Exclusive | ‘Nagas Will Never Join Indian Union Nor Accept India’s Constitution’: NSCN (I-M) Chief

In an interview to The Wire, Thuingaleng Muivah added that there could be no compromise on the NSCN (I-M)’s insistence on a Naga flag and Naga constitution.

New Delhi: In an interview that is likely to upset and even annoy the government at the Centre and which starkly reveals the sharp differences that are still separating the National Socialist Council of Nagalim (Isak-Muivah) from the Indian government, the general secretary of the NSCN (I-M) has repeatedly and forcefully said that the Nagas will never be part of the Indian Union nor will they accept India’s constitution.

Thuingaleng Muivah added that there could be no compromise on the NSCN (I-M)’s insistence on a Naga flag and Naga constitution.

“We have stood our ground on these two non-negotiable issues and we shall continue to stand till the last man standing,” he said.

Muivah added that Naga organisations like the Naga National Political Groups or several civil society organisations, who are not insisting on a separate flag and constitution, are “traitors”.

In a 55-minute interview to Karan Thapar for The Wire, Muivah, who is 86 and hard of hearing, also sharply criticised R.N. Ravi, the interlocutor and Nagaland Governor.

Also read: NSCN (I-M) Blames Interlocutor – the Nagaland Governor – for Peace Accord Delays

He says Ravi has “betrayed” the NSCN (I-M), “he has thrown us away” and that was acting at the behest of the Union home ministry.

Clearly indicating that the NSCN (I-M)’s patience is running out Muivah told The Wire that if the government does not agree to the NSCN (I-M)’s terms or backs away from earlier understandings they would be “compelled to leave the talks”.

However, despite repeated questioning, he refused to say how much more time he was prepared to give the talks. He also repeatedly refused to answer the question whether the NSCN (I-M) would take to arms if it walked out of the talks thus returning the situation in Nagaland to what prevailed before the 1997 ceasefire. At one point when he was asked whether the insurgency would re-start if the talks collapse, his answer was “you need to ask that to the Indian government”.

It is clear from the interview that the starting point of Muivah’s arguments is the fact that he believes the Nagas have a unique history and identity. He said that historically the Nagas have never been under Indian rule. He repeatedly said this has been accepted by the Indian government. Therefore, he argued, if the Nagas have a unique identity and history the solution must also be unique.

Asked specifically whether the government’s refusal to agree to a separate Naga flag and constitution would be a breaking point he said “there can be no solution without a flag and constitution”. He dismissed the argument that after the government had revoked Article 370 and done away with Kashmir’s flag and constitution it cannot now accept this in the case of Nagaland. He said the unique Naga history and identity not only means that the solution has to be unique but also that the Jammu and Kashmir precedent cannot apply.

When it was pointed out to Muivah that groups like Naga National Political Groups and civil society organisations are not insisting on a flag and constitution he dismissed them as “traitors”.

Yesterday, October 15, all NNPGs and civil society groups unanimously passed a resolution to support the ongoing talks in ‘one voice’. The resolution, however, was quiet on the NSCN (I-M)’s demand for a separate flag.

Also read: Four Reasons Why the NSCN(I-M) Released the Confidential Nagaland Framework Agreement

Speaking to The Wire about the fact that the Framework Agreement of August 2015, signed by the NSCN (I-M) and the government of India, talks of “sharing the sovereign power,” Muivah emphatically and repeatedly said that this does not mean that the Nagas will accept and come under the Indian constitution.

Their unique history and identity means that they have to have their own constitution, he said. He also said repeatedly and emphatically that the Nagas would never be part of the Indian Union.

In The Wire interview, Muivah repeatedly spoke of the Nagas and the government of India as two entities. At one point he even spoke of them as two separate nations.

He said they could share sovereignty with each other and added that during the last 23 years of talks the two have come close to each other but they still remain separate entities. He emphatically stood by the line he took on August 14, 2019, a date the NSCN (I-M) regards as Naga Independence Day, that Nagas “will not merge with India”.

Speaking to about the NSCN (I-M)’s insistence that all Naga inhabited areas outside the present boundaries of Nagaland must integrate with Nagaland to create what the NSCN calls ‘Nagalim’, Muivah said that this remained an important part of the NSCN’s position.

