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Bipin Rawat’s Brother Vijay Joins BJP, May Contest Polls in Uttarakhand

Vijay Rawat, who retired as a colonel from the Army, joined the BJP in the presence of Uttarakhand chief minister Pushkar Singh Dhami and Rajya Sabha MP Anil Baluni.

New Delhi: Vijay Rawat, the brother of India’s first Chief of Defence Staff General Bipin Rawat who recently died in a helicopter crash, joined the BJP on Wednesday.

The BJP may field him as a candidate in poll-bound Uttarakhand, sources said.

Vijay Rawat, who retired as a colonel from the Army, joined the BJP in the presence of Uttarakhand chief minister Pushkar Singh Dhami and Rajya Sabha MP Anil Baluni.

Noting that his father, also a former army officer, was associated with the BJP, Rawat expressed happiness at working for the party and lavished praise on Prime Minister Narendra Modi, saying he has a unique vision and mindset.

He thinks out of the box and all his efforts are directed towards the country’s betterment, Rawat said.

Welcoming Rawat into the party, Dhami said the late CDS wanted to work for the state after retirement and his younger brother will advance his vision.

The BJP is inspired by nationalist ideology and has always worked for security personnel’s welfare, he said.

Noting that Rawat’s family has been joining the army for three generations, he said his decision to join the BJP will boost its strength.

What an Angry General’s Unwarranted Admonition of Kashmiris Says About the Army and Politics

Mosques in Srinagar have broadcast appeals to defend the minorities and Kashmiri leaders have voiced their protest at the terrorist killings but what the Kashmiris say is never enough for those who seek to blame them for the violence.

The director general of the Defence Intelligence Agency, Lieutenant General K.J.S. Dhillon, recently asked why the ‘silent majority’ among Kashmiris is”silent” in the face of terrorist killings in Kashmir. He made these remarks during a seminar at the Army Management Studies Board (AMSB) in Srinagar.

Though he appears not to have made specific reference to the targeting of Hindu and Sikh civilians, it is likely that the recent shootings provided the context for his remarks.

Ignoring the fact that he too was being selective about what he chose to vocally condemn, the general cautioned that not only would Kashmiris lose their right to be heard for being ‘selective’ about what they condemn but that the very term ‘Kashmiri’ might end up as a pejorative, quite like the racist term, ‘Paki’, is in the west.

To him, the failure of Kashmiris to protest against lethal attacks on their fellow Kashmiris can best be referred to as “selective dementia”. Perhaps he meant ‘selective amnesia’, a more familiar phrase. Or – uncharitably – he may have meant ‘collective dementia’, wherein Kashmiris, most of whom are Muslims, maddened by prejudice, did not condole publicly enough the killings of Kashmiri Pandits and Sikhs, as violence spiked over the last one month.

Also read: As Terrorist Violence in Kashmir Turns More Communal, the Majority Must Not Forget its Duties

The general’s plainspeak is a departure from a standard that guides civil-military relations, and cannot be allowed to go unremarked. True, a precedent has already been set by his boss, the chief of defence staff (CDS), General Bipin Rawat, who has done so repeatedly over the years since his elevation to the post of army chief. Since that has become Rawat’s trademark, it is somewhat normalised, perhaps, allowing his subordinates to take a cue.

However, to give ‘Tiny’ Dhillon (as he referred to in the Army; ‘Tiny’ alludes to his 6 feet 4 inches height) the benefit of the doubt, he may have been acting in his official capacity. After all, at the apex of the intelligence set-up of the military, he may well be playing his part since infowar is part of the intelligence domain.

The intent of his remarks appears to be to shame the majority in the Valley, i.e. Kashmiri Muslims, into registering their disapproval of the change in insurgent tactics with regard to terrorism, especially the targeting of members of the minority community.

In strategic terms, this may help deter the terrorist minders sitting across the Line of Control from ordering more such murders since it would set the majority – the sea – against the insurgents – the fish. But there is an obvious downside to this public scolding of Kashmiris too. Apart from amounting to victim-blaming – ordinary Kashmiris have borne the brunt of the insurgency and counter insurgency for some three decades now – the message that they are failing in their ‘duty’ as a people can easily be (and is) turned into another stick to beat them with.

