CDS role

What the Four-Month Delay in Appointing a New CDS Says About the Modi Govt

‘Is there military reform in this somewhere or is it in line with Modi’s proclivity to make important announcements giving little or no notice, like that of the demonetisation in 2016 and the lockdown in 2020?’

Chandigarh: Incessant delays in appointing a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) to replace General Bipin Rawat, who died in a helicopter crash last December, belies the importance the Bharatiya Janata Party-led government seemingly places on this senior military position.

The noise surrounding General Rawat’s sudden appointment as CDS for three years, a day before he retired as the Chief of Army Staff (CoAS) in December 2019, was thunderous. The silence over his successor is mysterious, but ironically, equally deafening.

“In many WhatsApp groups, especially those of defence forces veterans, rumours and gossip of behind-the-scenes machinations along with narratives of palace intrigue are doing the rounds regarding the next likely CDS,” said military analyst, retired Colonel K. Thammayya Udupa.

Writing recently on the Rediff.com news website, he goes on to state that the agenda of defence reforms was believed to be close to Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s heart, and hence it was widely believed that a new CDS would be summarily appointed to succeed General Rawat.

But over four months later, India still does not have a CDS, the former army officer added.

Other service veterans and senior Ministry of Defence (MoD) officials echoed similar sentiments. They said this delay clearly demonstrated that the post of CDS was not ‘overly critical’ to military reforms, despite the urgency displayed by the Modi administration nearly three years ago in making that appointment.

In this December 7, 2021 file photo, Chief of Defence Staff General Bipin Rawat speaks at DRDO Bhawan in New Delhi. Photo: PTI/Arun Sharma

“The government’s casual and secretive approach to nominating a new CDS reveals the low priority it accords to naming General Rawat’s successor,” said a retired two-star army officer. Obviously, for the government, the CDS post is not really what it was initially cracked up to be, he added, declining to be named.

Others darkly hinted at a ‘conspiracy’ involving MoD civil servants who were reportedly resentful of the eclipse in their authority that General Rawat had brought about in the ministry, through bellicosity and brio. For, other than being the single-point advisor on military matters to the Defence Minister, the CDS is also the Permanent Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee and Secretary of the newly created Department of Military Affairs or DMA. He is also responsible for prioritising material procurement for all three services, besides being the military advisor to the tri-service Nuclear Command Authority, thereby subsuming a large proportion of the authority and control hitherto exercised by senior MoD personnel, who clearly remain incensed over their depreciated authority.

However, soon after General Rawat died along with 12 others in an Indian Air Force (IAF) Mi-17V5 helicopter crash in Tamil Nadu, there was widespread speculation in the media, including The Wire, and in military circles that General Manoj Naravane, who retired as the Army Chief on April 30, was an automatic ‘shoe-in’ as India’s second CDS. The broader reasoning espoused was that military planners had tentatively determined that the first two-or even three-CDS’s needed to be from the army, the largest and most widely deployed of the country’s armed forces to usher in long-deferred reforms and to initiate ‘theatreisation’ of the three services.

Also read: Here’s Why the Appointment of India’s Second CDS Is Likely to Be Deferred for a While

And since General Naravane had worked closely with General Rawat, first as the Vice-Chief of Army Staff and later, when the latter was elevated to the country’s topmost military post, his elevation as CDS was considered within and outside the force as a fait accompli. General Naravane had also been appointed the ‘acting’ Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee in mid-December 2021, a move that also contributed significantly to the belief that it was only a matter of weeks before he became the CDS before superannuating as the CoAS on April 30.

Senior military officers further hinted that even within the army there was widespread conviction that General Naravane would be the next CDS, as he reportedly was not ‘dined out’ by the respective commands, or even by Army Headquarters that normally hosts this traditional ceremonial event at the Army Battle Honours Mess in Chanakyapuri in New Delhi. This only further fuelled chatter in the ‘fauji langar’ regarding General Naravane’s appointment as the forthcoming CDS.

Former Chief of Army Staff Gen. Manoj Mukund Naravane. Photo: PTI

Furthermore, analysts hypothesised that once the government had decided on Lieutenant General Manoj Pande, the former Eastern Army Commander and later the Army Vice-Chief as General Naravane’s successor, the latter would simply move up the ladder as the CDS. Obviously this has not transpired, though conjecture is still ripe that it could well ensue, but the possibility of it occurring had considerably dimmed.

Meanwhile, there is speculation in security circles that the government could well appoint retired Indian Navy Chief of Staff Admiral Karambir Singh as the new CDS. Defence analyst Bharat Karnad recently argued, somewhat obliquely, that as a former helicopter pilot Admiral Singh who retired in November 2021, would be acceptable as CDS to both the IAF and the Indian Army- albeit via the Army Aviation Corps that also operates rotary-wing platforms. Helicopters, Karnad rationalises, were the lynchpin endearing the former Indian Navy chief to the two other services.

