There is a swirl of controversy over the actions of the former Andhra Pradesh chief minister Jaganmohan Reddy who was at the helm of affairs in the state in the duration of the purported scandal involving bribes having been paid to Indians.
There is a swirl of controversy over the actions of the former Andhra Pradesh chief minister Jaganmohan Reddy who was at the helm of affairs in Andhra Pradesh in the duration of the purported scandal involving bribes having been paid to Indians.
The indictment alleges that Gautam Adani himself was personally involved in talks in which “more than $250 million was promised in bribes to Indian government officials to secure solar energy contracts.” Adani Group has called the charges baseless and denied them.
The US laws allow investigations against foreign corruption if US markets are involved or impacted.
The public copy of the indictment anonymises several names and institutions, among which is “Foreign Official #1.”
The indictment notes that #1 was a citizen of India who resided in India. “From approximately May 2019 through June 2024, Foreign Official #1 served as a high-ranking government official of Andhra Pradesh, India,” it said.
In June 2024, Andhra Pradesh saw a change in government, with Jaganmohan Reddy being voted out of power and Chandrababu Naidu being elected chief minister.
The indictment said that Adani “personally met with Foreign Official #1 in Andhra Pradesh to advance the execution of a PSA between SECI and Andhra Pradesh’s state electricity distribution companies, including on or about August 7, 2021, on or about September 12, 2021 and on or about November 20, 2021.”
On September 13, 2021, Andhra media had reported Jagan meeting with Adani and other Group officials without him disclosing the fact or details of those meetings.
Areport on September 13 said that in September 2021, Gautam Adani “along with his brothers” met Jagan at the then chief minister’s Tadepalli residence. There was no official update on the visit, the report said, noting that this goes against tradition when it comes to such a meeting.
Another reportnoted that the other Adani with Gautam was his brother Karan who was the chief executive officer of Adani Ports and SEZ Limited.
Before this visit, the Andhra Pradesh government made a move to sell its 10.4% stake in the Gangavaram port to the Adani Group, which at that time had around 89.61% stake in the port. The move was challenged in the high court.
The Communist Party of India (CPI) haddemanded the Andhra Pradesh government disclose the details of this secret meeting between Jagan and Adani, following which the Andhra Pradesh state cabinet adopted resolutions to allow Adani group to set up 9,000 megawatt solar power plants in the state.
The party had asked why the contract was given to Adani alone when several contractors, and some closer home, could have shared the execution of the project.
The indictment said, “Approximately 1,750 crore rupees (approximately $228 million) of the corrupt payments was offered to Foreign Official #1 in exchange for Foreign Official #1 causing Andhra Pradesh’s state electricity distribution companies to agree to purchase seven gigawatts of solar power from SECI under the Manufacturing Linked Project.”
The indictment notes that Andhra Pradesh’s electricity distribution companies entered into a PSA [or power supply agreement] with SECI on or about December 1, 2021, pursuant to which the state agreed to purchase approximately seven gigawatts of solar power – by far the largest amount of any Indian state or region.
SECI or Solar Energy Corporation of India was a company of the Ministry of New and Renewable Energy under the Narendra Modi-ruled Union government of India. “SECI was stateowned and state-controlled and performed a function that India treated as its own. SECI was an “instrumentality” of the Indian government,” the indictment says.
A month after the alleged meeting between Adani and Jagan, in 2021, areport in an Andhra outlet said that Jagan was attracting attention over his use of special private jets owned by the Adanis and Ambanis. In October, Jagan had used an Adani flight to Chittoor to visit the Tirupati temple. In August, before his meeting with the Adanis, he had used a flight owned by the Reliance Group.
Adani Group has called the charges “baseless” and denied them.
‘PM knows he will be implicated’
Leader of the opposition in the parliament, Rahul Gandhi renewed his attack on the Adani group in a press conference on the morning of November 21. He challenged PM Narendra Modi to arrest him but added that he was confident that Gautam Adani, who should be in prison, will not be arrested as the industrialist has the complete support of the prime minister.
“If Gautam Adani is arrested, the PM knows that he will also be implicated (for being complicit in his crimes),” he said.
Gandhi said that he has been raising concerns about the way the Adani-Modi duo has “hijacked Hindustan” that has led to loss of jobs, power price spike and inflation in the country.
He said that his primary message for people of this country is that Adani, with the help of Modi, has hijacked the institutions of this country, as the Congress had shown recently in the way SEBI chief Madhabi Buch was allegedly protected. He said Buch was responsible for protecting Adani stocks but she did not fulfil her primary role to protect retail share market investors. He added that the Congress will eventually expose the “political-bureaucratic” network of Adani which is being sheltered by none other than PM Modi.
“We will dismantle the nexus,” he said.
He also said that although he has no hope of a government probe being initiated by Modi, he demands a JPC probe and a thorough investigation into all of Adani’s projects. “If investigations reveal any wrongdoing by even opposition-ruled states, they should also be made subjects of probe, he said.”
As a LoP, Gandhi said, it was his responsibility to protect Indian citizens and he will keep raising the concern in the parliament in the upcoming parliament session and demand a JPC probe, too.
He said that the Adani group is being given institutional protection that has helped the industrial conglomerate to raise its valuation, and that in turn has allowed it to raise huge funds from banks and investors.
“[The] political finance, stock market, Adani ji nexus is dangerous for the country. Retail investors will be the most harmed but this is also dangerous for the country’s security. So much concentration of wealth in one group’s hand is dangerous for the future of this country. We demand Gautam Adani’s arrest and a thorough probe against his alleged wrongdoings,” Gandhi said.
Jairam Ramesh
Congress veteran Jairam Ramesh has posted on X that since January 2023, the Congress has been calling for a Joint Parliamentary Committee investigation into the various “Modani scams.”
Modani is a portmanteau of the last name of prime minister Narendra Modi and Adani.
“The Congress had asked a hundred questions in its Hum Adani ke Hain (HAHK) series bringing out the various dimensions of these scams and of the intimate nexus that has existed between the PM and his favourite businessman. These questions have remained unanswered.”
The indictment says that more than $250 million was promised in bribes to Indian government officials by the Adani group to secure solar energy contracts.
Congress has also highlighted SEBI’s lack of action in probing the purported nexus between Adani and various governments – now thrown in contrast:
“The SEC’s actions also cast poor light on the manner in which its Indian counterpart, namely SEBI, has gone about investigating violations of securities and other laws by the Adani Group and its abject failure to hold the Group to account for the source of its investments, shell companies, etc.,” he said.
The party has reiterated its demand for a JPC into the transactions of the Adani Group, “which is leading to growing monopolisation in key sectors of the Indian economy, fuelling inflation, and posing huge foreign policy challenges as well, especially in our neighbourhood.”
The indictment mentions that Gautam Adani personally met with an Indian government official to advance a bribery scheme.
It is noteworthy that in 2021, the Communist Party of India (CPI) had demanded the Andhra Pradesh government disclose the details of a secret meeting between then chief minister Y.S. Jagan Mohan Reddy and Adani, following which the Andhra Pradesh state cabinet adopted resolutions to allow Adani group to set up 9,000 megawatt solar power plants in the state.
The party had asked why the contract was given to Adani alone when several contractors, and some closer home, could be divided the project.
The US Attorney’s Office statement says that Adani is accused of personally being involved in the scheme, that he met with an Indian government official to advance the scheme, which took place between 2020 to 2024. The Adani Group has denied the charges.
New Delhi: The Securities and Exchange Commission and the Attorney’s Office of the United States have charged billionaire industrialist Gautam Adani over his alleged role in what they have called is a “massive bribery scheme.” The Adani Group has called the charges “baseless” and denied them.
US law allows foreign corruption allegations to be investigated if they involve links to US markets.
The Attorney’ Office has it in its statement that Adani is accused of personally being involved in the scheme, that he met with an Indian government official to advance the scheme, which took place between 2020 to 2024. “The defendants frequently met and discussed the bribery scheme, including evidence on several phones,” it says.
“More than $250 million was promised in bribes to Indian government officials, to secure solar energy contracts,” it says.
Adani, who heads the Adani Group, and his nephew Sagar have been indicted for their roles as executives of Adani Green Energy Ltd. Cyril Cabanes, an executive of Azure Power Global Ltd, has also been charged.
