All Eyeballs on Reader Reaction as Ad-Blocking War Comes to India

ToI and HT are a part of the group of offenders when it comes to intrusive online ads. How will the ad-blocking wars play out in India?

ToI and HT are a part of the group of offenders when it comes to intrusive online ads. How will the ad-blocking wars play out in India?

A sustainable business model that satisfies readers as well as publishers needs to be found. Credit: PTI

A sustainable business model that satisfies readers as well as publishers needs to be found. Credit: PTI

“Half the money I spend on advertising is wasted,” former US postmaster general John Wanamaker once famously lamented. “The trouble is I don’t know which half.”

The trouble with online advertising, even with all of the medium’s abilities to track and closely identify its intended audience, is that there’s a very real likelihood that all your advertising budget is being wasted because of ad-blocking software.

On Thursday, reported first by FactorDaily, readers in India woke up to the consequences of their ad-blocking ways: major news publishers including Times of India (ToI) and Hindustan Times (HT) started flashing messages like the one above that asks users to turn off their ad-blockers if they want to view the content in question.

Both publications come with a slightly different way of trying to convince their users. While the homepages of both websites can be viewed, once a user clicks on a ToI specific story they are not allowed to view anything; a HT story however gives the reader two paragraphs of content after which they are prompted (very much like a subscription warning) to turn off their ad-blocking software.

A little premature?

Multiple executives from advertising agencies such as Media.net that The Wire spoke to, who had meetings with ToI and HT officials in the months running up to this decision, believe that the time has come for such a step.

“As India’s digital economy bursts at its seams, the pace at which consumer technology debates happen in India are also speeding up. So while issues such as net neutrality and privacy, which started being hotly debated in the US over ten years ago, are only happening now in India…other issues such as ad-blocking which only blew up in the US last year are already impacting India,” said one advertising executive.

And yet, publicly available data on the popularity of ad-blocking software in the country and the impact of ad-blockers on India’s multimedia and content industry is muddled at best.

There are a few random data points: market researcher GlobalWebIndex in a 2015 survey showed that “42% of India’s iPhone 6 users used the in-built ad-blocking software compared with a global average of 31%.” This doesn’t say much though – Apple’s market share in India stands only at little under 2% of total sales.

Banning the ad-blockers. Credit: TOI

Banning the ad-blockers. Credit: TOI

Most of the data that comes up again and again is from PageFair, an Irish start-up whose website states that it “helps companies bypass ad-blocks”.  A 2015 Mint article points out that the “number of people actively using ad blockers in India increased from two million (in the second quarter of 2014) to 4 million by June 2015” – a grand total of only about 2% of India’s total internet users.

These four million “active ad-block” users, according to the PageFair study (which, curiously, doesn’t specifically say four million) hit Indian publishers for $74 million in the second quarter of 2015.

What further complicates matters is that PageFair came out with a subsequent report in 2016 that specifically addressed mobile ad-blocking, which has been widely believed to be more rampant in Asia-Pacific countries. The results of this study were slightly more alarming: over 120 million users in India were using mobile browsers that had built-in ad-blocking capabilities. This means that as of May 2016, it is likely that a substantial chunk of those 120 million users were engaging in some form of ad-blocking; the caveat being of course that they had not switched those browser-specific ad-blocking capabilities off.

To put the 120 million statistic in perspective, India currently has 300-350 million desktop and mobile internet users.

Another important note of caution here, one senior Google executive warned The Wire while talking about the study, is that it doesn’t mean there are 120 million people in India who have “actively gone and downloaded AdBlock Plus or something similar”. It just means that the mobile browser that they are using (either by default or choice) has built-in ad-blocking capabilities; the nature of which is not known.

“One of the reasons that it [the 120 million number] is so high is because UC Browser has built-in ad-blocking capabilities and it has currently a little over 50% market share in India… even ahead of Google Chrome,” said the Google executive. UC Browser, made by Chinese e-commerce giant Alibaba, entered India at a time when the number of proprietary Android smartphone browsers were few and has made significant inroads.

Much ado about nothing?

Why does the number of Indian ad-blockers and a quantitatively-verifiable, ad-blocking-caused impact matter? After all, if ToI and HT have started banning ad-blocking, it’s obvious that there are enough ad-blockers to pose a threat to the the publications’ bottom-line.

The most critical argument against digital advertisements – in their current, privacy-intruding form – is that they have gone far beyond their initial social contract with readers. The implicit understanding was that readers enjoyed free content in exchange for viewing a couple of advertisements. The online ads that many publications serve up these days (sometimes for no fault of theirs) however hog user data, pass on viruses and stall network activity. The worst advertisement networks no longer serve their earlier purpose of trying to inform a reader about a product but instead are used to engage in the illegal collection of user data.

The public-facing heads of InMobi, an Indian online advertising firm that at one point used to command billion-dollar valuations, for instance, have always maintained that it “makes sense for advertisers to respect user privacy”. And yet, just last week, InMobi was slapped with a $4 million fine by the FCC in the US for “tracking the location of hundreds of millions of consumers, kids included, and using that information to serve behaviourally targeted advertising.”

As well-known app developer Marco Arment described the current state of affairs last year: “Publishers, advertisers, and browser vendors are all partly responsible for the situation we’re all in. Nobody could blame the users of yesteryear for killing pop-up ad rates, and nobody should blame the users of 2015 for blocking abusive, intrusive, misleading, and privacy-stealing ads and trackers, even if it’s inconvenient for publishers and web developers.”

While New York Times CEO Mark Thompson may declare that “no one who refuses to contribute to the creation of high quality journalism has the right to consume it”, it doesn’t take away from the fact the news websites are more likely to feature trackers; even more than pornographic websites.

In Digital India, the argument in favour of ad-blockers becomes far more poignant. Bloated online ads, that often come with malicious code, can puff up the data size of a web page to as much as 14 mb, drain battery power and stall network activity. This is intolerable for internet users in Tier-3 and Tier-4 towns and definitely not acceptable for the residents of India’s villages; seeing as most of them will be forced to depend on some form of public Wi-Fi system as their sole means of connecting to the internet.

One of the reasons that Alibaba’s UC mobile browser is so popular in India – and why built-in ad-blocking browsers are popular across Asia – is because, as the PageFair study notes, it improves “page speed and reduces bandwidth consumption on [a] mobile”. Accordingly, these type of browsers “are most rapidly adopted in markets where mobile data infrastructure is less developed and therefore slow and/or expensive relative to income”.

Worst of the lot

As a senior Google executive pointed out to The Wire, “it’s no coincidence that ToI and HT both have some of the most intrusive and annoying online advertisements amongst all Indian news publishers”.

“It makes sense for both of them deciding to go in on this [ad-blocking] together. They are some of the biggest online traffic generators in India, both have intrusive advertisements and if it backfires, it hurts both of them jointly,” the search giant executive said.

One of the more common theories floating around the online advertisements and digital marketing industry currently is that more news publishers will join in on the ad-blocking because it’s being currently seen as a way of avoiding subscriptions for the next couple of years. One Indian Express business executive concurred with this perspective.  “It’s being seen as an experiment for now. If it works, then the question of digital subscriptions can be postponed for another day.”

