Tag: india china border faceoff

Watch | ‘By Standing Up to China’s Bullying, India’s Image Has Risen Several Notches’

Gautam Bambawale, former Ambassador to China and former High Commissioner to Pakistan, said China’s strategic aim is to show the world it’s the hegemon of Asia and that India is much weaker.

Expressing a view that will surprise many people, one of India’s highly regarded former ambassadors to China, who has also served as High Commissioner to Pakistan and Ambassador to Bhutan, has said “India’s standing in the neighbourhood and world has gone up several notches because India has shown it is willing to stand up to China’s bullying.”

Asked if he was saying that India is more highly regarded than previously, Gautam Bambawale emphatically replied “absolutely”. However, Bambawale accepted this is an answer many will find surprising or, even, paradoxical.

In a 35-minute interview to Karan Thapar for The Wire, Bambawale said it is “significant” that restoring status quo ante to what it was in April “finds no mention in the Joint Statement”.

He added this clearly means “the two sides are far apart on this issue”. However, he said the fact that the Joint Statement talks about border areas and not the Line of Actual Control – although all the boundary-related accords and protocols refer to LAC – “is not something I find special or alarming”.

Bambawale said there are clearly two implications behind China’s behaviour in Ladakh: tactically, the aim is to move the ground position of the LAC. In other words, China is moving its control of land right up to where China thinks the LAC lies. Strategically, he said, China’s aim is to show India and the world that there is a huge asymmetry between China and India. As he put it, China wants to show “it’s the hegemon and India is much weaker”.

Bambawale told The Wire that what’s happening in Ladakh is very different to what happened at Depsang in 2013 and Chumar in 2014. The number of troops involved this time is much larger. He added that to move such a large number of troops can only be done with planning and premeditation. His point was obvious. This is not something China has done overnight. It has been carefully planned.

The PLA has denied the Indian Army’s patrols access to five patrol points – PP 10, 11, 11a, 12 and 13 – by blocking them at Bottleneck/Y junction around 18 km inside the LAC. Map: The Wire.

He added that India needs to respond with leverage in both the military and policy areas. He said the policy area can be further sub-divided into two – the economic sphere and the political sphere. The sizeable military build-up by the Indian army, in response to China’s behaviour, is a clear sign that India has responded adequately in military terms and the Chinese know this. In political terms India needs to build-up its relationship with Australia, Japan, the United States i.e. the Quad countries.

When questioned on whether India has economic leverage to cause China sufficient pain to make it change its behaviour, Bambawale emphatically argued that it did. He did not accept that China would already have factored in any disruption in trade, which is anyway only 2% of China’s trade, or the debarment of Huawei from India’s 5G development plans. As he put it, “India has a huge telecom market. 900 million. If Chinese companies like Huawei cannot participate it’s going to be quite painful.”

Citing Sumdorong Chu in 1986 which took seven years to resolve, Bambawale said, “Time is on India’s side”. He said “a combination of leverage will work in the long run”. He cited how India’s banning of TikTok had led to several countries like the United States, Australia and, even, Japan, rethinking or reconsidering their relationship with TikTok.

However, Bambawale was critical of the government’s failure or reluctance to share more information about what’s happening in Ladakh with the Indian people. As he put it: “The government should share more information with all of us about what’s happening on the border in Ladakh rather than allow leaks to define the narrative”.

Bambawale told The Wire that he did not find it reassuring that point 5 of the Joint Statement issued by the Indian and Chinese Foreign Ministers committed both countries to a new confidence building mechanism. He said “a whole series of confidence building measures already exist. An entire architecture which has been implemented over 30 years. But it has been junked by China since May. China has violated every principle that existed”. He said the earlier confidence building measures have now been thrown “into the dustbin of history”.

However, Bambawale added that “it’s a good thing the Foreign Ministers met in Moscow. It shows a channel of communication is open.”