The SEC’s complaint against Gautam and Sagar Adani charges them with violating the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws. The complaint seeks permanent injunctions, civil penalties, and officer and director bars.
In parallel action, the Attorney’s Office’s five-count criminal indictment in a federal court in Brooklyn charges along with Gautam and Sagar Adani, Vneet S. Jaain, with “conspiracies to commit securities and wire fraud and substantive securities fraud for their roles in a multi-billion-dollar scheme to obtain funds from U.S. investors and global financial institutions on the basis of false and misleading statements.” The indictment also charges Ranjit Gupta and Rupesh Agarwal, former executives of a renewable-energy company with securities that had traded on the New York Stock Exchange, and Cyril Cabanes, Saurabh Agarwal and Deepak Malhotra, former employees of a Canadian institutional investor, with conspiracy to violate the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in connection with the bribery scheme.
“Gautam S. Adani and seven other business executives allegedly bribed the Indian government to finance lucrative contracts designed to benefit their businesses. Adani and other defendants also defrauded investors by raising capital on the basis of false statements about bribery and corruption, while still other defendants allegedly attempted to conceal the bribery conspiracy by obstructing the government’s investigation,” stated FBI assistant director in charge James E. Dennehy.
Bloomberg had reported in March this year that such an investigation was afoot. The Adani Group had then told the news outlet that it was not aware of any such probe against chairman Adani. “As a business group that operates with the highest standards of governance, we are subject to and fully compliant with anti-corruption and anti-bribery laws in India and other countries,” it had said.
Adani group stocks faced a heavy drubbing during early trade today, with Adani Energy and Adani Enterprises tumbling 20%.
Before the Adani Group officially responded, Adani Green Energy Ltd announced the decision to halt its proposed $600-million dollar-denominated bond issue. “The company announced its decision to scrap the bond issue in a regulatory filing, citing the indictment as the reason for its subsidiaries’ plans to defer the bond offering,” a report said.
Adani response: ‘We are a law-abiding organisation’
In a media statement, the group has said that allegations made by the US Department of Justice and the US Securities and Exchange Commission against the directors of Adani Green are “baseless and denied.”
It sought to remind readers that the charges were allegations at present, quoting the US Department of Justice’s own disclaimer:
“As stated by the US Department of Justice itself, “the charges in the indictment are allegations and the defendants are presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty.” All possible legal recourse will be sought.”
The group said that it has always upheld and is steadfastly committed to “maintaining the highest standards of governance, transparency and regulatory compliance across all jurisdictions of its operations.”
“We assure our stakeholders, partners and employees that we are a law-abiding organisation, fully compliant with all laws,” it added.
Attorney’s office charges
The Attorney’s Office breaks down the charges as such:
“…[B]etween approximately 2020 and 2024, the defendants agreed to pay more than $250 million in bribes to Indian government officials to obtain lucrative solar energy supply contracts with the Indian government, which were projected to generate more than $2 billion in profits after tax over an approximately 20-year period (the Bribery Scheme).”
Noting, as mentioned above, that on several occasions, Gautam Adani personally met with an Indian government official to advance the bribery scheme, and the defendants held in-person meetings with each other to discuss aspects of its execution, the indictment says that defendants “frequently discussed their efforts in furtherance of the bribery scheme, including through an electronic messaging application.”
Notably, in 2021, the Communist Party of India (CPI) had demanded the Andhra Pradesh government disclose the details of a secret meeting between then chief minister Y.S. Jagan Mohan Reddy and Adani, following which the Andhra Pradesh state cabinet adopted resolutions to allow Adani group to set up 9,000 megawatt solar power plants in the state. The party had asked why the contract was given to Adani alone when several contractors, and some closer home, could be divided the project.
The Adanis and the other indicted executives also extensively documented their corrupt efforts, the Attorney Office indictment alleges. “For example, Sagar R. Adani used his cellular phone to track specific details of the bribes offered and promised to government officials; Vneet S. Jaain used his cellular phone to photograph a document summarizing various bribe amounts the U.S. Issuer owed the Indian Energy Company for its respective portion of the bribes; and Rupesh Agarwal prepared and distributed to other defendants multiple analyses using PowerPoint and Excel that summarized various options for paying and concealing bribe payments (Bribery Analyses).”
Adani, Sagar Adani and Jaain also allegedly conspired to misrepresent Adani Green’s anti-bribery and corruption practices and conceal the bribery scheme from US investors and international financial institutions in order to obtain financing, including to fund those solar energy supply contracts procured through bribery.
Indian stock exchanges mentioned
It is noteworthy that the US Attorney’s Office noted that in March this year, Individual #2 [names of some individuals and financial institutions have been anonymised in the public copy of the indictment] “emailed employees of Financial Institution #2, Financial Institution #3 and Financial Institution #4 letters that the Indian Energy Company had sent to the National Stock Exchange of India and BSE Limited, both Indian stock exchanges.”
It said, “The letters falsely stated, among other things, that the Indian Energy Company “has not received any notice from the Department of Justice of U.S. in respect of the allegation referred to in the [2024 News Article]” and that the Indian Energy Company was “aware of an investigation” into potential violations of United States anti-corruption laws by a “third party.””
SEC charges
According to the SEC’s allegations, the bribery scheme was orchestrated to enable the two renewable energy companies to capitalise on a multi-billion-dollar solar energy project that the companies had been awarded by the Indian government. “During the alleged scheme, Adani Green raised more than $175 million from US investors and Azure Power’s stock was traded on the New York Stock Exchange,” the statement by the SEC said.
According to the SEC’s complaint, Gautam and Sagar Adani “orchestrated a bribery scheme that involved paying or promising to pay the equivalent of hundreds of millions of dollars in bribes to Indian government officials” to secure their commitment to purchase energy at above-market rates that would benefit Adani green and Azure Power.
The scheme was allegedly in play in 2021, when in a note offering, Adani Green claimed that it raised $750 million, including approximately $175 million from US investors. “The Adani Green offering materials included statements about its anti-corruption and anti-bribery efforts that were materially false or misleading in light of Gautam and Sagar Adani’s conduct,” the SEC has said.
The charge against Cyril Cabanes, a former member of Azure Power’s Board of Directors, is under the US’s Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). According to the SEC’s complaint, Cabanes allegedly facilitated the authorisation of bribes in furtherance of the scheme while in the United States and abroad.
“As alleged, Gautam and Sagar Adani induced US investors to buy Adani Green bonds through an offering process that misrepresented not only that Adani Green had a robust anti-bribery compliance program but also that the company’s senior management had not and would not pay or promise to pay bribes, and Cyril Cabanes participated in the underlying bribery scheme while serving as director of a US public company,” said Sanjay Wadhwa, Acting Director of the SEC’s Division of Enforcement said.
“We will continue to vigorously pursue and hold individuals, including senior corporate officers and directors, accountable when they violate our securities laws.”
This article is being updated with details as they come in.
As Sri Lanka found in 2022, simply making a payment does not cause the electricity to flow instantly. Competitive bids must be sought and assessed. Ships must sail and be unloaded. All this takes time.
Instead of buying fuel for power generation, Bangladesh is buying 10% of the electricity it needs from a dedicated power plant located across the border in Godda in Jharkhand. The Bangladesh Power Development Board (BPDB) has failed to make timely payments and Adani Power is threatening to cut supplies. It is reported that the outstanding payments may be as much as USD 800 million. State-owned coal powered generating plants in Bangladesh are running below capacity because they too lack dollars to buy the needed fuel.
At the peak of the Sri Lankan crisis in 2022, people experienced 13 hour power cuts because the government lacked the money (and creditworthiness) to unload the coal shipments in Colombo port.
Load shedding is not something any self-respecting government should allow in this day and age. Whether the cause is inability to buy fuel for a state-owned plant or the inability to buy electricity from a private supplier, the result is the same: load shedding. The cause for both is lack of dollars.
