Tag: US Pakistan

US Site Publishes ‘Diplomatic Cable’ at Heart of Imran Khan’s ‘Foreign Conspiracy’ Claim

The encrypted message, published by The Intercept, allegedly quotes a senior US diplomat suggesting that Pakistan’s relations with US and Europe would improve if the former cricketer was not at the helm.

New Delhi: More than a year after Imran Khan brandished a document at a public rally, claiming it was a diplomatic cable that substantiated US effort to dethrone him from the position of Prime Minister of Pakistan, a news website based in the United States released the purported classified document on Wednesday, August 9.

The encrypted message, published by The Intercept, allegedly quotes a senior US diplomat suggesting that Pakistan’s relations with US and Europe would improve if the former cricketer was not at the helm.

In April 2022, Khan was ousted as prime minister after a parliamentary vote of no confidence by the joint opposition alliance. He is currently jailed after being sentenced for corruption allegations. After the conviction, the Election Commission disqualified him from running for office for five years.

A month earlier, senior State Department official Donald Lu attended a lunch for outgoing Pakistani ambassador Asad Majeed Khan at the latter’s residence in Washington. The alleged diplomatic cable at the centre of the political controversy was based on the discussions at the lunch sent by the Pakistani diplomat to headquarters in Islamabad.

At the start of the discussions, as per the note published by The Intercept, Lu conveyed that there was a lot of unhappiness over Pakistan’s policy on Ukraine. Russia had begun the invasion of Ukraine on February 24, just as Imran Khan was enroute Moscow on a state visit. Thereafter, Pakistan had also abstained on various UN resolutions that criticised Russia on the Ukraine war.

The note stated that Lu said that it was “quite clear that this is the Prime Minister’s policy”, indicating that the military establishment was not on the same page.

Lu added that the view was that this policy over Russia was “tied to the current political dramas in Islamabad that he (Prime Minister) needs and is trying to show a public face”. The Pakistani ambassador apparently responded that this wasn’t a correct reading of the developments.

The following key excerpt from the diplomatic cable is where Lu refers to the disenchantment over Khan. He conveyed, as per the version transcribed by the Pakistani diplomat, that if Khan lost the no-confidence vote, it will be easier for US and its western allies to quickly mend frayed diplomatic ties with Pakistan,

I asked Don if the reason for a strong U.S. reaction was Pakistan’s abstention in the voting in the UNGA. He categorically replied in the negative and said that it was due to the Prime Minister’s visit to Moscow. He said that “I think if the no-confidence vote against the Prime Minister succeeds, all will be forgiven in Washington because the Russia visit is being looked at as a decision by the Prime Minister. Otherwise, I think it will be tough going ahead.” He paused and then said “I cannot tell how this will be seen by Europe but I suspect their reaction will be similar.” He then said that “honestly I think isolation of the Prime Minister will become very strong from Europe and the United States.” Don further commented that it seemed that the Prime Minister’s visit to Moscow was planned during the Beijing Olympics and there was an attempt by the Prime Minister to meet Putin which was not successful and then this idea was hatched that he would go to Moscow.

In another part of the published cable, the Pakistani diplomat accused the US of being tougher on Pakistan while going easy on India – which had also taken a neutral position on the Ukraine war.

Don was evasive and responded that Washington looked at the U.S.-India relationship very much through the lens of what was happening in China. He added that while India had a close relationship with Moscow, “I think we will actually see a change in India’s policy once all Indian students are out of Ukraine.”

The article also said that the document was “provided to The Intercept by an anonymous source in the Pakistani military who said that they had no ties to Imran Khan or Khan’s party”.

According to Dawn, despite this disclaimer by The Intercept about the source, “many believe that the source of the leak could be the PTI itself”.

The newspaper said that timing of the alleged cable’s publication “seems quite significant, as it comes in the wake of the imprisonment of Imran Khan over charges of graft in the Toshakhana case”. It noted that as per protocol, only a limited number of senior officials had access to the confidential cable, which included the prime minister, foreign minister and army chief.

‘Massive crime’ says Shehbaz Sharif

In an interview with WE News today, Pakistan Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif was asked about The Intecept‘s story.

While the Pakistan government’s tenure ended at Wednesday midnight, he said that during two meetings of the National Security Committee on the cypher were held under his leadership. “In one of the meetings, former ambassador and foreign secretary Asad Majeed clearly stated that there was no discussion of a conspiracy in his meeting with Donald Lu,” he said.

He added that if the contents of the cypher are true and they were published in an international media outlet, “then it is a massive crime”.

Rana Sanaullah Khan, interior minister in Sharif cabinet, tweeted that there had to be an investigation to establish the authenticity of the document. “Potentially, it is a very sinister, treacherous, and seditious act,” he said.

Indicating that the article could be the basis of further action, the interior minister noted that Khan had stated that he had a “copy of the cypher, which he has not returned and has accepted (on record) that he misplaced or lost it”.

“If proven guilty, Khan should be tried under the Official Secret Act,” he tweeted.

At a media briefing on Wednesday in Washington, the US State department spokesperson Mathew Miller confirmed that the US had expressed its concern both privately and publicly about Imran Khan’s visit to Moscow.

“We express concern privately to the Government of Pakistan, as we express concern publicly, about the visit of then Prime Minister Khan to Moscow on the very day of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. We made that concern quite clear,” he said in response to a media query.

While refusing to authenticate the document, Miller added that the comments in the published note “were accurate as reported, they in no way show the United States taking a position on who the leader of Pakistan ought to be”.

“The allegations that the United States has interfered in internal decisions about the leadership of Pakistan are false, as we have stated they were false. They were always false and they remain false,” he stated.

When pointed out that the remarks could be construed as regime change due to the US’s history of ousting leaders in other countries, Miller noted, “I will say that I can understand how those comments, number one, could be taken out of context; and number two, how people might have the desire for them to be taken out of context, and might try to use them to advance an agenda that is not represented by the comments themselves.”

In the run-up to the no-confidence vote, Khan had first mentioned the “foreign plot” when he wave a document and claimed that it was “credible proof” of a conspiracy to remove him from office. On March 31, his government issued a demarche to the US embassy to make a formal protest that the United States had backed the opposition on the no-confidence vote.

The US state department had then said that there “no truth” to the allegations made by Khan.

Four days later, in a televised address to his party lawmakers, Khan named US Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs Donald Lu as having reportedly warn in a meeting with Pakistan’s Ambassador to the US, Asad Majeed that there could be implications if he survived the opposition’s no-confidence motion in the National Assembly.

Donald Lu. Photo: US Department of State, Public Domain

Incidentally, Khan had this February gone back on his earlier allegations targeting the United States and accused former army chief Qamar Javed Bajwa for being responsible for his ouster.

“Whatever happened, now as things unfold, it wasn’t the US who told Pakistan [to oust me]. It was unfortunately, from what evidence has come up, [former army chief] Gen [Qamar Javed] Bajwa who somehow managed to tell the Americans that I was anti-American. And so, it [the plan to oust me] wasn’t imported from there. It was exported from here to there,” he told Voice of America in an interview.

