Karakoram Pass

Indian, Chinese Troops To Complete Gogra Disengagement on September 12: MEA

The ministry also confirmed that all temporary structures and other infrastructure created in the area by both sides will be dismantled and mutually verified.

New Delhi: The disengagement between Indian and Chinese troops at Patrolling Point 15 (PP-15) will be completed within five days on September 12, just ahead of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit in Uzbekistan, where both Chinese President Xi Jinping and Prime minister Narendra Modi are likely to be in attendance.

The announcement about the disengagement at PP-15 was made on Thursday through a terse joint press release. It effectively created the fourth buffer zone in eastern Ladakh, where the Indian Army and the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) had been at a stand-off at multiple points since May 2020.

The strategically important areas of Demchok and Depsang plains continue to have armies of the two giant neighbours in close proximity, with no signs of compromise.

Giving more details of the understanding reached between the two sides about PP15 disengagement, the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) spokesperson Arindam Bagchi said that the armies have “agreed to cease forward deployments in this area in a phased, coordinated and verified manner, resulting in the return of the troops of both sides to their respective areas”.

“As per the agreement, the disengagement process in this area started on 08 September 2022 at 0830 hrs and will be completed by 12 September 2022,” he added on Friday.

The agreement about PP-15 is based on discussions held at the 16th round of talks between Corps Commanders on July 17.

Bagchi further noted that “all temporary structures and other allied infrastructure created in the area by both sides will be dismantled and mutually verified”. “The landforms in the area will be restored to pre-stand-off period by both sides,” he said.

The MEA spokesperson observed that the Line of Actual Control (LAC) “in this area will be strictly observed and respected by both sides, and that there will be no unilateral change in status quo”.

“With the resolution of stand-off at PP-15, both sides mutually agreed to take the talks forward and resolve the remaining issues along LAC and restore peace and tranquility in India-China border areas,” stated Bagchi.

At a briefing in Beijing on Friday, Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Mao Ning reiterated that the “status quo of April 2020 you mentioned was created by India’s illegal crossing of the LAC”. “China will by no means accept that,” she added.

Describing the start of the disengagement at PP-15 as a “positive development”, Mao said, “We don’t accept the so-called status quo created by India’s illegal crossing of the LAC, but that doesn’t mean we don’t attach importance to peace and tranquility along the border.”

The movement towards disengagement of the fourth friction point occurs in the run-up to the SCO summit at Samarkand on September 15-16. While Beijing has made no formal announcement, Chinese President Xi Jinping will certainly travel to Uzbekistan for the summit, as Russia has officially confirmed a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin on the sidelines. This would be the first foreign travel by President Xi in over two years.

India has, so far, officially not announced a visit by Prime Minister Modi, but he is likely to travel to Uzbekistan as per indications. If Modi does meet with Xi in Uzbekistan, it will be their first face-to-face encounter since the BRICS summit in Brazil in November 2019.

In June 2020, Indian and Chinese troops clashed at Galwan valley in Ladakh, leaving over 23 dead – the deadliest clash at the LAC since 1975.

According to the Times of India, the fourth ‘no-patrol buffer zone’ at PP-15 means that Indian soldiers will fall back to their permanent posts, and PLA troops will withdraw towards their side of the LAC.

The previous buffer zones were created at PP-14, PP-17A and both banks of the Pangong Tso, ranging in size from three to nearly 10 kilometres. As the Indian media reported, there had been concerns that these buffer zones primarily covered areas that India claimed as its territory.

As per reports, the Chinese encroachment on Depsang Plains is a significant concern, as it is located near the Karakoram Pass in the north and Daulat Beg Oldie. Indian troops have not been able to patrol towards its traditional patrolling points in Depsang after being blocked by the Chinese since May 2020.

Podcast | How Have Medicinal Plants Changed Our World?

Tropical plants have driven exploration, started wars, transformed economies. Hear the stories in episode 2 of the new Scrolls & Leaves podcast.

Faced with COVID-19, for which there are no specific treatments, people have scrambled to find herbal remedies to protect themselves.

Plant-based medicine companies have spotted the opportunity. In June, Baba Ramdev, yoga guru and the owner of Pantanjali Ltd., claimed without evidence that an herbal medicine named ‘Coronil’ could cure COVID-19. In Afghanistan, an herbalist was caught mixing opiates with plants and selling that to people. There’s been a run on “immunity boosting” foods, techniques and supplements around the world.

Understandably, all this can make one wary of alternative remedies. But in episode 2 of Scrolls & Leaves, ‘Healing Plants’, we search for an alternative – and hopefully, less conflicting – narrative about plants as medicine. Scrolls & Leaves is an immersive-sound history podcast, and season 1, entitled ‘Trade Winds’, focuses on how trade across the Indian Ocean over the past 2,000 years changed our world.

We know plants are healers, of course. But they’re also so much more. They have shaped our history. Just a few centuries ago, they drove exploration, started wars, transformed economies. Today, they are the bedrock of Big Pharma and traditional medicine empires like Patanjali Ayurved.

The episode begins with a murder on the Karakoram Pass, and a hunt for the killer that yields an ancient pocketbook that belonged to a Buddhist monk. The book has recipes for medicines – including one for boosting intelligence and memory (04:52).

We then go briefly to Europe for a royal wedding, and then travel back with the explorer Vasco da Gama (did you know an Arab Omani sailor was piloting his ship?) to the Malabar coast, fabled home to spices – and maybe even a unicorn? (13:00)

In India, Europeans jostle to learn about medicinal plants featured in its rich folk and traditional medical systems. Soon, they set up a global supply chain to transport valuable plants back to Europe. The medicinal knowledge taken from the tropics is written into journals by the Royal Society, which is Britain’s national academy of sciences (26:00).

And finally, with advances in chemistry, Europeans learn to extract the active compounds from plants, and start making pills (29:30). The new way of doing science revolutionises medicine, and ‘modern establishment medicine’ supplants traditional medical systems as the go-to in most places around the world, according to Dominik Wujastyk, an Ayurveda scholar at the University of Alberta, Canada.

Like in episode 1, ‘Pandemics & Borders’, this episode hints at cultural and knowledge appropriation, as well as the connections between science and empire.

We can’t fault the modern life-saving drugs that Western medicine has given us. But we wonder if something effervescent doesn’t get lost when plants become pills? Perhaps the traditional and holistic healing framework that medicinal plants once belonged to?

The first two episodes of Scrolls & Leaves are supported by India BioScience, DBT/Wellcome Trust India Alliance and Deepa Agashe at NCBS.

What Rajnath Left Out: PLA Blocks Access to 900 Sq Km of Indian Territory in Depsang

The scale of Chinese control in this strategically significant corner of Ladakh makes it the largest chunk of territory denied to Indian soldiers in a single swoop since the 1962 war, a fact that warranted inclusion in the defence minister’s speech.

New Delhi: In ‘The Adventure of Silver Blaze’, Arthur Conan Doyle’s story about the theft of the eponymous race horse, everyone assumed a stranger stole the horse. But Sherlock Holmes pinned its disappearance on the horse’s late trainer because a dog at the stable did not bark on the night of the crime. The dog’s silence was an important clue which solved the mystery of who took the horse.

It was in a similar vein that defence minister Rajnath Singh’s speech in parliament on the situation on the border with China in Ladakh was silent about the strategically vital area of the Depsang plains in Sub-Sector North (SSN). The omission of this place name from Singh’s speech provides an important clue as to what the most vital area for India is on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Ladakh.

Of the more than 1,000 square kilometres in Ladakh along the LAC now under Chinese control after tensions erupted in May, the scale of Chinese control in Depsang alone is about 900 square kilometres. That would make it the largest chunk of Indian territory denied to Indian soldiers in a single swoop after the 1962 Sino-India war, a fact which surely warranted inclusion in an official speech to parliament by the raksha mantri.

