A Budget That Throws the Railways Off the Tracks

The budget for 2024-25 completely ignores the crisis afflicting the Indian railways, undermines not just the efficiency of its operations or of safety, but thwarts the potential positive spinoffs that may have been available for the wider economy.

The sidelining of the Indian Railways, historically a part of the Indian budget-making process, is now complete. Finance minister Nirmala Sitharaman’s seventh edition of the budget is historic for not attempting even a token pretence of a reference to the Indian Railways in her presentation. Not even the spate of railway accidents since her last full-year budget has moved her. “Railways” figured just once in the entire speech – that too in relation to her general concern about infrastructure and industrial development.

One of the first steps initiated in this direction by the Narendra Modi government after assuming office in 2014 was to eliminate the practice of a separate budget. Ironically, the justification for this “smart” move – that this was a vestige of the colonial past – came from a political formation that singularly stood aside from the national independence movement.

The most striking aspect of the budget – in the context of the collapse of capital formation and investment in the wider economy – is that it utterly belies the expectation that there would be larger capital outlays. And, naturally, this is reflected in the continuing neglect of investment in the Indian Railways.

This is not some incidental expectation; it arises from the fact that the railways is the single largest Indian enterprise – private or government-owned – not just in terms of contribution to output or in terms of employment, but also because the scale and scope of its impact is unlike in any other activity.

In fact, a chief economic adviser to the Modi regime in its early days had pointed out that the multiplier effect works with a factor of five in the case of the railways – one rupee of investment in it generates activity that is five times greater.

One of the trademark features of budget-crafting in the Modi kaal – perfected by Arun Jaitley when he helmed the finance ministry – was to cynically undermine the sanctity of budgetary numbers. The trick was simply to promise a large-sounding number as an outlay, quietly slip it down in the revised figures presented the following year, and then tweak them even lower when the actuals arrived a couple of years later.

Bereft of media attention or scrutiny, the regime could bask immediately in the glow of a “massive” increase in outlay without delivering anything substantial at all. This tested model was applied to the railway finances.

Also read: On Board a ‘Ghulam Express’ of the Indian Railways

The capex mirage

Overall capital expenditure in the wider budget is projected to amount to a nice-sounding Rs 11,11,111 crore in 2024-25, but if the past is any guide, one can safely assume it would be lower when the next budget comes along. Here is why: the budget estimate of capex for 2023-24 was Rs 10 lakh crore but was revised to Rs 9.5 lakh crore and now, the latest “provisional revised” estimates place them even lower, at Rs 9.49 lakh crore.

In effect, between the budgetary promise of last year and what is estimated now, there is a slippage of 5%. But even more important, the increase between now and last year is just about 10%, barely enough to cover inflation. This approach to capex is mirrored in the way the needs of the railways have been addressed.

The capital outlay for the railways in 2023-24 was significantly higher than in the previous year, an increase of almost 51% over the previous year’s budgetary allocation. However, in the current fiscal year, 2024-25, the outlay has been increased to Rs 2.51 lakh crore — an increase of just about 5 per cent — not even enough to keep pace with inflation (see table).

This apparently sharp increase in the railways’ capex needs to be qualified on two counts. First, it happened after the complete collapse of investment during the pandemic; in effect, normalising the spike would have meant that there was nothing remarkable.

Second, this came after several years of waffling during which the Modi regime moved the goalposts for investments several times – first on account of its plans for the railways under the National Infrastructure Pipeline and then a National Rail Plan – promising investments over a stretched timescale, but which it never adhered to. This apparent one-year uptick in investment thus came after a prolonged period in which investment in critical infrastructure was strangled.

Fundamental crisis of network capacity

The fundamental constraint on the operations of the Indian Railways arises from the acute shortage of physical capacity, which has resulted in the severe congestion on the network. In several major trunk routes, tracks are handling capacities that are in excess of 140-150% of the rated capacity.

Investment in capital expenditures is thus urgently needed to resolve this capacity constraint. The neglect of capital investments has meant that the shortage of railway network capacity has been snowballing into the (emphasis added) fundamental constraint on the operations of the Indian railways under the watch of the Modi regime. In fact, this is essentially what is at play, creating the systemic risks that lurk behind the issue of safety in the railways’ operations.

Over the years, as the network has become more congested – caused by more and frequent trains, a widening mix of different kinds of trains with varying speeds running on the same tracks – the needs of maintaining train operations and traffic requirements have dictated terms that are ever in danger of running afoul of normative safety standards (by the way, very well-defined in the Indian Railways’ rulebooks and manuals).

Also read: Five Reasons Why the Indian Railways Have Gone Off-Track

Indeed, the recent preliminary report of the chief commissioner of railway safety (CRS) on the June 17 accident involving a passenger train and a goods train near New Jalpaiguri is absolutely on point here, remarking that this was “an accident-in-waiting”. As we have seen after every accident, Kavach has been waved as a magic wand that would usher in an amrit kaal of sorts for railway safety, but there is nothing – absolutely nothing – in the budget for this grand pipe dream of a project.