Last month, the cipher controversy again came back to top headlines of the Pakistani media after alleged “confession” of Imran Khan’s former principal secretary surfaced. In the ‘confession’, allegedly recorded before a magistrate, Azam Khan who went ‘missing’ earlier, accused the former prime minister of using the diplomatic cable to gain political mileage and build an “anti-establishment narrative”.

As per the statement reported by Dawn on July 20, Khan was allegedly “euphoric” after reading the cipher. Azam Khan also said that a copy of the cipher was “retained by Imran Khan and the next day (March 10) when he asked for it, Imran Khan replied that he has misplaced it.” The statement claimed that the PTI chief did not return the original cipher, despite repeated requests. Imran Khan had subsequently responded that the cipher copy had not been misplaced and remained in the custody of the foreign office.

Hours after the ‘confession’ being published in the media, Rana Sanaullah held a press conference to claim that the statement was credible. Thereafter, the Federal Investigation Agency issued a notice to Imran Khan, asking him to appear before the bureau in Islamabad

The interior minister had then claimed that the cipher case was “similar to the proceedings initiated against former US President Donald Trump for mishandling classified documents”.

A day later, Imran Khan said that the cipher controversy had been dug up again to disqualify him from contesting elections and alleged that his former aide was forced to make the statement.

He claimed that the US was actually addressing the former army chief through the cipher as the latter had the power to remove his government. “My own army chief was lobbying against me and acting to topple his government that had revived the country’s economy and industry after hectic efforts,” the PTI chairman alleged on July 21.

Note: Additional details were added to this article after it was published.

What Can India Do to Counter Pakistan’s ‘Silver Tongue’ Which Charms US Officials?

In assessing the US’s turbulent bonhomie with Pakistan, Indian officials, analysts and commentators miss a critical aspect that dominates this bilateral tempestuousness, says one expert.

New Delhi: In assessing the US’s turbulent bonhomie with Pakistan, Indian officials, analysts and commentators either deliberately, or out of oversight and ignorance, miss a critical aspect that dominates this bilateral tempestuousness: alluring Pakistani patronage of American officials through lavish hospitality, easy access to officialdom, well-articulated lies and military tourism.

“Pakistan’s track record shows that it is relatively easy for its Army to beguile American officials to its strategic, military and above all, its pecuniary advantage,” Christine Fair, author of Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army’s Way of War and co-editor of Pakistan’s Enduring Challenges, told The Wire.

Despite Pakistan continually funding and supporting the Afghan Taliban who, over years, had killed thousands of US troops, and regardless of it brashly developing tactical nuclear weapons, Washington has given Islamabad over $50 billion since 9/11, said Fair who spent over 15 years in Pakistan as a security analyst and learning Urdu and Punjabi. The US also provided Pakistan access to weapons systems best suited to fight Washington’s strategic ally India, rather than insurgents and terrorists it claimed to be battling, declared Fair who is currently a professor of Security Studies at Georgetown University in Washington DC.

“Pakistan’s military establishment manages to successfully woo large sections of the US’s public policy ecosystem like individual senators and Congress members, Congressional delegations, junior think tank analysts and even journalists by providing them unhindered access to its top military leadership and their organisations,” she said. Over decades, the Pakistanis have astutely studied what Americans like and work hard on how best to cater to their preferences, she stated.

The Pakistanis are quick, asserted Fair in spotting ‘potential’ in junior US officials and think-tank analysts and in investing wisely in them for ‘future mining’. For all of them, its military abandoned protocol and organised meetings with not only the Pakistan Army Chief of Staff, but also the Director General of the formidable Inter-Service Intelligence Directorate (ISID), all the while unleashing its duplicitous charms upon gullible and naïve Americans.

“Consequently, US subway strap hangers from humble backgrounds were bowled over by the Pakistan Army’s feudal grandeur and showmanship and went away not only impressed and obligated, but also sympathetic to Islamabad’s cause and determined to plead its case in providing it material and monetary assistance,” Fair declared.

For instance, Fair said President Pervez Musharraf had once autographed a picture of her beloved pit-bull terrier during a brief one-on-one meeting with her when she was a junior analyst at the Rand Corporation think tank in California. And, soon after he even had the Pakistan Army band play her favourite tune at a private event arranged for a project team led by Peter Lavoy, who was then at the Naval Postgraduate School. Lavoy later went on to become assistant secretary of defence for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs and remains an influential voice in US national security matters, especially those concerning Washington’s ties with Pakistan.

“Pakistani military and security officials are engaging, seemingly jocular and always charming as they deliberately set about miseducating American officials on a range of vital issues like their nuclear and F-16 programmes, Islamabad’s assistance to the Afghan Taliban and other equally vital matters,” Fair said.

And through this ‘lethal cocktail’ of charm and disingenuity, they managed eventually to inveigle their way into the upper echelons of US power centres like the Pentagon, the State Department and influential think tanks, said Fair.

Many retired Pakistani military officers – especially those on the Strategic Plans Division (SPD) tasked with managing their country’s nuclear weapons stockpile – end up securing post-retirement placements in US think tanks.

Pakistan Chief of Army Staff Qamar Javed Bajwa at a ceremony in Rawalpindi. Photo: Reuters

Tactics which pay rich dividends

Such finagling tactics paid Islamabad rich dividends earlier this month, when US defence secretary Lloyd Austin, National Security Adviser Jacob Sullivan and other senior State Department and Pentagon officials received the Pakistan Army Chief of Staff General Qamar Javed Bajwa in Washington to discuss bilateral military cooperation and regional security issues.

“This long-standing partnership continues today with discussions focused on the opportunity to address mutual defence interests,” a Pentagon statement had declared on October 4 as General Bajwa and Austin and other American officials celebrated the 75th anniversary of US-Pakistan ties.

Recent media reports also indicated that Pakistan, under subtle US influence, could soon exit the Increased Monitoring List or ‘Grey List’ of the global Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the global money laundering and terrorist financing watchdog body. Pakistan has been on this punitive list since mid-2018, and has been provided with a plan of action by FATF to complete, before becoming eligible to be pulled out from it. Security officials in New Delhi, however, said that despite being far from compliant with these pre-conditions, the US’s considerable clout with the FATF was reportedly in the process of ‘enabling and facilitating’ Islamabad’s exit at the plenary session in Singapore later this week.

Earlier, in September, the US had provided the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) a $450 million fleet sustainment package for its 65-odd F-16 ‘Fighting Falcon’ combat aircraft, to upgrade their power packs, overall structure and electronic warfare capability, for the implausible aim of boosting Islamabad’s counter-terrorism capabilities. In response to external affairs minister S. Jaishankar’s criticism of this aid package to Pakistan, US secretary of state Antony Blinken feebly and unconvincingly declared on September 28 that Washington was ‘obliged’ to provide Islamabad the money to ensure the PAF F-16s were suitably maintained to counter “clear terrorist threats” from Al Qaeda and ISIS.

