M. Ravibabu

Why the Railways’ 100% Electrification Plan Is a Bizarre Decision

The move would increase average cost of transportation on many routes. The government’s stated goals also do not appear to make sense when considered against technical details.

Before 2018, the Indian Railways had proceeded cautiously before electrifying a route.

It used as basis, the gross million tonnes moved on a route. On routes with insufficient GMT, operational factors were taken into consideration before electrification.

All this was reversed in September 2018, when the Cabinet Committee on Economic Affairs (CCEA) of the Union government announced 100% electrification of the broad gauge routes as its goal.

The Railways highlighted the following advantages of 100% electrification:

Reduced operating cost,
Haulage of heavier freight trains and longer passenger trains,
Environment friendly mode of transport, and
Reduced dependence on imported crude oil.

These are being parroted both by political outfits and press. But let us analyse each of these items and assess the utility of the 100% electrification plan.

Where does this come from?

In economics, as fixed investments increase, assets have to be used intensely so that they become productive. Using the same principle, various committees appointed by Railway Board have analysed traffic break even points at which electrification is viable. Such break even points have ranged from around 6 gross million tonnes in 1963 to around 49 gross million tonnes in 1996.

Published data for 2012-13 on gross million tonnes carried on 55,590 route-kilometres is available. An analysis of gross million tonnes carried indicates that 18% of route-kilometres should not have been electrified when 6 gross million tonnes was carried. The percentage rises to 85% of route-kilometres when it is 49 gross million tonnes.

If one chooses an average figure of 27 gross million tonnes, 62% of route-kilometres should not be electrified.

The Railways have many divisions with terminals beyond which trains do not run. Izatnagar division, bordering the sub-Himalayan region, in the North Eastern Railway, is one such. Data on gross million tonnes for the Izatnagar division indicates that for the year 2019-20, out of over 1,000 route-kilometres, around 40% carried less than 6 gross million tonnes. This indicates the futility of electrification of these routes.

In addition to the economics, electrified sections are most vulnerable to various unusual occurrences. In such cases diesel locos are used for emergency operations. With 100% electrification, recovery from emergency situations will be delayed and also become complicated.

With this background, let us analyse the tenability of advantages proffered for electrification.

Also read: India’s Rail Routes are Being Electrified, But Electric Locos Still Can’t Run On All of Them

‘Reduced operating cost’

Reduced operating would be effective when the traffic crosses the traffic density given above. Otherwise electric operations would be costlier than diesel operations. This is because of the higher fixed cost involved in electrification. Thus, by quoting operating costs and ignoring fixed and average costs, the Railways have misguided the public.

‘Haulage of heavier freight trains and longer passenger trains’

This is another of the myths propagated without much logic. Routes on the Railways are classified into five categories – A to E.

A and B routes are designed for 160 and 130 kilometre per hour (kmph) speeds respectively. More than 90% of A and B routes, except few exceptions like the Jalpaiguri line, were electrified before 2018. While C route is for suburban sections, routes D and D Special have maximum speeds of 110 kmph. E routes have maximum speed of 100 kmph. As most these routes had not been electrified before 2018, diesel locos would essentially be running on these routes.

The highest power of electric passenger and goods locos operational in the Railways (not including locos on dedicated freight corridor) is 6350 and 6120 Horse Power (HP) respectively while those of diesel passenger and goods locos is 4,500 HP. Other than A and B routes, diesel locos would not be any inferior to electrical locos in hauling similar length passenger trains at maximum speeds on other routes.

As far as goods trains are considered, while power is important another important parameter is the tractive effort – which indicates a locomotive’s ability to start a trailing load. Incidentally, both electric and diesel locos have almost same tractive effort – indicating that their ability to start heavy loads are similar. Thus speeds for diesel trains could be little lower due to lesser power but difference would not be substantial.

Thus, haulage of heavier loads and longer passenger trains is wholly untenable and difference, if any, is insignificant.

‘Environment friendly mode of transport’

Another myth being publicised is that diesel loco emits smoke while electric loco does not.

Unfortunately, in 2021-22, 75% of electricity in India is generated from fossil fuels and the smoke emitted by these plants is no less than what a diesel loco emits. In spite of hype about renewable energy production, total electricity produced from wind and solar sources is 11.5% of the total electricity produced in the country in 2021-22.

The Railway has also created a lot of hype about it own renewable energy production. It needs to install 30,000 mega watts (MW) to be carbon neutral by 2030 and as of February 23 its total installed capacity is 147 MW of solar and 103 MW of wind.

They are estimated to produce 0.66 billion units – which is 3% of the Railway’s electricity consumption for traction purposes and 0.04% of total India’s electricity production.