The capacity constraint that has built up over the last decade has arisen from the systematic neglect of investment in the railways. Soon after Modi made the grandiose announcement of the Infrastructure Pipeline in 2015 from the ramparts of the Red Fort, it became clear that the money it was allocating was nowhere near what it said it was committed to.

The annual shortfall in the railways’ component in the first four years of the NIP from 2015-16 were 45%, 35%, 22% and 15%. These were to be made in critical areas that would have augmented network capacity, modernised equipment and made for more efficient train operations, apart from crucially adding an additional margin of safety to the operations of the railways.

As the accompanying charts and tables show, investments in each of the areas – signalling, track renewal (a euphemism for the replacement of ageing track assets), track doubling and the special railway safety scheme that is named the RRSK (Rashtriya Rail Sanraksha Kosh) – allocations have either not been consistent or kept pace with normative requirements set by this government.

Added to this have been two additional layers of complexity, arising entirely from the Modi regime’s uniquely whimsical method of functioning (see charts on safety-related investments and outcomes).

Skewed priorities, overloaded capacity

First, it turns out that the increase in outlays for 2023-24, which appear to flatter at first sight, have actually arisen from the way the regime has painted itself into a corner.

Given the Modi regime’s first instinct to leave things to the market, it was natural that it banked on mobilising capital from sources other than its own coffers via the budgetary process. In doing this it relied on the Indian Railway Finance Corporation (IRFC) to fund its rolling stock acquisition programme, via leases. It also had an abiding faith in Public Private Partnerships (PPP); it waited in vain for several years before giving up on this front as well.

The other sources of funds were from internal resources of the railways, but because the operational surplus was too meagre, nothing much came of it. The spike of 2023-24 thus came when the government ran out of options. The IRFC could no longer lease because its balance sheet was stretched; the government also found interest payments for leased assets was mounting.

In fact, what happened in 2023-24 was simply a rearrangement of the sources of funding, not a significant additional increase in capex for the railways. In effect, if one aggregates internal resources, funding from IRFC, expected investments in PPP and funding from other institutional sources of funding, all of which had not materialised, and substitute them with budgetary allocations that were made, the increase would be just about a paltry Rs 15,000 crore.

The much-needed additionality in investments to free capacity never materialised and continues to add even more bottlenecks for the movement of passenger and freight traffic and for safety.

But, bad as this was, things have been worsened by the whimsical arrangement of priorities in the overall constrained environment. This relates to the emphasis placed on select marquee projects – most notably the Vande Bharat trains or the over-the-top station beautification projects at arbitrarily select locations that cannot be justified by any objective criteria.

The misalignment of priorities has implied that roughly one-fifth of the allocations since 2022-23 have been earmarked for rolling stock acquisition. But the question to ask is: what is the point in adding more trains, locomotives and wagons when the track and trackside infrastructure they need to run along and the signals that guide them languish?

The introduction of the Vande Bharat trains, for instance, distorts the traffic priorities of the railways because they actually lower (emphasis added) the capacity of the network on which they run. This is because these faster trains require many other trains – which are slower, including the many goods trains – to be moved off the track when these fancier trains need the tracks for their runs.

Recall, the average speed of a passenger train on the Indian railways system is about 50 km/hr and the average speed of a goods train is just about 25 km/hr. It is also significant that the freight traffic is what earns net revenues for the railways. In effect, these marquee projects add several layers of complexity to a system that is already creaking.

One had almost given up hope that this government would do anything meaningful by way of actually making investments to solve the capacity constraint that is choking the railways. A possibility for hope emerged with the elections, in the expectation that the limited mandate may force the regime to change course, if not make a U-turn. Nirmala Sitharaman’s latest salvo has emphatically ruled out any such possibility.

Table by author.

V. Sridhar is a journalist based in Bengaluru.

‘Alarming’ Railway Accidents: 11 Groups Issue Scathing Statement Demanding Accountability from Govt

‘Just recently in Ambala, Punjab, on June 3rd 2024, both the LP and ALP of a goods train fell into micro-sleep and collided with another goods train. This LP was doing his 4th consecutive night duty. He had already been forced to do 12 night duties in the month.’

New Delhi: Eleven railway organisations and central trade unions have issued a scathing joint statement, demanding accountability of the Union government, its ministers and other high authorities for the large number of preventable accidents in the Indian Railways.

Accidents including signal failures and derailments have occupied headlines almost on a monthly basis in the last couple of years, resulting in deaths, injuries and enormous loss of public property.

Just earlier this week, on July 18, four people died and several others were injured after the Chandigarh-Dibrugarh Express derailed near Uttar Pradesh’s Gonda. On June 7, the Kanchanjunga Express met with a collision, leaving nine dead and more than 25 injured.

Crucially, the groups have urged the government to stop the “violation of safety norms and procedures,” highlighting key loopholes that may be responsible for the accidents. The groups have also called on the government to fill all vacant positions in the safety category in Indian Railways, providing examples of the fatal human cost of overwork. 

