Analysis

Ethnic Tribes Caught in the Crossfire as Free Movement Regime With Myanmar Nears End

While aimed at curbing insurgency, smuggling and illegal immigration, the move to terminate the Free Movement Regime (FMR) has sparked concerns among tribal communities whose lives and economies are deeply tied to cross-border ties.

On January 2, 2024, Union home minister Amit Shah declared the central government’s commitment towards restricting free movement of people with Myanmar by erecting a fence along the 1,643-km border. The defined border passes through the states of Manipur (398 km), Mizoram (510 km), Nagaland (215km) and Arunachal Pradesh (520 km), with a maritime boundary located by the Bay of Bengal.

In September 2023, the Manipur government appealed to the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) to nullify the Free Movement Regime (FMR) and fence the entire international border between the two countries. The appeal serendipitously aligns with the central government’s avowed concerns about the FMR being exploited by insurgents to escape to Myanmar after carrying out attacks on Indian soil. The FMR agreement, reached between the two countries in 2018, remains suspended since September 2022, amply expressing that anxiety.

Historical context and exploitation of the FMR

The 1948 Burma Passport Laws and the Passport (Entry into India) Rules of 1950, later amended by the MHA, allowed the “hill tribes, who is either a citizen of India or the Union of Burma and who is ordinarily a resident in any area within 40 km (25 miles) on either side of the India-Burma frontier” to enter India without a passport or visa. Yet, this did not thwart the governmental imperative to track and regulate such tribes with mutually common customs and ways of lives, and who frequently travel across the border.

The government hence drew up a list of 62 items permissible for border trade at a concessional duty rate of 5%, regular or normal trade being allowed via Land Customs Station in Moreh (Manipur) and Zokhawthar (Mizoram). Each individual was allowed to carry as much ware as could fit in a head load. While the Myanmar government permitted Indians to remain in Myanmar for a maximum of 24 hours, the Indian government stipulated that Myanmarese nationals may stay in India for 72 hours. However, not much else is known about the specifics of the actual terms and conditions of border control and cooperation between the two countries.

While it is true that the FMR helped the tribes maintain their age-old bonds across the national borders, unfortunately, the Indian government’s apprehensions are well-founded. The FMR arrangements have been repeatedly exploited by certain Indian groups to carry out anti-social actions in India. Cadres of various rebel groups would enter Myanmar to receive armed training and then return to India to carry out operations, escaping back to Myanmar afterwards. This was the pattern set by the Nagas in 1956, Meiteis in 1964 and the Mizos in 1966. The central government claims that the existence of FMR and a weakly monitored border allowed the rebels to intensify their operations, endangering national security. The cumulative heft of the insurgencies of the Naga, the Meitei and the Zo ethnic groups compelled the Indian government to review the FMR’s terms and restrict these tribes’ unfettered cross-border mobility.

Evolution of border policies

Consequently, in August 1968, the MHA instituted a “permission system” for crossing the Myanmar border, requiring individuals from both countries to carry permits from their respective nations in order to cross over. This stipulation remained in force for the next 40 years. Nevertheless, since the 1990s and the early 2000s, the security situation in the Northeast has significantly deteriorated due to a sharp rise in rebel activities across the international border, matched by similar increments in drug trafficking and gun smuggling.

India decides to further limit the FMR’s span to 16 km in 2004, and only allow ethnic tribes residing within this limit across the two borders, to cross the international boundary through the three officially recognised locations of Pangsau, Moreh and Zokhawthar in the corresponding states of Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur and Mizoram. In the absence of a formal agreement on the free movement of hill tribes across their shared border with Myanmar at the time, the Indian government developed a Memorandum of Understanding to be discussed with the Myanmar government. The Agreement on Land Border Crossing was ratified on May 11, 2018, as part of the Narendra Modi government’s Act East policy, formalising the hitherto informal provisions of the FMR arrangements. However, in the face of a tenacious ethnic conflict in Manipur since May 2023, the central government announced on January 2, 2024, its decision to scrap the FMR. This was predictably received by most ethnic tribes across the borders as a grave intrusion in their customary ways of lives which pivot around free movement across the region.

Impact on tribes and local economies

The decision to scrap the FMR shows that the security imperative has spanned the entire policy spectrum on the matter, eschewing the historical and humanitarian aspects. For the tribes residing within the FMR limits on the Myanmar side, health and education are more easily accessible across the border in India. Further, the local economies and livelihoods on both sides are going to be impacted negatively, cross-border trade being the pivot of these low-income economies. The governments of Mizoram and Nagaland have expressed their opposition to the decision on these conspicuous grounds, contending that it will have utterly adverse effects over the social, cultural and economic landscape of the region at large. The Manipur government, however, no longer keen on sweating it out at the policy drawing boards trying to hammer out a mechanism that is permissive yet highly surveillant, has chosen instead to go with the easier blanket measure, favourably citing the influx of refugees after the coup of February, 2021.

The claims of manifold increase in smuggling from across the border into India are doubtlessly true. Manipur chief minister Biren Singh said that since the war on drugs campaign was launched in 2018, a total of around 19,135 acres of illegal poppy cultivation has been destroyed and around 297 drug smugglers have been convicted. The chief minister added that more than 50% of the poppy crop in the state has been eradicated thanks to the “war on drugs,” which is still going strong under Modi’s “Nasha Mukt Bharat” campaign. In 2021–22, illegal poppy cultivation was discovered on 28,598.91 acres in the state; however, in 2023–24, that number was reduced to 11,288.07 acres, according to Singh.

Also read: Chaos Over Border Passes at Mizoram-Myanmar Border, Free Movement Regime Rules Tightened

The situation is further compounded by a stretch of 500 km of highly susceptible border that runs along Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur and Mizoram, through forests and undulating terrain, much of it unfenced. In Manipur, only about 6 km have been fenced so far. The assumption that the negative impact that will inevitably follow the scrapping of the FMR will most likely give further impetus to cross-border smuggling is, therefore, not a stretch.

The need for a balanced approach

Since the coup in February, 2021, the junta has launched a sustained campaign against the Zo ethnic tribes (Zomi-Kuki-Mizo) people, pushing the multitude across the country’s western border into India, largely in Manipur and Mizoram. In Mizoram, cross-border solidarity has paved the way for setting up camps for 40,000 refugees, despite protests from the MHA.

Biometrics have made it considerably easier to identify illegal migrants. In 2023, 2,500 illegal immigrants were identified in Manipur. In September 2022, 5,500 illegal immigrants were apprehended at the Moreh border itself, 4,300 being returned to Myanmar. The Manipur government has repeatedly blamed local village chiefs of colluding with the immigrants in setting up settlements for the latter. An eviction drive against such settlements became the flashpoint between Zo ethnic tribes and government forces, leading to violence across the state. In its navigation of the border situation, New Delhi needs to reevaluate and reform the FMR rather than terminate it. Strategic policies ought not to include either sweeping measures or ones that place social, economic and cultural aspects outside the scope of governmental deliberations.

Langthianmung Vualzong is an alumnus of Special Centre for the Study of Law and Governance, Jawaharlal Nehru University.

Installation of Shivaji Statue in Pangong Tso Sparks Veterans’ Backlash Over Political Symbolism

The installation of Chhatrapati Shivaji’s statue by the Indian Army at Pangong Tso has drawn sharp criticism from Ladakhi locals and military veterans, highlighting concerns over political motivations, historical relevance, and military traditions.

Chandigarh: India’s military brass has, in recent years, gone out of its way to incorporate Chhatrapati Shivaji — the 17th century Maratha military leader and ruler — into its traditions and folklore, amid opposition from many senior service veterans.

The Indian Army recently erected Shivaji’s statue on the banks of Pangong Tso (lake) in eastern Ladakh, as a tribute to his ‘unwavering spirit’ and legacy which, according to the force, remained a source of inspiration for generations of Indians.

The Army declared on X that the statue, inaugurated on Boxing Day by Lieutenant General Hitesh Bhalla, General Officer Commanding of the Leh-based 14 Corps, celebrated the unwavering spirit of the Indian ruler, who was a ‘towering symbol of valour, vision and unwavering justice’.

As further justification for the statue’s installation, it went on to add that Gen Bhalla was also colonel of the Maratha Light Infantry (MLI) regiment that had been deployed in Ladakh as part of the Rashtriya Rifles, and that Shivaji’s sculpture had been funded by voluntary contributions from regimental serving and retired personnel.

