What is Delaying the Landmark Left Merger in Nepal?

Both Prime Minister Oli and CPN-Maoist Centre leader Prachanda need each other’s help to maintain the strength of the government and the unified party.

Kathmandu: In October 2017, Nepal’s two main communist forces— the Communist Party of Nepal-Unified Marxists Leninists (UML) the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist Centre)—announced their electoral alliance, and an eventual merger, ahead of the two-phase provincial and federal elections. Eleven years in the making, the proposed merger was widely welcomed in Nepal, as it promised a long-eluded political stability if the alliance could get two-third majority in the elections, which it did. But the formal merger, which Nepalis were told would take place soon after the elections, has not materialised in seven months.

As the pressure for unification mounted, the long delay, it was announced, would finally end on April 22, the birthday of Vladimir Lenin and the day Nepal’s first communist party was founded in 1949. But it wasn’t meant to be. This in turn has spawned many speculations about the proposed merger and the fate of the Left government in Kathmandu. And it will be difficult for both KP Sharma Oli, the prime minister and chairman of UML and Pushpa Kamal Dahal ‘Prachanda’, the Maoist chief, to back down from the merger, after securing two-thirds vote on the popular planks of ‘stability’ and ‘prosperity’.

Moreover, Oli needs Prachanda to continue to be the leader of a strong government with two-thirds majority as much as Prachanda needs Oli, as at the time of the announcement of the electoral alliance, it was reported the Maoist chairman would lead the new party while Oli ran the government. And this is why, even though there was no formal merger on April 22, the two of them took great pains to convince their sceptical countrymen that it would happen sooner rather than later.

Merger between ‘equals’

One of the reasons for the delay is the immense pressure that Prachanda has faced from his party rank and file, who want the merger on ‘equal terms’ rather than the earlier ‘60-40’ formula devised for selection of electoral candidates, with 60% of nominations going to the UML and 40% to the Maoists. The leaders in the 1099-member Maoist central committee fear ‘demotion’ in the new party which, according to UML-Maoist merger agreement, will have only 299 members in its central committee. The Maoist party members want a larger share in the new outfit’s decision-making pie.

But Oli reckons that such a demand is unjustified as even within the left alliance, UML had emerged by far the largest party in the country after the 2017 elections and hence it deserves to have more members in the decision-making bodies. Prachanda, for his part, wants a clear, written assurance that he will either get to become the prime minister after two and half years of Oli’s reign or that he will get to lead the combined communist party after its general convention. Oli is reluctant to offer any such written assurances.

But even if there was a written assurance, it might be meaningless, as the new party chairman will be chosen by the delegates to the future national convention via a secret ballot, and they might easily opt for someone other than Prachanda. There is also no guarantee that senior UML leaders will accept Prachanda as their prime minister.

Prachanda has of late become quite suspicious of Oli, especially after the prime minister transferred senior government bureaucrats without consulting him. He fears that Oli could strike a deal with Madhav Kumar Nepal, former prime minister and UML second-in-command, making arrangements for Nepal to be the new party chairman. And if Oli refuses to resign as prime minister, Prachanda will be left out in the cold.

All options open

Prachanda wants to retain the possibility of breaking away from the new party open, should Oli and UML renege on their promise. But according to electoral laws he will need the support of at least 40% of the central committee members to form a separate party. This is another reason why he is pitching for a near 50-50 UML-Maoist split in all important decision-making bodies.

Yet another bone of contention is whether to formally recognise the decade-long ‘people’s war’ in which nearly 16,000 people were killed. The Maoists credit the war as a harbinger the federal, republican Nepal, and its recognition in the new party’s statute is seen as mandatory. But UML fears the new party will be discredited, both nationally and internationally, if it formally recognises the ‘murder’ of so many people.

So there are some fundamental differences between the two sides. Yet there are also some compelling portents in favour of the merger. For instance, it had long been assumed here in Kathmandu that New Delhi was against the left alliance, which, in its reckoning, had Beijing’s imprimatur. But during his recent visit to India, Oli is said to have gotten a clear message from Narendra Modi that India too backs the left merger. “It looked like Modi was keen to have the soon-to-be-formed unified left party on his side before it had had a chance to cozy up to China,” according to a top Oli aide.

