India defence

CDS Anil Chauhan Faces Serious Challenges in Undertaking Unresolved Tasks

A cross-section of serving and retired military officers and defence analysts said that formulating ITCs topped General Chauhan’s to-do list.

New Delhi: The newly re-commissioned Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) General Anil Chauhan faces serious challenges in undertaking multiple unresolved military tasks, of which the creation of integrated theatre commands (ITCs) to augment and fine-tune inter-service synergy remains the foremost.

A cross-section of serving and retired military officers and defence analysts said that formulating ITCs topped General Chauhan’s to-do list, as their establishment would eventually determine, not only the future configuration and structure of India’s armed forces, but more importantly, the operational role of the three service chiefs in the higher defence management.

They maintained that the service chiefs’ collective responsibilities in inverse proportion to the CDS’s burgeoning authority could, in an ITC environment, be reduced, sooner than later, to them performing merely administrative duties like overseeing personnel recruitment and training, and providing logistics support to the new commands. Operational responsibilities would, from then on, be vindicated by the ITC chiefs.

After all, these officers argued that elementary logic dictated that once the 17 existing individual service commands were amalgamated, as envisaged by General Chauhan’s predecessor, General Bipin Rawat, into four or five ITCs, their respective three-star commanders would report not to their individual Chiefs of Staff, but to the unitary authority of the CDS.

Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) Lt General Anil Chauhan during a Guard of Honour, in New Delhi, September 30, 2022. Photo: PTI/Atul Yadav

And once that chain of command is established, the role of the respective military chiefs would automatically be depreciated to little or limited significance.

The CDS, on the other hand, in such a scenario would perform his mandated role as military advisor to the defence minister, but without direct operational authority as decreed in the founding charter in late 2020. In turn, the defence minister would report to the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) headed by the Prime Minister.

The CCS’s decision, thereafter, would follow a reverse trajectory, flowing back to the defence minister and onto the CDS and thence onwards to the ITC commanders for eventual execution. Official sources indicated that National Security Advisor Ajit Doval, though without executive authority, could also be part of the overall decision-making loop, considering his overarching influence over security and military issues, and proximity to Prime Minister Narendra Modi.

Consequently, single service chiefs would end up playing a marginal role, much like in the US system, in which the Indian CDS template appears to be loosely modelled. After the Goldwater-Nichols Act, 1986, the single service chiefs in the US, too, were reduced to performing administrative tasks under the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the country’s highest-ranking military officer, who was also the principal military adviser to the president, the secretary of defence and the national security council, but without operational command authority.

Conversely, the US chain of command descended from the president to the secretary of defence and thence onwards to the regional combatant commanders or rough equivalents to India’s proposed three-star ITC heads.

Domestically, General Chauhan is the military advisor not to the prime minister, but to the defence minister, and as permanent Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, is primus inter pares – or first among equals – in relation to the other service chiefs. He is also secretary of the newly created Department of Military Affairs (DMA) and advisor to the tri-service Nuclear Command Authority, in addition to serving on multiple advisory bodies committees and councils responsible for prioritising and effecting materiel procurements and defining military and security policies.

Meanwhile, security sources indicated that General Chauhan is currently evaluating the analyses requisitioned by General Rawat from all three-service headquarters in late 2021 on formulating ITCs by 2023, to manage future conflicts, streamline operations and economise defence expenditure, besides executing other long-deferred military reforms.

However, in all likelihood, the 2023 deadline for creating ITCs stands advanced, as it inexplicably took the government over nine months to elevate retired Lieutenant General Chauhan to the country’s topmost military post as the second four-star CDS.

Also read: A Host of Complex Issues Threaten the Formation of the Military’s Integrated Theatre Commands

‘Another layer of layer of decision-making’

The recurrent obstacle in creating ITCs has centred around their basic structure, the overall chain of operational command, optimisation of all assets and manpower resources of the three services and their individual budgetary allocations. “Details surrounding the conception of ITCs should have been crystalised by now, as the process has been in the pipeline for several years,” said Brigadier (retired) Rahul Bhonsle of the Security Risk consultancy in New Delhi.

The absence of a clearly enunciated National Security Strategy by the government, too, has not helped matters either, he added.

Other veteran military officers maintained that ‘total opacity’ surrounded the establishment of ITCs, which reports indicate are expected to include two or even three land-based commands to manage the threat from Pakistan and China along the disputed frontiers in the north, east and west, alongside an overarching maritime and an air defence command.

Military analyst Air Marshal V.K. ‘Jimmy’ Bhatia said, “Attitudinal jointness between all three services is needed more than ITCs and their headquarters.”

The headquarters, warned the Indian Air Force (IAF) fighter pilot, do not fight wars; they merely create one more layer of decision-making that will eventually depreciate operational efficiency.

Representative image. Photo: Facebook/Indian Air Force

The Air Marshal was merely echoing the IAF’s opposition to ITCs, which General Chauhan will need to neutralise if he is to succeed in his endeavours as its concerns are prompted primarily by its depreciating combat assets being spread thinly over the prospective commands. Air Chief Marshal V.R. Chaudhari cautiously iterated recently that the IAF was not opposed to ITCs, provided their proposed structures did not ‘compromise’ its war-fighting doctrine.