There’s are a very few precedents in this matter. Forbes, in December 2015, decided to ban ad-blocking software for around 50% of the publication’s ad-blocking visitors. The company’s business executives recently came back with some results: Around 4 million desktop visitors (or 42% of those asked) either “disabled their blockers or whitelisted Forbes.com”. In addition to this, “visitors who turned off their blockers spent an average of 149 seconds per session versus 117 seconds for visitors who were placed in a control group with their ad-blockers still active”.

For Indian news publishers, there is very little doubt that this is a gamble that will affect the future of journalism and content production. History tells us though that a sustainable business model, which takes into account the concerns of readers and users, is the way to go. It may be naive or seem foolish to suggest that ToI and HT should orient their business models to accommodate rural, internet-handicapped or privacy-conscious readers. It is also true, however, that writing a piece of code that gets around the ban on ad-blocking software is playfully simple.

Disclaimer: The Wire competes with Times of India, Hindustan Times and other news publications mentioned in the article.

Boris Johnson Withdraws PM Candidacy, Opening Up Race Amongst Tories

This makes Theresa May, the interior minister who backed remaining in the EU, the new favourite to succeed Cameron.

This makes Theresa May, the interior minister who backed remaining in the EU, the new favourite to succeed Cameron.

Boris Johnson delivers a speech in London, Britain June 30. Credit: Reuters/Toby Melville

Boris Johnson delivers a speech in London, Britain June 30. Credit: Reuters/Toby Melville

London: Former London mayor Boris Johnson, favourite to become Britain’s prime minister, abruptly pulled out of the race on Thursday, upending the contest less than a week after leading the campaign to take the country out of the EU.

Johnson’s announcement, to audible gasps from a roomful of journalists and supporters, was the biggest political surprise since Prime Minister David Cameron quit on Friday, the morning after losing the referendum on British membership in the bloc.

It makes Theresa May, the interior minister who backed remaining in the EU, the new favourite to succeed Cameron.

May, a party stalwart seen as a steady hand, announced her own candidacy earlier on Thursday, promising to deliver the withdrawal from the EU voters had demanded, despite having campaigned for the other side.

“Brexit means Brexit,” she told a news conference. “The campaign was fought, the vote was held, turnout was high and the public gave their verdict. There must be no attempts to remain inside the EU, no attempts to rejoin it through the back door and no second referendum.”

The decision to quit the EU has cost Britain its top credit rating, pushed the pound to its lowest level since the mid-1980s and wiped a record $3 trillion off global shares. EU leaders are scrambling to prevent further unravelling of a bloc that helped guarantee peace in post-war Europe.

The IMF said on Thursday uncertainty over Brexit would hurt economic growth in Britain and the rest of Euorpe, and impact output globally.

Johnson, whose backing for the Leave cause was widely seen as essential to its victory, saw his leadership bid suddenly crumble after his Brexit campaign ally, justice secretary Michael Gove, withdrew support and announced a bid of his own.

“I must tell you, my friends, you who have waited faithfully for the punchline of this speech, that having consulted colleagues and in view of the circumstances in parliament, I have concluded that person cannot be me,” Johnson said at the close of his speech at a London luxury hotel.

The bombshell stunned supporters gathered for what they thought would be the first speech of his leadership campaign. Johnson began by hailing a “moment for hope and ambition for Britain, a time not to fight against the tide of history but to take that tide at the flood and sail on to fortune”.

But by the time he spoke his bid had already been undermined by Gove, a close friend of Cameron’s despite differences with the prime minister over Europe, who had previously said he would back Johnson.

In an article on Thursday in the Spectator, a magazine Johnson used to edit, Gove wrote that he had come “reluctantly, to the conclusion that Boris cannot provide the leadership or build the team for the task ahead”.

The main opposition Labour Party also faces an acrimonious leadership battle, with lawmakers having overwhelmingly voted to withdraw confidence in left-wing party leader Jeremy Corbyn, who refuses to step down. Corbyn’s party critics say his campaign to remain in the EU was half-hearted. He says he was chosen by grassroots activists and should not be pushed out.

The vacuum at the top of both major parties has added to the uncertainty at a time when Britain faces its biggest constitutional change since the dissolution of its empire in the decades after World War Two.

‘Dies by the sword’

Conservative lawmakers said Johnson may have been undone by supporters of Cameron exacting revenge for his decision to defy the prime minister and back the Leave campaign.

“He who lives by the sword, dies by the sword,” said one lawmaker, describing internal party conflict on condition of anonymity. The lawmaker told Reuters that Johnson had realised his bid would fail after lawmakers defected from his campaign overnight.

Johnson is the latest political casualty of a civil war in the ruling party unleashed by Cameron’s decision to hold the referendum on membership in the EU, an issue that divided the Conservatives for decades and now divides the country.

Known for a jokey public persona and a mop of unkempt blonde hair, Johnson became a popular national figure during eight years as London mayor and used his charm to aid the Leave cause after deciding only late in the day to push for Brexit.

But in the week since his side won, several leading Conservatives questioned whether Johnson had the gravitas to run tough talks to mend the broken relationship with the EU.

In an article in the Times newspaper, May took aim at Johnson’s persona by saying government was not “a game”.

Britain’s new prime minister faces a huge task to unite the party and country, and persuade the EU to offer a deal balancing the desire expressed by voters to reduce immigration with London’s desire to maintain access to EU markets. EU leaders say Britain must allow free movement of people to keep open access to the common market.

A new British leader will also need to reassure financial markets, which have plummeted since the referendum. The pound briefly rose after Johnson’s announcement.

“The market reaction was that it makes Theresa May a shoo-in, which is less confrontational, less damaging,” said Marc Ostwald, strategist at ADM Investor Services.

But some Conservative lawmakers said it was too early to crown May. Conservative members of parliament will first narrow a field of five candidates down to two, after which party members will elect the leader by September 9.

Political vacuum

In addition to May and Gove, the candidates are Stephen Crabb, the cabinet minister responsible for pensions, who campaigned to stay in the EU, and two pro-Brexit figures, Liam Fox, a right-wing former defence secretary, and Andrea Leadsom, a minister in the energy department.

Leadsom suggested the next prime minister should come from the Brexit camp. Crabb, who like May has vowed to carry out Brexit despite having opposed it, has said control over immigration should be a red line in talks with the EU.

Scottish leader Nicola Sturgeon blamed the Conservative government for recklessly holding the referendum “purely for internal leadership purposes”.

Scots voted by a margin of nearly two to one to stay in the EU and Sturgeon has said they must not be dragged out against their will, raising the prospect that the UK itself could break apart.

“Each and every one of you should be deeply, deeply ashamed of yourselves,” she said to Conservative lawmakers in the Scottish parliament.

(Reuters)

Nagas Apprehensive About Lasting Peace as They Bid Farewell to a Beloved Leader

At a memorial for Isak Chishi Swu, there was notable tension on the future of the Framework Accord and the peace process.

At a memorial for Isak Chishi Swu, there was notable tension on the future of the Framework Accord and the peace process.

