South Asia

Can ASEAN’s Cybersecurity Push Protect People and Economies?

Taking the lead on cybersecurity, both through the Norms Implementation Checklist and the ASEAN Regional Computer Emergency Response Team, is crucial to the security of people and economies in Southeast Asia.

As ransomware attacks and cyber-scams surge across Southeast Asia, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is stepping up to create a more secure regional cyberspace.

With cyber criminals targeting the region’s critical infrastructure, including data centres, and young and old users at risk of falling victim to digital scams, ASEAN’s efforts are not only about digital security — they’re also aimed at protecting economic and social stability.

In October 2024, ASEAN members launched two major initiatives.

First, the ASEAN Regional Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) opened its Singapore headquarters to boost collaboration on cybersecurity incident response, with Malaysia leading as the first overall coordinator.

This response team focuses on critical areas including information-sharing and strengthening public-private partnerships to bolster defences across the region.

In the same month, the Cyber Security Agency of Singapore and Malaysia’s National Cyber Security Agency introduced the Norms Implementation Checklist.

This list of action points aims to guide ASEAN nations in promoting responsible behaviour in cyberspace, based on United Nations (UN) cybersecurity norms.

Responding to a surge in cyberattacks

This year, the region has experienced a spate of major ransomware attacks. For example, a major incident occurred in June, when the Brain Cipher ransomware group disrupted the data centre operations of more than 200 government agencies in Indonesia.

Critical information infrastructure supports government and other essential services, so any disruption can cause severe socio-economic impacts that undermine public trust in government.

The threat of disruption from cybersecurity incidents extends to the private sector where, for example, in Singapore, three out of five companies polled had paid ransom during cyberattacks in 2023.

In addition, cyber scams are a major crime concern: they often impact vulnerable groups and are now so common they have become a regional security threat.

The rapid pace of digitalisation in Southeast Asia, coupled with low digital literacy and the ease of conducting online financial transactions, has facilitated a sharp increase in cyber scams such as phishing and social media scams.

Tackling cyber scams at the source is challenging. Transnational organised crime groups thrive in Southeast Asian countries with limited cybersecurity and insufficient law enforcement capabilities.

They often collude with local power structures: for example, they operate in conflict areas near the border of Myanmar, where they collude with militant groups.

Given these increasing threats, the launch of the ASEAN Regional Computer Emergency Response Team is a promising effort to enhance cooperation among Southeast Asian countries.

The eight functions of the response team — which include information-sharing, training and exercises, as well as developing partnerships with academic institutions and industry — aim to strengthen regional coordination on cyber incident response.

Incident response is a critical part of the region’s attempts to mitigate the impact of malicious cyber activities such as ransomware and the epidemic of cyber scams.

Strengthening ASEAN’s strategic position in cyberspace

In 2018, ASEAN agreed to subscribe in principle to the 11 UN norms of responsible state behaviour in cyberspace.

While their full potential has not yet been realised, these 11 norms, set out in the UN’s Norms Implementation Checklist, could play a crucial role in helping ASEAN member states progress from ‘in principle’ to ‘in practice’ in the cybersecurity space. These norms aim to guide countries’ national cyber policies to align with the rules-based international order set out by the UN.

Adherence to these cyber norms (such as fostering inter-state cooperation on security, preventing misuse of Information and communications technologies, and cooperating to stop crime and terrorism) could, ideally, complement the work of the ASEAN Regional Computer Emergency Response Team in responding to malicious cyber activities and fighting cyber scams.

Regional implementation of these norms could contribute to an environment of trust and confidence among ASEAN countries, to create stability in Southeast Asia’s cyberspace.

There are strategic reasons for creating regional cyberspace stability. As the UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres has warned, cyberspace is increasingly being exploited as a weapon in conflicts — by criminals, non-state actors, and even governments. This trend is inimical to ASEAN’s regional ambitions, strengthening the argument for nations in the region to proactively adopt a cyber rules-based order.

What’s more, ASEAN aims to be a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality. This goal emphasises keeping the region free from interference by external powers that could create insecurity.

As ASEAN established this goal in 1971 during the analogue era and Cold War, it is only appropriate that the organisation develop new initiatives to adapt to the digital era and Cold War 2.0.