“Air power,” the Air Chief Marshal said at his annual press briefing earlier this month, “has the unique capability of undertaking independent strategic operations, and operations coordinated with sister services and other national security arms”. Nevertheless, he added, the IAF had “certain reservations” over the proposed [ITC] structures and that a separate Air Defence Command could prove ‘counterproductive’ in future wars.

“Air defence and offensive missions are interdependent, and if executed in isolation, they would not only be disjointed but also ineffective in design or execution of the joint strategy,” Air Chief Marshal Chaudhari added.

Corresponding rumblings had also arisen over the operational efficacy of combining all three Indian Navy (IN) commands into a single colossal Maritime Theatre Command based at Karwar on India’s southwest coast.

In short, the projected ITC formation remains riddled with confusion, indicating that such a major transformation guaranteed to completely alter the military’s overall structure, had entailed little or no credible planning. This was despite the creation of two multi-service organisations in 2001 and 2007 for the specific purpose of fostering ‘jointness’ between the three-armed forces once a CDS was appointed, which was in January 2020.

The first such recommendatory body was the Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff or HQ IDS, created in October 2001, following the recommendations of a ‘Group of Ministers’ after the 1999 Kargil war with Pakistan, with the remit of evolving the blueprint for tri-service cooperation in addition to reforming numerous other inherent shortcomings to enhance operational efficiency.

Accordingly, the IDS was given charge of the country’s first two tri-service commands, of which the Andaman and Nicobar Command or ANC was the one to safeguard India’s strategic interests in the Indian Ocean Region by creating the potential for rapid multi-service deployment. The other was the Strategic Forces Command, or SFC, tasked with ownership of India’s nuclear assets deliverable by land-based mobile platforms and air and underwater assets.

At the time, the ministers’ group had reasoned that being a mixed organisation, staffed by service and civilian personnel, HQ IDS would be able to integrate policies and doctrines of the individual services into joint documents, but little had since emerged or been achieved. Furthermore, the IDS advanced its ‘jointness’ agenda by promoting a discourse on higher defence planning through the multi-service Centre for Joint Warfare Studies (CENJOWS) founded in 2007, which, too, had proved disappointing as did the three other service-specific think tanks, founded by the Ministry of Defence (MoD).

These included the Centre for Air Power Studies (CAPS) that came up in 2001, followed by the Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS), created in 2004, while the National Maritime Foundation or NMF was the last to be inaugurated, in 2005. Additionally, the 56-year-old MoD-financed Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA) has proven unable to recommend even an embryonic proposal for higher defence reforms, leave alone the ITCs. Of course, there are plenty of media and journal articles by IDSA affiliated scholars.

Also read: Book Excerpt: How Will a India-China War Pan Out?

Other challenges

In the meantime, several complex personnel and fiscal issues threaten the ITCs’ formation, which have not received adequate, if any, attention.

These comprise the planned absorption into the ITCs of establishments like the Border Roads Organisation and the Indian Coast Guard, both managed by the MoD and the Central Para Military Forces such as the Border Security Force, Assam Rifles and the Indo-Tibetan Border Police, which are run by the Ministry of Home Affairs.

Integrating all these organisations, albeit partially, into the ITCs is not going to be without problems, as it will entail service, salary and retirement matters that invariably present challenges in India’s litigious environment that take years to resolve.

The other more critical issue is parity in status and seniority of military officers.

Each of the 17 existing commands – seven each for the Indian Army and the IAF and three for the IN – is headed by a three-star officer. But with these numbers eventually reducing to four or five, after the ITCs are established, one of the immediate challenges would be to accommodate – and placate – some 11-12 three-star officers, who would be dispossessed of their elevated statuses.

Additionally, some principal staff officers at all three services headquarters are also likely to become redundant in the new ITC command and control structure, further engendering disaffection among senior military officers, presumably to General Chauhan’s chagrin.

Creating infrastructure for the ITCs will also necessitate massive funding, which the impecunious MoD simply does not have, leaving the government a Hobson’s choice of deciding between India’s long-deferred military modernisation and its new, but poorly equipped revised ITC order of battle.

Besides, establishing other essential services like water, electricity, approach roads, schools, and shopping centres for tens of thousands of military men and their families, too, will be an equally onerous exercise, with environmental consequences.

And, the other rarely talked about concern is intra-service rivalry surfacing adversely in the ITCs, considering the preconceived prejudices that each of the three forces harbours against the other two. The rivalry between the Indian Army and the IAF officers is well known, while the IN, the smallest and possibly the most professional and competent of the three armed forces, is considered the ‘silent service’ by the other two, and treated as such.

Considering the overwhelming hurdles, perhaps it would be better for General Chauhan to hasten slowly with regard to ITCs after due consultation with veterans who have fought wars successfully.

Perhaps, it would also be judicious for him to consider that if the system ain’t broke, it doesn’t really need fixing; or at best, some minor tinkering.