The PLA has denied the Indian Army’s patrols access to five patrol points – PP 10, 11, 11a, 12 and 13 – which marked India’s limit of patrol, or LOP, by blocking them at Bottleneck/Y junction around 18 km inside the LAC. Map: The Wire.

Depsang is the area for which specific major general-level talks were held between the two sides on August 8. It can thus be no one’s case that there is no problem at Depsang – the Chinese have stopped Indian patrols from accessing five patrolling points in the area since May. As the map above indicates, Indian soldiers have effectively been blocked from going up to the traditional ‘limit of patrol’ line near the Line of Actual Control because of the presence of Chinese troops at a key point in Depsang 18 kilometres inside the LAC known as Bottleneck/Y-Junction.

Like the northern bank of Pangong Tso, this area was a point of contention between the two sides where local arrangements allowed both sides to patrol the area but those mechanisms have broken down since May.

While Indian military patrols being denied access to such territory is significant, more worrisome is the fact that the army has always identified this area – including Trig Heights and Daulat Beg Oldie (DBO) – where it finds itself most vulnerable in Ladakh. For decades, the army’s annual war-games in Udhampur have flagged it as the most important area of concern, devising plans to tackle the major Chinese challenge that would put India at a huge strategic disadvantage.

Also read: In Lok Sabha, Rajnath Paints Unclear Picture of Ladakh; Key Questions on China Stand-Off Remain

Geography

It is the geography of the area which makes it so vital strategically. Broadly called the Sub-Sector North (SSN), this is an enclave of flat terrain that provides land access to Central Asia through the Karakoram Pass. The Line of Control (LoC) that was marked and signed on maps between India and Pakistan in 1972 ended at a point called NJ9842.

Map of the Siachen and Sub-Sector North area in Ladakh. Graphic: The Wire

India contends that the line runs further northwards, placing the Siachen glacier firmly in Indian territory. That line beyond NJ9842 is called the Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL). But the Pakistani side claims that the line runs towards north east, connecting NJ9842 to the Karakoram Pass. That would place the Siachen glacier inside Pakistani control, and physically link Pakistan and China.

The strategically important area of SSN lies to the east of Siachen, located between the Saltoro ridge on the Pakistani border and the Saser ridge close to the Chinese border. It is the only place where a physical military collusion can take place between Pakistan and China – and the challenge of a two-front war can become real in the worst-case scenario. In such a scenario, it will be nearly impossible for India to launch a military operation to wrest back Gilgit-Baltistan from Pakistan.

The flat terrain of Depsang, Trig Heights and DBO, which provides direct access to Aksai Chin, is suited for mechanised warfare but is located at the end of a very long and tenuous communication axis for India. China, in turn, has multiple roads that provide easy access to the area. This leaves SSN highly vulnerable to an ingress by the PLA. It is also seen as a viable launchpad for a mechanised force-based military offensive launched by India inside Aksai Chin, if the army has to fulfil Union home minister Amit Shah’s desire of getting back Aksai Chin from China.

Also read: We Need to Look at What Was Missing in the India-China Joint Statement

In 2007, India decided to construct two roads to access SSN. The first was on the alignment of the old track from Darbuk to Shyok and then onwards to DBO. There were problems with the initial alignment, which led to a delay in its completion. The 255-km long all-weather road was formally inaugurated by the defence minister last October. Military planners say that the 430-meter long bridge across the Shyok River, which the minister opened, is also the weakest link on the strategic road.

The DSDBO road to Sub-Sector North

The second road constructed by BRO is from Sasoma in Nubra River valley via the Saser La. This is a jeepable track which has been improved this summer but it provides limited connectivity, that too only during the summer months.

The only other access to SSN is an aerial one via the DBO airstrip, located eight kilometres south of the Karakoram Pass. The old Advanced Landing Ground lying in disuse was made operational in 2008. In peacetime, it can be used to sustain the troops deployed in the area but the army remains doubtful about the Indian Air Force risking its top-end strategic lift aircraft to Chinese action in the event of any conflict.

India’s concern

Indian military planners do not foresee a scenario in which PLA can physically link up with the Pakistan army, as that would mean capturing a formidable obstacle – the Siachen glacier. But the PLA could try and cut off the Indian road to Siachen, providing Pakistan’s army with an opportunity to launch an offensive to capture positions on the Saltoro ridge and the Siachen glacier. Towards this aim, after succeeding in an initial mechanised battle, the PLA could seize Saser La, and then reach Sasoma which lies short of the Siachen base camp. This would deny India the road that feeds its deployment of the central and northern glacier, even though the southern glacier would still be maintained through existing routes.

Also read: From ‘LAC’ to ‘Border Areas’, the Joint Statement Indicates What India Has Lost to China

Aware of the larger strategic challenge, there are three concerns for the army. One, the limited connectivity to the area which can be cut off by targeting the bridge on the DSDBO road which makes sending of reinforcements and provisioning of logistics difficult. It is not confident that the DBO airstrip can be kept operational by the IAF once war breaks out. Two, the lack of good defensive features in SSN, where Indian troops can deploy and force the PLA into a prolonged battle by imposing delay and heavy losses. And finally, the wear and tear imposed on the mechanised military platforms while operating at a high altitude of 17,000 feet in an environment with low oxygen content.

Over the years, the army has taken steps to overcome some of the drawbacks. It had made heavy deployment of mechanised forces, along with the infantry troops, ab initio in the area. A number of shelters and maintenance yards were constructed to protect the mechanised military platforms in the area, to prolong their service life.

Three former Northern Army Commanders that The Wire spoke to said that the battle plans have been refined in the wargames and the army is better prepared for a PLA ingress in the area than it had been earlier. But all of them flagged it as an area of strategic vulnerability and biggest worry for India in the region, far more than Pangong Tso or the Galwan Valley. That is why it is all the more surprising that the defence minister chose to omit Depsang from his statement to parliament on Tuesday.

Sushant Singh is an award-winning journalist who has served in the Indian Army. He has taught political science at Yale University.

A Tragedy has Been Averted but the Danger for India and China Persists

Going forward, it is essential that each side understand its opponent.

A tragedy has been averted: Chinese troops that had entered the disputed areas that lie between the Indian and Chinese definitions of the Line of Actual Control, have pulled back from three of them. Indian troops have done the same.

But the military build-up in their base areas outside the intermediate “grey” zone continues.

If the talks between Indian national security adviser Ajit Doval and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi do not yield fruit, it is certain to increase. The clouds of war have therefore only lifted: they have yet to disperse.

Galwan and Dhola – The similarity between 2020 and 1962

To appreciate how close we came to a war last month, we only need to remind ourselves of how the 1962 war began. Officially, it began when the Chinese attacked Dhola post, not far from Tawang, in the eastern Himalayas on October 20, and ended with a China-declared unilateral truce on November 21. In reality, it began 10 days earlier and, like the conflict in the Galwan valley on June 15, it too started over a cartographic dispute.

Also read: It Is Time to Accept How Badly India Misread Chinese Intentions in 1962 – and 2020

How this dispute arose is described in detail in the still proscribed Henderson-Brooks Report of 1963, but can now be downloaded from the internet. In August 1962, Eastern Command informed Delhi that one of its patrols had reported that the tri-junction of Bhutan, India and Tibet marked on the McMahon line did not fall on the Himalayan watershed, as McMahon had intended it to do, but four miles south of it .

McMahon Line, Original Map of the North-East Frontier.

The Ministry of External Affairs took this up with the Chinese government, presumably suggesting a rectification, but Beijing did not agree. So in September, Delhi decided to correct it on its own, established the Dhola post at a point between the two locations, and manned it with a platoon of soldiers. This post was immediately surrounded by 600 Chinese soldiers with the obvious intention of starving the defenders out.