Writing in Security Wise, a geo-strategic, military and foreign policy website, Karnad stated that if indeed the former “phlegmatic” Indian Navy chief became the CDS he would have to ‘root out’ from the CDS secretariat his predecessor’s antipathy to expeditiously and extensively establishing military bases on the Indian Ocean Region. Consequently, he would need to carve out a ready-use expeditionary element in the Indian armed forces to counter China’s fast-growing footprint, and effectively handling crises in this strategically critical region.

Also read: Vacant for More than a Month, the CDS’s Role in an India that is Nuclear Needs a Serious Rejig

But other defence analysts spotlight the inherent drawbacks in appointing a retired officer as CDS in a highly status conscious milieu where upward mobility is ordained by seniority and one in which pensioners are cynically considered ‘has-been’s.

“It going to be difficult, if not impossible, for the services to accept any retiree as the CDS,” said a former two-star Navy officer. It could also end up restricting the CDS’s wider operational responsibilities if it happens, confining his role to that of merely a secretary in the DMA, he added.

Meanwhile, in his incisive analysis in Rediff.com Colonel Udupa roundly criticised the Modi government for inordinate delays in announcing the names of service chiefs to replace the ones retiring, well in advance, so as to enable them to be adequately briefed and to position personnel to suit their individual vision. These latter activities could take anything up to two months, hence the logic in announcing the names early, he reasoned.

Colonel Udupa goes on to state that in eight of nine such service chief appointments executed by the BJP government after it assumed office in 2014, the average timeline in making these announcements was just 17 days, compared with 56 days by previous administrations.

He illustrated his thesis by declaring that General Rawat’s name as the CoAS was announced on December 17, 2017, merely 14 days before he was to assume office. Similarly Air Chief Marshal B.S. Dhanoa took charge of the IAF on January 1, just 13 days after his appointment was made public. Thereafter, his successor R.K.S. Bhaduria assumed office on September 30, 2019, 11 days after being shortlisted as ACM.

Former Chief of Defence Staff, late General Bipin Rawat, former Air Chief Marshal Rakesh Kumar Singh Bhadauria, Navy Chief Admiral Karambir Singh and former Chief of Army Staff General M.M. Naravane at the press conference on May 1, 2020. Photo: PTI/Manvender Vashist

Correspondingly, General Naravane’s appointment was made public on December 17, 2019, a fortnight before he became CoAS and two weeks ago General Pande was designated the Army Chief a mere 12 days before he took over on April 30. The only exception Colonel Udupa pointed out was in the instance of Admiral Karambir Singh whose appointment was announced 69 days before he assumed office on May 31, 2020.

“Announcing the name of a successor service chief as late as possible has now become a characteristic of this government,” declared Colonel Udupa. This stands on its head the earlier belief that an early announcement helps in a well-planned and smooth change over, he said.

Is there any military reform in this somewhere, he asks, or it is in line with Modi’s proclivity to make important announcements giving little or no notice, like that of demonetisation in November 2016 and total lockdown in March 2020?

Other senior officers said this penchant to take such matters so close to the finish line also ‘dented’ morale amongst higher defence personnel, as there were several hopefuls vying – and lobbying – for the top job and all vacancies in the military’s pyramidical structure were watchfully monitored by aspiring officers.

But, as a senior army officer said, if retirees now become a vital part of the military’s hierarchy, it would further precipitate a psychological hurdle upon an already complex situation at a time when the security situation in the neighbourhood and beyond was highly tenuous.

Vacant for More than a Month, the CDS’s Role in an India that is Nuclear Needs a Serious Rejig

Some roles must be explicated or distinctly enhanced. A uniform chain of command can ensure directness and simplicity.

India is temporarily back to the erstwhile system of a rotating chairman of the chiefs of staff committee (COSC) in which the senior most serving service chief tenanted the appointment. It’s now well over a month since General Bipin Rawat’s untimely demise in the saddle, but the new chief of defence staff (CDS) has not been appointed as yet.

It is true that the jointness initiative, largely for which General Rawat figured in the Padma awards list, was in pause at the time of his death. The services had been asked to turn in studies on how each wished to see jointness shape up. Appointed interim CCOSC, General M. M. Naravane, who is familiar with the fledgling steps taken by jointness so far, is taking it forward.

This sanguineness that the CDS will not be overly missed owes to the CDS appointment – though triple-hatted in also being secretary Department of Military Affairs – missing a vital ingredient, that of command authority. His command authority is restricted to ‘Tri-service agencies/organisations/commands related to cyber and space.’

