Month: April 2018

Happymon Jacob: Hello and welcome to National Security Conversations with me, Happymon Jacob. The summit meeting between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping has just been concluded in city of Wuhan in China. While we are still awaiting the details of the summit meeting, there aren’t too many expectations in terms of agreements and declarations coming out of this meeting. In fact, the two leaders went into this meeting without any expectations themselves and therefore the meeting has been called an ‘informal’ summit. In that sense, this summit has been about going back to the negotiating table and not about negotiating anything new or different.

Sino-Indian relations have been under great stress lately, especially in the aftermath of the Doklam standoff at the tri-junction between Bhutan, India and China. There has been a lot of rhetoric, mudslinging and propaganda between the two sides in the wake of the Doklam crisis. The Wuhan summit needs to be viewed in the context of this vitiated atmosphere and a desire for stability and rapprochement between the two sides.

The summit in that sense has perhaps provided much needed thaw between India and China. This is certainly a good beginning but there are several questions that need to be answered. Has this summit meeting come too late in the day to have achieved anything substantive? Is this summit meeting more about optics rather than about substance? Will the two sides be able to translate the warmth in Wuhan to their day-to-day military engagements on their border? Is the international system conducive for a Sino-Indian entente cordiale? These are some of the questions we need to ask at this point, now that the Wuhan summit is over.

To talk to us about this and more we have professor Alka Acharya from School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University. Professor Alka Acharya is professor of Chinese studies at the Jawaharlal Nehru University. She was until recently the director of the Institute of Chinese Studies in New Delhi. She was also the editor of China Report, one of the finest academic journals on China. She was also a member of the National Security Advisory Board of government of India. Professor Alka Acharya, welcome to the National Security Conversations.

Alka Acharya: Thanks Happy.

HJ: Prof Acharya, could you please give us some general background to the run-up to this informal meeting we just saw taking place in Wuhan.

AA: I think you did refer to Doklam as having constituted a kind of a low-point in the relationship. Last year, in summer for 73 days, armies from both sides were facing each other. A new low as well in the kind of invective that came out from both sides, more on Chinese side one must admit. Surprisingly, the two sides did make repeated references to 1962, that we are not the India of 1962 and China said neither are we. So this brought the entire discourse to a completely new low and especially when for the last 20 years, we have been patting ourselves on the back that we are more or less getting past 1962 – new treaties have come up, quite border, not a shot has been fired and all these kind of things.

In fact, both the sides takes considerable pride in the fact that this is the longest contested border and yet it is the quietest. So I think, Doklam really brought the two sides up against a very, very formidable issue – is the substantial achievement of Sino-Indian relationship actually going to just fritter away because of this? So that was one of the wake-up calls and I think the second part was also that this is new element in the whole boundary dispute that it’s just not about what India and China between us are dealing with but then now we are now also getting problems – CPEC on this side and the Doklam which involves Bhutan, India and China tri-junction on the other side. So clearly it’s becoming much more complex kind of an issue.

HJ: In other words, there was a sense that things were getting out of control and there was a desire to bring things back on the track.

AA: Yes, so when we are looking at run-up to Wuhan, Doklam becomes a very significant watershed. But equally, the intensity of Doklam was heightened by the few years proceeding where the two sides literally seemed to be pitted opposite against each other on a range of issues. There were questions about China’s support to Pakistan with regards to terrorism, its unwillingness to concede India’s demand that they should support permanent membership of the Security Council and other minor irritants that did play out.

It seemed as if the two sides were no longer considerate about each other’s sensitivities. So where was the meeting point? And of course in the midst of this, the talk would come about of how even economic ties were not showing the kind of dynamism, it was highly imbalanced and so on. So, all in all, I think, Doklam brings us to a point when the relationship has been steadily unravelling in many ways and not very positive momentum and not a very positive political sort of interaction.

HJ: So, in that sense and that context of a desire to build stability between the two sides, what do you think are some of the key achievements of the Wuhan summit? I think one of things that the two leaderships have said is that they will issue strategic guidance to their respective militaries to strengthen communication and build trust and understanding. What does this really mean? Does that mean that the militaries of India and China were behaving in a particular manner on the border without the green signal or go ahead by the political establishment? Now, the political establishments today thinks that it is important to tell their militaries to behave themselves. Is that the correct way of reading this particular statement?

AA: Well, I think, in effect it would boil down to that because some of the analysis that I have seen seems to suggest that many of these incursions are happening not just because of the fact there is a difference of perception where the Line of Actual Control runs but also because army commanders on the ground are taking unto themselves to take these patrols into undefined territory.