Kashmiri Pandits take part in a candle light protest against the killing of 3 persons including pharmacist ML Bindroo by militants, at Ghanta Ghar in Srinagar, Wednesday evening, Oct. 6, 2021. Photo: PTI.

Apparently, the general believes he has the moral authority to lecture the people of Kashmir since his last tenure – of the five tenures he has served in Jammu and Kashmir, was as commanding general in Badami Bagh. His profile on Twitter claims he has “worked for peace in Kashmir in Chinar Corps”, adding, “(N)ation first always and every time”. The two statements put together explain his going voluble on Kashmir and in Kashmir.

When the general commanded the 15th corps out of Badami Bagh, Operation All Out was in full swing. The state, rattled by the protests in the aftermath of the killing of Burhan Wani, had set its security forces to go about killing militants with renewed vigour.

The figures for years 2018 and 2019 are of zero surrenders. This was when those signing up were at best impressionable youth, not quite hardened jihadis. According to the general, their lifespan as militants was less than a year. Sans training and weaponry, they could not have made credible insurgents.

So, does a ‘take no prisoners’ approach explain the figure of ‘zero’ surrenders in years 2018 and 2019, followed by a meagre nine beginning only later in 2020, after the general had departed Srinagar for New Delhi? Though credited with having parents persuade sons abandon the ‘militant fold’, resulting in some 50 youth coming back ‘quietly’, this is unverifiable for obvious reasons.

As it turned out, Operation All Out was the preparation of the cake for the icing that was to come. Lt Gen Dhillon lent his credentials, and the dignity of uniform, for a bit of drama that preceded the launch of the Modi-Shah assault on Article 370. Knowing that the reading down of Article 370 would set off protests, the security establishment needed to have Kashmir vacated of soft targets.

Also read: Armed Forces’ Officers Must Think Twice Before Making Their Political Views Public

The general went on primetime television claiming that the army, having found an anti-tank mine with Pakistani marking on the yatra route, had uncovered a Pakistani plot to target the yatra, leading up to it being called off. White lies in the line of national security duty being de rigueur, the general’s performance enabled the government to blame Pakistan for the extensive crackdown that followed, even as it went about despoiling the constitutional provision for autonomy.

A woman being checked during a surprise check in Srinagar in the aftermath of the civilian killings. Photo: PTI

The fact is, however, that whatever Kashmiris may do, it would never be taken as ‘enough’. Mosques in Srinagar broadcast appeals to defend the minorities. Kashmiri leaders have voiced their protest at the targeted killing of civilians, especially Hindus and Sikhs, even though the state has gone out of its way to marginalise mainstream politicians.

Also, the general needs to remember that not all civilian killings can be attributed to terrorists. Of those killed this month, two Kashmiris evidently unconnected to militancy have been killed by security forces, who command immunity. No one has admonished the ‘silent majority’ in the rest of India for its silence in the face of these incidents.

Equally, the state has failed the people of Kashmir by keeping the conflict alive, allowing for the Right Wing experimentation with solutions such as the dissolution of the state. It bears asking what the army input from its operational level commander in Badami Bagh was when that measure was at the discussion stage.

Also, now that statehood is to be restored, but only after elections, has the Defence Intelligence Agency indicated the security implications of the chronology being followed: delimitation, elections and only then statehood?

It is an open secret that the ongoing constituency delimitation exercise is aimed at shifting the balance of seats in favour of the Jammu region, making it easier for the Jammu belt to vote in the Bharatiya Janata Party. Since ‘scenario building’ is in his agency’s ambit, Lt Gen Dhillon needs to answer what will happen if this expectation does not materialise. But by then he might perhaps have retired.

It is important to challenge the general’s remarks. This is particularly so since his admonition is directed at a particularly vulnerable Indian community, the Kashmiris, who also happen to be overwhelmingly Muslim. On two prior occasions, senior army officers have had an exchange of words with Muslim politicians on matters regarding Muslims in India. Unless called out, the trend might become a norm.

