Indian Airforce

Indian Navy Begins Evaluating Rafale’s Compatibility With Vikrant

While the Navy will also test the compatibility of the US-origin Super Hornet, senior sources said the Rafale-M has the ‘advantage of commonality’.

Chandigarh: The Indian Navy (IN) began evaluating its long-standing requirement for multi-role carrier-borne fighters (MRCBF) on Monday, with the French-origin Rafale-M fighter demonstrating its capabilities at its Shore Based Test Facility (SBTF) in Goa.

Official sources said that over the next few days, the IN will assess Dassault’s twin-engine Rafale-M’s ability to undertake short take-off but arrested recovery (STOBAR) flights and other related operational parameters at the SBTF’s 283-metre mock-up ski jump at INS Hansa.

The Navy’s objective is to assess whether the French fighter would be capable of operating from INS Vikrant, its 37,500-tonne STOBAR indigenous aircraft carrier that began its third round of sea trials over the weekend and is scheduled for commissioning in August, on India’s 75th Independence Day.

The commencement of sea trials of the indigenous aircraft carrier Vikrant. Photo: PTI

The naval fighter demonstration was aimed at meeting the IN’s January 2017 requirement for 57 MRCBF in flyaway condition, a number which naval sources said could be reduced to 36 due to budgetary constraints. In pursuit of this procurement, the IN also plans on reviewing Boeing’s F/A-18 Block III Super Hornet dual-engine fighters performance at the SBTF in March, as an alternative to the relatively lighter and smaller air-framed Rafale-M.

The French and US maritime combat aircraft were two of four such fighter types that had responded to the IN’s request for information (RfI) for 57 platforms dispatched five years ago. The other two included Saab of Sweden’s single-engine, under-development Gripen Maritime fighter and Russian Aircraft Corporation’s MiG-29K/KUB’s, which are presently in service with the IN. Both the latter fighters are not in contention for the IN’s MRCBF tender, naval sources indicated: Gripen Maritime is yet to be operationalised, while the MiG-29K/KUBs confront a questionable operational service record with the IN.

According to the Navy’s MRCBF RfI, potential vendors for the day-and-night, all-weather fighter would need to specify whether their platforms were capable of both STOBAR and catapult arrested take-off but arrested recovery (CATOBAR) operations using the Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System (EMALS).

It stated that the fighters were being acquired for employment in air defence, air-to-surface operations, buddy refuelling, reconnaissance and electronic warfare missions from IN aircraft carriers. They would also need to be equipped with Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar, infra-red search and track (IRST) systems, laser range finders and helmet-mounted or direct retinal displays. Furthermore, their weapon suites would be required to include four beyond visual range and two all-aspect air-to-air missiles. The shortlisted platform also needed to be capable of being fitted with assorted indigenously developed and commercial off-the-shelf equipment, the RfI added.

Advantage of commonality

Senior naval sources said the Rafale-M had an ‘advantage of commonality’ in the eventual shortlisting process, as the Indian Air Force (IAF) is operating 32 of the 36 Rafale fighters it had acquired in 2016 for $8.92 billion and is awaiting delivery of the remaining four. Dassault had also set up a Rafale maintenance and flight training facility at Ambala, where one of the two French fighter squadrons is based, and one which could support the Rafale-M if acquired, thereby reducing overall procurement costs considerably.

Senior IN aviators told The Wire that it made ‘good financial and logistical sense’ for the IN to link its MRCBF buy to the IAF’s, like it had earlier done in acquiring 45 MiG-29K/KUBs which comprise the combat air arm of INS Vikramaditya (ex-Admiral Gorshkov), the Navy’s sole 44,750 tonne refurbished Kiev-class carrier.

“Simply acquiring 57 naval fighters off-the-shelf would not only be prohibitively expensive but also pose inventory and logistical problems,” said a retired three-star naval fighter pilot. Commonality in the prospective naval fighter procurement made eminent sense on multiple counts, he added, declining to be named for commenting on sensitive materiel acquisition matters.

The IN had acquired the MiG-29K/KUB platforms between 2004 and 2010 for $2.29 billion, principally because of their ‘commonality’ with the IAF’s 60-odd MiG-29 fighters, inducted into service from 1985. At the time, Russia was revamping Vikramaditya and had employed commercial and logistic reasoning with the IN by maintaining that indigenously available technical support and the associated availability of spares and maintenance for the IAF’s MiG-29s would amply and economically support the IN’s MIG-29K/KUBs variants.

INS Vikramaditya at sea. Photo: Indian Navy

India’s procurement also revived Mikoyan’s flagging MiG-29 naval variant programme, rendering the IN as Russia’s sole overseas customer. The Russian Navy, for its part, operates merely 20 MiG-29K’s and four KUB trainer versions or almost half of those in service with the IN.

However, military sources said that the IN’s 45 Russian fighters – 16 earmarked for Vikramaditya and 29 for Vikrant – which were delivered to the IN between 2009 and 2017 had failed in ‘adequately meeting’ the navy’s operational requirements, as they were reportedly unable to deliver their weapons payload to their stated range with a full fuel load.

In July 2016, India’s Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) had severely criticised the IN for technically accepting the MiG-29K/KUB fighters, despite them being “riddled with problems, discrepancies, and anomalies”. The CAG further revealed that these deficiencies included shortcomings with the naval fighter’s airframe, its RD-33 MK engines and fly-by-wire systems; in short, the entire fighter. The report also stated that the fighters had suffered repeated engine failures, with at least 10 cases of single-engine landings. Besides, of the 65 RD-33MK turbofan engines received from manufacturer Klimov, the IN had rejected or withdrawn at least 40 from service.

Consequently, operational availability of the MiG-29Ks between 2014 and 2016 fluctuated from 15.93% to 37.63%, while that of the MiG-29KUB trainers was between 21.20% and 47.14%, the CAG disclosed and matters had improved little thereafter, naval sources said. Additionally, the MiG-29K/KUB fleet continued to face severe maintenance problems, as a large number needed repair after each deck landing that damaged many of the fighters on-board components.

There were also complaints from the IN regarding Russia’s inability to incorporate all agreed-upon features onto the MiG-29Ks. This had emanated from the 2014 sanctions, still in place, imposed on Moscow by the US, European Union, and other international organisations for its military intervention in Ukraine, which had been contracted originally to provide several of the MiG-29K components.

Since Russia was consequently unable to integrate these systems and subsystems onto the fighters, the IN was left with little choice but to import them directly from Ukraine. These were then integrated onto the fighters at the Hansa Indian Naval Air Station, where the first batch of 16 MiG-29K/KUBs was formally inducted into service in May 2013 as part of the 303 Black Panthers squadron, but with limited assistance from the OEM. Industry sources said this aspect too had adversely impacted the fighters’ overall efficiency, but the IN declined to officially comment on the matter.

Hence, the IN’s unsatisfactory experience with Russian fighters and delays in the development of the indigenous Light Combat Aircraft (Navy) or LCA(N) had consequently contributed to the issuance of the RfI for 57 MRCBFs in 2017.

LCA(N) project continues to face delays

The LCA(N) project, for its part, continues to face developmental delays with the government-run Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) currently involved in testing two of its indigenously designed, single-engine naval Mk1 prototypes. However, the IN had earlier categorically declared that it would not be inducting Mk1s that are principally a variant of the IAF’s Tejas LCA Mk1, and like it, powered by the US’s General Electric GE F-404 power pack capable of generating 80-85kN of thrust.

In late 2016, then IN Chief of Staff Admiral Sunil Lanba had said that this engine did not fulfil the Navy’s ‘thrust-to weight’ requirement, as it circumscribed the platform’s ability to operate with adequate fuel and weapons load from the deck of an aircraft carrier. Other IN aviators concurred, stating that the Navy needed the ‘back-up’ of an additional engine for supplementary power to get airborne with a greater payload and to halt quicker upon landing.