Also Read | ‘Both India and Pakistan Are Our Partners’: US Responds to Jaishankar’s Jibe on F-16

Thereafter, speaking at a Democratic Party Congressional Campaign Committee reception in California earlier this month, US President Joe Biden had tersely declared Pakistan to be one of the ‘world’s most dangerous nations’ because of its cohesionless nuclear weapons programme.

Promptly a few days later the US State Department spokesman Vendant Patel did a U-turn and stated that Washington was confident of Pakistan’s commitment and ability to secure its nuclear assets. “The US values its long-standing cooperation with Pakistan,” Patel said soon after a meeting between State Department counsellor Derek Chollet and the Pakistani ambassador to Washington, Masood Khan.

“Similar behavioural and mood fluctuations by Washington with regard to Pakistan were not uncommon and followed a set pattern, with numerous such past precedents in this stormy symbiotic relationship,” said Fair. But like on innumerable earlier occasions, such condemnations will doubtlessly be neutralised soon by effective Pakistani lobbying.

Americans, observed Fair unequivocally, find the ‘feigned candour’ of the Pakistani military officers refreshing. The few exceptions, however, to this public relations and charm offensive, and wholly impervious to it all, were the few US military and other officials who had served in Afghanistan from 2001 onwards and were familiar with ‘deceitful’ Pakistani doublespeak. But, over years, these groups were neither numerically enough nor organised collectively to counter the silver-tongued Pakistanis, who also successfully portrayed themselves as ‘victims’ of the US’s perfidious self-seeking foreign policy goals in the region, Fair argued.

According to Fair, a host of successive US embassy officials, including military attaches in Islamabad, visiting Congress members, analysts and even media persons, amongst others, were ‘utterly charmed’ after engaging with glib senior Pakistan Army officers. Alongside, their visits to the Army’s General Head Quarters (GHQ) in Rawalpindi, the SPD, ISI headquarters and the Frontier Force base at the historic Bala Hisar Fort, were some of the much-anticipated stopovers for US officials, where grand hospitality, fetching take-away mementoes and equally elaborate, albeit disingenuous briefings, were organised for them.

Military tourism too was a part of this image management offensive, with helicopter trips laid on for visiting Americans by the Army and the ISI to the restive Federally Administered Tribal Regions (FATA) along the Afghan border, the Force Command Northern Areas (FCNA), a division-sized formation deployed along the disputed Line of Control with India in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, and the breathtaking Khyber Pass and Swat regions. “With Toyota Hilux pick-ups, loaded with armed soldiers, zooming around with blaring sirens, it’s difficult not to feel important,” Fair admitted. And the Pakistanis were well aware of it and capitalised on it vigorously, she said.

US and Pakistani flags. Photo: Reuters

What about India?

In contrast, the ambience was just the reverse in India for Fair, who over the years has also spent an extended period researching security issues here, as well as honing her linguistic skills, most recently in Chandigarh – where she spent months translating short stories from Gurmukhi into English.

She said India’s status-conscious officialdom was ‘disdainful’ of visiting junior analysts, Congressional delegations and random senators, who also simultaneously visited Pakistan where their access to the powers that be was unhindered. “Unlike Pakistani officials, their Indian counterparts were simply unable to comprehend that even junior Congressmen were influential in shaping US security policies,” Fair said. Hence, even though it was imperative that they be adequately briefed and instructed with the Indian viewpoint, it simply did not occur to New Delhi to do so.

“And even the meetings one does manage to secure, end up displaying less cordiality and more hectoring,” Fair observed. Thus the experience itself with Indian officialdom is less than pleasant compared to meetings with disingenuous Pakistani officials whose sophistry was more endearing, she said. Furthermore, this experiential difference matters to American officials and analysts new to South Asia and often ends up colouring their perception of both countries, invariably to Pakistan’s advantage.

“US officials view this standoffishness in Delhi with frustration and with suspicion,” said Fair. They contend that if India really was under threat from nuclear rivals and allies Pakistan and China – which it truly is – why were its officials not doing what the Pakistanis were to effectively publicise their precarious security situation, she asked.

“As a US citizen who believes that Washington’s interests are best served by a better and more robust relationship with Delhi, I appeal to the Indian leadership to adopt a more accommodating and flexible approach in dealing with Americans, and also consider employing war tourism as a part of its influencing strategy,” Fair advised.

In the end, she anticipated, both India and the US will benefit.

US Secretary of State Blinken Defends Sale of F-16 Maintenance Package to Pakistan

Blinken said that the deal was part of a long-standing ‘sustainment’ programme and that it is the US’s responsibility to ensure that equipment supplied by it is sustained and maintained.

New Delhi: US Secretary of State Antony Blinken on Tuesday, September 27, strongly defended the sale of the F-16 aircraft maintenance package to Pakistan, asserting that it was part of an ongoing programme to support counter-terrorism operations.

Two days earlier, Indian external affairs minister S. Jaishankar had said that the US’s argument that the $450 million F-16 jet aircraft maintenance package to Pakistan was for counter-terrorism was “not fooling anybody”.

Standing next to Jaishankar at a press conference at the end of bilateral talks on Tuesday, Blinken was asked whether the sale was justified given that F-16 aircraft are used against India.

“To be very clear, this is a sustainment program that Pakistan long had. These are not new planes, new systems, new weapons. It’s sustaining what they have. We have a responsibility and an obligation to whomever we provide military equipment to make sure that it’s maintained and sustained,” Blinken said.

Noting that the Pakistani F-16 programme bolsters “its capability to deal with terrorist threats emanating from Pakistan or from the region”, he added, “It’s in no one’s interests that those threats be able to go forward with impunity.”

To another query from an Indian journalist asking how the F-16 jets will be used in counter-terrorist operations, Blinken replied, “And whether it is TTP that may be targeting Pakistan, whether it’s ISIS-Khorasan, whether it’s al-Qaeda, I think the threats are clear, well-known, and we all have an interest in making sure that we have the means to deal with them.  And that’s what this is about”.

While Jaishankar had made the jibe about the F-16 sale on Sunday, he didn’t add any comments at the press conference.

Also read: What Does US Aid To Upgrade Pakistan’s F-16s Mean for India?

A day earlier, Blinken had met with the Pakistani foreign minister Bilawal Bhutto Zardari and asked him to work towards managing a “responsible partnership” with India. “It would not be appropriate for me to characterise Pakistan’s response, just as I wouldn’t characterise our friend’s response in a similar conversation,” said Blinken in reply to a question on the Pakistani response to his advice.

Besides F-16 aircraft sales, the US and Indian foreign ministers had to answer a barrage of questions about various aspects of the impact of the Ukraine war.

In response to a question on whether India would join an oil price cap on Russian crude mooted by the United States, Jaishankar indicated that the matter came up in bilateral talks. 