Watch: The Naga Question: Insurgency, Ceasefire and the Peace Process

He said that Ravi’s proposed Pan Naga Hoho, a cultural body with no political role or executive authority, and Naga Regional Territorial Councils, under the Sixth Schedule of the constitution, for Naga inhabited areas of Manipur and Arunachal Pradesh, is acceptable as a transition and as a first step. However, the goal remains the integration of all Naga areas in Nagalim. He also said that Ravi has accepted that this is only a transitional measure and that all Naga areas must be integrated.

What seems clear is that on this issue of integrating Naga-inhabited areas, the NSCN (I-M) is prepared to give the government time to implement it fully provided the government accepts the principle of doing so. This is a reiteration of what Muivah told the BBC programme ‘HARDtalk India’ in an interview in April 2005.

Muivah spoke particularly strongly and passionately of the loss of trust in Ravi.

File image of Prime Minister Narendra Modi with NSCN (I-M) General Secretary Thuingaleng Muivah at the signing ceremony of historic peace accord between Government of India and NSCN (I-M), in New Delhi. Photo: PTI

Confirming to The Wire that he wrote to Prime Minister Narendra Modi in February insisting that hereafter the talks should happen at the “highest” level, “without pre-condition and outside India in a third country”, Muivah said that even eight months later, the NSCN (I-M) has not got a formal reply. He would not say whether they had received one informally, or what it was.

Asked repeatedly as to whether the talks are near breaking point, Muivah refused to give a clear answer but he did say that if the government refuses to accept the NSCN (I-M)’s important demands or goes back on what it has earlier agreed to then they would be “compelled” to leave. But he would not say how much more time he was prepared to give the talks nor whether the NSCN (I-M) would resume the insurgency and fighting if the talks collapse.

Muivah said that the NSCN (I-M) still has patience, although they have been talking for 23 years. He repeatedly said, without giving details, that on many points an understanding or agreement had been reached earlier but now it is Ravi who appears to be backing away.

In fact, Muivah, who began the interview criticising Jawaharlal Nehru for his intransigence and his refusal to accept that the Nagas have a unique history and identity, towards the end started to compare Narendra Modi to Nehru and suggested that his government, today, is similarly intransigent.

The above is a paraphrased precis of Thuingaleng Muivah’s interview to Karan Thapar for The Wire. Please bear with the high volume at which the questions were asked, often repeatedly. It was necessary to ensure that Thuingaleng Muivah could hear them properly. The full interview is available here.

The Naga Peace Process Is Lost Between Integration and Unification

The current stalemate is rooted in the NSCN-IM’s decision not to use the framework agreement as a point of departure to build consensus over the final agreement.

On August 3, 2015, Prime Minister Narendra Modi tweeted thrice within two hours. At 6:15 PM, he informed the nation that “we would be witness to an important & landmark event”. A few minutes later, he added that he “will be making a special announcement”. Finally at 8:17 PM, the nation learnt about the “signing of the historic agreement between Government of India and NSCN” that marked “not merely the end of a problem, but the beginning of a new future.”

Like most of the prime minister’s “special” announcements, this turned out to be a damp squib. What was signed was not the final agreement, rather merely a framework agreement with one of the factions and even that was not released to the public. Instead of taking the dialogue with the government to its logical conclusion, the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Isak-Muivah) (NSCN-IM) procrastinated. Little did it realise that sooner than later, the issue would fall off the prime minister’s radar.

More importantly, instead of using the framework agreement as a point of departure to engage other Naga stakeholders and build consensus over the final agreement, NSCN-IM chose to press ahead with the partisan goal of integration rather than unification.

‘Integration’ in Naga parlance applies to their territory divided by “artificial” colonial and post-colonial borders between Myanmar and India and within India between Nagaland and its neighbouring states. The goal of integration is to create a unified Naga realm variously known as Nagalim, Greater Nagaland and Naga Lands.

Also Read: What Ails the Naga Peace Process?

On the other hand, ‘unification’ applies to factions of insurgent groups, even though it is also used to refer to territory. In fact, there is even a faction called NSCN-Unification, which as the name suggests, was ostensibly launched to achieve unification among factions.