Also read: India’s First High-Power Electric Loco, Flagged off by Modi in April, Fails Test Run

‘Reduced dependence on imported crude oil and saving foreign currency’

In the year 2021-22, the Indian Railways consumed around 1.25 million tonnes of diesel, while India consumed 76.6 million tonnes of diesel and 201.7 million tonnes of all petroleum products put together. Thus the Railways consumed 1.62 % of diesel consumed in the country and 0.62% petroleum products consumed in the country. The import bill for March 22 for crude oil was US $ 13.7 billion while the reserves as on March 31, 2022, were US $ 598 billion – which is 2.3% of the total reserves. With a 0.62% share in consumption of total petroleum products, impact of IR’s diesel consumption on foreign exchange works out to 0.01%.

Though the stated reasons for 100% electrification are laudable, the above establishes that they are misplaced.

What about diesel assets?

The decision took no consideration of the diesel assets available with the Railways and its contractual commitments. As on March 31, 2018, the Railways had 5,866 diesel locos and conservative estimate of these locos would be around Rs 52,800 crores. More importantly, the Railways have a contractual commitment to GE Transportation to to buy 1,000 locos worth around Rs 14,000 crores over a 10-year period.

Did the CCEA not note assets worth Rs 66,800 crores or the strengths developed in diesel loco domain before taking the decision?

Politics and finances behind the decision

The National Democratic Alliance government came to power with a promise that it would improve the Railways.

From 2016-17, Railways finances were in the doldrums. In the year 2016-17, railway freight reduced by around 35 million tonnes, a probable outcome of demonetisation, and the operating ratio – amount spent to earn Rs 100 – deteriorated to 96.5 from the previous year’s value of 90.5. The figure itself is an exercise in window dressing by reducing depreciation amount, and if the 2014-15 amount was provided for depreciation of assets then the ratio would have further deteriorated to 99. In 2017-18, the operating ratio further deteriorated to 98.4 with reduced provision for depreciation. If the 2014-15 amount was provided for depreciation, then the ratio would work out to 103 – indicating that IR was making operational losses after a very long time.

It is in this context that one has to look at the decision of 100% Railway electrification. It would bring in a lot of visibility. In addition, one can assign popular, but glib reasons such as environmental friendliness, saving of foreign exchange and operational convenience. But they appear to be attempts to detract from the Railways’ performance.

Harmful consequences

As seen above, the 100% electrification move would increase average cost of transportation on many routes. To offset this increase, the Railways have to increase passenger and freight prices. However, as transport market is highly price sensitive they would shift to other modes – predominantly to road. This in turn would increase consumption of fossil fuels and increase pollution.

Though 100% electrification is harmful for the Railways, it cannot be reversed at this juncture. However, it is high time that the government reviews critically some of its policies.

M. Ravibabu, retired from the Indian Railways and is a founder member of Anekdhara, a public policy portal.

How the Movie ‘Razakar – Silent Genocide of Hyderabad’ Sets Out to Distort History

Violence perpetuated during the Nizam of Hyderabad’s rule was not a communal genocide.

The teaser of Razakar – Silent Genocide of Hyderabad, a movie purported to bring out the historic realities of Nizam rule in Telangana just before and after Indian independence, was released in September. The teaser claims that the Nizam’s aim was to make Hyderabad an independent Islamic state and a silent genocide was committed on the Hindu population of Hyderabad state.

The Nizam’s ruling structure, nearly static since inception, was headed by the Nizam. Below him were the Muslim nobility in the court. Below them were a huge retinue, mostly Hindus, helping the Nizam in administering the countryside.

Out of 53 million acres of land, 10% was the fiefdom of the Nizam, 30% was with nobles and landlords, and the rest was under government land revenue. In addition to back-breaking taxes, all methods were used to exploit the peasantry. Accentuating these problems are the religious and linguist differences between the ruled and the ruler – acutely felt by the urban elite.

Thus while the regime was patently pro-Muslim, the rural set up was bolstered by Hindu upper castes thus it was not an Islamic theocratic state. Within the feudal set up that the Nizam was presiding over, there is evidence to show that the Nizam was syncretic as he gave grants to temples and educational institutions, and for promoting works not limited to Islam. This was further strengthened as the Nizam banned cow slaughter in public places in 1923.