Ali Ahmed was, till the time of his retirement, an infantry colonel in the Indian Army.

Why India Must Avoid Hitching Itself to US Military’s Plans for China and the Indo-Pacific

During his visit to Delhi, US defence secretary Lloyd Austin is expected to discuss the Pentagon’s multi-domain operations concept. But there are serious pitfalls to India agreeing to any cooperation in combat.

Having signed the four basic US military foundational agreements necessary for interoperability – the last of those in October 2020 – the Narendra Modi government will now be taking India’s military relationship with the United States several notches higher. If things move at the government’s pace, India will soon be a de facto US ally without any clarity on how this will enhance the country’s defence against the combined China-Pakistan threat. Or how it would help establish geopolitical equilibrium with China.

When US secretary of defence Lloyd J. Austin III comes to India (March 19-21) after his visits to Japan and South Korea – both formal US allies in Asia – on the table for discussion will be the Pentagon’s multi domain operations (MDO) warfighting concept. That this is in the offing was indicated by the army chief, General M.M. Naravane during his February 24 address at a webinar organised by the Vivekanand International Foundation (VIF). According to Gen. Naravane, multi domain operations are the future of war for which the Indian Army is preparing.

Coming to grips with the shift in US military thinking

While the army chief’s sudden switch to MDO from network-centric operations (NCO) may have come as a surprise to many, the national security advisor, and by extension the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO), had been working the ropes to get under the broader and more definitive US security umbrella. I believe that the NSA’s office was acquainted with the idea of MDO during the Ladakh crisis, when in desperation the government was looking at all options to counter China. These included seeking non-traditional (by Indian thinking) means as well. A few start-ups, familiar with some of the technologies involved, have been working with the NSA’s office on developing an Indian version of MDO. This was the reason the Modi government rushed to sign Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA) last year even when it was unclear if Trump administration would return to power.

The Biden administration is determined to do more than incorporate allies and partners (like India) into its MDO warfighting concept. Even before the US Indo-Pacific commander (INDOPACOM), Admiral Philip Davidson recently told the Senate Armed Services Committee that Chinese military aggression towards Taiwan and India could manifest ‘in fact in the next six years’, the White House had asked the Pentagon to conduct a task force review on how to meet the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) challenge in Asia. Senior US officials, including the joint chiefs chairman, General Mark Milley, have gone public in suggesting what steps needed to be taken to stem the US military downslide.

The steps suggested by US military officers are meant to address two major issues: How to meet the PLA’s anti access and area denial (A2AD) challenge, and how to strengthen US military’s conventional deterrence by MDO.

A2AD is the US military term for what the PLA calls its counter-intervention strategy comprising its long and medium range ballistic missiles, hypersonic and supersonic cruise missiles, early warning and long-range radars, integrated air and missile defence system, long range reconnaissance satellites and aircraft, cyber, electronic, and counter space capabilities. The counter-invention strategy or A2AD weapons are meant to disallow US military access to its bases, and to deny force operational freedom of action once there.

At the heart of this strategy is China’s systems destruction warfare exemplified by its awesome projective-centric (missiles) warfare and ability to destroy US networks which connect its kill chain. The latter also called the Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act (OODA) loop is a three-part process consisting of understanding the situation, deciding on the course of action at the command-and-control operating centres, and ordering the appropriate shooter (missiles, guns, laser guided bombs, laser weapons, cyber weapons, jamming, counter space weapons) to destroy the targets.

The US military’s three priorities

US military officers say that the A2AD challenge is huge and requires three actions to meet it. First, the US should increase its missiles production rapidly. The Trump administration had withdrawn from the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty in 2019 since it prevented the US from building conventional land-based missiles over 500km range. Since China was not part of this treaty, it could unabashedly test and operationalise ballistic missiles in large numbers unmatched by any nation.

The second action relates to the challenge of PLA’s long ranges and accurate missiles, especially when they would soon be enabled by artificial intelligence (AI) imbedded in them. These ‘intelligent’ missiles, called lethal autonomous weapons (LAWs) would be able to operate independently. Able to accomplish given tasks by themselves, LAWs would not require software networking communication with the human controller. Incidentally, this network which connects the missile to the control station is its most vulnerable part. It can be destroyed by the adversary – in China’s case, by the US – thereby blinding the missile.