A stalemate ensued during which both sides sent more troops to the area. The first skirmish took place in early October and went the way of India. On October 10, therefore, Delhi asked the army to ‘evict the Chinese from the Thagla ridge’. What followed is history and need not detain us here.

Also read: Why It Is Imperative That Indians Come to Know What Happened in 1962

The situation that developed at Patrol Point 14 in the Galwan valley on June 15 is similar to the one that had developed at the Dhola post 58 years earlier. On June 15, it was only the stringent protocols designed to prevent armed conflict, put in place after the 1993 Agreement on Peace and Tranquility in the Border region, that prevented the savage hand-to-hand fighting that took place from tuning into a bloodbath. Had those protocols not been in place, India and China may well have been in the middle of another fratricidal war today.

Who needs another war?

Neither country wants, needs, or indeed can afford, a war in the Himalayas now. So as talks at the diplomatic level begin, it has become imperative for civil society in both countries to understand what brought us to the brink of war and how we can get back to a durable and mutually beneficial peace.

More specifically, we need to understand why the Chinese chose to occupy these particular stretches of the LAC; why the PLA stayed broadly within the limits of China’s definition of the LAC and, having gone so far, why it has now agreed to move back from three of them and thin down its presence in the other two.

Depsang Plains in Ladakh. Photo: Wikimedia Commons/ CC BY-SA 3.0

The topography of the region answers the first question. The Depsang plains are the closest point on the Chinese LAC to Daulat Beg Oldi. DBO is situated on a finger of land west of the Karakoram range, at only 13 kilometres from the Karakoram Pass, and a little more than 200 kms from the Khunjerab pass through which the Karakoram highway, which links China to Pakistan now, passes.

Till only two years ago, for all but a few months in summer, Daulat Beg Oldi was linked to the rest of Ladakh only by air. But following the completion of a 450-metre bridge across the Shyok river, it is now linked by an all-weather road. DBO also has an airfield now that can take Antonov and C-130 Hercules cargo planes. Finally, it is barely 120 kilometres – six minutes in a modern fighter plane – from G219, China’s strategic link road between Xinxiang and Tibet.

Pangong lake, at the other end of the road, is 134 kms long and G219 skirts its eastern shore just as the road to DBO skirts its western edge. It therefore provides a swift route for moving large numbers of troops, artillery and armour from deep inside Tibet to places from which they can cut off the road to DBO within hours. Occupying the heights above finger 4, can give the PLA the capacity to interdict any Indian counter-attack on Chinese landing craft in the lake. A similar dominating position in the heights above the Galwan valley can give the PLA a second choke point from which to target the road from Ladakh to DBO.

Daulat Beg Oldi shown in the northernmost part of Ladakh (1988 CIA map).
Photo: Wikimedia Commons/Public domain

These are strategic deployments of the kind usually made in anticipation of war. So why, after having made them, did China take care to remain within its broad definition of the LAC and agree to talks? The only rational explanation is that its purpose was not to annex the land but to force the Modi government into a dialogue to clear the misgivings and distrust that its abrupt change of foreign policy in 2014 had sown in Beijing’s mind.

This was underlined by China’s ambassador to India, Sun Weidong, who has stated repeatedly since the confrontation began that China’s goal is to forge a strategic partnership, not rivalry with India. It was also echoed by the foreign office’s spokesperson in Beijing: “The Indian side should not have (sic) strategic miscalculation on China. We hope it will work with China to uphold the overall picture of our bilateral relations.”

But what does China mean by ‘strategic miscalculation’ and ‘strategic partnership’? In the second part of this article, we will examine this crucial dimension of the current crisis in the bilateral relationship against the backdrop of wider region and global security dynamics.

Victor Gao was the English language interpreter for Chairman Deng Xiaoping, from 1984 to 1988. (In this photo he is seen interpreting for Chairman Deng and US Vice President Walter Mondale in Beijing in 1984.) He is currently chair professor, Soochow University and vice president, Centre for China and Globalisation. The CCG is ranked 94th among the world’s top think tanks.

Prem Shankar Jha is a columnist for The Wire, former media adviser to V.P. Singh when he was prime minister and former Editor of the Hindustan Times. He is the author of Managed Chaos: The Fragility of the Chinese Miracle (2009) and Crouching Dragon, Hidden Tiger: Can China and India dominate the West ( 2010).

Note: In an earlier version of this article, a zero was dropped while describing the distance from the Khunjerab Pass to Daulat Beg Oldi. The sentence should have read “little more than 200 km” and not “little more than 20 km”.

It Is Time to Accept How Badly India Misread Chinese Intentions in 1962 – and 2020

China has changed the rules of the game unilaterally and given a go-by to all the agreements and protocols that have existed.

The recent standoff with China should serve as a wake-up call.

Sino-Indian relations had remained frozen after the 1962 War till 1976 when diplomatic activity restarted. Though there have been a number of stand offs over the years since then, what exuded hope was the fact that the two sides had signed a number of agreements and confidence building measures (CBMs) in the military field while diplomatic activity between the two at the highest levels had continued as recently as 2019 when Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Xi Jinping met at Mamallapuram.

The question that arises is: Why has China suddenly tried to change the rules of the game and how should India deal with the changed narrative?

Though the two sides resumed designating ambassadors to each other in 1976 after a long break, the real breakthrough came with the late prime minister Rajiv Gandhi’s visit to China in 1988.

The two sides agreed that pending resolution of the boundary dispute, they would maintain peace and tranquility along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), and make efforts to improve and develop bilateral relations. Since then, India and China have signed a number of agreements; namely:

September, 1993: Agreement on maintaining peace and tranquility along the LAC.
November, 1996: Agreement on CBMs in the military field along the LAC.
April, 2005: Agreement on political parameters and guiding principles for settlement of the boundary dispute.
January, 2012: Agreement on the establishment of a working mechanism for consultation and co-ordination on India-China border affairs.
October, 2013: Border Defence Cooperation Agreement.

In addition, during late prime minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s visit to China in June 2003, the Special Representatives (SRs) mechanism for resolution of the boundary dispute was also set up. Since then, the SRs have had 22 rounds of talks (the last one in December, 2019) but without getting any closer to a resolution of the boundary dispute.

Also read: In Official Testimony to MPs, Government Revealed Full Story of Doklam

Consequent to the Doklam stand off in 2017 which lasted for 73 days, there have been two informal summits between Prime Minister Modi and President Xi Jinping at Wuhan in 2018 and at Mamallapuram in 2019.

The Wuhan Summit was organised with great preparation and fanfare, and President Xi played a perfect host. There were great expectations from the summit and what came to be called the ‘Wuhan Spirit’. However, that kind of enthusiasm was missing from the Chinese side for the Mamallapuram Summit and there was not even a joint declaration.

There was a degree of uncertainty if President Xi would actually be coming, till about three days before the summit. In fact, the body language of President Xi indicated that he was just keeping a date having promised the same.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping exchange gifts at Mamallapuram. Photo: PTI/Files

It was decided (at Mamallapuram) that the year 2020 would mark the 70th anniversary of the establishment of India-China diplomatic relations and the two countries would be organising 70 activities during 2020 to emphasise the historical connection between the two civilisations.

Instead, what do we have? A series of military stand offs starting from Sikkim to Ladakh culminating in the June 15 violent clash resulting in considerable casualties on both sides to mark the occasion.

Obviously, China has unilaterally changed the rules of the game. It is quite apparent that a new narrative is shaping up as far as Sino-Indian relations are concerned.

Also read: Explainer: Key Questions on Modi-Xi Informal Summit Answered

The genesis of the recent intrusions during April-May 2020 by the PLA can be traced back to the 1962 Sino-Indian War. China declared unilateral ceasefire on November 21, 1962 and announced that its forces would halt all further operations and commence withdrawal from occupied territories.