Consequently, in mid-2020, the Union government approved the Rs 800 crore development of a twin-engine deck-based fighter (TE-DBF) by the state-run Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA) that was tasked with conducting the LCA(N) Mk2’s first test flight within six-seven years and inducting it into service 2030-31 onwards.

They said the proposed fighter, with an all-up weight of 24 tonnes, would be powered by two US GE F-414 afterburning turbofan engines, each of which was capable of generating 90kN of thrust to enable the aircraft to operate with a 3.5 tonne payload of fuel and weapons. Several design features of the proposed fighter were presently under evaluation and included a tail-less delta wing version and one featuring canards to enhance agility, especially at high angles of attack or during a stall.

Meanwhile, the ongoing flight demonstrations by the Rafale-M fighter and those imminently by the F/A-18 Super Hornet, exhibit the urgency of acquiring naval combat aircraft for Vikrant at a time of great turbulence in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) and the IN’s ‘coming out’ as a ‘pivot’ force in this area. Globally, the choice of proven naval fighters is limited to just a handful; hopefully, the IN, known for focusing acutely on its operational requirements, will select the platform most suitable to optimise its resources and efficiency.

Afghanistan Crisis: India Evacuates 392 People Including 2 Afghan Lawmakers

Two Afghan lawmakers, Anarkali Honaryar and Narender Singh Khalsa, were among those evacuated from Kabul.

New Delhi: India evacuated 392 people on Sunday including two Afghan lawmakers in three different flights as part of its mission to bring back Indians and Afghan partners from Kabul.

Various nations are scrambling to rescue their citizens from the war-ravaged country, in the wake of deteriorating security situation and increasing Taliban hostilities.

“Separately, 146 Indian nationals who were evacuated from Afghanistan to Doha, are being repatriated to India on Sunday night”, the Indian embassy in Qatar said in the evening.

In the morning, a total of 168 people including 107 Indians and 23 Afghan Sikhs and Hindus, were flown out of Kabul to Hindon Airbase near Delhi in a C-17 heavy-lift military transport aircraft of the Indian Air Force (IAF).

Another group of 87 Indians and two Nepalese nationals were also brought back in a special Air India flight from Dushanbe, a day after they were evacuated to the Tajikistan capital in an IAF 130J transport aircraft.

“As many as 135 Indians, who were earlier evacuated from Kabul to Doha in the last few days by the US and NATO aircraft, were flown back from the Qatari capital city to Delhi in a special flight”, officials said.

“Bringing Indians back from Afghanistan. 2nd batch of 146 Indian nationals, who were evacuated from Afghanistan to Doha, being repatriated today to India,” the Indian mission in Qatar tweeted at around 8 PM.

According to the sources, the second batch of Indians from Doha will reach Delhi in four different flights, which are scheduled to land in the national capital between 1.55 AM and 5.10 AM on Monday.

The 168 people evacuated from Kabul included Afghan lawmakers Anarkali Honaryar and Narender Singh Khalsa and their families.

“India is our second home. Even if we are Afghans and live in that country, people often call us Hindustanis. I thank India for extending its helping hand,” Khalsa told reporters at the Hindon Airbase near Delhi.

“I feel like crying. Everything is finished. It is a very difficult and painful decision to leave the country. We have not seen such a situation. Everything has been snatched away. It’s all over”, Khalsa said as he broke down when asked about the situation in Afghanistan.

Taking to Twitter, Farid Mamundzay, Afghanistan ambassador to India, thanked Indian friends for their messages of support. “I appreciate the kind words of sympathy and support messages from all Indian friends and the diplomatic missions in New Delhi over the suffering of Afghans in the past few weeks, particularly the last 7-8 days.”

He further added, “The avoidable suffering of Afghanistan is man-made and at a scale beyond all civilized contemplation. Afghanistan is going through a difficult time, and only good leadership, compassionate attitude and international support to the Afghan people would somewhat bring an end to these miseries.”

Government officials welcome Indian citizens on their arrival from crisis-hit Afghanistan by an Indian Air Forces C-17 aircraft, in Jamnagar, Tuesday, Aug. 17, 2021. Photo: PTI

India carried out the evacuation missions in coordination with the US and several other friendly countries. It is learnt that a small group of Indian officials is coordinating the evacuation mission at the Kabul airport, and another batch of Indians is expected to be brought back from the Afghan capital on Monday.

However, it will depend on whether a sizeable number of Indians, as well as Indian-origin people, will manage to reach the airport. People familiar with the situation in Kabul told, Afghan nationals who are having Indian visas are facing increasing scrutiny from the Taliban.

“Evacuation continues! IAF special repatriation flight with 168 passengers on board, including 107 Indian nationals, is on its way to Delhi from Kabul,” external affairs ministry spokesperson Arindam Bagchi tweeted hours before the plane landed at Hindon.

It is learnt that the Indians evacuated to Doha from Kabul, were employees of a number of foreign companies that were operating in Afghanistan.

“Bringing Indians home from Afghanistan! AI 1956 carrying 87 Indians departs from Tajikistan for New Delhi. Two Nepalese nationals also evacuated”, he tweeted.

On the second batch of Indians returning home from Doha, the people cited above said 104 of them are being sent by a Vistara flight, 30 by a Qatar Airways flight and 11 of them will be reaching Delhi by an Indigo flight. One person is returning by an Air India flight, sources said.

With Sunday’s evacuation, the number of people evacuated by India from Kabul reached around 590. The first group of people were evacuated on last Monday, a day after the Taliban seized control of the city. India evacuated 200 people including the Indian envoy and other staffers of its embassy in Kabul, in two C-17 heavy-lift transport aircraft of the IAF.

The first evacuation flight brought back over 40 people, mostly staffers at the Indian embassy, on last Monday. The second C-17 aircraft evacuated around 150 people including Indian diplomats, officials, security personnel and some stranded Indians from Kabul on Tuesday.

The Taliban swept across Afghanistan this month, seizing control of almost all key towns and cities, including Kabul, in the backdrop of the withdrawal of the US forces.

Following the evacuation, the MEA said, the focus now would be to ensure the safe return of all Indian nationals from the Afghan capital. It said the immediate priority for the government is to obtain accurate information about all Indian nationals, currently staying in Afghanistan.

It also requested the Indians as well as their employers, to urgently share relevant details with the special Afghanistan cell that was set up on August 16.

The cell have received more than 2,000 phone calls and answered over 6,000 WhatsApp queries during the first five days of its operation, sources said. The cell answered more than 1200 e-mails during the period. According to a rough estimate last week, the number of Indians stranded in Afghanistan could be around 400, and India has been looking at ways to evacuate them including by coordinating with the US and other friendly countries.

India Must Chart Out a National Security Strategy for a Changing Geopolitical World

Although the national security establishment often talks about having a “plan” to deal with changing global and regional issues, there still remains a number of unanswered questions, which do not bode well for India’s security.

Officers of the previous generation who served in Delhi will remember the arduous efforts that were made to convince the government to institute a National Security Council and appoint a National Security Adviser (NSA). The struggle went on in the files for well over a decade, and the main argument was that there was no high-level multi-disciplinary thinking.

The fight was conducted only by the services’ headquarters. Some progress was made by forming a defence planning staff, which was hamstrung by uncooperative civil bureaucracies. Eventually, the Cabinet Committee on Security was virtually transformed into the National Security Council, and under the first Vajpayee government, Brijesh Mishra was double-hatted with the post of NSA and Secretary to the Prime Minister.

Also read: The Politics of Warmongering Obscures the Myth of India’s Invincibility

This was unsatisfactory as there still was no multi-disciplinary staff. This came later during the first term of the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government when M.K. Narayan became the NSA with a multi-disciplinary staff. Unfortunately, various departments were still uncooperative and sent the not so brilliant officers to the staff. Yet, some progress was made, and this writer spent a couple of years after retirement heading a special task force working on the future scenarios and geopolitical gaming.

