Chiefs of Staff Committee

What the Four-Month Delay in Appointing a New CDS Says About the Modi Govt

‘Is there military reform in this somewhere or is it in line with Modi’s proclivity to make important announcements giving little or no notice, like that of the demonetisation in 2016 and the lockdown in 2020?’

Chandigarh: Incessant delays in appointing a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) to replace General Bipin Rawat, who died in a helicopter crash last December, belies the importance the Bharatiya Janata Party-led government seemingly places on this senior military position.

The noise surrounding General Rawat’s sudden appointment as CDS for three years, a day before he retired as the Chief of Army Staff (CoAS) in December 2019, was thunderous. The silence over his successor is mysterious, but ironically, equally deafening.

“In many WhatsApp groups, especially those of defence forces veterans, rumours and gossip of behind-the-scenes machinations along with narratives of palace intrigue are doing the rounds regarding the next likely CDS,” said military analyst, retired Colonel K. Thammayya Udupa.

Writing recently on the Rediff.com news website, he goes on to state that the agenda of defence reforms was believed to be close to Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s heart, and hence it was widely believed that a new CDS would be summarily appointed to succeed General Rawat.

But over four months later, India still does not have a CDS, the former army officer added.

Other service veterans and senior Ministry of Defence (MoD) officials echoed similar sentiments. They said this delay clearly demonstrated that the post of CDS was not ‘overly critical’ to military reforms, despite the urgency displayed by the Modi administration nearly three years ago in making that appointment.

In this December 7, 2021 file photo, Chief of Defence Staff General Bipin Rawat speaks at DRDO Bhawan in New Delhi. Photo: PTI/Arun Sharma

“The government’s casual and secretive approach to nominating a new CDS reveals the low priority it accords to naming General Rawat’s successor,” said a retired two-star army officer. Obviously, for the government, the CDS post is not really what it was initially cracked up to be, he added, declining to be named.

Others darkly hinted at a ‘conspiracy’ involving MoD civil servants who were reportedly resentful of the eclipse in their authority that General Rawat had brought about in the ministry, through bellicosity and brio. For, other than being the single-point advisor on military matters to the Defence Minister, the CDS is also the Permanent Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee and Secretary of the newly created Department of Military Affairs or DMA. He is also responsible for prioritising material procurement for all three services, besides being the military advisor to the tri-service Nuclear Command Authority, thereby subsuming a large proportion of the authority and control hitherto exercised by senior MoD personnel, who clearly remain incensed over their depreciated authority.

However, soon after General Rawat died along with 12 others in an Indian Air Force (IAF) Mi-17V5 helicopter crash in Tamil Nadu, there was widespread speculation in the media, including The Wire, and in military circles that General Manoj Naravane, who retired as the Army Chief on April 30, was an automatic ‘shoe-in’ as India’s second CDS. The broader reasoning espoused was that military planners had tentatively determined that the first two-or even three-CDS’s needed to be from the army, the largest and most widely deployed of the country’s armed forces to usher in long-deferred reforms and to initiate ‘theatreisation’ of the three services.

Also read: Here’s Why the Appointment of India’s Second CDS Is Likely to Be Deferred for a While

And since General Naravane had worked closely with General Rawat, first as the Vice-Chief of Army Staff and later, when the latter was elevated to the country’s topmost military post, his elevation as CDS was considered within and outside the force as a fait accompli. General Naravane had also been appointed the ‘acting’ Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee in mid-December 2021, a move that also contributed significantly to the belief that it was only a matter of weeks before he became the CDS before superannuating as the CoAS on April 30.

Senior military officers further hinted that even within the army there was widespread conviction that General Naravane would be the next CDS, as he reportedly was not ‘dined out’ by the respective commands, or even by Army Headquarters that normally hosts this traditional ceremonial event at the Army Battle Honours Mess in Chanakyapuri in New Delhi. This only further fuelled chatter in the ‘fauji langar’ regarding General Naravane’s appointment as the forthcoming CDS.