However, this withdrawal was confined to erstwhile NEFA (now Arunachal Pradesh) only. In the Western Sector (Ladakh), there was no withdrawal. The Chinese forces had advanced up to their “1960 Claim Line” and that became their Line of Actual Control in the Western Sector.

Their aim in 1962 in the Western Sector was to remove 43 Indian posts (out of 72) which they considered were across their Claim Line. However, there was one exception and that was in the Depsang Plain (southeast of Karakoram Pass) where they seemed to have overstepped their Claim Line and straightened the eastward bulge.

In 1962, the two major attacks that took place on October 18 morning were against the Red Top Hill held by 14 J&K Militia in the Daulat Beg Oldie Sector (Sub-sector North) and the Galwan Post held by 5 JAT in the Galwan River Valley. Thereafter, the attacking troops (the 4th Infantry Division of the PLA which had been brought from Xinjiang) moved further south for operations in the Indus Valley area (Demchok-Chang La) which began on October 26 and terminated on October 28.

There was a lull in fighting from October 29 to November 17, during which they made preparations for further operations which commenced in the Chushul sub-sector on November 18, with attacks on the Gurung Hill and Rezangla (south of Spangur Lake).

A look at Chinese thinking

It will be interesting to look at the Chinese thinking at this juncture, i.e. before launching the second phase of their operations on November 18, 1962. I reproduce below an extract from the telegraphic instructions issued by the Central Military Commission (CMC) to Xinjiang Military Command on November 14, 1962.

I quote from A History of Counter Attack War in Self Defence along Sino-Indian Border:

“While eliminating the [Indian] strongholds, do not fight with the Indian forces deployed in artillery bases and strongholds set up outside our territory by the Indian troops. If we do not attack and Indian forces attack us, in that case we will definitely launch a counter attack. Retaliate with short, fierce and sudden fire power, hit their airfield at Chushul; the shells may cross the border but personnel should not cross the border. While returning fire, it must be approved by GHQ.”

This clearly shows that the Chinese considered their 1960 Claim Line as the border and had no intention to overstep that line.

However, Indian troops withdrew all along the line, even from positions which were not even attacked as most of these were meant to show the Indian flag and were not sited tactically. Even Daulat Beg Oldie which was held by 14 J&K Militia and was neither attacked, nor contacted by the attacking troops, was abandoned.

Also read: Are China and India Going Back to 1962?

The Gurung Hill Complex in the Chushul Sub-sector was held by two companies of 1/8 Gorkha Rifles and was attacked on November 18 along with the Rezangla Hill but could not be captured by the Chinese in spite of repeated attacks during the whole of November 18 and 19.

However, instead of reinforcing the Gurung Hill, the brigade commander decided to withdraw troops from Gurung Hill and all other such positions that were holding out during the night of November 19 and 20. As a result, the control of the whole of Kailash Range passed into Chinese hands and the Chushul airfield was rendered unusable as it now lay in no man’s land and was dominated by the Chinese on the eastern hills.

Though Chinese troops gave no indication for conducting further operations towards Leh, Indian troops were withdrawn almost 250 km for the defence of Leh. Thus contact was broken with the attacking troops all along the front, from Daulat Beg Oldie in the north to Demchok in the south. Such was the operational situation when the Chinese declared unilateral ceasefire effective from midnight of November 21, having achieved their aims in the Western as well as the Eastern Sectors.

Incidentally, India never accepted the ceasefire formally and has not done so till date. It remains a unilateral declaration.

So, the question arises, what could have been the motivation for Chinese movements in massive strength towards the LAC and in some cases even across it during April-May 2020? Of these, the intrusions in the Depsang Plain in the north and on the north bank of Pangong Tso appear to be substantial and seem to have shifted the LAC by quite some distance, even beyond their 1960 Claim Line.

Also read: Why It Is Imperative That Indians Come to Know What Happened in 1962

How should we read the Chinese actions in trying to change the LAC unilaterally in contravention of all the existing protocols?

Explanations emerge

There are two plausible explanations. One, they had undoubtedly suffered a loss of face during the Doklam stand off in 2017 and could have planned this operation over a period of two years as a quid pro. While the world, including India were busy in dealing with COVID-19, they considered it a suitable opportunity to teach India another lesson.

The second reason could be the frequent stand offs at the LAC since 2013 resulting in physical pushing, shoving, stone throwing and so on which were getting uglier by the day. They may well have decided to assert their Claim Line to which they had advanced in 1962 and establish the same as the new LAC and a de-facto border, at least in the Western Sector.

This consideration may have got further accentuated by the ongoing development of infrastructure in the border areas by India which they have been objecting to from time to time. The operationalising of the road from Darbuk to Daulat Beg Oldie along the Shyok River may have added to the urgency as they may have felt their Aksai Chin Highway threatened.

Satellite image of Ladakh, with the Chinese claim line marked in yellow and the Chinese road from Yecheng in Xinjiang to Tibet in red passing through Aksai Chin in eastern Ladakh. Image: The Wire/Google Earth

Whatever be their motivation for this deliberate and planned aggressive manoeuvre which was totally unexpected, it is in violation and contravention of all the agreements and CBMs worked out so assiduously since 1993 and points towards a new direction in the Sino-Indian relations.

The turn of events of May-June 2020 has also disproved another view that had been gaining ground since globalisation had set in that intertwined economies could tide over other geopolitical issues between nations.

This has also been demonstrated in the case of US-China relations which seem to have moved from G-20 to a new kind of cold war setting in between them. It also holds true for Sino-Indian relations which were being increasingly show cased as a strategic partnership. We have been carrying out joint military exercises over the last decade and a half which seemed a little surreal; especially so, as in 22 rounds of the SR talks the two sides were not able to even define the LAC.

Also read: India, China Talk of Border Disengagement ‘At the Earliest’, But Key Differences Remain

Since 2014, China during various interactions at the apex level has been stressing on the need for early resolution of the boundary dispute. President Xi had mentioned this for the first time in a bilateral meeting with Prime Minister Modi on the sidelines of the BRICS Summit hosted by Brazil in July 2014.

This was repeated again during his visit to India in September 2014 in response to a point raised by Prime Minister Modi for early definition of the LAC. This was at variance with their earlier stand that the resolution of the boundary dispute could be left for the future generations. Obviously, there has been a change in the Chinese thinking since President Xi Jinping came to power.

So, China had been messaging repeatedly that they would like to resolve the boundary dispute at an early date, albeit on Chinese terms.

Our trade deficit with China has been rising from the beginning of this century and was around US $48.66 billion in the year 2019-20. It has not been possible to address this issue despite a number of meetings of the Joint Working Group, primarily because of the gross asymmetry in the two economies and Chinese intransigence. It has become a major sticking point in the bilateral relations.

The presence of His Holiness the Dalai Lama and his followers in India, and the unsettled conditions in Tibet is yet another source of mistrust by the Chinese. To the above must be added the emerging nexus between China and Pakistan in the military field and the development of China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) through Pakistan Occupied Kashmir which by all standards is Indian territory under illegal occupation of Pakistan.

The Indus at the site of the proposed Diamer-Basha dam. Photo: Water and Power Development Authority, Pakistan

China, through CPEC projects hopes to become a third party in the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan. The latest development of the commencement of construction of Diamer-Basha Dam on the river Indus in Gilgit-Baltistan under CPEC is a serious development which poses a direct challenge to India’s core interests.

Under these conditions, it seems unrealistic to think and hope that India and China can be strategic partners. It is time that India got real in its view of the rising China and evolved a pragmatic and long term perspective for this vital relationship which affects national security to the core.

The way ahead

To start with, we need not be in a hurry to resolve the ongoing stand-off at the LAC; especially so if China is not prepared to restore the status quo ante in a realistic time frame as it prevailed in April 2020. We can dig in and make sure that PLA is not allowed to change the status quo unilaterally in any other sector of the LAC.