NSCN (I-M) chairman Isak Shishi Chu at rest in Nagaland House, New Delhi, covered with the "Naga national flag”. Credit: Sangeeta Barooah Pisharoty

NSCN (I-M) chairman Isak Chishi Swu at rest in Nagaland House, New Delhi, covered with the “Naga national flag”. Credit: Sangeeta Barooah Pisharoty

New Delhi: Wrapped in woolen Naga shawls and stoles, jackets and mufflers in spite of the burning heat, hundreds of people from the Naga community living in Delhi turned up at the Nagaland House on Wednesday evening to mourn their beloved leader – Isak Chishi Swu.

A day earlier, on June 28, 87-year-old Swu, chairman of the Naga separatist group the Nationalist Socialist Council of Nagaland (Isak-Muivah) or the NSCN (I-M), passed away after a year of illness in the national capital, a city where most residents – including the media – have barely any idea about who he was or how much he mattered to the Naga people. Or that he raised a bloody secessionist war against the Indian state to set up the “Naga nation”.

Future of the Framework Accord

That general “Indian” ignorance couldn’t be found at the venue though, where a pall of gloom enveloped everyone present. Waiting for Swu’s mortal remains to arrive from the morgue of a private hospital to Nagaland House, where the association of the Naga community of Delhi NCR organised a condolence meeting in his memory, hushed conversations could be heard among those assembled. They were about what now worries most Nagas – what would be the future of “the accord” without Swu? Will the ‘M’ of the NSCN (I-M) – Thuingaleng Muivah – be able to take all the Naga tribes towards lasting peace together?

On August 3, 2015, Prime Minister Narendra Modi declared the Naga Accord between his government and the NSCN (I-M) as “historic” on Twitter, surprising the national media and opposition parties at the sudden development. However, it raised hope in most Nagas for peace in their state after over 50 years of unrest and many failed attempts at negotiations between the rebels and the Centre. However, nearly a year has passed since and the clauses of that accord, titled Framework Agreement, are still a secret.


Also read: The ‘I’ of the I-M: Nagaland’s Marathon Man, of Faith and Grit


Later, speaking at the condolence meeting, the Centre’s present interlocutor, senior home ministry bureaucrat R.N. Ravi said, “After we agreed on the terms of the agreement, Swu fell seriously ill. We waited for him to recover from it and he did, and he could sign the agreement last year.” Ravi repeatedly underlined that the terms of the agreement were approved by Swu, which hinted at the Centre’s apprehension now about its wider acceptability among all tribes in Nagaland in the absence of a mass leader like Swu.

The anxiety could be traced in Muivah’s speech too. The NSCN (I-M) general secretary was categorical, “I know, without him there will be problem.”

Though Muivah is also a well-respected Naga leader, he is not from Nagaland but from the neighbouring Manipur. Swu was a Sema Naga from Nagaland. Though yet another veteran Naga separatist leader Kholi Konyak – he was, till about three months ago, leading a rival faction NSCN (Unification) or GPRN – has been declared the chairman of the NSCN (I-M) after Swu’s demise, it is yet to be seen whether he and Muivah will be able to win the confidence of all the Naga tribes like Muivah and Swu together could. Back home, a hint of disagreement can already be seen, particularly from the Naga National Council (NNC), the mother organisation of NSCN. In 1975, Muivah, Swu and S.S. Khaplang disagreed with the Shillong Accord which the NNC signed with the Indian government. In 1980, the trio formed NSCN, which split into two in 1988 after a bloody fight between Swu-Muivah and Khaplang, a Naga from Myanmar bordering Nagaland which most Nagas refer to as eastern Nagaland. In July 1997, NSCN (I-M) entered into a ceasefire agreement with the Centre, thereafter leading to over 80 rounds of talks.

Changing relations

After an hour’s delay, Swu’s coffin arrived at Nagaland House. A series of traditional Naga death cries went up in the air before it was led by youth dressed in different Naga tribal attires to the stage. They covered it with the “Naga national flag” – sky blue with a white star and lines of red, yellow and green forming an arch on it.

It was the same flag that once defined NSCN as an anti-India terrorist group, anti-India, secessionists who needed to be crushed militarily by the Centre. Yesterday, just a few metres from that flag, sat India’s top bureaucrat, national security advisor Ajit Doval, at the official building owned by the state. Doval put a wreath on the coffin covered with the flag, signifying how the Indian position on the Naga issue has changed over the decades.

NSCN (I-M) general secretary T. Muivah with NSA Ajit Doval, the Centre’s interlocutor for the Naga Accord, R.N. Ravi, and former Nagaland chief minister Neiphu Rio at the condolence meeting for NSCN (I-M) chairman Isak Chichi Swu at Nagaland House, New Delhi. Credit: Sangeeta Baroah Pisharoty

From the right: NSCN (I-M) general secretary T. Muivah with NSA Ajit Doval, the Centre’s interlocutor for the Naga Accord, R.N. Ravi, and former Nagaland chief minister Neiphu Rio at the condolence meeting for NSCN (I-M) chairman Isak Chichi Swu at Nagaland House, New Delhi. Credit: Sangeeta Baroah Pisharoty

One also couldn’t help but think, would it have been possible to remember a Kashmiri separatist leader in Delhi in the same fashion? What would those who took umbrage at the allegedly “anti-India” speech by “Kashmiri separatists” at Jawaharlal Nehru University some months ago have said to that?

Born in 1929 in Nagaland’s Zunheboto district, Swu was no doubt the greatest leader of the Nagas after Phizo. In fact, he and Muivah rose under Phizo, in NNC, developing a friendship that remained till he died. Muivah remembered, “We were together for 52 years facing fire. Never had we have any disagreement over anything. Never did we doubt each other’s intentions. I can’t help but get emotional.” Together they fled to China, led an underground life in Bangkok, in Manila, engaged in secret meetings with Indian prime ministers in Paris, Zurich and elsewhere, even took the Naga issue to the UN, much to India’s angst. The duo, over the years, dealt with many prime ministers. Modi is the seventh one.

They also dealt with quite a few government interlocutors to negotiate peace. While one of them, former union home secretary K. Padmanabhaiah, sent his condolences to Swu’s family, two others, R. N. Ravi and former Mizoram governor Swaraj Kaushal, were at the meeting. Kaushal recalled his interactions with them, “Those days, Indian position on the Naga issue was different. So, many times there were heated arguments. After we would shout at each other, there would be long spells of silence in the room. We later became friends.”

Noted lawyer Nandita Haksar, journalist Bharat Bhushan and Deepak Dewan too fondly remembered their memories of interacting with Swu in Bangkok.

The speech by Swu’s eldest son Ikato was moving. While his mother Khulu looked on, Ikato talked about seeing his father for the first time when he was 15, in Pokhara, Nepal. “After NSCN was declared a terrorist outfit, my parents went underground and all five brothers and sisters were sent to different households in eastern Nagaland. We grew up there, away from each other. In my entire life, we lived as a family only for four years, from 2000 to 2004 when my father called all the children to Manila. His year-long illness brought us together as siblings, as we grew up as strangers to each other,” he said.

In the long speech that Muivah gave, he touched upon “sovereignty”, a term that sunk many earlier peace negotiations because of their rigid stand to not compromise on it. Yesterday, Muivah said, “Sovereignty lies with the people of Nagaland,” perhaps to hint that the once-sacrosanct clause would be diluted in the Framework Agreement. However, he underlined, “One big change with the Indian government now is that it has recognised the Naga issue as a political issue and not a military issue. It has recognised that the Naga history is unique and it needs a unique solution.”

