Indian Railways, considered to be a resilient railway system, got adverse publicity due to the accident near Balasore, but it has brought down accidents from 131 to 34 in the last decade by continuous investments in safety-related work. But this unwavering attention by the top management appears to have been missing in recent years.
Indian Railways is a very dynamic organisation where operational and safety instructions are implemented within 24 hours across the system, when the top management decrees it. Normally, the Railway Board sets policy guidelines and the zones function almost independently to implement them. Except in safety and operations, the Board’s intervention is the exception.
Operations and safety are routine but onerous tasks. They neither get visibility nor publicity. A smoothly running system is not newsworthy. However, it takes enormous dedication of field staff and the unwavering attention of the management.
Changed style of working
The government and the Minister of Railways (MoR) set organisational priorities. Like prior governments, this one also prioritised operations and safety. In addition, it added a number of other priorities ― faster execution of projects, fund mobilisation for them, 100% electrification, solar power generation, higher speeds, rapid replacement of coaches, rapid introduction of Vande Bharat trains, upgrading research facilities and setting up educational institutions. While most are highly commendable, the focus was misplaced and the style of functioning inappropriate.
Before 2014, MoRs rarely intervened in day-to-day running. After 2014, that changed slowly but palpably. MoR was assisted by a set of well-read consultants who nevertheless had no experience in running a large organisation like IR. While policy interventions are a minister’s prerogative and they can overrule the advice of a bureaucrat, the environment was such that free discussion became very difficult. Decision-making became highly centralised.
MoRs and the ‘MoR cell’ started intervening actively, first at the Board level, and then in zones and divisions. While monitoring by policy makers is welcome, it’s a problem when the focus is exclusively on their pet themes, at the cost of routine operations.
Belittling and putting down officers has become the norm. When the MoR publicly rebukes officials, it’s made viral on social media. Plus, compulsory and voluntary retirements have been forced on the officers. It became difficult to express a professional opinion. The pet themes of the ‘MoR cell’, selected to ensure constant visibility in the press and on social media, became the organisational obsession. Anecdotal evidence suggests a steady reduction in time spent on operational safety in review meetings.
While all this can be brushed aside as biased perception, the deployment of funds nails it.
Inadequate funding for safety
IR wanted to accelerate investment rapidly but operations offered inadequate surpluses and government grants were low. So it increased market borrowings and sought Public-Private Partnership projects. Regrettably, safety funds were also diverted to projects.
To ensure that sufficient amounts are allocated exclusively for specified purposes, IR maintains separate funds. It has three funds for safety ― Depreciation Reserve Fund (DRF), Railway Safety Fund (RSF), and Rashtriya Rail Sanraksha Kosh (RRSK).
DRF was set up to replenish operational assets and is crucial for safe running. Additions to DRF, which were around Rs 8,000 crore in 2013-14 and 2014-15, dwindled to Rs 1,540 crore in 2017-18, to Rs 200 crores in 2020-21, and finally to zero in 2021-22. CAG reports have observed that such inadequate provisioning is affecting safety.
The Railway Safety Fund, created in 2001, was primarily meant to finance the conversion of unmanned level crossings and for the construction of over/under bridges, and its main source is transfer of funds from the Central Road Fund (CRF). The fund has large additions of over Rs 10,000 crore every year. Its scope has been enlarged in 2016-17 to include new lines, electrification and gauge conversion. Thus, the safety fund is now partially a project fund.
IR started the Rashtriya Rail Sanraksha Kosh (RRSK) in 2017 with a corpus of Rs 1 lakh crore and an annual contribution of Rs 15,000 crore from the government and Rs 5,000 crore from internal resources. However, as internal surpluses were not available in the five-year period ending 2022-23, IR contributed only Rs 4,225 crore instead of Rs 25,000 crores. The government also defaulted on the Rs 15,000 crore promised every year.
So the Railways not only failed to provide sufficient funds for safety but also diverted safety funds to project execution. As per CAG estimates, assets worth Rs 95,000 crore were due for replacement up to 2020-21. Assets don’t fail overnight, but a debilitating effect is visible in the long term.
Unless safe operations are adopted as an abiding theme, both in terms of focus and funds, we could be looking at a spiralling problem in years to come. The top management should realise this.
M. Ravibabu retired from the Indian Railway Traffic Service.