“On the price cap, we had a brief discussion on it this morning. More technical people are engaged between the two systems on this particular subject,” he said.

Jaishankar noted that in the aftermath of the Ukraine war, developing nations have “found it difficult to compete for limited energy, not just in terms of pricing, escalating pricing, but often in terms of availability”.

“There are tenders – countries have had tenders for which they don’t even get a reply from suppliers,” he said.

When pushed further to clarify whether India was in favour of the price cap, he said, “…look, we have concerns about the price of oil. But we are a $2,000 per capita economy. I mean, the price of oil is breaking our back. I mean, that is our big concern.”

Also read: The Strategic Implications for India as US Pushes for Oil Price Cap, More Output

With sanctions imposed by western nations making scant impact on Russia, the G-7 countries and the European Union have mooted an oil price cap on Russian crude and refined products to limit the Kremlin’s revenues.

Earlier this month, a statement issued by G-7 Finance Ministers said the price cap was specifically designed to reduce Russian revenues and its ability to fund the Ukraine war.

Indian officials are worried that an oil price cap on Russian crude would lead to shortages – thereby further driving up the cost.

(With PTI inputs)

 

US Approves $450-Million F-16 Fleet Sustainment Plan to Pakistan for Counter-Terrorism

This is Washington’s first major security assistance to Islamabad in four years.

Washington: The Biden administration has approved a US $ 450 million F-16 fighter jet fleet sustainment programme to Pakistan to help it meet current and future counterterrorism threats, in Washington’s first major security assistance to Islamabad in four years.

In 2018, Biden’s predecessor Donald Trump had suspended about USD 2 billion in security aid to Islamabad for failing to clamp down on the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqani Network terror groups and dismantle their safe havens in the country.

In a notification to the US Congress on Wednesday, the State Department said it has approved a possible foreign military sale of F-16 case for sustainment and related equipment for an estimated cost of USD 450 million, arguing that this will sustain Islamabad’s capability to meet current and future counterterrorism threats by maintaining its F-16 fleet.

The Defence Security Cooperation Agency delivered the required certification notifying the Congress of this possible sale on Wednesday.

The United States Government has notified Congress of a proposed Foreign Military Sales case to sustain the Pakistan Air Force’s F-16 programme. Pakistan is an important counterterrorism partner, and as part of longstanding policy, the United States provides life cycle maintenance and sustainment packages for US-origin platforms, a State Department spokesperson said.

Pakistan’s F-16 programme is an important part of the broader United States-Pakistan bilateral relationship. The proposed sale will sustain Pakistan’s capability to meet current and future counterterrorism threats by maintaining its F-16 fleet. The F-16 fleet allows Pakistan to support counterterrorism operations and we expect Pakistan to take sustained action against all terrorist groups, the spokesperson said.

According to the Congressional notification, the proposed sale does not include any new capabilities, weapons, or munitions.

It said that Pakistan has requested to consolidate prior F-16 sustainment and support cases to support the Pakistan Air Force F-16 fleet by reducing duplicate case activities and adding additional continued support elements.

The USD 450 million foreign military sale to Pakistan participation in F-16 Aircraft Structural Integrity Programme, electronic combat international security assistance programme, international engine management programme, engine component improvement programme, and other technical coordination groups; aircraft and engine hardware and software modifications and support and aircraft and engine spare repair/return parts.

The Pentagon said this proposed sale will support the foreign policy and national security objectives of the United States by allowing Pakistan to retain interoperability with US and partner forces in ongoing counterterrorism efforts and in preparation for future contingency operations.

The proposed sale will continue the sustainment of Pakistan’s F-16 fleet, which greatly improves Pakistan’s ability to support counterterrorism operations through its robust air-to-ground capability. Pakistan will have no difficulty absorbing these articles and services into its armed forces, it said.

According to the Congressional notification, the proposed sale of this equipment and support will not alter the basic military balance in the region.

(Lalit K. Jha)

With Hina Rabbani Khar’s Return as Pak Junior FM, What Can India Expect?

During her previous term, Khar emphasised a regional approach to the country’s foreign policy. Recently, she criticised the US for its alleged preference for military regimes in Istanbul.

New Delhi: For the second time, Hina Rabbani Khar, who got a celebrity treatment during her first official visit to India, will take helm as Pakistan’s junior foreign minister in the new 37-member cabinet unveiled by Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif on Tuesday.

Khar was the youngest and first woman minister during her tenure as Pakistan’s minister of state for foreign affairs between February 2011 and March 2013. She has once again been appointed to the same position.

After taking the oath of office, Khar on Tuesday stressed the need for employing “sincere efforts” to address the challenges on the diplomatic front, according to the Express Tribune. She expressed these views while chairing her first high-level meeting.

In Pakistan, foreign policy, especially with US and India, is not entirely in the hand of civilian politicians but rather controlled from Rawalpindi. There have been recent remarks by Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff Qamar Javed Bajwa, which indicated that the military wanted to steer Pakistan away from Imran Khan’s populist foreign policy towards closer ties with the US and work toward normalisation of relations with India.

However, it may not be easy for Islamabad to make dramatic foreign policy overtures, with Imran Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf holding large rallies for snap general elections. Even if the election is held on schedule it gives the Sharif government only about 16 months  – perhaps not enough space to concentrate on foreign relations when the country is going through severe economic stress.

In the run-up to the cabinet formation, there had been a widespread belief that Pakistan Peoples’ Party chairman Bilawal Bhutto Zardari was going to be the foreign minister. But, his absence is due to Zardari’s involvement in resolving crucial political issues with partners, prominent Pakistani journalist Hamid Mir told Karan Thapar in an interview for The Wire. Mir asserted that Zardari is likely to be sworn in as foreign minister within the next 14-20 days.

Even if Zardari joins as the foreign minister, he is likely to be guided by the more-experienced Khar, at least in the initial stages. So which path will Khar, Zardari and Sharif take? An examination of her previous two-year tenure and statements she has made since may prove useful.

The Guardian, in a 2011 profile, described Khar as the “scion of a wealthy landowning family from southern Punjab”. She joined politics at just 25, after she graduated from a university in the US. During her first election, Khar’s “landlord father Noor addressed rallies and glad-handed voters; Hina stayed largely at home, with not even her photo appearing on the posters”, the newspaper reported.

She was one of the few ministers who transitioned from the military government of General Pervez Musharraf to the civilian government. She joined the Pakistan People’s Party just before the 2008 general election in the country.

Soon after her appointment as the junior foreign minister, Khar travelled to India. Talks between the two countries were suspended after the 2008 Mumbai terror attacks but were resumed around the time of her appointment. During her visit, trade and Kashmir were discussed. She also held talks with the separatist Kashmir group, the Hurriyat Conference, which the BJP – then the main opposition party – criticised.

Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and his Pakistan counterpart Yousuf Raza Gilani speak to the press after the bilateral meeting on the sidelines of the 17th SAARC Summit, in the Maldives on November 10, 2011. Indian external affairs minister S.M. Krishna and Pakistan junior foreign minister Hina Rabbani Khar are also seen. Photo: PMO India, Public Domain

In 2015, reflecting on her term, Khar told Al Jazeera that the Asif Ali Zardari government pivoted to regional interests. “We didn’t need to have a great relationship with London, or with Washington DC, but we needed a great relationship with Kabul and Delhi,” she said. She also praised the Zardari government for decoupling the issues of trade and Kashmir.

In the same interview, Khar criticised the US government’s foreign policy on Pakistan, saying the country preferred dealing with military regimes, which “resulted in the pre-eminence of military influence in Pakistan”. “The US government has had a long history of immense fascination with the military of Pakistan,” she said.

In 2019, she criticised Pakistan for choosing to be a “client state instead of becoming [a] strategic partner” of any country. She reiterated that Pakistan should prioritise ties with regional countries like Afghanistan, India, Iran and China and not the US. “The US does not deserve that much importance as is given in Pakistan because our economy is not dependent on US aid, as is widely believed,” Khar said.

In 2016, she told the Pakistani channel Geo News that Pakistan cannot “conquer Kashmir through war” and progress on the dispute hinges on an “environment of mutual trust with India”.

“I believe that Pakistan cannot conquer Kashmir through war and if we cannot do that, the option we are left with is dialogue, and dialogue can only proceed with a partner with which we have normal relations and a certain level of mutual trust,” she said.

Watch: ‘Bilawal Bhutto Will Be Sworn in as Pak Foreign Minister Within 14-20 Days’

Khar has also criticised countries for using non-state actors to deal with conflicts, saying this would only create more conflict. She was speaking in 2015 in the context of the civil war in Syria. Khar said “all the powerful countries of the world involved [in Syria] have different goals which they are trying to achieve through non-state actors. This would produce drastic results.”

She also admitted that Pakistan was involved in inculcating “extremist thought” to certain terror groups. “I don’t see world getting orderly in the near future. The cause of the disorder is not the contest between the powers, it’s because we employ the tools that create disorder. The al-Qaeda, Taliban and militant Islamic State groups were created by the extremist thought inculcated in them by the states, including the US and Pakistan,” she said at a Lahore event in 2015/

Watch | ‘Pakistan Army Upset With Political Mess; Wants Changes in India Relationship’

Journalist Ahmed Rashid tells Karan Thapar that the Pakistan Army wants to “resume a dialogue with India as soon as possible” and is looking for some sort of concession, not necessarily regarding Jammu and Kashmir but possibly in trade.

The highly regarded Pakistani journalist, commentator and author Ahmed Rashid has said “the [Pakistan] army is very upset with the mess” Imran Khan has created politically in the country. He says the army does not want the country polarised and believes a very dangerous situation has been created by Khan. Rashid also says that Chief of Army Staff General Qamar Bajwa, in his speech at the Islamabad Security Dialogue on Saturday, indicated that the army wants “a warmer and closer relationship with the US” and also that there is “a change of perception” vis-à-vis India. He says the army wants to resume a dialogue with India as soon as possible and is looking for some sort of concession, not necessarily in terms of Kashmir but possibly in terms of trade.

In a 20-minute interview for The Wire, Rashid spoke to Karan Thapar from Lahore. He said Imran Khan has “plunged the country into [a] constitutional crisis of enormously large proportions”. He said Imran Khan has “acted prematurely without thinking of the country”.

Rashid said the Supreme Court now faces a crisis. It’s under enormous pressure from both Khan’s supporters as well as the opposition. He said it’s caught in the middle and agreed this is a critical test for Pakistan’s top court.

The journalist said he does not believe the Pakistani people accept Khan’s claim that Donald Lu, assistant secretary of state for South Asia, which is not a very senior US position, was “conspiring” with Pakistan’s opposition parties to unseat Imran Khan: “No, I don’t think so, even a lot of his supporters don’t believe it.”

Rashid suggests that, unlike Khan, General Bajwa is not “looking for a reversal” of the changes made to the status of Kashmir in August 2019 but, possibly, for concessions in terms of trade.

This is a highlight of some important things that Ahmed Rashid discusses in the interview. For a full understanding of his views, watch the video.

Explained: FATF, Pakistan and the ‘Grey List’

Here is a quick overview of the FATF categorisation and Pakistan’s chequered history with the inter-governmental group.

This explainer, first published on February 21, 2020, when Pakistan originally received a reprieve of four months, is being republished with additional information on October 24, 2020, when Pakistan was given more months on the ‘grey list’ by FATF.

New Delhi: Pakistan may have avoided being bumped upwards into a ‘black list’ by the global terror financing watchdog, but it remains on the ‘grey list’ of countries which have deficiencies in the anti-money laundering and counter terror financing regime.

After a three-day plenary, FATF announced on Friday (October 23) that Pakistan remained on the ‘grey list’ and had time till February 2021 to fully implement the “Action Plan’. Out of the 27 action points, Pakistan has, so far, fully met the standards of 21 points.

Here is a quick overview of the FATF categorisation and Pakistan’s chequered history with the inter-governmental group.

Why was this FATF meeting significant?

From October 21, officials from around 205 countries, jurisdictions and other countries started the first ever virtual FATF plenary meeting for 2020 in Paris. Every year, there are three plenary meetings of the inter-governmental body tasked with rooting out money laundering and terror financing by plugging loops holes in the international financial system.

For India, FATF has become an important measure to put pressure on Pakistan to dismantle the infrastructure that supports cross-border attacks.

The virtual meeting was also taking place after a gap of eight months, as the June plenary was cancelled due to coronavirus pandemic.

What are the ‘black’ and ‘grey’ lists?

These two terms actually do not exist in official FATF terminology. The group does identify “jurisdictions with weak measures” through two public documents issued at the end of the plenary held thrice a year.

The first is the FATF’s “public statement’, that lists two set of countries. The first one which is colloquially known as a ‘black list’, is for “countries or jurisdictions with such serious strategic deficiencies that the FATF calls on its members and non-members to apply counter-measures”. This ‘black list’ category has a small group which is less stringent – and only calls on   its members to apply enhanced due diligence measures proportionate to the risks arising from the deficiencies associated with the country”. 

The second public document “Improving Global AML/CFT Compliance: On-going process” is the ‘grey list.  

Also read: After Erdogan Supports Pakistan on Kashmir, India Asks Turkey Not to Interfere

These list countries that have a “strategic weakness” in their regime to counter money laundering and terror financing. Once listed as ‘jurisdiction under increased monitoring’ by FATF, they will have to complete an action plan within a certain time period. FATF does not ask its members to take additional “due diligence” measures against the ‘grey list countries”, but encourages states “to take into account the information presented below in their risk analysis”.

The FATF plenary session in progress. Photo: Twitter/@FATFNews

Why was Pakistan put on the FATF ‘grey list’?