The question now is, whether it is unique enough to bring lasting peace in Nagaland.

To Save Corporate Defaulters and Overexposed Banks, PMO Moots Plan to Dip into RBI Reserves

The Centre is wrong in assuming that Rajan’s exit will make things easy. The institutional integrity of India’s central bank is at stake.

The Centre is wrong in assuming that Rajan’s exit will make things easy. The institutional integrity of India’s central bank is at stake.

The Reserve Bank of India. Photo: PTI.

The Reserve Bank of India. Photo: PTI.

New Delhi: The prime minister’s office (PMO) is quietly pushing for using an unusually large chunk of the Reserve Bank of India’s (RBI) equity capital –  upto Rs 4 lakh crore – to bail out the banking system, which has accumulated stressed assets amounting to over Rs 10 lakh crore.

This is highly controversial, as any attempt perceived by the RBI top brass to weaken its capital base, especially in the context of Brexit and its cascading effects, will be seen as weakening the institution – the main source of stability for India’s financial system.

Outgoing governor Raghuram Rajan has also stoutly opposed use of the RBI’s equity capital to create a ‘bad bank’, to be capitalised by its equity, where large chunks of non-performing loans of big business houses will be transferred to give relief to both the banks and the borrowing companies. The government also proposes to use RBI equity capital to recapitalise public sector (PSU) banks, which need at least Rs 3 lakh crore of fresh capital, because much of its equity capital has been wiped out by large scale defaults by businesses. Most experts say this is an easy way out for the government.

The government wants to use the RBI’s equity funds, and not provide capital through the Union budget, primarily to ensure the fiscal deficit remains under control. Otherwise, pumping in close to Rs 4 lakh crore in banks over two to three years will create a fiscal slippage of about 3% of the GDP. This could force global credit rating agencies to downgrade India. Using the RBI’s capital is an easy, indeed lazy, way of avoiding the fiscal slippage.

In other words, the government, at the top level, thinks that the RBI is a good milch cow to make good the massive losses of the banking system.

Politically, this move will be questioned, as it will ease pressure on a dozen big business houses, which alone account for about Rs 7.5 lakh crore of stressed assets. The RBI was in the process of forcing these businesses to sell their profitable assets to make good their massive loan defaults, but the use of RBI capital to bail out the PSU banks will be seen as going soft on the defaulting businesses. No wonder a top advisor of the Sangh parivar told the Economic Times this week that Rajan had scared India’s business houses, who had withdrawn into a shell because of the the RBI’s vigorous campaign against non-performing assets.

The PMO has used rather clever logic for the use of the RBI’s equity funds to bail out banks and big business borrowers. In an informal note, it has argued that the RBI has the second largest equity capital base in the world, if seen as a ratio of the total assets of the central bank. The RBI’s capital base is 31% of the total size of its balance sheet. The average equity capital base of the world’s central banks is 11% of the balance sheet. Therefore, the government argues, the RBI can easily bring down its capital base by a few percentage points without compromising its strength.

As per the PMO’s calculation, even if the RBI gives Rs 4 lakh crore as bailout funds from its current equity capital, it will still be left with 19% of the total assets as its capital base. Even if this is lower than the present 31%, it is still higher that the world average of 11%, the PMO argues. What is not stated here is that countries with a relatively low capital base are either developed economies with hard currencies (such as the US, the UK and Japan) or developing economies that are rich in natural resources and therefore not so vulnerable to global economic shocks. India is neither and therefore follows the prudential policy of maintaining a much higher capital base. 

A prophecy unheeded

In fact, this issue was examined in detail a few years ago by the Y.H. Malegam committee, which specifically went into the question of the RBI’s capital base and its annual earnings. The committee broadly concluded that the incremental profits the RBI earns, and adds to its reserves, could be given to the government as dividend income. However, the current stock of the RBI’s equity capital should not be eroded, the committee said, as this was needed to address future vulnerabilities caused by both internal and external economic shocks. Internal shocks could be caused by bad monsoons and droughts, which create inflationary pressures. External shocks could come from global financial volatility.

The committee’s observation was prophetic, as India, at the moment, has to maintain a vigil over possible shocks from both these sources. A member of the committee told The Wire,”We have clearly cautioned against drawing down the equity and accumulated reserves of the RBI. However, incremental revenues of the central bank can be taken by the Centre as non-tax revenues which is already happening in the last two years”.

After the committee gave the green signal in 2013 that enabled the RBI to share a large part of its profits with the Centre, the central bank has given dividends of nearly 0.5% of GDP annually to the Centre and thus has helped greatly in maintaining fiscal balance.

However, disregarding the warning by the committee, the Centre now wants the RBI to share even its equity capital, which includes contingency reserves, as a soft option to bail out PSU banks and big business defaulters. This will be opposed tooth and nail by the RBI and whoever takes over as the next governor. The Centre is making a mistake in assuming that Rajan’s exit will make things easy. The institutional integrity of India’s central bank is at stake.

Listen: Three Recordings in Memory of Veena Sahasrabuddhe

Veena Sahasrabuddhe’s death is a great loss because she was a formidable singer, and also because she was a self-aware guru and a woman.

Veena Sahasrabuddhe (1948 - 2016), vocalist of the Gwalior gharana. Credit: Youtube

Veena Sahasrabuddhe (1948 – 2016), vocalist of the Gwalior gharana. Credit: Youtube

Veena Sahasrabuddhe was one of those strong female singers who seemed both so rooted, as though intimate with another time, and so successful in the contemporary world.

She rarely failed to do what Hindustani music does best: create synchronies of sound and time between listener and performer, so that musical meaning seems to generate spontaneously, and boundlessly. She understood that Hindustani music is not about delivering an impressive performance, but about becoming a medium, along with the listener, for that kind of meaning.

She passed away yesterday, the night of June 29, at the age of only 67. She had performed all over India and the world, and was famous equally for her khayal and her bhajan-singing. In 2013, she won the prestigious Sangeet Natak Akademi award.

In 2010, I saw her advertised in concert at the University of California, Los Angeles, and, as a student of Hindustani singing, made it a point to take the one and a half-hour drive from where I lived to the university. The concert took place in one of those black-box auditoriums, of course – an environment that has always struck me as so antithetical to Indian classical music – and we all sat stiffly upright on uncomfortable chairs, silent as we listened. But Sahasrabuddhe’s music swept over us all and seemed to melt away the walls and hard surfaces (including the metaphoric ones inside each of us). There was nothing I had to be conscious about except that, the music – not even her figure on stage, her clothes or the expression on her face (as seems to happen at the performances of so many younger, contemporary artists!).

Later, on my way home, I remembered her CD of Rama bhajans that I had at home. For many months afterwards, I continued to listen to those songs, rendered in her haunting, sinewy voice, first thing after waking up each morning.

Born in 1948, Sahasrabuddhe was ensconced in the Gwalior gharana through her training under her father Shankar Shripad Bodas, who was a disciple of Vishnu Digambar Paluskar, and her brother Kashinath Shankar Bodas.

As she went on, she also borrowed from the Jaipur and Kirana gharanas in developing her style, and her other mentors included Balwantrai Bhatt, Vasant Thakar and Gajananrao Joshi. In 1972, she won the national All India Radio competition for artists under 25 in the vocal classical category.