By 1946, with the imminent departure of the British, chaos set in and Hyderabad became a power keg. The Nizam wanted to cling to power, come what may. As the Nizam’s army was weak and police inadequate and corrupt, he encouraged a Muslim extremist organisation, Majlis-E-Ittehadul Muslimeen (MIM). Under the militant presidentship of Kasim Razvi, its militia swelled to around 200,000 – propped by the inflow of Muslims from within and outside Hyderabad state. They were joined by militia of the rural gentry, who were mostly Hindu, and some lower caste Hindus badly impacted by caste and economic oppression. Thus while it was a predominantly Muslim force, it had some Hindus.

The Arya Samaj and Hindu Mahasabha were active in Hyderabad, and in Marathi- and Kannada-speaking areas. They trained cadre within the state and also outside, and focused narrowly on shuddi (religious reconversion) and Hindu rights. As per Padmaja Naidu, as quoted in Lucien D Benichou’s From Autocracy To Integration, communal tensions arose owing to the competitive conversions by the Arya Samaj and Muslim organisations. She further says that the Congress was a divided house, with most conservatives supporting communal elements. Sporadic satyagraha calls from the Congress also unnerved the Nizam.

In parallel, the Andhra Maha Sabha and Communist led resistance of common people in rural areas of Telangana, especially in the districts of Warangal, Nalgonda and Khammam. By September 1948, in about 3,000 villages landlords were driven out and self rule was set up by the poor and around 10 lakh acres of land distributed to people. However, no such resistance movements were noticed in the Karnataka and Marathwada areas.

K. M. Munshi, in his book The End of an Era, writes that between October 1947 and April 1948, Razakars (a paramilitary force) committed 260 events of brutality but does not elaborate further. A white paper published by the Government of India in 1948 describes 53 events of Razakar atrocities in four districts of Marathwada. As per author’s assessment, in the 53 events around 200 deaths occurred, probably 20 rapes were committed (may be an underestimate as rapes are not stated easily), and around 50 incidents of loot happened of which around 30 were against the rich like moneylenders, business people or village heads. If one extends the same proportion to the 260 events, probable deaths would be around 980. The Hindu cites one report to say Razakars were responsible for the murder of 880 people and the rape of about 1,125 women before August 1948.

The situation in areas under the control of communists was entirely different, as people resisted and replied to the Razakars in the same coin. It is estimated that 2,000 communist militants laid down their lives, but killed a similar number in retaliation.

A few events, originally written about by Munshi and reported in various other fora, need to be discussed to understand the nature of Razakar atrocities. The first is the brutal murder of Shoebullah Khan, a journalist. His only crime was he was advocating for the merger of Hyderabad into India. His murder showed that all opponents were killed, religious affiliation did not matter.

Another more brutal event was the murder of 200 people in Gorata B village in Basavakalyan in Karnataka. According to Munshi, this was the chain of events, “On January 29, the Minister Venkatarao, leader of the Ittehad Harijans, made a vicious attack in an open conference on the Brahmans, Banias and Lingayats …He declared that the Lingayats were the arch criminals …miseries of the depressed classes and he therefore exhorted his people to exterminate them.” Munshi indicates that Muslims did attack, but had some backing from others.

Another event was in Bairanpalli village in Telangana where more than half a dozen attacks of Razakars and police to reinstate the local landlords were rebuffed by the villagers. Finally, the Nizam’s military was deployed leading to the death of 88 people. Hindus were killed to bring back Hindu landlords – not a communal genocide.

From the above, it can be seen that in addition to religion there were other proximate causes for violence. Reinstatement of the local landlords is the most important reason in Telangana.

During and immediately after the police action, around 25,000-30,000 Muslims were killed, according to the Sundarlal committee. It also noted that at many places, army and police personnel took active part in perpetuating the violence. The report also states that violence was also perpetuated by men from a communal organisation from Solapur. Between 1948 and ’51, 2,000 communists were killed by the Indian Army with the help of local landlords – thus reinstating them in their villages.

The above narrative affirms there was violence and mayhem, but it was not a genocide of a particular religious community. Till 1947, Asaf Jahis (the ruling dynasty) not only did not show any streak of religious extremism, but even co-opted the Hindu rural gentry to exploit the poor and the meek. Events after 1947 also show how the Razakars, while using religious slogans to mobilise, were undertaking a secular activity of amassing wealth or reinstating the Hindu landlords to their lands. Thus a Hindu genocide was never the intention nor the purpose of the violence, but the rhetoric was communal.

Regarding the setting up of an Islamic republic, Asaf Jahis never showed this intent in their 225 years of rule. They always had fair-weather friends from all faiths. Even in 1947, the Nizam was more worried about his kingdom and not what happens to Islam or to other Muslims.

Thus the film title Razakar – Silent Genocide of Hyderabad and the assertions in the teaser are a distortion of history. But in these days of lies and half-truths, facts don’t matter. As a Telugu saying goes, it is an “attempt to collect money on dead bodies”.