For instance, when Xi Jinping was visiting India and the incursion that happened along with the visit, it was suggested that this happened because the army commander did not have contact with the headquarters. This may seem strange but if we look at what is being discussed at Wuhan now, it would appear that possibly there is some disjunction or disconnect between the people who are in those very far-flung territories and sometime 15 days away from nearest controlling point… possibly there could be some miscommunication.

HJ: Professor, this is very important because in many ways, in what it means that despite the desire of the two political establishments to maintain stability between two strong powers in Asia, tactical factors, local level military factors can create problems at the strategic level. Isn’t that worrying?

AA: That’s what this new direction to the military would suggest, though, to be fair, I would say that…may be the local level commanders are not doing this deliberately because the problem is, that there is no line of control which is mutually agreed upon. So there is that perception gap. How do these new strategic understanding that they will communicate to the commanders be translated on the ground?

Let us keep in mind that this is a huge length of territory and there are areas which are completely uninhabited. The points where incursions are happening or where sometimes they come face-to-face are about 15-20 along Line of Actual Control, so I don’t think it’s a very difficult matter to control the process of this engagement at those very critical points. They are with reference to certain passes, they are adjacent to certain territories, they are located in some of the well-worn routes, these are the areas where there is possibility of misunderstanding and I think that’s probably what will now be attended to.

HJ: So you then argue that this is probably one of the best outcomes of this meeting that they have put their heads together and sort of recognised the problem as it where and said hey that this needs to be done and issued a strategic guidance. So wouldn’t you say this is one of the best outcomes of this summit meeting?

AA: If we keep Doklam in the background and then looking at this new understanding that they seek to the strategic understanding which will be communicated to the military commander. I don’t think that the two are directly linked because Doklam did not involve misperception in the way in which other incursions are between India and China. This involves a third country as well and India went in because Bhutan requested help, as we are informed.

In one sense, these incursions are structurally part of this situation and they say that it’s not a big deal, whether it has been UPA in power or NDA, the same kind of statement has been made. So I’m therefore suggesting that it’s not the incursions per say but because the boundary is such a sensitive issue and because the idea is that we should reduce these incursions because (a) they tend to inflame public opinion, (b) they tend to always arouse within the strategic communities on either side a certain negativity, about the intensions of the other, its best to control this process.

To that extent, I think it’s good because it sends again, very importantly, a signal that the political leadership is committed to ensuring that there is peace and tranquillity and whatever further prophylactics are needed by all means we welcome it. I do believe that our focus is overly on management and once again we have come up with yet another scheme by which we seek to manage the border, whereas I think now we have reached that point where we know we need to now actively move towards resolving.

But indefinitely to focus only on how to just keep managing a contested border is bound to create situations in the future again and so I think now, I hope at the informal level maybe the two have said, ‘Ok, while we need to still show that the management is important, we need to move towards a resolution and we can see that there are slight indications that the consideration of resolving the boundary could begin.’

HJ: What make you say that, because there is a clear, worrying lack of incremental progress towards the border negotiations and resolving the border conflict as it were? You have the National Security Advisor of India, who is the special representative for Sino-Indian boundary talks, he has absolutely no time in his hands – I mean how many things will he manage? To my mind the very fact that you appoint the National Security Advisor to have talks with China on the border issue shows that there is always so much progress that would take place. You have pro forma visits, you have informal summits and you have the National Security Advisor as the representative of boundary talks, so this actually means there is not going to be much incremental progress towards the resolution.

AA: I think if you look at various kinds of documents that have come about or the kind of statements have been made or even the writings by some of the former officials, you will see that it appears that much of the negotiations about what needs to be done has been completed. The question now is how you bring about the quid pro quo. And over that I think you need the right ambiance. You certainly can’t have ambiance where you are doing quid pro quo where you may be possibly compromising on certain kind of parts of the territory, in a situation where China is seen as possible threat and enemy. I feel that the ambiance is now being created by this informal summit.

HJ: Prof Acharya, this is a very interesting point you are making – that much of negotiations on the boundary is probably over, what needs to be done now is for the two heads of the two governments to come together and to agree on the quid pro quo, what need to be done in order to sign that final document. What is missing? What is lacking? What needs to be done for the two sides to get to that point?

AA: I think informally, what we gather is that the negotiations are now stuck on Tawang. What had initially been virtually promised by the 2005 agreement that settled populations will not be disturbed, it seems that some re-thinking is happening within China, because Twang is now being associated with very strong spiritual aspect in terms of the Tibetans and their feelings and therefore now it appears that as if there is some kind of re-thinking in China about the status of Tawang.

