In a move that echoed its 2004 ‘India Shining’ campaign, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)’s decision to use the slogan of ‘Viksit Bharat’ (developed India) as the centrepiece of its 2024 campaign was a measure of its high confidence. The slogan explicitly conveys a message of ‘mission on track’ about the project of economic development – which will supposedly be complete by 2047.
But this claim that economic development is ‘on track’ has always been in serious doubt. Numerous writers have pointed out the lack of improvement in the few macro-level economic indicators we have data for anymore, even as inequality has shot up. They argued that while the BJP might be able to declare ‘mission accomplished’ on the Ram Temple, the same could not be said for economic development. Of course, these scholars were dismissed as anti-national and out of touch by the BJP and its supporters.
Midway through this electoral process, it seems that ordinary voters are also not convinced that Bharat is becoming ‘Viksit’. A series of household-by-household in-person pre-election surveys (table 1) conducted amongst Dalits in two key constituencies – Jalaun in Uttar Pradesh and Muzzafarpur in Bihar – may help us understand, on the one hand, the limits of the BJP’s ‘economy + Hindutva’ strategy, and, on the other hand, the challenge of converting voter scepticism about the BJP’s achievements into opposition votes.
The core BJP voter is upper-caste – as much as 61% of general category caste groups voted for the BJP in 2019. These shares were 82% for Brahmins, 89% for Thakurs and 70% for Vaishyas in UP, for example. But Dalits are an important constituency for the BJP. The BJP has made serious, and to some degree successful, attempts to make inroads into Dalit communities. The BJP went from 24% of the Dalit vote in 2014 to 34% in 2019 nationally. However regional differences persist. In state assembly elections in UP for instance, per a CSDS post-poll survey, the BJP went from 5% of the Jatav vote and 11% of the non-Jatav vote in 2012 to 21% of the Jatav vote and 41% of the non-Jatav vote in 2022. The surveys discussed here were conducted to understand these trends in the Dalit vote. It must be noted that in our survey, when asked an open-ended question about who the respondent would like to see as prime minister, preference for Modi as prime minister began from a much higher starting point amongst Dalits in Bihar than in UP (table 2).
Our surveys were conducted to understand these trends in the Dalit vote. Rather than treat these surveys as predictive, we use them here as a snapshot of views amongst Dalit respondents to see if there are any insights to be gained.
To what extent have Dalits bought into the BJP’s economic claims?
Our respondents overwhelmingly described economic conditions as difficult. This was expressed through answers across a variety of questions on the survey (see Table 3). In both constituencies, less than 10% reported their income being sufficient for their spending needs. Even more concretely, less than 10% in both constituencies reported that their economic situation had improved in the last 5 years. More than 60% of respondents in UP and Bihar reported that the gap between the rich and poor (inequality) had widened in the last 5 years.
Daily wage workers, who rarely have savings to fall back on, cannot afford ‘unemployment’ as it is conventionally defined. They tend to accept lower wages and/or worsening work conditions rather than remain unemployed. 68% of survey respondents in Bihar, and 75% in UP were daily wage earners (doing ‘mazdoori’). Nevertheless, 17% and 24% of our respondents in UP and Bihar respectively reported being unemployed, with women reporting almost double the unemployment rates of men. Finally, when respondents were asked to choose the most important local problems they face, around 90% across both constituencies reported that unemployment and/or price rises (‘mehangai’) were the most important local problems they faced (table 3).
Respondents who stated that inequality is increasing were less likely to choose Modi, although the direction of causality is unclear: do people say inequality is increasing because they have decided to oppose Modi, or the other way around? And we did find that amongst those who think their economic situation has worsened in the last five years, Modi’s vote share is lower than amongst those whose economic situation has improved. This is a strong correlation in both states, although again the direction of causality is unclear. Finally, when respondents were asked to pick a reason why Modi might lose, ‘unemployment and price rise’ was amongst the top two reasons chosen (table 6).
On the other hand, there was no direct correlation between reporting being unemployed and choosing Modi – in part because women were both more likely to report being unemployed and also more likely to choose Modi; and similarly, there was not a strong correlation in either direction between picking unemployment and prices as important local problems, and preferring Modi as PM. Clearly, the Dalit vote is mediated by other factors in addition to the economy.
