar charges have also been levelled by Canada where Prime Minister Justin Trudeau said in September 2023 that Canada had credible evidence that agents of the Indian government were involved in the murder of pro-Khalistan activist Hardeep Singh Nijjar in British Columbia in June 2023. Canadian authorities have repeatedly said they have shared evidence of that with Indian authorities, but the Modi government has repeatedly dismissed the allegations. Canada had publicly alleged that the government in New Delhi allegedly works with a criminal network affiliated with incarcerated gangster Lawrence Bishnoi.

The US has asked India to cooperate with Canada’s investigation into the killing of Nijjar, calling the allegations “extremely serious.” In October, the US said, “When it comes to the Canadian matter, we have made clear that the allegations are extremely seriously and they need to be taken seriously. And we wanted to see the government of India cooperate with Canada in its investigation. Obviously, they have not chosen that path”. Canada and the United States are both members of the Five Eyes alliance, which also has the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand as members.

The MHA statement makes no reference to Pannun or the murder of Nijjar in Canada – which officials in Ottawa and Washington have linked to the R&AW and also Union home minister Amit Shah.

While the Modi government has officially denied all the charges made on record by the Canadians, it established a high level enquiry committee in November 2023 in the wake of the first Pannun indictment by the US, when Washington pushed India to accept responsibility for the plot.

Nikhil Gupta, Vikash Yadav and a ‘lone wolf’

The home ministry statement notably suggests that the officer was a ‘lone wolf’ with criminal antecedents who apparently exploited weaknesses in India’s intelligence system to carry out a rogue operation, resulting in India being mentioned alongside China and Iran in discussions of transnational repression.

To buttress the rogue operator theory, the MHA press release says the Committee “has further recommended functional improvements in systems and procedures as also initiation of steps that could strengthen India’s response capability, ensure systematic controls and coordinated action in dealing with matters like this.”

The statement noted that the Enquiry Committee conducted its “own investigations,” “pursued leads provided by the US side,” examined officials from various agencies, and scrutinised documents.

In November 2023, the US authorities had unsealed an indictment that charged an Indian national, Nikhil Gupta, for charges of attempted murder of Pannun. The charges observed that Gupta was directed by an Indian government official, who was then identified only as “CC-1.”

A year later, on October 18, 2024, the US prosecutors unsealed a second indictment that directly charged “CC-1,” now identified as Vikash Yadav, an official at the cabinet secretariat under the prime minister’s office.

The MEA later stated that he was “no longer an employee of the government of India.”

The Federal Bureau of Investigation had also issued a “wanted notice” which listed his birthplace as Pranpura in Haryana, with his birthdate as December 11, 1984.

It was subsequently revealed that just three weeks after the first US indictment in 2023 named Nikhil Gupta and referred to an unnamed government official from the CRPF and R&AW, Yadav was arrested by Delhi Police on December 18, which was around the last time that he was seen by neigbours in his South Delhi government flat.

As per the Delhi Police FIR, Yadav abducted a resident of Rohini and attempted to extort him on December 11. After reportedly spending four months in jail, he was released in April on bail. Thereafter, his whereabouts are unknown.

When The Wire visited Yadav’s village in Haryana in October 2024, his family had said that he had called them immediately and told him that he was “safe and sound,” but did not reveal his whereabouts.

A Delhi court on November 16, granted exemption from hearings for about three months to Vikash Yadav, accepting Yadav’s plea citing threats to his life and directed him to appear for the next hearing on February 3, 2025, reported the Indian Express.

In another twist, records of the Central Administrative Tribunal’s principal bench in Delhi show that Yadav’s case against the Cabinet Secretariat for not confirming his deputation was deposed off on the same day when the first indictment was released in New York in 2024. The bench had observed that the Yadav’s lawyer stated that the government had confirmed in “the post of SFO (GD) in Executive Cadre of DG (S) in respect of the applicant with effect from 13.11.2015”.

Push for legal action represents New Delhi’s attempt to reset relations with US

The report’s submission, accompanied by the public statement, occurs just five days before the Trump administration’s inauguration, signalling that the messaging is primarily aimed at the incoming administration rather than the outgoing one.

Over the past four years, President Joe Biden has made consistent efforts to strengthen ties with Prime Minister Modi, hosting him for what was Modi’s first state visit to Washington despite his prior visits to the US capital.