The answer to this problem, the US military says, is to abandon its limited and permanent Asian bases with a high density of troops in places like Japan, South Korea, and Guam. Established after the Second World War, these would be easy targets for PLA missiles. Instead, the US should seek diffused bases, at many places, where troops could be placed on a rotational basis. It is argued that dispersed and expeditionary US troops across the INDOPACOM would be a less vulnerable target and provide better conventional deterrence. Looking for such bases amongst partners in the region would be a high priority for US defence secretary Austin when he meets India’s NSA.

Would the Modi government, which has gone out of its way to seek US security, refuse an American request for rotational troops on Indian soil?

The third action the US military intends to take is to permanently position the US army-led multi domain task force (MDTF) closer to the Chinese A2AD firewall to potentially penetrate it before a major attack is mounted by the US forces arriving from rotational bases. The MDTF would comprise long-range US missiles and cyber capabilities (under the US army cyber command) meant to destroy PLA missiles.

India and the US warfighting concept

Interestingly, at the aforementioned webinar, General Naravane spoke about the need to address the PLA’s ‘grey zone capabilities short of war’ by the framework of the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) and the Department of Military Affairs under him. The ‘grey zone’ referred to the PLA’s capabilities in the virtual domains of cyber, space, and electronic (electromagnetic spectrum) warfare. According to the army chief, India’s defence cyber agency under the CDS and the army’s demonstrated swarm drone capability on Army Day on January 15 would be able to hit the A2AD bubble.

Since this is wishful thinking, will India ask the visiting US defence secretary to help raise an India-specific MDTF with capabilities procured from the US across the Line of Actual Control (LAC) between India and China? After all, the PLA has raised a smaller version of the A2AD firewall it has for Taiwan – the distance between Taiwan and mainland China is 110 miles. If India goes down this path, the presence of US military experts close to the LAC could make China review its India strategy, leading perhaps to an escalation neither wants.

Defence secretary Lloyd would likely discuss India’s involvement in the US’s MDO warfighting concept with Ajit Doval, with perhaps the CDS in attendance. The MDO involves the virtual networking of long-range fire, electronic, space and cyber warfare capabilities with the physical war domains of land, air, sea, and information operations. It would involve MDO command-and-control or operating centres where information from all listed entities/weapon systems from all domains would come at a central place for decision-making to close the kill chain faster than the enemy.

The MDO operating centres, depending upon the level of headquarters, would be huge halls with umpteen computers manned by service personnel from all arms and services sitting together to make sense of the information pouring in at the speed of light in nanoseconds. There is difference between data and information which should be understood. Raw data on situational awareness procured by thousands of miniaturised sensors (electro-optical, radars, infrared, lidar, numerous acoustic sensors) placed in physical war domains would be processed instantly by edge computing. Making sense of the raw data, edge computing would turn it into actionable information which would then be passed to the MDO operation centres. The latter, which will include senior officers from all services, will then take quick decisions on action to be taken on the information coming to them.

At present, the US’s individual services have their own version of MDO with two shortcomings: First, the services (army, air force, navy, marines and space force) need to interact with one another usually by voice calls and data transfer, which is an archaic way of communication. And second, software networks which link various systems or nodes are inflexible with industrial age architecture which can be destroyed by the PLA’s system destruction warfare, leaving commanders blind. General Milley has proposed a ‘joint warfighting concept’ – Joint MDO – whereby all services would be networked, bringing information into single MDO operating centres for all three services. Thus, instead of fighting wars as army, air force, navy, marines, and space forces, the US military would fight wars as a nation with allies and partners in INDOPACOM. The underlining idea of ‘joint warfighting concept’ would be to make data/information from all war domains available to every participant including allies and partners into their MDO operating centres.