The 11 organisations who have signed the statement are: the All India Central Council of Trade Unions (AICCTU), the All India Loco Running Staff Association (AILRSA), the All India Pointsmen Association (AIPMA), the All India Station Masters Association (AISMA), the All India Railway Track Maintainers Union (AIRTU), the All India Trade Union Congress(AITUC), the Indian National Trade Union Congress (INTUC), the Indian Railway Loco Runningmen’s Organisation (IRLRO), Indian Railway Signal and Telecom Maintainers Union (IRS & TMU), the Kamgar Ekta Committee (KEC), and the Labour Progressive Front(LPF). 

§

India is rapidly becoming the railway accident capital of the world. The frequency of accidents is alarming both passengers and rail workers. 

Collisions or so-called “accidents” happen in the IR, resulting in deaths, severe injuries and tremendous loss of public property. Even before the real reason is determined, the high authorities quickly denounce the railway workers, including, loco pilots, Station Masters, train managers (earlier known as guards), signaling staff, and so on. Often these people are even dead or injured and cannot defend themselves. Even if alive, they do not have the media power to make their voices heard. 

On June 17, 2024, a goods train collided with Kanchenjunga Express between Rangapani and Chattar Hat stations in West Bengal. The loco pilot (LP) of the goods train, the train manager of the express train and 14 passengers killed and nearly 50 injured. Immediately after the accident, the CEO and Chairperson of the Railway Board blamed the deceased LP of the gcoods train even before the Commissioner of Railway Safety (CRS) had given its official report! 

Also read: Confusion on Signal Failures, Overworked Staff: Policy Body Points to Systemic Issues in Railways

October 29, 2023. Two passenger trains collide at Vizianagaram, Andhra Pradesh. The Railway Minister claimed that the LP and Assistant Loco Pilot (ALP) were watching a cricket match, which was the reason for the accident! The claim of the Railway Minister was debunked by the Official CRS report which came subsequently.

Should not making such untrue claims and slandering be punishable offences? The real facts show that so many recent accidents have been caused by systemic failures. 

The automatic signalling system in the concerned section had failed when the Kanchenjunga Express met with an accident. This system had been installed in December 2023 by a private company, Siemens Limited, which also had the Annual Maintenance Contract (AMC) for it. As per the Railways’ own rules, after a new signalling system is installed, the Chief Loco Inspector (CLI) needs to give training to Loco Pilots on the New Signalling system including Learning Road (on the field) training. However there is no uniform procedure across Indian Railways on how this training is to be given. In Southern Railway, a special orientation course is conducted over three days, outside of duty hours wherein the Loco Pilots are given proper training. After this they are issued an orientation certificate. 

However in many other zones, the training is limited to the CLI giving instructions during duty hours. As a result, the LPs and ALPs are not totally clear about the new signalling system as well as what is to be done when the signalling system fails. When the Signalling system fails, there are multiple types of forms to be issued, such as T/A912, T/912, T/D 912, T/B409 etc. to guide the LP.

Left: The site of the Kanchanjunga Express collision. Photo: Samvu Nath. Right: A 1908 image of two engines after collision near Ludhiana, India. Courtesy of Mary Evans Picture Library/Illustrated London News Ltd. From Marian Aguiar, ‘Tracking Modernity’.

This shortcut method of training and overwork of all safety category including Station Masters (SMs) and LPs, the SMs are not clear on what is the form to be issued and the LPs are not clear on what is the form to be received! 

Even the highest railway authorities do not themselves know or understand the various complicated rules required for movement of the trains. Immedaitely after the accident , on June 19th 2024, at a meeting of the top railway officials of the Eastern Railway , which included the General Manager and Principal HODs a circular was issued that “ issuance of T/A 912 will remain suspended.” 

But immediately the next day , on 20th June, 2024, they issued a fresh notification that the earlier order suspending T/A-912 “was erroneous and it is withdrawn”!!!

This only shows that if the highest Railway officials are themselves confused about what is to be done when the automatic signalling system becomes defective, what are the the Loco Pilots and Station Masters to do in such situations? 

In both accidents June 17th ,2022 involving Kanchenjunga Express and the accident on October 29, 2023 at Vizianagaram, it was lack of proper training about the new automatic signalling system which had been installed which led to the devastating accidents. 

This is typical of the way in which many shortcuts are being taken all over the Indian Railways which are the real reason for the increasing number of accidents. 

The IR is increasingly being run like a private company that is only interested in profit and not in the safety and comfort of its workers and passengers. Its social obligation of providing affordable and comfortable mode of transport for crores of people has been set aside by curtailing passenger trains and second class coaches. More and more expensive coaches and air-conditioned trains like Vande Bharat are being introduced to increase its revenue. Vacancies are not being filled to reduce expenditure on its workforce. Expenditure on rail track renewal and safety is given low priority. Training is now considered an avoidable expenditure. 