Former Chief of Army Staff Gen. Manoj Mukund Naravane. Photo: PTI

Furthermore, analysts hypothesised that once the government had decided on Lieutenant General Manoj Pande, the former Eastern Army Commander and later the Army Vice-Chief as General Naravane’s successor, the latter would simply move up the ladder as the CDS. Obviously this has not transpired, though conjecture is still ripe that it could well ensue, but the possibility of it occurring had considerably dimmed.

Meanwhile, there is speculation in security circles that the government could well appoint retired Indian Navy Chief of Staff Admiral Karambir Singh as the new CDS. Defence analyst Bharat Karnad recently argued, somewhat obliquely, that as a former helicopter pilot Admiral Singh who retired in November 2021, would be acceptable as CDS to both the IAF and the Indian Army- albeit via the Army Aviation Corps that also operates rotary-wing platforms. Helicopters, Karnad rationalises, were the lynchpin endearing the former Indian Navy chief to the two other services.

Writing in Security Wise, a geo-strategic, military and foreign policy website, Karnad stated that if indeed the former “phlegmatic” Indian Navy chief became the CDS he would have to ‘root out’ from the CDS secretariat his predecessor’s antipathy to expeditiously and extensively establishing military bases on the Indian Ocean Region. Consequently, he would need to carve out a ready-use expeditionary element in the Indian armed forces to counter China’s fast-growing footprint, and effectively handling crises in this strategically critical region.

Also read: Vacant for More than a Month, the CDS’s Role in an India that is Nuclear Needs a Serious Rejig

But other defence analysts spotlight the inherent drawbacks in appointing a retired officer as CDS in a highly status conscious milieu where upward mobility is ordained by seniority and one in which pensioners are cynically considered ‘has-been’s.

“It going to be difficult, if not impossible, for the services to accept any retiree as the CDS,” said a former two-star Navy officer. It could also end up restricting the CDS’s wider operational responsibilities if it happens, confining his role to that of merely a secretary in the DMA, he added.

Meanwhile, in his incisive analysis in Rediff.com Colonel Udupa roundly criticised the Modi government for inordinate delays in announcing the names of service chiefs to replace the ones retiring, well in advance, so as to enable them to be adequately briefed and to position personnel to suit their individual vision. These latter activities could take anything up to two months, hence the logic in announcing the names early, he reasoned.

Colonel Udupa goes on to state that in eight of nine such service chief appointments executed by the BJP government after it assumed office in 2014, the average timeline in making these announcements was just 17 days, compared with 56 days by previous administrations.

He illustrated his thesis by declaring that General Rawat’s name as the CoAS was announced on December 17, 2017, merely 14 days before he was to assume office. Similarly Air Chief Marshal B.S. Dhanoa took charge of the IAF on January 1, just 13 days after his appointment was made public. Thereafter, his successor R.K.S. Bhaduria assumed office on September 30, 2019, 11 days after being shortlisted as ACM.

Former Chief of Defence Staff, late General Bipin Rawat, former Air Chief Marshal Rakesh Kumar Singh Bhadauria, Navy Chief Admiral Karambir Singh and former Chief of Army Staff General M.M. Naravane at the press conference on May 1, 2020. Photo: PTI/Manvender Vashist

Correspondingly, General Naravane’s appointment was made public on December 17, 2019, a fortnight before he became CoAS and two weeks ago General Pande was designated the Army Chief a mere 12 days before he took over on April 30. The only exception Colonel Udupa pointed out was in the instance of Admiral Karambir Singh whose appointment was announced 69 days before he assumed office on May 31, 2020.

“Announcing the name of a successor service chief as late as possible has now become a characteristic of this government,” declared Colonel Udupa. This stands on its head the earlier belief that an early announcement helps in a well-planned and smooth change over, he said.

Is there any military reform in this somewhere, he asks, or it is in line with Modi’s proclivity to make important announcements giving little or no notice, like that of demonetisation in November 2016 and total lockdown in March 2020?