Note: This story has been edited on October 19, 2022, to clarify the reference to IDSA.

Do We Need a New Department of Military Affairs and Integrated Theatre Commands?

What is more important is that we urgently correct the imbalances and imperfections that have crept into our higher defence structures.

The recent reforms in our defence structures, beginning with the inadequate and half-baked creation of the post of the Chief of Defence Staff heading a newly created separate Department of Military Affairs (DMA) as well as the current exercise in creating integrated theatre commands are simply not the right way forward for a country of the size and stature of India in general and her Armed Forces in particular.

Let me begin with the post of the CDS in the form that we have created it.

As learnt from the official press release of the Press Information Bureau (Defence Wing) and from what is being observed on ground, this has fallen woefully short of the bold, path-breaking reform that was needed to overcome the shortcomings in the Department of Defence (DOD), within the larger Ministry of Defence (MOD).

Instead of making the existing DOD more cohesive and integrated by merging the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC) and the attendant HQ Integrated Defence Staff (HQ IDS) with it, we went and created yet another ‘department’ which will again be operating outside the main DOD, much like the other departments of Defence Production, Research and Development and that of Ex-Servicemen.

Not only has this department been very oddly named (the word ‘affairs’ being totally non-military in nature), but it has resulted in further multiplying the ambiguities that already plague our existing higher defence structures.

Chief of Defence Staff General Bipin Rawat at the press conference on May 1, 2020. Photo: PTI/Manvender Vashist

This single most important reform in the MOD should have led to the establishment of very clear lines of responsibility and accountability in the Ministry. Any ambiguity is simply not acceptable in an organisation whose only business is the defence of India; an onerous task which (in addition to photo ops) actually implies a quiet nurturing of force capabilities required to secure our political goals in the event of war.

What actually left me aghast was that while re-distributing subjects to this new department from among those originally allotted to the DOD (in the Second Schedule to the Allocation of Business Rules dated January 14, 1961 issued by the President of India) this new Department of ‘Military Affairs’ has not even been entrusted with some elements of the very first and most important subject laid out in this second schedule – that of, ‘defence of India and every part thereof including preparation for defence and all such acts as may be conducive in times of war to its prosecution and after its termination to effective demobilisation.’

Last, a minor but relevant issue in the protocol-conscious society that we have become is that the press release stated that the CDS will function as the Secretary of this new department. The CDS (with the rank of a ‘four star’ Armed Forces General Officer or Service Chief), is way above in protocol to Secretaries to the Government of India (who are equated to three-star-ranked Army Commander or equivalent).

Also watch | ‘China Intrusions: Army Responded Slowly, Is Hampered By CDS Structure’

Therefore, to my mind, this ‘relegation’ of the CDS as Secretary of the department is not in the right spirit of things and should have been unacceptable to at least those in uniform. At best, this function should be carried out by the VCDS (existing CISC) since being of a three-star-ranked Army Commander status, he is in the same protocol bracket as a Secretary to the Government of India.

So what do we need to do if we really want to set our DOD in order?

In my way of looking at things, it would have made more sense to take a leaf out of the United Kingdom model of the MOD. Having derived our parliamentary form of democracy from the UK model, we could also go a step further and seek to reform our higher defence structures on similar lines, by having the CDS and the Defence Secretary (in the UK he is called the Permanent Under Secretary) acting as the two principal advisors (one military and one civilian) to the Minister of Defence.

‘It would have made more sense to take a leaf out of the United Kingdom model of the MOD.’ Photo: Reuters/File

The other elements of the structure, such as the creation of the various councils and boards as adapted to our needs, would then have automatically fallen in place in a truly integrated Department of Defence overseen by the Minister of Defence. The thrust of the reform related to the CDS should have been on creating a compact synergised DOD with clear cut lines of responsibility and accountability running up to the Defence Minister through his two principal advisors.

Creating another department outside the DOD has not ‘caught the bull by its horns’ and we have only added to the ambiguity that is already plaguing the system.

Integrated Theatre Commands

Now let me come to the reform currently underway related to creation of Integrated Theatre Commands (ITC). The question that needs to be answered here is: do we really need these new structures to win the next war?

Undoubtedly our next war will be a Joint Services War backed up by all the other instruments of national power. However, given our geo-politico-military realities, such future ‘national’ wars are bound to be contingency driven with one of the services being the lead service for a particular developing situation as happened in case of our ‘lightning war’ for the liberation of Bangladesh.

The point is that, as and when war is thrust on us or even in the event when we proactively prosecute war, the whole country is going to be one geographic theatre to include all our land boundaries, air space, sea lanes and island territories.

‘Such theatre commands as are evident in the world today are more suitable for a presidential or highly centralised forms of government.’ Photo: Twitter/@adgpi

To support this argument that India is the equivalent of just one theatre of war, let us take the example of the global commands of the USA from whom we seem to be taking this thought process of creating theatre commands. One US Combatant Command covers as much as a continent in its arc of responsibility and therefore our Indian sub-continent is at best one single theatre when seen from this perspective.