Pakistan had first figured in a FATF statement after the plenary of February 2008. At that time, FATF had noted Pakistan’s recent progress in adopting anti-money laundering legislation but urged financial institutions to be aware of the “remaining deficiencies” that could constitute a vulnerability in the international financial system.

Pakistan gave a “high level” commitment in June 2010 that it would work with FATF and Asia Pacific Group, the regional FATF-like body, to sort out these differences. But, it continued to not demonstrate enough progress to be taken out of the grey list even in October 2011.

The FATF public statement of February 2012 listed Pakistan among countries who have “Jurisdictions with strategic AML/CFT deficiencies that have not made sufficient progress in addressing the deficiencies or have not committed to an action plan developed with the FATF to address the deficiencies”. A senior minister in then Nawaz Sharif government and opposition leader Khawaja Asif described this move as a “black list”.

The FATF’s main concern was that Pakistan did not have appropriate legislation to identify terror financing, as well as, confiscate terrorist assets. Pakistan went out of the Public Statement to the second statement of “Improving public compliance” from June 2014, which noted that the country had made “significant progress”.

Within nine months, Pakistan was “no longer subject to the FATF’s monitoring process under its on-going global AML/CFT compliance process”.

Also read: Pakistan’s Army Continues to Mollycoddle Terrorists and Hound its Critics

After three years, Pakistan was back on the ‘grey list’ in June 2018. The FATF press release indicated that the ‘action plan’ should largely look at plugging the holes in terror financing and activities of UN-designated terrorists.

The action plan submitted by Pakistan has 27 points, including full implementation of that targeted financial sanctions against all UN-designated terrorists.

Was there politics behind Pakistan going back on the ‘grey list’ in June 2018?

The US had spearheaded the move that led to the FATF plenary to first propose that Pakistan be assigned to the ‘grey list’ in three months.

In the run-up to the June 2018 plenary, Pakistan did take some steps like amending the anti-terrorism act and clamping down on affiliates of Jamaat-ud-Dawa, a UN-designated terror group.

At the same time, JUD leader Hafiz Saeed, who is the key mastermind of the 2008 Mumbai terror attacks, was allowed to enter the political mainstream, with his political wing contesting seats in the parliamentary elections.

While foreign ministries insist that the FATF is a technical body, geo-politics does play a role, with countries using the money laundering watchdog as diplomatic leverage.

“Bottom line is that FATF’s grey listing of Pakistan should not be looked at in isolation but placed in the larger picture of US-Pakistan relations that have had many ups and downs,” asserted an article in Pakistani newspaper Dawn.

In the run-up to the February 2008 decision, the US had weaned Saudi Arabia away, leaving only China and Turkey supporting Pakistan. China eventually withdrew its objection. A few days later, India publicly congratulated China for its election as vice president of FATF, lending credence to the suspicion that a deal had been reached behind closed doors.

What has happened since Pakistan was put on the ‘grey list’ in 2018?

Since June 2018, all the FATF plenaries have retained Pakistan on the grey list. However, it was not enough to be brought out of the ‘grey list’. But, it was sufficient that Pakistan could not be bumped up to the FATF public statement which, with China, Turkey and Malaysia backing Islamabad.

Also read: FATF Arm Finds ‘Critical Gaps’ in Pakistan’s Actions Against Terror Groups

Pakistan raised the pitch that the FATF had been politicised, with Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan stating that India wanted to destroy Pakistani economy. China has also stated that there were “political designs” behind “some countries which want to include Pakistan in the blacklist”.

Pakistan PM Imran Khan addresses the 74th session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York, US, September 27, 2019. Photo: Reuters/Lucas Jackson

Ahead of the FATF’s October 2019 plenary, the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering, after considering Pakistan’s Mutual Evaluation Report, found critical gaps in Islamabad’s reforms to curb the flow of funds to proscribed terror groups like Jamaat-ud-Dawa and Lashkar-e-Toiba.

Indian defence minister Rajnath Singh had claimed that the FATF would “blacklist Pakistan anytime” – which was seized on by Pakistan’s foreign minister as an example of the politicisation of the body. Since then, statements by Indian political leaders about FATF have been relatively rare.

In October 2019, Pakistan had fully met only five out of the 27 action points. But, it managed to avoid the ‘black list’ and was given a reprieve till February 2020.

Pakistan managed to deliver on 14 out of 27 action points by February this year, which allowed FATF to give it a grace period of four months to fully implement the Action Plan. 

With COVID-19 becoming a full-fledged pandemic, the June plenary was cancelled and Pakistan got a reprieve of four months till October. Last month, Pakistan government convened a joint session of parliament and passed over a dozen legislations that would upgrade the country’s legal mechanism to meet FATF standards. At the time of the October 2020 meeting – the first virtual plenary in FATF – Pakistan had complied with 21 out of 27 action points. 

Why does Pakistan remain on the grey list? Will it ever be ‘blacklisted’?

It is highly unlikely that Pakistan would ever join North Korea and Iran in the FATF public statement. As evident from the composition of the ‘black list’, the US would have to show a strong push to put Pakistan in the top tier of countries whose financial regimes face isolation from the international system.

Two days before the FATF plenary began, the US Principal Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asia, Alice G. Wells had praised Pakistan for convicting Hafiz Saeed and his associate as an important step “in meeting its international commitments to combat terrorist financing”. India had, however, termed the conviction of Saeed as an ‘eyewash’.

With the US currently in the midst of the final leg of a peace deal with the Taliban, Washington may not have been too eager to push Islamabad, especially since Pakistan’s economy was already in deep doldrums.

However, Pakistan, despite support from countries like Turkey, Malaysia and China, had not made enough progress to also exit the grey list, as per various technical evaluations.

However, it has got extensions in the last three plenary meetings in October 2019, February 2020 and October 2020. This is because it managed to steadily increase the number of action plan points that it has fully implemented. “As long as we see a country is progressing in action items, and we have seen progress with Pakistan, we give them a chance to repair the outstanding issues,” FATF president Marcus Pleyer told reporters on October 24.

To exit the ‘grey list’, Pakistan will have to tell the FATF member states that it has completed the Action Plan. Once a FATF onsite investigation team verifies Islamabad’s Action Plan implementation, then the decks will cleared for Pakistan to finally leave the ‘grey list’.

How Pakistan’s Unregulated Economy Feeds the Criminal Terror Nexus

Rising above the exultation from Pakistan’s continued categorisation as ‘grey’ on the FATF, it is crucial to identify ways to effectively dent its militant economy.

At the ongoing Financial Action Task Force (FATF) plenary in Paris, Pakistan’s case was up for review and it was retained on the ‘grey list’ failure to fully comply with global Anti-Money Laundering/Combating Financing of Terrorism (AML/CTF) standards. Pakistan has been under FATF observation for eleven years now, having been placed on the grey list first in 2012, and subsequently again in 2018.