Other senior officers said this penchant to take such matters so close to the finish line also ‘dented’ morale amongst higher defence personnel, as there were several hopefuls vying – and lobbying – for the top job and all vacancies in the military’s pyramidical structure were watchfully monitored by aspiring officers.

But, as a senior army officer said, if retirees now become a vital part of the military’s hierarchy, it would further precipitate a psychological hurdle upon an already complex situation at a time when the security situation in the neighbourhood and beyond was highly tenuous.

Vacant for More than a Month, the CDS’s Role in an India that is Nuclear Needs a Serious Rejig

Some roles must be explicated or distinctly enhanced. A uniform chain of command can ensure directness and simplicity.

India is temporarily back to the erstwhile system of a rotating chairman of the chiefs of staff committee (COSC) in which the senior most serving service chief tenanted the appointment. It’s now well over a month since General Bipin Rawat’s untimely demise in the saddle, but the new chief of defence staff (CDS) has not been appointed as yet.

It is true that the jointness initiative, largely for which General Rawat figured in the Padma awards list, was in pause at the time of his death. The services had been asked to turn in studies on how each wished to see jointness shape up. Appointed interim CCOSC, General M. M. Naravane, who is familiar with the fledgling steps taken by jointness so far, is taking it forward.

This sanguineness that the CDS will not be overly missed owes to the CDS appointment – though triple-hatted in also being secretary Department of Military Affairs – missing a vital ingredient, that of command authority. His command authority is restricted to ‘Tri-service agencies/organisations/commands related to cyber and space.’

Also read: With Army’s Next Vice Chief Shortlisted, Centre Moves a Step Closer To Appointing CDS

Overlooked in the delay is that the CDS, in his capacity of permanent chairman of the COSC, is ‘the military adviser to the Nuclear Command Authority (NCA).’ This is a consequential function, especially when the security situation is not ideal with military factors to the fore, especially in Ladakh over the past two years.

To enhance deterrence, the role of the permanent chairman of the COSC in the nuclear command and control chain needs to be enhanced. The permanent chairman of the COSC, in addition to a military advisory role, should also be vested with command authority over the Strategic Forces Command (SFC). As will be shown below, there is no command authority over the SFC, a gap that needs filling to keep deterrence honed.

In the current nuclear command and control arrangement, the commander-in-chief of the SFC, who ‘manages and administers’ the SFC, has dual reporting lines: with operational authority lying with the national security adviser or NSA and being only administratively under the permanent chairman of COSC.

Ambiguity galore

An academic has described the nuclear command and control arrangement as: “The command of India’s nuclear forces flows from the Prime Minister’s Office through the office of the NSA to the chairman of the COSC and the SFC commander.”

However, there is no mention of nuclear command and control in the Allocation of Business rules.

The NSA, an unelected civilian at present with cabinet rank and with a term co-extensive with the prime minister, is ‘the principal adviser on national security matters to the prime minister; and the National Security Council.’ There is no reference to any executive role for the NSA. Therefore, there is no legal basis for the NSA’s operational authority over the SFC.

The cryptic 2003 press release with an abridged nuclear doctrine is the only official clue to go on. It reads: “The executive council is chaired by the national security advisor. It provides inputs for decision making by the Nuclear Command Authority and executes the directives given to it by the political council.”

This has been translated as allowing the NSA, as chair of the executive council, operational authority over the SFC, the commander-in-chief of the SFC being a member of the executive council.

Does this also mean that the NSA has operational authority over the other members that include service chiefs and the permanent chairman of the COSC? Chairmanship of a committee does not imply subordination of the members by the chair.

The political council, being ‘the sole body which can authorise the use of nuclear weapons,’ cannot delegate its authority to the NSA. The executive council – as a collective – ‘executes the directives given to it by the political council’. In other words, a subordinate committee is empowered by and answerable to the higher committee.

Also read: Here’s Why the Appointment of India’s Second CDS Is Likely to Be Deferred for a While

In this interpretation, the commander-in-chief of the SFC, a member of the executive council, is answerable to the political council as part of the collective, the executive council. In effect, then, a three-star commander-in-chief of the SFC is without a single-point superior with command authority overseeing him and his command.