It has also to be borne in mind that such theatre commands as are evident in the world today are more suitable for a presidential or highly centralised forms of government. Theatre commands could also be a natural organisational extension in case a nation has extra regional ambitions backed up by sustainable power projection capabilities deployed across the globe or in their desired area of influence.

Undoubtedly India is a formidable regional power but we are not in this league of power projection yet and when such a politico-military need arises, a specific out of area joint command can be created as required for that contingency.

Notwithstanding the above, a ‘National Joint Services’ war in our context does not mean that there will be no single service wars (such as a purely air, sea or land) but the crux of issue in all cases would be the timely appointment of the Overall Force Commander (OFC) by the COSC/CDS and the Defence Minister for that particular developing situation.

It is also more than likely that one of the Service Chiefs may himself be designated as the OFC and given the responsibility for the conduct of the campaign to achieve our politico-military aims in much the same way as General Dwight D Eisenhower was appointed as the Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force and tasked to undertake operations aimed at the heart of Germany and the destruction of her armed forces.

And so it is my case that India just does not need Theatre Commands and definitely not a DMA operating outside the DOD. What is more important is that we urgently correct the imbalances and imperfections that have now further crept into our higher defence structures particularly the DOD or MOD.

I am convinced that if we address this problem at the top adequately, the rest will automatically fall in place.

Lt Gen. Ravi Dastane is a veteran who commanded the strategic High Altitude 14 Corps at Leh. He retired as the Deputy Chief, HQ IDS. He has also authored a book, India’s Armed Forces: Tempering the Steel (Continental Prakashan, Pune).

IAF Successfully Test Fires Brahmos Surface-to-Surface Missile From Mobile Platform

The drill checked the IAF’s capability to hit targets with “pin-point” accuracy at targets close to 300 km.

New Delhi: The Indian Air Force (IAF) has carried out successful firing of BrahMos surface-to-surface missiles from a mobile platform at Trak Island in Andaman Nicobar islands, officials said on Tuesday.

The drill to check the IAF’s capability to hit targets with “pin-point” accuracy at targets close to 300 km was conducted on Monday and Tuesday, they said.

“Surface-to-surface missiles were fired by IAF at Trak Island in the Andaman Nicobar group of islands,” said an official, adding the missile engaged the designated mock targets close to 300 km away.

“A direct hit on the target was achieved in both cases. Firing of the missile has enhanced IAF’s capability to engage the grounds targets with pin point accuracy from a mobile platform,” he said.

The 2.5-tonne surface-to-surface missile has a range of around 300 km.

BrahMos Aerospace, an India-Russian joint venture, produces the missile that can be launched from submarines, ships, aircraft, or from land platforms.

Watch | Revolution in Military Affairs and India’s Defense Preparedness

Happymon Jacob discusses the new revolution in the military affairs and its implications on global and regional strategic stability.

New Delhi: Happymon Jacob speaks with Dr Vipin Narang (associate professor, security studies, MIT) about the new revolution in the military affairs (RMA) and its implications on global and regional strategic stability.

The conversation discusses China’s growing military capabilities, especially new age weapon systems and their impact on India’s defense preparedness. Narang also discusses the concept of a ‘Third Nuclear Age’, tactical nuclear weapon systems and their impact on nuclear dyads like India and Pakistan.

How must India’s strategic doctrine and practices adapt in order to maintain a healthy deterrent capability in the third nuclear age?

Yashwant Sinha, Arun Shourie, Bhushan: Rafale Deal Caused Great Loss to Exchequer

Lawyer-activist Prashan Bhushan and former BJP leaders Yashwant Sinha and Arun Shourie held a joint press conference in which they claimed “the purpose of the new deal was to ‘kick out’ HAL and give the offset contract to Reliance”.

New Delhi: The controversy over the purchase of 36 Rafale fighter jet planes by the Narendra Modi government is getting hotter. Other political leaders and civil society activists too are beginning to raise questions on the secrecy around the defence deal with French company Dassault Aviation. The Congress has held a series of press conferences in the last few months to highlight alleged irregularities and cronyism in the deal finalised by BJP-led NDA government.

On Wednesday, eminent advocate and activist Prashant Bhushan and former BJP leaders Yashwant Sinha and Arun Shourie put the Union government in the dock for maintaining a conspicuous opacity around the issue, which has become one of the most fiercely debated issues of the Modi regime. They alleged multiple instances of bypassing of regulations and lack of transparency in the deal, which they said caused a great loss to the exchequer and may have “jeopardised national security”. They also said the losses made by the government appear to have profited one private company, the Anil Ambani-owned Reliance Infrastructure Limited, which secured the offset contract arising out of the purchase.

They presented a detailed, point-by-point, draft that pointed out several irregularities in the way the deal was struck in 2015. The trio also drew attention to various inconsistencies in the versions that the government has advanced from time to time.

Loss to the exchequer

The leaders pointed out that when PM Modi announced that India would purchase 36 Rafale aircraft in a “fly-away” condition in April 2015 during his visit to France, he not only violated many protocols, but also overlooked the previous, cheaper, deal struck by the UPA government.