Finally, when asked whether he fears that if it comes to war Pakistan might open a second front, Bambawale, who has also served as High Commissioner to Pakistan, said: “I don’t fear it. I know they will.”

India Tells China it Wants Complete Disengagement at All Friction Points

China however has reiterated that the ‘pressing need’ is for New Delhi to ‘correct its mistake’.

New Delhi: India on Thursday stated that there should be “complete disengagement” at all friction points, with special emphasis on Pangong Tso Lake, even as China reiterated that the “pressing need” was for New Delhi to “correct its mistake” and disengage its troops.

The differing emphasis between the two sides is especially stark after the foreign ministers met at Moscow on September 10 and agreed on five principles that are supposed to guide their approach to the ongoing stand-off in eastern Ladakh.

At the weekly briefing on Thursday, MEA spokesperson Anurag Srivastava said that  following the Moscow consensus, both countries should “focus on easing tensions in the friction areas by refraining from any actions that may lead to an escalation in the situation”.

Also read: What Rajnath Left Out: PLA Blocks Access to 900 Sq Km of Indian Territory in Depsang

“The Chinese side should sincerely work with the Indian side for complete disengagement at the earliest from all friction areas including Pangong Lake as well as de-escalation in border areas in accordance with the bilateral agreements and protocols on maintenance of peace and tranquility in border areas,” he said.

Indian and Chinese troops have clashed on the north and south banks of the lake, which straddles the LAC. Shots had also been fired on multiple occasions this month, according to several reports.

He added that China should “strictly respect and observe the Line of Actual Control and not make further attempts to unilaterally change status quo”.

Earlier in the day, defence minister Rajnath Singh had issued a statement that India-China skirmishes had been over patrolling disputes and that New Delhi wants restoration of the traditional patrolling pattern of its military in that area.

The Chinese side, meanwhile, asserted for the second consecutive day that India will have to take the first step.

“Like I said in my reply to Indian correspondents yesterday, the Chinese border troops have always strictly observed the relevant agreements between the two countries and are committed to safeguarding China’s territorial sovereignty and maintaining peace and stability in the border areas. What is pressing now is that the Indian side should immediately correct its mistake, disengage on the ground as soon as possible and take concrete actions to ease the tension and lower the temperature along the border,” said Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Wang Wenbin on Thursday in Beijing.

At the meeting in Moscow, the two ministers had decided that ground commanders would hold further round of talks, but no dates have been confirmed so far.

What Rajnath Left Out: PLA Blocks Access to 900 Sq Km of Indian Territory in Depsang

The scale of Chinese control in this strategically significant corner of Ladakh makes it the largest chunk of territory denied to Indian soldiers in a single swoop since the 1962 war, a fact that warranted inclusion in the defence minister’s speech.

New Delhi: In ‘The Adventure of Silver Blaze’, Arthur Conan Doyle’s story about the theft of the eponymous race horse, everyone assumed a stranger stole the horse. But Sherlock Holmes pinned its disappearance on the horse’s late trainer because a dog at the stable did not bark on the night of the crime. The dog’s silence was an important clue which solved the mystery of who took the horse.

It was in a similar vein that defence minister Rajnath Singh’s speech in parliament on the situation on the border with China in Ladakh was silent about the strategically vital area of the Depsang plains in Sub-Sector North (SSN). The omission of this place name from Singh’s speech provides an important clue as to what the most vital area for India is on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Ladakh.

Of the more than 1,000 square kilometres in Ladakh along the LAC now under Chinese control after tensions erupted in May, the scale of Chinese control in Depsang alone is about 900 square kilometres. That would make it the largest chunk of Indian territory denied to Indian soldiers in a single swoop after the 1962 Sino-India war, a fact which surely warranted inclusion in an official speech to parliament by the raksha mantri.

The PLA has denied the Indian Army’s patrols access to five patrol points – PP 10, 11, 11a, 12 and 13 – which marked India’s limit of patrol, or LOP, by blocking them at Bottleneck/Y junction around 18 km inside the LAC. Map: The Wire.