Placating Prachanda’s ego

Oli is reportedly keen on completing the merger before Modi’s planned trip to Nepal on May 11, to prevent suspicion that India had any role in it. Interestingly, the news of Modi’s Nepal trip came out on the same day the Nepali foreign minister, Pradeep Gyawali, had returned from an official visit to China to lay the ground for PM Oli’s formal visit. Perhaps Modi wanted to preempt Oli’s proposed China visit, which will now be impossible before the end of May for domestic reasons.  

A formal merger may soon be announced. But its longevity will rest largely on how secure Prachanda feels within the new party, particularly if he doesn’t get to lead it. In recent interviews Prachanda, who has continuously held party leadership positions since 1994, has consistently maintained that he is not used to being a ‘second man’.

How the new party handles relations with India and China, and how that plays out among the broader public, which is still largely sympathetic to China and wary of India, will be another big determinant of its longevity.

Biswas Baral is the editor of The Annapurna Express weekly published from Kathmandu. He tweets @biswasktm

Nepal Hopes for Stability Ahead of Parliamentary and Provincial Assembly Elections

Both India and China are likely to be watching the results of Thursday’s election closely.

Both India and China are likely to be watching the results of Thursday’s election closely.

An officer from election commission works to set up a polling station during the parliamentary and provincial elections at Chautara in Sindhupalchok District November 26, 2017. Credit: Reuters/Navesh Chitrakar

An officer from the Election Commission works to set up a polling station during the parliamentary and provincial elections at Chautara in Sindhupalchok District November 26, 2017. Credit: Reuters/Navesh Chitrakar

Kathmandu: The polls on Thursday are the last phase of Nepal’s first parliamentary and provincial assembly elections to be held after the promulgation of the country’s constitution in 2015. The elections are expected to end the prolonged political transition from what was once a Hindu monarchy to a secular, federal, democratic republic and bring about political stability.

The elections are taking place amidst intense political polarisation, particularly with the formation of the Left alliance comprising the Communist Party of Nepal (CPN)-United Marxist Leninist (UML) and CPN-Maoist Centre. On top of that, the electoral battle between the Left alliance, apparently backed by China, and the Nepali Congress, which is seen as closer to India than other parties based on historical ties, may also determine whether Chinese or Indian interests over development projects will prevail thereafter.

The assembly elections are a part of the major changes brought about by the constitution and its amendment, which institutionalised federalism, republicanism, inclusion and secularism. These changes were the outcome of different political movements, including a decade-long civil war (1996-2006), the Jana Andolan II (2006) against the monarchy and the Madhes movements of 2007, 2008 and 2015.

The first round of parliamentary and provincial assembly elections was held in 32 districts on November 26, while Thursday’s elections are taking place in 45 districts.

These elections will elect 275 members to the House of Representatives (HoR) and 550 representatives to the assemblies of the seven newly-created provinces. The country has adopted a mixed electoral system, using both the first-past-the-post (FPTP) and proportional representation systems. The 275-member HoR comprises 165 MPs elected under the FPTP system and 110 MPs elected through the proportional representation system. Out of the 275 seats in the HoR, a party or alliance requires 138 seats to form the government.

If the elections go smoothly, the country will likely get the stable government many people are hoping for. However, others doubt whether this stability will last the next five years if dissenting voices against the constitution are not addressed through an amendment.

Electoral violence on the rise

The number of incidents of electoral violence ahead of the second round of parliamentary and provincial assembly elections is higher than during the first round held on November 26 and the local level elections held on September 18. Last Monday, Gagan Thapa, Nepali Congress candidate for Kathmandu constituency 4, was among 11 people injured after a bomb exploded at Chapali Height, a neighbourhood in the capital. Thapa is an influential youth leader in Nepali politics. The incident has been widely condemned.

temporary policeman deployed for the elections to Dang district in the western Terai region (close to the border with India’s Uttar Pradesh), died a day after being injured when a bomb, reportedly targeting Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba’s election campaign, exploded on November 28. 