The NSCN-IM prioritises integration over unification, while the people of Nagaland treat unification as a logical precursor to integration (and, eventually, sovereignty), a means to avoid further bloodshed and an opportunity to reinsert themselves into the peace process. For nearly a decade, this has been the central contradiction of the peace process in Nagaland that is structured around the NSCN-IM dominated by Tangkhuls of Ukhrul district of Manipur.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi witnessing the exchange of the peace accord text by the Government of India interlocutor RN Ravi and NSCN(I-M) leader Th. Muivah in New Delhi on August 3, 2015. Photo: PTI Photo

The factors thwarting unification

Unification is thwarted by several factors. First, the gross asymmetry between factions in terms of firepower and visibility in the world beyond the Naga realm makes for unequal bargaining power. The NSCN-IM is far ahead of other factions in terms of access to arms and finance and has secured the membership of international organisations such as the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organisation (UNPO).

Second, the asymmetry in power has also meant that NSCN-IM has been accused of inflicting greater harm on others. Unification would, therefore, require forgiveness but that will level the playing field by pulling the NSCN-IM qua recipient of forgiveness a few notches down.

Third, the smaller factions with roots in Nagaland did not need the mediation of the NSCN-IM to join the peace process. They had to simply wait for their respective communities or New Delhi to put them on the negotiation table, which is what happened eventually in 2017, much to the chagrin of NSCN-IM.

Fourth, the Naga civil society, which has been the main driver of unification along with the Church, has itself fractured over the past decade due to the NSCN-IM’s ethnic politics.

Fifth, the competition to control Dimapur is another obstacle. Bertil Lintner suggests that a similar competition drove a wedge between the leading tribes of the Naga National Council in the 1960s. Dimapur was a very small transport hub at that time. Since then, it has emerged as perhaps the most important commercial town east of Guwahati and the stakes have grown enormously.

Also Read: An Ill-timed Delimitation in Nagaland

The problem of integration is even more complex because it cannot be settled within the Naga family and requires outreach to other states as well. First, Nagaland is represented by one MP each in the Rajya Sabha and the Lok Sabha. Nagaland’s neighbouring states – Arunachal Pradesh, Assam and Manipur – are represented by 9 and 18 MPs, respectively. Of these, Assam alone accounts for 7 and 14 MPs, respectively.

Second, the ruling party at the Centre has not been in power in Nagaland since 1995. However, through most of this period, national parties have been in power in Nagaland’s neighbouring states. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) was a junior coalition partner in Nagaland government during 2003-08, while it had a token presence in the ruling coalition in the next decade. The BJP emerged as a major coalition partner in 2018 but its stakes are larger in Arunachal Pradesh, Assam and Manipur, where it is the main ruling party and which are also more important to its ideological mentor the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS).

In short, national parties do not have any incentive to support a constitutional amendment to redraw borders. So, whether by accident or design, by electing national parties to rule their states, Nagaland’s neighbours have insured themselves against Naga irredentism.

Third, there is a lack of clarity about the extent of Naga Lands and the identification of Naga tribes outside Nagaland. Moreover, many territories claimed by the partisans of integration have substantial non-Naga populations. Given its past record, the NSCN-IM is a liability in any Naga attempt to engage non-Naga neighbours.

Also Read: Four Reasons Why the NSCN(I-M) Released the Confidential Nagaland Framework Agreement

Different priorities

Fourth, Nagas have lived separately under different political and administrative setups for decades. Integration threatens entrenched interest groups in these areas. This logic operates at two levels. At one level, Nagas of Nagaland want to protect their resources from other Nagas. At another, different groups within Nagaland have different priorities vis-à-vis integration. For example, Sumis attach the highest priority to the disputed belt around Dimapur, while Konyaks prefer the adjoining districts of Arunachal Pradesh. For Sumis and Konyaks, northern Manipur, the priority for the NSCN-IM’s Tangkhuls, is a far off place whose integration will severely erode their bargaining power within an expanded Nagaland. In fact, there are disagreements over integration even within close groups of tribes such as the Eastern Nagas.

Fifth, the NSCN-IM’s “Greater Nagaland” project has not yet come to terms with ‘lesser Nagalands’ such as “Frontier Nagaland” proposed as a separate state for six “backward” Naga tribes of Nagaland. Not coincidently, these Eastern Nagaland tribes have been closer to the NSCN-Khaplang, the main rival of the NSCN-IM until the demise of Khaplang. Likewise, the sporadic Zeliangrong project for unifying Zeme, Liangmai and Rongmei tribes at the tri-junction of Assam, Manipur and Nagaland presents an entirely different set of challenges.