The Adani contract is said to be unfavourable to Bangladesh. I do not know enough to comment on the details of the complex contract between Adani Power and BPDB. For example, I know enough to say that a capacity-charge component is normal in these kinds of transactions, but lack enough information to say whether the amount (reported to be US $ 450 million/year) is reasonable. When a major dedicated investment (in excess of US $ 1.7 billion) is made to fulfil the terms of a contract, it is normal to include capacity charges. It was upto the BPDB officials to ensure the terms were reasonable.
The coal is brought all the way from an Adani owned mine in Australia to Jharkand, a coal-rich state. This is said to result in excessive costs. But the appropriate comparison is with the alternatives that the BPDB has at this time. “Other coal-fired plants are running at 50% capacity and the country is unable to buy enough coal owing to the dollar crisis, so it is important to continue readymade power supply from Adani. It is marginally more expensive than local producers but it is a crucial supply,” the BBC reported Dr Ajaj Hossain, energy expert and a retired professor as saying.
With the available dollars, should BPDB pay the outstanding debt to Adani or buy coal for the state-owned plants? As Sri Lanka found in 2022, simply making a payment does not cause the electricity to flow instantly. Competitive bids must be sought and assessed. Ships must sail and be unloaded. All this takes time.
Modern societies cannot function without electricity. How can a government allow such matters to be under the control of foreign companies or governments?
On the surface, the answer seems obvious: become self-sufficient in energy. Sri Lanka has enough wind and solar potential to meet its entire requirements and more. Bangladesh has this option too, though its current renewable share is in the single digits. It also has natural gas in the ground. Why are these countries scrambling for dollars to pay for essential electricity and the inputs for electricity?
Solar and wind require major investments and the key inputs have to be brought from outside the country. The early wind plants in Sri Lanka even required the cranes for raising the towers to be brought from India. India has developed the eco-system for renewables, but is not fully self-sufficient. It is widely accepted that the solar panels produced in China are the cheapest. In addition, the grid has to be built out to the locations where the wind and solar power is generated. This requires major investments. Here too, the choices are investment or loans. It’s likely to take three to five years from green light to cut over.
Foreign investment is perhaps the only option for increasing the proportion of electricity generated from wind and solar for governments with fiscal constraints. Contracts such as the one entered into with Adani are seen as necessary to assure the investor in any kind of energy supply that they will continue to earn returns throughout the projected life of the investment. Of course, each element in a contract must be negotiated carefully because parties have incentive to embed favourable provisions within the complex legalese.
Before the investment is made, the investor has a strong negotiating position: treat us fairly or we will go elsewhere. But once the investment is made, the investor cannot dismantle the turbines and go elsewhere. Now the state and the buyer of the output of the plant (often the buyer is owned by the state) have the upper hand.
This is what happened to independent power producers (IPPs) supplying electricity using renewable sources during the 2022-23 crisis in Sri Lanka. The state-owned electricity board did not honour its contractual obligations. The IPPs could have disconnected their plants from the grid, resulting in longer periods of load shedding for the public and no income for themselves. Or they could let the electricity flow while lobbying those is authority for payments to be made, even if late. The Sri Lankan IPPs chose the latter path and have now been made whole.
The Adani contract differs from the Sri Lankan case in two ways. The first and most important is that the Godda plant requires 7-9 million tonnes of coal per year. A plant using renewable sources will require minimal cost outlays for operations. The wind will blow and the sun will shine. By contrast, a coal plant requires continual expenditures for fuel and transport. The second difference is that the Godda plant is outside Bangladesh jurisdiction.
A Google Map depiction of the road route between Godda and Bangladesh’s Dhaka area.
The IPPs in Sri Lanka, whose losses were limited to the costs of serving the debt taken to build their plants and the forgone profits of the shareholders, could afford to be patient. Adani Power has to pay for the coal including transportation costs, in addition. That is likely the reason for Adani’s hard stance.
The second difference is that the coercive power of the Bangladesh government does not extend into Jharkhand state. The Indian government is not supporting the Bangladesh government’s demands. It is instead easing the pain for Adani by allowing electricity from the Godda plant to be sold within India.
Managing dependence
Saudi Arabia is a major energy exporter. If any country can be self-sufficient in energy, it should be Saudi Arabia. Yet it is partnering with multiple Chinese entities to ramp up its renewable energy capacity. If this is the case for Saudi Arabia, how can fiscally constrained Bangladesh and Sri Lanka be self-sufficient?
Issues of dependence cannot be wished away. Russia cut off electricity supplies to Finland in the context of that country’s support for Ukraine. But because Finland had diversified, it was able to make up the difference by getting more power from Sweden. Adani was not the sole external supplier of electricity to Bangladesh, but it was the largest. Even the other suppliers reduced supply because of non-payment.
Usually, what happens is that a supplier withholds service for political reasons (like in Finland). With Adani and the other Indian suppliers, the problem is the opposite. They want to sell. Supply is being withheld because they are not being paid.
Diversification is how dependence is managed. However, problems cannot be avoided if macro-economic mismanagement delays or stops payments for contracted services. Finland was able to avoid load shedding because its electricity companies had the funds to pay the new suppliers.
Energy utilities must actively mitigate risks, including geopolitical risks. But the most fundamental risk-mitigation action is sound macro-economic management. Bankruptcy negates more risk mitigation measures.
Rohan Samarajiva is founding Chair of LIRNEasia, an ICT policy and regulation think-tank active across emerging Asia.
A cornerstone of India’s climate transition plan is to shift towards a high-efficiency, low-emission power sector. There are significant investment and financing challenges associated with such a shift.
Transitioning to a high-efficiency, low-emission (HELE) power sector requires significant capital outlay, not only for new low-emission generation capacity but also for the necessary transmission infrastructure. In this post, we consolidate existing projections under various HELE scenarios and evaluate investment estimates across the different scenarios. We also review existing capital pools and their ability to support HELE investments within the current regulatory and policy framework. We conclude by presenting policy measures to boost HELE investments. and assess these against the available financial resources.
Demand for investment
Numerous studies have estimated the investment requirements for India’s transition to a HELE power sector, each based on three key assumptions:
i. Time horizon: The timelines align with India’s commitments under various international agreements ii. Target specifications: These pertain to emission reduction goals and the power generation mix within the set timeframes iii. Scope of estimates: This may range from power system investments (generation, transmission, storage, distribution) to broader investments in industries like steel and cement, vehicle electrification, and coal-based power abatement technologies such as carbon capture and storage.
Two prominent time horizons are 2030, the target year for India’s Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) for emission reduction, and 2070, the target year for net zero emissions. Estimates for 2030 are notably more precise than those for 2070.
By 2030, the investment goals align with India’s NDCs, which include a 45% reduction in emissions relative to 2005 levels and achieving a 50% share of power generation capacity from renewable sources. Estimates vary regarding the power generation mix, the scope of storage and transmission capacity, and the phase-out or abatement of coal capacity. The 2070 net zero target remains too distant for precise estimates; thus, our analysis focuses on the 2030 investment requirements, particularly within the power sector – the creation of renewable generation capacity, transmission, and storage – excluding investments in end-use sectors like vehicle electrification or industrial emission controls.
We have carefully reviewed estimates from reputable sources. Table 1 presents a summary of investment estimates from various agencies, reflecting the diversity of targets and scope. These estimates are comprehensive, covering both power systems and investments in end-use sectors like industrial emission controls and transport electrification, and they highlight the significant variation due to differences in targets and coverage. This table is selective, not exhaustive.
Table 1. Estimates of overall investments required for meeting climate related targets in India
Agency
Target & Timeline
Investment Estimate
International Energy Agency (2023)
Net zero by 2070
US$160 billion per annum
BloombergNEF (2023)
Net zero 2050; non fossil sources of energy with ~80% share of generation
Total US$4800 billion in power grid and generation (~US$192 billion per annum)
McKinsey & Company (2022)
Net Zero by 2070
US$44 billion per annum until 2030
US$154 billion per annum 2030 onwards, and US$440 billion per annum from 2040 onwards
Central Electricity Authority – National Electricity Plan (2023)
NDC by 2030
Total Rs. 17 trillion (US$200 billion at current exchange rate) or ~US$50 billion per annum
For our base case on power generation investments through 2030, we rely on estimates from the Central Electricity Authority (CEA) under the National Electricity Plan (2023). This plan outlines investments across generation, transmission, and storage, with generation investment estimates rooted in the NDC target of achieving a 50% renewable share in the power mix. The phasing of these investments considers the current status of ongoing projects.