Also read: Eleven Years in the Making, Left Alliance Could Herald New Era of Political Stability in Nepal


There is an increase in the intensity and frequency of electoral violence, with election candidates and party cadres being targeted. Reports claim that the Netra Bikram Chand aka ‘Biplab’-led faction of the communist party, a splinter Maoist group opposed to the CPN-Maoist Centre’s foray into mainstream politics, is involved in violent activities with the motive to intimidate voters

Expressing its concerns over the situation, the Election Commission (EC) on November 30 ordered the authorities to ensure security for the elections. The National Human Rights Commission also called on the concerned authorities to take adequate security measures to ensure free and fair elections. Ironically, the home ministry, which is currently under Nepal’s prime minister, is not seen as an effective authority to deal with security challenges. 

Meanwhile, talking to the media, chief election commissioner Ayodhi Prasad Yadav asked voters to cast their votes without fear. He said the commission is confident about security arrangements made for the polls.

Changed political context

The parliamentary and provincial assembly elections are taking place under a changed political context. The trajectory of politics in the country shifted dramatically after the successful completion of local level elections. On eve of the two-round parliamentary and provincial assembly elections, the Communist Party of Nepal (CPN)-United Marxist Leninist (UML) and CPN-Maoist Center formed an alliance on October 3, a turn of events that even astute political analysts failed to predict. The alliance was surprising because though the two parties share the ‘communist’ label, they have been rivals for decades and did not agree on various contentious issues, including federalism, citizenship and inclusion.

The Nepali Congress had not prepared itself to counter the Left alliance. Immediately, Prime Minister Deuba, who is also Nepali Congress president, called on forces such as the Rastriya Prajatantra Party Nepal and Madhesi parties like the Rastriya Janata Party Nepal (RJPN) and Federal Socialist Forum Nepal (FSFN) to join a “broader democratic alliance” with an intent to counter the Left alliance. The Congress’s call did not yield any substantial results.

The Congress, which leads the incumbent government, also tried its best to postpone the elections by at least a few days so that it could have more time for preparation. India was also reportedly actively supporting the party in trying to do so. A Supreme Court intervention was likely to postpone the elections by a few days, but it was too late for the party by then. The Left alliance opposed any change in date, and so did the Madhesi parties.

File photo of Sher Bahadur Deuba. Credit: Reuters/Eduardo Munoz

File photo of Sher Bahadur Deuba. Credit: Reuters/Eduardo Munoz

Left alliance vs Nepali Congress

During the election campaign, Deuba asked voters to make a choice between democracy or the ‘authoritarianism’ of Leftist rule while casting their votes. On the other hand, CPN-UML chairperson K.P. Sharma Oli, accusing the Nepali Congress of spreading rumours about his party, claimed that only a majority government formed under the leadership of the Left alliance can bring long-lasting development in the country.

The election campaigns of the Nepali Congress and Left alliance have been focused on attacking each other, Jhalak Subedi, a columnist, told The Wire. He added that these parties were reluctant to talk to voters about pertinent issues, such as the functioning of federal and provincial assemblies, although they mentioned those issues in their manifestos. “This was disappointing,” he said.

Unlike other provinces, the election campaign tactics of the major rival parties has not really worked in Province 2. The constitutional amendment agenda used by the Madhesi parties in their campaign has caught people’s attention here, Chandrakishore, a prominent journalist and political analyst, told The Wire.

Madhesis unite

A section of Kathmandu thinks that whatever Madhesi parties do fulfils Indian interests. However, a recent move by these parties has surprised not just Kathmandu but also Delhi. Instead of joining the Nepali Congress for the “broader democratic alliance”, both Madhesi parties – RJPN and FSFN – fielded a common candidate under the FPTP electoral system. In Province 2, Madhesi parties have emerged as competition to the Nepali Congress. These dynamics are likely to affect the two-thirds majority claimed by the Left alliance, since the mood in Madhes is against the Nepali Congress and the Left alliance, Chandrakishore said. Mahesh Chaurasiya, press coordinator for FSFN, the Madhesi party led by Upendra Yadav, also thinks the same.

Madhesi parties are likely to be elected with a majority in Province 2, and they will once again press for constitutional amendments in order to address the dissenting voices of Madhesis, Tharus, Janjatis and women.