What India needs to ask itself

However, all this leads to critical questions. Would India be a part of the bigger US MDO for INDOPACOM? Or would it seek US help in setting up its own MDO operating centres? If yes, what purpose would they serve considering the Indian military understands warfare only in physical domains with the army as the lead service. Endorsing the MDO concept would require, in the least, the Indian Army to shift away from the outdated concept of massed territorial profile of defence and offense. More importantly, are the Indian military and the NSA/CDS working on different warfighting concepts, totally removed from one another? What about the much-publicised military reforms announced by the CDS?

The problem does not end here. Worried about the PLA’s intelligent, autonomous, and thinking software networks with AI inserted into them, the US military, in 2017, had asked its Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) to improve technology and warfighting concepts to match the PLA’s AI enabled intelligenised warfare. The latter is a total break from the mechanised, network centric, and MDO concepts of the past and the present. In this new warfare, which is referred to as mosaic or algorithmic warfare by DARPA, technology would not support humans, but replace them. It would become algorithmic war – one algorithm fighting with the algorithm of the opposing side. This software driven war would have intelligent networks, intelligent internet, intelligent military internet of things, and intelligent weapons. This would be a reality soon.

Once that comes about, the evolving US Joint MDO concept would need to make major changes in doctrines, concept of operations, and force structuring. The big change would be the removal of most MDO operating centres since most machines would communicate directly with machines within the US military and perhaps with the machines of allies and partners. To the numerous sceptics in India, frozen in military thinking, Intelligentised war, according to China would be a reality by 2027, much quicker against India, perhaps by 2024.

India’s limitations are real

The Indian military is far removed from intelligentised warfighting. This was evident from General Naravane’s assertion, made twice in the VIF webinar, that while the character of war changes constantly, the nature of war does not change. ‘Nature of war’ refers to defining the war, which is violence and bloodshed, and ‘character of war’ is how it would be fought, and refers to technology and war fighting concepts. With technology replacing human soldiers in combat, there would be little bloodshed and violence. This would, for the first time in global war history, change the nature of war. This should give an idea of where warfare is headed, and once India hitches on to the US military bandwagon there would be no coming back.

India lacks capability, capacity, indigenous military-industrial complex, and above all military intellect to understand the deep hole we might get into by accepting any of US secretary Lloyd’s proposals for cooperation in combat. Surely, India would not want to get into an avoidable war with China when the possibilities of crafting a smart strategy for peace in the region exist.

Pravin Sawhney is editor, FORCE news magazine. He is writing a book on artificial intelligence enabled future warfare

Denigration of Defence Ministry’s Finance Division Is Just Another Blame Game

The division cannot be held responsible for slowing down the process of appointment of the deputy Chief of Army Staff (Strategy), as it does not have a veto over the final decision.

Ensnared by complex policies, rules and procedures that they themselves have framed, the civilian and military bureaucracy of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) routinely holds its own finance division (FD) responsible for blocking reforms, obstructing acquisitions and pretty much everything else that can, and does, go wrong. Braving growing marginalisation within the MoD, the FD has become an enfeebled successor of the Military Finance Department, dating back to April 13, 1906, when Sir W.S. Meyer, ICS was appointed as its secretary.

The latest hint of this impasse was reported by the Times of India on August 17. Quoting unnamed sources, the account revealed that objections by the FD had slowed down the process of appointment of the deputy Chief of Army Staff (Strategy), or DCOAS (S), a three-star appointment that was considered critical during the 73-day military face-off with China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) at Doklam in north-eastern India three years ago.

Also Read: Despite Army Push, Post for Planning During Border Crises Not Created Since Doklam Stand Off

What possible ‘objection’ could the FD have for the creation of this operationally crucial appointment? This is even more baffling because, as the report suggests, the proposal was ‘revenue-neutral’, implying that the projected post was merely a swap, as it were, with the post of Director General Rashtriya Rifles (RR), a position the Indian Army (IA) has apparently terminated. Consequently, there would have been no extra financial burden on the Army, as no additional post was being created.

Chinese and Indian Army troops. Credit: PTI/Files

Chinese and Indian Army troops. Photo: PTI/Files

The FD has no veto over the final decision

The reality is that the executive authorities vested with the administrative and financial powers to take such decisions – that would include sanctioning the DCOAS (S) post – are also empowered to overrule any advice, objection, or observation proffered by the FD in its capacity as the Integrated Financial Advisor (IFA) to those authorities. The FD has no veto over the final decision.