Beyond generation, substantial investments in the transmission network are necessary to efficiently evacuate power generated by new renewable sources. The CEA estimates that approximately 50,000 circuit kilometres of additional transmission lines will be needed to support the targeted 2030 renewable capacity. The investment required for this expansion is projected at around Rs. 2,100 billion, averaging Rs. 420 billion per year (approximately US$26 billion at the current exchange rate, or US$5.2 billion annually). An additional Rs. 300 billion will be required to support offshore wind generation, should it come online by 2030.
Given the intermittent nature of renewable energy sources like solar and wind, increasing generation capacity also necessitates investments in storage systems to ensure efficient utilisation. Focusing on the current technological and economic landscape, we consider two primary models of energy storage: pumped storage plants (PSPs) and battery energy storage systems (BESS). We rely on the National Electricity Plan’s investment estimates for both PSPs and BESSs through the financial year 2030 (FY30). Table 2 below summarises the investment requirements for the power system – generation, transmission, and storage – from FY25 to FY30.
Table 2. Estimate of investment requirement in power generation, transmission and storage, FY25-FY30
Investment Destination
FY25
FY26
FY27
FY28
FY29
FY30
Cumulative
(Rs. Billion)
Generation
Solar
1,467
1,571
1,720
1,821
1,915
1,972
10,466
Wind
548
556
531
613
711
787
3,746
Hydro
150
103
95
299
333
316
1,296
Bio
50
52
54
55
57
59
327
Sub-total
2,215
2,282
2,400
2,788
3,016
3,134
15,835
Transmission and Storage
Transmission
350
350
350
350
350
350
2,100
Battery Capacity (BESS)
566
1450
840
225
3,081
Pumped Storage Plants (PSPS)
47
154
282
297
251
154
1,185
Sub-total
397
504
1,198
2,097
1,441
729
6,366
Source: National Electricity Plan – Vol. 1 (2023) by Central Electricity Authority, and Ministry of New and Renewable Energy (MNRE).
The table indicates that the cumulative five-year investment required is approximately Rs. 22,621 billion (around US$275 billion). Roughly 70% of this capital will be directed toward developing new renewable generation capacity, predominantly solar (50%) and wind (17%). Investment in the transmission network is projected to account for about 11% of the total.
These figures underscore the substantial financial commitment required to meet India’s 2030 NDCs. On average, annual investments of Rs. 3,700 billion (or US$45 billion) will be needed in the power sector. This estimate excludes additional investments required for emission abatement in existing fossil fuel generators and in end-use sectors like industrial production and transportation.
Supply of capital
The bulk of investment in the power sector is expected to come from corporations, both private and State-owned, with capital flowing in as either debt or equity. Assuming that most investments will be corporate-led (including government-owned entities), we assess the necessary mix of equity and debt at a 3:1 debt-to-equity ratio, deemed commercially viable. This implies that at least 25% of the investment must be equity, while 75% can be financed through debt. Based on these assumptions, an annual infusion of Rs. 900 billion (approximately US$11 billion) in equity and Rs. 2,800 billion (around US$44.5 billion) in debt will be required from FY25 to FY30 to achieve the 2030 targets.
Debt capital
Debt capital can be sourced through two primary channels: institutional lenders (such as banks and non-bank financial companies(NBFCs)) and debt capital markets, whether domestic or global. Historically, India’s banking system has been the largest provider of credit to businesses. Recently, NBFCs have also emerged as significant institutional providers of debt capital. Notably, three government-owned NBFCs – Power Finance Corporation (PFC), Rural Electrification Corporation (REC), and Indian Renewable Energy Development Agency (IREDA) – have become key sources of debt capital, particularly for the renewable power sector.
Table 3 summarises the credit extended to the power sector in India by the banking system and the three government-owned NBFCs.
Table 3. Institutional credit to power sector in India
FY19
FY20
FY 21
FY 22
FY 23
FY 24
(Rs. Billion)
Credit from the banking sector
5,690
5,709
5,706
6,108
6,208
6,454
Credit from PSU NBFCs
9,235
10,508
11,870
12,202
13,928
16,240
Total institutional credit
14,925
16,217
17,576
18,310
20,136
22,694
Annual incremental credit
1,292
1,359
734
1,826
2,558
Source: Reserve Bank of India (RBI), Company disclosures.The data show that annual incremental debt from banks and NBFCs over the last five financial years (2020-2024) ranged from Rs. 725 billion to Rs. 2,556 billion. This credit encompasses the entire power sector, including conventional fossil fuel-based energy and renewables. Although precise figures are elusive, it is estimated that less than 30% of this credit has been directed toward renewables, implying that cumulative institutional credit to the renewable energy sector over this period is unlikely to have exceeded Rs. 2,400 billion.
In addition to institutional credit, debt capital can also be raised through the bond market. The Indian bond market has grown substantially over the past decade, particularly in corporate bond issuance. From 2020 to 2024, cumulative net bond issuance in the Indian market reached approximately Rs. 18,500 billion, with about 70% of these issuances from financial institutions, predominantly NBFCs. Notably, Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) data reveal that bond issuances are heavily weighted toward high-rated borrowers, with those rated AA and above accounting for over 80% by value of all bonds issued.
Within the broader category of corporate bonds, Indian regulations also recognise “green bonds,” which can be issued by both government entities and corporations to fund climate-related initiatives. During 2020-2024, green bonds totalling Rs. 455 billion were issued, with nearly 80% of these bonds by value issued by the government (mainly the central government and some municipal corporations). Private corporations accounted for only 8% of green bond issuance, amounting to Rs. 33 billion (BloombergNEF, 2023).
These data suggest that while the Indian bond market has developed considerable depth, with annual net bond issuance reaching Rs. 4,000 billion, the portion accessible for HELE power systems remains limited. Even the creation of the green bond category has not significantly expanded this debt capital pool. It is evident from the analysis that the current domestic debt capital available – from both institutions and markets – falls well short of the annual estimated demand of Rs. 2,800 billion. The 2023 BloombergNEF Report also notes that “India’s domestic banks may not be able to match the scale or speed required to meet the financing needs of the net zero transition.”
Equity capital
While government support for the HELE power transition is anticipated, most required investments are expected to come from corporations, both private and State-owned. These entities will need to deploy equity capital as part of their investments. Earlier estimates pegged the demand for equity capital at Rs. 900 billion annually over the next five FYs, up to 2030.
Equity capital can be sourced either from internally generated funds, such as retained earnings, or from public and private equity markets. National Stock Exchange (NSE) data show that, over the five years from 2020 to 2025, Indian companies raised Rs. 4,743 billion in equity through public markets, via initial public offerings and rights issues. Renewable energy companies, particularly Adani Green Energy and ReNew Power, have been significant contributors to this pool. However, this amount falls short of the annual requirement of US$900 billion over the next five years.
The capacity of companies to meet the equity demand is limited. In recent years, the profitability of many Indian companies, including those in the renewable energy sector, has been modest. Retained earnings alone are unlikely to meet the required levels of equity, necessitating greater reliance on public and private equity markets.
In the global context, India’s renewable energy sector is seen as an attractive investment destination, with a number of international equity investors, particularly private equity firms and sovereign wealth funds, showing interest. However, their investments to date have been modest, especially when considering the capital needs of the HELE transition. In 2023, private equity and venture capital investments in the Indian renewables sector amounted to around US$1.4 billion (Rs. 112 billion), reflecting only a small fraction of the required equity capital.
This analysis suggests that, while India’s capital markets have expanded and diversified over the past decade, they may still fall short in meeting the equity and debt needs of the HELE transition.
Policy options to enhance capital flow into HELE investments
To bridge the gap between the capital required for the HELE transition and the available supply, a mix of policy interventions is essential. These include:
Regulatory reforms: Streamlining and simplifying the regulatory framework governing capital markets can encourage greater participation by both domestic and international investors.
Incentives for green bonds: Expanding the scope and incentives for green bond issuance could increase the pool of debt capital available for HELE investments. This could include tax incentives or credit enhancement mechanisms for green bond issuers.