Also read: Kanchanjunga Express Tragedy: Railways Focus on Deceased Driver, Workers Point to Systemic Failures

The Railways have their own large and modern signalling workshops at many places but are trying to close them down and hand over all the work to private companies. This work includes installing and maintaining the signalling system. Due to outsourcing of signalling work, there are multiple companies involved in installing these signalling systems and each company brings in different technology and hence there exists multiple technologies in different sections further adding to confusion. When the Railway Boards own workshops install a system they follow standard procedures which ensure more uniformity. 

For instance, the Railway Board has been trying to close the signal workshop of the IR at Howrah, Kolkata. Even though Rs. 37.37 crores had been sanctioned for its modernisation, it was not given and implemented. The stiff opposition from the workers’ unions has managed to stop the Railway Board in its nefarious plan. It is astonishing that for more than a year the post of Additional

Member (Signal), Railway Board , who heads the signal department of the Indian Railways is kept vacant, so that in effect there is no overall incharge of the signal department, which is a critical safety category. 

Large number of vacancies and overwork

The goods LP involved in the Kanchenjunga accident had already completed three consecutive night duties and when taking rest on the fourth night, he had been rudely woken up at 2 pm and asked to take charge of the goods train. He resisted and finally he came to take the train at 6.30 am. 

According to multiple safety committee recommendations, LPs should not be asked to do more than two consecutive night duties, but the Railway officials blatantly ignore these recommendations and force the LPs and ALPs to do more than two consecutive night duties. This deprives them of the needed rest and can also cause accidents as happened. 

Just recently in Ambala, Punjab, on June 3rd 2024, both the LP and ALP of a goods train fell into microsleep and collided with another goods train. This LP was doing his 4th consecutive night duty. He had already been forced to do 12 night duties in the month. 

High railway officials put extreme pressure on safety category workers, which is another major reason for the increasing number of railway accidents. The All India Loco Runnings Staff Association (AILRSA) carried out a militant struggle in Southern Railway, from June 1st 2024 to June 28, 2024, opposing the inadequate periodic rest of 30 hours, duty at a stretch of more than 10 hours, 4 continuous night duties and detention outside Head Quarters for more than 48 hours for LPs and ALPs. 

High railway officials put pressure on media not to publish any material criticising them as well as the unsafe operating practises which are forced on the staff, under threat of withholding of railway advertisements to the concerned media channel.

From all the above it is clear that it is the High Railway Officials who pressurise the lower staff to violate all safety procedures and recommendations, which is the real cause of the increasing number of accidents. However, the railway authorities are quick to blame the lower safety category staff of LPs ALPs SMs, S&T maintainers, pointsmen etc. for all accidents and hand out capital punishment including jail and dismissal from service. 

For preventing further rail accidents, we demand 

(i) Hold ministers and other high railway authorities accountable for preventable accidents resulting in deaths, injuries and loss of public property!

(ii) Stop the violation of all safety norms and procedures by any railway authority and give exemplary punishment if they do so. 

(iii) Fill all vacant positions in the safety category in Indian Railways to make their working conditions stress-free for the safe running of trains. 

(iv) Safety Category Staff to be increased in accordance with creation of New assets and new lines being laid down. 

Indian Railways Hasn’t Commissioned New Kavach Lines This Year: Performance Report

“Commissioning of Kavach is Nil till October 31, compare(d) to 10 km last fiscal during same period and against the target of 637 km till Oct 31, 2023,” the performance report noted.

New Delhi: The Indian Railways Performance Highlight report has noted that the railways has not commissioned any new lines with its safety system Kavach till October this year. In the April–October period last year, 10 km of such lines were commissioned, according to The Hindu Business Line.

“Commissioning of Kavach is Nil till October 31, compare(d) to 10 km last fiscal during same period and against the target of 637 km till Oct 31, 2023,” the performance report noted.

Kavach is an Automatic Train Protection (ATP) system created by the Research Design and Standards Organisation (RDSO).

While no lines under Kavach were commissioned, “the new line setting up was 186.65 km, the doubling of lines was 1019.69 km, and gauge conversion (from narrow to broad gauge) was 96 km. A cumulative of 1302.34 km was covered till Oct-end, at least 25 per cent-odd lesser than last year (across these categories) which covered 1728.55 km ( that included new line laying of 52.8 kms, gauge conversion across 102 km, and double lining: 1573.75 km),” according to the newspaper.

“It is cause of concern in view of additional expenditure on this account during the same period and less commissioning,” the railways’ report noted.

The same reported also noted that there was an increase in consequential accidents across the Indian Railways’ network in 2021-22, compared to the previous year. According to official data, nine were killed in train accidents in 2021-22 and 45 were injured. No loss of life or injuries were reported in 2020-21.

Headline-Hunting and Diversion of Safety Funds Are Hurting Indian Railways

The Railways not only failed to provide sufficient funds for safety but also diverted safety funds to project execution.