The Colonel of the Regiment (CoR) is a senior officer of brigadier rank and above, who represents his, or her, regiment’s overall interests. In one of many British Army traditions, all of which Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s BJP government has undertaken to expunge, the CoR is the regiment’s ‘father-figure’, or ‘a kind of agony aunt’, to try and resolve its many tribulations and to provide it general direction.

Shivaji’s statue in Ladakh, however, has not only provoked outrage amongst local Ladakhis, but more significantly amid many IA veterans, a handful of whom have publicly railed against such a move, initiated for obvious political reasons by the Army’s top brass at the behest of the BJP government. Many more senior army veterans were visibly upset over this move, but declined to be identified, fearful of inviting official displeasure and possible penalties.

While local Ladakhi leaders questioned the relevance of placing Shivaji’s statue in Ladakh, which he neither visited, nor fought in or was in any remote way associated with, some IA veterans were blunt in their criticism.

“There are the statutes [or laws] of war, but of late our armed forces are studying the ‘statues of war’,” retired Major General Birender Singh Dhanoa declared on X. “A simple question for you guys in 14 Corps,” he stated, “are all fixed class units (ethnically recruited, like in the MLI) erecting statues across their Corps Zone(s) that are in keeping with their ancestral satraps (like Shivaji)?” The former two-star armoured corps officer also questioned the IA and the concerned CoR for publicizing the statue’s installation on social media, with the obvious inference that such unwarranted publicity was uncalled for and avoidable.

Retired Colonel Sanjay Pande, for his part, advocated putting up a statue of Zorawar Singh, a general in service with Jammu’s Dogra ruler Gulab Singh, as part of Maharaja Ranjit Singh’s Sikh empire and one who was responsible for extending its territories to include Ladakh, Baltistan, Skardu and parts of Tibet, by defeating the Chinese. He also attempted to conquer Western Tibet, but was killed in battle in 1841, and for his numerous Himalayan conquests this Dogra general has been dubbed by some local historians as the ‘Napoleon of India’. “Zorawar Singh fought wars 180 years back (in Ladakh and the wider Himalayas) in weather as found today,” Col Pande declared on X. “He deserves to be there,” added the former Dogra Regiment officer.

Other veterans said that with Army headquarters in New Delhi sanctioning Shivaji’s statue in Ladakh to commemorate the MLI’s deployment there, other army units too could press their case for similarly celebrating their respective ‘ancestral’ notables at locations they had served in. “This could well lead to a ludicrous situation of a host of statues around the country celebrating army units,” said a former MoD official, declining to be named.

Correspondingly, however, there were some army veterans who supported the move to place Shivaji’s statue on Pangong Tso, claiming it would boost troop morale. Retired Brigadier Hardeep Sohi stated that since the chances of hand-to-hand combat in infantry units were higher, they needed ‘inspiration’ which Shivaji’s statue duly provided.

Meanwhile, in a move in keeping with the Shivaji statue inauguration, Army Chief Gen Dwivedi accompanied Defence Minister Rajnath Singh in offering prayers at the Mahakaleshwar Jyotirlinga temple at Ujjain in Madhya Pradesh on Monday, dressed in saffron clothing.

And though the event was criticized by many Opposition leaders and commentators, BJP leaders vigorously defended it. “Nobody should have a problem with the Raksha Mantri or the army chief, or anybody celebrating their own faith,” former BJP MP and minister Rajeev Chandrashekhar told Times Now television on Tuesday. “Anyone who has a problem, should look for a hole and bury themselves in it,” he added.

Earlier, in late 2023, Indian Navy (IN) veterans were similarly critical of Prime Minister Modi’s declaration that the epaulettes of all naval officers would henceforth bear the imprint of Shivaji’s maritime legacy, in a bid to further ‘de-colonize’ the country’s military. The only difference was that all these officers opted to remain anonymous at the time and even now, fearful of ‘repercussions’ from the government.

“It is not for the Prime Minister to make pronouncements like revamping naval epaulettes, which is exclusively the responsibility of the IN’s Controller of Personnel Services,” said a retired two-star naval officer. “It is also obvious,” he regretfully added, “that the IN’s top brass were complicit in this undertaking, and in all likelihood connived and even encouraged it to earn government approval.”

The Prime Minister’s proclamation in his Navy Day address at Sindhudurg on 4 December 2023 was part of a wider agenda of ‘deracinating’ the navy, by ditching all association dating back to its founding as the Royal Indian Navy or RIN in 1932. This entailed infusing Shivaji’s 17th century octagonal stamp in place of the ubiquitous Nelson’s ring on uniform epaulettes inherited from the Royal Navy.

“Inspired by the ideals of Shivaji, today’s India is moving forward and abandoning the mentality of slavery,” Prime Minister Modi had declared. “I am happy to announce that the epaulettes donned by the naval officers will now highlight the heritage and legacy of Shivaji and they will be similar to the naval ensign,” he added.

Nearly a year earlier Shivaji’s octagonal stamp, symbolizing India’s hoary maritime heritage had replaced the Cross of St George on the IN’s ensign or flag as part of ‘the military’s de-colonization’ launched by the BJP-led administration. The Prime Minister had also announced that the force would additionally discard ‘vestiges of the colonial era’ by ‘Indianising’ ranks for all its personnel below officer rank (PBOR).

Official sources said over 65,000 naval PBOR who would imminently be re-designated included Master Chief Petty Officer’s 1st class, Master Chief Petty Officer’s 2nd class, Chief Petty Officer’s, Petty Officer’s, Leading Seamen, Seamen 1st class and Seamen 2nd class. Their new ranks were to be made public later, but thereafter this move, hastily advocated by the Prime Minister, has been scrapped, as there were far too many complexities involved in the change.

“Such internal service matters are best left to the armed forces themselves to announce, as declarations by politicians concerning them give rise, justifiably to charges of politicizing the military,” said a retired one-star IN officer. Yet another veteran, also declining to be named, said the matters of epaulettes and re-naming naval PBOR was too ‘small’ an issue to be so grandiosely publicized by the Prime Minister. “It was best left to the IN itself to make public,” he stated.

In the meantime, in light of major changes in service custom and ritual, there is a mounting conspiracy of silence amongst innumerable veteran officers in speaking to the media. And the handful who do actually consent to comment critically on such matters, albeit reluctantly, invariably request anonymity in anticipation of a ‘backlash’ from either their respective service, the MoD or the overall national security establishment, or all three.

These reactions typically prompt a ‘solicitous’ call from either a still serving service colleague, a ‘concerned’ MoD official, or at times even a common intermediary, all conveying undisguised disapproval of the concerned veteran’s harsh or at least questioning observations. In almost all instances this was warning enough to spook the veteran from ever interacting with the media again, as they were apprehensive lest their pensions were ‘adversely impacted’.

The Puzzling Divestment of Ferro Scrap Nigam

After Pawan Hans and Central Electronics, another PSU’s divestment raises questions.

On September 19, the government approved the sale of Ferro Scrap Nigam Limited (FSNL). For Rs 320 crore, a Japanese firm called Konoike Transport would get 100% equity in the firm.

The news didn’t create too many ripples. Headquartered in Bhilai, FSNL, a subsidiary of state-owned Metal Scrap Trade Corporation (MSTC), is one of India’s lesser-known Public Sector Undertakings (PSUs). In addition, unlike the abortive divestments of Central Electronics and Pawan Hans where the buyers had questionable antecedents, Konoike Transport is an established Japanese firm with investments from global Foreign Institutional Investors (FIIs) like Vanguard and BlackRock.

And yet, the sale needed greater attention than it has received. FSNL’s valuation, given its assets, profitability and ability to diversify into sectors set for rapid growth, seems to be low.

Top Line Profits After Tax (in crores)

Year	Total Revenue	Profits After Tax
2017	328.30	23.75
2018	340.30	8.07
2019	378.41	26.69
2020	409.90	30.58
2021	364.97	22.75
2022	415.38	40.36*
2023	414.16	38.37*
2024	467.72	64.92*

*Had FSNL not paid high dividends to its shareholders including MSTC – Rs 11.2 crore in 2022, Rs 9 crore in 2023 and Rs 12.80 crore in 2024 – its cash holdings would have been higher yet.