The draft Indian nuclear doctrine’s call for ‘unity of command and control of nuclear forces’ has apparently not been met. It’s possible that the full length nuclear doctrine – of which only the abridged version is in the open domain – explicates a thorough nuclear C2. Even so, the lack of transparency that gives rise to such ambiguity does not help with deterrence.

Why fix nuclear command and control?

To vest the NSA with operational authority over the SFC is an anomaly in India’s democratic system of governance based on collective ministerial responsibility. The NSA’s advisory role is understandable. But an executive mandate with operational authority over a critical military formation – the SFC – is at odds with the ministerial system.

Even in the presidential system of the United States, the NSA does not have executive responsibility, with the command authority over combatant commands, such as the Strategic Command that controls nuclear weapons, resting with the US president and is exercised through the secretary of defence.

The belief that ‘nuclear weapons are political weapons, not weapons of warfighting,’ may have led to the civilian political authority channeling its nuclear directives through a civilian NSA. The apprehension may be over militarisation of nuclear decisions. Since the NSA would be on hand for a holistic input, such a situation would not arise. The NSA has a military adviser in the National Security Council Secretariat, a military veteran, who can potentially provide a second opinion to the military’s advice.

Changes necessary

The permanent chairman of the COSC as lead military adviser to the NCA must be part of the political council as a permanent invitee. Being on hand, he or she would be able to receive the nuclear directives directly from the political council, of which the defence minister – their boss – is part. Operational authorisation of nuclear weapons can be transmitted to the SFC through a single – uniformed – chain of command.

By virtue of this empowerment of the permanent chairman of the COSC, he or she could also co-chair the executive council. This will ease implementation since execution now is a combined civil-military activity, not all nuclear warheads being in a de-mated state.

With the SFC ‘under command’ of the permanent chairman of the COSC, deterrence stands to gain. Continuing with a nuclear command and control that sufficed over the past two decades needs a debate in light of India’s changed security situation. In the interim, at a minimum, the role of the permanent chairman of the COSC in relation to the SFC must be explicated by incorporating a specific mention in the mandate of the new CDS.

Ali Ahmed is a freelance strategic analyst.

Army Chief General Naravane Takes Charge as Chairman of Chiefs of Staff Committee

General Naravane has been given the charge as the chairman of the committee as he is the senior-most among the three service chiefs, sources said.

New Delhi: Army Chief General M.M. Naravane has assumed the charge as the chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee that comprises the three service chiefs, people familiar with the development said on Wednesday.

The post fell vacant following the death of Chief of Defence Staff General Bipin Rawat in the Indian Air Force helicopter crash on December 8.

General Naravane has been given the charge as the chairman of the committee as he is the senior-most among the three service chiefs, the people cited above said.

IAF Air Chief Marshal V.R. Chaudhari and Navy Chief Admiral R. Hari Kumar had taken over their respective positions on September 30 and November 30.

Before the creation of the post of the Chief of Defence Staff, the senior-most among the three service chiefs used to be the chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee.

The Chiefs of Staff Committee met on Tuesday and condoled the death of General Rawat, his wife Madhulika and 11 armed forces personnel.

Group Captain Varun Singh, the lone survivor of the crash, succumbed to injuries on Wednesday at a military hospital in Bengaluru.

Meanwhile, General Naravane held a telephonic conversation with Lieutenant General Fahd bin Abdullah Al-Mutair, the Commander of Royal Saudi Armed Forces.

The Army said they discussed issues of bilateral defence cooperation.

(PTI)

Do We Need a New Department of Military Affairs and Integrated Theatre Commands?

What is more important is that we urgently correct the imbalances and imperfections that have crept into our higher defence structures.

The recent reforms in our defence structures, beginning with the inadequate and half-baked creation of the post of the Chief of Defence Staff heading a newly created separate Department of Military Affairs (DMA) as well as the current exercise in creating integrated theatre commands are simply not the right way forward for a country of the size and stature of India in general and her Armed Forces in particular.