Depsang is the area for which specific major general-level talks were held between the two sides on August 8. It can thus be no one’s case that there is no problem at Depsang – the Chinese have stopped Indian patrols from accessing five patrolling points in the area since May. As the map above indicates, Indian soldiers have effectively been blocked from going up to the traditional ‘limit of patrol’ line near the Line of Actual Control because of the presence of Chinese troops at a key point in Depsang 18 kilometres inside the LAC known as Bottleneck/Y-Junction.

Like the northern bank of Pangong Tso, this area was a point of contention between the two sides where local arrangements allowed both sides to patrol the area but those mechanisms have broken down since May.

While Indian military patrols being denied access to such territory is significant, more worrisome is the fact that the army has always identified this area – including Trig Heights and Daulat Beg Oldie (DBO) – where it finds itself most vulnerable in Ladakh. For decades, the army’s annual war-games in Udhampur have flagged it as the most important area of concern, devising plans to tackle the major Chinese challenge that would put India at a huge strategic disadvantage.

Also read: In Lok Sabha, Rajnath Paints Unclear Picture of Ladakh; Key Questions on China Stand-Off Remain

Geography

It is the geography of the area which makes it so vital strategically. Broadly called the Sub-Sector North (SSN), this is an enclave of flat terrain that provides land access to Central Asia through the Karakoram Pass. The Line of Control (LoC) that was marked and signed on maps between India and Pakistan in 1972 ended at a point called NJ9842.

Map of the Siachen and Sub-Sector North area in Ladakh. Graphic: The Wire

 

India contends that the line runs further northwards, placing the Siachen glacier firmly in Indian territory. That line beyond NJ9842 is called the Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL). But the Pakistani side claims that the line runs towards north east, connecting NJ9842 to the Karakoram Pass. That would place the Siachen glacier inside Pakistani control, and physically link Pakistan and China.

The strategically important area of SSN lies to the east of Siachen, located between the Saltoro ridge on the Pakistani border and the Saser ridge close to the Chinese border. It is the only place where a physical military collusion can take place between Pakistan and China – and the challenge of a two-front war can become real in the worst-case scenario. In such a scenario, it will be nearly impossible for India to launch a military operation to wrest back Gilgit-Baltistan from Pakistan.

The flat terrain of Depsang, Trig Heights and DBO, which provides direct access to Aksai Chin, is suited for mechanised warfare but is located at the end of a very long and tenuous communication axis for India. China, in turn, has multiple roads that provide easy access to the area. This leaves SSN highly vulnerable to an ingress by the PLA. It is also seen as a viable launchpad for a mechanised force-based military offensive launched by India inside Aksai Chin, if the army has to fulfil Union home minister Amit Shah’s desire of getting back Aksai Chin from China.

Also read: We Need to Look at What Was Missing in the India-China Joint Statement

In 2007, India decided to construct two roads to access SSN. The first was on the alignment of the old track from Darbuk to Shyok and then onwards to DBO. There were problems with the initial alignment, which led to a delay in its completion. The 255-km long all-weather road was formally inaugurated by the defence minister last October. Military planners say that the 430-meter long bridge across the Shyok River, which the minister opened, is also the weakest link on the strategic road.

The DSDBO road to Sub-Sector North

The second road constructed by BRO is from Sasoma in Nubra River valley via the Saser La. This is a jeepable track which has been improved this summer but it provides limited connectivity, that too only during the summer months.

The only other access to SSN is an aerial one via the DBO airstrip, located eight kilometres south of the Karakoram Pass. The old Advanced Landing Ground lying in disuse was made operational in 2008. In peacetime, it can be used to sustain the troops deployed in the area but the army remains doubtful about the Indian Air Force risking its top-end strategic lift aircraft to Chinese action in the event of any conflict.