Indian Railways, considered to be a resilient railway system, got adverse publicity due to the accident near Balasore, but it has brought down accidents from 131 to 34 in the last decade by continuous investments in safety-related work. But this unwavering attention by the top management appears to have been missing in recent years.

Indian Railways is a very dynamic organisation where operational and safety instructions are implemented within 24 hours across the system, when the top management decrees it. Normally, the Railway Board sets policy guidelines and the zones function almost independently to implement them. Except in safety and operations, the Board’s intervention is the exception.

Operations and safety are routine but onerous tasks. They neither get visibility nor publicity. A smoothly running system is not newsworthy. However, it takes enormous dedication of field staff and the unwavering attention of the management.

Changed style of working

The government and the Minister of Railways (MoR) set organisational priorities. Like prior governments, this one also prioritised operations and safety. In addition, it added a number of other priorities ― faster execution of projects, fund mobilisation for them, 100% electrification, solar power generation, higher speeds, rapid replacement of coaches, rapid introduction of Vande Bharat trains, upgrading research facilities and setting up educational institutions. While most are highly commendable, the focus was misplaced and the style of functioning inappropriate.

Before 2014, MoRs rarely intervened in day-to-day running. After 2014, that changed slowly but palpably. MoR was assisted by a set of well-read consultants who nevertheless had no experience in running a large organisation like IR. While policy interventions are a minister’s prerogative and they can overrule the advice of a bureaucrat, the environment was such that free discussion became very difficult. Decision-making became highly centralised.

MoRs and the ‘MoR cell’ started intervening actively, first at the Board level, and then in zones and divisions. While monitoring by policy makers is welcome, it’s a problem when the focus is exclusively on their pet themes, at the cost of routine operations.

Belittling and putting down officers has become the norm. When the MoR publicly rebukes officials, it’s made viral on social media. Plus, compulsory and voluntary retirements have been forced on the officers. It became difficult to express a professional opinion. The pet themes of the ‘MoR cell’, selected to ensure constant visibility in the press and on social media, became the organisational obsession. Anecdotal evidence suggests a steady reduction in time spent on operational safety in review meetings.

While all this can be brushed aside as biased perception, the deployment of funds nails it.

Inadequate funding for safety

IR wanted to accelerate investment rapidly but operations offered inadequate surpluses and government grants were low. So it increased market borrowings and sought Public-Private Partnership projects. Regrettably, safety funds were also diverted to projects.

To ensure that sufficient amounts are allocated exclusively for specified purposes, IR maintains separate funds. It has three funds for safety ― Depreciation Reserve Fund (DRF), Railway Safety Fund (RSF), and Rashtriya Rail Sanraksha Kosh (RRSK).

DRF was set up to replenish operational assets and is crucial for safe running. Additions to DRF, which were around Rs 8,000 crore in 2013-14 and 2014-15, dwindled to Rs 1,540 crore in 2017-18, to Rs 200 crores in 2020-21, and finally to zero in 2021-22. CAG reports have observed that such inadequate provisioning is affecting safety.

The Railway Safety Fund, created in 2001, was primarily meant to finance the conversion of unmanned level crossings and for the construction of over/under bridges, and its main source is transfer of funds from the Central Road Fund (CRF). The fund has large additions of over Rs 10,000 crore every year. Its scope has been enlarged in 2016-17 to include new lines, electrification and gauge conversion. Thus, the safety fund is now partially a project fund.

IR started the Rashtriya Rail Sanraksha Kosh (RRSK) in 2017 with a corpus of Rs 1 lakh crore and an annual contribution of Rs 15,000 crore from the government and Rs 5,000 crore from internal resources. However, as internal surpluses were not available in the five-year period ending 2022-23, IR contributed only Rs 4,225 crore instead of Rs 25,000 crores. The government also defaulted on the Rs 15,000 crore promised every year.

So the Railways not only failed to provide sufficient funds for safety but also diverted safety funds to project execution. As per CAG estimates, assets worth Rs 95,000 crore were due for replacement up to 2020-21. Assets don’t fail overnight, but a debilitating effect is visible in the long term.

Unless safe operations are adopted as an abiding theme, both in terms of focus and funds, we could be looking at a spiralling problem in years to come. The top management should realise this.

M. Ravibabu retired from the Indian Railway Traffic Service.

Need for Speed Has Taken Focus off Rail Safety

The semi-high speed Vande Bharat Express, or similar such trophies, could be yet another predictable idea of the Modi government for pumping up the sentiment of national prestige, but should such propaganda entirely displace critical issues at hand?

An accident as deadly and heartbreaking as the Balasore train crash rarely becomes an occasion to flag the banality of high-pitched advertising campaigns.

Yet, the death of over 275 people in the biggest train mishap over two decades has spawned discussions around Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s flashy PR drive about semi-high speed Vande Bharat Expresses, or even the first Indian bullet train, at a time when his government should have ideally addressed the structural problems that have afflicted the Indian Railways for years.