(Source: FSNL annual report 2023-24; Preliminary Information Memorandum, Department of Investment & Public Asset Management (DIPAM)

In the past, asset valuers appointed by the Department of Investment and Public Asset Management (DIPAM) have combined methodologies like Asset Valuation and Discounted Cash Flow to appraise the worth of state assets.

On the first of these, despite having over Rs 400 crore in cash and hard assets – trade receivables of Rs 202 crore, a bank balance of Rs 124 crore, plant and machinery worth Rs 81 crore and zero debt – against total liabilities of Rs 184 crore, FSNL ended up with a reserve price of Rs 262 crore.

Discounted Cash Flow, which estimates the current value of a firm’s future earnings, throws up even more puzzling numbers. “Our work orders for the next two years stand at Rs 1,000 crore,” said an FSNL employee on the condition of anonymity. “Our pre-tax profits from these alone will be Rs 300 crore.”

Even these numbers are an underestimation. Given its expertise in steel slag reprocessing, FSNL can tap three emerging opportunities – vehicle scrappage, steel scrap for small and medium steelmakers struggling with carbon border taxes, and steel slag for highway construction. The reserve price doesn’t seem to factor in those potential gains to Konoike either.

These questions over valuation, however, are just the tip of the proverbial iceberg. There are other puzzling dimensions to this sale which have not received attention.

A firm which gets work because it’s a PSU

FSNL mainly works with state-owned steel manufacturers.

It gets steel slag from Steel Authority of India Limited (SAIL), Mishra Dhatu Nigam, Rashtriya Ispat Nigam and National Mineral Development Corporation. It leases land inside these plants and separates slag into steel scrap (which goes back into furnaces) and slag aggregates (which are used by steel plants for construction).

The steelmakers gain greater efficiencies due to recycling. As FSNL’s website says, “the recovered metallics are used in place of externally purchased scrap which saves their costs substantially.” As for FSNL, it gets a service charge from these firms.

Hardwired into these supply and sale relationships is a catch. Once divested, FSNL will get steel slag from steel PSUs for just two more years. It will also lose its capacity to sell reprocessed slag to these firms. “This is a production unit which gets raw material because it is a PSU,” said a senior manager in FSNL on the condition of anonymity. “Once it becomes a private firm, slag won’t come to it on nomination basis. India’s steel firms might not buy its reprocessed steel either.”

For this reason, an earlier plan, mooted in 2016, to divest the firm was cancelled. That October, the cabinet committee on economic affairs had given an “in-principle” nod to sell the firm. The very next year, the government scrapped those plans saying the entity has no tangible assets barring machinery. “We are removing FSNL… from disinvestment list because it does not have anything. No land. It just has equipment,” Aruna Sharma, who was steel secretary at the time, told PTI that July. “SAIL permits them to do the scrap sale or making its pellets as it is a PSU,” she said. “So it does not make any sense for a buyer because SAIL cannot give it to a private person for conversion. So what will anybody do by taking scrap machinery,” she added.

This aspect of the firm’s business is why bidders wanted slag contracts, especially those given by SAIL, to be extended by at least 5 years. They were eventually extended for two years.

The first two questions arise here. If FSNL will lose its raison d’etre in just two years, why did the Centre cancel its previous decision to not sell this profitable firm? Also, why would Konoike want such a firm?

A firm which straddles large market opportunities

In its Preliminary Investment Memorandum for FSNL, DIPAM makes an uncomplicated sales pitch. It talks about opportunities in the scrap handling and slag management sector and pitches FSNL as a beachhead for firms looking to serve the steel sector.

Along the way, it misses three potential areas FSNL can diversify into.

The first is within the global steel industry. Spurred by carbon taxes, the sector is trying to go green. Steel can be produced from ore and from steel scrap. The first of these is energy-intensive and, ergo, only large firms are in a position to invest in decarbonised forms of energy like hydrogen and small and modular nuclear reactors as they try to stave off carbon taxes.

Steel produced from scrap, however, is less energy-intensive and polluting. “As the steel industry decarbonises, firms can either decarbonise by investing in hydrogen or other modes of green steel – or they can buy scrap steel and use that for their furnaces,” said a senior manager at Vizag steel plant in Visakhapatnam, on the condition of anonymity. “For mid-rung firms, the latter is an easier option.”

In other words, if FSNL can diversify its slag supply beyond state-run PSUs, it will find customers. As things stand, the firm already works with Arcelor Mittal.

There is also rising interest, from Nitin Gadkari’s Ministry of Road Transport and Highways, to use steel slag for highway-building. Vijay Joshi, the founder of an Australian firm called Dr Slag, which advocates the use of slag for highway construction, is working with Gadkari as an advisor. “On August 7, Gadkari wrote to steel minister H.D. Kumaraswamy asking if the steel ministry can start a pilot project under the supervision of Dr Joshi for commercial use of waste slag in highway construction,” the senior FSNL manager told The Wire. “A month later, on September 18, the top brass of FSNL were called by the Steel Ministry to Delhi where they were told to develop ways to use steel slag for roads. The next day, however, FSNL’s sale was announced.”

The third area FSNL can move into is vehicle scrappage. Also led by Gadkari, India has launched a vehicle scrappage policy which wants to scrap all vehicles – whether private or commercial – that are over 15 years old. Apart from boosting vehicle sales, the policy is also expected to dramatically reduce scrap imports and raw material costs for manufacturers. In 2021, the eventual size of this market was pegged at $6 billion . An observer of Indo-Japan trade relationships pegged this number even higher. “Steel scrap will be a $50 billion business in India over the next 25 years,” he said on the condition of anonymity. As firms vie to dominate this sector, FSNL appears to be a prime catch. “It has the infrastructure and the technology,” the observer said. “Owning this firm will cut the buyer’s lead time for entering the segment.”

In essence, FSNL seems to have two potential revenue streams. It can charge for reprocessing steel (from steel-makers and scrapped vehicles) and sell the reprocessed steel to small and medium steel-makers, and leftover slag to highway builders.

A third question lies here. If FSNL can diversify into new markets – green steel; highway aggregates, scrapping vehicles – shouldn’t its reserve price capture some of that value?

According to the Preliminary Information Memorandum for FSNL, the firm’s valuation was done by Delhi-based AAA Valuation Professionals LLP. The transaction advisor was Mumbai-based BDO India LLP. The Wire wrote to officials in all three organisations – secretary Tuhin Kanta Pandey, financial advisor Amit Ray and joint secretary Manoj Kumar at DIPAM; Maulik Sanghavi, a partner at BDO India and Ankit Goel, a designated partner at AAA Valuation Professionals – asking them to explain the Rs 262 crore valuation.

The fourth question lies here. FSNL could have just as easily diversified into these segments even without divestment. So, why is it being sold?

This question was posed to the three DIPAM officials as well as Union steel secretary Sandeep Poundrik. They didn’t respond. This article will be updated when they do.

The centrality of FSNL to MSTC’s financials

In the days after the sale, India’s financial dailies alluded to the country’s disinvestment targets while reporting on FSNL’s sale.

As justifications go, this one was poorly thought-out. The Rs 320 crore from Konoike will go to MSTC – not the Centre. Given that 35% of MSTC’s shares are publicly held, even if MSTC transfers sale proceeds to the government as a dividend, the latter will net Rs 208 crore.

Each divestment is a cost-benefit exercise. In this case, the Union might get Rs 208 crore. But what about the costs?

MSTC is a starting point. In 2023-24, it posted a consolidated revenue of Rs 750 crore – and profits after tax (PAT) of Rs 204 crore. To put these numbers in context, FSNL’s top line profits stood at Rs 467.72 crore – and its PAT at Rs 64.92 crore. This point came up in a MSTC investors call in November 2023. “If I’m not mistaken, (FSNL) contribute(s)… about 30% in our topline and about the same in our bottom line,” one analyst asked MSTC’s management. “So, then whether it is in our interest to divest that stake?”

In response, the MSTC’s management said: “FSNL disinvestment is being done by the government of India itself, DIPAM specifically,” said Bhanu Kumar, an MSTC director (commercial). “We are also just a party to the entire process, and when we are not in a decision-making position, there is no point in saying whether it is good for the company, bad for the company, only time will tell.”

What is incontrovertible, however, is that MSTC’s dividends from FSNL will stop and its top line and bottom line profits will both shrink. MSTC’s share price is likely to fall as well, with its own attendant implications. This is the fifth question. How does the Centre’s potential Rs 208 crore gain compare with the wider losses to MSTC?