India and China closely eye Nepal polls 

Ahead of the parliamentary and provincial assembly elections, Deuba recently cancelled the Budhi Gandaki hydropower project which had been contracted to a Chinese company by the previous government. It is learnt that the project will be assigned to an Indian contractor. However, UML chairperson Oli said that he would revive the project after coming into power.

As the government that will be formed after the elections is supposed to be in power for the next five years, India and China are closely watching the polls. The results are likely to determine which country’s interests are served on development and infrastructure projects. 

A majority for the Left alliance is imminent if the results of the recently-concluded local level elections, where CPN-UML and CPN-Maoist Center had emerged as the first and third parties, are anything to go by. If this comes true and the Left alliance backed by Beijing forms the government, New Delhi fears it will lose its influence over Nepal.

Praveen Kumar Yadav is a Nepali journalist writing on politics, development, human rights and social justice. He tweets at @iPrav33n. 

Oli’s Endgame in Nepal: Mixed Blessings, Persisting Perceptions

The biggest challenge for the political class will be to collectively work out a compromise that addresses the grievances of the marginalised communities, one that has the support of the CPN-UML.

The biggest challenge for the political class will be to collectively work out a compromise that addresses the grievances of the marginalised communities, one that has the support of the CPN-UML.

Nepal's Prime Minister Khadga Prasad Sharma Oli observing a minute of silence for earthquake victims. Credit: Reuters

Nepali Prime Minister Khadga Prasad Sharma Oli observing a minute of silence for earthquake victims. Credit: Reuters

In order to save his government from an imminent collapse, Nepali Prime Minister K.P. Sharma Oli struck a devil’s bargain with the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist Centre), his main coalition partner, on May 5.

The nine-point agreement between the prime minister’s Communist Party of Nepal-Unified Marxists Leninists (CPN-UML) and the Maoists provided, in a roundabout way, blanket amnesty for human rights abusers over the decade-long Maoist insurgency. This was done in order to save the Maoist leaders, possibly even chairman Pushpa Kamal Dahal, popularly known as Prachanda, from being implicated in war crimes. Senior Maoist leaders were jittery ever since India started raising the issue of transitional justice in Nepal at various international forums, apparently to scare the Maoists into toeing its line on the new Nepali constitution.

In return for such blanket amnesty, Dahal promised to continue to support the Oli government and to allow it to bring about the budget.

There was also a ‘gentleman’s agreement’ between the two parties, whereby Oli would step down after the passage of the annual budget by the Nepali parliament. After this, Dahal would get to lead the new government. But when Oli refused to step down even after the passage of the budget, the Maoists had no option but to rethink their support.

The two primary reasons for the fall of the Oli government are thus his inability to follow through with the (untenable) commitment of blanket amnesty for Maoist leaders and Dahal’s desire to be the prime minister for a second time. The long delay in getting help to the victims of the 2015 earthquake, the government’s inability to tame runaway inflation and Oli’s unwillingness to take Madheshi forces into confidence were some of the other, secondary, reasons.

Blessing in disguise

But the dogged Oli will not go without a fight. He has already made it clear that he will prefer to face a vote of no-confidence in parliament rather than meekly resign. Taking advantage of some vague clauses in the new constitution, he will also question the legal ground for his removal.

Rather than weakening the CPN-UML, many believe Oli’s forced removal could be a blessing in disguise for the party. For one, his removal will go down well with the party’s core constituencies up in the hills, who will see the situation as a Nepali prime minister, who courageously stood up to a ‘bullying’ India during the four-and-a-half months of the border blockade, forced out of office because of ‘direct Indian intervention’. ‘#ISUPPORTOLI’ began to trend on Twitter soon after news of the Maoist pull-out broke.

True, India might have had a hand. It was clearly unhappy with Oli, someone seemingly keen to cultivate China as a counterweight and who was projected as the bête noir of the Madheshi parties. This was why India had supported the last (aborted) attempt of the Maoists to bring down the Oli government back in May. India’s suspicions were further heightened when the Chinese, breaking from their old script of a strictly hands-off policy in Nepal, decided to intervene in Kathmandu for the retention of the Oli government.