We can let the Chinese know of our perception of the LAC and end the differing perceptions. The Central Sector (Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand) requires urgent attention as that can also become a flash point. China claims approximately 2,000 square km of the territory in the Central Sector and that is under Indian control. We need to improve our infrastructure and defensive posture in the Central Sector so that China cannot create a Ladakh like situation.

Also read: A Logistical Battle Awaits the Indian Army’s Troops in Ladakh

There is an urgent need to fix responsibility for the northern border with China. Who is responsible to maintain the sanctity of the LAC, is it the Indian Army or the ITBP? If it is the responsibility of the Army which rightfully should be so, then the ITBP should be under Army’s operational control.

ITBP is a police force and is neither equipped, nor trained to conduct military operations in the face of the enemy. The present arrangement is ambiguous and needs to be set right urgently.

When it comes to trade relations, we need to remember that there is life without China also. It was there in the earlier times and it can be developed again. We may step back a little as far as economic ties are concerned. We value our relationship with Taiwan and can certainly give it a boost, especially in trade and technological fields. However, we must remember that Taiwan’s stand on the border dispute is no different from that of mainland China.

From 1947-49, India has failed itself in the sense that we failed to demarcate and secure the borders with Tibet when the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was nowhere in sight. We totally neglected the security of our northern borders.

The PRC emerged on October 1, 1949, and declared its intention to ‘liberate’ Tibet as early as January, 1950, soon after they had annexed Xinjiang. We failed Tibet and the Tibetans in their hour of need. Not only did we not intervene politically or militarily to preserve its independence, we did not even allow Tibet’s bid for independence to be raised in the UN Security Council due to a misplaced thinking on the part of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru that it would adversely affect his efforts to bring about a ceasefire in the Korean War between the Americans and the Chinese.

Not only that, we surrendered all the privileges in Tibet that we had inherited from the British while signing the Panchsheel Agreement in April, 1954, without even negotiating the border between India and China. The ink on this Agreement had not even dried that China made its first trans-border incursion in Barahoti in the Central Sector in June, 1954. The boundary dispute had begun.

An Indian Army convoy moves towards the Ladakh, in Kullu. Photo: PTI

It is a misperception that India is no match for China militarily.

Perhaps, it is the result of 1962 syndrome which still persists at the political and higher military levels. Keeping the 1962 happenings under wraps has further perpetuated such an impression. It can be stated unambiguously that the failure in 1962 was at the higher direction of war.

The Indian soldier was not found wanting in courage and steadfastness, and the units performed admirably, wherever led properly. However, their performance at the individual and unit level was subsumed in the bigger debacle for which we feel shy of introspection till date. Let us put that behind us. If there is a strong political resolve, a sound military strategy and professional leadership, the Indian soldiery will not be found wanting.

We misread the Chinese intentions in the events leading to 1962 and we have misread them again in 2020. Let us not do it again for the third time because that would be inexcusable. China has changed the rules of the game unilaterally and given a go by to all the agreements and protocols that have existed.

We need to wait and watch and should not be in a hurry to reach a modus vivendi which would be detrimental to our core national interests. There is a flurry of anti-Chinese feeling amongst the nations of the world for its handling of the coronavirus and its aggressive behaviour in the South China Sea. The challenge for our political and military leadership is to turn this to our advantage in Tibet and elsewhere.

Major General P.J.S. Sandhu (Retd) was the Chief of Staff of a Strike Corps and former deputy director and editor at the United Service Institution of India (USI). Between 2013-2015, he edited a USI study, 1962 – A View from the Other Side of the Hill.

China’s Intrusion in Ladakh Was Not Treachery But Surprise, And It Shouldn’t Have Been One

It is implausible that external intelligence collection agencies like the RAW and NTRO did not provide any evidence of the massive movement by the PLA towards the LAC from end-April onwards

Although the government has been rather frugal in disseminating facts, it is clear from open source satellite imagery, statements by Indian officials and assessments by various defence experts that China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has established a small presence across the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Sub-Sector North (SSN), north-east Ladakh.

This occupation at Pangong Tso, Hot Springs, the Galwan Valley and the Depsang Plains – places long accepted as Indian territory for decades – did not happen overnight. Yet we were caught off-guard.

Importance of SSN

The Karakoram Range has two massive mountain spurs in this area. The western spur, Saltoro Ridge, separates Indian and Pakistani forces on the Siachen Glacier. To Saltoro’s east lies Sasser Ridge and SSN.

Access to SSN from Leh is through Chang La and the recently completed Durbuk-Shyok-Daulat Beg Oldie (DSDBO) road. The DSDBO passes from Durbuk along the Shyok river past the confluence of the Shyok and Galwan rivers up to Murgo and then the Depsang Plains, and ends at the Daulat Beg Oldie (DBO) airstrip, about 16 kms south of the Karakoram Pass, where the Chinese border begins. This is India’s only airstrip in this harsh, high altitude SSN.

Sub-Sector North: Map of the road from Durbuk to Daulat Beg Oldie. The place where Indian and Chinese soldiers clashed on June 15, 2020 is around 5 kilometres east of the road. Image: The Wire/Google Earth

If the PLA succeeds in entrenching itself at various locations overlooking the strategic DSDBO road, it can potentially cut off Indian access in SSN and to DBO. It could also attempt a sustained but difficult offensive through intermediate passes to threaten our access to Siachen. Such an offensive, if successful, would enable Pakistan to improve its posture there.

The ceasefire line after the 1962 war was ratified as the LAC in the Sept 1993 bilateral agreement on “Maintaining of Peace and Tranquillity along the LAC in the India-China Border Areas”. This, the agreements of Nov 1996 and June 2005 suggest there were no major differences in perception of where the LAC lies. However, in the absence of precise delineation on the ground, patrols of both India and China have continued to operate in a grey zone, with the PLA routinely coming up to China’s perception of the LAC, and Indian troops going up to India’s perception.

Also Read: 1960 Claim Line Contradicts Beijing’s Assertion that ‘Galwan is Chinese’

On many occasions, both sides objected to the other’s patrol(s) and there were minor affrays too. What happened in May and June is unprecedented, yet there were many indicators that should have kept us vigilant.

Strategic indicators

After President Xi Jinping assumed power, China began pursuing an assertive foreign policy. From 2015, he thrust down a series of deep, comprehensive, doctrinal, structural and force modernisation reforms on the PLA. These reforms included converting the erstwhile seven military regions into five theatre commands. Opposite India, the former Chengdu and Lanzhou military regions were merged into the Western Command with substantial military resources at its disposal. China’s 2019 White Paper, a significant departure from the defence-oriented one published in 2015, emphasized that the country will “pursue national defence goals which include safeguarding national sovereignty, unity, territorial integrity…”.

In addition is Xi’s stress on combat readiness, particularly in high-altitude areas, and the increasing number of exercises by the PLA Army (PLAA), PLA Air Force (PLAAF) and the PLA Rocket Forces (PLARF) in the areas opposite India.

A January 2018 article in China’s Global Times on the PLA’s “hard training for potential conflict” quoted a retired PLA officer, “…potential military conflicts in plateau regions … on the rise since the border friction with India last year, increasing military training in the plateau region is highly necessary”.

Tactical indicators

In 2009, China built a road from Sumdo up to Patrol Point 13 in the Depsang Plains. This was followed by the 2011 and 2013 trans-LAC incursions by the PLA into Depsang, and subsequent face-offs with Indian forces. 2014 saw incursions into Chumar (eastern Ladakh) and 2017, a tense, protracted stand-off at Doklam (on the Indo-China-Bhutan border). Troops from both sides continued to jostle and brawl but without incurring serious casualties. Although the 2011 intrusion was resolved by the military leadership, all others – 2013, 2014 and 2017 – required higher political intervention.