ASEAN should also promote the Norms Implementation Checklist as a guide for other countries that are its dialogue partners but are embroiled in geopolitical and cyber rivalry (such as China and the United States).

Observers warn that the inability of the regional group to address the Myanmar civil war and rising tensions in the South China Sea, both of which involve cyber activities, is eroding its relevance.

This crisis consequently shapes how some ASEAN members and external powers view ASEAN centrality. It is also among the reasons why non-ASEAN security arrangements — such as the QUAD, NATO Indo-Pacific Four and Japan-Philippines-US alliance —are establishing cooperative efforts, including on cybersecurity, in the Indo-Pacific.

Taking the lead on cybersecurity, both through the Norms Implementation Checklist and the ASEAN Regional Computer Emergency Response Team, is therefore crucial to the security of people and economies in Southeast Asia.

It could also prevent ASEAN’s centrality in regional security matters from eroding further. But this is contingent on ASEAN nations providing sufficient resources, policy thinking and political will to make these two initiatives deliver results.

Muhammad Faizal Abdul Rahman is a research fellow (Regional Security Architecture Programme) with the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.

Originally published under Creative Commons by 360info™.

Watch | ‘Sri Lanka’s Dissanayake Is a Powerful, Popular President but a Pragmatist Not a Marxist’

Paikiasothy Saravanamuttu, the executive director, Centre for Policy Alternatives, analyses the parliamentary mandate Sri Lanka’s president has received.

In an interview to assess the enormous parliamentary mandate President Anura Kumara Dissanayake’s National People’s Power coalition has won and how he is likely to use his sweeping powers, one of the foremost political analysts in Sri Lanka says president Dissanayake will be one of the island’s most powerful and popular presidents but adds that he is a pragmatist and not, as much of the Western press has described him, a straightforward marxist.

Paikiasothy Saravanamuttu, the executive director, Centre for Policy Alternatives, in a 25-minute interview, analyses the parliamentary mandate Sri Lanka’s president has received with 159 seats, which is more than two-thirds, and nearly 62% of the vote. This is the first time Sri Lanka’s proportional representation system has produced a two-thirds majority.

More importantly, president Dissanayake’s NPP, whose largest component is the JVP, a Sinhala majority party, has won the majority of votes in the North, which is dominated by Tamils, in the East, where there is a large Muslim population, and in the hill country, where there is also a large Tamil population. This clearly indicates the extent to which the perception of the JVP has transformed since the 1980s, when it was widely viewed as anti-Tamil and Sinhala racist.

Muhammad Yunus Announces Bangladesh’s Plan to Seek Sheikh Hasina’s Repatriation from India

This appears to be the first instance of Yunus making such a significant commitment in a public speech.

New Delhi: Bangladesh chief adviser Muhammad Yunus on November 17 said that he will seek the repatriation of former interim prime Sheikh Hasina who is currently in India since her ouster from power in August.

Bangladesh state media broadcast an address to the nation from Yunus on the occasion of the completion of 100 days of his interim government, which took over after Hasina fled for India on August 5 after the students-led reform movement led to the fall of her government.

Bangladeshi news agency UNB reported that Yunus pledged the interim government would “seek the repatriation of the deposed dictator, Sheikh Hasina, from India.”

“Not only for the murders of July and August, but we’ll prosecute all the crimes committed over the past 15 years. Many people have been subjected to enforced disappearance and murdered during this time,” the chief adviser said.

He announced that the number of enforced disappearances that took place during Hasina’s rule, which are under investigation, could “exceed 3,500.”

This appears to be the first instance of Yunus making such a significant commitment in a public speech.

In September, during an interview with the Indian news agency PTI, he had remarked that Hasina should remain quiet “till the time that Bangladesh wants her back.”

Yunus appeared to be responding to Hasina’s August 13 statement, where she demanded “justice” and called for accountability for those involved in recent “terror acts,” killings, and vandalism.

This statement remains Hasina’s only public comment since her flight. It was posted on the social media accounts of her US-based son, Sajeeb Wazed Joy.

Indian external affairs minister S. Jaishankar had informed parliament in August that Hasina was allowed to enter India after seeking permission on “short notice.” However, no further clarification about her status in India has been provided since then.