Although the case for ‘black listing’ Pakistan for its flagrant violation of FATF standards has been strong, with support from three nations, China, Turkey and Malaysia, this has been an arduous diplomatic struggle for India. Any country under review requires only three votes to keep if off the ‘black list’ and 12 votes to take it off the grey list.

In June 2018, the FATF granted Pakistan 15 months to implement an appropriate legislative framework to identify, freeze and confiscate terrorist assets. At the end of that timeframe in October 2019, a regional grouping of the FATF, the Asia Pacific Group stated in its Mutual Evaluation Report (MER) that Pakistan was ‘Compliant’ for 1 and ‘Largely Compliant’ for 9 of the forty global AML/CTF Recommendations.

Despite this severe analysis of Pakistan’s financial structure, aggressive lobbying by the country made enough progress for it to be considered for removal from the grey list. In fact, there was speculation until the last hour that Pakistan might even get ‘white listed’ with support from certain European nations in addition to its traditional allies.

Staged for the sake of the FATF review, international security analysts witnessed the recurring drama of global terrorist Hafiz Saeed’s conviction. Pakistan also tried to keep under wraps, the reoccupation of the infamous Lal Masjid by radical Islamic preacher Maulana Abdul Aziz on February 6. Soon after followed the brazen escape of Ehsanullah Ehsan, the former spokesman of the Pakistani Taliban militant group, Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) from the custody of security agencies – events which clearly demonstrated Pakistan’s failure as a state to take effective counter-extremism measures.

Also read: Explained: FATF, Pakistan and the ‘Grey List’

Pakistan has been providing weak and misleading statistical evidence in its defence at the FATF reviews. Several indexes by the international organisations rank Pakistan as one of the worst countries in terms of a poor AML/CFT strategy. Significant money laundering (ML) predicates in the country include tax evasion, corruption, trade in counterfeit goods, narcotics trafficking, and terrorist financing (TF).

Pakistan is still not qualified for membership to the Egmont Group, an informal network of 164 financial intelligence units (FIUs), which provides a forum for the exchange of financial intelligence and expertise to check ML/TF.

The FATF plenary in Paris, on February 19. Photo: Twitter/@FATFNews

Unregulated economy

Focus on anti-money laundering measures by banks in Pakistan is scarce because it is encouraged by the government – foreign remittances and wire transfers remain the safest and most popular instrument of laundering money in Pakistan. The regular tax amnesty schemes are abused by shady elements to legalise their unreported assets.

Pakistan’s tax-exempted areas erstwhile Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) and Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA), serve as covers for illegal money, which are masked as proceeds of income from businesses carried out there. Despite their merger with the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) province, they are exempt from paying any income tax, customs duty on cars, sales tax, and agriculture income tax.

The Afghan Transit trade is also manipulated to source illegal finances. In one incident, expensive boating equipment meant for high seas was booked through this transit trade ignoring the fact that Afghanistan is a country without any sea. A significant share of terror financing (TF) in Pakistan emanates from donations to “charitable” organisations which divert funds to militant groups, or through direct donations to such groups.

Funds are mostly transferred through Informal Value Transfer Systems (IVTSs). Despite claims to the contrary, even in the future, Pakistan will be unable to control the more pernicious uses of IVTS transactions as it is widespread with only about 14% of adults having access to a formal financial institution. A majority of Pakistanis still use informal financial access such as committees, hawala/hundi money transfers, and so forth.

Also read: Pakistan’s Army Continues to Mollycoddle Terrorists and Hound its Critics

Money laundering and terror financing in Pakistan

The unregulated financial structure of Pakistan further feeds the criminal terror nexus because of the illicit methods that money launderers use to disguise the sources of their ill-gotten wealth, thus effectively sponsoring terrorism. The MER has clearly stated that neither the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) nor the Securities & Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) has a clear understanding of the ML and TF risks unique to the sectors it supervises. It is wishful to imagine that in a span of three months these financial institutions would have not only comprehended the scale of the ML/TF  threats but also implemented measures to contain the same.

For counter-terror efforts to be effective in the longer term, it is crucial to effectively dent the militant economy, by tracing the financial mechanisms of funding used by militants, neutralising those sources, and preventing banned outfits from raising funds domestically or internationally. An estimate of the scale of terrorism financing in Pakistan is difficult as it “does not demonstrate a proper understanding of the TF risks posed by Da’esh, Al qaeda (AQ), Jamaat-ud-Daawa (JuD) and Fatah-e-Insaniat (FiF), Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), Haqqani Network (HQN), and persons affiliated with the Taliban”.

There have been very few convictions for money laundering, and terrorist financing in Pakistan. With only 49 convictions in Punjab and a dismal nine in the rest of the country, convictions have certainly not been consistent with province-specific terror financing risks. Further, information on the sentences handed down with these convictions was not provided by Pakistan.

Pakistan hasn’t made the institutional changes it needs to seriously tackle TF. Evidence suggests that security agencies have no intention of breaking ties with terror groups like the LeT, which are effectively their assets, particularly against India. UN-designated terrorist Hafiz Saeed has been leading an unrestricted life in Pakistan, notwithstanding the periodic staging of his arrest by Pakistani authorities. His recent conviction was only spurred by an urgency to deflect a negative review in Paris. A term of five years for the terrorist who masterminded of the 2008 Mumbai attacks that killed more than 160 people hardly qualifies as a fitting conviction.

Also read: Pakistan’s Pashtun Rights Movement is Alive and Kicking

JeM ‘chief’ Maulana Masood Azhar, the architect of the Pulwama attack operates freely within Pakistan but has been missing of late. In an interview, former President Pervez Musharraf admitted that JeM was a terror outfit and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), had used it to carry out attacks in India during his tenure. Meanwhile, the notoriously radical students of the Jamia Hafsa seminary, have barricaded themselves inside the Lal Masjid. In 2014, this seminary had pledged allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, “caliph” of the Islamic State. The centre of radical Islamic learning Lal Masjid acts as a ‘watering hole’ for militant groups, like LeT, JeM among others.

In July 2019, demonstrating incredulous inconsistency, as Pakistan’s National Counter Terrorism Authority Pakistan (NACTA) listed 7,600 individuals in Schedule IV of the Anti-Terrorism Act, during an event in the US, Prime Minister Imran Khan claimed that there were 30-40 thousand terrorists in Pakistan. NACTA’s list of proscribed persons has now been reduced to 6600, with no explanation available as to how nearly a thousand persons were removed from Schedule IV.

Pakistan’s Prime Minister Imran Khan speaks during a session at the 50th World Economic Forum (WEF) in Davos, Switzerland, January 22, 2020. Photo: Reuters/Denis Balibouse

Pakistan has become quite adept at showcasing superficial actions against proscribed groups and their front organisations, every time it is due for scrutiny by FATF. The only reason that it is concerned about the listing is that any further downgrading would mean no more bailouts by the World Bank or the IMF.

