Watch | ‘By Standing Up to China’s Bullying, India’s Image Has Risen Several Notches’

Gautam Bambawale, former Ambassador to China and former High Commissioner to Pakistan, said China’s strategic aim is to show the world it’s the hegemon of Asia and that India is much weaker.

Expressing a view that will surprise many people, one of India’s highly regarded former ambassadors to China, who has also served as High Commissioner to Pakistan and Ambassador to Bhutan, has said “India’s standing in the neighbourhood and world has gone up several notches because India has shown it is willing to stand up to China’s bullying.”

Asked if he was saying that India is more highly regarded than previously, Gautam Bambawale emphatically replied “absolutely”. However, Bambawale accepted this is an answer many will find surprising or, even, paradoxical.

In a 35-minute interview to Karan Thapar for The Wire, Bambawale said it is “significant” that restoring status quo ante to what it was in April “finds no mention in the Joint Statement”.

He added this clearly means “the two sides are far apart on this issue”. However, he said the fact that the Joint Statement talks about border areas and not the Line of Actual Control – although all the boundary-related accords and protocols refer to LAC – “is not something I find special or alarming”.

Bambawale said there are clearly two implications behind China’s behaviour in Ladakh: tactically, the aim is to move the ground position of the LAC. In other words, China is moving its control of land right up to where China thinks the LAC lies. Strategically, he said, China’s aim is to show India and the world that there is a huge asymmetry between China and India. As he put it, China wants to show “it’s the hegemon and India is much weaker”.

Bambawale told The Wire that what’s happening in Ladakh is very different to what happened at Depsang in 2013 and Chumar in 2014. The number of troops involved this time is much larger. He added that to move such a large number of troops can only be done with planning and premeditation. His point was obvious. This is not something China has done overnight. It has been carefully planned.

The PLA has denied the Indian Army’s patrols access to five patrol points – PP 10, 11, 11a, 12 and 13 – by blocking them at Bottleneck/Y junction around 18 km inside the LAC. Map: The Wire.

He added that India needs to respond with leverage in both the military and policy areas. He said the policy area can be further sub-divided into two – the economic sphere and the political sphere. The sizeable military build-up by the Indian army, in response to China’s behaviour, is a clear sign that India has responded adequately in military terms and the Chinese know this. In political terms India needs to build-up its relationship with Australia, Japan, the United States i.e. the Quad countries.

When questioned on whether India has economic leverage to cause China sufficient pain to make it change its behaviour, Bambawale emphatically argued that it did. He did not accept that China would already have factored in any disruption in trade, which is anyway only 2% of China’s trade, or the debarment of Huawei from India’s 5G development plans. As he put it, “India has a huge telecom market. 900 million. If Chinese companies like Huawei cannot participate it’s going to be quite painful.”

Citing Sumdorong Chu in 1986 which took seven years to resolve, Bambawale said, “Time is on India’s side”. He said “a combination of leverage will work in the long run”. He cited how India’s banning of TikTok had led to several countries like the United States, Australia and, even, Japan, rethinking or reconsidering their relationship with TikTok.

However, Bambawale was critical of the government’s failure or reluctance to share more information about what’s happening in Ladakh with the Indian people. As he put it: “The government should share more information with all of us about what’s happening on the border in Ladakh rather than allow leaks to define the narrative”.

Bambawale told The Wire that he did not find it reassuring that point 5 of the Joint Statement issued by the Indian and Chinese Foreign Ministers committed both countries to a new confidence building mechanism. He said “a whole series of confidence building measures already exist. An entire architecture which has been implemented over 30 years. But it has been junked by China since May. China has violated every principle that existed”. He said the earlier confidence building measures have now been thrown “into the dustbin of history”.

However, Bambawale added that “it’s a good thing the Foreign Ministers met in Moscow. It shows a channel of communication is open.”

Finally, when asked whether he fears that if it comes to war Pakistan might open a second front, Bambawale, who has also served as High Commissioner to Pakistan, said: “I don’t fear it. I know they will.”

India Tells China it Wants Complete Disengagement at All Friction Points

China however has reiterated that the ‘pressing need’ is for New Delhi to ‘correct its mistake’.

New Delhi: India on Thursday stated that there should be “complete disengagement” at all friction points, with special emphasis on Pangong Tso Lake, even as China reiterated that the “pressing need” was for New Delhi to “correct its mistake” and disengage its troops.