Sadly, the national security staff have over two decades produced only one public document – Non Alignment 2.0 – that too indirectly. There is no sign of any white paper, global future scenarios or an open and periodic national security strategy. As a result, the perceptive analyst in India is left with a number of important unanswered questions on national security.

Unanswered questions

For instance, there is much loose talk in services headquarters on the imperative to prepare for a two-front war. This is a big question mark and would be a disastrous outcome for the country; and yet is there any directive on the subject? Concurrently is there an unspoken cap on defence expenditure of 2% of the GDP? Many other questions arise.

Indian army representational image. Photo: Reuters/Mukesh Gupta.

Is non-alignment dead or not? If it is not, how does the cabinet propose that the armed forces face a two-front war with a 2% cap of the defence budget? Clearly, the directive to the armed forces, their financial limits and the country’s foreign policy are interlinked. That was the reason the National Security Council was required in the first place – to have high-level multidisciplinary thinking.

At present the clear impression is that the defence, finance and external affairs are all pursuing independent policies with no coordination. If we don’t have enough money, and we clearly don’t, why do we feel privileged to conduct an independent foreign policy? Why are we so adamant against alliances?

Also read: Subcontinent on the Brink of War: Why the Present Standoff Is Different

Eventually, it appears that the load will have to be borne solely by the Indian army – but even here there are major questions. The Indian army already outnumbers the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) by 2,85,000 men, on active duty and yet, when encounters occur, we are invariably outnumbered. The army says that they have the Pakistan front to defend, which absorbs half a million men. So, we have ended up alone, against two enemies and no friends? What kind of high-level policymaking is that?

Admittedly, Himalayan geography is against us, but the geography of the Pacific and the Indian Ocean is hugely against China. They have a massive two-front oceanic problem with the gigantic United States navy at their doorstep, and the Indian Ocean is 2500 miles away.

The PLA navy has something like 82 major combatant vessels, and India, Japan and Australia alone own 86 major war vessels. This is discounting the entire US navy. If the PLA navy were to retain 50-60 warships in the Pacific against the US navy and venture into the Indian Ocean 2,500 miles away, they would be outclassed by the Indian Navy’s p-8 aircraft and the combined fleets of East and West. So why are we struggling all alone and leaving the Indian army to bear an entire load of bad policy?

Lack of coordinated thinking

Forget the advantages of multidisciplinary thought, we don’t even exhibit the existence of dynamic tri-service coordination. The Chinese, for instance, are constantly exhibiting their fear of the Malacca dilemma, with 75% of Chinese oil transiting through.

Defence minister Rajnath Singh at Stakna near Leh on July 17. Photo: Twitter/@rajnathsingh

Beijing fears America, but strangely enough, dismisses the real Indian threat. Why don’t we spend Rs 2,000 crore and transform the Car-Nicobar airfield into a formidable airbase, to dominate the exit to the straits? With the Maritime Information Sharing Technical Arrangement (MISTA) and the US-India info-dominance of the Indian Ocean, why don’t we relieve Himalayan tensions by a threat to China’s oil supply?

Without India, the US cannot contest the emerging Chinese hegemony. Above all, why doesn’t the Indian strategic community have evidence of the government’s multi-disciplinary thinking on Global Futures, the Nuclear Posture and national security strategy, instead of governmental furtive secrecy and unthinking arrogance?

Also read: India Needs a New Military Grand Strategy

The world is undergoing a huge geopolitical transformation. The European Union is a military non-entity. Russia and Japan are in demographic decline. There is a serious anti-Iran coalition building up in the Middle East.

China has arrived in Cambodia, Myanmar, Pakistan, Djibouti and Piraeus and built a land corridor to Europe. Presumably, we are growing into a regional power.

How do we propose to deal with the changing world, whose governance will be contested by Beijing, by merely defending Aksai Chin? The government surely has plans – but why not publish unclassified versions as democracies around the world do? There are no shortage of talented individuals in government, but institutional thinking will eclipse individual efforts any day.

Admiral Raja Menon was a career officer and a submarine specialist in the Indian Navy. He commanded seven ships and submarines before retiring in 1994 as assistant chief of naval staff (operations).

India’s 2021-22 Defence Budget Needs Honest Financial Reckoning, Not Empty Rhetoric

Over the decades, successive finance ministers have routinely promised that there will be no shortage of funds for the armed forces, but the reality remains otherwise.

India’s military faces a massive financial predicament in the fiscal year 2021-22, as it remains locked in a costly faceoff with China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in eastern Ladakh.

To meet this forbidding challenge, that shows no sign of abating, all three services are believed to have already executed emergency purchases of over $2 billion since June 2020 to plug enduring equipment and ammunition shortages, adversely upsetting budgetary calculations. It is undeniable that the services will require vast sums of money in the upcoming budget on February 1 to operationally sustain them in the faceoff with China that could conceivably continue for years.

The military’s financial demands come at a time when India is deep in recession, following the serious financial downturn due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Though some green shoots are visible in the economy, these are unlikely to shore up government revenues in the coming fiscal in any substantial measure. Besides, to revive the economy, funds will need to be invested across several sectors from manufacturing to infrastructure, placing the government in a quandary over where it can possibly source funds to adequately finance the military.

Pompous pronouncements

Over decades, successive finance ministers have routinely promised that there will be no shortage of funds for the armed forces, and all additional monies which they may require will be provided. Totally disregarding reality, then defence minister Nirmala Sitharaman had unbelievingly declared in July 2018 that there was neither a shortage of funds nor of ammunition, when there was a paucity of both. The minister’s optimism, in fact, was in direct contrast to the Defence Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defence (SCoD) that had publicly affirmed a shortage of funds for the military.

Sitharaman’s declaration was as ironic as it was surprising, as in the financial year 2018-19 there was a yawning gap of Rs 1,12, 137 crore between the requirement projected by the services and the funds allotted to them. Of this, Rs 76,766 crore was the shortfall in allocation for capital expenditure that largely caters for force modernisation. What the then Indian Army’s vice-chief Lieutenant General Sarath Chand had told the SCoD that year is more telling.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi with the chief of defence staff General Bipin Rawat (left) and army chief General M.M. Naravane (right) during in his visit to Ladakh in July 2020. Photo: PMO

“It (the budget) is barely enough to cater to the rise in expenses on account of inflation and does not even cater for taxes,” Lieutenant General Chand had told the Committee. He had stated that Rs 21,338 crore capital allocation for the army’s modernisation was “insufficient to cater for the committed payment” of Rs 29,033 crore for 125 ongoing schemes and for ammunition and equipment procurement”.

Also read: It Is Time to Accept That India’s Defence Planning Is Crippled by Severe Financial Woes

The vice chief had further revealed that 68% of the army’s equipment was in the ‘vintage category’, 24% in the current and 8% in the state of art grouping, and consequently, insufficient funds were certainly not going to remedy this worrying state of affairs.

The Committee’s prescient warning that the shortage of funds could lead to a default in payment for equipment to vendors, proved true in January 2019. This was when the ministry of defence (MoD) withheld payment of about Rs 20,000 crore to the state-owned Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) in order to pay overseas vendors and obviate punitive contractual provisions. Nobody asked, and no explanations were given, as to how the situation was managed the following year when the allocation to the services again fell short of their requirement by Rs 92,412 crore.

The recurring financial crisis to sustain the country’s military is as much on account of the government’s inability to meet the services’ financial requirement, as on account of the failure to acknowledge that finances will always be finite. Therefore, financially unviable, and disjointed expenditure plans continue to be made, with each service independently pursuing its own vision of the future.

The Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) General Bipin Rawat appointed exactly a year ago as head of the all-powerful department of military affairs (DMA) was expected to ensure service jointness and prioritisation in defence planning, especially with regard to financing, but the situation remains unaltered.

In fact, the DMA has floated ideas like a short tour of duty for military service and a graded pension structure to save on salaries and pensions which collectively account for almost half the annual defence outlay. But these are contentious proposals, which even if implemented, can in no way provide any immediate financial relief. Therefore, as things stand, the endless tussle by each individual service to secure a larger share of the defence budget is likely to continue unabated.

The resultant emasculation of the department of defence (DoD) too will have repercussions and add to the overall financial disarray. The DoD, for its part, continues to labour under the misconception that delegating more financial powers to the services, tweaking procurement procedures and enforcing indigenisation by banning defence imports will somehow magically solve the problem.

Reality check

The reality, however, is that procedures and policies can only produce results provided there are sufficient funds available to secure the desired military capabilities which too remain somewhat undefined and amorphous. This is also true of atmanirbharta or indigenisation, which in theory is desirable, but not always a cost-effective alternative to imported materiel.

Over decades, watchdog bodies like the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) have detailed how costly it is to indigenously license-build platforms like fighters, light utility helicopters, main battle tanks and even assault rifles compared to directly importing them.

Representative image. Defence Minister Rajnath Singh poses for a group photo with troops who took part in para dropping and other military exercises at Stakna, in Leh, Ladakh, Friday, July 17, 2020. Photo: PTI

Indian defence planners somehow fail to realise that creating industrial facilities domestically to manufacture these platforms and equipment needs massive and sustained investment by the manufacturers and large budget outlays to buy the indigenously manufactured material. Both of these are problematic.

This continuing financial crisis has been further exacerbated by the lack of an efficacious financial management system in the MoD to ensure that funds needed for material acquisitions, alongside recurring expenditure on salaries, rations, ammunition and maintenance of infrastructure and equipment are indeed available.

Also read: Despite Advances in Strategic Arms, Country Fails ‘Make in India’ Test for Basic Equipment

This drawback is responsible for the growing mismatch between the financial requirement projected by the armed forces and the outlays allocated to them. This gap has widened from Rs 23,014 crore in 2010-11 to Rs 1,03,535 crore in 2020-21 after reaching its peak in 2018-19.

However, unfazed by this shortfall, the services formulated a five-year plan in July 2017 that envisaged an outlay of a whopping Rs 26.84 lakh crore. This projected astronomical amount would have necessitated doubling the annual defence budget that was – and remains – a virtual impossibility, considering that the decadal average increase in the country’s military outlay is merely eight to 10%. It is incomprehensible to imagine what goals are served by such outlandish planning that will, for decades, remain in the realm of fantasy.

Defence analysts argue that it is not for the government to meet the services’ requirement as security is critical and of paramount importance. That is true; but only partially, as the government is also responsible for other equally vital sectors like health, education, internal security, and infrastructure. This, in turn, will continue to compel all governments to walk a tightrope between the needs of all these other sectors and defence in the foreseeable future.

In conclusion, this can only mean that while there may be an above average hike in the defence budget for the financial year 2020-21, it is bound to fall short of the services’ desired requirement.

For this to be reversed or somewhat mitigated, financial realities need to be acknowledged and furthermore implemented practically in defence planning. The title of the 1968 Jerry Lewis Hollywood hit could provide a clue to its resolution: Don’t Raise the Bridge, Lower the River.

Amit Cowshish is a former financial advisor (acquisitions), Ministry of Defence.

IAF Confirms Budgam Chopper Crash Was Caused by ‘Friendly Fire’

Air Chief Marshal Rakesh Kumar Singh Bhadauria described the crash as a “big mistake”.

New Delhi: The Indian Air Force (IAF) has admitted that the Mi-17 helicopter that crashed on February 27 was brought down by friendly fire. The chopper was brought down a day after India conducted airstrikes in Balakot, when Pakistani jets invaded Indian airspace and were engaged in a dogfight. Six IAF officers and a civilian were killed in the crash.

Defence analyst Ajai Shukla had reported in April that the IAF was under political pressure to delay the Court of Inquiry’s (CoI) final report from being submitted. The Balakot airstrike was politicised by the BJP and Prime Minister Narendra Modi during the run-up to the general elections as a strong response to the Pulwama terror attack.

Though the Air Force denied that there was any pressure, just days after the final phase of polling ended in May, it moved to press charges against officers found guilty of lapses that led to the downing of the chopper.

On Friday, Air Chief Marshal Rakesh Kumar Singh Bhadauria described the crash as a “big mistake”. He said that the CoI has submitted its report and the IAF is taking punitive action against two officers found guilty of lapses.

Air Chief Marshal Rakesh Kumar Singh Bhadauria. Photo: PTI

The probe concluded that a surface-to-air missile of the Air Force brought down the Mi-17 aircraft in Kashmir’s Budgam on the morning of February 27 when the Indian and Pakistani air forces were engaged in a fierce dogfight. The chopper may have been shot down under the impression that it was an unmanned Pakistani aerial vehicle.

The Air Chief Marshal reiterated that Pakistan lost an F-16 during the dogfight, a claim that the country has denied. He also said India lost a MiG-21 in aerial engagement with the Pakistan Air Force, which led to the capture and subsequent release of Wing Commander Abhinandan.

One of the officers who is believed to have been found guilty in the friendly fire incident is the senior-most officer of the Srinagar air force base – the Air Officer Commanding (AOC) – when the incident occurred. The officer was subsequently removed from the position.

The other officer who was under scrutiny was the Terminal Weapons Director (TWD), as the person who cleared the missile’s launch. An Economic Times report said the CoI was trying to verify if the TWD was present at the control room when the command to fire the missile was issued, or if he relayed it over a hand-held transmitter.

Previous reports suggested that there had been several lapses contributing to the catastrophe. According to the Hindustan Times, air traffic control asked the chopper to return to base while Indian and Pakistani jets were engaged. “Ideally, the helicopter should have been sent away to a safer zone instead of being called back to the base,” a senior defence ministry official said.

Reports also said that the helicopter was not marked a “red target” by the IAF’s Integrated Air Command and Control System (IACCS) – which monitors incoming aircraft from Pakistan – at Barnala, Punjab.

Another lapse that contributed to the missile being fired was that the helicopter Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) system was switched off. The IFF beams a coded signal that helps IAF radars identify the aircraft.

‘Operational preparedness very high’

Despite the admission that the chopper was brought down by friendly fire, Air Chief Marshal Bhadauria said the “operational preparedness of the IAF has been of a very high order”. He said the IAF had achieved a number of operational milestones last year, including the Balakot strikes. He was addressing the Air Force’s annual press conference.

He said the IAF is prepared to meet any contingency and does not rest on past laurels. Ahead of the press conference, the IAF also showed representational video clips of the Balakot strikes.

#WATCH Indian Air Force showcases the story of the Balakot aerial strikes in a promotional video at the annual Air Force Day press conference by Air Force Chief Air Chief Marshal Rakesh Kumar Singh Bhadauria. pic.twitter.com/GBRWwWe6sJ

— ANI (@ANI) October 4, 2019

Bhadauria also said acquisition of Rafale aircraft and S400 air defence systems will greatly enhance IAF’s operational capabilities.

The IAF chief said the issue of Pakistan using small drones is “a new threat and some procurements are already in process to tackle the issue”.

(With PTI inputs)

Indian Army’s Land Warfare Doctrine 2018: Questions and Concerns

Writing a doctrine can be a helpful exercise, but we have to see if it leads to a change in policies.

“I am tempted to declare that whatever doctrine the Armed Forces are working on, they have got it wrong. I am also tempted to declare that it does not matter that they have got it wrong. What does matter is their capacity to get it right quickly when the moment arrives. It is the task of military science in an age of peace to prevent the doctrine being too badly wrong.”