There are yet wider costs. Firms like SAIL have to make alternative arrangements for slag disposal and reprocessing.

The Wire posed this question of larger costs – the corollary to the government’s gain of Rs 208 crore – to Pandey, Ray, Kumar and Poundrik. This article will be updated should they respond.

Why is a profitable PSU being divested?
Given zero debt, assets of over 400 crore and an order book of Rs 1,000 crore, is Rs 320 crore a fair valuation for FSNL?
Were revenues from potential diversification into vehicle scrappage, steel scrap sales to steelmakers and slag sales to highway builders considered while arriving at the reserve price of Rs 262 crore?
Why is FSNL being sold instead of being allowed to diversify, as a PSU, into these sectors?
Why was the 2016 decision against selling the firm reversed?
The centre might make Rs 208 crore. How much will the MSTC, which gets a third of its revenues from FSNL, lose?

Who is Konoike Transport?

As global firms go, Konoike is not especially large.

Its group sales for FY24 stood at 315,029 million yen, or over17,000 crore. Its profits stood at 11,462 million yen, or around Rs 640 crore.

It’s a diversified group with interests spanning logistics, healthcare and steel – a point that was emphasised by the finance ministry while announcing the sale. “Konoike’s steel division is a long-established segment of the company, with over 140 years of experience in steelworks operations,” said the finance ministry in a statement about the approval granted by a government panel comprising Gadkari, Kumaraswamy, and finance minister Nirmala Sitharaman.

The firm is not new to India. It entered the country in 2008 through a subsidiary called Konoike Asia (India), which has now been renamed Konoike India. It’s a small firm. Its revenues from operations in FY24 stood at Rs 14.82 crore and its PAT at Rs 38 lakh.

In India, Konoike India has focused on international forwarding, installation of machinery and equipment, and plant relocation, and is expanding its logistics and packaging business. Apart from this firm, Konoike has three more firms in India. Two of these – SPD India Healthcare, which provides sterilisation services to over 150 hospitals in and around Delhi; and Carna Medical Database, which works with Japanese firms eyeing India’s healthcare market – focus on healthcare. The third firm, Joshi Konoike Transport and Infrastructure (JKTI), works as a container train operator between Delhi and three ports on India’s west coast – Pipavav, Nhava Sheva and Mundra.

Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) filings show that JKTI is a 51:49 joint venture between Konoike Transport and New Delhi-based Associated Container Terminals Limited (ACTL) with Konoike holding the majority stake.

In its response to The Wire, Konoike Transport said it is “currently in the process of share transfer of FSNL. We plan to issue a news release after the share transfer (scheduled for January 2025), so we would like to respond in accordance with the contents of this news release.”

In the meantime, however, FSNL’s divestment remains a welter of unexamined questions.

At this time, the only pushback to the sale is coming from FSNL’s employee unions. They have challenged the divestment in the Delhi High Court.

M. Rajshekhar is an independent reporter writing on energy, climate and kleptocracy. His book, Despite The State: Why India Lets Its People Down and How They Cope, was published by Westland Books in 2020.

Proposed GST Rise on ‘Sin Goods’: What’s the Rush and What’s at Stake?

The GST council’s proposed increase on tax rates for ‘sin goods’ – soft drinks, textiles, tobacco and related products – to 35% will affect people from all sections of society, especially those from low and middle-income households.

New Delhi: There is an indication that a new goods and services tax (GST) slab will be introduced, in addition to the existing four GST rates: 5%, 12%, 18%, and 28%. The group of ministers (GoM) in the GST council has proposed increasing the tax rates for tobacco and related products, as well as aerated beverages, to 35%. There are also suggestions to increase the GST on luxury items, such as shoes costing above Rs 15,000 and wristwatches priced above Rs 25,000, which are likely to be shifted to the highest slab of 28% GST from the current 18%. Additionally, cotton and textile items may be moved from their existing tax slabs to the next highest GST slab rates.

Why is there such an urgency to introduce an additional GST slab, especially on the higher side, which could complicate the indirect tax structure? Many developed countries, such as Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and Japan, have a single GST rate, typically ranging between 5% and 15%. A higher multi-layered GST slab could have the unintended consequence of dampening consumption and negatively impacting businesses. With GST collections already at record levels, exceeding Rs 20 lakh crore in 2023-2024, there is no urgent need to introduce an additional 35% tax slab, particularly when India’s economy is already grappling with challenges like a slowing growth rate of 5.4%.

Apparently, for the government, the need to collect taxes stems from the goal of facilitating income transfers, which play a crucial role in securing votes. The tax on ‘sin goods’ is price inelastic, meaning that consumers (who are otherwise addicted to the habit) will continue to consume them. The government may believe that increasing the tax will simply boost the tax revenue. This is the government’s way of transferring resources from the middle and upper-middle class to finance election promises, such as the Ladli Behna Yojana, Kanyashree Prakalpa, or other schemes aimed at the marginal voters. As per a recent estimate, Rs 2 lakh crore annualised worth of income transfers are happening. These are benefiting 20% of India’s adult women and all in the very low-income segments.

Also read: The GST Council Is a Constitutional Crisis in the Making

One of the reasons why voters often favour short-term freebies over long-term subsidies is the human tendency toward temporal discounting. Temporal discounting is the psychological phenomenon where people tend to undervalue rewards or benefits that are further in the future. Politicians are acutely aware of voters’ preferences for short-term gains. To secure re-election, the political elites prefer to implement populist policies, even if these policies may not be sustainable in the long run.

Over-reliance on freebies can cause fiscal imbalances, leading to large deficits, inflation and long-term economic instability. The Rs 2 lakh crore spent on income transfers exceeds the fund allocation in the Union Budget 2024-25 on account for micro small and medium enterprises (MSMEs), agriculture, education, health and skill development, all of which are necessary for long-term growth.

At a time when employment opportunities are scarce, economic logic suggests that more funding should be allocated for MSMEs, education and skill development. According to the Periodic Labour Force Survey Annual Report 2022-23, a majority of jobs are being created in the low-paying agricultural sector and in the category of self-employment in the urban sector. This has an implication on the widening income inequality.

The increase in GST rates on carbonated soft drinks (CSD) and tobacco products affects people from all sections of society, as these items are widely consumed. Low and middle-income households are likely to be hit harder as higher taxes will strain their budgets more. The government’s justification for curbing consumption – and thereby promoting greater health benefits – through higher taxes on certain products is illogical, given that it continues to impose a high GST on health insurance.

Representative image: A coca-cola mini truck. Photo: Flickr/Meena Kadri (CC BY-NC-ND 2.0)

Higher the tax, more the repercussions

A higher and more complex GST structure can have other repercussions.

First, an increase in the GST slab to the next highest level may lead to an 8% rise in the price of readymade garments, making our exports uncompetitive in the global market. Second, when accounting for the cess on items such as tobacco, automobiles, and carbonated soft drinks, the total tax could reach 50%, with a negative impact on businesses and the government losing out on revenue. As suggested by the Laffer Curve principle, excessively high tax rates can dampen consumption and lead to a shift towards lower-taxed substitutes or even illicit tobacco and CSD products, ultimately reducing tax revenue collection.

Most of the illicit products, including cigarettes, originate from China. With China producing 45% of global cigarettes, China Tobacco exploits smuggling to expand under the Belt and Road Initiative. Chinese cigarettes have flooded the Indian market, particularly in the northeast, with enforcement agencies seizing Rs 273 crore worth of smuggled cigarettes in six months. The illicit market is valued at Rs 17,250-23,000 crores annually.

Third, a higher tax structure can also act as an “industry killer”; take, for example, the case of gaming and cryptocurrency. For example, the hike in the GST rate from 18% to 28% in the gaming industry has seen the business moving out to Singapore. Gaming differs from lotteries, gambling and betting in that its outcome depends on the skills of the players, rather than chance. Similar is the case with cryptocurrency with most of the businesses moving out to Dubai and Hong Kong. According to NASSCOM, the Indian cryptocurrency market has been growing exponentially over the last few years and is expected to reach up to $241 million by 2030 in India and $2.3 billion by 2026 globally. The government is not only losing out on the revenues generated by these businesses but also on both direct and indirect employment opportunities.

Finally, there is also evidence suggesting that cash transfers/freebies are reducing allocations to other more essential areas, such as health and education. For example, while the West Bengal government is running the hugely popular Kanyashree project for girls, it has led to lower allocations for building primary school infrastructure and hiring school teachers.