Keeping Pakistan on the ‘grey list’

FATF’s continued categorisation of Pakistan on the ‘grey list’ springs from the fact that it has consistently failed to implement local legislation to comply with the relevant UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions.  Several terrorist groups operating from within Pakistan figure in the consolidated sanctions list generated by the UNSC under resolution 1566.

Also read: FATF Arm Finds ‘Critical Gaps’ in Pakistan’s Actions Against Terror Groups

A sanctions regime against Pakistan remains the best deterrent against the activities of the UN-designated terrorists that are operating from Pakistani soil. Consider the case of the LeT which has confined its activities albeit to maintain deniability and avoid international scrutiny and outfits. This amply signifies its ties to the Pakistan military which desires to avoid confrontation with India at the present juncture. There is a danger that the present downward trend in terror activities might inaccurately be perceived as a result of genuine action against terrorism by Pakistan.

Although India has revoked Pakistan’s “most favoured nation” trading status, since the bilateral trade only amounts to around US2 billion, this has failed to make a dent. For sanctions to have a significant effect, India will need to persuade powerful economic actors, especially the EU which is Pakistan’s biggest trading partner.

By sidestepping structural and procedural gaps in AML/CTF legislative framework Pakistan has been making a mockery of the FATF procedures. This time around the inter-governmental body has granted Pakistan four months before it undertakes another review of its performance.

In the end, rising above the exultation of Pakistan’s continued categorisation as ‘grey’ on the FATF, the real challenge is to reach a universally consistent mindset of countering terrorism by deconstructing terrorism. There is ample empirical evidence showing that terrorism financing and recruitment promote terrorist attacks. Economic sanctions should become a primary means to fight state-sponsored terrorism, not just an afterthought.

Vaishali Basu has worked as a consultant with the National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS) for several years. She is, at present, associated with the think tank Policy Perspectives Foundation. 

Pakistan Once Again Avoids FATF’s ‘Black List’

The decision was announced at the end of the plenary of the FATF, chaired by China in Paris on Friday.

New Delhi: Pakistan remains on the ‘grey list’ of the money-laundering watchdog Financial Action Task Force and has avoided the ‘black list’ for another four months, despite meeting only about half of its action plan.

The decision was announced at the end of the plenary of the FATF, chaired by China in Paris on Friday.

Pakistan was put on the ‘grey list’ in June 2018, with time given till October 2019 to implement a 27-point Action plan to address its “strategic counter-terrorist financing-related deficiencies”. At the October plenary, FATF observed that Pakistan should “swiftly complete its full action plan by February 2020”.

Four months later, the February plenary also gave a reprieve to Pakistan. In similar language, FATF “strongly urges Pakistan to swiftly complete its full action plan by June 2020”.

In October last year, Pakistan had implemented only about five out of the 27 points in the action plan. This has increased to 14, which is perhaps the reason that FATF also observed that Pakistan has made “recent and notable improvements”.

However, just like in October, FATF also stated that “all deadlines in the action plan have expired”.

Also read: Explained: FATF, Pakistan and the ‘Grey List’

In identical phrasing as from the last plenary, FATF also stated that if Pakistan did not make “significant and sustainable progress” by the next plenary, FATF will “take action which could include the FATF calling on its members and urging all jurisdiction to advise their FIs to give special attention to business relations and transactions with Pakistan”.

China was the first to welcome the FATF decision. It described the avoidance of ‘black list’ as a consequence of Pakistan’s “enormous efforts in improving its CTF regime, which has been recognised by the majority”.

Pakistan getting a reprieve from the ‘black list’ was not unexpected. In the run-up to the plenary meeting this week, the US had praised Pakistan for meeting its international commitments of combating terror financing by convicting the Jamaat-ud-Daawa chief Hafiz Saeed.

So far, there has been no public response from India on Pakistan remaining on the ‘grey list’.

Hafiz Saeed Conviction: US Welcomes ‘Important Step Forward’, India Dubious

Indian government sources expressed scepticism about the “efficacy” of the decision since it was made on the eve of the plenary meeting of the Financial Action Task Force.

New Delhi: A day after a Pakistani court sentenced Mumbai terror attack accused Hafiz Saeed to 11 years for terror financing, India expressed scepticism about the “efficacy” of the decision since it was made on the eve of the plenary meeting of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), while the US welcomed it as an “important step forward”.

On Wednesday, Jamat-ud-Dawa (JuD) chief Saeed was sentenced to 11 years in jail by an anti-terrorism court in Pakistan in two terror financing cases. These are not, however, related to the Mumbai terror attack conspiracy cases, which are currently stuck in legal quagmire.

The first response from the US was one of appreciation. “Today’s conviction of Hafiz Saeed and his associate is an important step forward – both toward holding LeT accountable for its crimes, and for #Pakistan in meeting its international commitments to combat terrorist financing,” said an initialled tweet on behalf of US state department’s principal deputy assistant secretary, bureau of South and Central Asian affairs, Alice G. Wells on Wednesday.

She also referred to Pakistan Prime Minister Imran Khan’s remarks that it was in the interest of his country to “not allow non-state actors to operate from its soil”.


While Washington welcomed the court decision, Indian officials expressed scepticism about the sustainability of the process, inferring that Pakistan only took a tough step ahead of the next plenary meeting of the FATF, the international money laundering and terror funding watchdog.

Unlike the US, there was, however, no official response from India yet, with sources preferring to give their initial reaction on background.

Also Read: Not Blacklisted Yet, Pakistan Gets Final Reprieve From FATF, To Remain ‘Greylisted’ For 4 Months

Stating that it was part of a “long pending” obligation of Pakistan to “end support for terrorism”, government sources said, “The decision has been made on the eve of FATF Plenary meeting, which has to be noted. Hence, the efficacy of this decision remains to be seen.” India has, so far, remained consistently dubious about any visible steps taken by Pakistan against terror groups in the past few years.

The next plenary meeting of FATF will be held in Paris from February 16 to 23.

At the last meeting in October 2019, Pakistan which has been ‘grey listed’ for over an year, had got a final reprieve of four months to avoid being ‘blacklisted’ if it implemented reforms to prevent money laundering and terror. FATF had “strongly urge(d) Pakistan to swiftly complete its full action plan by February 2020”.

If there is no “significant and sustainable progress” across the “full range of its action plan” by February 2020, then the watchdog warned that actions could include directions to member nations to advise their financial institutions to “give special attention to business relations and transactions with Pakistan”.

Before the October 2019 plenary, Pakistan’s mutual evaluation report by the Asia Pacific Group, the regional affiliate of FATF, was made public. It showed that there were critical gaps in Pakistan’s efforts to curb flow of funds and restrict activities of proscribed terror groups like JuD and Lashkar-e-Taiba.

Meanwhile, Indian officials were also sceptical whether Pakistan would take steps against other terror groups. “It remains to be seen whether Pakistan would take action against other all terrorist entities and individuals operating from territories under its control, and bring perpetrators of cross border terrorist attacks, including in Mumbai and Pathankot to justice expeditiously,” said government sources.