One thing is for sure – this time, the impending ouster of Oli, after only nine months in office, will only reinforce the old perception that it is suicidal for a government in Nepal to be seen as working against Indian interest. This will be the case even though the CPN-UML’s hand might in the long run be strengthened by its recent distinctly nationalist, anti-India posture. Pretty much the same applies to the Rastriya Prajatantra Party-Nepal, the pro-monarchy and anti-federalism force that is also a constituent of the Oli government. In fact, on the eve of the three sets of elections – local, provincial and federal – planned for the next 20 months, playing up the ‘India-victim’ card might be the single biggest electoral draw of the political parties that were represented in the Oli rainbow coalition.

What next?

According to the 7-point agreement between the Maoists and Nepali Congress signed on July 12, there will now be a coalition government under Maoist leadership. This government will make way for a Congress-led government after 10 months.

More significantly, the agreement states that the new government will take the initiative to address the demands of the Madheshis, Tharus and Janajatis by amending the constitution based on political negotiations. Although the new coalition under Dahal will look to garner the support of the broadest segment of the Nepali polity, it is unlikely to include the CPN-UML.

The Congress wants to keep the CPN-UML, traditionally its arch electoral rival, out of government during the three sets of elections. (In the past the CPN-UML has been rather adept at turning control over state resources into solid electoral gains.) The CPN-UML will also opt to stay out to accentuate its victimhood to India.

After ten months of Dahal it will be the turn of the Congress president, Sher Bahadur Deuba, to become prime minster. With local level elections – the first of the three sets – slated for November-December sure to be postponed because of a lack of preparations, Deuba could lead his party into all three electoral cycles. This will be a mixed blessing. While the Congress will surely look to leverage state resources to its electoral advantage, it will also have to contend with a traditional anti-incumbency trend in Nepal.

Wrest the initiative

It will also be strange to see India back a Dahal-led government, as seems to be the case. New Delhi, after all, was instrumental in not only bringing down his government in 2009 after only only nine months in power, but also in engineering a split in the Maoist party in order to isolate its radical wing. Although India doesn’t completely trust the forever-vacillating Dahal, it will likely go along with his candidacy if there is clear commitment to accommodate the Madheshis. In fact no one would be surprised if there is a tacit understanding between the Indian establishment and the Maoists that India will drop its demands on transitional justice if the Maoists support Madheshi agendas.

But it would be counterproductive for either India or the Congress-Maoist combine in Nepal to now try to isolate the CPN-UML. Firstly, India’s enmity goes down well among the CPN-UML’s targeted vote banks. India should thus not do anything to further fan pro-CPN-UML and anti-India sentiments in Nepal. Secondly, it will be impossible to amend the constitution without the support of the CPN-UML, which has nearly a third of all seats in the national parliament.

Thus, the biggest challenge for the political class in Kathmandu will be to collectively work out a political compromise that addresses the grievances of the traditionally marginalised communities while also ensuring that such a compromise has the support of the CPN-UML. One possible way out could be for the four major political forces in Nepal – the Congress, CPN-UML, Maoists and Madheshi parties — to agree on a new federal model that at least partly addresses the demands of the protesting Madheshis and Tharus, say through land swaps in the current seven-state model.

Of course, not all of them need to be in the government for this. With a workable constitutional settlement at hand, the political parties can then use this new political goodwill to create an atmosphere for free and fair elections.

This is a wonderful opportunity for domestic political actors in Nepal to wrest the initiative and come up with an inclusive constitutional settlement. Such a settlement will be the single biggest step towards political stability in Nepal, leading, ultimately, to less foreign interference and more peace and prosperity.

Biswas Baral is a Kathmandu-based journalist who writes on Nepal’s foreign policy. He tweets at @biswasktm.

Nepal is Nearing a Point of No Return

The longer both sides don’t compromise on the Madhesh deadlock, the more the radicals’ hand will be strengthened.

The longer both sides don’t compromise on the Madhes deadlock, the more the radicals’ hands will be strengthened.

Members of Federal Alliance, a coalition of Madhesh-based parties and organisations, protesting the new Constitution near the Prime Minister's office in Kathmandu. Credit: Navesh Chitrakar/Reuters

Members of Federal Alliance, a coalition of Madhesh-based parties and organisations, protesting the new Constitution near the prime minister’s office in Kathmandu. Credit: Navesh Chitrakar/Reuters/Files

Kathmandu: Nepal has never been more polarised. The main cause of this polarisation, ironically, is the new constitution that was promulgated by an overwhelming majority of the sovereign constituent assembly. With over 85% of lawmakers in the 601-strong assembly in favour of the constitution, there is no questioning the legality of the new charter. If so, why has the new document been vehemently contested, especially by the political parties representing Tarai-Madhes, the fertile flatlands of Nepal?