Nilanjan Banik is a professor at School of Management, Mahindra University.

This piece was first published on The India Cable – a premium newsletter from The Wire & Galileo Ideas – and has been updated and republished here. To subscribe to The India Cable, click here.

Maharashtra: Unrest Across Eastern Vidarbha as Adivasi Communities Fear Losing Zudpi Jungle

For generations, the Zudpi lands have served as grazing ground for feeding livestock, threshing sites, cremation grounds, and community spaces for Adivasi communities but their ambiguous legal status has made them a flashpoint of conflict.

Chandrapur: In Maharashtra’s eastern Vidarbha region, a wave of protests is mobilising tribal communities as they face the prospect of losing control over Zudpi Jungle – traditional lands integral to their livelihoods. Moves by the state government to designate these commons as reserve forests have ignited widespread unrest, laying bare the tensions between conservation policies, the development imperative and the land rights of forest-dwelling communities.

From Gadchiroli to Chandrapur and Nagpur, these communities, dependent on common lands for grazing, agriculture, and cultural practices, are raising their voices against decisions they believe threaten their survival. When an area is declared a reserve forest, several restrictions follow – locals need permission from the forest department to access the reserve area, and grazing, tree felling, and the use of forest resources are banned unless specific orders are issued. In some villages, activists alleged that land, where tribals got land ownership titles under the Forest Rights Act of 2006 (FRA), was also included in the notification for reserve forests, effectively cancelling the legal rights of tribals. The conflict is a reflection of broader governance challenges around land, rights, and development.

The contested Zudpi Jungle

The Zudpi Jungle is a type of common land that is covered by scrubs and bush growth instead of tall trees. It is spread across six districts in the east Vidarbha region – Bhandara, Chandrapur, Gadchiroli, Nagpur, Wardha, and Gondia. For generations, these commons have served as grazing grounds as the vegetation is suitable for feeding livestock, threshing sites, cremation grounds, and community spaces for Adivasi communities. But their ambiguous legal status has made them a flashpoint of conflict.

Historically, the Zudpi Jungle has been classified as revenue land (in practice, they are like village commons, with the customary rights applicable). But since the name includes “forest”, they have been treated as such. This meant that under the Forest Conservation Act of 1980, the state required central approval for diverting these lands. This ambiguity was compounded by the landmark T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India judgment in 1996, which defined all lands recorded as forests – regardless of use – as such.

Also read: How the NTCA Defied the Tribal Ministry, its Own Officials to Order Massive Displacement of Tribals For ‘Conservation’

In 1998, a central committee recommended that 92,115 hectares of Zudpi Jungle be notified as reserve or protected forests while freeing up 86,409 hectares for development. Over the years, successive state governments have attempted to implement these recommendations. The attempt really took off in 2019, when the Maharashtra government filed an Interlocutory Application (IA) in the Godavarman case, seeking clarity on denotification.

Since then, efforts to settle claims and finalise the notification process have escalated. The state aims to complete the forest settlement of over 93,000 hectares, sparking fear and resistance among tribal communities dependent on these lands.

Mangli village: A protest erupts

The struggle is perhaps most visible in Chandrapur’s Mangli village, where a reserve forest notification has galvanised protests. The village is in Bhadravati taluka, 34 km from the district headquarters and bordering the Tadoba-Andhari Tiger Reserve.
The village is home to people from the Madia Gond community. Their community forest rights, covering 62.27 hectares, were approved in 2014, though titles were issued in 2018. These rights allow them to protect, conserve, and manage shared forest resources, access grazing land, and safeguard biological diversity, intellectual property, and traditional knowledge.

However, their CFR area excludes nearby Zudpi lands now earmarked for reserve forest status. These lands, vital for cattle grazing and used for livestock burial pits, are central to the community’s livelihood.

The villagers were first informed about the reserve forest notification dated February 2019, in May 2024. The same month they submitted a written complaint to the sub-divisional officer, saying that the notification should not be given a go-ahead. Despite this, on August 20, 2023, an order was passed acquiring a few parcels of land in their village for the constitution of the reserve forest, without any mention of the written complaint.

“When the sub-divisional officer of Warora had first come to inform us about it, I asked what would happen when the said land is declared as reserved forest, she had no answer. Another officer (forest settlement officer) also had no idea what happens after an area is called a reserve forest,” said Kunal, a local protest leader. Nearby villages, including Pirli, Chora, and Dhanoli, face similar threats, prompting fears of restricted access to grazing lands and water bodies.

For Mangli’s residents, the implications are severe. The reserve forest notification details what they can and cannot do. The villagers were told that they would need permission from the collector’s office to visit the reserve forest area and graze their animals, which they had earlier been doing freely. They were given a stipulated time between 10 am to 2 pm when the grazing and access to the pond would be allowed but only after getting the required consent. They were also informed that only buffalo and cows would be allowed to graze on that land and not sheep or goats.

“We struggled for years to understand and exercise our CFR rights. Now we’re being pushed back into uncertainty,” Kunal said.

Representative image of animals grazing in common lands. Photo: Foundation for Ecological Security (FES)

FRA violations

The notifications have drawn criticism from activists and academics who allege violations of the FRA. In several villages, reserve forest notifications have reportedly included parcels already covered by FRA titles.

“There is no official data on which areas the forest department plans to declare as reserves. Why are community forest rights committees being excluded from the process?” asked Dr Nishant Mate, assistant professor at the College of Social Work, Kamptee.

In Chandrapur’s Dhanoli and Bhandara’s Tawepar villages, activists claim reserve forest designations overlapped with FRA-recognised lands. Several activists, all of whom spoke on the condition of anonymity, pointed to a lack of clarity and transparency, despite a recent meeting with the Additional Commissioner of State Tribal Development Ravindra Thakre, where concerns over these overlaps were raised.

The Chandrapur District Collector, Vinay Gowda, emphasised that the process is still at the verification stage. “Field verification is ongoing to classify land as agricultural or inhabited. If any issues arise, I will ensure they’re resolved with the respective SDOs,” he said.

But the villagers and activists are not uncertain. “Notifications are being issued without proper communication or consultation. Communities are being sidelined,” one activist said.

Also read: ’76 Years After Independence, We Still Fight’: In Gadchiroli, a 150-Day Protest Against Mining

Impacts on livelihoods

The reserve forest designations threaten to upend the livelihoods of Adivasi communities across Vidarbha. In Mangli, the designated area includes a pond critical for both livestock and villagers. Restrictions on grazing hours and livestock types further exacerbate the challenges.

Similar issues have been reported in Nagpur’s Ramtek taluka, where reserve forest notifications have banned fishing, grazing, and tree cutting. Permissions for such activities are theoretically possible but often inaccessible to marginalised communities due to bureaucratic hurdles.

Dr Mate stressed that such policies deepen marginalisation. “When the state fails to provide clarity or support, it only amplifies the anxiety of those already struggling to survive,” he said.

The Divisional Forest Officer Prashant Khade said that forests are being overseen by the Joint Forest Management, a community-based program that involves the state forest department and local communities working together to protect and manage forests. “There are different types of rights forest-dwelling communities can exercise in reserve forest – cattle grazing, Non-Timber Forest Produce (NTFP) collection, among others. If the communities are granted those rights, there won’t be any restrictions,” he said.

Risks of denotification

While reserve forest status restricts access, denotifying Zudpi lands presents its own risks. An IA filed in the Godavarman case in 2020, highlighted illegal non-forest use, including mining, on lands not yet officially denotified. Activists fear that opening these areas for development could lead to further exploitation and displacement of tribal communities.

“This is a double-edged sword,” said an activist. “On one hand, reserve forest designations marginalise communities; on the other, denotification could invite industrial misuse.”

A fight for justice

The protests in Mangli and other villages are part of a broader movement across Vidarbha. Kunal and others are rallying neighbouring villages to strengthen their resistance, calling for greater transparency and adherence to FRA provisions. Activists are urging the government to balance conservation with community rights, emphasising that policies must evolve to reflect modern realities.

As Vidarbha’s Adivasis fight to protect their land, their struggle underscores a critical question: Can India’s colonial-era forest laws adapt to serve its marginalised communities? For now, the answer remains elusive, but the voices from these forests are growing louder.