Public-private partnerships (PPP): Facilitating PPPs can attract more private sector investment into the power sector, leveraging government funding to de-risk projects and improve returns for private investors.
Sovereign green bonds: The government could consider issuing sovereign green bonds to fund HELE projects, particularly in areas where private capital is scarce or risk averse.
International funding mechanisms: Engaging with international financial institutions, such as the World Bank or the Asian Development Bank, can provide concessional funding or guarantees to support HELE investments in India.
Blended finance models: Utilising blended finance models, which combine concessional finance with private capital, can lower the overall cost of capital for HELE projects, making them more attractive to investors.
Strengthening domestic financial institutions: Enhancing the capacity and mandate of domestic financial institutions, such as IREDA, PFC, and REC, to finance HELE projects can ensure a steady flow of capital to this sector.
Figure 1.Capital structures evolve as sectors mature
Note: U5MR stands for under-five mortality, IMR stands for infant mortality, and NMR stands for neonatal mortality. The proportions shown above are indicative. Source: Tilotia (2023)
Conclusion
India’s transition to a HELE power sector presents a monumental challenge, particularly in terms of securing the necessary investment. While substantial capital is required, the current supply of both debt and equity capital falls short of the projected demand. Addressing this gap will require a concerted effort by policymakers to create an enabling environment that attracts and mobilises the necessary financial resources. By implementing a mix of regulatory reforms, incentives, and innovative financing mechanisms, India can enhance its ability to finance the HELE transition, ensuring that the country meets its ambitious climate goals while continuing to foster economic growth.
This article is based on a chapter which will be included in the forthcoming India Infrastructure Report.
This is part two of a series that looks at one of India’s most significant environmental movements, led by the indigenous communities of the Hasdeo Arand forest in Chhattisgarh. Through a sociological and legal lens, it investigates the complexities surrounding an area designated under the Fifth Schedule of the Indian constitution, yet allocated for coal mining to Rajasthan Rajya Vidyut Utpadan Nigam Ltd (RRVUNL), with operations subcontracted to Adani Enterprises Ltd. Since 2013, the villagers of Ghatbarra, Hariharpur, Salhi, and Fatehpur have actively resisted these developments, fighting for their identity, economic autonomy, legal rights, and communal way of life. Read the first part here.
In the dense and vibrant Hasdeo Arand forest of Chhattisgarh, once home to towering sal trees, orchids, and endangered wildlife, the village of Kete thrived, nestled deep in the green heart of one of India’s most biodiverse regions.
Today, however, Kete exists only as a memory – an early victim in the ongoing decimation of Hasdeo’s forests, cleared to make way for coal mining. It was here, in 2013, that the Parsa East Kete Basan (PEKB) coal block, granted to Adani Enterprises, began its operations, setting off a chain of events that would irreversibly alter the lives of Kete’s residents.
As India’s energy needs grow, forests are being sacrificed to the relentless march of coal mining. Historically, more than 90% of the country’s coal has been mined by state-owned companies. However, under Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s administration, private enterprises – led by corporate behemoths like Adani – have gained unprecedented control over mining operations. Adani, in particular, has been the subject of heated debate. Critics point to a slew of policies that appear tailor-made to favour the company, leading to accusations of cronyism. While Adani denies such allegations, the true cost of this shift is not measured in political scandals but in the suffering of local, often tribal, communities, such as those of Kete.
Once vibrant and full of life, Kete today exists only in whispers among the residents of neighbouring villages like Hariharpur, Salhi, Ghatbarra, and Fatehpur. Mentioning the name “Kete” is like invoking a curse. Eyes avert, heads lower, and voices trail off into murmurs. “No one knows where the people from Kete went,” says a villager. “They are all gone.” The fate of Kete haunts the residents of these villages, all too aware that their turn might be next.
A decade after displacement: The wreckage of Kete
The people of Kete, displaced nearly a decade ago, have been scattered in every direction. Many relocated to Basan, a government-designated rehabilitation site. Many of those relocated fell into poverty, alcoholism, or despair, with some losing their lives to accidents fuelled by alcohol addiction. Social worker and activist Mehendi Lal Yadav says, “Almost 50-60 women from Kete were widowed because of extreme alcoholism among the men. Many men died crossing roads while drunk. In 10 years, they lost their families, land, homes, and their entire community. Did the state account for this cost?”
Yadav, who led protests against the establishment of power plants by Indian Farmers Fertiliser Cooperative Limited (IFFCO) and Chhattisgarh State Power Generation Company in his own village of Chandan Nagar, managed get operations to halt in 2013 after a fierce struggle. He had raised critical questions during negotiations. “We didn’t just ask how much money per acre we would get. We raised questions like: How will we access the 100 litres of the water we need daily for farming after relocation? What about our access to herbal medicines from the forest after we have relocated? How will we find the wild foods we rely on for nutrition?” These were not just theoretical questions but ones rooted in the daily realities of forest life, essential for locals’ survival.
By contrast, the people of Kete were unaware of the full scale of what they would lose.
Ram Charan, a former resident of Kete, now displaced and working for Adani, vividly recalls the day he took a check from the company in exchange for his land. “Such a huge land I had, and it was reduced to a piece of paper,” he says. “All the gold I owned turned into a rock.” Ram Charan’s family once cultivated nearly 100 acres, growing crops like potato, paddy, and mustard. The company compensated him with Rs 3 lakhs per acre which was divided among his family. He managed to buy 16 acres of land in nearby villages, but nothing has been the same.
‘We weren’t told that the houses we’d be given would be like this.’ Photo: Shubhanghi Derhgawen.
Now 50, Ram Charan juggles farming his land while working a menial job for Adani’s afforestation team, earning Rs 14,000 per month. “They plant these green canopy trees, like the Gulmohar, which they brought from outside. It’s not the same as the forest we had.” Ram Charan’s sense of loss is palpable. “This is what we got in return for our land and village, right?” His voice is weary, resigned to the daily fight of demanding wages that the company often delays for 20 to 25 days. Despite his disillusionment, he doesn’t quit. “No matter what, I will not quit. It’s my only reminder of what was.”
When asked about the day he left his home, Ram Charan recalls how his children wept. He spent five days cutting down his paddy fields for the last time, carrying the crops with him, each day ending in tears. “The Gram Sabha was manipulated,” he says bitterly. “We weren’t told that the houses we’d be given would be like this.”
The harsh reality of life after displacement is visible in Basan, where many of Kete’s former residents were relocated. The houses built for rehabilitation are small, modern cement structures, cramped together with little space for the ‘badi,’ or kitchen garden, that once sustained families. These 25-square-metre dwellings, a far cry from the traditional homes of mud and bamboo that once dotted the villages of Hasdeo, stand in stark contrast to the sprawling, nature-integrated courtyards people were accustomed to. Devoid of farmland and locked up, most of these homes are now deserted, overgrown with weed. The people of Kete have long since abandoned them.
Very few families who are working at the mine live in Kete now. It’s been 10 years since the relocation. Most have moved towards the cities of Ambikapur (70 kilometres away) and some took up daily wage jobs in Udaipur (28 kilometres away).
‘In Basan, where Kete’s former residents were relocated, the land was forcibly acquired from the Uraon and Baiga tribes’. Photo: Shubhanghi Derhgawen.
Displacement beyond Kete
In Basan, where Kete’s former residents were relocated, the land was forcibly acquired from the Uraon and Baiga tribes, groups who have deep ties to the forest. Their land should have been protected under the Forest Rights Act (FRA) of 2006, which grants indigenous communities the right to their ancestral lands. Yet, like so many others, their claims to the land have been left unresolved.
Across the country, the FRA has struggled to deliver on its promises. By October 2023, around 2.34 million land titles, covering over 18 million acres, had been distributed under the FRA, according to the Ministry of Tribal Affairs. However, this represents only half of the claims submitted since the law came into effect. More troubling still is the slow pace of progress. Many claims, like those of the Uraon and Baiga communities, remain stuck in limbo for years, leaving the fate of countless villages uncertain.
The issue extends far beyond Chhattisgarh. National data from November 2023 highlights a significant increase in claims processed under the FRA since the Modi government came to power in 2014. The number of Community Forest Rights (CFR) and individual forest rights (IFR) claims settled rose nearly fourfold, from 23,578 up to May 2014 to 86,621 by June 2023. The amount of land distributed under these claims more than doubled, growing from 5.5 million acres to 12.3 million acres during the same period.