It took a catastrophic disaster like the collision of two passenger trains to draw our attention to concerns like antiquated safety mechanisms, failing infrastructure, vacancies at all levels, and poor and inadequate budgeting that railway officials and official bodies have been flagging from time to time, even as the Modi government marked out flagship trains like Vande Bharat Express as the new benchmarks in the history of the railways’ development.

The government’s PR exercises shored up its claims about large-scale and speedy infrastructure development under Modi’s leadership, but also overshadowed persistent issues that plagued the Indian railways. For the government, perception mattered more than a structural overhaul that could have possibly prevented the Balasore human tragedy, and similar such incidents, over the last few years.

Train accidents in the past have drawn attention to the humble concerns of the railways, forcing the governments to attend to some of these teething problems, even if momentarily. However, even these temporary noises seem to have disappeared amidst the Modi government’s hyperbolic campaigns around BJP’s brand of cultural nationalism that unabashedly seek to drown out any criticism.

Consider a few instances where priorities of the Indian Railways were either sidelined or kept off the table. As recently as February 2023, a top railway official in the South Western Railway zone raised concerns about frequent signal failures and said that such malfunctioning could lead to serious accidents. The Balasore train mishap, we know now, is a result of a similar signal failure.

Also read: A ‘Migrant Train’, the Coromandel Express Had Been the Ticket to a Livelihood for Bengal’s Poorest

A recent CAG report also pointed out that two-thirds of all rail accidents between 2017-18 and 2020-21 happened because of derailments ― which is how the Chennai-bound Coromandel Express jumped off its tracks to ram into the static goods train. The report also showed that the budgetary allocations for urgent infrastructure development like track renewal to handle increasing traffic and improvement in safety mechanisms have been on the decline during Modi’s tenure. The government’s much-vaunted anti-collision device system KAVACH, too, is agonisingly under funded, and over 90% routes have not been equipped to use the feature.

The Modi government’s inclination to override official mechanisms has been so overwhelming that the Balasore disaster appears to be yet another corollary of the government’s neglect of railway safety concerns. The 323rd report of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Transport, Tourism, and Culture had pointed out grave disregard shown by the Railway Boards towards the recommendations of the Commission of Railway Safety.

At a more basic level, a series of RTI responses revealed that over 3 lakh positions at every level of the railways are lying vacant. This also explains why current employees are forced to work 12-14 hour shifts.

As The Wire’s founding editor M.K. Venu said, the Balasore mishap is a reminder that Modi’s mantra of “speed and scale” must be calibrated to deliver “safety first”, especially in critical infrastructure like aviation, roads, bridges, and railways. The grave accident, in fact, highlights the widening gap between the Modi government’s priorities ― often geared towards scoring political brownie points over the opposition ― and real issues that desperately need attention.

The semi-high speed Vande Bharat Express, or similar such trophies, could be yet another predictable idea of the Modi government for pumping up the sentiment of national prestige, but should such propaganda entirely displace critical issues at hand?

Even as this question looms large, the Union government has yet again resorted to virtue-signalling. Facing the heat at the moment, the Prime Minister, Union Railways Minister Ashwini Vaishnaw and other BJP leaders have attempted to control the political narrative through social media campaigns that seek to showcase the government’s dedication and selflessness in the rescue efforts. The out-of-the-blue claims made by some BJP leaders about the accident being a potential case of sabotage by the left-wing extremists, and Vaishnaw’s swift recommendation for the CBI to probe the mishap, appear to be more attempts by the government to divert attention from its gross failures.

It is high time that the Modi government trains its focus on the urgent concerns of the Indian railways with some seriousness, instead of treating the human tragedy as a mere hurdle in its political campaign ahead of the 2024 Lok Sabha polls.

This piece was first published on The India Cable – a premium newsletter from The Wire & Galileo Ideas – and has been republished here. To subscribe to The India Cable, click here.

Days After Odisha Collision, Report Flags ‘Grave’ Safety Concerns Aired in Earlier Railway Meetings

Minutes of a Railway ministry safety review meeting in April studied by Business Standard showed that the CEO and Chairman of the Railway Board, Anil Lahoti, had raised the rise in consequential accidents and called it a matter of serious concern.

New Delhi: Three days after one of the worst railway accidents in Indian history led to the deaths of 275 people, news reports continue to point to recent efforts by various apex bodies stressing the necessity for safety.

Business Standard has reported how in a review meeting in April, the Railway Board chairman had flagged a 37% rise in consequential accidents as a “matter of grave concern”. Because many of these accidents involved goods trains and were thus not casualty-heavy, they had invoked little concern.

Minutes of a Railway ministry safety review meeting in April studied by the newspaper showed that the CEO and Chairman of the Railway Board, Anil Lahoti, had raised the rise in consequential accidents and called it a matter of serious concern.

According to the report, the board also highlighted track issues, and problems with signalling and operations, and other ‘systemic deficiencies’. Notably, signalling trouble is one of the issues that are preliminarily believed to have led to the three-train clash in Balasore in Odisha on June 2.