Sukriti Vats is a writing fellow with Land Conflict Watch, an independent network of researchers that carries out research on land and natural resources.

The Quiet Replacement of Extras by VFX in Films

Digital agents now populate frames where junior artists once stood, raising critical questions about labour, cinematic authenticity and the politics of representation.

Advances in visual effects (VFX) technology are producing spectacular imagery in Indian blockbusters. In Mani Ratnam’s Ponniyin Selvan in 2022, a 10th century kingdom comes back to life. In Om Raut’s 2023 film Adipurush, we witness the burning of mythical Lanka. In Siddharth Anand’s Pathaan last year, Shah Rukh Khan flies in and out of a canyon valley. These images are entirely computer-generated or artfully blend computer-generated imagery (CGI) with live-action photography. They are created using software applications during the “post-production” phase of a film by VFX artists working in studios often far removed in time and place from a film’s real locations and stars. But “post-production” is not quite enough to describe the central role this technology has assumed – a film’s VFX supervisors, like a film’s cinematographer or production designer, are now involved in conversations about the look and story of the film at its inception. Films are being imagined, scripted, shot and sold on the strength of such effects, which are every day transforming the physical processes of filmmaking.

The transformation, however, is much more widespread than a focus on spectacular imagery and special effects would suggest. VFX artists are also leaving their mark in almost every frame – from adjusting the color of light for continuity to modifying an image on a censor’s demand. Such effects are not all spectacular, nor do they necessarily call attention to themselves as special. One of the more profound developments in recent years has been the quiet replacement of physical performers who populate the frame with virtual performers. Critics, journalists, and scholars of Indian cinema should pay attention to this transformation. The substitution of human presence poses important questions not only for the essence of cinema as an art, but for the visual politics of cinematic representation and the political economy of film production.

Superstars fill the spotlight of Indian cinema’s blockbuster machine, but the cinema also needs bodies in the background against which these popular icons can pop on-screen. At the end of Sanjay Leela Bhansali’s 2018 film Padmavat, hundreds of women descend the steps to a ceremonial pyre for self-immolation as their fort is breached by invaders in medieval Rajasthan. Trailing their queen (Deepika Padukone), they create a fiery vision of mass suicide that is the film’s most indelible image, one which provoked heated debate upon the film’s release. But the creation of this sequence was no less heated. Filming took place over several days during a hot summer in Mumbai’s Film City. To generate fire and smoke, real and virtual elements were combined. The blazing pyre was digital, but smaller flames dotting the frame were created on set by setting fire to rubber tires. Those burning tires evaporated into clouds of black smoke that filled the frame, while the tires themselves were carefully concealed. But assembling the women proved difficult; the film’s director, Bhansali, is alleged to have complained about the 350 extras or “junior artists” hired for this scene: “The shooting of the scene went on for a week, and the junior artists got restless. They would meander off in groups in between shoots and doze off due to exhaustion.” Their exhaustion may be explained by the relentless heat of the city and the infamous exactitude of the film’s director, as well as the particularly noxious effects of those burning rubber tires. Black smoke may photograph uniquely well, but those same fumes rapidly induce nausea, dizziness and depletion. As overheated extras struggled to cope with the physically draining effects of the shoot – and perform an obedient choreography of collective resolve – Bhansali described the shoot as a “challenge more emotional than physical.” To guard against the emotional and expensive challenges errant extras can mount to a film’s completion, filmmakers may be turning to an altogether different source from which to cast their anonymous crowds.

S.S. Rajamouli’s 2022 film RRR opens on a hot day on the outskirts of Delhi in 1920s India. Hundreds of angry young men have gathered around a colonial police station to protest the arrest of Lala Lajpat Rai in Calcutta. The mob will soon be dispersed by an imperial officer (Ram Charan), whose muscularity sets in motion a revisionist fantasy: armed violence, the film tells us, could have cut short colonial rule decades earlier than the transfer of power eventually took place. This historical fantasy finds its visual expression in the displacement of the people – icons of collective non-violent non-cooperation – from the centre of the film’s visual world to make place for strong superheroes. Indeed, the people are mere mirage: many of those we see gathering around the police station are not paid extras but digital “agents” generated by crowd simulation software. Similarly large crowds today are extended with digital agents created, costumed and animated as armoured soldiers flanking a swordfight (Ponniyin Selvan) or gun-slinging commandos watching a helicopter land (Jawaan). All of these films were made during or after the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, which triggered safety protocols across India’s film industries – crowd simulation solved the problem of physical proximity for the pandemic era (and allow cinematic persons to persist in a “post-human” mode). But such “solutions” may remain in place long after the pandemic ends its rampage, accelerating older shifts in how films are made, with stark consequences for those who have long participated in their production.

Still from RRR (S.S. Rajamouli, 2022)

Compare, for instance, how crowds were convened for another nationalist epic, Gandhi, by Richard Attenborough in 1982. Using crowd casting suppliers, translators and megaphones, hundreds of thousands of real people were contracted to recreate the rising political consciousness of decolonial struggle. The film’s production in India was controversial, but as a co-producing partner, the National Film Development Corporation sought to allay anxieties by settling on a deal: revenues from the film’s run in India would be used to launch a new welfare fund to support film workers, among whose largest representative associations were those for extras or junior artists. The deal was the product of intense political struggle. Through the 1980s, film workers organised and struck repeatedly as they fought for better terms from film producers and for recognition from the government. Negotiations were incredibly fine-grained. What an extra would be paid depended on if they spoke more than five words or fewer, whether they waded into water above their knee or below it, and whether their faces appeared prominently in the camera or not. The relative muteness or stillness of background players, even their facelessness, then, are financial calculations with aesthetic consequences. I cover this terrain of political struggle more extensively in my recently published book, Seeing Things published by University of California Press this year, which examines the production of horror films in 1980s Bombay. Some of the same struggle is registered in Gandhi. If you pause it just right, you will see extras looking directly at the camera instead of away from it and toward their messianic leader (played by the half-white Ben Kingsley). It is an act of disobedience that injects something like lived reality into cinematic fiction, an unscripted insurgency that could only arise from live performers. But the problems posed by the materiality of live performers – by their capacity for exhaustion or infection, their demand for better dues or call to strike – are being quietly scrubbed by VFX artists.

Still from Gandhi (Richard Attenborough, 1982)

VFX artists now supply the appearance of extras onscreen, rather than extras themselves. Many of these artists are employed at Indian VFX studios, among them Makuta VFX (Hyderabad), Red Chillies VFX (Mumbai) or VFXWalla (Hyderabad). In Hyderabad, their offices are clustered in the same upscale neighborhoods that house the local offices of global corporations, rather than closer to the film’s traditional filmmaking neighborhoods – a reminder of the original orientation of India’s VFX industries. These studios emerged at first to supply “outsourced” digital labour for Hollywood studios, which have relied on digital visual effects to a greater extent for a longer period of time. Indeed, crowd simulation software first revolutionised Hollywood filmmaking at the turn of the century, evident in such films as Gladiator by Ridley Scott in 2000 and The Lord of the Rings by Peter Jackson the following year. Since then, India’s contribution to global VFX output has grown. It is estimated that 20% of the world’s VFX work is executed in India. This should unsettle our idea of what counts as an Indian film, but also about the kind of exploitative labour unleashed by advances in technology. VFX work is symptomatic of the neoliberal recalibration of labour. These are workers outside unions, working across time zones, and competing with workers in other countries for a slice of the VFX pie. A high-pressure environment in which artists flame out quickly and studios declare bankruptcy, VFX artists may be little more than “coolies, working in air-conditioned, white-collar sweatshops.” By generating mass redundancies for the junior artists who have for decades supplied the human supplement to the superstars in the foreground and focus, VFX artists are unwittingly defanging the background or junior artists’ union in favor of using digital extras in their films’ backgrounds. Instead, VFX workers might learn something from their struggles.

Kartik Nair is an Assistant Professor of Film and Media Arts at Temple University. He is the author of Seeing Things (University of California Press, 2024).

This article first appeared in India in Transition, a publication of the Center for the Advanced Study of India, University of Pennsylvania.

SIP Additions Fall, Credit Card Delinquencies Rise as Private Sector Salaries Remain Stagnant

The issuance of e-way bills, a barometer for goods movement across India, fell to a five-month low of 101.8 million in November, down from a record 117.2 million in October.