In answer to a question at a weekly media briefing, the Ministry of External Affairs’ spokesperson Randhir Jaiswal stated that “she had come here at a short notice for safety reasons, as she continues to be”.

Watch: What the Sri Lankan Election Results Mean

Ahilan Kadirgamar, senior lecturer of the Jaffna University, and B. Skanthakumar, co-editor of the ‘Polity Magazine’, discuss what the historic mandate could reflect.

Rising above ethnic, language and religious differences, Sri Lankan voters pushed the National People’s Power alliance to a landslide victory, giving the NPP of president Anura Kumara Dissanayake a total of 141 seats out of a possible 225 on Friday (November 15).

The NPP expected to obtain a two-third majority. A total of 196 seats were decided by direct election in the country’s proportional representation system with the remaining 26 members to Parliament being selected by eligible parties through a national list. With the NPP expected to gain 18 out of the 26 national list seats, their tally is expected to go upto 159 seats.

Amit Baruah, an independent journalist, is in conversation with Ahilan Kadirgamar, senior lecturer of the Jaffna University and B. Skanthakumar, co-editor of the Polity Magazine.

In a First, Nepal Exports Power to Bangladesh Through India Under Trilateral Agreement

Nepal will export 40 megawatts of power to Bangladesh as per the agreement.

New Delhi: For the first time, three South Asian countries collaborated in a transmission network, with Nepal successfully exporting power to Bangladesh through an Indian grid on Friday (November 15).

The energy export was virtually inaugurated by Union urban affairs minister Manohar Lal, Nepal’s energy minister Deepak Khadka, and Bangladesh’s energy advisor Muhammad Fouzul Kabir Khan.

The tripartite power sales agreement between NTPC Vidyut Vyapar Nigam, Nepal Electricity Authority and Bangladesh Power Development Board was signed on October 3, 2024 in Kathmandu.

Nepal will export 40 megawatts of power to Bangladesh as per the agreement.

“The start of this power flow from Nepal to Bangladesh through India is expected to boost sub-regional connectivity in the power sector,” the Union external affairs ministry said in a press release.

“The Indian government had announced its decision to facilitate the first trilateral power transaction during the visit of former prime Minister of Nepal, Mr. Pushpa Kamal Dahal ‘Prachanda’ to India from 31 May to 3 June 2023. During the visit, both sides had expressed their commitment towards greater sub-regional cooperation, including in the energy sector, which would lead to increased inter-linkages between the economies for mutual benefit of all stakeholders,” it added.

“This milestone is a reflection of our shared vision for a sustainable and interconnected energy future in South Asia,” Khadka said.

Nepal will transmit electricity through the 400KV Dhalkebar-Muzaffarpur line in India, the Kathmandu Post reported.

The export that started Friday afternoon will last only until Friday midnight. As per the agreement, Nepal and Bangladesh will trade power only between June 15-November 15. Hence, the three countries worked to complete at least one round of power export during this season.

Economic Struggles Push Anura Dissanayake’s NPP Alliance to Victory in Sri Lanka Parliamentary Polls

‘Since my childhood, every election map has highlighted a divided country, with clear regional splits in the results. For the first time, I’m seeing a truly unified Sri Lanka across the map.’

Colombo: Rising above ethnic, language and religious differences, Sri Lankan voters swept the National People’s Power alliance to a landslide victory, giving the NPP of president Anura Kumara Dissanayake a total of 141 seats out of a possible 225 on Friday (November 15), the country’s Election Commission said.

The NPP demolished the hold of ethnic Tamil and Muslim parties in the country’s North and the East – including the Jaffna peninsula – once the centre of a 26-year-long insurgency led by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).

Given that the NPP had just three seats in the previous Parliament, a likely two-thirds majority being projected for the alliance is nothing short of a political tsunami – something that the NPP itself may not have expected.

Many observers link the results to the unprecedented economic hardships being faced by ordinary Sri Lankans during and after the economic crisis of 2022 and the Aragalya, or the people’s struggle that followed.