Also Read: Documents Prove the Rafale Transaction Is a Case of Criminal Misconduct

They said the UPA government had negotiated a deal with Dassault after an official bidding process, following which Dassault Aviation was given the contract to hand over 18 Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircrafts (MMRCA) in a fly-away condition to India and assist the Indian public sector company Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) to manufacture another 108 aircraft by transferring its technology. The request for proposal that the UPA issued included cost of initial purchase, transfer of technology and licensed production among others. The deal would have cost India Rs 42,000 crore, the leaders said.

However, Modi overlooked the earlier deal and negotiated the purchase of 36 aircraft at a cost of Rs 60,000 crore (according to documents released by Dassault and Reliance). The trio said this figure is “embarrassing for the government” as each aircraft would cost Rs 1,660 crore.

A Rafale fighter jet performs during the Aero India air show at Yelahanka air base in Bengaluru February 18, 2015. Credit: Reuters/Abhishek N. Chinnappa/Files

The leaders said this is an even bigger figure than the one estimated by then defence minister Manohar Parrikar in an interview to Doordarshan. Parrikar had pegged the amount as Rs 90,000 crore for 126 planes, which works out to Rs 715 crore per plane. They pointed out Parrikar’s interview was only a few days ahead of Modi’s announcement of the purchase of 36 aircraft from Paris, indicating that the defence minister may not have been in the loop before the final deal was struck.

The trio said this figure is “embarrassing for the government” as each aircraft would cost Rs 1,660 crore.

Additionally, the new deal did not figure HAL in the picture and did not mention transfer of technology clause, causing further damage to the country’s exchequer.

Inconsistencies in the government versions

Shourie, Bhushan and Sinha also hinted at the possibility of the government deliberately denying information regarding the contract, highlighting several examples. First, Parrikar did not know about the new agreement with Dassault. Or else, why would he talk about buying 126 planes only a week before the final agreement, the trio asked.

Second, only two days before Modi announced the deal, the then foreign secretary S. Jaishankar briefed the press about Rafale on April 8, 2015. He spoke about HAL’s involvement and added that Modi’s visit to France was a “leadership-level” one and the “ongoing defence contracts” were on a “different track”. Yet, Modi announced an entirely new deal two days later.

Three, the India-France joint statement indicated that the new agreement was more favourable to India than the UPA negotiated one, ensuring the aircraft are delivered at a much reduced price. However, the leaders pointed out that the government was yet to reveal the price, but Dassault and Reliance’s documents show that the aircraft were bought at a price three times higher than the deal UPA had negotiated.

They further said the joint statement also indicated that the price could not have become higher because of newly added aircraft configurations. The joint statement says clearly “the aircraft and associated systems and weapons would be delivered on the same configuration as had been tested and approved by Indian Air Force (during the UPA government)”.

Regarding the response of the government that the new deal was struck because of an urgent requirement in the Indian Air Force, the leaders said:

“All that was said by government sources in justification was that the Air Force needed the planes urgently and that these 36 planes would reach India within two years. Three years later, the aircraft are nowhere in sight. It has in fact been announced in parliament that the first Rafale fighters will come only by September 2019 (four-and-a-half years after the prime minister’s announcement). The full-pack of 36 aircraft will not be available to India till mid-2022.”

When the new deal was announced in April 2015, it was not approved by the cabinet committee on security. They said there was clear evidence that the defence ministry violated many defence regulations and procedures when the deal was being materialised.

They also questioned the government on why it did not invite fresh tenders despite the fact that one of the original bidders, Eurofighter GmbH, had “formally written to the the then defence minister Arun Jaitley on July 4, 2014, offering to reduce the cost of the Eurofighter Typhoon by a full 20%?”

Cronyism

The most severe charge they made against the government was that the purpose of the new deal was to “kick out” HAL and give the offset contract to Reliance. Claiming that it was one of the most blatant instances of cronyism, the leaders asked how could Reliance Defence Limited – a subsidiary of RIL – which was formed only 10 days before the new deal was signed, had no previous experience of aerospace manufacturing and no factory unit, could get the biggest defence offset contract in Indian history. They were pointing towards the contract that the joint venture company between Dassault Aviation and Reliance Defence Ltd secured to maintain and repair the newly-bought 36 aircrafts. The offset value is Rs 30,000 crore and a subsequent lifecycle contract amounting Rs 1 lakh crore was also given to the joint venture.

“Neither Reliance Defence nor any of its allied companies have any experience of manufacturing aerospace and defence equipment. Its Pipavav Shipyard is facing serious difficulties in building Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPVs) for the Navy – a long-delayed order that is impacting the Navy’s operational effectiveness. In contrast, HAL has over 60 years of experience in aircraft manufacturing.”

Secrecy around the deal

The most severe charge they made against the government was that the purpose of the new deal was to “kick out” HAL and give the offset contract to Reliance.

Even as the allegations on the government piled up, the union government has not revealed either the cost of the plane or why HAL was denied the offset contract. Defence minister Nirmala Sitharaman has said that since these are issues of national security, the details could not be divulged because of a secrecy clause.