NSCN(K) chairman S.S. Khaplang, seen here at a camp in Myanmar in 2011. Photo: Rajeev Bhattacharyya

Sixth, pan-Naga civil society organisations that were key to building internal consensus on integration have become dysfunctional as they are seen to be dominated by the NSCN-IM and “entirely lopsided and helplessly drifting southward” toward Manipur. The Eastern Nagaland tribes were the first to withdraw from pan-Naga organisations. After that, the Central Nagaland tribes and, finally, the Southern Nagaland tribes too left as they felt marginalised in platforms dominated by non-Nagaland tribes.

Over the last three decades, the NSCN-IM won most of its battles. Yet it stares at losing the war because of its self-serving obsession with integration, even if it is non-territorial in character. This is not acceptable to Nagas of Nagaland, which makes peace elusive. In the end, S.C. Jamir, one of the last surviving architects of the state of Nagaland and the NSCN-IM’s bête noire, might have the last laugh because after all, the much-maligned state of Nagaland, which was formed by combining the Naga Hills district of Assam and the Tuensang Frontier Division of the North East Frontier Agency, remains the only instance of successful integration of Naga territories.

Vikas Kumar teaches at Azim Premji University, Bengaluru, and is co-author of Numbers in India’s Periphery: The Political Economy of Government Statistics, Cambridge University Press (2020).

AAPSU on Naga Talks: ‘Will Strongly Oppose Any Territorial Changes to Arunachal’

The apex students’ body has advocated for the assurances given by the Centre’s interlocutor and present Nagaland Governor R.N. Ravi in 2015.

Itanagar: The AAPSU appealed to the Centre on Wednesday to keep Arunachal Pradesh away from any kind of “territorial changes” while finding a solution to the decades-old Naga political problem.

The All Arunachal Pradesh Students Union (AAPSU) stated that the talks should not affect the state and its people in any way.

We welcome the initiative taken by the successive governments in resolving the Naga issue. However, we would also like to make it clear that the indigenous people of Arunachal Pradesh will strongly oppose any attempts made to change the territorial jurisdiction of the state or any kind of administrative, political or other interventions while reaching a final solution to the decades-old insurgency problem in Nagaland, it said in a statement.

Also read: Could the Home Ministry Bring More ‘Facilitators’ to Break Naga Peace Talks Deadlock?

The apex students’ body said the Centre should also stand by the assurances given by its interlocutor and present Nagaland Governor R N Ravi in 2015.

Ravi, during his meeting with the AAPSU in 2015, had promised that Arunachals interest would not be compromised during the time of executing the final draft of the Naga Peace Accord.

The union called upon all the legislators of the state, the MPs, and the political parties to strongly oppose any possible attempts to alter the states territorial jurisdiction and administration for the proposed accord.

We are very much aware of the NSCN-IM’s vision of Nagalim or Greater Nagaland but there are no Nagas in Arunachal Pradesh. We have always, on record, objected to their vested interest designs,” it said.

The map of Nagalim, released by the NSCN-IM a few years ago, includes Tirap, Changlang, Longding, Anjaw, Lohit and Namsai districts of Arunachal Pradesh.

The NSCN-IM leadership is currently in Delhi and held two rounds of official-level discussions in the last few days.

Could the Home Ministry Bring More ‘Facilitators’ to Break Naga Peace Talks Deadlock?

While the demand for the removal of interlocutor R.N. Ravi grows, the arrival of key leaders in New Delhi suggests a measure to smoothen disagreements could be in the offing.

New Delhi: Amid the Nationalist Socialist Council of Nagalim-Isak Muivah’s reported demand for a change of the Centre’s interlocutor for the Naga peace talks, the Ministry of Home Affairs is looking at the possibility of bringing in a set of new “facilitators” to break the deadlock, it is learned.

The home ministry, however, plans to keep the present interlocutor in place.

The NSCN (I-M) is the signatory to the framework agreement (FA) with the central government.

Several sources that The Wire spoke to in New Delhi and Nagaland, along with top civil society leaders in the north-eastern state who are privy to the latest developments, have corroborated this fresh development.

A senior official at the MHA, on condition of anonymity, said that though the NSCN (I-M) “is more for a change of the interlocutor” – Nagaland governor R.N. Ravi – the “Ministry is not likely to concede (to it) at the moment. Instead, it may look at the possibility of bringing in a few more facilitators, though, nothing is final yet.”

Going by the NSCN (I-M)’s statement issued to mark five years of the inconclusive talks after the signing of the FA in the presence of Prime Minister Narendra Modi in New Delhi in 2015, The Wire had stated on August 3 that the organisation may be aiming for a change of interlocutor for the accord. 