Veteran Jaffna-based political activist Sooriasegaram told this writer as the election results poured in, “Race and religion did not come into the equation – not even in a minor way.” People who were unable to make ends meet had voted as Sri Lankans and placed their trust in a national party to improve their circumstances, Sooriasegaram added.

Established political formations like the Samagi Jana Balawegaya (United People’s Power) of Sajith Premadasa and the New Democratic Front led by former President Ranil Wickremesinghe were rejected by the people. The SJB with 35 seats was a distant second and the NDF had managed just three seats so far.

“Since my childhood, every election map has highlighted a divided country, with clear regional splits in the results. For the first time, I’m seeing a truly unified Sri Lanka across the map. No more divide and rule,” Zahran Careem, a photographer, wrote on X.

The massive parliamentary mandate for the Janata Vimukthi Peramuna (People’s Liberation Front)-led NPP by voters cutting across ethnic and religious divides puts enormous pressure on President Dissanayake to deliver on his promises.

Amit Baruah is an independent journalist and former Sri Lanka correspondent of The Hindu.

Sri Lanka: Anura Dissanayake’s Ruling Coalition Secures Majority

The NPP has secured 113 seats in the 225-seat Sri Lankan parliament.

New Delhi: Newly elected Sri Lanka president Anura Kumara Dissanayake’s National People’s Party coalition has secured a majority in the parliamentary snap polls that took place barely seven weeks since he assumed office.

Reports say that the NPP has secured 113 seats in the Sri Lankan parliament. Prior to the election, Dissanayake’s coalition just three of parliament’s 225 seats.

The Samagi Jana Balawegaya of Sajith Premadasa is a distant second with 31 seats.

The majority will be crucial as Dissanayake pushes his promised tax and economic reforms.

Voting took place a day ago, on November 14.

As The Wire has reported before, the five-year term of Sri Lanka’s unicameral parliament was set to lapse in August 2025, but Dissanayake had promised during his presidential election campaign to dissolve it immediately were he to come to power.

This is a breaking news copy and will be updated as poll data comes in.

Contrary to Reports, Dhaka Is Not on the Boil – It Is Going About Its Business, Albeit Cautiously

As hope gives way to scepticism on the ground, the interim government is facing the heat over inflation and an uncertain law and order situation.

Dhaka: The revolutionary graffiti on the walls of Dhaka have not faded yet and television channels still occasionally play distressing visuals of young students who were felled by police bullets during the quota protests. On November 8, the rickshaw that had carried the bullet-riddled body of one of the protestors to hospital was sent for display at the July Revolution Museum.

But exactly three months since Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus took charge as the chief adviser to the interim government in Bangladesh, audacious hope has been replaced by the first signs of scepticism even as the government, faced with an uncertain law and order situation and recalcitrant inflation, is feeling the heat.

On a question about inflation on the news channel News24, Mohammad Abul Kalam Azad Majumder, deputy press secretary to Yunus, said: “We are working on it and nobody can doubt our intent and earnestness. We are looking for ways to cut out middlemen so that consumers can benefit.”

The interim government has said at multiple fora that the fact that they have been able to repay debts without dipping into the reserves is one metric of their success. They are also wearing the “no corruption” badge on their sleeves.

On the streets, disillusionment is just kicking in about the high rates of inflation; rumour mills are also working overtime, speculating about another political upheaval in the country on the back of Donald Trump’s re-election as US president.

Says Saidul Islam, who has a saree shop in Banarasi Pally in Mirpur: “I do not know what is happening to the country. I had taken to the streets to protest too and when Yunus arrived, I was hopeful. But now what it has come to is we are trying to hide behind him and hoping that our creditors will not ask for their money back. When Hasina left I was happy. But look where we are. Everyday, vegetable prices are through the roof.

“In India you pay Rs 10-15 for a piece of cauliflower. We pay Tk 100 [Rs 70.6]. Even pumpkins and radishes cost close to Tk 100 per kg. We used to buy eggs for Tk 120 per dozen; now we are paying Tk 160. I am beginning to think ‘yes she was corrupt, but at least our lives were better’. It is a Friday and normally I have customers queueing up outside my shop. Today there is nobody. Now I am hearing Hasina may come back because she is friends with Trump.” Latest government figures peg food inflation at 12.66%.