However, Bhushan, Sinha and Shourie pointed out several contradictions in this explanation. They said the same government had disclosed the details of the deal on the floor of the government and questioned why the secrecy clause was not adhered to then.

“In fact, on November 18, 2016, in response to a question asked in the Lok Sabha on the acquisition of fighter aircraft, the MoS, Defence stated that, Inter-Governmental Agreement with the government of French Republic has been signed on September 23, 2016 for purchase of 36 Rafale aircraft along with requisite equipments, services and weapons. Cost of each Rafale aircraft is approximately Rs 670 crore and all the aircraft will be delivered by April 2022.”

They claimed the government was “definitely trying to hide something” when suspicions have emerged around the deal. They also cited examples of cost of defence contracts made public on several occasions by different governments.

“Even more conclusive is the fact that the secrecy clause in the agreement binds India not to disclose the technical specifications and operational capabilities of the aircraft. It does not bind India to keep the price secret. In fact, French President Emmanuel Macron himself stated explicitly in March in an interview to India Today that how much is to be disclosed in this regard is entirely up to the Indian government,” the leaders added.

In the end, the leaders said the unfolding of the Rafale deal bears much similarity to the infamous Bofors scam in the 1980s where too the government insisted on not disclosing the details. Later, it became evident that the Congress government was trying to hide high-level corruption.

In the end, the trio urged the parliament and media to follow up on the case. “The entire transaction is thus a textbook case of criminal misconduct, of misuse of public office, and of enriching parties at the expense of the national interest and national security,” they said.

Despite the Hype, the Defence Offset Policy Hasn’t Really Worked for India

Foreign suppliers find India’s offset guidelines too complicated to comply with.

New Delhi: ‘Offset’ has become a buzzword in India’s defence manufacturing industry in recent years, as the government steps up arms purchases to maintain the balance of conventional military power in the region. But despite that, the country is struggling to reap the intended benefits of the policy.

The reason for this is that foreign suppliers find India’s offset guidelines too complicated to comply with. The repeated changes in offset guidelines do not seem to have helped the matter either.

The offset policy, introduced in 2005, mandates foreign suppliers to spend at least 30% of the contract value in India. It was first revised in 2006 and then again in 2011 and in 2016. Another round of tweaking is currently underway.

A defence equipment manufacturer told The Wire that offset norms are revised even before the industry adjusts to them.

But on the other hand, countries like Spain, Japan and Brazil have used offset policies to build credible local defence manufacturing capabilities. For example, Brazil’s Embraer aircraft manufacturing programme is globally cited as a successful experiment in offset policy implementation.

Indian defence manufacturers lack the technological prowess needed to benefit from the offset policy. They are not able to effectively use transferred technology in their own manufacturing processes. It is no surprise, then, that foreign suppliers find themselves struggling to fulfil their offset commitments in a cost-effective manner, and so outsource only low-end manufacturing and machining jobs to private and public sector companies in India.

According to industry sources, the real problem lies in implementation, not in the policy. Regulatory and operational bottlenecks further complicate challenges for foreign arms suppliers.

Civil aerospace, internal security brought under offset policy

The Ministry of Defence introduced the offset policy following recommendations from a panel headed by former finance secretary Vijay Kelkar. The panel was tasked with suggesting measures to involve private players in defence equipment manufacturing under a public-private partnership model.

After several rounds of revision, civil aerospace and internal security deals have also been brought under the offset policy. The offset limit has now been increased from Rs 300 crore to Rs 2,000 crore.

The policy now allows the private sector to compete in the production of surveillance vessels, such as inshore and offshore patrol vessels, with defence shipyards. This has provided a level playing field for private players in the shipbuilding sector.

The policy change has injected price competition into the market and also led to an improvement in the timely delivery of contracted supplies.

However, private players are yet to play a big role in the production of helicopters, trainers and transport aircrafts.

The offset policy envisions leveraging big-ticket purchases in the defence space to cajole original equipment manufacturers into giving outsourcing orders, transferring technologies to Indian companies and investing here. The objective is to create a strong local ecosystem for defence manufacturing, and step up exports.

A total of 12 offset contracts were concluded between 2005 and 2012, with a value of $1.5 billion. Subsequently, ten more contracts were concluded between 2013 and 2016, with a combined value of nearly $1.5 billion.

Defence sector fails to attract FDI

India’s dream of becoming a defence manufacturing hub is far from fulfilled, despite vigorous marketing by the government. The sector attracted a paltry sum of Rs 56 lakh as foreign direct investment (FDI) between October 2014 and September 2016, according to a reply given by minister of state for defence Rao Inderjit Singh in parliament recently.

The picture was even more dismal in 2015-16, with the sector attracting only Rs 8 lakh till September, as per data available with the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion.

India’s offset policy, which many feel originated from the defence public sector’s inability to increase exports, lacks coherence and well-defined aims. It is totally silent on what it wants to achieve, say defence experts.