Yet, progress on paper often fails to reflect the reality on the ground. For people like 33-year-old Amar Sayid, the FRA has offered little protection. Amar’s family, part of the Uraon community, lived in Basan for generations, farming the same land. In 2012, however, their land was taken by Adani Enterprises despite ongoing legal claims. “They said, since I don’t have a document recognizing this land as mine, I cannot fight the company,” Amar recalls. His family was forced to take compensation or risk losing everything without any recourse. “We are nobody. How could we have fought them? The company had the biggest weapon with them: the government.”
Amar lost his three acres of farmland, leaving him with little to support his family. Though they managed to hold on to a small kitchen garden near their home after much pleading, their livelihood has been destroyed. Today, Amar survives on forest produce and occasional odd jobs, a shadow of his former self-sufficient existence. He often walks by the deserted rehabilitation houses in Basan, reminders of the forced displacement that destroyed his community. “I don’t hold anything against the people from Kete. They lost their land too. But you know who gained? Adani and the government.”
Shubhanghi Derhgawen is a freelance journalist and a lead researcher with the Visual Storyboard Team of the Centre for New Economics Studies (CNES), O.P. Jindal Global University.
Deepanshu Mohan is a professor of economics, Dean, IDEAS, and Director, CNES. He is a visiting professor at the London School of Economics and an academic visiting fellow to AMES, University of Oxford.
This research forms part of a series of field-based essays produced by the Visual Storyboard team at the Centre for New Economics Studies (CNES), OP Jindal Global University, dedicated to amplifying the voices of tribal communities in Chhattisgarh.
Despite their awareness and strong voice within the forest rights movement in Chhattisgarh, the private dynamics of the household often push them to the background.
Hasdeo (Chhattisgarh): Walking through the dense forest of Hasdeo Aranya near Fatehpur village in Chhattisgarh’s Sarguja district, Sunita Porte could not help but smile at our fascination with the forest. For her and the tribal community, the forest wasn’t just a patch of greenery; it was the backbone of their existence. “Your fascination is fascinating to me,” she remarked. “But please record this. Show people outside how we sustain ourselves through this forest.”
As Sunita and her companions collected wood and foraged for wild food, a pressing question lingered in the air: “What is a forest truly worth?”
According to the Union government, a forest is defined as any land larger than one hectare with a tree canopy density exceeding 10 percent, regardless of ownership or legal status. This definition, however, falls short of capturing what the Hasdeo forests mean to people like Sunita. “This forest is our life,” she said. “Every tree, every leaf here serves a purpose. We build our homes from its dried wood and mud. We make products like mats from its shrubs. I may not know all technical names, but I know everything here. It’s our god.
Latest government data from 2021 suggests an increase in forest cover by 2,261 square kilometres since 2019. But according to Global Forest Watch, India has lost over 23,000 square kilometres of tree cover in the past two decades. The disparity in these numbers arise from a shift in how India classifies land designated as forest areas – where forests are seen more for their carbon potential and economic value than for their biodiversity or communal ecosystem
Similarly, for the women of Hasdeo Aranya, these forests are more than just an economic asset; they are a symbol of livelihood, culture, and resistance. Their fight to protect these lands forms the heart of the Hasdeo Bachao Andolan, a movement that has been ongoing since 2011. Women are the cornerstone of this resistance that has, against all odds, saved over 445,000 acres of forest from 21 proposed coal mines. Yet, beneath the green canopy still lies an estimated 5.6 billion tonnes of coal – a resource so coveted that, despite protests, coal blocks continue to be auctioned off, especially during the 2020 pandemic when the government announced 21 new coal auctions.
‘What is a forest truly worth?’ Photo: Shubhanghi Derhgawen.
In 2014, the Supreme Court had cancelled 204 coal blocks across the country, including 20 in Hasdeo. But this has not stopped efforts to exploit the area. As of today, one block is actively mined by Adani Enterprises Ltd, and efforts are underway to open two more. The struggle to save the 1,876-square-kilometre Hasdeo region is far from over.
Fearless women, relentless resistance
Until May 2024, the women from villages like Salhi, Ghatbarra, Hairharpur and Fatehpur, staged a protest for over 800 consecutive days. “We are not afraid of the police, the administration, or the company,” said Bijayanti Khusro, a Ghatbarra resident, recalling a recent clash with authorities. In late August, at 3 am, they were informed that movement leaders had been detained by the police, and tree felling was imminent. Without a structured communication system, news spread by word of mouth, and soon enough, women poured out of their homes to gather near the forest, trying to stop the destruction.
Rattu Porte recounted how the situation escalated. “We stayed there all night. As more women gathered, more police vans arrived. By morning, the police became aggressive. They tore our sarees, broke our bangles, and threw us into buses,” she said. Despite the physical altercations and being forcibly removed, Bijayanti remained defiant. “What’s the worst they could do? Take us to the police station? It’s built for us, right? We’ll go, and we’ll take our families with us!”
‘We are not afraid of the police, the administration, or the company.’ Photo: Shubhanghi Derhgawen.
Over 100 women from three villages – Salhi, Ghatbarra, and Fatehpur – were preventively detained without a cause mentioned. Held in a government school from 10 am to 5 pm, they were released only after the trees they had so fiercely protected were felled. Their anger was palpable. Sambai Khusro, a protester from Ghatbarra, recounted, “Only we know the pain we felt, and how much we cried when they pulled us away from the trees. For years, we have revered this land, and they destroyed it within hours.”
Awareness and voting: The disconnect
Rattu Porte, an active figure in the Hasdeo movement, emphasised how women have consistently been engaged in the Gram Sabhas and the public life, juggling domestic responsibilities with community involvement. “We witnessed first-hand how the state encroached on our rights, how they pressured Gram Sabha secretaries to falsely show the villagers’ assent for mining activities,” she explained.
While women understood the manipulations within the Gram Sabhas, there remained a deeper, more nuanced disconnect when it came to fully grasping their rights under key legislations like the Forest Rights Act (FRA) of 2006 and the Panchayats (Extension to Scheduled Areas) Act (PESA) of 1996. These laws promise significant protection for forest dwellers – under the FRA, more than 40% of India’s forest land could be vested as community forest rights with Gram Sabhas. However, the implementation has been flawed, with delays, mass rejections of claims, and ongoing threats of eviction. For many women, while the lived experience of protecting their forest is deeply ingrained, the legal framework that safeguard these rights often feel distant, overshadowed by male counterparts who possess more formal knowledge.
‘It was instinct. The tree is like our child.’ Photo: Shubhanghi Derhgawen.
Even though women are the backbone of the movement, much of the strategies, legal knowledge, and organisational tactics have been passed down from their male peers. “The techniques we used to resist tree-felling were similar to the Chipko movement, but at the start, we didn’t even know about Chipko,” said Sambai Khusro. The Chipko movement, which saw women hugging trees in the 1970s to prevent deforestation, shares deep similarities with Hasdeo, but the connection came later for the women here.
“It was instinct. The tree is like our child. When the authorities approached with tools to cut it down, we hugged it, trying to shield it from pain,” Sambai recalled.
Over time, the women have learned about the historical parallels, giving their movement a stronger sense of legacy. Yet, at its core, their fight has always been rooted in their personal and intimate connection to the land.
Despite the women’s determination in the Hasdeo struggle, many women still feel disconnected from the political processes that shape their rights. Their interactions with the state are often limited to negative encounters, such as police crackdowns, while popular political slogans by the ruling Bhartiya Janta Party like “sabkavikas (development for all)” prompt them to ask, “Kiskavikas? (whose development?)”. The disillusionment with political promises has created a growing indifference to voting.
This indifference was evident in the 2024 general elections, when many women, including Sambai, did not want to vote. As a cook at the village government school, she was present on voting day but felt intimidated by the officials. “I don’t understand the symbols or the process. I’m not educated. They tell me to put my thumbprint here and there, and out of fear, I do it. But I don’t even know where my vote is going,” she shared, repeatedly expressing her lack of desire to participate. The act of voting, for many, has become hollow, a process stripped of meaning due to a lack of trust in the system or belief in its impact on their daily lives.