It so happens that days after Trump was declared the US president-elect, Awami League supporters who had been mostly under the radar for the last three months started circulating an invitation on social media for a meeting on November 10. They were eventually thwarted by student organisations and political parties.

The invitation, which did not mention the Awami League, says below the date: “Representatives of international media including the BBC, CNN, TRT World, Al Jazeera, Deutsche Welle [and the] Telegraph will be present. Army and police will not create any trouble. Anyway, they are under pressure internationally. Everybody can come without fear.”

The government retaliated immediately with statements on social media saying that no “fascist party” would be allowed to hold protests in Bangladesh. But Awami League supporters now have a spring in their step that had been missing all this while.

There is an element of uncertainty not just about when the next election will happen, but also about whether it will be an organic process or if it will precipitate more unrest.

Also read: Bangladesh Must Now Face Up to the Risk of Democracy

The government’s ability to get things done is constantly called into question with a slightly derisive “NGO government” tag. In an interview to the news channel Ekattor, environment and forests adviser Syeda Rizwana Hasan said: “What is the harm in being an ‘NGO government’ if we can give this country what the ‘GO government’ could not?”

But Dhaka is by no means a city on the boil as many reports seem to suggest. The city is going about its business as usual, but there is an element of insecurity.

In the wake of the protests, policemen have been at the receiving end of public ire for their role in the killing of young protesters. This has caused the force to avoid many of its key functions, including traffic management, making Dhaka’s normal traffic congestion far worse. Citizens feel unsafe and businessmen also feel the impact of this insecurity as they blame recurrent worker unrest on antisocial elements.

There is distrust and disappointment with India, and the portrayal of Bangladesh in large sections of the Indian media has caused outrage. Attempts at conversation, particularly with Dhaka’s elite, will occasionally be thwarted by the question: “How do I know you are not RAW?” The Research and Analysis Wing is India’s foreign intelligence agency.

A city in the making

From towering skyrises to multi-level roads and the newly inaugurated Dhaka Metro, the capital of Bangladesh is a city under construction. The elevated expressway that has drastically cut travel time to and from the airport is a matter of great pride among residents. The third terminal of the Hazrat Shahjalal International Airport is also expected to open in the coming months.

Behind closed doors, the credit for transforming Dhaka into a modern and international city is generously given to Sheikh Hasina, but always with the proviso that corruption levels had become unacceptable and the way the last elections in the country were conducted was the last straw.

“She had vision, she transformed the city. Look at this 300-foot road that we are driving on. It was her idea. It is true that corruption levels were very high, but I would still say she was the victim of a conspiracy that she failed to detect,” says a businessman who did not want to be quoted.

Others cite the example of the Mirpur and Kazipara metro stations that had been damaged during the July-August protests to underline the level of corruption. The managing director of the Dhaka Metro had said that the damage would cost Tk 300 crore to repair. Eventually it took less than Tk 20 crore.

Bangladesh’s biggest foreign exchange earner, the country’s readymade garments (RMG) sector, is seeing continued tremors of an essentially political nature, as worker unrest resurfaces and government sources blame owners’ political affiliations for these disturbances.

A senior government official says: “The RMG sector of Bangladesh remains competitive across the world. Export increased 7% year-on-year in September after the July-August uprising. So you can imagine how robust the sector is. August was admittedly topsy-turvy; in some places police were not on duty. Things stabilised in September.

“The unrest in some factories is because of the political connections their owners harboured with the previous regime. Because of those connections, they got cheap loans to run the factory and they were not competitive at all. They had productivity issues.”

Owners on their part say the unrest is a sign of the government’s lack of a handle on the law and order situation in the country. There are murmurs also of some sections of the police owing allegiance to the deposed government, the one that government spokespersons and sundry media channels have now taken to calling the ‘fascist government’.”

In Photos: Dhaka in a ‘New’ Bangladesh

Eye on elections

All traces of the Awami League have been wiped from the streets of Dhaka, even though the interim government has clarified that it is not in favour of a ban against the party, which had been in power since 2009 – a year that many say was when the last free and fair elections happened in the country.

The streets are plastered with posters of Zia Ur Rahman – the founder of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and of his son Tariq Rahman, who is currently based in London.