The differing emphasis between the two sides is especially stark after the foreign ministers met at Moscow on September 10 and agreed on five principles that are supposed to guide their approach to the ongoing stand-off in eastern Ladakh.

At the weekly briefing on Thursday, MEA spokesperson Anurag Srivastava said that  following the Moscow consensus, both countries should “focus on easing tensions in the friction areas by refraining from any actions that may lead to an escalation in the situation”.

Also read: What Rajnath Left Out: PLA Blocks Access to 900 Sq Km of Indian Territory in Depsang

“The Chinese side should sincerely work with the Indian side for complete disengagement at the earliest from all friction areas including Pangong Lake as well as de-escalation in border areas in accordance with the bilateral agreements and protocols on maintenance of peace and tranquility in border areas,” he said.

Indian and Chinese troops have clashed on the north and south banks of the lake, which straddles the LAC. Shots had also been fired on multiple occasions this month, according to several reports.

He added that China should “strictly respect and observe the Line of Actual Control and not make further attempts to unilaterally change status quo”.

Earlier in the day, defence minister Rajnath Singh had issued a statement that India-China skirmishes had been over patrolling disputes and that New Delhi wants restoration of the traditional patrolling pattern of its military in that area.

The Chinese side, meanwhile, asserted for the second consecutive day that India will have to take the first step.

“Like I said in my reply to Indian correspondents yesterday, the Chinese border troops have always strictly observed the relevant agreements between the two countries and are committed to safeguarding China’s territorial sovereignty and maintaining peace and stability in the border areas. What is pressing now is that the Indian side should immediately correct its mistake, disengage on the ground as soon as possible and take concrete actions to ease the tension and lower the temperature along the border,” said Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Wang Wenbin on Thursday in Beijing.

At the meeting in Moscow, the two ministers had decided that ground commanders would hold further round of talks, but no dates have been confirmed so far.

From ‘LAC’ to ‘Border Areas’, the Joint Statement Indicates What India Has Lost to China

Unlike the LAC which allowed the PLA to transgress it at will for 27 years, an ‘area’, unless delimited, would be an amorphous concept, providing unlimited possibilities for the militarily powerful side.

The joint statement issued after the meeting of foreign ministers of India and China in Moscow on September 10 might end the deadlock over the Ladakh crisis with the possibility of an early disengagement. However, this will come at huge cost to India and by opening a can of worms in the future.

According to a report in The Hindu, the PLA is in control of 1,000 square km of Indian territory in Ladakh. For a perspective on the amount of land India has traded for peace, here’s a comparative figure – the total area of the national capital Delhi is 1,464 square km.

The fact that the PLA will not vacate territories occupied through multi-pronged deep intrusions in eastern Ladakh since May has been accepted by India.

This is obvious from the fact that there is no mention of the Indian demand that the PLA restore the status quo ante – i.e. the April positions – in the joint statement. Also missing is the reference point of the 1993 Line of Actual Control (LAC).

Rather, the quiet obliteration of the acronym LAC – which was at the heart of the Ladakh crisis – from the statement spills the beans on the compromise India has made.

Also read: We Need to Look at What Was Missing in the India-China Joint Statement

China had said that it abides by the November 1959 LAC which was mentioned by Prime Minister Zhou Enlai to Jawaharlal Nehru.

India, on the other hand, has stood by the 1993 LAC which, though not mutually identified on maps and on the ground, was, according to the Ministry of External Affairs’ June statement, well known to both sides.

For 27 years, the Indian Army had been guarding this military line. It was to defend this line that 20 soldiers lost their lives, scores were wounded and 10 soldiers including three officers were taken captive in the savage ambush inflicted by the PLA on the night of June 15 in the Galwan area.

Having dispensed with the LAC, the new normal is ‘border areas’ which originates from the Chinese suggestion to end the political and military deadlock.

China’s 1960 claim line in Ladakh is marked in yellow, the LAC at Pangong Tso in in pink. As can be seen, Thakung, the site of the latest standoff, is inside the LAC but within the 1960 Chinese claim line. Map: The Wire

Writing in FORCE, a prominent Chinese scholar Qian Feng had said that “the concept of a ‘zone of actual control’ can replace the concept of ‘line of actual control’ in some areas without human population or obvious natural geomorphological features. In the future, the two countries could go beyond the traditional ‘border line’ approach and adopt the method of delimiting the disputed ‘border belt’ in question which do not involve population adjustment.”

Consequently, while borrowing the idea to ‘maintain and enhance peace and tranquillity in the border areas’ from the 1993 agreement, the joint statement has dropped the term ‘Line of Actual Control,’ which was clearly mentioned in the aforementioned agreement.