M. Ravibabu is a retired civil servant and co-founder of Anekdhara – a public policy forum.

Headline-Hunting and Diversion of Safety Funds Are Hurting Indian Railways

The Railways not only failed to provide sufficient funds for safety but also diverted safety funds to project execution.

Indian Railways, considered to be a resilient railway system, got adverse publicity due to the accident near Balasore, but it has brought down accidents from 131 to 34 in the last decade by continuous investments in safety-related work. But this unwavering attention by the top management appears to have been missing in recent years.

Indian Railways is a very dynamic organisation where operational and safety instructions are implemented within 24 hours across the system, when the top management decrees it. Normally, the Railway Board sets policy guidelines and the zones function almost independently to implement them. Except in safety and operations, the Board’s intervention is the exception.

Operations and safety are routine but onerous tasks. They neither get visibility nor publicity. A smoothly running system is not newsworthy. However, it takes enormous dedication of field staff and the unwavering attention of the management.

Changed style of working

The government and the Minister of Railways (MoR) set organisational priorities. Like prior governments, this one also prioritised operations and safety. In addition, it added a number of other priorities ― faster execution of projects, fund mobilisation for them, 100% electrification, solar power generation, higher speeds, rapid replacement of coaches, rapid introduction of Vande Bharat trains, upgrading research facilities and setting up educational institutions. While most are highly commendable, the focus was misplaced and the style of functioning inappropriate.

Before 2014, MoRs rarely intervened in day-to-day running. After 2014, that changed slowly but palpably. MoR was assisted by a set of well-read consultants who nevertheless had no experience in running a large organisation like IR. While policy interventions are a minister’s prerogative and they can overrule the advice of a bureaucrat, the environment was such that free discussion became very difficult. Decision-making became highly centralised.

MoRs and the ‘MoR cell’ started intervening actively, first at the Board level, and then in zones and divisions. While monitoring by policy makers is welcome, it’s a problem when the focus is exclusively on their pet themes, at the cost of routine operations.

Belittling and putting down officers has become the norm. When the MoR publicly rebukes officials, it’s made viral on social media. Plus, compulsory and voluntary retirements have been forced on the officers. It became difficult to express a professional opinion. The pet themes of the ‘MoR cell’, selected to ensure constant visibility in the press and on social media, became the organisational obsession. Anecdotal evidence suggests a steady reduction in time spent on operational safety in review meetings.

While all this can be brushed aside as biased perception, the deployment of funds nails it.

Inadequate funding for safety

IR wanted to accelerate investment rapidly but operations offered inadequate surpluses and government grants were low. So it increased market borrowings and sought Public-Private Partnership projects. Regrettably, safety funds were also diverted to projects.

To ensure that sufficient amounts are allocated exclusively for specified purposes, IR maintains separate funds. It has three funds for safety ― Depreciation Reserve Fund (DRF), Railway Safety Fund (RSF), and Rashtriya Rail Sanraksha Kosh (RRSK).

DRF was set up to replenish operational assets and is crucial for safe running. Additions to DRF, which were around Rs 8,000 crore in 2013-14 and 2014-15, dwindled to Rs 1,540 crore in 2017-18, to Rs 200 crores in 2020-21, and finally to zero in 2021-22. CAG reports have observed that such inadequate provisioning is affecting safety.

The Railway Safety Fund, created in 2001, was primarily meant to finance the conversion of unmanned level crossings and for the construction of over/under bridges, and its main source is transfer of funds from the Central Road Fund (CRF). The fund has large additions of over Rs 10,000 crore every year. Its scope has been enlarged in 2016-17 to include new lines, electrification and gauge conversion. Thus, the safety fund is now partially a project fund.

IR started the Rashtriya Rail Sanraksha Kosh (RRSK) in 2017 with a corpus of Rs 1 lakh crore and an annual contribution of Rs 15,000 crore from the government and Rs 5,000 crore from internal resources. However, as internal surpluses were not available in the five-year period ending 2022-23, IR contributed only Rs 4,225 crore instead of Rs 25,000 crores. The government also defaulted on the Rs 15,000 crore promised every year.

So the Railways not only failed to provide sufficient funds for safety but also diverted safety funds to project execution. As per CAG estimates, assets worth Rs 95,000 crore were due for replacement up to 2020-21. Assets don’t fail overnight, but a debilitating effect is visible in the long term.

Unless safe operations are adopted as an abiding theme, both in terms of focus and funds, we could be looking at a spiralling problem in years to come. The top management should realise this.

M. Ravibabu retired from the Indian Railway Traffic Service.