So therefore, I think the question now is going to be a very delicate one, because obviously Tawang apart from the spiritual, because we also have a substantial Buddhist population for whom Tawang is equally important, but strategically the location of Twang is very critical for India’s security. And in fact I remember, when I was a part of National Security Advisory board there was actually a very interesting discussion as to how can we ensure that both India and China have stakes in Tawang. And can we evolve some mechanism whereby Tawang could be jointly looked at by the two countries. So, there are interesting ideas which have been floating around but when it comes to high politics and when it comes to national projections, I think these ideas tend to get lost and they are not even considered as part of the overall process.

HJ: In other words, we know what to do but we don’t have the political courage and willingness to do that. To go back early question that I asked, there is also an announcement for a joint economic project in Afghanistan. How do you view this? Does it create problems in Sino-Pakistan relations? How will Pakistan respond to that? For instance, Pakistan has been very clear for a very long time that India should get out of Afghanistan, this is our backyard and India has no role to play. So a Sino-Indian joint economic project in Afghanistan, that might come as surprise for Pakistan. How do you see this?

AA: I doubt it…I think this is not something very new. I am part of a track two dialogue, which is a Russia-India-China academic scholars conference, which has been going on for the last 15 years and nearly about six to eight years ago, this idea was mooted in one of the conferences, to which the Chinese responded very enthusiastically. Of course, these are Chinese scholars but they were representing institutions which are affiliated to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. So this proposal came up, it was sent also as part of report to the concerned authorities.

And I don’t think that we have actually pushed the Chinese enough with regards to Pakistan and some of the aspects over there. I think we’ve made it too much of a problematic issue between India and Pakistan and therefore the role of China, such as it could be, is not even considered. For instance, the Chinese enthusiastically saying that, yes a joint project would be very good, means that they know, that they can convince the Pakistanis, not to stand against it. Or, that they will be able to reassure the Pakistanis that this does not mean diluting Sino-Pakistan special relationship.

So, I think we have a possibility now of various forms of collaboration which can bring in Pakistan and give it equal stakes along with us and the Chinese in Afghanistan, which is not a bad outcome to my mind. Otherwise you would always have situation where two countries are working, and the third is working at cross purposes. Afghanistan would also benefit I think but the whole point is, how do you actually balance out the different equations and different expectations from the three parties. Sometimes it may be interesting to call the Chinese bluff and take it up and see how it goes…you know we reject those possibilities…we completely refused to consider them.

About cooperating in CPEC or cooperating in Afghanistan, these are new ideas of course and certainly require time for the establishment to get around their very traditional views. Scholars of course can keep playing with these ideas and throwing them around. I think it would be useful to think in terms of a China-Pakistan-India dialogue on Afghanistan to begin with. The whole scenario is changing. You have the Russians now coming in a different way….whole Central Asia is opening….you don’t have access to Central Asia. You’re literally bound in one sense by your limited access. How do you break out of it? Some kind of radical thinking has to be thought, you cannot possibly go across the ocean, road and land all the time. So I think Afghanistan offers an interesting possibility.

HJ: Prof Acharya you made a very interesting point about calling the Chinese bluff on CPEC. I’m going to probe that a little further. How do we call the Chinese bluff on CPEC? Are you suggesting that India should try and convince the Chinese to tweak the CPEC in a way that India can then be potentially part of it. Is that what you are getting at?

AA: Well, one of the suggestion for instance, India’s point is that this is our territory and by calling it the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, they are actually negating India’s territorial claims and India’s sovereignty over the area of concern. Now, for instance one suggestion came that supposing we change the name – we don’t call it CPEC, so that the fact that this area is contested can be somewhere part of the picture but at least India also gets stakes in what it considers its own area, otherwise your sitting on the side and watching the process unfold and simply beating your chest about your sovereignty and how this cannot be done. So when I say let’s call the Chinese bluff what I mean is, would the Pakistanis agree to this? Will the Chinese be able to convince the Pakistanis? Because the original agreement which is constantly reiterated by Chinese is that Pakistanis entered the transfer of this territory in 1963 and once India-Pakistan sort out their problem, they will deal with whoever will be controlling it.

But that was 1963 and now it’s 2018. So, we have a situation where the de facto control has been with one country, a third country has come in, the whole area has been developed. Whether it fails or succeeds – these are different issues entirely. The question is that an area on which we claims sovereignty is being developed by two other countries and there is an offer that you be part of it, whenever the problem get sorted out…of course the sovereignty issue will be sorted out.