The BNP took out a rally on November 7, which is observed as National Revolution and Solidarity Day. It is seeking elections soon but is not ready to take to the streets yet with that demand. It has also made it clear that it does not want any political party to be banned.

BNP leader and former minister Gayaswar Roy says: “We want elections, but we do not want the people to say that we are greedy. On the reforms our position is very clear; whatever reforms the interim government can build consensus on, they can do. If that is not achieved, then they have to leave that work for the elected government.”

There is also hope for early elections given the importance an elected government would hold for Washington, even if a Trump government may be less friendly to Dhaka than the Democrats.

There is also the heightened activity of the recently unbanned Jamaat-e-Islami on the streets of Dhaka, even though political observers say they may not have that wide a voter base in order to become a potent political force when elections do take place.

“The people of Bangladesh are God-fearing; they are not blinded by religion. That is why this country can never have a fundamentalist government,” said a senior Bangladeshi politician.

Abantika Ghosh is a journalist and public policy professional. She was recently in Dhaka for a project.

Southeast Asia Needs $190 Billion Annually to Meet Clean Energy Goals

Annual average energy investment over the last three years was $72 billion.

Financing has long been recognised as a barrie r to accelerating decarbonisation in Southeast Asia.

A successful transition to a low-carbon economy – especially in the region’s low- and middle-income countries – will rely heavily on two things.

The first is international concessional finance and the second, stronger climate targets to accelerate investor interest.

Both are expected to be determined at COP29.

Countries must update their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) by February 2025 under the terms of the Paris Agreement and leaders will announce the New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG), a new set of financing commitments to support developing countries in their climate actions post 2025.

Required finance could fall short

While most countries in Southeast Asia now have ambitious long-term clean energy goals, the investments required to meet these targets are not yet on track.

According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), the region attracts only 2% of global clean energy investment despite accounting for 6% of global GDP, 5% of global energy demand and being home to 9% of the world’s population.

Annual average energy investment over the last three years was $72 billion. The IEA’s ‘Net Zero Emissions’ (NZE) scenario calls for $190 billion in annual investment from 2026–2030.

Developing countries require far more funding than current levels to adopt green technologies at scale and deploy adaptation measures. Many developing country NDCs include “conditional” climate pledges, which they say are only attainable with international support.

Of the $4.5 trillion developing countries say is needed, one-third is linked to conditional pledges. There are significant differences between conditional and unconditional targets in the existing NDCs submitted to the UNFCCC by most Southeast Asian countries.

For instance, the Philippines’ unconditional target is a 2.71% emissions “reduction and avoidance,” while its conditional target is a 72.29% emissions reduction. In Vietnam, NDC targets are framed as large emissions reductions against a business-as-usual scenario: a 15.8% reduction unconditionally and 43.5% conditionally.

COP29 can accelerate decarbonisation

At COP29, leaders will negotiate financial contributions to support developing countries in tackling climate change.

Key points to monitor include the total amount of financing for developing countries and how it is accounted for.

For example, discussions centred on whether the last financing goal from COP15, which promised $100 billion annually, was met as reported by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).

This is complicated by the fact that many of these financing commitments are repurposed from existing programme funds, meaning they are not ‘new and additional,’ and there is no clear distinction between grants and non-grants.

Lower- and middle-income countries in the region are primarily concerned about whether accelerating decarbonisation will lead to significant debt and create trade-offs with other important priorities, such as health and education.

These issues have already posed a real challenge to the implementation of Just Energy Transition Partnerships in Indonesia and Vietnam.

In addition to grants, concessional loans – those with more favourable terms than “market rate” – are also essential for accelerating Southeast Asia’s energy transition, as the region faces capital costs significantly higher than in industrialised nations.

The IEA suggests that the region could meet its energy transition goals with substantial increases in concessional financing from development finance institutions. This type of financing can lower the cost of capital and enhance the financial viability of clean energy projects, especially in emerging and “high-risk” markets.

In the IEA’s net zero scenario, an estimated $12 billion in concessional finance could be needed for the region by the early 2030s to support an accelerated uptake of clean energy technologies.