One of the greatest fears expressed by the women of the Hasdeo region is the loss of their independence, not just over their land but in public life. Neeru Uirra, a resident of Ghatbarra, cradling her two-year-old daughter, articulated this fear: “If we lose the village, we lose the community. We won’t be able to finish our housework and gather at 10 am to discuss work opportunities or run our group finance units. We pool our savings to invest in small enterprises, like setting up a shop or selling the products we make here. Without the village meetings and sabhas, our physical movement will be restricted – we won’t even go to the forest as often to collect supplies or forage.”
‘We pool our savings to invest in small enterprises.’ Photo: Shubhanghi Derhgawen.
With helplessness on her face, Neeru exclaimed, “We will be stuck at home.”
This concern highlights the visible difference between women’s empowerment in the private versus public spheres. With the encroachment on land rights, the fabric of their communal life unravels.
As the process of land acquisition in villages like Ghatbarra have advanced, many households have begun accepting compensation from Adani Enterprises. Among the five such households visited, women of the family consistently expressed discontent over being excluded from such decisions. Despite some women holding land rights in their names, the men dominated all decisions regarding compensation. In many cases, wives were unaware of how much money was even given for the land.
The elders of the movement, like Hari Prasad, also pointed out the adverse social consequences of the company’s influence. Since Adani began convincing villagers to give their consent, alcoholism has surged manifolds among men further complicating circumstances for women. Parpatiya Porte, a resident of Ghatbarra who a part of the protests and movement was once, shared her own story of loss. Her husband, who never drank before the land disputes began, now regularly consumes alcohol. He has taken a menial job at the coal mine in exchange for their land and has received part of the compensation money. “What do I say? My husband didn’t think of children or me. Now he spends all the money on alcohol,” she said. Parpatiya has now stopped being a part of the movement or stepping out of her house and joining other women in their activities.
‘Do you think men listen to anything women have to say?’ Photo: Shubhanghi Derhgawen.
Even her everyday private protests and attempts to stop her husband’s drinking fall on deaf ears. “My daughter, who is in college, tried to convince him not to give away the land, but do you think men listen to anything women have to say?” she asked bitterly. When asked about the fate of the compensation money being squandered on alcohol, she stared off into the distance, dejected and resigned to a future where the hard-earned gains of the community, and her family’s security, seem to be slipping away.
This situation reflects the broader challenges women face in Hasdeo. On one hand, they risk losing their participation in public affairs, economic security, and community life. Yet, despite their awareness and strong voices within the movement, the private dynamics of the household often push women to the background. Information about the movement, or critical decisions, is filtered through the men. Compounding these struggles is the rising issue of alcoholism among men in the community, which has left many women to face abuse and neglect. This dual loss – of public space and private autonomy – marks the complex and deeply layered reality for women in Hasdeo.
Shubhangi Derhgawen is a freelance journalist and a lead researcher with the Visual Storyboard Team of the Centre for New Economics Studies (CNES), O.P. Jindal Global University.
Deepanshu Mohan is a professor of economics, Dean, IDEAS, and Director, CNES. He is a visiting professor at the London School of Economics and an academic visiting fellow to AMES, University of Oxford.
This research forms part of a series of field-based essays produced by the Visual Storyboard team at the Centre for New Economics Studies (CNES), OP Jindal Global University, dedicated to amplifying the voices of tribal communities in Chhattisgarh.
This is the first time Nepal will sell electricity to a third country.
India, Nepal and Bangladesh have signed a trilateral agreement to trade 40 megawatts of electricity.
The historic deal, signed in Kathmandu on October 3, for the first time allows Nepal to sell electricity to a third country. Thus far, Nepal’s energy trade had been only with India.
The agreement was signed by Kulman Ghising, executive director of the Nepal Electricity Authority; Mohammad Rezaul Karim, chairman of Bangladesh Power Development Board; and Renu Narang, CEO of India’s NTPC Vidyut Vyapar Nigam at a function in Kathmandu.
Nepal’s energy minister Deepak Khadka, minister of state for energy Purna Bahadur Tamang, and Bangladeshi water resources minister Syeda Rizwana Hasan witnessed the signing.
As per the agreement, Bangladesh will now import 40 megawatts of electricity from Nepal. The Indian side has also been involved as Nepal’s electricity will be transmitted to Bangladesh through the transmission infrastructure on the Indian territory. Nepal and Bangladesh are not territorially linked.
Nepal is expected to sell 144,000 MWh (megawatt-hour) of electricity in five months – mid-June to mid-November – every year at the rate of 6.4 US cents a unit.
During the signing ceremony, ministers and other officials from the three countries hailed the tripartite deal as a historic one.
Nepal’s energy minister Khadka described the agreement as a landmark for Nepal’s energy sector development.
Bangladeshi minister Hasan termed it a milestone in energy cooperation in South Asia. Stating that Bangladesh was working to add renewable energy in its energy system, the hydroelectricity to be imported from Nepal will be vital for them. In the energy mix of Bangladesh, hydropower has a very nominal portion.
According to the Energy Scenario of Bangladesh (2022-23) published by the Energy and Mineral Resources Division of the country in February 2024, hydroelectricity makes up just 1 percent of the total generation of 24,911 MW. Of this, renewable energy is only 2 percent (459 MW). This shows the urgent need for renewable energy in Bangladesh.
Originally scheduled for July 28, the signing was postponed due to political unrest and a government change in Bangladesh.
According to NEA Executive Director Ghishing, it will take a few weeks to complete the remaining procedures to actually export electricity to Bangladesh. “But we will start exporting electricity to Bangladesh this season, even if for a single day,” Ghising said.
Nepal’s ambassador to Bangladesh, Ghanshyam Bhandari, described the signing as “a small but significant step that will surely serve as a springboard for future sub-regional energy cooperation.”
Former chief secretary Shanker Bairagi, who also served as a foreign secretary, wrote on X, “A significant milestone in power sector collaboration has been achieved today in Kathmandu with the signing of a tripartite agreement among Nepal, India, and Bangladesh, enabling the export of 40 MW electricity from Nepal to Bangladesh.”
Nepal and Bangladesh have finalised the deal six years after they reached an understanding on energy cooperation.
For now, Nepal will transmit the energy to India through the 400KV Dhalkebar-Muzaffarpur cross-border transmission line before India transmits the equivalent to Bangladesh. The NEA will calculate the quantum of exported energy at the Mazaffarpur point. The NEA estimates a yearly earning of around Rs 330 million for the country through the sale.
This report first appeared on the Kathmandu Post and has been republished with permission.
The judgment, which was delivered by the Chief Justice of India D.Y. Chandrachud, had a 8:1 majority ruling.
New Delhi: The Union government has asked for a review of the Supreme Court’s nine-judge bench judgment upholding the power of states to tax the extraction of minerals from their land, Indian Express has reported.
The judgment, which was delivered by the Chief Justice of India D.Y. Chandrachud, had a 8:1 majority ruling. The initial order came on July 25 and in a subsequent order on August 14, the apex court noted that the judgement will not have prospective effect. It allowed mineral-rich states to recover arrears from the Union government and mining firms since April 1, 2005. This would mean that the Union government would now have to pay thousands of crores to states.
Just a day ago, PTI had reported the Supreme Court as having said that it will set up a bench to hear subsequent pleas of mineral-rich states like Jharkhand seeking to recover royalty and tax dues on mineral rights and mineral-bearing lands worth thousands of crore of rupees from the Union government and mining firms.
Now, the Union government has sought a review of both the July 25 and the August 14 judgments.
Express quoted it as having said, “The ultimate impact of the retrospective application of the judgment is that the common man may have to bear the burden of the extraordinary dues that will be presented to the entire sector. This would be extremely deleterious to the economic health of the nation and would unnecessarily burden the common man.”
The Union government has also said that the judgement ignores the macro-economic impact of minerals as a resource along with practical realities.
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Justice B.V. Nagarathna had dissented, citing the “unhealthy competition” between states that the judgment would spawn.