– Sir Michael Howard

The Indian Army’s doctrine was first published in the form of a book, Fundamentals, Concepts, Doctrine – Indian Army (1998), by Lt Gen Vijay Oberoi. It is difficult to find this book.

The second time Indian Army’s doctrine was published was 2004, under the aegis of the then Chief of the Army Staff (COAS) General N.C. Vij.

A third attempt was made when General V.K. Singh was the COAS. It was published in electronic format on the websites of the Indian Army and HQ Integrated Defence Staff (IDS). Today this doctrine is not available on any of the official websites, a signal about the state of institutional memory of the Indian Army. The Army Training Command must take the lead.

Cold Start Doctrine

General Deepak Kapoor, in his tenure as COAS, developed the concept of Cold Start Doctrine. While much has been said about this concept, some important observations are :

Pakistan has used Cold Start to the hilt to justify its development of tactical nuclear weapons. Whatever the Indian Army wanted to do, it could have done without announcing to the world. Pakistan presumably would have taken action immediately to counter Indian Army’s Cold Start Doctrine.
Was this doctrine was discussed in the National Security Council (NSC) before it was announced? The NSC was formed for discussing this type of issue – but it was never done.

To add to the confusion, General V.K. Singh, while COAS, downplayed the Cold Start doctrine, saying:

There is nothing called ‘Cold Start’. As part of our overall strategy we have a number of contingencies and options, depending on what the aggressor does. In the recent years, we have been improving our systems with respect to mobilisation, but our basic military posture is defensive.

Former defence minister Jaswant Singh also denied the existence of the doctrine: “There is no Cold Start doctrine. No such thing. It was an off-the-cuff remark from a former Chief of Army Staff. I have been defence minister of the country. I should know”.

Yet on January 6, 2017, Army Chief General Bipin Rawat admitted the existence of this doctrine. In an extensive interview with India Today Executive Editor Sandeep Unnithan, General Rawat was asked whether the Cold Start doctrine was an option in response to attacks like 26/11 in Mumbai, or attack on Parliament in 2001.

Also read: New Land Warfare Doctrine Is Not a Credible Deterrent to China or Pakistan

Rawat replied: “The Cold Start doctrine exists for conventional military operations. Whether we have to conduct conventional operations for such strikes is a decision well thought through, involving the government and the Cabinet Committee on Security.”

Are we still following Cold Start Doctrine? More clarity is required.

Sub-conventional warfare

In December 2006, the Army published am excellently crafted, 45-page document on the Doctrine of Sub Conventional Warfare. In today’s cacophony of ‘Hybrid Warfare’, one wonders what has happened to it. Has it been superseded? Yet again, more clarity is required.

Land Warfare Doctrine 2018

Most recently, the Indian Army published its Land Warfare Doctrine – a well-written, compact, 13-page document.

Under the broad heading of Geo-Strategic Environment, Environmental Realities has been covered in two bullet points. Future Security Challenges has four bullets. Jargons like Grey Zone, Hybrid and Multi Domain warfare have been used. We should be very careful about using these terminologies when writing formal official doctrine. US Army’s 366 page operational doctrine Field Manual 3-0 released in December 2017 does not have these terminologies.

Counter-Insurgency/ Counter-Terror: These find a paragraph under the heading “Current Dynamics/ No War No Peace”. A large part of our Northern Army has been actively involved in CI/CT Ops since 1991. Surely it merits more than a paragraph in generic terms. This is the place where the Indian Army must put forward its strategy, concept or doctrine in clear terms and send a message that we mean business.

Spectrum of conflict and force application: It is not clear whether Integrated Battle Groups (IBG) will be applicable in Northern and Eastern Army.

Capability development: It has been stated that a pragmatic mix of both, capability and threat-based approaches, will enable a greater span of responses to plausible scenarios for force developers to work on. We need more clarity on threat-based versus capability-based approach. As per the US Joint Warfighting Center Pamphlet 1:

“Our military has been moving in recent years from the Cold War threat-based approach to force structure to a concept of capabilities-based transformation. This reflects the fact that we cannot predict with confidence what nation, combination of nations, or non-state actors will pose threats to United States’ interests or those of our friends and allies a decade from now. We can, however, anticipate the capabilities an adversary could employ to coerce its neighbors or to deter the United States from assisting its friends and allies.”

We do not have any such dilemma. We have two potent threats in our Western and Northern neighbours with whom we have fought wars. At least for now, we need not be concerned about the capabilities of insurgents or terrorists to change our capability-development plan.

Techno-centric environment: There is no harm in having a wish-list, but technology costs money. With the present state of budget allocations to the Indian Army, it is hard to even dream of these technologies.

To date, all these documents have been published as Indian Army Doctrine. This time it is called the Land Warfare Doctrine. Are the two interchangeable, or is there a subtle difference?

Also read: India’s Armed Forces Must Stop Depending on US Jargon

Conclusion

The writing of doctrines in the Indian Army is a recent phenomenon. The 4 Corps of Eastern Army performed brilliantly in the 1971 Bangladesh War, using the concept of ‘manoeuver-warfare’ from World War II. The crossing of the Meghna river using Bell helicopters and country boats is written in gold in the annals of Indian military history. There was no official written doctrine then.

Former US Secretary of Defence Robert Gates puts the value of written strategy or doctrine in correct perspective in his memoirs:

“Personally, I don’t recall ever reading the president’s National Security Strategy… Nor did I read any of the previous National Defense Strategy documents when I became secretary. I never felt disadvantaged by not having read these scriptures.”

Writing of a doctrine can be a helpful exercise, but we have to see if it leads to change in policies on procurement, tactics, training, leadership, human resources or organisation. It will be prudent to check if any of these underwent changes based on earlier doctrines. If not, this remains an exercise of writing good “English”.

The Army’s Land Warfare Doctrine 2018 is a good attempt. However, it is too crisp, missing some important issues like operational art, manoeuver-warfare etc. When a doctrine is published after a gap of about eight years, one looks for changes that have taken place since the last one. Those should be clearly brought out.

The latest doctrine must supersede the earlier publication. Somehow, none of our doctrines have been superseded officially.

Maj Gen P.K. Mullick, VSM, retired from service as senior directing staff at the National Defence College in New Delhi.

New Land Warfare Doctrine Is Not a Credible Deterrent to China or Pakistan

By harping on non-conventional operations like COINOPS as its primary task, the Army is shrinking its role in conventional war.

The Land Warfare Doctrine, released by the Indian army on December 19 is a disappointing document. Its drafters have read the wrong warfare literature – lifting ideas from American writings, instead of drawing on China’s 2015 military reforms.

Had the Indian army studied China – which is India’s bigger military challenger – closely, it would have identified its threats correctly. And felt embarrassed declaring that “the Indian army shall be the primary instrument of the overall deterrence capability of the nation.”

The real threat from China

The military threat from China comes from its strategic and operational joint-ness.

At the strategic level, joint-ness strengthens political will since the Commander-in-Chief, Xi Jinping, understands the war escalation ladder – or the spectrum between credible deterrence and military coercion.

Without robust political will, the chances of a nation succumbing to military coercion increase exponentially. A case in point is April 2018’s Wuhan informal summit, where Prime Minister Narendra Modi sought peace with President Xi Jinping following the 2017 Doklam crisis.

Once the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) military build-up in the winter of 2017-2018 became apparent, Modi lost his nerve and hurriedly sought peace with China. His spin-doctors softened the force of national humiliation by calling it the ‘reset strategy’. The reality was that India, for the first time since Independence, had capitulated to military coercion. China won without firing a shot.