After her concert that I attended in Los Angeles, Sahasrabuddhe also conducted a workshop for students of Hindustani singing, for which I signed up. Just as she had done as a performer, Sahasrabuddhe the guru got down to business – scales, exercises and the ‘basics’ of Raga Yaman – with the systematic approach of someone who has not just undergone thorough talim herself but has also thought about the question of how to open up the traditionally gharanedar world of Indian music for ‘non-gharanedar’ (a contentious term) disciples in non-traditional settings.

It’s one thing to be an excellent performer and another to be a good guru: this fact is the bane of every music student’s existence. Artists, as soon as they become established performers, seem to forget all those wonderful pedagogical techniques to which they were subjected by their fathers or uncles, unable to incorporate them into their own teaching and hand them down to their own disciples. Higher education programmes for music in India are a mishmash of performance practice and academic work that fail to produce individuals passionate about or equipped for teaching Hindustani music in modern classrooms, whether in homes or institutions. And so many musicians, especially in smaller cities and towns, fail to complete their own degrees or gain skills that would help them adapt their private worlds to changing global contexts.

Like the younger Ashwini Bhide Deshpande is today (of a different gharana but similar in this respect), Sahasrabuddhe was one example of a successful performing artist who was also well-educated and worldly-wise. Like Deshpande, her academic career ran parallel to her musical one for a significant portion of her life. She studied both Sanskrit and English literature from Kanpur University, completing a BA and an MA. She was also the head of the music department at SNDT Pune for a few years.

Sahasrabuddhe was a treasure; her premature death is a great loss to the Indian musical community, because she was a formidable singer, and also because she was a self-aware guru and a woman.

Post-Brexit UK Sees a Rise in Hate Crimes

A police-funded website has seen a 57% increase of reports on hate crime between Thursday and Sunday, compared with the same period last month.

A police-funded website has seen a 57% increase of reports on hate crime between June 23 and June 26, compared with the same period last month.

Credit: Twitter/David Olusoga

Credit: Twitter/David Olusoga

 

The UK’s vote to leave the EU has come as a shocker to many even as uncertainty looms over the next course of action. Fissures between the ‘leave’ and ‘remain’ camp seem to be hardening with people simply not knowing what the future holds for them. The immediate fallout of the June 23 referendum was a $2 trillion fall in global markets with a sharp devaluation of sterling. Even as people come to term with the news of Britain’s impending departure, Brexit may have set the ball rolling for a chain of hate crimes.

The xenophobic and racist campaign of ‘leave’ politicians, who had spun the referendum debate around immigration, has exacerbated the disenchantment with immigrants. This suspicion and fear of ‘the other’ has become more evident post Brexit. For a long time, the EU was seen as the source of all miseries, from inflation to immigration to the sorry state of affairs. However, with changing dynamics and the EU all set to leave the stage, Britishers are now looking for a new scapegoat.

The aftermath of the Brexit has seen a spate in xenophobic attacks with an increase in online reporting of hate crimes. True Vision, a police-funded website, has seen a 57%  increase in reports on hate crimes between between June 23 and June 26, compared with the same period last month. This is not a definitive national figure – reports are also made directly to police stations and community groups – but Stop Hate UK, a charity that provides support to people affected by hate crimes, has also seen an increase, while Tell Mama, an organisation tackling Islamophobia, which usually deals with 40-45 reports a month, received 33 within 48-72 hours.

Social media is being used to vent out vitriol with racial slurs being directed at individuals. So far not many significant cases of violence have been reported but in the current polarised atmosphere, the fear of threats escalating to direct violence looms large. Police have said offensive leaflets targeting Poles had been distributed in a town in central England, and graffiti had been daubed on a Polish cultural centre in London on June 26, three days after the vote. Meanwhile, Islamic groups said there had been a sharp rise in incidents against Muslims.

 

After an attack on the Polish Embassy in London, Prime Minister David Cameron condemned the incidents in parliament.

“In the past few days we have seen despicable graffiti daubed on a Polish community centre, we’ve seen verbal abuse hurled against individuals because they are members of ethnic minorities,” Reuters reported Cameron as saying.

“We will not stand for hate crime or these kinds of attacks. They must be stamped out,” he added.

Many immigrants say that they are not new to hatred and bigotry based on region, religion but post Brexit the situation has become more tense. At a time when those who voted for Brexit also seem to be going through buyer’s remorse, its imperative that steps are taken to quell the heightened sense of insecurity.

Interview: There is a New China in the NSG and India Needs to Find a Way to Deal With It

In the second part of his interview with The Wire, former foreign secretary Shyam Saran discusses why China acted the way it did at the NSG and what India can do about it.

In the second part of his interview with The Wire, former foreign secretary Shyam Saran discusses why China acted the way it did at the NSG and what India can do about it.

Siddharth Varadarajan: We have two questions from Madhup Mohta, this may well be your former colleague at the MEA. He asks, “Why does India need to be in the NSG at all? We have capability and access through alternative means.” And he also says that what happened in Seoul “basically shows that our China policy is weak and spineless. We do not know how to bell the cat in both multilateral and bilateral fora.” Strong words!

Shyam Saran: (laughs) Well, the first question about why NSG membership is important to India, I think we have already covered that [in the first part of the interview].

With regard to what happened in Seoul, frankly, some people have been arguing that we have taken too tough a public position with respect to China. As I have argued frequently, the India-China relationship is a very complex relationship. You know, it’s not an either/or relationship. It’s not a relationship merely of adversaries or of collaborators. It is a mix of both. And it is extremely important that in carrying forward this relationship, that sort of balance should be maintained. Areas where we have convergence with the Chinese, we should pursue those areas of convergence. We should maintain the high-level engagement that we have been able to maintain for the last 15 years because my own personal experience has been, having sat in many of those meetings, that those summit meetings play a very important role in introducing a degree of, shall I say, calm, in what could be otherwise troubled waters in the relationship. That does not mean that when our interests are threatened by what China is doing, we should not respond to it. Certainly, we should respond. Areas where there are differences in perspective, we should try and overcome those differences in perspective. But, if there is clear evidence that China is working against India’s interest, certainly India should respond. And I think, by and large, if I look at the record of the past 15 years or so, generally speaking, governments in India, whether belonging to the BJP or to the Congress, have actually worked upon that basis and I would hope that we can keep this going. This is the reason why I said that I would not want to see NSG membership being made into a very major point of friction between the two countries.

SV: Now, if we look at Seoul, whether we say that China hid behind these other six or seven countries or the other way round, it’s clear that the opposition, whether in procedural or process terms, was more than simply Beijing, and that seven or eight countries raised the need for objective – I think Brazil said non-discriminatory – criteria for membership of non-NPT countries. Now, the question that comes to my mind is that when the 2008 waiver uses pretty clear language about the need for broadening the effective implementation of the goals of the NPT – when you use that phrase – you are implying that India will never be a member but there is no reason why India cannot help to contribute towards the goals of NPT, primarily as a nuclear weapon state, i.e. that you won’t proliferate. And, I suppose, that you will also work towards universal disarmament. Now, India fulfils both of these conditions and more. If we won that battle in 2008 and actually, then, agreed to abide by seven or eight commitments, and the world can see that we have stuck with our commitments…

SS: Absolutely.