Simultaneously, the Biden administration has taken a firm stance on holding the Indian government accountable for any foreign intelligence operations on US soil. The Indian side, however, seems to anticipate a less interventionist approach from the Trump administration.

Its recent offer to take action against the former R&AW officer represents an attempt to reset relations and gives the Trump administration an opportunity to argue that additional pressure on India would be unwarranted given the steps already taken.

The test will lie in whether the Trump administration accepts the Indian report.

Nonetheless, New Delhi’s strategy faces significant challenges, as the case has entered the US legal system, which often operates with its own momentum.

Additionally, Democrat lawmakers in Congress are likely to monitor closely whether the Trump administration adopts a more hands-off approach in pressuring India and accepts the Indian narrative of events.

As Another Indian Is Killed in Ukraine War, India ‘Strongly’ Raises Issue With Russia

The external affairs ministry also reiterated its demand for the return of all Indians working with the Russian army.

New Delhi: A day after news surfaced of another Indian national killed in Russia, India announced on Tuesday (January 14) that it had “strongly” raised the issue with Russian authorities and reiterated its demand for the release of the remaining Indian nationals serving with the Russian army.

Reports on Monday identified the deceased as 32-year-old Binil T.B., a resident of Wadakkanchery in Kerala’s Thrissur district. Binil had made repeated appeals to return home over the last several months. He died on the frontlines of the Russia-Ukraine war. His relative, 27-year-old Jain T.K., was injured in the same attack Binil was killed in.

Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) spokesperson Randhir Jaiswal confirmed Binil’s death and Jain’s injury, noting that Jain is receiving treatment at a hospital in Moscow.

Jaiswal stated that the Indian embassy is in touch with their families and working with Russian authorities to facilitate the early repatriation of Binil’s mortal remains. Efforts are also underway to secure the prompt return of the injured individual to India.

Additionally, the MEA reiterated its demand for the return of all Indians working with the Russian army.

“The matter has been strongly taken up with Russian authorities in Moscow as well as the Russian embassy in New Delhi. We have also reiterated our demand for the early discharge of the remaining Indian nationals,” Jaiswal said.

A few days ago, Binil’s family received a message that the two men had been injured in a drone attack. However, the family was unable to contact either Binil or Jain afterwards.

An Indian Express report revealed that Binil and Jain had been desperately attempting to return home for months. Binil had shared a series of voice messages with the publication last month, stating that their efforts to seek help from the Indian embassy in Moscow since September had been futile.

“Mentally and physically, we are exhausted,” Binil had said according to the report.

In his last message, he mentioned being forced to move to the frontlines of the war.

“We are now in difficult terrain in the Russia-occupied territory of Ukraine. Our commander says the contract was for a year. We have been pleading with local commanders for our release. The Indian embassy says that unless the Russian army relieves us, they cannot help. The embassy says we should be taken back to Russian territory,” he was quoted as saying.

In a parliamentary reply on December 6, 2024, the MEA disclosed that ten Indian nationals had died in Russia. Among them, two were from Uttar Pradesh, two from Gujarat, and one each from Haryana, Punjab, Uttarakhand, Telangana, Kerala and Odisha. This is likely the 11th such death.

Six months ago, Prime Minister Narendra Modi raised the plight of Indians in the Russian army with President Vladimir Putin. India claimed that Russia had then promised the early release of all such individuals.

In August, external affairs minister S. Jaishankar told parliament that the Indian government does not support Russia’s claim that these Indians knowingly entered into contracts with the Russian army.

The Russian embassy later stated that Moscow had not engaged in any recruitment efforts targeting Indian citizens and that, starting April 2024, the Russian Ministry of Defence had ceased admitting citizens of several foreign countries, including India, into its armed forces.

Insight South Asia | National Security Driving Indian Contact With Taliban

India has entered into functional engagement with the Taliban authorities like China, Iran, Russia and other regional players.

Former Indian high commissioner to Pakistan T.C.A. Raghavan told Amit Baruah that India has entered into functional engagement with the Taliban authorities in Afghanistan like China, Iran, Russia and other regional players. Raghavan said it was surprising how quickly the relationship between the Taliban and Afghanistan had unraveled. He is also of the view that there would be some engagement eventually between India and Pakistan.