India’s concern

Indian military planners do not foresee a scenario in which PLA can physically link up with the Pakistan army, as that would mean capturing a formidable obstacle – the Siachen glacier. But the PLA could try and cut off the Indian road to Siachen, providing Pakistan’s army with an opportunity to launch an offensive to capture positions on the Saltoro ridge and the Siachen glacier. Towards this aim, after succeeding in an initial mechanised battle, the PLA could seize Saser La, and then reach Sasoma which lies short of the Siachen base camp. This would deny India the road that feeds its deployment of the central and northern glacier, even though the southern glacier would still be maintained through existing routes.

Also read: From ‘LAC’ to ‘Border Areas’, the Joint Statement Indicates What India Has Lost to China

Aware of the larger strategic challenge, there are three concerns for the army. One, the limited connectivity to the area which can be cut off by targeting the bridge on the DSDBO road which makes sending of reinforcements and provisioning of logistics difficult. It is not confident that the DBO airstrip can be kept operational by the IAF once war breaks out. Two, the lack of good defensive features in SSN, where Indian troops can deploy and force the PLA into a prolonged battle by imposing delay and heavy losses. And finally, the wear and tear imposed on the mechanised military platforms while operating at a high altitude of 17,000 feet in an environment with low oxygen content.

Over the years, the army has taken steps to overcome some of the drawbacks. It had made heavy deployment of mechanised forces, along with the infantry troops, ab initio in the area. A number of shelters and maintenance yards were constructed to protect the mechanised military platforms in the area, to prolong their service life.

Three former Northern Army Commanders that The Wire spoke to said that the battle plans have been refined in the wargames and the army is better prepared for a PLA ingress in the area than it had been earlier. But all of them flagged it as an area of strategic vulnerability and biggest worry for India in the region, far more than Pangong Tso or the Galwan Valley. That is why it is all the more surprising that the defence minister chose to omit Depsang from his statement to parliament on Tuesday.

Sushant Singh is an award-winning journalist who has served in the Indian Army. He has taught political science at Yale University.

We Need to Look at What Was Missing in the India-China Joint Statement

Restoration of status quo ante has to be squeezed into the agenda of negotiations. Until this is achieved, bilateral relations will remain skewed.

Nothing is deemed to be done till words have translated into deeds. This is the vertebrae of the cold war principle of trust, but verify.

The outcome of the low-expectation dialogue of foreign ministers of India and China, S. Jaishankar and Wang Yi, from the five-point agreement in Moscow on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), is neither breakdown nor breakthrough. Simply put, it is old wine in new bottle.

Still, for the first time, neither country has blamed the other for the tensions on the border which had become standard practice. It is also the first time there was a joint statement instead of customary separate ones, but each side issued a supplementary note.

What was conspicuously missing from the joint statement was RSQA – restoration of status quo ante. Think of it. RSQA has never appeared in any of the Chinese statements in the past. The Chinese have repeatedly mentioned ‘restoration of peace and tranquility in border area’. The word LAC is also not used.

Also read: Chinese Company ‘Monitors’ Top Indian Politicians, Bureaucrats and Defence Officials: Report

The Indian statements have also not used RSQA probably due to deference to Chinese sensitivities. But RSQA has figured frequently outside the formal Indian statements.

Similarly, Depsang where the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has made the deepest incursion and is the most strategic ingress is not covered by the DDP – disengagement and de-escalation process – which has revived in military lexicon, the terms buffer zones and friction points.

‘Provocative action’

Pre-empting the PLA’s attempts at what it has done on the north bank of Pangong Lake on the south bank, Indian elite troops from Special Frontier Force consisting of exiled Tibetans occupied the commanding heights on the ridgeline of Kailash Range overlooking Chinese Moldo garrison, including tactical heights point 5167, Bump, Magar Hill, Gurung Hill, Mukhpari, Rezang La and Rechin La stretching almost 30 kilometre.