The 1993 agreement is actually called the ‘Agreement between the government of the Republic of India and the government of the People’s Republic of China on the maintenance of peace and tranquillity along the line of actual control in the India-China border areas.’ (emphasis added)

Also read: How China Turned the Tables on India and Converted 1993 Agreement into a Land Grab

The new emphasis on ‘border areas’ has implications as the blunder of the 1993, which created the LAC, has been repeated. Like the LAC, which was agreed by India before a mutual formal clarification on how it ran on the maps and ground, the ‘border areas’ too would be indistinguishable on the ground, open-ended, and worse, impossible to defend.

Therefore, unlike the LAC (line) which allowed the PLA to transgress it at will for 27 years, an ‘area’, unless delimited, would be an amorphous concept, and would provide unlimited possibilities for the militarily powerful side (the PLA) to keep extending its territorial claims. For the record, China also claims the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh which it calls ‘south Tibet or Xizang’.

For immediate disengagement of forces, especially in the south Pangong Tso area, the statement says that the existing agreements and protocols would be followed to ‘avoid any action that could escalate matters.’

The Line of Actual Control between China and India is seen in this handout satellite image of Pangong Lake. Photo: Planet Labs/Handout via Reuters/Files

Given that the PLA insists that the Indian Army in a preemptive action occupied two of its dominating posts on the Kailash range on August 29-30 night, it would be interesting to observe how the Modi government would fulfil this Chinese demand when a Special Frontier Force soldier of the army has lost his life in action.

At the corps commander-level military meetings, creating an understanding on ‘border areas’ would not be easy with any deadlock requiring political intervention once again.

After the disengagement, according to the statement, the two sides would work on new Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) for peace and tranquillity in ‘border areas.’

Replacing existing CBMs with new ones heavily favours the PLA. For example, the 1993 agreement had the concept of ‘mutual and equal security’ which could balance operational shortcomings on the Indian side today.

Unlike the Tibetan plateau which is flat terrain with excellent infrastructure and border management (done by technology), the Indian side has difficult terrain across mountains prone to landslides, archaic border management and inadequate infrastructure.

Similarly, the 1996 agreement dealt with ceilings on manpower, weapons systems, missiles and firepower, scope and level of military exercises close to the LAC.

It also had restriction on air force and ‘unarmed transport aircraft, survey aircraft and helicopters’ flying within 10 km of the LAC.

These agreements were done when both the Indian Army and the PLA were struggling with their border management. Over time, the PLA raced rapidly ahead, eliminating the possibility of a ‘catch-up’ by India.

The PLA wants to retain its present combat lead, which would only grow with time. With old CBMs gone, there would be no restrictions or limitation on what it can do close to the ‘border areas.’

Thus, the PLA would retain and improve its infrastructure, habitat and ecosystems created since the 2017 Doklam crisis for nearly 200,000 troops under the Western Theatre Command facing India’s ‘border areas.’

It will continue with its combat training both from within the resources of the theatre and other theatres. It has laid fibre optics cables (internet) on occupied territories (which will not be its own) and has built radar chain to fight to its technological strength across the entire battle space.

It has also installed its formidable integrated air defence and missile systems across the entire disputed border. The PLA is sharpening its operational base in Tibet Autonomous Region for capabilities to be launched at short notice.

The existing heightened threat of ‘forces-in-being’ will continue to increase with time as the PLA brings in new disruptive warfare capabilities into the theatre. India should bear in mind that such formidable war-fighting capabilities with new concept of operations are not needed for a mere border war.

Having won the Ladakh round from an ill-prepared India, without a fight, the PLA has further entrenched itself in an area which is going to be the likely site of a future bigger conflict.

Pravin Sawhney is editor of FORCE magazine.

In Lok Sabha, Rajnath Paints Unclear Picture of Ladakh; Key Questions on China Stand-Off Remain

The defence minister’s major omissions include the September 7 incident at the LAC that saw firing, as well as the challenge at Depsang.

New Delhi: For the first time since the start of the military stand-off with China, defence minister Rajnath Singh offered a statement on the historical background and ongoing ground situation in eastern Ladakh. However, the minister’s words in the Lok Sabha have left many questions unanswered.

In a speech interspersed with applause, Singh stressed on the valour and bravery of Indian soldiers at the commanding heights of the Himalayas and urged the parliament to back them, as it had done in the past.