Let me begin with the post of the CDS in the form that we have created it.

As learnt from the official press release of the Press Information Bureau (Defence Wing) and from what is being observed on ground, this has fallen woefully short of the bold, path-breaking reform that was needed to overcome the shortcomings in the Department of Defence (DOD), within the larger Ministry of Defence (MOD).

Instead of making the existing DOD more cohesive and integrated by merging the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC) and the attendant HQ Integrated Defence Staff (HQ IDS) with it, we went and created yet another ‘department’ which will again be operating outside the main DOD, much like the other departments of Defence Production, Research and Development and that of Ex-Servicemen.

Not only has this department been very oddly named (the word ‘affairs’ being totally non-military in nature), but it has resulted in further multiplying the ambiguities that already plague our existing higher defence structures.

Chief of Defence Staff General Bipin Rawat at the press conference on May 1, 2020. Photo: PTI/Manvender Vashist

This single most important reform in the MOD should have led to the establishment of very clear lines of responsibility and accountability in the Ministry. Any ambiguity is simply not acceptable in an organisation whose only business is the defence of India; an onerous task which (in addition to photo ops) actually implies a quiet nurturing of force capabilities required to secure our political goals in the event of war.

What actually left me aghast was that while re-distributing subjects to this new department from among those originally allotted to the DOD (in the Second Schedule to the Allocation of Business Rules dated January 14, 1961 issued by the President of India) this new Department of ‘Military Affairs’ has not even been entrusted with some elements of the very first and most important subject laid out in this second schedule – that of, ‘defence of India and every part thereof including preparation for defence and all such acts as may be conducive in times of war to its prosecution and after its termination to effective demobilisation.’

Last, a minor but relevant issue in the protocol-conscious society that we have become is that the press release stated that the CDS will function as the Secretary of this new department. The CDS (with the rank of a ‘four star’ Armed Forces General Officer or Service Chief), is way above in protocol to Secretaries to the Government of India (who are equated to three-star-ranked Army Commander or equivalent).

Also watch | ‘China Intrusions: Army Responded Slowly, Is Hampered By CDS Structure’

Therefore, to my mind, this ‘relegation’ of the CDS as Secretary of the department is not in the right spirit of things and should have been unacceptable to at least those in uniform. At best, this function should be carried out by the VCDS (existing CISC) since being of a three-star-ranked Army Commander status, he is in the same protocol bracket as a Secretary to the Government of India.

So what do we need to do if we really want to set our DOD in order?

In my way of looking at things, it would have made more sense to take a leaf out of the United Kingdom model of the MOD. Having derived our parliamentary form of democracy from the UK model, we could also go a step further and seek to reform our higher defence structures on similar lines, by having the CDS and the Defence Secretary (in the UK he is called the Permanent Under Secretary) acting as the two principal advisors (one military and one civilian) to the Minister of Defence.

‘It would have made more sense to take a leaf out of the United Kingdom model of the MOD.’ Photo: Reuters/File

The other elements of the structure, such as the creation of the various councils and boards as adapted to our needs, would then have automatically fallen in place in a truly integrated Department of Defence overseen by the Minister of Defence. The thrust of the reform related to the CDS should have been on creating a compact synergised DOD with clear cut lines of responsibility and accountability running up to the Defence Minister through his two principal advisors.

Creating another department outside the DOD has not ‘caught the bull by its horns’ and we have only added to the ambiguity that is already plaguing the system.

Integrated Theatre Commands

Now let me come to the reform currently underway related to creation of Integrated Theatre Commands (ITC). The question that needs to be answered here is: do we really need these new structures to win the next war?

Undoubtedly our next war will be a Joint Services War backed up by all the other instruments of national power. However, given our geo-politico-military realities, such future ‘national’ wars are bound to be contingency driven with one of the services being the lead service for a particular developing situation as happened in case of our ‘lightning war’ for the liberation of Bangladesh.