The board also sought to highlight the fact that SECR and East Coast Railway crew worked beyond shifts that ranged for 12 hours. Shortage in Railway human resources was also flagged by the Congress party in a detailed statement yesterday, June 4. The statement also noted that a Right to Information request has revealed that more than 3.11 lakh posts out of the nearly 15 lakh Group C posts and 3,018 out of the 18,881 gazetted cadre positions are lying vacant in the Indian Railways.

A separate report by Business Standard has highlighted how the Railways witnessed 11 train collisions in five years since 2017-18. Although collisions are not the bulk of train accidents, which include derailments, level-crossing incidents, fire and other events that make up 20 times the number of train collisions, the report notes that the ‘Kavach’ system of avoiding collisions has been implemented only in a limited way.

Similar numbers were also revealed in a CAG report which was reported on by The Wire yesterday. In it, the auditor said that almost seven out of 10 rail accidents between 2017-18 and 2020-21 were derailments triggered by track defects, engineering and maintenance issues and operating errors.

Most reports probing the collision have highlighted how safety appears to have been compromised upon in spite of a large budget allocation.

Equipment Failure at Indian Railways Raises Questions Over Long-Term Safety Strategy

The incidents fall into a number of different categories: ‘rail fracture’, ‘train parting’, signal and weld failure among others.

New Delhi: The Indian Railways has witnessed a significant number of equipment failures between April 2018 and January 2019, according to internal government data, raising questions over the national transporter’s safety strategy.

The incidents fall into a number of different categories: ‘rail fracture’, ‘train parting’, signal and weld failure among others.

There were also 2,313 cases of over head electric (OHE) failure and 97,520 cases of signal failure reported up to January 2019, according to railways data accessed by The Wire.  

The data revealed that ‘coach detachment’ was recorded 1,302 times. Wagon detachment was recorded in 2,059 incidents while cases of ‘train parting’ were reported 643 times across the country, causing localised disruptions in railway operations.

In January alone, 60 cases of train parting and 201 cases of wagon detachment were reported.

Also read: Railways Finds Itself With Tough Task of Reversing Operating Ratio Before March 31

Train parting, coach and wagon detachment are all caused by what is called a ‘coupling break’, a serious safety concern for railways.

There were 3,001 rail fractures and 1,633 weld failures reported up to January 2019, a total of 4,634 incidents. In comparison, in FY’18, there were 4,369 record instances of rail and weld fracture. In FY’17, 3,546 such incidents were reported.

From April 2018 to January 2019 (nine months), there were also 468 cases of ‘hot axle’ incidents that were reported. When the bearing becomes hot, it causes the axles to overheat, leading to an accident. In comparison, in the previous two years, there were 521 (FY’17) and 453 (FY’18) hot axle issues.

On the diesel and electric front, there were 11,460 cases of electric locomotive failure and 9,054 cases of diesel locomotive failure up to January 2019.

The Central Railway reported the maximum number of electric loco incidents (2,304) while North Western Railway had the maximum diesel engine failures (1,367). In January alone, 21 cases of auxiliary transformer failure and ten cases of grid failure were reported.

There were five fire incidents, 43 derailment cases, six accidents at level crossings – three each at unmanned and manned level crossings – in the current fiscal.

Also read: What Happened to the ‘Strategic Rethink’ of the Railways’ 100% Electrification Policy?

In order to prevent accidents, the national transporter has undertaken a series of steps including signal upgradation and elimination of unmanned level crossings across the country, said a senior railway ministry official.

Besides this, track renewal is being carried out in almost all sections to prevent rail and weld fractures, the official added. However, repeated equipment failures have caused a serious setback in the railways’ safety drive.

Under previous railway minister Suresh Prabhu, the ministry kicked off ‘Kaya Kalp’ an exercise aimed at suggesting “improvements and innovation”. It primarily involved a committee headed by Ratan Tata – media reports from 2015 noted that the panel would “develop an action plan to reduce recurring train mishaps”.

However, when incumbent minister Piyush Goyal took charge at Rail Bhawan, the Kaya Kalp initiative was sidelined even though the committee had come out with some proposals and held six meetings that were presided over by Tata and attended by senior railway officials. 

Arun Kumar Das is a senior journalist and can be contacted at akdas2005@gmail.com

What Explains the High Number of Railway Accidents?

In 2015-16, a majority of train accidents were caused due to derailments (60%), followed by accidents at level crossings (33%).

In 2015-16, a majority of train accidents were caused due to derailments (60%), followed by accidents at level crossings (33%).

A train derailed in Pukhrayan, near Kanpur, in November 2016. Credit: Reuters/Jitendra Prakash

A train derailed in Pukhrayan, near Kanpur, in November 2016. Credit: Reuters/Jitendra Prakash

Safety has been one of the biggest concerns in the Indian Railways system. While the number of accidents have gone down over the last few years, the number still remains above 100. In light of recent train accidents, including the Duronto Express derailment on Tuesday (August 29) morning, it makes sense to look at the details around railway safety.