SV:  Then why is it that we haven’t managed to convince these seven or eight countries?

SS: Well, this is the irony – that we were engaged in far more complex, far more difficult negotiations on that waiver document. This would have been a very simply case of either yes or no on the membership.

SV: Because the waiver is a much bigger obstacle than membership?

SS: Exactly. So, it should have been a very simple matter to actually admit India into the NSG based on precisely those conditions that are listed in the waiver. That did not happen. That did not happen because of procedural reasons. We should recognise that there are important political reasons behind this. This is why I said that there is a change as far as the Chinese posture is concerned. China is no longer hiding behind other countries. My sense is that China would have been ready to be the last man standing, if it came to that.

SV: Right. So if things were pressed for an up-down vote, China would say, fine, here’s my veto…

SS: That’s my judgment. I cannot prove it in any way but my sense is the change that has taken place in China is precisely that today I am ready to take a public posture on this. I am ready to be the last man standing, if it comes to that.

SV: So, what explains that? Is it because of their perception that India has drawn close to the US?

SS: My sense is that, number one, China is in a way demonstrating that as far as these global regimes are concerned, it will no longer just be a spectator. It is a power in the same league as the United States of America, and is ready to play that role.

Second, and I think it is important for us to look at the implications of this, this represents a level of commitment to Pakistan which is more than what we have seen in the past.

SV: So this is a new factor, actually.

SS: Yes. It is not only as a proxy against India, which has been the traditional role that Pakistan has played, but also, to my mind, the role that Pakistan is potentially going to play as far as the very ambitious One Belt, One Road plan is concerned. Pakistan is a very key factor in the success of  Xi Jinping’s great project. So, I think there is a willingness to show that, you know, because our interests are involved here, we are ready to give satisfaction to Pakistan because for Pakistan, it is far more important not to have India in and Pakistan out than it is, frankly speaking, for India. Because India has the waiver, Pakistan does not. So, in a sense, the commitment to Pakistan is greater and that has implications for India, which we should be looking at.

The third is, I think the Chinese sense that, you know, this hyphenation between China and India, which is being fostered by the US and others, this simply does not exist. This is one way of demonstrating…

SV: You mean the idea that these are two rising powers in Asia and so on.

SS: Yes, so this equivalence that people have tried to bring about, [China wants] to show that this is simply not true. We are in the driving seat. So, there is a more assertive China. There is a China which believes that it is already in a very different league than, say, India is or several other middle powers are concerned. And, therefore, the world must take notice.

 

SV: What about the Chinese reading of the India-US relationship? Is that also somewhere a factor –  that they see India now in that way? For example, the quadrilateral has been revived – India Japan Australia and the US in Asia. We have repeatedly made statements about freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. Are these also elements which may have worked on the Chinese leadership?

SS: There may be an element of concern but I think China is fully aware of the fact that India is not going to become a subordinate ally of the US as say, for example, Japan is or Australia is. That there is a degree of convergence between India and the US as far as the security environment in the region is concerned, that is quite apparent. However, I think we also need to be able to project the fact that much of that convergence is a result of the actions of the Chinese themselves.

SV: Right

SS: Recently, I was in Beijing when we were having one of these track II dialogues and, you know, if China says we are not against the freedom of navigation, and yet in the next breath says, that as far as the nine-dash line is concerned, these are the historic waters of China, then how are you going to have freedom of navigation (laughs), if you are virtually saying that this is a part of Chinese jurisdiction?

SV: Right

SS: So, there are, you know, actions on the part of China which do cause concern.

SV: They’ve sharpened their border confrontations with virtually all neighbours at the same time.

SS: Yes. Everybody recognises, even the Chinese themselves recognise, that they have been far more assertive. Now, they should not be surprised if the rest of the world is reacting to that. And, the other aspect is that with… we see, for example, in the Asia Pacific…you know, ASEAN was not a major power but as a platform, you know, regional platform, it was useful to all the major powers, as a kind a mediating platform, as a kind of a reconciling… providing a little bit of a buffer in what could be a major power conflict. In the last few years, China has actually abandoned that implicit consensus that we should not undermine ASEAN because it is useful to us. Now, you see China going all out in terms of dividing ASEAN. And that is not good for the region. And I believe it’s not good for China either. So, when we use this mantra that we have been using, I think one should not dismiss that only as a mantra – that we need to have an open, inclusive, transparent and balanced security architecture in the region, which does not exclude China.

SV: Right

SS: But, China should see its interest in that kind of a multilateral framework, rather than seek unilateral dominance. That is something which will inevitably invite a countervailing response.

SV: There’s a question from Samar Jodha who says that this is a larger issue here. China at every point wants India inside South Asia. Do we have any long-term strategy and is there a danger in India becoming an outsourced wing of the US.

SS: Well, I don’t think that India is in danger of becoming an outsourced wing of any power because India itself is a major power. But, with regard to what is our strategy against China trying to keep us tethered in South Asia, the obvious strategy is that you need to have a much better environment in the sub-continent itself.

SV: With your neighbours?

SS: So you [need to] follow a very very active, properly nuanced policy with respect to your South Asian neighbours, including Pakistan, and you become a champion of say, regional integration, you become the engine of growth for your neighbours who begin to see you as an opportunity rather than as a threat. If you create spaces, someone will walk in. So, our effort should be to make certain that as far as the subcontinent is concerned, we don’t create those spaces. That we become the most relevant power for our neighbours not because we are able to impose upon them but because we offer better opportunities than any other power can. I think that should be really our response.

SV: Manisha Chachra asks, with India making efforts to become a part of the NSG, is the idea of NAM or the Nonaligned Movement as a policy objective principle still relevant? We were a part of the group which wrote Nonalignment 2.0 so, I know how you will answer this.

SS: Yes, so, maybe I do not need to answer this, maybe you can! There is no doubt that the non-aligned movement has become a pale shadow of what it was and that is because there is a completely changed geo-political situation. I mean you don’t have a Cold War, you don’t have an east-west confrontation. Even the north-south confrontation has become different than it was before. So, the non-aligned movement itself and its role has become diminished. There is no doubt about that. However, as we had argued in Nonalignment 2.0, that nonalignment as a policy or non-alliance as a framework within which India orders its relations with the rest of the world still remains relevant because my view has been that non-alignment has been nothing more than another name for strategic autonomy. And what is strategic autonomy? Strategic economy is that on matters of vital interest to India, it should be able to take a relatively autonomous decisions. Not take completely autonomous decisions because you have to live in a world where you have to interact with so many other powers, you know. Not all the interests are vital and therefore you should distinguish what is really important, and what is not important. So as we discuss with regard to NSG membership, I do not see that as an elemental issue – that requires a very very major diplomatic effort on our part going forward. But, on whether or not you have the capability and the willingness and the intention to take those relatively autonomous decisions on issues which we have determined are of vital interests to India, that is what non-alignment is to me – that is the philosophy of non-alignment.

SV: We’re almost out of time but I just want to come back to Seoul and the NSG. The second and the final day of the plenary meeting concluded with Mexico making a proposal for the NSG to continue to remain engaged on the issue of membership criteria for non-NPT countries particularly India and that seems to have carried the day that there will probably be another meeting this year. Assuming that this happens, say, November-December, India has a good five or six months. What do you think is the conversation we need to have with China as well as with the five or six other holdouts but primarily with China? What can we say or do.