It is not known if the post was to be approved by the IA itself, the defence minister, or one of the cabinet committees, but since all of them have overriding powers, blaming the FD for obstructing decisions is a poor alibi for the inability to exercise those powers.

Rendering financial advice requires the FD to scrutinise all proposals that have, or are likely to have, financial implications. This entails validating not just the financial implications of the proposal, but also its conformity with the relevant rules, and the overall procedural propriety. None of these, as detailed earlier, are of the FD’s making, all having been devised jointly by a coalition of civil and military officials with limited and non-binding inputs from the FD.

Financial scrutiny of a proposal may reveal flaws or deficiencies, requiring it to be reviewed, or even abandoned. In most instances, however, the observations merely centre on easily addressable procedural aspects. In all this, the FD’s role is merely advisory, with the final decision resting with the executive authorities, if necessary, by overruling the former.

Given the overriding authority of the executive authorities, it is inexplicable that the FD’s advice should be viewed as a needless irritant. This negativity is reinforced in various scholarly commentaries by defence experts and on the capital’s influential seminar circuit, where some even question the professional competence of the FD officials. They are invariably blamed for delays and obstructions in operational matters and in the long-deferred military modernisation.

The officers are selected for deputation to the higher echelons in the FD, based on their experience and past record through a vigorous selection process. It is, therefore, unquestionable that they are all professionally competent to perform the tasks for which they are selected which, it needs reiteration, is limited to dealing merely with the financial and procedural, and not the operational aspects, of any proposal.

South Block of Central Secretariat, where the defence ministry is located. Photo: Wikimedia Commons/Matthew T Rader CC BY SA 4.0

Is FD resigned to being the patsy?

Rather than taking pride in the task assigned to it, over the years, the FD also seems to have resigned itself to being the ministry’s and armed forces’ patsy. It gets blamed, both privately and publicly, for being ‘perfunctory and obstructionist’, blind to the larger, albeit unexplained picture. This fallacious perception has steadily gained currency in the absence of a counter-narrative and any emphatic rebuttal by the FD when publicly vilified.

There has been no official rejoinder, much less a rebuttal, to the report of the DCOAS(S)’s appointment being stuck because of the FD’s objections. It is a post to which the Directors General heading the respective directorates of Military Operations, Military Intelligence, Operational Logistics, Perspective Planning, and Information Warfare directorates would eventually report. Further delay in the DCOAS(S)’ appointment may, therefore, have serious operational implications for the army.

For anyone in the MoD or the IA to have given the impression to the media that the FD’s objections were responsible for deferring the DCOAS (S)’s appointment is laughable, considering that recently a full-fledged Department of Military Affairs (DMA), headed by the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) General Bipin Rawat, was created easily and without fuss as the fifth department in the MoD. And this was despite the likelihood of its not being revenue-neutral.

How blame game can be avoided

It is, however, possible that in the maze of the government’s rules of business, the decision-making boundaries are somewhat imprecisely defined in some areas of responsibility and consequently lend themselves to subjective interpretation. If so, it would help if the MoD issued guidelines or orders specifying the protocol for obtaining as well as overruling the FD’s observations, objections, and advice in the interest of overall efficiency.

If, however, the armed forces – IA in this case – and the MoD executive authorities believe that they are the most competent arbiters of financial propriety, they should urge the government to review the prevailing IFA system in the MoD and the lower echelons. This would ensure that the enduring blame game between the executive, on one side, and the FD on the other, gives way to quicker decision making and single-point accountability.

It will not at all be a surprise if in the coming days, the perception gains ground that the military standoff with the Chinese along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Ladakh could have been prevented, or its outcome different, had the DCOAS (S) already been ensconced. Eventually, in keeping with the past trend, the FD may have to take the fall.