The Indian Express report noted that the government also opposed the Supreme Court’s interpretation that the expression “land” as appearing in Entry 49 of List II – State List – includes lands of every description and that mineral-bearing land also falls within this description and said if such an interpretation “is adopted, the entire constitutional federal regime on minerals would collapse”.
For a long time, India has been advocating for the end of unsustainable use-and-throw economy. However, in a case of mismatch between its words and action, about 79% of the budget allocated for the petroleum and natural gas ministry this year is meant for expanding the footprint of public sector oil and gas companies.
In her 2024 budget speech, Union finance minister Nirmala Sitharaman mentioned that “PVC (Poly Vinyl Chloride) flex banners are non-biodegradable and hazardous for environment and health. To curb their imports, I propose to raise the basic customs duty (BCD) on them from 10 to 25%.”
Basic Customs Duty (BCD) is a type of tax imposed on imported goods in India, which is primarily used to protect domestic industries from competition from imported goods. It also serves as a source of revenue for the government.
Six days later, on July 28, news emerged that the Adani Group had achieved financial closure for its proposed 2000 Kilo Tonnes Per Annum (KTPA) Coal to PVC plant and it would be operational by December 2026. Perhaps this is the real reason for the finance minister to increase BCD on PVC in the 2024 Union budget.
If the material was so hazardous that the government wanted to restrict the import, then why is the environmental clearance for this project, whose emissions are three times more than PVC, made from oil, not revoked?
Ethylene, a major ingredient used in PVC production, is typically derived from petroleum, natural gas or coal, all of which are fossil fuels. This makes PVC a fossil fuel-based plastic. Financial closure signifies that all necessary financial arrangements and funding commitments have been formally made and are in place.
According to PlastIndia Foundation’s 2021-22 report, the demand for PVC in 2021-22 was 2.8 Million Metric Tons Per Annum (MMTPA), which contributed to 18% of the total demand of major plastics in India.
According to the Chemicals and Petrochemicals Manufacturers Association of India, PVC installed capacity, production, imports and consumption in 2022-23 stood at 1,617.00 Kilotonne (KT), 1,493.00 KT, 1,493.00 KT, and 3,679.00 KT respectively. There are a total of five producers of PVC in India, with Reliance Industries Limited (RIL) producing 48% of all PVC.
On the other hand, there is a planned expansion to the tune of 5,457 KT. Out of this, 1500 KT is being planned by RIL. The increase in BCD will benefit the existing producers since a supply-deficit market will surely ensure that prices will remain high. This BCD will also improve the financial viability calculations of Adani’s coal-to-PVC project in Mundra, Gujarat.
Look climate – talk emissions
A key argument in Chapters 6 and 13 of the latest Economic Survey is around the unfair burden on developing countries to decouple emissions and development, when developed countries have already gained from highly emitting forms of development. It is indeed true that developed countries are first and foremost bound to reduce their emissions and support the adaptation and mitigation efforts of developing nations. However, it is crucial for developing countries like ours to not make the same mistakes that the developed nations have!
Instead, the Union government has repeatedly expressed its intention to expand its oil and gas footprint. About 79% of the MoPNG 2024 budget is allocated to the expansion of the public sector oil and gas companies. In the Exploration and Production Sector, Indian Oil Corporation Limited, Oil India Limited and ONGC Videsh Limited are the biggest gainers this year with an increase of 63.38%, 40.52% and 72.81% respectively.
Oil and Natural Gas Corporation, with a share of 25.80% of the total allocation to public sector oil and gas companies, continues to be a significant recipient of allocations to support its intention of exploration for oil and gas in the existing Krishna Godavari basin and other uncharted areas including the Mahanadi, Andaman Sea, Bengal, and Kerala-Konkan belt.
According to the minister of petroleum and natural gas, the government intends to increase the sedimentary basin under exploration from the current 10% to 16% in 2024. Importantly, much of the regions intended for exploration are eco-sensitive like the Andaman Sea and the Kerala-Konkan belt which forms the Western Ghats.
In the refining and marketing sector, Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited (BPCL) has seen a 26% increase from last year’s allocations. Recently, there was news that the Prime Minister had granted Rs. 60,000 crore to set up BPCL’s refinery in Andhra Pradesh.
Representational image for petrochemical plant. Photo: Wikimedia Commons/Secl/CC BY 3.0
The biggest increase in budget allocation in 2024-25 in the petroleum sector has been to petrochemicals, which saw a 60% jump from the previous year’s allocation. While the total allocation forms only 9% of the current year’s sub-section budget, it is important to note that 80% of existing refineries are integrated to process crude oil for petrol/diesel and for petrochemicals and that all new refineries are similarly planned. The petrochemical industry in India is seeing massive expansion since the government has made its intention clear to contribute 10% of incremental global demand.
According to the International Energy Agency, emissions from chemicals and petrochemicals amount to around 1.5 gigatonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent per year (GtCO2e), which is 18% of all industrial-sector CO2 emissions, or 5% of total combustion-related CO2 emissions.
While industry argues that this sector emits less compared to steel and cement, what is overlooked is that the carbon contained in chemical feedstocks is mostly locked into final products (such as plastics), and is released only when the products are disposed of or burned.
A recent study by the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL), on the issue of the production of primary polymers, concluded:
“Under a conservative growth scenario (2.5%/yr), Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions from primary plastic production would more than double to 4.75 GtCO2e by 2050, accounting for 21-26% of the remaining global carbon budget to keep average temperature increases below 1.5°C. At 4%/yr growth, emissions from primary plastic production would increase more than three times to 6.78 GtCO2e, accounting for 25-31% of the remaining global carbon budget for limiting global warming to 1.5°C.”
With India’s aggressive growth of the petrochemical industry, it appears that Common But Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR) is invoked as an excuse to pollute, instead of a way to slow down emissions.
Polymers: The oil and gas industry’s Plan B
Chapter 13 of the 2024 Economic Survey intends to arrest overconsumption and revert to sustainable materials and practices like using reusable bags instead of plastic bags, plant-based plates instead of plastic plates in the case of use and throw purposes, metal water bottles which can be refilled instead of single-use plastic bottles etc.
However, a popular argument by the government is the low per capita consumption of polymers and plastics in India. In December 2022, the minister for petroleum and natural gas said, “Petrochemical market size is currently in India about USD 190 billion, whereas the per capita consumption of petrochemical segments is significantly lower, compared to that in developed economies. And this gap offers substantial space for demand growth and investment opportunities.”
About 99% of plastics are made from polymers produced by refining fossil fuels. In India, plastics are largely made from oil with a smaller percentage from gas. While the Chapter pitches reuse and refill mechanisms, the petrochemical and plastics policy adopted in India takes the country on a completely contrarian and unsustainable path.
According to a FICCI report, 59% of total plastics consumed in India are towards packaging (42% flexible and 17% rigid packaging), which are basically single-use plastics! While the Plastic Waste Management Rules, 2021 ban 19 Single Use Plastics (SUPs), according to industry reports, these form only 2-3% of total SUPs consumed and have no impact on the Fast Moving Consumer Goods (FMCG) industry, which are the largest consumers of these unsustainable and avoidable plastics.
It has been evident globally that the shift to renewable energy and electric transportation would not simply shut down the oil and gas industry. The crude oil to chemical business was always the industry’s Plan B and governments are colluding in this shift. Energy security is being peddled as the reason for an increase in refinery capacity in India.
The budget this year has made it crystal clear that India intends to scale up its petrochemical production rather than being responsible and allocate resources for the system change need to shift to alternate materials to replace polymers and to put in place reuse and refill mechanisms as a means to put an end to the unsustainable use-and-throw economy that is currently prevailing.
It is important to note that this push for petrochemicals goes against the basic tenet of “atma-nirbharta” or self-sufficiency. About 87% to 90% of the crude oil used in India is imported. That this will keep increasing our current account deficit, one of the main reasons for the falling value of the Indian Rupee, should be a matter of concern for the government, instead of going bullish on this sector.
Swathi Seshadri is associated with the Centre of Financial Accountability. She is a participant in ongoing international negotiations towards a legally binding Global Plastics Treaty to End Pollution Including in the Marine Environment.
Note: U5MR stands for under-five mortality, IMR stands for infant mortality, and NMR stands for neonatal mortality. The proportions shown above are indicative. Source: 