Last autumn perhaps held enough hints of what was to come. India-China tensions had risen after India scrapped Article 370 (August 2019) – and September 2019 saw a serious brawl at Pangong Tso after the PLA began blocking Indian patrols; on both sides, soldiers were injured and boats damaged.

Recent events

The PLA conducts an exercise every year in Aksai Chin and its immediate forward areas along the LAC. In January 2020, China’s state-run Global Times reported that the PLA had begun major military exercises in the Tibet Plateau bordering India with “latest weapons”. The exercise, which was not a surreptitious affair, continued – and after amassing troops astride the Galwan river, the PLA simply moved into SSN at four points around May 5. Importantly, it had, from 2015-2016, commenced building mud roads along the Galwan River – it flows west from Chinese’s side into Shyok River. The DSDBO road runs alongside this river for a considerable length.

Also Read: India Has Known About the Chinese Threat in Ladakh for Years. So Why Are We Unprepared?

In the June 6 military commanders meeting, the PLA reportedly declined to discuss its shallow ingress into the Galwan valley, stating that it belongs to China, a claim repeated by its foreign ministry. This was followed by the brutal brawl of June 15 in which 20 Indian soldiers were killed and about 76 injured; 50 of these injured and 10 others were briefly detained by the Chinese side.

Although the Indian Army and the Indian Air Force are matching the PLA deployment, the latter having pre-empted the Indian side is now entrenched at its new positions. Unlike the past incursions, the present stand-off, at multiple locations, seems pre-planned with political approval.

Given this background, India essentially has three options.

First, negotiate a voluntary Chinese withdrawal from these new occupations. With both China and India adopting extreme positions, a breakthrough can only be thrust down by the top political leadership, an eventuality which currently appears doubtful.

If that fails, the second option is to try and push back the PLA by force. This carries risks as China will contest Indian actions, which may lead to a wider confrontation. Given the ongoing pandemic and the state of our economy, even a short, sectorally-limited conflict would be disastrous. Besides, the international community is unlikely to support any escalation beyond a point. Significantly, PLA veterans are asking the Chinese leadership to be ready for ‘mid-sized war’ with India.

Third, India may allow China to retain, partly or wholly, the territory it has encroached into. Public statements by Indian leaders that the alignment of the LAC in unclear suggest this possibility.

What went wrong?

While there are a number of issues that may have spurred China to this transgression, the underlying fact is that just as Pakistan surprised us at Kargil in 1999, China surprised India’s political and military establishments by occupying areas across the LAC in May.

Prior to the Kargil conflict, individual agencies had adequate intelligence inputs about the intrusion. However, these individual inputs were either ignored, or were not subjected to proper assembling, analysis and averment. The Kargil Review Committee (KRC) had correctly attributed this to “intelligence failure” and systemic flaws, and the associated Group of Ministers rendered ‘Recommendations’ across four domains to “Reform the National Security System”, i.e. the intelligence apparatus, internal security, border management and management of defence. But it does seem we were surprised again.

Also Read: Don’t Blame Modi for ‘No Intrusion’ Claim, Blame Him for Dramatic Shift in China Policy

The Chinese media had been periodically commenting on the PLA’s exercises. So, it is implausible that external intelligence collection agencies like the RAW and NTRO did not provide any evidence of the massive movement by the PLA towards the LAC from end-April onwards.

Even sparse inputs should have prompted users to generate urgent intelligence requirements seeking further information. Hence, once again, it seems that inputs, plenty or scant, were not subjected to proper assembling, analysis and averment by various assessment agencies and users. Or perhaps, after decades of counter-terrorism operations, we have simply forgotten the principles of war – what we are labelling as ‘treachery’ is actually ‘surprise’ by the PLA, their “coming in large numbers” is ‘concentration of force’ – even as we didn’t exploit ‘intelligence’. Given that Pakistan and China are long standing adversaries and we have unsettled borders with them, we should have been on our best guard.

What needs to be done

In response to the PLA’s annual exercises, the Indian Army too has been deploying troops to the LAC each year to thwart any misadventure. However, this year the Army didn’t move troops forward because of the COVID-19 pandemic. Further, the primary focus of the Indian Army has continued to be counter-terror operations and Pakistan. Both factors perhaps limited our ability to respond rapidly and forcefully as the crisis developed in the SSN.

Intelligence is a nation’s first line of defence and the intelligence structure is a critical constituent of its safety and security, as also of its statecraft and grand strategy. Thus, if India is to sit at the highest table in the comity of nations, then it must introspect on failures and put in place a robust, responsive intelligence structure to thwart external threats.

The high-altitude topography, extreme weather conditions and comparative paucity of infrastructure makes guarding SSN a difficult task. Given the defence budget squeeze, the end of which isn’t apparent, there is a dire need to rebalance India’s military power away from the weak adversary in the west and towards the LAC.

Kuldip Singh is a retired Brigadier from the Indian Army.

Watch | The Truth About China’s Advances into Indian Soil

Is the situation improving for India at all?

Three days after Indian and Chinese military commanders met on Saturday at Chushul, in Ladakh, to discuss the crisis caused by the occupation by thousands of Chinese soldiers of territory traditionally patrolled by both armies, top Army sources in India sought to portray a rapidly improving situation. But is that the truth? Arfa Khanum Sherwani discusses the issue with Ajai Shukla.

Exclusive: In Talks, China Takes Hard Line, Claims All of Galwan Valley, Chunk of Pangong Tso

During the military-to-military dialogue on Saturday, China refused to even discuss its intrusions into the Galwan River valley, instead claiming ownership over the entire area.

New Delhi: Three days after Indian and Chinese military commanders met on Saturday at Chushul, in Ladakh, to discuss the crisis caused by the occupation by thousands of Chinese soldiers of territory traditionally patrolled by both armies, top army sources in India sought to portray a rapidly improving situation.

Claiming that both sides – the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the Indian Army – have “retreated a bit” after the Saturday meeting, the army sources revealed that another Sino-Indian meeting would be held on Wednesday at a more junior level.

However, sources on the ground paint a far bleaker picture of Chinese intransigence along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). They say that during the talks, the PLA interlocutors flatly rejected the Indian demand for Chinese troops to withdraw from areas they occupied in May and restore the status quo that prevailed in April.

In fact, during the military-to-military dialogue on Saturday, China refused to even discuss its intrusions into the Galwan River valley, instead claiming ownership over the entire area.

Underlining these sharp divergences between the Indian and Chinese positions, no joint statement was released after Lieutenant General Harinder Singh, the Leh corps commander, met PLA Major General Liu Lin, who heads the South Xinjiang Military Region in a bid to defuse the confrontation.

Nor did New Delhi release any details about the military discussions. Only on Tuesday, after being sharply criticised by opposition members, including Rahul Gandhi of the Congress Party, did “top army sources” present the media with the military’s version of events.

According to their version, the Indian and Chinese corps commanders met one-on-one for almost three hours before engaging further during delegate-level talks. The two sides “mutually agreed and identified five locations of conflicts” between PLA and Indian troops. These include Patrolling Point 14 (PP14), PP15, PP17, the north bank of Pangong Tso Lake and Chushul.

The fact that these conflict locations make no mention of the Galwan River valley lends credence to the argument that the sector did not feature on the discussion agenda.

Galwan River valley

During the talks, the PLA indicated they were taking control of the Galwan River valley, which has traditionally been a peaceful sector where China adhered to a claim line. Now PLA negotiators have asserted ownership of the entire Galwan Valley, claiming that China had controlled the hilltops astride the Galwan River for “as long as they could remember.”

The PLA alleged that the one-kilometre-long track that India had built from the Shyok-Galwan river junction, heading eastwards along the Galwan River, was an encroachment on Chinese territory. They alleged that India was developing this track into a metal (black-topped) road.