Also read: How India Walked a Tightrope to Ink the S-400 Missiles Deal With Russia

The PLA’s threat comes from the joint-ness of its forces, combined with the capabilities – kinetic and non-kinetic – that can be brought to bear on India. The PLA’s impressive non-kinetic capability is amalgamated under the new Strategic Support Force (SSF). The SSF, comprising space, cyber, electronic, psychological and other technical capabilities, has two tasks: to support joint operations, and to independently paralyse and sabotage enemy’s command, control, communication, computer and intelligence systems.

The PLA’s kinetic capabilities include its army, air force and navy domains, reinforced by precision long-range cruise and hypersonic missiles, unmanned combat aerial vehicles and directed energy.

People’s Liberation Army (PLA) armoured vehicles equipped with anti-aircraft artillery roll into Tiananmen Square during the military parade to mark the 70th anniversary of the end of WW2. REUTERS/Damir Sagolj

These humongous capabilities will be complemented with the second wave of technologies, including Artificial Intelligence (AI), partially autonomous unmanned systems, robotics and human-machine interface, under China’s New Generation AI Development Plan.

The AI will help the PLA increase the speed of conventional operations and overwhelm the enemy war-fighting loop – called the Observe-Orient-Decide-Act (OODA) – to ensure the enemy remains defensive and unbalanced in war.

These expansive military reforms were initiated once the PLA decided to move its pivot from land-based territorial defence to extended power projection. It did so because it does not consider the Indian military of much consequence. Not because it is dismissive of its kinetic war capabilities, but because it knows India’s defence services are its own worst enemy, unwilling to abandon archaic doctrinal thinking. With little real joint-ness, India is unsuited for modern warfare.

The real threat from Pakistan

The military threat from Pakistan comes from its increasing interoperability with the PLA, combined with the high geo-strategic stakes that China has in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. These stakes would spur the PLA to support Pakistan with its non-kinetic SSF capability in a war against India.

Once the military threats from the Line of Actual Control with China and the Line of Control with Pakistan are assessed properly, it becomes clear the Indian military needs joint-ness at both strategic and war-fighting levels, which it doesn’t have.

This – and not what the new doctrine boasts of – would bring credible deterrence for India.

The problems with the doctrine

There are major problems with the new Land Warfare Doctrine. The first is that the army has not one, but three doctrines; two of its own — COINOPS (counter insurgency operations) and land warfare (conventional war) — and one Joint Doctrine of the Indian Armed Forces, released in 2017.

The army insists on operating across the entire spectrum from non-conventional to conventional operations, which is neither feasible nor possible. Non-conventional and conventional operations are as different as chalk and cheese.

Also read: India’s Armed Forces Must Stop Depending on US Jargon

COINOPS (against Pakistan) has been upgraded to ‘hybrid warfare’ by the army chief, General Bipin Rawat. A term from the US, hybrid warfare encompasses conventional, unconventional, political, economic, cyber and so on – with emphasis on unconventional and psychological or propaganda warfare. General Rawat was made the chief for his stated expertise in COINOPS, so this is what he and most of his senior commanders have focussed on.

The criticism in the media of General Rawat opining on every subject under the sun, including politics, is not totally unjustified. Since his declarations come under the rubric of psychological warfare, he perhaps has the sanction of the government. If the Modi government can deep-select the Army chief for his expertise in COINOPS, why can’t it give him a free hand to address all subjects relating to national security?

General Bipin Rawat. Credit: PTI

When the land warfare doctrine says, “a concerted effort is being made by our adversary to shrink the space for conventional war,” it is oblivious of the fact that the Indian army shrunk this space itself.

Pakistan’s army has just one of its three war verticals – proxy war being run by the ISI, conventional war under chief of general staff, and nuclear warfare under strategic plans division – working on the proxy war against India. But most of the Indian army’s top brass is obsessed with COINOPS.

This obsession is working to Pakistan’s war-fighting advantage: the Indian army does not have credible counter-offensive capabilities; three decades of COINOPS has blunted the army’s operational edge, making it unfit for conventional war. This is why Pakistan continues undeterred with its proxy war, killing Indian security forces unabashedly. And the Indian Army, with twice the strength, can do no more than spill its own blood.

On conventional warfare, the doctrine says, “all combat operations will be as Integrated Battle Groups (IBGs), under command of combined arms operational headquarters.” This requires explaining. IBGs will be combined arms entities centred on an armour, infantry or mountain brigade (depending on the terrain), with support elements like artillery, signals, engineers and so on.

Also read: The Time for India to Have Joint Theatre Commands Has Not Come

The thinking is that IBGs will supplement the combat power of the pivot corps along the border. Within 72 hours of war being launched, the IBGs in tandem with pivot corps would ingress three to five kilometres into Pakistani territory. Meanwhile, the three strike corps, which would break down into smaller combat commands for faster mobility, would build up on the success of the IBGs and pivot corps.

In this proactive strategy, the combined effort of the IBGs, pivot corps and combat command would aim to ingress about 10-15 km inside Pakistan as fast as possible.

According to the doctrine, the Army “response along the Western Front will be sharp and swift with the aim of destroying the centre of gravity of the adversary and secure spatial gains.”

Sounds good. But there are two problems with this wishful thinking.

Indian Navy ships on patrol. Credit: Twitter/@indiannavy

First, this strategy requires regular and intense training, as it involves attachments and detachments of formations before and during war. There is nothing to suggest that the army leadership is doing this.

Moreover, the army would be required to fight with whatever capabilities it has. Given the known shortages of equipment, spares and ammunition, coupled with the fact that most war-withal would be imported, this poses severe limitations on the army’s capabilities and aspirations.

Two, the strategy requires an assured air cover to succeed. Nothing less than limited air superiority by the Indian Air Force (IAF) will be essential for the army to ingress successfully. Pakistan has moved nearly 25 per cent of its reserve troops and air defence missiles forward since the 2001-2002 Operation Parakram. This means the IAF has to become the lead land-war service in order to create a favourable air situation.

This, however, is unacceptable to the army. General Rawat has publicly stated that the army would be the lead in war. The army, regurgitating lessons of previous wars, believes the IAF’s primary role should be to support land battles. Since the IAF doesn’t accept this archaic thinking (and rightly so), the army has decided to have its own air defence cover – thus the sought induction of US Apache armed helicopters.

The case for a mixed threat and capability-based plan

Such unreconcilable differences between the IAF and the army on who will be the lead have resulted in the lack of a joint doctrine for continental defence. The 2017 Joint Doctrine of the Indian Armed Forces was drafted by the Integrated Defence Headquarters, which is an administrative rather than an operational headquarters.

The ultimate irony: the Indian military has a joint doctrine for contingency situations (which it might rarely use), but none for land warfare. Without the latter, its hope of fighting a short, swift and intense war, which the army keeps talking about, will remain a pipe-dream.

Given the army’s woolliness about threats, it’s no wonder that its capability development plan is equally fuzzy. According to the doctrine, “development of capacities will be a pragmatic mix of both capability and threat-based approach to enable a greater span of responses to plausible scenarios for force developers to work on.”

Also read: In Defence Budget 2018, Political Goals Masquerade as Military Objectives

Since the Indian military, unlike major powers, is not a global force, its plan should either be threat or capability-based. With a limited annual defence budget of $49 billion, an uninspiring research base, coupled with well-defined threats, force development should be threat- and not capability-based, which is an open-ended concept. Since the army is unwilling to relinquish or reduce COINOPS and other peacetime activities, it wants to have it both ways.

To modify the Lincoln quote, an army divided against itself cannot stand. So it is with the Indian army. By insisting on COINOPS as its primary task, its role in conventional war – forget overall deterrence – is shrinking fast. The greater worry is that its primary role may be reduced to mere border management.

Here, too, the question is: why should the nation spend huge amounts on the army when its tasks can be performed by the Central Armed Police Forces, which are, incidentally, already being trained by it.