Also read: Trump Is President Again, and It’s Bad News For the Climate

Robust frameworks and targets needed

Financing accelerated energy transition in Southeast Asia will significantly depend on the strength and integration of the region’s climate policy framework, which would send long-term signals to mitigate risks for investors, including political, technology, currency and market risks.

A robust NDC target, aligned with policy frameworks can convey strong ‘push’ signals for investors. The robustness and alignment of different targets need to be supported by effective institutional and cross-ministerial governance arrangements to enable effective implementation.

Southeast Asian nations have an opportunity to strengthen their NDC targets and signal long-term and demonstrable ambition to mitigate market and political risks.

This, in turn, can help reduce capital costs and broaden the investment pool. It is also crucial to enhance sustainable finance policies, such as regional and national taxonomies, and to increase 1.5-degree-aligned climate reporting and ESG reporting standards.

Climate finance for Southeast Asia is critical for global transition

Southeast Asia is projected to account for a quarter of the growth in global energy demand over the next decade, driven by its expanding population and industrial growth.

To meet global climate goals outlined in the Paris Agreement, COP29 must see developed countries enhance their financing offers, while Southeast Asian nations need to present ambitious NDC targets supported by credible transition plans.

A second Trump administration could introduce uncertainties in meeting these goals, making international cooperation even more vital.

The international community must come together to support Southeast Asia – both as a key driver of global economic growth and as one of the regions most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change.

Trang Nguyen is the Southeast Asia Lead at Climateworks Centre, an independent and non-profit organisation within Monash University. Trang is also a non-executive Director for the Asian Australians for Climate Solutions, a non-profit organisation working to increase climate change awareness and engagement among Asian Australian communities.

Bangladesh Versus Adani Power: A Sri Lankan Perspective

As Sri Lanka found in 2022, simply making a payment does not cause the electricity to flow instantly. Competitive bids must be sought and assessed. Ships must sail and be unloaded. All this takes time.

Instead of buying fuel for power generation, Bangladesh is buying 10% of the electricity it needs from a dedicated power plant located across the border in Godda in Jharkhand. The Bangladesh Power Development Board (BPDB) has failed to make timely payments and Adani Power is threatening to cut supplies. It is reported that the outstanding payments may be as much as USD 800 million. State-owned coal powered generating plants in Bangladesh are running below capacity because they too lack dollars to buy the needed fuel.

At the peak of the Sri Lankan crisis in 2022, people experienced 13 hour power cuts because the government lacked the money (and creditworthiness) to unload the coal shipments in Colombo port.

Load shedding is not something any self-respecting government should allow in this day and age. Whether the cause is inability to buy fuel for a state-owned plant or the inability to buy electricity from a private supplier, the result is the same: load shedding. The cause for both is lack of dollars.

The Adani contract is said to be unfavourable to Bangladesh. I do not know enough to comment on the details of the complex contract between Adani Power and BPDB. For example, I know enough to say that a capacity-charge component is normal in these kinds of transactions, but lack enough information to say whether the amount (reported to be US $ 450 million/year) is reasonable. When a major dedicated investment (in excess of US $ 1.7 billion) is made to fulfil the terms of a contract, it is normal to include capacity charges. It was upto the BPDB officials to ensure the terms were reasonable.

The coal is brought all the way from an Adani owned mine in Australia to Jharkand, a coal-rich state. This is said to result in excessive costs. But the appropriate comparison is with the alternatives that the BPDB has at this time. “Other coal-fired plants are running at 50% capacity and the country is unable to buy enough coal owing to the dollar crisis, so it is important to continue readymade power supply from Adani. It is marginally more expensive than local producers but it is a crucial supply,” the BBC reported Dr Ajaj Hossain, energy expert and a retired professor as saying.

Also read: To Legalise Power Project Given to Adani Without Tender, Sri Lanka Wants it Turned Into Govt-to-Govt Deal

Right now, and long-term

With the available dollars, should BPDB pay the outstanding debt to Adani or buy coal for the state-owned plants? As Sri Lanka found in 2022, simply making a payment does not cause the electricity to flow instantly. Competitive bids must be sought and assessed. Ships must sail and be unloaded. All this takes time.

Modern societies cannot function without electricity. How can a government allow such matters to be under the control of foreign companies or governments?