New Delhi: A series of economic and sectoral data has painted a mixed picture of the growth trajectory, highlighting challenges in investment, consumer spending and wage trends amid a broader economic slowdown as the GDP growth slowed to 5.4% in the July-September quarter.

SIP account growth slows

The mutual fund industry’s Systematic Investment Plan (SIP) account additions dropped for the fourth consecutive month in November, falling to 1.3 million – the lowest in six months – compared to 2.5 million in October. Data from the Association of Mutual Funds in India attributed the decline to fewer new registrations and a slowdown in new fund offerings, according to a Business Standard report.

Only 10 equity NFOs were launched in November, compared to 24 in October. Despite this, SIP inflows remained steady at Rs 25,320 crore, matching the previous month’s contribution. Overall active equity fund inflows, however, dropped 14% month-on-month to Rs 35,943 crore, with sectoral and thematic funds witnessing the steepest decline, from Rs 12,279 crore in October to Rs 7,658 crore in November.

Auto discounts soar as sales decline

The Federation of Automobile Dealers Association reported record-high discounts of up to Rs 3.7 lakh on passenger vehicles (PVs) in December, as the PV market faced a 14% year-on-year (YoY) sales drop in November. Retail sales slumped following the festive season in October, leaving dealers with an inventory of around 65 days, Business Standard reported.

Although automakers have announced price hikes for January, the significant discounts reflect efforts to clear stock amid muted consumer sentiment. Comparatively, post-festive sales last year had grown by 2.6% with lower discounts ranging from Rs 2 lakh to Rs 2.5 lakh.

E-Way bill generation drops

The issuance of e-way bills, a barometer for goods movement across India, fell to a five-month low of 101.8 million in November, down from a record 117.2 million in October. While still higher than November 2023’s 87.5 million, the decline signals a cooling-off period after the festive season’s inventory build-up, according to a Mint report.

GST collections, closely linked to e-way bill activity, reached Rs 1.82 trillion in November, an 8.5% YoY increase but slightly below October’s Rs 1.87 trillion.

Also read: Rupee at All-Time Low, Passenger Vehicles Unsold as ‘Top 100’ Make Rs 138 Lakh Crore in 5 Years

Wages show meagre growth amid rising inflation

A report by the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce & Industry and Quess Corp, presented to the government, revealed subdued wage growth across key sectors between 2019 and 2023. The compounded annual growth rate for wages ranged from 0.8% in the engineering, manufacturing, process, and infrastructure sectors to 5.4% in the fast-moving consumer goods (FMCG) sector, reported the Indian Express.

Retail inflation, which breached the RBI’s tolerance range at 6.21% in October, has exacerbated the issue, with real incomes declining in several sectors. The report highlighted stagnant wage growth in the corporate sector despite profits quadrupling over the past four years.

The average wage in 2023 was highest in the IT sector at Rs 49,076 and lowest in FMCG at Rs 19,023. Analysts warn that rising inequality could further dampen consumption and hinder sustainable growth.

Credit card delinquencies rise as issuances decline

The credit card segment reported higher delinquencies in October 2023, with accounts overdue by 91-180 days increasing to 7.6%, up from 6.5% in June. New card issuances also fell 34.4% YoY in Q1FY25 to 4.4 million, while the growth rate of cards in circulation slowed to 13.5%, down from 18.7% a year earlier, Business Standard reported.

Banks have tightened credit score requirements and spending limits to manage defaults. The RBI has attributed stress in unsecured loans, including credit cards, to over-leveraged clients and higher provisioning.

Israeli Army Killed Over 145 Journalists in Gaza Since October 2023: Report

This year, 54 journalists were killed worldwide, with 31 deaths occurring in conflict zones such as Gaza, Iraq, Sudan, Myanmar and Ukraine.

The 2024 Round-up by Reporters Without Borders (RSF) paints a grim picture of the state of journalism, with escalating violence against media workers, particularly in conflict zones. Over half of the journalists killed this year lost their lives in areas of armed conflict. The Gaza Strip emerged as the deadliest region globally for journalists.

Conflict zones dominate journalist fatalities

This year, 54 journalists were killed worldwide, with 31 deaths occurring in conflict zones such as Gaza, Iraq, Sudan, Myanmar and Ukraine. RSF’s data reveals that nearly 30% of these deaths occurred in Gaza, where at least 35 journalists were killed in direct connection with their work.Since October 2023, the Israeli army has been implicated in over 145 journalist fatalities in the region. RSF has filed four war crime complaints with the International Criminal Court to address these killings.Palestine has become the most dangerous country for journalists, recording the highest death toll over the past five years.

Rising detentions: 550 journalists behind bars

Globally, 550 journalists are currently imprisoned, marking a 7% increase compared to last year. The uptick is attributed to surges in journalist detentions in Russia and Israel, which has become the third-largest jailer of journalists since the onset of the Gaza offensive. Four countries – China (124 journalists), Myanmar (61), Israel (41) and Belarus (40) – account for nearly half of the imprisoned journalists worldwide.

Also read: UNGA Resolution Calls For ‘Immediate, Unconditional, Permanent’ Gaza Ceasefire

Hostages and missing journalists

This year’s report also highlights the plight of 55 journalists held hostage and 95 journalists reported missing. Syria remains the epicentre for hostage situations, with 70% of the cases linked to kidnappings by the Islamic State. Yemen saw two new abductions in 2024, while Mali recorded similar cases last year.Of the missing journalists, 45% are victims of enforced disappearances. Countries like Mexico, Syria and Palestine feature prominently in these cases. RSF has urged nations to ratify the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance to address this growing concern.

Urgent call to action

Thibaut Bruttin, RSF’s director general, stressed the need for global action to combat impunity for crimes against journalists. “Journalists do not die, they are killed; they are not in prison, regimes lock them up; they do not disappear, they are kidnapped,” Bruttin said, emphasising the importance of justice and protection for media workers.”These crimes – often orchestrated by governments and armed groups with total impunity – violate international law and too often go unpunished. We need to get things moving, to remind ourselves as citizens that journalists are dying for us, to keep us informed. We must continue to count, name, condemn, investigate, and ensure that justice is served. Fatalism should never win. Protecting those who inform us is protecting the truth,” Bruttin further stated.

The Curious Case of the ‘Former Terrorist’

The phrase “former terrorist” categorises terrorism as a day job from which you can presumably retire.

One of the pleasures of former editorship is enjoying the dilemma faced by gracious masters of ceremony who are in two minds on how to introduce “ex-editors” (an alliterative headline word): veteran journalist (translation: past expiry date like a Gelusil bottle), senior journalist (euphemism for unemployed/unemployable hacks) or observer (a voyeuristic Peeping Tom that is not exactly a charitable description in polite company)?

Most master of ceremonies steer clear of the evocative and descriptive phrase “former editor,” possibly fearing that it would be taken as “has-been” editor. Against this backdrop, I found salvation this morning in an uncommon phrase the Press Trust of India (PTI) has used to describe the suspected shooter of Badal: “former terrorist.” PTI reported, “Amritsar: A former terrorist opened fire at Shiromani Akali Dal leader Sukhbir Singh Badal from a close range while he was performing the duty of ‘sewadar’ outside the Golden Temple here on Wednesday but missed as he was overpowered by a plainclothes policeman.”

The phrase “former terrorist” is a forgiving and reformative term, much like “correctional homes” that has replaced “jails.” The inclusive phrase “former terrorist” also categorises terrorism as a day job from which you can presumably retire. The next level in precise journalism should be “retired terrorist.” It raises the pertinent question: what do you do when a terrorist applies for voluntary retirement – do you offer a golden handshake in a hazmat suit? It is also not clear whether the said shooter had sent any resignation letter to the alleged terrorist outfit to which he had been linked.

Since William Safire – the oracle of language and the arbiter of usage who deployed merciless, if not outrageous, wordplay – is no longer around, I did not know how to check the chequered past of a “former terrorist.” I did find a reference in the New York Times (NYT). The PTI will be happy to know that the NYT had conferred such an honour on a subcontinental sibling: a Pakistan-origin “former terrorist” called Majid Shoukat Khan.

The NYT reported in 2023, “Belize City – A small Central American nation, known for its barrier reef and ecotourism, has taken in a former terrorist turned US government informant whose tale of torture by the CIA moved a military jury at Guantánamo Bay to urge the Pentagon to grant him leniency.” But the NYT has a reason for calling Khan a “former terrorist.” Although Khan had contributed to acts of terrorism, he was brutally abused and tortured and he served time.