SS: The first order of business is that whatever criteria are going to be discussed, they do not go beyond what is there in the 2008 waiver. That’s very important. So, if we perceive that the discussion may vary in a direction where instead of opening the door for membership, it becomes an occasion for imposing more onerous conditions, I think we would be well-advised to [not proceed].

SV: Such as signing the CTBT or agreeing to a fissile material production moratorium.

SS: Yes, because we are not there and you know, the evangelical countries will want to bring as many [demands] as we saw in 2008. So, I think we have to be a little circumspect and a little, shall I say alert to the possibility that in seeking membership, we do not actually open the door for more restrictive or onerous conditions being brought in.

SV: And when it comes to the conversation with China? What can we say to push the envelope there?

SS: Well, I think the diplomacy with China would really have to convince China that in terms of that larger fabric of India-China relations and the many things on which we work together and we need to work together – if China does not have any problem with India becoming a member, as it says, but it was only a procedural issue, a technical issue, then I think that our effort should be to convince China that insisting on those technical grounds, having conceded the waiver for which we appreciate China’s stand, does not really make sense because there is a much larger…

SV: But the Chinese objection is primarily political rather than procedural.

SS: It is political. Although, since it is being projected as procedural, you operate on that basis. If the Chinese are saying it is procedural, why should I go to them and say no no, it is political.

SV: Not as a Tu-Tu Main-Main (accusation) but I am saying as far as addressing the underlying politics.

SS: Let us respond to what the formal Chinese position is, which is that it is procedural. So, we can sit down and say, if you have said it is procedural, can we [move forward].

SV: But a final thought. If in fact the strengthened Pakistan-China relationship is propelling China in taking a certain stand, is there something India could do with Pakistan? We have seen Prime Minister Modi for example, say that we want better relations with Pakistan. He has tried two or three times but somehow the car hasn’t moved forward. Is there something that we could do with Pakistan that could unlock this?

SS: I think that even though he may not have been successful, if you look at the record of not just Prime Minister Modi but previous prime ministers as well, all of them recognised that it is very important to try and improve India-Pakistan relations not to a level of bonhomie or friendship but at least to that more normal kind of a state-to-state relations. I think that is a realistic objective. And I think even if there are setbacks, even if there are issues, we need to be able to pursue that policy with respect to Pakistan. My own sense has been that it is perhaps far more realistic to gain by incremental steps with Pakistan, whether it is with respect to trade or people-to-people relationships or working on things which are of larger interest like ecology or climate change. These are ways in which you can expand the scope of our engagement, even while we are dealing with difficult issues. But it is when you have a high-profile kind of a thing like Lahore – there is inevitably a reaction from those who see any improvement in India-Pakistan relations as a great threat to themselves. Somehow or the other, we need to neutralise them and neutralisation can be done to my mind, given the record of what we were able to achieve in the 2004-2007 period – by really taking incremental steps. I think that is the way to go.

SV: We have covered a lot of ground in our conversation. Thank you.

SS: My pleasure.

SV: Well, it’s been a roller coaster ride from India in the last 11 years. 2005 is when India and the US issued the first joint statement envisaging the ending of nuclear sanctions on India. Three years later, India’s NSG waiver was agreed and now we have seen in 2016, the Indian effort to join the NSG, stumbling at the door because of opposition from China and a handful of other countries. We know that this issue will be raised again later this year. Be sure to tune in or check in with The Wire for our foreign policy coverage and our coverage of nuclear issues to learn what happens to the story. Certainly, we haven’t seen the last chapter being written on this yet.

You can see the first part of this interview here.

Taliban Suicide Bombers Kill 27 in Attack on Afghan Police Cadets

Two Taliban suicide bombers killed at least 27 people and wounded around 40 in an attack on Thursday on buses carrying recently graduated cadets on the western outskirts of Kabul.

Afghan security forces keep watch at the site of a suicide attack on the western outskirts of Kabul, Afghanistan June 30, 2016. Credit: Reuters

Afghan security forces keep watch at the site of a suicide attack on the western outskirts of Kabul, Afghanistan June 30, 2016. Credit: Reuters

Kabul: Two Taliban suicide bombers killed at least 27 people and wounded around 40 in an attack on Thursday on buses carrying recently graduated cadets on the western outskirts of Kabul, officials said.

Three buses were attacked as they approached the capital from neighbouring Wardak province, a police official said, according to preliminary information.

“Initial information we have is that two suicide bombers were involved and there are many casualties,” he said, declining to be identified by name.

An interior ministry official said at least 27 people were killed and 40 wounded.

Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid said the first attack targeted a bus carrying police cadets and their instructors. Then, as rescuers and emergency services arrived, the second bomber rammed his car, packed with explosives, into their vehicles, killing dozens.

The attacks underline the deadly threat to security in Afghanistan just over a week before a NATO summit in Warsaw where leaders are expected to discuss whether to maintain support for the Kabul government.

Under new leader Mullah Haibatullah Akhundzada, who took over last month after his predecessor, Mullah Akhtar Mansour, was killed in a U.S. drone strike, the Taliban have made clear that they will continue attacks against the Western-backed government.

The latest suicide bombings, in the Muslim holy month of Ramadan, come 10 days after an attack on a bus carrying Nepali security guards working for the Canadian embassy in Kabul that killed 14 people.

In April, at least 64 people were killed in a Taliban attack on a security services facility in Kabul in the deadliest bombing of its kind in Afghanistan since 2011.

Last week, the top UN official in Afghanistan warned of the danger of a new spiral of violence following recent suicide attacks and a spate of highway kidnappings by the Taliban.

(Reuters)

North Korean Parliament Confers New Title on Kim Jong Un

He was appointed chairman of the newly constituted State Affairs Commission in North Korea

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un waves as he participates in a photo session with officials who are committed to the success of the test-fire of surface-to-surface medium long-range strategic ballistic missile Hwasong-10, in this undated photo released by North Korea's Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) June 28, 2016. Credit: Reuters/KCNA

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un waves as he participates in a photo session with officials who are committed to the success of the test-fire of surface-to-surface medium long-range strategic ballistic missile Hwasong-10, in this undated photo released by North Korea’s Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) June 28, 2016. Credit: Reuters/KCNA

Seoul: North Korea’s parliament awarded Kim Jong Un a new post on June 29, adding to a long list of titles for the young leader.

Kim was made chairman of the State Affairs Commission, a new body established under a revised constitution adopted by the parliament and which replaces the powerful National Defence Commission, state media reported on June 30.

His full title is now the Dear Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un, Chairman of the Workers’ Party of Korea, Chairman of the State Affairs Commission of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army.

Kim, believed to be in his early 30s, attended the assembly meeting on June 29. He also holds the rank of marshal in the North Korean military and is more usually referred to as “our marshal” in propaganda and common parlance.

The parliament meets once or twice a year to formally approve budgets or policies set out by the ruling Workers’ Party, which has increased in prominence under Kim.

The assembly also has the authority to grant Kim new titles or positions within North Korea’s opaque leadership structure.