Also read: NSCN (I-M) Blames Interlocutor – the Nagaland Governor – for Peace Accord Delays

In the last few months, the unease between the NSCN and Ravi has been coming out in the open. In that anniversary statement, while the NSCN praised “the dynamic leadership of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi” for signing the “historic framework agreement” with it, it was scathing in its criticism of Ravi, accusing him of “deceptive manner of handling the FA”.

It said he “deceitfully went beyond the call of interlocutor to indulge himself in playing divisive game among the Nagas to dismantle the very foundation of FA”.

All of these were a clear indication that the organisation may be seeking a replacement of Ravi due to deteriorating relations. An Indian Express report on August 9, citing “sources” in the NSCN, also stated that they would request that the forthcoming round of talks “be conducted by a new interlocutor”.  

Speculation in local news dailies have it that the names of A.B. Mathur, the Centre’s interlocutor for the NDFB talks and the continuing talks with the ULFA in Assam and the UPF-KNO of Manipur, and Lt Gen (retd) Himalaya Singh from Manipur are doing the rounds as a possible new interlocutor of the Centre for the Naga talks.

However, on past August 9, a senior MHA official told this correspondent that at the behest of the Ministry, Nagaland chief minister Neiphu Rio and Assam finance minister Himanta Biswa Sarma had air-dashed to New Delhi late last week in a chartered flight along with some others, including former president of the Naga Hoho Keviletuo.

Signing the Framework Accord. Credit: PTI

Signing of the Framework Agreement in 2015. Credit: PTI

The team met NSCN general secretary Th. Muivah who has been in New Delhi since July 20 for the twin reasons of getting his health checked and to seek a change of the interlocutor by the MHA to break the deadlock in the talks. The scheduled talks of the NSCN in the second week of July with Ravi did not take place. Among the sustained issues with the organisation have been a strong demand for a separate flag and a constitution. 

Also read: What Ails the Naga Peace Process?

None of the stakeholders are, however, ready to officially talk about the government’s latest line of thinking at the moment, though the MHA official has stated that Rio and Sarma are likely to be a part of it. The Wire had contacted Sarma for a confirmation of the meeting with Muivah and the likelihood of him being a part of the talks but he didn’t comment on either. 

A top source privy to it in the Nagaland government has however, confirmed the meeting to The Wire.

“It looks like the Central government at the moment is not likely to change the interlocutor but other factors can be brought in to help facilitate the talks, and most likely it will happen. The talks have been going on for long, it is the break it or make it point, all efforts will be made at the moment to make it a success,” the source said, refusing to be named here citing that reason that, “till it happens, nothing can be confirmed”. 

After Muivah, his wife and a few NSCN leaders reached Delhi in a chartered flight on July 20, a five-member team of the group flew to the National Capital from Nagaland on August 7 by a special flight. This was followed by another nine-member delegation of top leaders who arrived on August 8 by another hired flight. Since the governor-cum-interlocutor Ravi is also learnt to be travelling to Delhi on August 11, the expectation is that the stalemate will be broken and a round of talks will begin in Delhi.

“We can’t confirm the meeting or the exact date at the moment but since all of the top NSCN leaders are in Delhi and so is the interlocutor, the next round of talks are most likely to happen,” said the source. 

According to a news report in The Deccan Chronicle on August 10 citing “authoritative security sources”, the Prime Minister’s Office has “set a September deadline for the final settlement of all Naga political issues”, adding that Ravi has been asked to restart the process “next week” to “thrash out differences over some of the minor rhetorical issues”. 

While in some sections of the media, there have been speculation of a Naga peace accord announcement by Modi on August 15, going by this report, and The Wire’s conversation with government and BJP sources in the Northeast, it seems highly unlikely. However, there is a precedent to such announcements on the Northeast.

In 1985, the top leaders of the Assam Movement were brought in batches by special flights to New Delhi and the Assam Accord was signed on the intervening night of August 14-15. Then Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi had announced it in his Independence Day speech from the Red Fort.       

The Centre’s likely attempt to involve a senior leader of a neighbouring north-eastern state (may be Sarma) to help sort out a vexed issue is also not new. So there is precedent of the Centre including a chief minister of the state to help solve major peace issues with an armed group. 