These parties, along with some other small ethnicity-based outfits, believe that the new constitution perpetuates discriminations against traditionally marginalised groups like Madhesis, Tharus and Janajatis. They object to a host of constitutional issues: from ‘unequal’ citizenship provisions and a lack of proportional electoral representation to an ‘exclusionary’ state apparatus. But these are all secondary concerns. At the heart of the current dispute is the demarcation of new federal boundaries. If the federal boundaries are settled to their satisfaction, Madhesi leaders have repeatedly told this correspondent, they are ready for compromise on all other fronts.

The Madhes-based parties want two contiguous, east-to-west plains-only provinces spanning the whole of the flatlands bordering India. Only in such provinces where native Madhesis and Tharus are in a majority, they reason, will there be no discrimination against them. Madhes-based parties are demanding that there be one state with Madhesis in the majority and another state where the Tharus are in a plurality. (As per the 2011 national census, Madhesis make up around 36% of the national population while Tharus constitute around 7%.)

But the three major political parties – Nepali Congress, the Communist Party of Nepal-United Marxists-Leninists (CPN-UML) and the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist-Centre) – who were behind the new constitution, were of the view that such Madhes-only provinces are impossible. Such demarcations, they believed, would have been resisted by other ethnic groups who also claim these areas. Nor were such plains-only provinces economically viable, they argued.

A middle-way solution could have been to break up disputed districts like Jhapa, Morang and Sunsari so that hilly settlements fell under hill provinces while the settlements with major Madhesi/Tharu settlements came under the two proposed Madhes provinces. But that would still entail creating two contiguous Madhes provinces, which meant that the two provinces would effectively control Nepal’s access to India.

Many top Congress and UML leaders openly feared that such Madhes provinces could use their geographical advantage to blackmail the centre. These fears have been heightened after the recent border blockade that the Madhesi parties imposed with India’s support – or the other way round, as many in Kathmandu believe – and which brought the country to a standstill. The three big parties would like the hill provinces to have at least one point of access to India, which is not an unreasonable demand. But the Madhesi parties contend that such ‘gerrymandering’ will once again put the marginalised Madhesis and Tharus at a disadvantage in their calculus with the centre.

The inconvenient truth

So this is where the federalism debate has been stuck. There is now more talk of an imminent government change as other political parties, even those in the government, are increasingly unhappy with Prime Minister K.P. Sharma Oli. His government has become synonymous with corruption and misrule; he has failed to tame runaway inflation, officially pegged at around 10% but unofficially many times that; earthquake victims are yet to get substantial help; and there has been no headway in talks with the protesting Federal Alliance that includes the Madhesi parties. In fact, of late it has appeared that Oli’s only goal is to somehow keep his coalition intact.

This deliberate delay in settling outstanding constitutional issues could prove expensive. With each passing day, the level of polarisation between the Pahadi (hill) and Madhesi (plains) communities is increasing. The inhabitants of the hill regions have been told by Oli and company that the Madhesi parties are intent on dividing the country, in cahoots with the Indian establishment. In this narrative it is only Oli’s resolute stand not to compromise on national sovereignty that has kept the country intact thus far.

The Madhesi people of the plains, meanwhile, increasingly feel that it is futile to talk to Oli, who is “anti-Madhes”. As the deadlock continues, the radical forces in the Tarai are rousing locals with tales of the callous Kathmandu establishment that continues to treat Madhesis as second-class citizens. Attitudes are hardening on both the sides.

The more the state has tried to crack down on these radical elements in the Tarai, the more their popularity has increased. The inconvenient truth for Kathmandu is that the secessionist movement in Madhes spearheaded by Madhesi-intellectual-turned-radical, C.K. Raut, continues to gain in popularity, even though Madhes as a separate country is an impractical idea. Impractical because the Madhesi population is unevenly distributed among the 22 districts that comprise the Tarai belt. Even in the Madhes province that Madhesi parties have been campaigning for, while native Madhesis make up 70% of the population in the seven districts from Parsa to Saptari, in the easternmost triad of Jhapa, Morang and Sunsari, 65% of population are non-Madhesis.