HJ: So one is renaming it CPEC. That is one way of getting around the CPEC issue or calling the Chinese bluff as you put it. What else can you suggest?

AA: No, renaming was simply so that de facto China Pakistan do not get certain legitimacy because this is territory that is also ours. So that was one – that led us not stop or stall the developmental progress, let that continue, but you also have stakes in. Then the whole question about how do we push for peace in the area and how do we consider the interests of the people in the region and how do we bring certain kind of progress and so on to this whole area which is one of the most backward areas?

HJ: In the context of argument that you’re making, do you then think that the Indian government reacted prematurely to BRI and CPEC poised by China or should there have more thinking about strategic implications of BRI and CPEC in New Delhi?

AA: I wouldn’t say that they acted prematurely, the point was that what the Chinese did was first of course they announced it… the one problem that most Indian official establishments have was that there were no consultations. To which Chinese said, that they didn’t consult anybody, they just put it out there and all those who are interested can talk. But the other problem was that the Chinese then brought in all manner of connectivity projects that were underway in Asia, outside Asia, within the rubric of Belt and Road so that CPEC becomes one of the very significant legs of the BRI so does the BCIM.

This you could say was something that was extremely unpalatable. One involved the question of sovereignty and the other involved something that we were all already doing. So you took a position that unless and until concerns of sovereignty are sorted out we can’t be part of connectivity projects and because you therefore extrapolate that concern, within what are Chinese intensions? What is strategic game plan? How do they intend to use these for their future strategic objectives? But the BRI per say I think we could have given some more thought to it, because it’s not as if it’s something that is going to only benefit China. You won’t have more than 60 countries around the world signing up for these projects. Unless they perceived some benefit coming out to them. You have your entire neighbourhood endorsing this so enthusiastically, even though there are some concerns about debt trap and so on. You saw what the Sri Lankans said, we’ll handle it. So, I think this is great opportunity that if in this informal summit, Modi can actually get these two things going. One, get China invested in our development as well and partner with China in our neighbours. You need to be present in the neighbourhood not as a country which is blocking their options for other sources but as a country which actually can have different strengths, which they can bring to the table, which China cannot.

HJ: If I paraphrase you, you basically are saying that India should not be too worried about Chinese involvement in South Asia in the region, in the neighbourhood. It is also in sense China’s neighbourhood and therefore, India and China should find ways of cooperating and collaborating in the neighbourhood rather then get into competition.

AA: One thing we must recognise is the ability of the neighbourhood, our neighbours, to exploit China as a countervailing factor is the direct outcome of the India-China ties. You improve India-China ties and immediately the scope for the game as it were, where China becomes sort of saviour and India is projected as a spoiler immediately reduces. The moment India-China ties improve, Pakistan also becomes a slightly different problem. Fixing this Sino-Indian relationship is the key to sorting out the Chinese role in the sub-continent.

HJ: And changing the mind-set in Delhi that the Chinese are encroaching into our traditional sphere of influence and therefore something needs to be done to make sure that these small countries in neighbourhood don’t go bandwagoning the Chinese.

AA: Ten years ago, we didn’t hear this argument from the Chinese, today we are hearing it. Scholars are saying what do you mean extra-regional role of China in South Asia? South Asia is China’s neighbour and it has as much of role as any other country. See it is also a structural problem because as the Chinese rise in their power and capacity and scope, they’re going to play a bigger and bigger role. It’s natural. The question now is how do we manage, after all, India is also seemed to be now growing, this asymmetry is a bit of a problem and I think that’s the root of the way in which we are trying to manage the China problem.

HJ: Going back to the Sino-Indian relations under Mr Modi, things began very well under Mr Modi, the chemistry between Mr Xi and Mr Modi was fantastic. But then things fell apart, now I think, the chemistry is coming back, there is thaw, a rapprochement and there is recognition that it is important to invest in stabilising the relationship with China. What has led to this new realisation? Is it the unavoidability of Sino-Indian relations? Is it because Chinese economy is so huge that you can’t avoid it, is it because everyone else is jumping on the Chinese bandwagon. So what has led to this change of mind in New Delhi, in Mr Modi’s mind in your opinion?