Providing the background to the current stand-off, Singh noted that with the boundary question yet to be resolved, China does not accept the customary and traditional alignment of the border.

“We believe that this alignment is based on well-established geographical principles confirmed by treaties and agreements, as well as historical usage and practice, well-known for centuries to both sides. The Chinese position, however, is that the boundary between the two countries has not been formally delimited, that there exists a traditional customary line formed by the extent of jurisdiction that they claim was exercised historically by each side, and that the two sides have different interpretations of the position of the traditional customary line,” he said.

The defence minister claimed out that it was China which stopped the LAC clarification process in 2003.

Also read: How China Turned the Tables on India and Converted 1993 Agreement into a Land Grab

With no common delineation or view of the LAC, the slew of agreements and protocols agreed by both countries have been crucial to maintaining peace and tranquility at the border, he asserted.

“In these areas, as also with other sections of the border areas, various agreements govern the manner in which troops of both sides should operate and deal with situations of face-offs to maintain peace and tranquillity”.

It was on that basis, said Singh, that relations have improved dramatically since 1988.

Reiterating the Indian view about the space given to the boundary question, he said, “India’s position is that while bilateral relations can continue to develop in parallel with discussions on resolving the boundary question, any serious disturbance in peace and tranquillity along the LAC in the border areas is bound to have implications for the positive direction of our ties”.

This position has been articulated repeatedly by India during the current stand-off – and is different from the Chinese position, which emphasises the overall health of bilateral ties.

Also read: We Need to Look at What Was Missing in the India-China Joint Statement

The defence minister also underlined that armed forces, central police forces and difference intelligence agencies had an “elaborate and time tested mechanism” for coordination.

He also noted that there was an ongoing situation which involved “sensitive operational issues” – and therefore, stated that he will not be able to give more details.

The Indian minister also made it clear that the current situation was qualitatively different from previous stand-offs with China, which had been resolved peacefully. “…in the past too we have had situations of prolonged stand-offs in our border areas with China which have been resolved peacefully,” he stated.

The latest stand-off at eastern Ladakh, he said, was “very different both in terms of scale of troops involved and the number of friction points”.

An IAF transport aircraft C17 brings in essentials supplies at a base in Ladakh, Tuesday, Sept, 15, 2020, as the security forces gear up for winter amid tensions at the LAC. Photo: PTI

He said that while India remains committed to peaceful resolution, “At the same time, the House can be assured that we remain prepared to deal with all contingencies”.

On the start of the current stand-off, Singh said that India had noticed build-up of troops and armaments in China’s border areas adjacent to eastern Ladakh “since April”.

“In early May, the Chinese side had taken action to hinder the normal, traditional patrolling pattern of our troops in the Galwan Valley area, which resulted in a face-off,” said Rajnath.

Also read: A Few Questions on China That Narendra Modi Cannot Evade

While the ground commanders were talking to each other as per protocol, China made “made several attempts to transgress the LAC in other parts of the Western Sector” in mid-May. He stated those attempted transgressions “included Kongka La, Gogra and North Bank of Pangong Lake”. “These were “detected early” and “responded to appropriately” by Indian troops, said the minister.

Close up satellite image of the Chinese claim line of 1960 at Pangong Tso. Image: The Wire/Google Earth

On June 6, the senior commanders of both sides met at Chushul and agreed on a process of disengagement “that involved reciprocal actions”.

Both sides also agreed to respect and abide by the LAC and not undertake any activity to alter the status quo. However in violation of this the Chinese side created a violent face off on June 15th at Galwan. Our brave soldiers laid down their lives and also inflicted costs including casualties on the Chinese side,” said Singh.

The defence minister said that the Indian armed forces showed restraint in face of provocative action, but also valour when they were required to protect India’s territorial integrity.

Despite the violent face-off, India kept military and diplomatic channels open, but based the talks on three principles. According to Singh, these were:

  1. both sides should strictly respect and observe the LAC;
  2. neither side should attempt to alter the status quo unilaterally; and
  3. all agreements and understandings between the two sides much be fully abided by in their entirety.

The minister, however, did not give details of the contours of the disengagement process. For example, in Galwan valley, both Chinese and Indian troops pulled back to create a ‘buffer zone’. But, since the Chinese and Indian troops pulled back by similar distance, a large part of this buffer zone was in Indian territory, which had led to concerns. There was, however, no explanation given on this.