While in Assam, then Manipur chief minister Dorendro Singh was asked by the Indira Gandhi government to act as an intermediary for a possible solution to the Assam foreigners’ issue in the early 1980s, the Mizoram chief minister Lalthanhawla was kept in the loop during the Centre’s peace talks with the Mizo National Front, leading him to vacate his seat for Laldenga to become that state’s chief minister after the signing the Mizo Accord with the Rajiv Gandhi government in 1986.

Meanwhile, back in Nagaland, two of the prominent civil society groups are of the opinion that the interlocutor, Ravi, is functioning in an “autocratic” manner. In a separate memorandum to the Prime Minister, the Naga Hoho, the apex body of all Naga tribes, and the Naga Mother’s Association have reportedly stated that Ravi has been “hounding” the same Naga groups with whom he is supposed to negotiate and conclude the peace talks. 

However, the Nagaland Gaon Burah Association or the body of the village heads, in a press statement, have opposed the demand for change of interlocutor. The working committee of the seven Naga National Political Groups, brought in by Ravi to join the peace talks, are also opposed to the idea of changing him as the government’s intermediary stating that it would turn the clock back on the talks. 

What Ails the Naga Peace Process?

The Centre has inherited a peace process structured around the NSCN-IM, but is unable to conclude it for a variety of reasons.

Nagaland’s Governor R.N. Ravi stirred a hornet’s nest when he questioned the state government’s alleged hands off approach to law and order in the face of “rampant extortions and violence by…armed gangs” and invoked Article 371A to ask the government to seek his approval before the “transfer and posting of officials entrusted with maintenance of law and order.”

Ravi used a constitutional provision that the former chief minister, the late Hokishe Sema had left unattended, when he hurriedly redrew electoral and administrative boundaries to strengthen his position before the 1974 assembly elections.

The state government belatedly offered a tame defence that was followed up by a circular allegedly at the governor’s behest, asking all government officials to identify their relatives associated with insurgent groups. While the leaked letter to the state government, and the subsequent circular, has raised hackles, it merely reiterates Ravi’s earlier assessment of insurgent groups and their relation with the state.

Also read: NSCN (I-M) Blames Interlocutor – the Nagaland Governor – for Peace Accord Delays

Ravi outlined this in his op-eds published in The Hindu (on November 15, 2012 and January 23, 2014) before appointment as the interlocutor. In these pieces, he argued that the ceasefire allowed the National Socialist Council of Nagaland/Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM) “to set up multiple garrisons, almost in every district to help expand its reach” despite “popular opposition” and “resulted in the retreat of the state… and subversion of democratic politics.”

He concluded that a dialogue with the NSCN-IM, “a militia of the Tangkhul tribe of Manipur with little resonance with the broad Naga family,” will not yield “a sustainable peace.”

In another development, six NSCN-IM cadre were killed on July 11 in Arunachal Pradesh’s Longding district prompting the outfit to seek clarification about “the validity and extent of ceasefire agreement” within a week and issue a warning that “we shall not be held responsible” for the “ugly aftermaths evolving spontaneously out of such situation.”

Contrary to the fears of some observers, the breakdown of ceasefire is not the logical conclusion of the game of chicken between the governor and insurgent groups.

First, a majority of the present cadre of insurgent groups joined after the ceasefire and have been mostly involved in non-combat activities around camps including in Dimapur, a bustling commercial town in the plains.

Second, any group that violates ceasefire will face resistance before it returns to the jungles because tribal bodies and the church have invested a lot over the decades to sustain peace.

Third, a lot has changed over the past two decades including the turn to democracy and a tortuous peace process in Myanmar, the decay of Manipur’s (linguistic) syncretism, shrinking sanctuaries for insurgents in neighbouring countries, entrapment of most insurgent groups of the North East in peace processes and the linking of youth with metropolitan job markets.

The hurdles facing the NSCN-IM, let alone the smaller groups, in resuming fighting notwithstanding, the government ought to honour its commitment to the more than two-decade long peace process.

Home minister Rajnath Singh, PM Narendra Modi and T Muivah of NSCN (I-M. Credit: PTI

A 2017 photograph of then home minister Rajnath Singh, PM Narendra Modi and T Muivah of NSCN (I-M. Photo: PTI

However, before we can hope for a negotiated end to the insurgency, we need to acknowledge that the Naga society has changed immensely since the first ceasefire but the emergent diversity is not represented in the peace process that is hamstrung by tribal, territorial and generational divides.