But even though he is impractical, Raut pushes all the right emotional buttons, often by appealing to the basic instincts of Madhesi people.

In these contested times in Nepal, perception has become more important than reality. The native Madhesis have been convinced by radicals like Raut that ultimately they have no option but to have a country of their own where they can decide their own fate, where they are not treated as second-class citizens and where they are ruled by those who look and talk like them. The longer the constitutional disputes linger, the stronger this secessionist sentiment will be, making a viable constitutional settlement that much more unlikely.

Where there is will

The fact is that the federalism dispute is not as intractable as it is being made out to be. One of the problems is the ruling UML party, whose core constituency is up in the hills. Since it does not have much stake in the Tarai – unlike Congress which has a big base in Tarai-Madhes – the UML can safely play the anti-India nationalist card to cultivate its Pahadi constituencies. The UML has tried to project itself as the one and only defender of Nepal’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. It also tries to paint the protesting Madhesi and Janajati outfits, in ways both subtle and obvious, as secessionist forces working for India.

Not that the Madhesi parties are blameless. They too have fanned anti-Pahadi sentiments among Madhesis, often trying to deflect the blame for their own failures. After all, the Madhesi parties could not do much for common Madhesis during their repeated tenures in government. The sight of protesters affiliated to these parties taking to the streets with spears and axes during the recent Madhesi uprising also gave a lie to their claim that their protests were completely peaceful. Their relationship with the Indian establishment also remains murky.

If and when Oli goes, the person replacing him as prime minister will certainly be a more acceptable figure for the Madhesi parties. It will also give them the perfect alibi to return to the talks table.

But leaving the UML out of the proposed constitutional settlement is not an option either. The new constitution cannot be amended to the liking of Madhesi and Janajati forces without the support of the UML, which has nearly a third of all seats in parliament.

This is why a government of national unity, including UML, has become vital. Only such a government will be able to work out the  remaining constitutional issues. Oli believes that it is still possible to expand his communist coalition into a government of national unity. That’s why he keeps sending out feelers to the Federal Alliance to come back to the negotiating table. But the alliance feels it will be negotiating from a position of weakness if it sits down for talks immediately. The alliance also isn’t sure that Oli is serious.

Both sides could do more to build trust. The Madhesi parties should give up their insistence that the government commit to two Madhes-only provinces even before the start of the talks. (Of late there appear to be cracks within the Federal Alliance on whether to unconditionally sit for talks.) The ruling parties can show their seriousness by appointing either Oli or Maoist chief Prachanda as the leader of the government talks-team, something the protesting parties have been demanding.

If and when such talks start, the big three can categorically commit to breaking up existing districts to accommodate the demarcation demands of Madhesis and Tharus. The protesting parties, for their part, could commit to giving the upper Pahadi states at least one point of contact with India. There can be no breakthrough in the prolonged crisis without such substantive give and take.

Wrest the initiative

If the Oli government feels that the Madhesi agitation will simply fizzle out, it is mistaken. For it’s not just about the Madhesi parties now; it’s about the aspirations of the common Madhesis and Tharus who long to live in a free and equal society. If they feel the mainstream parties can’t deliver, they will increasingly gravitate towards radical forces.

Not that the Madhesi society is a monolith. Rubeena Mahato speaks for many Madhesis when she faults the ethnicity-focused strategy of Madhesi parties. “Tearing communities further apart by dwelling on differences and past injustices is not a solution,” she writes, echoing the sentiments of many of many Madhesis who, like the rest of the country, are also divided.

But whatever the reasons behind the prolonged deadlock – the callous Kathmandu establishment unheeding of marginalised groups or the ‘divisive’ ethnic agenda of Madhes-based parties, or both – one thing is for sure: the longer the deadlock continues, the more the hand of radical forces in Madhes will be strengthened. The moderate forces should be mindful that if they hand the initiative to radical forces now, they might never get it back.

Biswas Baral is a Kathmandu-based journalist who writes on Nepal’s foreign policy. He tweets at @biswasktm.