Kim’s father, Kim Jong Il, used the National Defence Commission to project authority under his rule, which was marked by famine and a “military-first” policy of priority spending on North Korean military development.

The new State Affairs Commission appears to be made up of cadres with civilian positions, according to a list of new appointments released by state media.

The meeting on June 29 was called to implement policy aims stated in a rare Workers’ Party congress in May, during which Kim Jong Un announced a five-year economic plan.

On June 22, North Korea launched two Musudan intermediate-range missiles, drawing strong condemnation from South Korea, Japan and the US for infringing UN sanctions designed to stop Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile development programmes.

North Korea referred to the missiles as a “Hwasong-10” and said the tests did not put the security of neighbouring countries at risk.

The UGC’s Idea of Measuring Faculty Productivity Isn’t Nuanced Enough

In a system that awards specific points to some research activities, it is not the value of that research activity that is awarded points but the value addition to the discourse that makes it worthy of recognition.

In a system that awards specific points to some research activities, it is not the value of that research activity that is awarded points but the value addition to the discourse that makes it worthy of recognition.

A classroom in Durgapur. Credit: shankaronline/Flickr, CC BY 2.0

A classroom in Durgapur. Credit: shankaronline/Flickr, CC BY 2.0

There is no generally accepted definition of faculty productivity. Defining it as a number of classes or courses taught, number of credit hours generated or number of students taught is really defining teaching workload, which some equate with faculty productivity. Katrina A. Meyer, affiliated with the University of Memphis, Tennessee, had argued in 1998 that “workload traditionally captures how time is spent, while productivity is a measure of what is produced with that time.” Though there are contentious positions on the accepted standard of measuring faculty productivity in the higher education context, the prevalent method is quantitative – wherein productivity is the ratio of output to input, with output being the number of units produced. Output is measured by graduation rates, number of papers published, PhD degrees awarded and research projects completed. Inputs are, usually, the cost of university education for a given time period.

For some scholars, there are one or two features that effectively measure faculty productivity. For Robert Blackburn, of the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, a faculty member’s level of motivation to teach, undertake research and service was a key facet. Blackburn however did not devise a method to calculate the level of motivation. For some others, supervision of doctoral students determined faculty productivity and another set of academicians contended that the number of publications reflected faculty productivity effectively.

Another group, closer to the contemporary understanding of faculty productivity measurement lists out a broader criteria on the basis of which a faculty member can be assessed. A series of individual and institutional attributes are ascertained to evaluate productivity along with a ratio of outputs to inputs, or benefits to costs. For Mary Frank Fox, of the Georgia Institute of Technology, there were a range of factors that were integral to calculating productivity: age and gender; rank, years in higher education, quality of graduate training, hours spent on research each week and extramural funds received; and institutional characteristics.

However, the most significant contribution to this discourse has come from James Fairweather and Andrea Beach, of the Western Michigan University, who point at the futility of portraying an average research university because of the variances across disciplines. With such multi-faceted approaches that examine different expectations, tasks and cultures, it is recommended by scholars that a broader evaluation standard be adopted.

In India, the University Grants Commission (UGC) sought to usher in institutional reform as an organ of the Ministry of Human Resource Development. The underlying objective was to regulate promotions of incumbent teachers as well as the recruitment of new teachers based on the academic performance indicators (API) under the Performance Based Appraisal System (PBAS). Introduced in 2010 and subsequently amended in 2013, the UGC has compartmentalised academic output into three categories for calculating API. According to the gazette notification, the first category focuses on teaching – learning, and evaluation related activities, the second category includes academic administration and co-curricular activities and the third category covers research output. These categories facilitate the process of recruitment and promotion of faculty under the Career Advancement Scheme (CAS). In addition, there is a structured point-based system that, in a sense, ranks faculty members to ensure systemised promotions.

Indian academicians have critiqued the PBAS as an overbearing evaluation scheme that interferes with the autonomy an academician ought to enjoy, with a potential to discourage long-term engagement in fundamental and path breaking research. With the advent of API, the UGC sought to streamline and standardise the myriad objectives and missions of different universities. Critiques have also noted that although API-PBAS factors in differences in academic disciplines, it is inadequate as it does not capture the asymmetry in publication opportunities for journals in different fields.

Moreover, PBAS fails to take cognisance of different research and academic pursuits undertaken by faculty members that may not be in line with their standards but still contribute substantially to the existing discourse. The broader and general discontent with PBAS has been that it assumes a linear relationship between time spent and research output. Terming quantified activities as only those generating knowledge on a subjective basis is simplistic and demeaning to other original, critical and potential activities that further the existing academic discourse.

“The introduction of academic performance indicators (API) by the University Grants Commission (UGC), lack of clarity in identifying and evaluating journals, the focus on ‘quantity’ over ‘quality’, unhealthy competition between peers, and overall, a favourable non-scientific publishing environment have led Indian researchers to publish in mediocre journals wherein most manuscripts are published without any peer review. Perhaps it is also the fear of peer review that has nourished predatory journals, making India one of the world’s largest base for predatory open-access publishing,” notes a September 2014 editorial in the journal Current Science.

According to Jeffrey Beall, a librarian at the University of Colorado, Denver, the number of predatory publishers has risen from 18 in 2011 to nearly 700 in 2015 and the number of standalone fake journals has shot up from 126 in 2013 to 507 in 2015.

Assessing a scholar almost solely based on her publications in prestigious journals is arguably flawed. These days, faculty members choose not to shape public debates or policies through publications but by alternate mediums of communication. Access to these journals is prohibitively expensive for practitioners and the sheer volume and incomprehensible jargon further prevents lay persons from reading them. While these prestigious journals identify themselves as exclusive, they do little to further debates or resolve problems.

This is not to say that we do not require purely theoretical discussions, for which popular media might not offer a platform. But on the other hand, it is imperative that the measuring standards account for the scholar’s presence in popular media. Access to televised debates or brief articles in newspapers has become simple in this era of information technology. Scholars also prefer these mediums to express views and in the recent times, interaction amongst reputed experts and individuals has increased tremendously.

Responding to another set of criticisms, it is significant to bring factors like course design, class preparation, devising assessments, conducting and assessing examinations and other such activities undertaken by faculty members beyond the classroom, within the scope of measurement. These factors are inherent to a faculty member’s professional requirements. In a sense, they also demonstrate the concerned faculty member’s motivation towards the area. Therefore, one way to respond to scholars, who advocate for a more holistic measuring mechanism which involve evaluation of qualitative characteristics, is by calculating time spent whilst undertaking these activities.

Creative endeavours undertaken by faculty members, or engagement with the subject material in a critical manner or other such diverse interests cannot be easily quantified. However, in a system that awards specific points to some research activities, it is not the value of that research activity that is awarded points, but the value addition to the discourse that makes it worthy of recognition. Similarly, measuring systems have to include, say, the impact on the discourse if faculty members and invite reputed scholars in a particular field of study to engage with students in a seminar.

While, on one hand, the argument that such tasks are hard to quantify can be accepted, if a system is introduced specifically to measure faculty productivity, then it must be fine-tuned to an extent that it acknowledges the varied nuances that flow from diverse faculty research interests.

Arjun Joshi is a final year B.A. LL.B. student of Jindal Global Law School. He would like to thank Prof. Anamika Srivastava for her support.