How resonant are Hindutva issues? (Ram Mandir, Hindu Dharm ki Raksha, opposition as pro-minority/anti-Hindu)
It is notable that a little under two-thirds of respondents in Bihar and UP think that the demand for a Hindu rashtra is not justified. Read in one way, in the Hindi heartland, around a third of even Dalits were happy to openly express their support for it; read in another way, that share is far from being a majority. Furthermore, ‘Hindu’ issues are not ranked highly as priority issues for voting. When we asked respondents to provide some reasons why Modi might win, 20% in UP and 35% percent of respondents in Bihar mentioned Hindu issues such as the Ram Temple or Article 370. In UP, about the same share listed the Hindu-Muslim hatred engendered by the BJP’s policies as a reason why Modi might lose—this share was lower in Bihar, where support for Modi amongst Dalits began from a higher level (table 6).
The role of access to ‘schemes’
The third plank of the BJP regime, and its main defence when it comes to rising inequality and high unemployment and inflation, is access to ‘schemes’. Our survey reveals that not that much has actually changed on the ground in terms of the schemes accessed. Access to rations is at 90% amongst Dalit respondents (table 4), but of course the Public Distribution Scheme (PDS), which is the only (weak) safety net that India provides its citizens, is many decades old. The ‘free’ rations provided by Modi do seem to have some narrative effect, as we discuss below. The Ujjwala gas scheme appears to have significant coverage in the Hindi heartland – at around 45% of respondents. The Ayushmann health insurance scheme in UP and the Nal Jal scheme in Bihar are the only others that break 20% in terms of access. Meanwhile, access to MNREGA is down to single digits in a time of high unemployment, a lost opportunity given the widely acknowledged success of MNREGA, particularly for women (who notably report higher rates of unemployment in our survey).
Once we drop the PDS, therefore, on average each respondent accessed just one other scheme in both states. Furthermore, there was no clear statistical correlation across our dataset between a respondent’s access to any particular scheme and preference for Modi. There was more of a correlation between accessing three or more schemes (which between 3–8% of our respondents did) and voting for Modi.
Nevertheless, in our survey, the BJP’s ‘schemes’ were indeed amongst the top three reasons people gave for why Modi might win. Notably ‘economic improvement’ was not (table 5). Thus, access to schemes does seem to have some narrative effect, even if it does not as clearly determine an individual voter’s choice. It may be that this is what respondents reach for when they try to explain why Modi will win – which is a widely expected outcome – despite so few seeing any tangible improvement in their economic situations, and so many being sceptical (at least outwardly) that Hindutva alone could get Modi to victory.
Perhaps this information should help us revise our understanding of the role of what scholars have called the Modi regime’s ‘new welfarism’. Welfare schemes do not directly and immediately create a mass of grateful labharthis, as some have claimed, but must instead be understood as part of the BJP’s effort to construct an image of Modi as a larger-than-life figure, one who, as a result, escapes blame for the poor economic situation of the country. This effort, moreover, needs to be understood not in isolation but alongside Modi’s broader messaging and use of symbols.
The role of ‘chahra’
This brings us to respondents’ reliance upon the nebulous ‘chahra’ – the top reason given in UP, and the second most important reason given in Bihar for why Modi might win (table 5). In fact, Dalit women in UP, who did lean towards Modi in our survey, were more likely to choose ‘chahra’ (rather than schemes or economic improvement or Hindutva issues) as the reason why Modi would win (table 7). Discussions with respondents pointed to the influence of Modi’s media coverage, and the strength of the narrative building around Modi in particular (as opposed to the BJP more generally). The low shares of respondents in UP and Bihar who attribute any aspect of the opposition’s plans or actions as an explanation for a possible Modi loss or a Modi win indicates the well-documented weakness of any equivalent ‘chahra’ building amongst the opposition. This weakness was reinforced by the BJP’s increasingly aggressive attacks against the financial resources of opposition parties (beginning with demonetisation in 2014), as well as against the leaders themselves.
So what does chahra symbolise? Read in one way, it is the result of media brainwashing. But read in another, it suggests a hunger for leadership and a hope for a better future that, based on this survey, the Modi regime has not delivered. This undercurrent of discontent – especially with respect to unemployment, inflation, inequality and threats to livelihoods – might or might not be expressed electorally this year. However, the fact that it has emerged organically, despite a BJP advertising blitzkrieg, and without a sufficiently organised and resourced opposition, must be reckoned with. While there are many complexities and contradictions that emerge in this survey, the one thing that does become clear is that Dalit respondents do not agree that Bharat is indeed on its way to becoming ‘Viksit’. That mission is far from accomplished.
Dr Smriti Rao is Professor of Economics at Assumption University, USA.