Pravin Sawhney is editor, FORCE newsmagazine.

In Defence Budget 2018, Political Goals Masquerade as Military Objectives

Slow modernisation of the armed forces is being justified by the Make-in-India project. However, even on the indigenisation front, we aren’t seeing much progress.

Slow modernisation of the armed forces is being justified in the name of the ‘Make in India’ project. However, even on the indigenisation front, we aren’t seeing much progress.

Defence minister Nirmala Sitharaman. Credit: PTI

The defence allocations for 2018-19 of Rs 2,95,511.41 crore – the lowest since 1962 – should get a thumbs up. Contrary to popular wisdom, modernisation will not be affected. Moreover, the allocations are helping the government’s political objectives, a first in independent India.

Modernisation of the armed forces and war-preparedness are not similar. The latter comprises achievable military objectives, military reforms to meet the defined objectives, modernisation to acquire essential capabilities and capacities and abandoning of domain-specific challenges for integrated joint-training by the defence services.

The end-result of war-preparedness is deterrence — whereby the enemy desists from machinations lest matters escalate. India’s credible deterrence would compel Pakistan to stop the proxy war, much as China would restrict, if not completely end, its border transgressions.

Since India’s stated military objective is to fight the unachievable and suicidal two-front war with Pakistan and China, three things become evident.

One, the political leadership has decided that, whatever the provocation, it will not initiate war with the two adversaries who are in cahoots with one another. It would, instead, utilise military force for grandstanding and an occasional flexing of muscles for domestic consumption. Pakistan and China, which are accomplishing their political objectives by the proxy war and regular border transgressions respectively, have little reasons to up the ante.

Two, since India does not intend to start a war, the need for sound military reforms becomes unnecessary. What we might get are piecemeal reforms which while not optimising war-preparedness, would satisfy analysts as work-in-progress. And three, the military leadership, which gets laurels, promotions and status from counter-terrorism operations (CT ops), have devised the unattainable military objectives to garner maximum capabilities and capacities by modernisation. The latter would result in progressive empire building – creation of more organisations which would improve officers’ career prospects.

Also read: Defence Budget 2018: The Proof of the Pudding Is in the Eating

Since the purpose of modernisation is not war-preparedness, it is not time-sensitive. Defence minister Nirmala Sitharaman couldn’t have been more explicit about it, “Defence modernisation is an ongoing process which we will prioritise between competing demands (of defence services)”.

The real challenge for modernisation is not finances, but the excruciatingly long and archaic procurement procedures which have to negotiate the bureaucratic maze of defence and finance ministries, the disruptive Defence Research and Development Organisation, and the ambiguous strategic partner benchmark under the Make in India policy before final approval by the cabinet committee on security. As a thumb rule, any major procurement takes a minimum of seven to ten years from floating of the tender to contract signing.

Little wonder that in the last two decades (including FY 2017-18) the defence ministry has been able to use the allocated capital allocations only thrice. So, unless the procurement procedures are made simple, transparent, assured and foreign manufacture-friendly, there is little need to increase capital outlays. After all, the ministry of defence can seek supplementary demands for defence if an acquisition has urgent operational requirement or it helps improve strategic ties with friendly nations. Thus, all discussion on increasing the present defence allocation from 1.58% of GDP to 3% is mere shadow-boxing.

India’s “Akash” missiles, mounted on a truck, are displayed during the Republic Day parade in New Delhi January 26, 2007. Credit: Reuters/B. Mathur/Files

This aside, the Budget meets the government’s political objective, which is to be seen as supportive of the armed forces in terms of their stature and privileges, hence there is an unprecedented 26% increase in defence pensions over the FY’ 2017-18, and more allocations for revenue (pay and allowances) rather than capital (for new acquisitions) spending. Monies apart, the government has elevated the stature of soldiers to national icons through a carefully-crafted social campaign in which even celebrities have been roped in.

This serves two purposes. One, it has quietened the serving officers and veterans from raising concerns about relentless loss of life – due to the absence of a political process – in conflict-ridden theatres like Jammu and Kashmir; and two, it allows the government to use the military for political rhetoric.

In his exceptional book The Utility of Force based on his extensive counter insurgency operations experience, British General Rupert Smith wrote, “It must always be remembered that the political objective and the military strategic objectives are not the same, and are never the same; the military strategic objective is achieved by military force whilst the political objective is achieved as a result of military success.” Unfortunately, this wisdom is lost on the Indian military and ignored by the government. Hence, most senior military officers in India seem to conflate military strategic objective with political objectives.

Also read: A Budget that Seeks to Boost Votes, Not Growth

Wise words from another general, George Patton of the US Army, wouldn’t be out of place here. He said, “The object of war is not to die for your country but to make the other bastard die for his.”

That said, the official spin-doctors are justifying slow modernisation by arguing that the government is committed to indigenising the defence industry and generate employment under Make in India project.

The announcement by the finance minister on the creation of two defence industrial production corridors, and the intent to bring out an industry-friendly defence production policy is being offered as evidence of that intent. Nothing wrong with this noble intent except that unless the government genuinely invests in research and development and provides a level playing field to the private sector, India would remain dependent on foreign companies for its state-of-the-art defence needs. The Budget gives no indication of this happening.

Pravin Sawhney is Editor, FORCE news magazine.

Adani to Partner Saab for India’s $10-Billion Single Fighter Jet Competition

Analysts say that the partnership with Adani, which has taken quiet if baby steps towards the defence sector over the last two years, may give the Swedish firm a decisive edge.

The new Gripen E aircraft from Saab. Credit: Reuters

New Delhi: Sweden’s Saab plans to announce a partnership with the Adani Group and throw its hat into India’s search for single-engine fighter jets, a competition that has seen interest from a Tata-Lockheed combine.

As The Wire has reported, the inefficient Rafale jet deal has left the Indian Air Force (IAF) with gaping holes in its ageing Soviet MiG-21 fighter fleet – defence ministry officials say that the airforce will require 200 single-engine fighter jets. In October 2016, the IAF put out a call for what will be roughly be 10-11 squadrons of medium multi-role combat aircraft.

It has long been rumoured that Saab – which is offering its Gripen E multirole combat aircraft – was planning to tie up with the Adani Group as its local Indian partner, the way Rafale has done with Reliance or Lockheed with the Tatas. According to three people with direct knowledge of the matter, the Saab-Adani partnership was officially confirmed a few weeks ago.

Independent defence consultant Ratan Shrivastava also told Reuters that the partnership will be publicly announced on Friday, when the Swedish defence firm has scheduled a press conference.

Corporate alliances aimed at bagging the lucrative defence contract have largely been targeted under Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s ‘Make-in-India’ initiative and also the defence ministry’s “strategic partnership policy”.

When the Tata-Lockheed partnership was announced, sources told The Wire that if the F-16 jet was chosen, Lockheed would push for a joint-venture model where the Indian partner would be a “majority owner”. The Tata Group firm that Lockheed is likely to work with is Tata Advanced Systems, which has in the past worked with the US manufacturer for a transport aircraft programme.

Adani history

The Adani Group, however, is different. It doesn’t have a long history in the defence sector like the Tatas. Nor has it forged its way into the defence with a big acquisition, the way Anil Ambani’s Reliance Defence did with Pipavav Defence for Rs 2,100 crore in 2015.

Over the last two years, the Gujarat-based conglomerate, whose boss Gautam Adani is considered close to Modi, has quietly made a few moves in the field of defence and aerospace production. In March 2015, the group set up a new entity called Adani Aero Defence Systems and Technologies, which applied for a licence to manufacture helicopters.