Rattled by this bold pre-emptive forward deployment similar to their own multiple intrusions in April-May, the PLA has deftly created a friction point by occupying a plateau opposite Mukhpari about 500 metres (m) away and 100 m lower than that. It is here that 40 to 50 PLA soldiers, armed with rods, spears and firearms, fired shots, sparring Indian soldiers into a Galwan-like clash.

After the PLA fired in the air, Indians reciprocated and did not allow the PLA to close in.

A friction point was manufactured a few days prior to the Moscow talks by the PLA so that the tactically significant Mukhpari and other heights could be included in the DDP when Corps Commanders resume their sixth round of talks later this week. The last round was held on August 2.

Incidentally it is now being reported by government sources that between 29 and 31 August, Helmet and Black Top – both on or close to Kailash ridge and on Chinese side of LAC – which were reported to having been occupied by Indian troops are in fact not in their possession, and are probably occupied by the PLA which gives them a foothold on these commanding heights.

Also read: The Key Issue Dividing India and China Today Is Not the Border

In brief, the five-point joint agreement calls for quick disengagement to ease tension, avoiding escalatory action, abiding by existing border protocols and continuing dialogue at all levels including special representatives and instituting new confidence building measures (CBMs).

Engaging through diplomatic channels

Some escalation has already taken place: the Galwan clash which resulted in casualties and the prophylactic firing by both sides near Kailash ridge, both events occurring for the first time in 45 years.

Each side made separate comments and statements after the agreement accompanied by vicious reports by China’s Global Times, reflecting deep differences and, especially, the demolition of trust.

A file photo of S. Jaishankar and Wang Yi. Photo: PTI

At a press conference along with Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov, Wang said: “As for relations between China-India, the whole world follows the development…most important is to avoid new violations of the obligations of the border”.

More importantly, he added: “We are ready to take conciliatory steps. Troops and equipment should be withdrawn from the Line of Actual Control.” He also noted that strategic guidance from Indian and Chinese leaders suggested that India and China were not competitive rivals or threat to each other.

Overall, he struck a friendly note, quite the opposite of the belligerent comments made by PLA western theatre command.

But a document released by the Chinese foreign ministry claimed that the “Indian side does not consider the relations to be dependent on the settlement of the boundary question”. This is 360 degrees to what Jaishankar has publicly asserted: bilateral ties cannot be separate from the situation on LAC.

Jaishankar told Wang that India will not de-escalate until there is complete and verifiable disengagement at all points on the LAC, as overall relations will suffer if there is no peace since the root cause of tension is Chinese breaking existing agreements in April-May. The Global Times wrote: ‘If India wants peace, China and India should uphold LAC of 7 November 1959. But if India wants war, China will oblige’.

India is reasonably satisfied with the agreement though there is no reference to RSQA or a timeline.

India has no coercive deterrent or leverage to force a border settlement due to a simple capacity deficit. Otherwise it would have acted more resolutely as it did during the Sumdorong Chu standoff in 1986, or in 1996 when the terms of CBMs and the LAC were institutionalised between two nearly equal powers.

With the economy bottoming and COVID-19 pandemic skyrocketing, India is in no position to exercise the military option that Chief of Defence Staff General Bipin Rawat has put out on the table at this late stage. The government can keep its domestic constituency happy with such rhetoric but is dangerous in case the balloon goes up.

Also read: ‘Afghan Soil Shouldn’t Be Used for Anti-India Activities’: Jaishankar at Intra-Afghan Talks Opening

China’s land grab policy

China certainly does not want war or even a limited conflict. It has demonstrated its policy of land grab by stealth – without firing a shot – through multiple intrusions presenting a fait accompli.

It knows India will not initiate hostilities and will only act in self-defence.

Some Generals from my tribe have been wagging their index finger on TV and print media to teach China a lesson (wish that were feasible), by recalling Indian soldiers’ combat superiority to PLA in mountains.

Realism has eluded them or josh and hosh must go together.