Also read: With Army’s Next Vice Chief Shortlisted, Centre Moves a Step Closer To Appointing CDS

Overlooked in the delay is that the CDS, in his capacity of permanent chairman of the COSC, is ‘the military adviser to the Nuclear Command Authority (NCA).’ This is a consequential function, especially when the security situation is not ideal with military factors to the fore, especially in Ladakh over the past two years.

To enhance deterrence, the role of the permanent chairman of the COSC in the nuclear command and control chain needs to be enhanced. The permanent chairman of the COSC, in addition to a military advisory role, should also be vested with command authority over the Strategic Forces Command (SFC). As will be shown below, there is no command authority over the SFC, a gap that needs filling to keep deterrence honed.

In the current nuclear command and control arrangement, the commander-in-chief of the SFC, who ‘manages and administers’ the SFC, has dual reporting lines: with operational authority lying with the national security adviser or NSA and being only administratively under the permanent chairman of COSC.

Ambiguity galore

An academic has described the nuclear command and control arrangement as: “The command of India’s nuclear forces flows from the Prime Minister’s Office through the office of the NSA to the chairman of the COSC and the SFC commander.”

However, there is no mention of nuclear command and control in the Allocation of Business rules.

The NSA, an unelected civilian at present with cabinet rank and with a term co-extensive with the prime minister, is ‘the principal adviser on national security matters to the prime minister; and the National Security Council.’ There is no reference to any executive role for the NSA. Therefore, there is no legal basis for the NSA’s operational authority over the SFC.

The cryptic 2003 press release with an abridged nuclear doctrine is the only official clue to go on. It reads: “The executive council is chaired by the national security advisor. It provides inputs for decision making by the Nuclear Command Authority and executes the directives given to it by the political council.”

This has been translated as allowing the NSA, as chair of the executive council, operational authority over the SFC, the commander-in-chief of the SFC being a member of the executive council.

Does this also mean that the NSA has operational authority over the other members that include service chiefs and the permanent chairman of the COSC? Chairmanship of a committee does not imply subordination of the members by the chair.

The political council, being ‘the sole body which can authorise the use of nuclear weapons,’ cannot delegate its authority to the NSA. The executive council – as a collective – ‘executes the directives given to it by the political council’. In other words, a subordinate committee is empowered by and answerable to the higher committee.

Also read: Here’s Why the Appointment of India’s Second CDS Is Likely to Be Deferred for a While

In this interpretation, the commander-in-chief of the SFC, a member of the executive council, is answerable to the political council as part of the collective, the executive council. In effect, then, a three-star commander-in-chief of the SFC is without a single-point superior with command authority overseeing him and his command.

The draft Indian nuclear doctrine’s call for ‘unity of command and control of nuclear forces’ has apparently not been met. It’s possible that the full length nuclear doctrine – of which only the abridged version is in the open domain – explicates a thorough nuclear C2. Even so, the lack of transparency that gives rise to such ambiguity does not help with deterrence.

Why fix nuclear command and control?

To vest the NSA with operational authority over the SFC is an anomaly in India’s democratic system of governance based on collective ministerial responsibility. The NSA’s advisory role is understandable. But an executive mandate with operational authority over a critical military formation – the SFC – is at odds with the ministerial system.

Even in the presidential system of the United States, the NSA does not have executive responsibility, with the command authority over combatant commands, such as the Strategic Command that controls nuclear weapons, resting with the US president and is exercised through the secretary of defence.

The belief that ‘nuclear weapons are political weapons, not weapons of warfighting,’ may have led to the civilian political authority channeling its nuclear directives through a civilian NSA. The apprehension may be over militarisation of nuclear decisions. Since the NSA would be on hand for a holistic input, such a situation would not arise. The NSA has a military adviser in the National Security Council Secretariat, a military veteran, who can potentially provide a second opinion to the military’s advice.

Changes necessary

The permanent chairman of the COSC as lead military adviser to the NCA must be part of the political council as a permanent invitee. Being on hand, he or she would be able to receive the nuclear directives directly from the political council, of which the defence minister – their boss – is part. Operational authorisation of nuclear weapons can be transmitted to the SFC through a single – uniformed – chain of command.

By virtue of this empowerment of the permanent chairman of the COSC, he or she could also co-chair the executive council. This will ease implementation since execution now is a combined civil-military activity, not all nuclear warheads being in a de-mated state.

With the SFC ‘under command’ of the permanent chairman of the COSC, deterrence stands to gain. Continuing with a nuclear command and control that sufficed over the past two decades needs a debate in light of India’s changed security situation. In the interim, at a minimum, the role of the permanent chairman of the COSC in relation to the SFC must be explicated by incorporating a specific mention in the mandate of the new CDS.

Ali Ahmed is a freelance strategic analyst.