A year later, in March 2016, following Modi’s trip to Israel, the defence subsidiary also formed a partnership with middle-east nation’s Elbit-ISTAR in the field of unmanned aircraft systems. At the time, the company stated that Adani Aero Defence Systems had interests in “design, technology development, technical collaboration, system integration services for aerospace and defence equipment and systems”

The Wire, in February 2017, analysed the differences between Lockheed’s F-16 and Saab’s Gripen aircraft. At the time, Indian government officials had told The Wire that while the Gripen E aircraft scores over the F-16 on most metrics, on a per-unit basis, it is around 25% more expensive.

Over the last six months, Saab has met with multiple senior defence ministry officials and promised the moon and more. In addition to a heap of sops aimed at helping the Tejas programme, the Swedish firm has stated that ti will set up a new product facility and dedicated Gripen design centre.

According to industry sources, Saab’s decision to partner with Adani may give it a decisive edge, although a few industry officials expressed concern.

“What expertise does Adani have when it comes to aerospace manufacturing? Has the strategic partnership policy been reduced to finding Indian partners that can help merely lubricate the deal and provide connections,” a senior industry official, who declined to be identified as he is not authorised to speak to the media, told The Wire.

There Is a ‘Critical Hollowness’ in India’s Defence Preparedness

Nearly half of India’s weapons, including tanks and artillery guns, have stocks for less than ten days of combat.

Kargil War (left), LoC. Credit: PTI, Reuters

With attempts at infiltration being made virtually every night and frequent exchanges of small arms and artillery fire, the line of control (LoC) with Pakistan is more active than it has been in the last five years. The number of terrorist attacks in Kashmir has also risen sharply this summer. The stand-off with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) at Doklam has stretched to two months. The rhetoric being spewed out by the Chinese government-controlled media is getting shriller by the day. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) now under construction will lead to further increase in their military collusion.

The net effect of India’s deteriorating security environment will be that the country will be confronted with a two-front situation during future conflict. With the dogs of war barking in the distance, in July, the comptroller and auditor general (CAG) of India released a disquieting report about continuing ammunition shortages. There are large-scale deficiencies in other important military items of equipment as well. Addressing the inadequacies in the state of India’s defence preparedness, termed as ‘critical hollowness’ by former army chief General V.K. Singh, merits the government’s urgent attention.

Deficiencies in ammunition have an adverse impact on the ability to sustain military operations over the period of time that is necessary. According to the CAG, in March 2013, 50% of the different categories of weapons (including tanks and artillery guns) had stocks for less than ten days of fighting. Since then, there has been some improvement, but for 40% of its weapons, the army still holds stocks for less than ten days of conflict.

The Kargil conflict in 1999 lasted 50 days and we must acknowledge that any future border conflict may also be prolonged. During the Kargil conflict, 50,000 rounds of 155 mm artillery ammunition had to be imported from South Africa. The occurrence of such a critical situation during a time of crisis must be avoided through a prudent replenishment and stocking policy.

The army’s sister services are no better off. While the Indian navy is far from acquiring the capabilities of a blue water navy, the People’s Liberation Army navy is getting ready to sail into the Indian Ocean, and is acquiring bases and port facilities in fast-forward mode. Over the last five years, the Indian navy has had major accidents on board submarines INS Sindhurakshak and INS Sindhuratna. In another accident, submarine batteries that should have been replaced much earlier were still being used due to inordinately long acquisition procedures. Meanwhile, the indigenous production of six Scorpene submarines has been delayed by almost five years.

From its peak at 39 squadrons over a decade ago, the fighting strength of the Indian air force has gone down to 32-33 squadrons, whereas actually 42-45 squadrons will be required to meet future threats and challenges. Obsolescent fighter aircraft like MiG-21s and MiG-27s and vintage helicopters are still in service. The holding of surface-to-air missile systems for air defence operations is grossly inadequate as indigenous research and development projects have been plagued by time and cost overruns. The fortification of forward air bases against terrorist attacks has not yet been completed, despite the attack on the Pathankot air base in January 2016.

The continuation in service of obsolete and obsolescent weapons and equipment also affects the country’s defence preparedness as fighter and bomber aircraft are extremely difficult to maintain towards the end of the life cycle. Modernisation of the armed forces has been stagnating due to the inadequacy of funds, the black-listing of several defence manufacturers and bureaucratic red tape that stymies the acquisition process. However, several pragmatic amendments were approved by Manohar Parrikar, then defence minister, in the new Defence Procurement Procedure to streamline procurement procedures and encourage participation of the private sector in defence manufacture.

Defence procurement projects worth over Rs 1,50,000 crore have been accorded ‘acceptance of necessity’, or approval in principle, by the NDA government, but it will take up to five years before deliveries of the weapons systems begin. And, like in the UPA regime, significantly large amounts of funds continue to be surrendered unspent from the capital budget.

In the army, artillery modernisation has been stagnating. There is an urgent need to acquire approximately 3,000 pieces of 155 mm/52-calibre guns to replace obsolescent towed and self-propelled guns and howitzers. So far a contract has been signed only for 145 pieces of M777 155 mm/45-calibre howitzers from the US. Another contract for 114 pieces of 155 mm/45-calibre Dhanush howitzers based on the Bofors design is expected to be signed with the Ordnance Factories Board shortly if the gun clears all trials. Air defence and army aviation units are also equipped with obsolete equipment that has substantially reduced their combat effectiveness and created vulnerabilities.

Modern wars are fought mostly during the hours of darkness, but a large number of the army’s armoured fighting vehicles – tanks and infantry combat vehicles – are still ‘night blind’. Only about 650 T-90S tanks of Russian origin have genuine night fighting capability. The infantry battalions need over 30,000 third generation night vision devices, new assault rifles – a soldier’s basic weapon, carbines for close quarter battle, general purpose machine guns, light-weight anti-materiel rifles, mine protected vehicles, 390,000 ballistic helmets, and 180,000 lightweight bullet proof jackets.

The navy is in the process of commissioning an air defence ship at Kochi to replace the aircraft carrier INS Vikrant and is building six Scorpene submarines at Mazagon Docks. It is also building 22 destroyers, frigates, corvettes, fast attack craft, landing ships and support ships. However, India’s maritime security challenges are growing and the navy not only needs to modernise but also expand its footprint in the Indo-Pacific region along with the navies of India’s strategic partners.

The modernisation plans of the air force are making progress, but at a snail’s pace. The Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft project to acquire 126 fighter aircraft to replace obsolete MiG-21s is stuck in a groove, with the exception of the purchase of 36 Rafale fighters from France. Lockheed Martin (F-16) and Boeing (F-18) have jumped into the fray again with offers to produce their fighter aircraft locally with transfer of technology.

The IAF also requires several additional AWACS early warning aircraft, six mid-air refueller tankers, 56 transporter planes, 20 advance jet trainers, 38 basic trainers, 48 medium-lift helicopters, reconnaissance and surveillance helicopters, surface-to-air missile systems and electronic warfare suites. All three Services need to upgrade their C4I2SR capabilities to prepare for effects-based operations in a network-centric environment and to match ever increasing Chinese military capabilities.

The planned acquisitions are capital intensive and the present defence budget cannot support many of them. The defence budget has dipped to 1.56% of the country’s projected GDP for 2017-18 – the lowest level since the disastrous 1962 war with China. It must be progressively raised to 3.0% of the GDP if India is to build the defence capabilities that it needs to meet future threats and challenges and discharge its growing responsibilities as a regional power in Southern Asia.

The government has recently sanctioned some funds and delegated financial powers to the three services to acquire the wherewithal necessary for combat readiness. However, unless the remaining deficiencies in weapons, ammunition and equipment are also made up quickly, the management of the defence budget improves by an order of magnitude and the defence procurement process is streamlined further, thoughts of critical hollowness in defence preparedness will continue to haunt India’s defence planners.

Gurmeet Kanwal is Distinguished Fellow, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), New Delhi.