On the surface, the answer seems obvious: become self-sufficient in energy. Sri Lanka has enough wind and solar potential to meet its entire requirements and more. Bangladesh has this option too, though its current renewable share is in the single digits. It also has natural gas in the ground. Why are these countries scrambling for dollars to pay for essential electricity and the inputs for electricity?

Solar and wind require major investments and the key inputs have to be brought from outside the country. The early wind plants in Sri Lanka even required the cranes for raising the towers to be brought from India. India has developed the eco-system for renewables, but is not fully self-sufficient. It is widely accepted that the solar panels produced in China are the cheapest. In addition, the grid has to be built out to the locations where the wind and solar power is generated. This requires major investments. Here too, the choices are investment or loans. It’s likely to take three to five years from green light to cut over.

Foreign investment is perhaps the only option for increasing the proportion of electricity generated from wind and solar for governments with fiscal constraints. Contracts such as the one entered into with Adani are seen as necessary to assure the investor in any kind of energy supply that they will continue to earn returns throughout the projected life of the investment. Of course, each element in a contract must be negotiated carefully because parties have incentive to embed favourable provisions within the complex legalese.

Before the investment is made, the investor has a strong negotiating position: treat us fairly or we will go elsewhere. But once the investment is made, the investor cannot dismantle the turbines and go elsewhere. Now the state and the buyer of the output of the plant (often the buyer is owned by the state) have the upper hand.

This is what happened to independent power producers (IPPs) supplying electricity using renewable sources during the 2022-23 crisis in Sri Lanka. The state-owned electricity board did not honour its contractual obligations. The IPPs could have disconnected their plants from the grid, resulting in longer periods of load shedding for the public and no income for themselves. Or they could let the electricity flow while lobbying those is authority for payments to be made, even if late. The Sri Lankan IPPs chose the latter path and have now been made whole.

The Adani contract differs from the Sri Lankan case in two ways. The first and most important is that the Godda plant requires 7-9 million tonnes of coal per year. A plant using renewable sources will require minimal cost outlays for operations. The wind will blow and the sun will shine. By contrast, a coal plant requires continual expenditures for fuel and transport. The second difference is that the Godda plant is outside Bangladesh jurisdiction.

A Google Map depiction of the road route between Godda and Bangladesh’s Dhaka area.

The IPPs in Sri Lanka, whose losses were limited to the costs of serving the debt taken to build their plants and the forgone profits of the shareholders, could afford to be patient. Adani Power has to pay for the coal including transportation costs, in addition. That is likely the reason for Adani’s hard stance.

The second difference is that the coercive power of the Bangladesh government does not extend into Jharkhand state. The Indian government is not supporting the Bangladesh government’s demands. It is instead easing the pain for Adani by allowing electricity from the Godda plant to be sold within India.

Managing dependence

Saudi Arabia is a major energy exporter. If any country can be self-sufficient in energy, it should be Saudi Arabia. Yet it is partnering with multiple Chinese entities to ramp up its renewable energy capacity. If this is the case for Saudi Arabia, how can fiscally constrained Bangladesh and Sri Lanka be self-sufficient?

Issues of dependence cannot be wished away. Russia cut off electricity supplies to Finland in the context of that country’s support for Ukraine. But because Finland had diversified, it was able to make up the difference by getting more power from Sweden. Adani was not the sole external supplier of electricity to Bangladesh, but it was the largest. Even the other suppliers reduced supply because of non-payment.

Usually, what happens is that a supplier withholds service for political reasons (like in Finland). With Adani and the other Indian suppliers, the problem is the opposite. They want to sell. Supply is being withheld because they are not being paid.

Diversification is how dependence is managed. However, problems cannot be avoided if macro-economic mismanagement delays or stops payments for contracted services. Finland was able to avoid load shedding because its electricity companies had the funds to pay the new suppliers.

Energy utilities must actively mitigate risks, including geopolitical risks. But the most fundamental risk-mitigation action is sound macro-economic management. Bankruptcy negates more risk mitigation measures.

Rohan Samarajiva is founding Chair of LIRNEasia, an ICT policy and regulation think-tank active across emerging Asia.