The point is that, as and when war is thrust on us or even in the event when we proactively prosecute war, the whole country is going to be one geographic theatre to include all our land boundaries, air space, sea lanes and island territories.

‘Such theatre commands as are evident in the world today are more suitable for a presidential or highly centralised forms of government.’ Photo: Twitter/@adgpi

To support this argument that India is the equivalent of just one theatre of war, let us take the example of the global commands of the USA from whom we seem to be taking this thought process of creating theatre commands. One US Combatant Command covers as much as a continent in its arc of responsibility and therefore our Indian sub-continent is at best one single theatre when seen from this perspective.

It has also to be borne in mind that such theatre commands as are evident in the world today are more suitable for a presidential or highly centralised forms of government. Theatre commands could also be a natural organisational extension in case a nation has extra regional ambitions backed up by sustainable power projection capabilities deployed across the globe or in their desired area of influence.

Undoubtedly India is a formidable regional power but we are not in this league of power projection yet and when such a politico-military need arises, a specific out of area joint command can be created as required for that contingency.

Notwithstanding the above, a ‘National Joint Services’ war in our context does not mean that there will be no single service wars (such as a purely air, sea or land) but the crux of issue in all cases would be the timely appointment of the Overall Force Commander (OFC) by the COSC/CDS and the Defence Minister for that particular developing situation.

It is also more than likely that one of the Service Chiefs may himself be designated as the OFC and given the responsibility for the conduct of the campaign to achieve our politico-military aims in much the same way as General Dwight D Eisenhower was appointed as the Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force and tasked to undertake operations aimed at the heart of Germany and the destruction of her armed forces.

And so it is my case that India just does not need Theatre Commands and definitely not a DMA operating outside the DOD. What is more important is that we urgently correct the imbalances and imperfections that have now further crept into our higher defence structures particularly the DOD or MOD.

I am convinced that if we address this problem at the top adequately, the rest will automatically fall in place.

Lt Gen. Ravi Dastane is a veteran who commanded the strategic High Altitude 14 Corps at Leh. He retired as the Deputy Chief, HQ IDS. He has also authored a book, India’s Armed Forces: Tempering the Steel (Continental Prakashan, Pune).

Watch | Why India May Need a CDS – But It’s Not Bipin Rawat

It is being widely speculated that General Rawat will be India’s first Chief of Defence Staff.

On August 15, Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced the appointment of Chief of Defence Staff – a person who will be above the three Service Chiefs of the Army, Navy and Air Force.

The case being provided for the appointment of a CDS is simple – the need for a single-point person as an advisor to the government. With Service Chiefs occupied in their operational roles, the CDS will be responsible for an overall long term planning, optimising procurement of the three services and ensuring that high-level decisions are taken consensually. According to The Hindu, the defence ministry will finalise a CDS in a few months. But this is not the first time such an idea has been floated.

The proposal for the appointment of a CDS in India was first made after the Kargil war in 2001, by the Group of Ministers constituted in the aftermath, but no consensus emerged because of apprehensions within the three services. The Ministry of Defence also opposed the proposal because of bureaucratic reasons; citing that most powers will get concentrated in a CDS’s post.

Currently, India has a chairman of Chiefs of Staff Committee (CoSC). The senior most among the three services is appointed as such. The office of the CoSC is not directly responsible for providing joint military advice to the government. This is at present done by the National Security Advisor which makes the office of CoSC quite ineffective. It also lapses with the Chairman’s retirement. The current Chairman of CoSC is Air Chief Marshal B.S. Dhanoa, but he will retire on September 30 and would have served as Chairman for merely four months.

The baton for the post of the Chairman of CoSC was likely to have passed on to General Bipin Rawat, the next senior most service personnel after ACM Dhanoa. But it is being widely speculated that General Bipin Rawat will hold the post of India’s first CDS instead.

General Rawat is seen as somebody with vast experience in counter-insurgency operations in the northeast and in Jammu and Kashmir. He was also the Chief of Army when the Narendra Modi led government carried out surgical strikes against Pakistan after the attack in Uri.