He repudiated radicalism, cooperated with the US government in the fight against terrorism. Khan pledged in a statement to become “a productive, law-abiding member of society,” adding, “I continue to ask for forgiveness from God and those I have hurt.” The suspected shooter PTI has described as “former terrorist” has been in and out of prison but it has not been reported in the agency report whether he had been convicted of any crime.

Neither is it clear whether he had admitted to being a terrorist and whether he denounced terrorism. In the absence of such information, I am not sure how PTI reached the conclusion that the suspect is a “former terrorist.” I am also not sure if the suspected shooter, an alleged member of a pro-Khalistani banned group, had surrendered. Which makes him a “surrendered” terrorist, a phrase that commands a certain degree of official precedent.

The erstwhile Saikia government (I think) in Assam gifted us an innovative phrase: Sulfa (Surrendered Ulfa). Never mind that Gerhard Domagk introduced the term “sulfa” to describe the first successful chemical treatments for bacterial infections in humans. Now that the suspected shooter has returned to terrorism (opening fire at a former chief minister qualifies so, I suppose), will it be more apt to say “former-terrorist turned-incumbent-suspected-terrorist?” Should he be convicted, can it be “former-terrorist-turned-incumbent-terrorist?” The PTI desk has a lot to chew on.

The phrase “former militant” (used by the Indian Express, the Hindu and the Times of India) is clear. It suggests that a person had been a member of an outfit that supported militancy and that he may no longer be the member of that organisation or that the organisation does not exist any more or that he had denounced militancy.

Newspapers used to be very careful about the use of the words “terrorist” and “terrorism,” mindful of the complexities associated with the terms and the nebulous nature exemplified by the saying “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter.” 9/11 changed all that with some patriots in the US insisting that newscasters use the phrase “terrorist,” not militant or extremist.

In India, too, most of the media have fallen prey to the intimidatory tactics so much so that all insurgents in Kashmir are now called terrorists, not militants or extremists as was in the case in the last decades of the 20th century. The same goes with “martyrs.” Some newspapers indiscriminately use the term to describe slain soldiers, even before the circumstances that led to the death are clear or established.

The Indian Army has gone to the extent of issuing a letter to all its commands, discouraging the use of “martyrs” to describe soldiers killed in the line of duty. “Martyr refers to a person who suffers death as a penalty for refusing to renounce a religion or a person who suffers very much or is killed because of their religious or political beliefs,” the Indian Army’s letter in 2022 said.

So “the continued reference to Indian Army soldiers as martyrs may not be appropriate.” Evidently, the WhatsApp University is mightier than the Indian Army. Under pressure from nationalist trolls, some newspapers continue to use the term “martyrs.” In these matters, the Indian Army has been more diligent than many modern-day chief subs who clear copies that say “former terrorist.”

In 2014, the Indian Army issued a circular for retired personnel informing them that the correct form of addressing a retired officer is “Rank ABC (Retd) and not Rank (Retd) ABC.” An example is: “Brigadier Sant Singh (Retd).” The stated rationale of the army was, “Rank never retires, it is an officer who retires.” The army circular added that “the privilege is only given to service officers.” So, PTI should not say “Terrorist XXXXXXXX (Retd).”

This article is sourced from R Rajagopal’s social media posts.

R Rajagopal is editor-at-large of the Telegraph.

This article was originally published on the AIDEM. It has been edited slightly for style.

What Kind of Future Are We Building for Our Children?

Despite the importance of public investment towards children, our investments have not only been suboptimal always but also reducing.

November, in some ways, is the month for children. November 14 is celebrated as children’s day in India, marking the birth anniversary of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru and November 20 is the International or World Children’s Day. It is also the date on which the UN General Assembly adopted the Convention on the Rights of the Child (UN-CRC) in 1989. UNICEF also releases its flagship report on the State of World’s Children (SoWC) during this month. This year’s SoWC 2024 report is devoted to the world in which children will live in 2050 and identifies three ‘megatrends’ that are shaping their futures. All three are particularly relevant for India and call for urgent priority to children and their rights.

2050: A third of the world’s children will live in four countries

The first is to do with the demographic transition. While the world, including India, is ageing the pace and stage varies significantly across different parts of the world. Therefore, even though the share of children in the population of most developing countries is reducing, a much larger percentage of children in the world are expected to be concentrated in these regions of Africa and South Asia. The report estimates that by the 2050s more than a third of the world’s children will live in just four countries – India, China, Nigeria and Pakistan. India alone is expected to account for almost 15% of the global child population. Developing countries, including India, face the challenge of catering to an increasing elderly population while also making up for the deficits during childhood and youth so that their potential can be realised. The report points to the changes that come with this demographic transition in the form of smaller family sizes and fewer or no siblings. Investments in children will have to continue while newer systems of support and care for the elderly are put in place.

Climate crisis

The second big trend that is expected to affect children’s lives disproportionately is the climate and environment crisis. Health and well-being is affected in many ways. Rising average temperatures have led to an increase in mosquitoes and mosquito-borne diseases like malaria, dengue, zika virus etc. Access to clean and safe drinking water is increasingly becoming a challenge. Air pollution has been shown to be especially harmful for children. The last we are only too familiar with currently, especially in Delhi and other cities in northern India. As can be seen in the city of Delhi, air pollution not only has health impacts, but also is affecting children’s education and play which can have lasting effects on their learning, mental health and development.

Also read: We’re Still Asking the Wrong Question About Food Insecurity in India

The impact of climate risks is also highly unequal. Children from marginalised economic and social backgrounds are likely to be more affected. Displacement due to climate and environmental risks is also increasing. UNICEF has called the climate crisis a ‘child rights crisis’ with its Children’s Climate Risk Index (CCRI) showing that 1 billion children are at ‘extremely high risk’ of the impacts of climate change (i.e. half of all children). Not only are children more vulnerable but with the planet becoming a riskier place to live, it is their futures that are impacted for the worse. Once again it is children in the developing world who are relatively more exposed to climate hazards. India ranks 26 out of 163 countries on the basis of its CCRI, with a higher rank indicating greater risk, and falls in the ‘extremely high risk’ category which has 33 countries. It is of course the case that countries at the risk are also, mostly, the lowest contributors to the causes of climate change. Yet, developed countries have not come forward to take responsibility and contribute a fair share towards climate finance (as seen in the outcome of the recent COP29 in Baku). While fighting the international battle for a just distribution of resources towards climate change mitigation and adaptation, governments in the higher risk countries of the Global South cannot ignore these risks for children in their development planning.

Digital divide

The third and final trend that the SOWC report talks about is digitisation. While predicting that the role of digital technologies will only continue to increase, the report also highlights the digital divide that currently exists between the advanced countries and low-income countries. This digital divide will only contribute to perpetuating inequalities further. At the same time, concerns related to digital spaces exposing children to wide risks and harms are also raised. While frontier technologies and AI can provide great opportunities for children, they come with challenges and also contribute to the perpetuation of inequalities. Here too, the role of government policy and public investment becomes important. All of these are most relevant for India as well.

From the Indian perspective, we also need to acknowledge the inequalities that exist within the country. Caste, class, geography and gender determine to a large extent the kind of basic education, health, nutrition and care that a young child can expect to get in India. With weakening public services especially in education and health, the divide is only increasing. A number of these issues related to child development require much more investment in India.

A call for action

While most children are now in school, completion rates still have a great scope for improvement and the learning outcomes are usually poor across surveys. The quality of education and infrastructure in schools varies hugely between government schools and high fee-paying private schools. Early childhood, a period that is considered to be the most important in laying the foundation for mental and physical well-being during adulthood, remains neglected. The variation in quality of pre-schools that young children have in the country is vast, with many not getting any preschool education. According to the UNICEF report, only 48% of the children in the three- to five-year-old age group in India attend preschool. So, the inequality is perpetuated right from the beginning.

What is of great concern is that despite the advances being made in understanding child development and the importance of public investment towards children, our investments in children have not only been suboptimal always but are also reducing. The ‘Budget for Children’ is at its lowest in a decade at 2.3% of total Union budget in 2024-25 compared to 3.3% in 2015-16. The process of consultations for Budget 2025 has begun. Children neither have a vote nor a voice in these spaces. It is upon everybody else to speak for them.

Dipa Sinha is a development economist.