Map of the road to Daulat Beg Oldi. Photo: Wikimedia

The Indian army representatives countered that the Chinese had constructed a metal road right to where the LAC had existed up till May – that is five kilometres from where the Galwan flows into the Shyok river – and that the road would soon cross the LAC. The Chinese responded that the Galwan Valley was their area and it was legitimate for them to build a road in it.

Indian negotiators also objected strongly to PLA troops deploying in the close vicinity of India’s Gogra post. Sources say the PLA did not offer a cogent response.

Nor was there a cogent PLA response to Indian allegations that the Chinese were constructing a road on India’s side of the LAC between Hot Springs and Gogra.

Pangong Tso area

Responding to Indian charges of Chinese intrusions onto the Pangong Tso north bank, the PLA negotiators claimed they had “acted rightfully” in constructing a metalled road up to Finger 4, and preparing defensive positions in that disputed area.

Prior to May, the Indian army regularly patrolled till their perceived LAC at Finger 8, eight kilometres east of Finger 4. However, since May 5, when thousands of PLA troops blocked and savagely beat up outnumbered Indian troops in that area, Indian patrols are unable to go beyond Finger 4, which the Chinese now claim is the LAC.

The Chinese military officials accepted that the aggression with which PLA soldiers attacked Indian troops at the Pangong Tso in mid-May “was not in the right spirit,” but said it was a reaction to Indian patrols crossing the PLA’s version of the LAC.

The Indian army also brought up the need to reduce forward deployments of PLA soldiers, armoured vehicles and artillery guns. The Chinese responded they would have to refer the matter to their superiors.

Gains and losses

Army sources apprehend the PLA has gained strategically in the Galwan Valley, where they now occupy positions overlooking the strategic Darbuk-Shyok-Daulet Beg Oldi (DSDBO) road to Depsang, at the base of the Karakoram Pass.

The Chinese have also gained strategically by isolating the Depsang area, as a consequence of dominating the DSDBO road. There is currently a large Chinese armour build up opposite Depsang, which is raising apprehensions of surprise ingress in that sector by the PLA.

Chinese gains in the Pangong Tso area, however, are being seen as tactical, even though the levels of violence the PLA displayed there is worrisome.

The other PLA activities at Naku La (Sikkim) and at Harsil and Lipu Lekh (Uttarakhand) are being viewed as “red herrings”, aimed at tying down Indian troops rather than serving any larger strategic objectives.

The army is also closely watching the long border between Arunachal Pradesh and Tibet, which is called the McMahon Line. This has been entirely quiet so far, with no Chinese activity in this area.

On Tuesday, Indian army sources provided a military-political perspective to the on-going PLA intrusions. “The core issue is the undecided LAC. Until that is solved, these episodes and issues will continue to happen,” they stated.

Also to blame, according to the army sources, was the PLA’s militarisation of the border areas. “China has deployed fighter bombers, rocket forces, air defence radars, jammers, etcetera. India has also deployed all its major assets along the LAC… just a few kilometres away from the frontline. India will continue to have a major build up until China withdraws the build up [it has] done there,” they said.

An Eco-Feminist Revolution Is Underway in Pakistan’s Hunza Valley

In Pakistan-occupied Kashmir’s Gilgit-Baltistan, exists a remarkable oasis with high literacy rates and gender equality.

In the disputed Karakoram mountains of northern Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, which brought India and Pakistan to the brink of war last month, the isolated Hunza valley feels cut off from the fractious politics surrounding it. As one approaches 8,200 feet, pine forests and orchards envelop villages that glint orange with apricots drying on their rooftops.

Mount Rakaposhi and the Hunza Valley. Credit: Sam Dalrymple

The blue and mustard shuttlecock burkhas, which are prevalent throughout the foothills, are non-existent here and unveiled women wander the streets, busking on street corners and leading tour groups. Over the last decade, Hunza has been at the centre of a remarkable eco-feminist movement, with women’s education and employment – primarily in the environmental sector – skyrocketing to some of the highest levels in South Asia.

Hunza has always been strikingly different from the rest of Pakistan. Its grand palaces are reminiscent of nearby Tibet and the local language Burushaski has no known relatives anywhere in the world. Before the opening of the Karakoram highway in 1979, its deadly mountain passes made Hunza accessible only to a few determined traders along the Silk Roads.

This remoteness gave the valley a mythic status for centuries. Hilton’s lost city of Shangri La is a motif used to promote every Buddhist town in the Himalayas, surprisingly, it was neither Lhasa nor Ladakh which inspired his creation. Instead, it was this liberal Muslim island, nestled within the otherwise ultra-conservative Pashtun society of the Karakorams, where he stayed during the colonial rule, immediately prior to writing his book.

Also Read: The Changing Life of the Wakhi People in Pakistan’s Shimshal

Despite its place in one of the most militarised regions of the world, Hunza is a major destination for Pakistani tourists and the mountains, which once isolated the Hunzakuts (the indigenous people of the valley), now attract hundreds of thousands of tourists each year.

But the valley remains remarkable for its unexpected feminist revolution that has taken place over the last decade. It is now a common sight to find women working in the bazaar and wandering around alone after dark. Female sport leagues have been set up and cricketers like Diana Baig have risen to the international level.

In 2013, Samina Baig, a young Hunzakut woman, became the youngest Muslim woman ever to climb Mount Everest. A year later, she became the first Pakistani woman to climb the highest peaks on all seven continents. The mountain Chashkin Sar was renamed Samina Peak in her honour after she became the first person in history to reach its summit, and she has since been appointed a National Goodwill Ambassador by the UN.

Students at the Leif Larson Music School, Altit. Credit: Sam Dalrymple

Hunza is governed as a part of Gilgit-Baltistan, a Pakistani province which enjoys little government funding or political representation thanks to the regional dispute with India. Its people are Ismailis, a persecuted Shi’a minority, who have frequently been targeted for their faith. Nonetheless, thanks to heavy investment in education and healthcare from the spiritual leader of the Ismailis – a philanthropist called the Aga Khan – the literacy rates in Hunza are surprisingly some of the best in South Asia.

Today 98% of children in Hunza between the ages of 5-16 are in school and many students pursue higher education, both in Pakistan and abroad. 49% of those enrolling in government schools are women. In 2016, Al Jazeera reported that Hunza had a literacy of around 95%, making it the most literate district in Pakistan, 37% above the national average.

Also Read: The Missing Women of Pakistan

This is all the more extraordinary when one considers the state of affairs in the neighbouring valleys: in Diamer district, only 200 kilometres south along the Karakorum Highway, women are virtually invisible to the public eye. 52% of children from 5-16 are enrolled in school, and only 2% of those enrolling in government schools are women. Just a few months ago, 13 schools in the district – most of which were girls’ schools – were burned down by unidentified assailants.

Altit Fort in Hunza which was surveyed and restored by a team of women. Credit: Sam Dalrymple

Despite the success, local women have only recently begun to benefit from Hunza’s employment sector. Maria Umar, the founder of the Women’s Digital League estimated in December 2013 that some 90% of Hunza’s educated population was unemployed, writing, “With each household averaging eight people, only male household members typically earn an income”.

But since the establishment of Ciqam, a small women’s social enterprise, large numbers of women have gained employment in a variety of sectors throughout Hunza, igniting an eco-feminist movement within the valley.

Ciqam began in 2009 as an offshoot of a women’s surveying project, setting up carbon-neutral carpentry and crafts workshops, in an attempt to fight the dominance of concrete and plastic in the region’s landscape. The women began planting local trees – willow, walnut, olive and mulberry woods – and promoted their use in local building materials. In the last three years, more than 14,000 trees have been planted.