The PLA has cleverly drawn out Indian forces from their prepared conventional high-altitude defences to the plateau areas of Ladakh (except Kailash ridge) to fight combined arms combat not mountain warfare.

Jaishankar understands the perils of war better than some unthinking Generals. China’s recent massive build up following the debacle in south Pangong and battle drills in Tibet coupled with war cries from Global Times are components of psy-war matching India’s unprecedented deployment.

While the chances of an accidental trigger to a Galwan-like clash exists, military conflict is unlikely despite China delaying the DDP.

Whether the Wang-Jaishankar agreement will provide fresh impetus for disengagement is not clear yet. The imponderable is PLA’s willingness to give up its hard-earned gains on the LAC.

The war-baiting Global Times’ statements are in consonance with PLA thinking. It will also test Wang’s clout as a political councilor. The Chinese game since April-May has been to push LAC west toward its 1959 claim line which they call Green Line.

Also read: How China Turned the Tables on India and Converted 1993 Agreement Into a Land Grab

Clearly, the Chinese have abandoned the concept of LAC and are instead playing for the 1959 claim line. Further, they have changed the meaning of LAC to Line That You Can Control.

The first hitch in the DDP will be China’s insistence on Indian forces withdrawing from the new friction point at Mukhpari on Kailash ridge which is on the Indian side of LAC. This will require astute negotiating skills which the Indian military team has not displayed so far.

The immediate task will be to get PLA to disengage properly from Hot Springs and Fingers area where the pullback from Finger 4 was cosmetic and jostling for heights there has not stopped.

Equally, the deep freeze of Depsang blockade has to be thawed.

While RSQA is still a bridge too far, it has to be squeezed into the agenda of negotiations. This will not be easy. But until it is achieved, bilateral relations – the Chinese will have to be told – will remain skewed.

To take consolation from the US not being able to restore the status quo ante in South China Sea is to rub the ignominy of the fait accompli.

India must remind China how President Hu Jintao had prescribed the virtues of the India-China border peace and tranquility model to Pakistan. In his era India and China signed a strategic partnership agreement…yes!

There is a good chance that Prime Minister Narendra Modi could meet President Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the G20 summit in Riyadh in November. The two leaders will need to renew strategic guidance for the establishment of new framework to ensure stable and peaceful borders once RSQA is reaffirmed and implemented.

In which case, maybe only token garrisons from both sides will have to contend with harsh winter in east Ladakh. This could of course, be wishful thinking.

General Ashok K. Mehta was part of the monitoring team of Defence Planning Staff in MoD of the year long PLA intrusion at Sumdorong chu in 1987/88.

Ban Chinese Firms From Government Tenders, RSS Affiliate Appeals to Centre

Swadeshi Jagran Manch asked citizens to shun Chinese products and celebrities not to promote Chinese brands.

New Delhi: The RSS-affiliated Swadeshi Jagran Manch (SJM) on Tuesday appealed to the Centre to bar Chinese companies from participating in tenders floated by the government and exhorted the people to boycott Chinese products as a tribute to the Army soldiers killed in a fierce clash with troops of China in the Galwan Valley in eastern Ladakh.

SJM co-convener Ashwani Mahajan said it’s high time people should shun Chinese products.

Mahajan also urged actors, cricketers and other celebrities not to promote Chinese products.

The SJM also requests the government to ban Chinese companies from participating in any tender floated by the Indian government and to not procure any Chinese items, he said.

Twenty Indian Army personnel including a colonel were killed in a fierce clash with Chinese troops in the Galwan Valley in eastern Ladakh on Monday night, the biggest military confrontation in over five decades that has significantly escalated the already volatile border standoff in the region.

The Army initially said on Tuesday that an officer and two soldiers were killed. But in a late evening statement it revised the figure to 20 saying 17 others who “were critically injured in the line of duty and exposed to sub-zero temperatures at the standoff location succumbed to their injuries.”

Government sources said the Chinese side too suffered “proportionate casualties” but chose not to speculate on the number.