While the Chinese side also took the position that bilateral agreements and protocol should rule interactions, the defence minister noted that despite ongoing discussions, Chinese troops “again engaged in provocative military manoeuvres on the night of August 29 and 30, in an attempt to change the status quo in the South Bank area of Pangong Lake”. These were also thwarted by the Indian side, he claimed.

As mentioned by earlier Indian statements, the minister also reiterated that China had been amassing troops since the 1993 and 1996 agreements. “Their actions have led to face-offs and frictions from time to time along the LAC. As I mentioned earlier, the agreements have detailed procedures and norms to deal with the situation of face-offs. However, in the recent incidents this year, the violent conduct of Chinese forces has been in complete violation of all mutually agreed norms”.

A photograph released by PTI shows Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) soldiers reportedly near the Indian post near Mukhpari peak at about 6 pm on Monday, September 7, 2020.

Currently, Singh told Lok Sabha, the Chinese side has “mobilised a large number of troops and armaments along the LAC as well as in the depth areas”. He also added that there were “several friction areas in Eastern Ladakh including Gogra, Kongka La and North and South Banks of the Pangong Lake”.

“In response to China’s actions, our armed forces have also made appropriate counter deployments in these areas to ensure that India’s security interests are fully protected,” he” stated Singh.

While he gave a timeline of the stand-off at the border since May, the minister’s statement had one glaring omission. His speech made no mention of the September 7 firing incident, when shots were fired for the first time at the LAC since 1975.

While the minister had talked about the need to mention “sensitive” operational details, the Indian Army had itself issued a statement on September 8 denying Chinese allegation and accusing PLA troops of firing a “few rounds in the air”. It was a substantive escalation in tension as both India and China had till now boasted that no shots had been fired at the LAC over the last decades, despite the boundary remaining ‘hot’.

Further, the defence minister did not mention the Depsang plains.

According to the Times of India, during the August 8 ground commander talks, India had stressed the importance of reducing tensions to prevent any inadvertent clash at the Depsang plains. The Hindustan Times had reported that PLA’s forward deployment in Depsang has hindered India’s patrolling on the route. Both armies have increased their deployments with manpower, tanks and artillery in the area.

Depsang Plains in Ladakh. Photo: Wikimedia Commons/ CC BY-SA 3.0

Both TOI and Indian Express have reported that the issue of Chinese intrusion into Depsang plains was “more strategically important” than other friction points, including Pangong Lake.

The Depsang Plains lie to the south of Daulat Beg Oldie, India’s northern most outpost where India operates an advanced landing ground to support its forward military deployments, noted Express.

Singh also repeated that the Chinese had attempted to transgress and change the status quo, but were thwarted by Indian troops. This, again, provides no clarity on where the Chinese are sitting on the Line of Actual Control at present.

The defence minister’s formulation that China had only “attempted” to transgress would mean that the PLA has gone back to its area of the LAC. His words echoed that of the Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s remarks to an all-party meeting, when the latter said that China had never intruded into Indian territory. In August, Ministry of Defence had published a routine document that stated China had “transgressed” into eastern Ladakh, but the file was removed from the website.

Citing government sources, The Hindu had reported that China had occupied about 1,000 square kilometres of area in Ladakh along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) after the transgressions in May.

If China had hindered India’s traditional patrolling pattern over the months, it would mean that their presence within India’s perception of LAC is more substantive than Singh mentioned. For example, there have been multiple reports that Chinese troops have come up to ‘Finger 4’, one of the mountainous peaks on Pangong Lake and have made constructions on the site.

While there have also been reports of counter-deployments, all of them mention Indian troops occupying heights that are marked within Indian territory. There have not been any reports of eviction of Chinese troops from their current positions, which are understood to have gone much beyond India’s perception of where the LAC lies at the border.

Singh claimed that rapid deployment at the border was due to the NDA government stepping up “budget for border infrastructure development to about double the previous levels”.

“This has not only provided much needed connectivity to the local population, but has also provided better logistical support for our armed forces, enabling them to be more alert in the border areas and respond more effectively where required. In the coming years too, the Government remains committed to this objective,” he said.

The defence minister concluded his speech by stating that morale was high and troops were being provisioned with suitable clothing and equipment. “The reassuring visit by our PM has ensured that our commanders and soldiers understand that the entire nation stands behind them in support of the just cause of defending our territorial integrity”.

Urging the house to pass a resolution, Singh said that it was time for MPs to come together to express confidence in the armed forces.

After the defence minister sat down, the opposition benches got up to state their views, but were not allowed to speak by Lok Sabha speaker, Om Birla.