AA: It’s a combination of a lot of things, some of which you have mentioned. First and foremost, we must realise that the last few years have been somewhat bizarre. It’s not as if the issue of Sino-Pakistan relationship is something new. We have been dealing with China-Pakistan special relationships since 1960s. We always wondered where exactly this would lead to; we are beginning to now see where exactly and how exactly it can harm us. So that’s one issue. The second thing is that the kind of problems that came up particularly, this Masood Azhar, and the other issue of Security Council membership. If you see, the last few years these three issues become virtually a test case for Sino India friendship. If you’re not going to vote against the Masood Azhar being declared a terrorist or if you’re not going to support our membership of UNSC, then entire relationship will flounder and then starting to use your own pressure tactics and so on. These irritants and these problematic issues which are part and parcel of any relationship suddenly became barriers to further development. In one sense the initiative for guiding the India-China relationship goes out and we literally are pursuing a path which is essentially about competitive power politics without fully factoring in as to who would benefit out of this.

HJ: Prof Acharya, notwithstanding these structural and the strategic rationale for the engagement that is taking place now, what is the rationale for PM Modi? He is one year away from elections and Xi Jinping just come back to power in China. What is the rationale for these two leaders to reach out and make peace and sort of try and calm things down? Does it really benefit Mr Modi electorally? Is there domestic political rationale to it? Is there a domestic political rationale to it in China? As scholar of China what do you think about it?

AA: I don’t see this as some kind of new thaw or anything of that sort, if Doklam is the point at which the whole thing became imbalanced, now we trying to regain the balance. One way to regain that balance is that you re-affirm the political commitment at the highest level, to this relationship as very important for both these countries. And I think Modi’s visit is essentially intended to signal that, to identify the weak spots, to ensure that Doklam doesn’t happen again. If you want rationale for why now, yes we are less than a year away from general elections and clearly another Doklam would queer a lot of pitches in India. So, we need to see how Doklam doesn’t happen again and specially as I said in the beginning that Doklam happens to be slightly different from normal border problems. The regional dynamics are such that your space, you’re being squeezed. People are talking about how China’s enlarging presence in neighbourhood is actually starting to constrict your role in the region which you yourself are allowing.

HJ: Rohingya issue is a good example.

AA: Yes, to be completely swamped by the situation and not making any attempt to move out of it, by constantly opposing something that cannot at this point be pushed back. You cannot push China out of this region any more.

HJ: More you withdraw, more China will come in.

AA: More you withdraw, more China is coming in. In that sense, the initiative seems to be going out as far as region and I think Mr Modi is trying to regain that initiative. Allowing other factors to come in to the India-China strategic equation has actually derailed it and somewhere he wants to once again bring that on track. And finally, I think the pressures that both countries are going to be facing from the new economic global challenges. At this point, India is the only comparable country to China in Asia with the same kind of concerns and challenges as far as economic order is concerned. And for China, it’s very important that they partner with India in dealing with these changes and finally, I think Mr Modi has to show something before he goes to the polls. Chinese are the only guys who can come in and actually produce some very impressive kind of changes, particularly if they come in with the investment. I mean Japanese came with the bullet train, what happened? We haven’t heard anything about it so far. You need action and rapid action, implementation of certain decisions which have already been taken between India and China. Fast track those.

HJ: You therefore say this is time to take a decision on the border question because the negotiations has been completed and you now have an opportunity to take that decision and that will actually go well for Mr Modi.

AA: I think so, somewhere while we keep saying that the border is being managed, it still is a source of suspicion and mistrust and so somewhere, now the bullet has to be bitten.

HJ: Prof Acharya, you are giving me a very optimistic picture, there are a lot of people in India who make the argument that the Chinese cannot be trusted. The power gap between India and China is increasing (military and economic power) and China is an aggressive rising power. So there is a fear in India that this is probably not a benign great power, this is going to be an aggressive power. Should we be worried?

AA: Look, one problem that one has with this whole notion is that China is rising, it is aggressive, that is something that I think has not been looked at very carefully. It’s a much more nuanced picture that is coming. As scholars of international relations, we focus on this whole nature of power in international relations and the question to ask ourselves is: Is China as a bigger and bigger power any different from the kind of powers that dominated the system earlier?

Does China behave or use its power in the same manner as the erstwhile powers or the way in which interventions are done or countries are sought to be overrun. I don’t think we are seeing that kind of interventions or that kind of power at this point. I’m not suggesting therefore that we need to be complacent about China. There are enough problems, we need to understand where the threat is, where the problems are and where the tensions is. But we need to do it in an informed manner and we need to do it from our own perspectives, not from perspectives that are imported and are used as the basis for dealing with China.

HJ: Prof Acharya great pleasure talking to you.