The defence ministry decided to use its substantial imports to promote exports. The initial policy, as announced in 2005, sought the direct purchase of products, components and services by foreign vendors. It was also aimed at creating both market access and new new markets. However, it soon dawned on the government that the policy was restrictive and unrealistic. It therefore initiated an exercise in 2006 to widen the scope of the policy.

According to defence experts, India’s ‘one size fits all’ policy approach has not yielded the desired results. This is why even 14 years after implementation of the offset policy, India heavily relies on imports to meet hardware requirements of its military, experts said.

India’s arms imports increased by 24% between 2008 and 2012, and then again at the same rate between 2013 and 2017, according to data released by global think-tank Stockholm International Peace Research Institute recently.

As many as 130 countries have offset policies in place, but their formats are different

Globally, there are more than 130 countries with offset policies, but they follow different formats. For example, the UAE’s offset policy stipulates that all suppliers of arms must develop commercially viable products worth at least 60% of the contract within a period of seven years.

Malaysia seeks opportunities for compensatory exports, technology transfer and direct investment in infrastructure.

South Africa demands nearly 20% of the contract value as direct defence-oriented offsets, 45% as counter purchase by the seller and 35% as foreign investment.

The UK insists on defence-related, new and of equivalent technical quality offsets. Both direct and indirect offsets are permitted by the country.

A new round of amendments underway

The defence ministry recently amended the offset policy to provide more opportunities for foreign arms suppliers to invest a percentage of the value of a military hardware deal in India.

Foreign suppliers of aerospace- and internal security-related hardware will be allowed to fulfil their offset obligations by investing in defence-related infrastructure projects such as setting up testing labs and skill centres. Foreign suppliers will also be allowed to fulfil their offset obligations by sharing “specified critical technology”.

These projects will be implemented through an agency to be identified by the government, which could be a public sector entity, the Defence Research and Development Organisation or a Special Purpose Vehicle to be set up with or without industry participation.

The government has allowed foreign suppliers to invest in a SEBI-regulated fund to meet their offset obligations. Experts said the proposed policy will drastically change how companies such as Boeing, Airbus and Dassault will spend an estimated $14 billion in India by 2028.

France offers to revive Kaveri engine project as part of Rafale offset programme

France has offered to help India revive the unsuccessful Kaveri engine project for the indigenous Tejas aircraft and a host of other high-end collaborations as part of the offsets in the 7.87 billion euro Rafale fighter plane deal.

Under the agreement, the French side has made a 30% offset commitment for military aerospace research and development programmes, and the balance 20% for manufacturing Rafale components in India.

The offsets will be carried out by French companies Safran, Thales, MBDA and Dassault, all part of the Rafale project.

The government has planned defence purchases of $250 billion to modernise the Indian military. Offset expenditure for these relatively less hi-tech purchases would be 50% of the contract. With Indian defence manufacturing companies lacking technological depth to benefit from offset programmes, how contracts worth $125 billion will be implemented is unclear.

Anil Ambani-promoted Reliance Defence has said that it has bagged offset contract of Rs 30,000 crore for the Rs 1 lakh crore-lifecycle cost contract signed by the defence ministry with France’s Dassault Aviation for Rafale jets.

But on the other hand, defence minister Nirmala Sitharaman has said that the government has not yet decided on an offset programme for the deal.

The contradictory statements of Reliance Defence and Sitharaman have given rise to the suspicion that the defence ministry is not maintaining records of offset contracts.

There Is a ‘Critical Hollowness’ in India’s Defence Preparedness

Nearly half of India’s weapons, including tanks and artillery guns, have stocks for less than ten days of combat.

Kargil War (left), LoC. Credit: PTI, Reuters

With attempts at infiltration being made virtually every night and frequent exchanges of small arms and artillery fire, the line of control (LoC) with Pakistan is more active than it has been in the last five years. The number of terrorist attacks in Kashmir has also risen sharply this summer. The stand-off with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) at Doklam has stretched to two months. The rhetoric being spewed out by the Chinese government-controlled media is getting shriller by the day. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) now under construction will lead to further increase in their military collusion.

The net effect of India’s deteriorating security environment will be that the country will be confronted with a two-front situation during future conflict. With the dogs of war barking in the distance, in July, the comptroller and auditor general (CAG) of India released a disquieting report about continuing ammunition shortages. There are large-scale deficiencies in other important military items of equipment as well. Addressing the inadequacies in the state of India’s defence preparedness, termed as ‘critical hollowness’ by former army chief General V.K. Singh, merits the government’s urgent attention.

Deficiencies in ammunition have an adverse impact on the ability to sustain military operations over the period of time that is necessary. According to the CAG, in March 2013, 50% of the different categories of weapons (including tanks and artillery guns) had stocks for less than ten days of fighting. Since then, there has been some improvement, but for 40% of its weapons, the army still holds stocks for less than ten days of conflict.

The Kargil conflict in 1999 lasted 50 days and we must acknowledge that any future border conflict may also be prolonged. During the Kargil conflict, 50,000 rounds of 155 mm artillery ammunition had to be imported from South Africa. The occurrence of such a critical situation during a time of crisis must be avoided through a prudent replenishment and stocking policy.