Causes of rail accidents

The number of rail accidents has declined from 325 in 2003-04 to 106 in 2015-16. The number of railway accidents divided by cause are shown in the graph below.  In 2015-16, majority of the accidents were caused due to derailments (60%), followed by accidents at level crossings (33%). In the last decade, accidents caused due to both these causes have reduced by about half. According to news reports, the recent railway accidents in UP were also caused due to derailment of the coaches.

Derailments

Between 2003-04 and 2015-16, derailments were the second highest reason for casualties. The Standing Committee on Railways had noted that one of the reasons for derailments is defect in the track or rolling stock. Of the total track length of 1,14,907 km in the country, 4,500 km should be renewed annually. However, in 2015-16, of the 5,000 km of track length due for renewal currently, only 2,700 km of track length was targeted to be renewed. The Standing Committee had recommended that Indian Railways should switch completely to the Linke Hoffman Busch (LHB) coaches as they do not pile upon each other during derailments and hence cause lesser casualties.2

Unmanned level crossings

Unmanned level crossings (UMLCs) continue to be the biggest cause of maximum casualties in rail accidents. Currently there are 14,440 UMLCs in the railway network. In 2014-15, about 40% of the accidents occurred at UMLCs, and in 2015-16, about 28%. Between 2010 and 2013, the ministry fell short of meeting the targets to eliminate UMLCs. Further, the target of eliminating UMLCs was reduced by about 50% in 2014-15. The Standing Committee on Railways had recommended that audio-visual warnings should be implemented at level crossings to warn road users about approaching trains. These may include the Approaching Train Warning Systems and the Train Actuated Warning Systems. In the Union Budget 2017-18, elimination of all unmanned level crossings on broad gauge lines by 2020 has been proposed.

Casualties and compensation

In the last few years, the number of casualties has varied. Further, on average, Indian Railways has paid Rs 303 lakh every year towards compensation for such accidents (see figure below).

Consequential train accidents

Consequential train accidents include collisions, derailments, accidents at level crossings, train fires and similar accidents that have serious repercussions in terms of casualties and damage to property. These exclude cases of trespassing at unmanned railway crossings. The causes of such consequential train accidents are shown in the graph below.

As seen in the figure above, the share of failure of railways staff is the biggest cause of consequential rail accidents. The number of rail accidents due to failure of reasons other than the railway staff (sabotage) has increased in the last few years.

Accidents due to failure of railway staff

The Standing Committee on Railways, when examining safety and security in the railways, had noted that more than half of the accidents are due to lapses on the part of railway staff. Such lapses include carelessness in working, poor maintenance work, adoption of short-cuts and non-observance of laid down safety rules and procedures. The committee had recommended that a regular refresher course for each category of railway staff should be conducted.

Accidents due to loco-pilots

Accidents also occur due to signalling errors for which loco-pilots (train operators) are responsible. With rail traffic increasing, loco-pilots encounter a signal at every kilometre and have to constantly be on high alert. Further, currently no technological support is available to the loco-pilots and they have to keep a vigilant watch on the signal and control the train accordingly. Loco-pilots are also overworked as they have to work beyond their stipulated hours of duty. This work stress and fatigue puts the life of thousands of commuters at risk and affects the safety of train operations. The Standing Committee on Railways had recommended that loco-pilots and other related running staff be provided with sound working conditions, better medical facilities and other amenities to improve their performance.  With regard to signals, the committee recommended that the location of signals can be uniformly displayed and be linked with visibility, braking distance and speed.

Under-investment in the railways leading to accidents

Various committees such as the High Level Safety Review Committee in 2012 (chaired by Anil Kakodkar) and the Standing Committee on Railways have looked at the aspect of safety in the Indian Railways and made certain recommendations. According to the Kakodkar Committee, the total financial implication of the safety measures over the five-year period (2012-17) was likely be around Rs 1 lakh crore.

In the Union Budget 2017-18, the creation of a Rashtriya Rail Sanraksha Kosh was proposed for passenger safety. It will have a corpus of Rs 1 lakh crore over a period of five years (Rs 20,000 crore per year).

While accidents have been decreasing, the number still remains fairly high. The Standing Committee on Railways noted that the slow expansion of rail networks has put undue burden on the existing infrastructure, leading to severe congestion and safety compromises. Since independence, while the railways’ route kilometres have increased by 23%, passenger and freight traffic over the railways network has increased by 1,344% and 1,642% respectively. This suggests that the railway lines are severely congested. Further, under-investment in the railways has resulted in congested routes, inability to add new trains, reduction of train speeds and more rail accidents. Therefore, avoiding such accidents in the future would also require significant investments towards capital and maintenance of railways infrastructure.

Prachee Mishra is a senior analyst at PRS Legislative Research.

This article was originally published on the PRS blog and is republished here with permission.