In 2012 they opened the Kha Basi Cafe, which serves regional cuisine using organic, locally grown produce. The café is administrated and managed entirely by women: a first for Pakistan. Women even took part in its construction. Since then, twenty independent feminist establishments have opened in Hunza. Women-run cafes have even begun popping up in major cities elsewhere in the country such as Karachi and Quetta.

Also Read: Turtuk, a Promised Land Between Two Hostile Neighbours

Most recently, Ciqam opened the Leif Larson Music Centre (LLMC) in 2016 to revive Hunza’s dying music traditions. Since then, the school has trained thirty-six students in local instruments and taught them songs in Burushaski and five other endangered languages. The school has produced two of the first female Rabab players, Sanya Taj and Suneila Baig, the latter of whom is also one of the first female Burushaski singers. The LLMC students are hoping to perform in both Norway and Tajikistan in the coming year.

Women working in Hunza. Credit: Aqeela Bano

Rehana Ali, an employee at Ciqam. Credit: Sam Dalrymple

Today Ciqam employs over 100 young women, supported by a small team of men. Through its success, it has inspired women throughout Hunza to become self-reliant and find employment.

The progress made for women is recent, and thus still quite fragile. Despite their newfound employment, women are still expected to do all the house chores and the area has seen a rise in female ‘suicides’, which many locals believe are honour killings.

Furthermore, many are worried about how the recent tourism boom in the region will impact the movement. In the years since Ciqam surveyed Altit fort, it has become one of Hunza’s major attractions and from 2012 to 2017 visitor numbers leapt up by 1800%. Local authorities have been slow to react to the swathe of issues associated with this influx of tourists from the south: pollution, litter, strained infrastructure and sexism.

“One our biggest problems is all the Panjabi tourists coming up here,” says Rehana Ali, a young Hunzakut woman who works as an agricultural consultant and teacher in Aliabad. “They start talking behind their backs when they’re being guided by a female tour guide”.

Last year, Ali Madad, president of the Hotel Owners Association in Hunza Valley complained to The Express Tribune that local women were drawing unwanted attention from domestic tourists, who regarded their appearances as signs of immodesty and sexual promiscuity. He claimed that although there are no brothels in the valley, “due to such demands, some untoward incidents did take place in the hotels”.

Also Read: A Bicycle Ride Around the Borders of Pakistan

But despite these challenges, the women still feel confident about the future and women empowerment is slowly becoming normalised and accepted. “In the last few years girls have suddenly entered every field,” says Rehana. “It’s changed so quickly. With the initial Ciqam carpenters and surveyors there was loads of backlash. People were stealing their ladders and tools asking, ‘Why are you doing this job? That’s not for women.’ But now everyone accepts it and wants all their daughters to go into it. Women are now starting their own businesses outside of Ciqam.”

The women of Ciqam are now working to minimise the negative impact of the tourism boom. They want to restrict the unregulated construction of concrete hotels and are developing techniques to provide cheap carbon neutral housing to locals instead.

“We aren’t afraid any more,” says the singer, Suneila Baig. “Who can stop us?”

Sam Dalrymple is a finalist scholar of Sanskrit and Persian at the University of Oxford. He has been published in The New York Times and Condé Nast Traveller and is currently the Operations Lead at Virtual Reality Venture Project Dastaan

The Shooting’s Over But Siachen Will Keep Taking Its Toll

Unless there is a paradigm shift in India-Pakistan relations to resolve the big issues – Kashmir and terrorism – the smaller ones like Siachen will remain unresolved.

The avalanche on the Siachen glacier which killed 10 soldiers of the Indian army this week is not the first of its kind. The harsh and sad truth about the world’s highest battleground is that climate and extreme natural events like avalanches have taken more lives on the glacier than enemy action.

There was a time in 1989-1992 when India and Pakistan came close to resolving the issue, as part of their bilateral dialogue. However, that moment has passed and the current geopolitical conjuncture and state of relations between the two countries prevent the old proposals to demilitarise the region from going ahead.

The best kept secret in Pakistan is that its forces are not anywhere near the glacier. They are in the north at a lower point beyond a place called Conway Saddle. As of now India sits on the entire Saltoro ridge from Indira Col to Bilafond La and Gyong La, overlooking the Pakistani posts below, with the Siachen glacier behind them. Yet access to the glacier from Bilafond La is easier from Pakistani positions than from Indian base. Only in Gyong La, a little to the south of Bilafond, are positions at the same level.

The Siachen area in Jammu and Kashmir. Composite image created from UN map and Wikimedia graphic.

The issue for the Indian side whenever mutual withdrawal and demilitarisation have been considered is this: how to prevent Pakistan from cheating on the agreement and occupying the glacier or Indian positions once they are vacated. There is a history behind this going back to the 1947 and 1971 wars when Pakistan took advantage of Indian carelessness after the ceasefire to move forces forward in Kargil and Tangdhar, respectively.

That is why the Indian army has insisted that an Agreed Ground Position Line be marked on mutually agreed maps. As is well known, the Line of Control that arose after the 1971 war terminated abruptly at point NJ 9842, leaving a 72 km gap up to Indira Col, beyond which is the Chinese-controlled part of the Shaksgam valley, which was controversially ceded by Islamabad to China.

In 1992 the two sides came close to an agreement to demilitarise the glacier. In the talks that were held in November, the Indian side wanted a delineation of the line from NJ9842 to Indira Col followed by a redeployment of forces away from the glacier and a monitoring of the zone of disengagement. The Pakistani side proposed that both sides vacate forces in a triangular area from enclosed between NJ 9842, Indira Col and Karakoram Pass. The extension of the zone to Karakoram Pass was a problem for India as it is the last point that China recognises as being Indian controlled in J&K.

The two sides came close to an agreement when Pakistan agreed that it could meet Indian requirements by indicating in an annexure the areas that would be vacated by the two sides and the points to which they would redeploy. But for reasons as yet unknown, the Indians balked at the last minute. That the two countries were willing to go so far in Siachen is all the more remarkable, considering that in 1990, Kashmir had blown up and by 1992, the insurgency in the state, backed to the hilt by Islamabad was in full swing.

After Pakistan’s Kargil misadventure, however, all deals were off. The reason was the taped conversation India obtained between the then Pakistan army chief Pervez Musharraf, who was in Beijing, and his chief of staff, Aziz Khan in Islamabad saying that they will claim that the Line of Control was not clear in the Kargil area.
This was patently untrue since the LoC has been jointly surveyed by Indian and Pakistani military surveyors and put down on maps which have been counter-signed by both sides. The Indian army has argued since then that if the Pakistan army could come up with such a blatant lie over Kargil, then it could very well do so again in some future misadventure in Siachen.

An additional factor that has emerged in recent years is the Chinese pressure in the Depsang plains area in adjacent Ladakh. The Indian side worries that should there be coordination between Pakistan and China, it could squeeze off territory in the north, endangering India’s ability to defend Leh and the region to the south of that.

In 2012, following an avalanche that killed 124 soldiers and 11 civilians, Pakistan’s army chief at the time, Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, called for the two sides to move forward on their old proposals to demilitarise the glacier. However, nothing came out of this because of the changed India-Pakistan discourse.

There was a time when the leaders of India and Pakistan believed that they should resolve their smaller problems – Siachen, Sir Creek, and the Wullar barrage dispute – and build trust to settle the larger issues like Kashmir which have bedevilled their relations.

Today, however, the situation suggests that unless there is a paradigm shift in India-Pakistan relations to resolve the big issues – Kashmir and terrorism – the smaller ones will remain unresolved.

So, the Indian army will have to continue guarding the line they occupied in March 1984 and have held with great grit and sacrifice.Their only comfort is that working conditions there are much easier than they were in the first few years of deployment. However, tragedies like the one that happened on Wednesday can happen again because no one, but no one, can overcome the power of nature.

Manoj Joshi is a Distinguished Fellow, Observer Research Foundation.