The NSCN-IM continues to command respect as the foremost champion of the nationalist cause. But that does not balance out concerns about its overwhelming Tangkhul character. These concerns have only intensified after Isak Swu’s death. The NSCN-IM qua Tangkhul outfit has been under attack in Nagaland because its decision-making processes bypass the Nagas of Nagaland and its top leaders are viewed as arrogant and condescending.

Further, the Nagas of Nagaland realise that territorial integration of Naga areas is not feasible and that any non-territorial integration of Naga areas will draw in Nagas from other states and strain Nagaland’s scarce resources.

Also read: In Centre’s Haste to Seal a Naga Accord, Peace Shouldn’t Be the First Casualty

The Meiteis based in the Imphal Valley made clear their commitment to Manipur’s territorial integrity through the Great June Uprising (2001) and Ibobi Singh’s blocking of Muivah’s visit to his birthplace (2010). Myanmarese Nagas too are gradually arriving at a modus vivendi with Naypyidaw.

In response to such developments, groups representing the Nagas of Nagaland forced the government to roll back the recognition of Rongmeis as an indigenous Naga tribe even though it benefitted only a few thousand people already counted as indigenous inhabitants by virtue of having settled before the state’s formation.

Rongmei Nagas of the erstwhile Tamenglong district are among the largest tribes of Manipur. The Nagas of Nagaland saw the indigenisation of Rongmeis as a testing of waters by Tangkhuls and a breach in floodgates that had so far held back large Naga tribes of Manipur out of Nagaland’s crowded job market.

Okram Ibobi Singh. Credit: PTI

Okram Ibobi Singh. Photo: PTI

These concerns intensified when Ibobi Singh redrew internal borders before the 2017 elections reducing the size of Naga-dominated districts to minimise the potential loss of territory to the proposed “Greater Nagaland”. The NSCN-IM seems to be haggling with New Delhi for an arrangement to protect Tangkhul interests in Manipur as they are not quite welcome in Nagaland. The Tangkhuls, who provided several chief ministers to Manipur, find themselves trapped in a shrinking middle ground between Nagaland and Imphal Valley. After decades of rallying behind ‘Greater Nagaland’ they find themselves unable to respond even to the partition of their native district Ukhrul.

Lastly, peace is being negotiated by leaders in their 80s. But it will have to be lived by the youth. The NSCN-IM cannot coerce the younger generation that came of age around the massive mobilisations led by Against Corruption and Unabated Taxation (ACAUT) to accept its version of peace.

Over the past two decades, the NSCN-IM could have reached out to other stakeholders and expanded its negotiation team. Instead it squandered its political capital to remain the exclusive representative of Nagas.

It threatened those who raised questions and cynically manipulated pan-Naga civil society bodies to manufacture consent undermining their legitimacy in Nagaland in the process.

The NSCN-IM made matters worse by refusing to disclose the August 3, 2015 Framework Agreement to the Nagas of Nagaland. Alarmed by their marginalisation, a section of civil society leaders helped bring together the long neglected Nagaland-based “Naga National Political Groups” (NNPGs).

Watch: The Naga Question: Insurgency, Ceasefire and the Peace Process

The NNPGs condemned the “unrepentant theatrical politics” of the NSCN-IM in its “nonexistent land called Nagalim [Greater Nagaland].” Several civil society organisations also criticised the Naga Hoho, which is seen as close to the NSCN-IM, as “entirely lopsided and helplessly drifting southward [toward Manipur] with imaginative domain which is null and void”.

Not coincidentally, some of the civil society leaders who helped unite the NNPGs had earlier in 2013 lamented the inability of the Naga Hoho and other pan-Naga bodies to “protect the interest of Naga people” and floated an alternative pan-Naga body for Nagaland.

The NSCN-IM ignored these developments only to find the Working Committee of the NNPGs signing an “Agreed Position or Preamble” with the interlocutor on November 17, 2017.

The government is now caught in a Catch-22 situation.

It has inherited the peace process structured around the NSCN-IM. However, it is unable to conclude the peace process as its key interlocutor enjoys a shrinking acceptance among the Nagas of Nagaland as well as Manipur but is unable to come to terms with the emergent diversity of the Naga society and accommodate other Naga stakeholders, let alone non-Naga indigenous tribes such as Kukis and Kacharis, on the negotiating table.

Vikas Kumar teaches at Azim Premji University, Bengaluru, and is co-author of Numbers in India’s Periphery: The Political Economy of Government Statistics, Cambridge University Press (2020).