The army’s sister services are no better off. While the Indian navy is far from acquiring the capabilities of a blue water navy, the People’s Liberation Army navy is getting ready to sail into the Indian Ocean, and is acquiring bases and port facilities in fast-forward mode. Over the last five years, the Indian navy has had major accidents on board submarines INS Sindhurakshak and INS Sindhuratna. In another accident, submarine batteries that should have been replaced much earlier were still being used due to inordinately long acquisition procedures. Meanwhile, the indigenous production of six Scorpene submarines has been delayed by almost five years.

From its peak at 39 squadrons over a decade ago, the fighting strength of the Indian air force has gone down to 32-33 squadrons, whereas actually 42-45 squadrons will be required to meet future threats and challenges. Obsolescent fighter aircraft like MiG-21s and MiG-27s and vintage helicopters are still in service. The holding of surface-to-air missile systems for air defence operations is grossly inadequate as indigenous research and development projects have been plagued by time and cost overruns. The fortification of forward air bases against terrorist attacks has not yet been completed, despite the attack on the Pathankot air base in January 2016.

The continuation in service of obsolete and obsolescent weapons and equipment also affects the country’s defence preparedness as fighter and bomber aircraft are extremely difficult to maintain towards the end of the life cycle. Modernisation of the armed forces has been stagnating due to the inadequacy of funds, the black-listing of several defence manufacturers and bureaucratic red tape that stymies the acquisition process. However, several pragmatic amendments were approved by Manohar Parrikar, then defence minister, in the new Defence Procurement Procedure to streamline procurement procedures and encourage participation of the private sector in defence manufacture.

Defence procurement projects worth over Rs 1,50,000 crore have been accorded ‘acceptance of necessity’, or approval in principle, by the NDA government, but it will take up to five years before deliveries of the weapons systems begin. And, like in the UPA regime, significantly large amounts of funds continue to be surrendered unspent from the capital budget.

In the army, artillery modernisation has been stagnating. There is an urgent need to acquire approximately 3,000 pieces of 155 mm/52-calibre guns to replace obsolescent towed and self-propelled guns and howitzers. So far a contract has been signed only for 145 pieces of M777 155 mm/45-calibre howitzers from the US. Another contract for 114 pieces of 155 mm/45-calibre Dhanush howitzers based on the Bofors design is expected to be signed with the Ordnance Factories Board shortly if the gun clears all trials. Air defence and army aviation units are also equipped with obsolete equipment that has substantially reduced their combat effectiveness and created vulnerabilities.

Modern wars are fought mostly during the hours of darkness, but a large number of the army’s armoured fighting vehicles – tanks and infantry combat vehicles – are still ‘night blind’. Only about 650 T-90S tanks of Russian origin have genuine night fighting capability. The infantry battalions need over 30,000 third generation night vision devices, new assault rifles – a soldier’s basic weapon, carbines for close quarter battle, general purpose machine guns, light-weight anti-materiel rifles, mine protected vehicles, 390,000 ballistic helmets, and 180,000 lightweight bullet proof jackets.

The navy is in the process of commissioning an air defence ship at Kochi to replace the aircraft carrier INS Vikrant and is building six Scorpene submarines at Mazagon Docks. It is also building 22 destroyers, frigates, corvettes, fast attack craft, landing ships and support ships. However, India’s maritime security challenges are growing and the navy not only needs to modernise but also expand its footprint in the Indo-Pacific region along with the navies of India’s strategic partners.

The modernisation plans of the air force are making progress, but at a snail’s pace. The Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft project to acquire 126 fighter aircraft to replace obsolete MiG-21s is stuck in a groove, with the exception of the purchase of 36 Rafale fighters from France. Lockheed Martin (F-16) and Boeing (F-18) have jumped into the fray again with offers to produce their fighter aircraft locally with transfer of technology.

The IAF also requires several additional AWACS early warning aircraft, six mid-air refueller tankers, 56 transporter planes, 20 advance jet trainers, 38 basic trainers, 48 medium-lift helicopters, reconnaissance and surveillance helicopters, surface-to-air missile systems and electronic warfare suites. All three Services need to upgrade their C4I2SR capabilities to prepare for effects-based operations in a network-centric environment and to match ever increasing Chinese military capabilities.

The planned acquisitions are capital intensive and the present defence budget cannot support many of them. The defence budget has dipped to 1.56% of the country’s projected GDP for 2017-18 – the lowest level since the disastrous 1962 war with China. It must be progressively raised to 3.0% of the GDP if India is to build the defence capabilities that it needs to meet future threats and challenges and discharge its growing responsibilities as a regional power in Southern Asia.

The government has recently sanctioned some funds and delegated financial powers to the three services to acquire the wherewithal necessary for combat readiness. However, unless the remaining deficiencies in weapons, ammunition and equipment are also made up quickly, the management of the defence budget improves by an order of magnitude and the defence procurement process is streamlined further, thoughts of critical hollowness in defence preparedness will continue to haunt India’s defence planners.

Gurmeet Kanwal is Distinguished Fellow, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), New Delhi.