Also Read: ‘China Made 2nd Provocative Action on Aug 31, While Talks to Resolve Aug 30 Face-Off Were On’

If that happens, it will be a travesty, impugning a century-old department created as a force multiplier to regulate and facilitate defence expenditure. It is pointless belabouring the notion that there would have been no problem in the first place if those empowered to approve the DCOAS (S)’s appointment had the courage of their convictions and overruled the FD’s putative objections. After all, convictions are worthless unless converted into conduct.

Amit Cowshish is former financial advisor (acquisitions), Ministry of Defence.

Here’s Why All’s Not Well for India on the Ladakh Front

The Chinese have created new facts on the ground and pushed the Indian political leadership to react in ways that will further disadvantage the Indian military.

Preoccupied by counter terror operations in Kashmir, India’s distracted army was taken by surprise when the Chinese PLA carried out well-planned and deftly-executed multi-prong deep incursions of three to five kilometres across north Sikkim and east Ladakh last month. Starting on May 5, the Chinese not only occupied Indian territory but also audaciously built concrete defences on it. That the Indian Army was surprised by the PLA manoeuvre showed its total obliviousness to the ground reality. Now if there is some “thinning” of Chinese troop deployments, as Indian military officials say, this is at best cold comfort since there has been no dismantling of the structures China erected, and which now represent new facts on the ground.

The world knows that consequent to the ill-handled 2017 Doklam crisis by India, the Western Theatre Command of the PLA – which is tasked for the 3,488 km Line of Actual Control (LAC) – now has at least two group armies, three air force bases, and one rocket force base. With a total of 13 combined armed brigades, support arms, support services, border guards and armed police, the number totals over 200,000 soldiers in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR). They have created an excellent military ecosystem and have been conducting realistic combat training. Given the increased forces-in-being threat, the Indian Army should be prepared for similar surprises. Without blaming the intelligence services.

The recent display of PLA power was probably sanctioned by Central Military Commission vice chairman General Xu Qiliang. Number two to the commander-in-chief, Xi Jinping, Xu, a former PLA Air Force (PLAAF) commander was the architect of the 2015 military reforms and is responsible for interoperability between the PLA and Pakistan military through joint combat exercises between the three services.

File photo from 2019 of General Xu Qiliang, Vice Chairman Central Military Commission (CMC) visiting Pakistan’s GHQ with a high level delegation. Also seen, the then COAS, General Qamar Javed Bajwa. Photo: ISPR

The Indian Army should also not be caught napping on the increased threat to the Siachen glacier it has been holding since April 1984 at a huge cost of men and finances. Speaking at a webinar organised by the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) on May 15, the army chief General M.M. Naravane, in the context of two-front war, said, “It is a possibility. It is not that it is going to happen every time. We have to be alive to all contingencies which can happen.”

He probably had a localised two-front war in north Ladakh – from Siachen to Sub Sector North (SSN) in mind. His ill-informed predecessor, and now the chief of defence staff, General Bipin Rawat had on October 21, 2019 advised the defence minister Rajnath Singh to open the Siachen area from the base camp to Kumar post for tourism. Announced within weeks of the tectonic development of August 5 2019 – which reconstituted the state of Jammu and Kashmir into two union territories of Jammu-Kashmir and Ladakh – this decision would have irked both Pakistan and China. Especially Beijing, whose two successive protests on the creation of the Ladakh UT, which it said changed the status quo, had fallen on deaf ears in New Delhi. The present PLA intrusions are a consequence of that. Plus more, as we shall see.

Localised two-war front a possibility

With the PLA now moving in strength in the Galwan valley (not a disputed area until now), it, along with the Pakistan military, is well poised to hem in the Indian Army on the Siachen glacier from two sides – the Pakistan Army on the west and the PLA on the east. What makes a localised two front war a real possibility is that (a) both partners have achievable political objectives and military aims; (b) they have been doing combined combat training since 2011 in air (the Pakistan Air Force-PLA Air Force’s Shaheen exercises) and on ground (Pakistan Army-PLA Army’s Warrior exercises) since 2013, interestingly, across north Ladakh, which includes Siachen; and (c) have capability, capacity and political will to achieve their objectives.

Also Read: In Talks, China Takes Hard Line, Claims All of Galwan Valley, Chunk of Pangong Tso

Held in August and September (close to border with north Ladakh), the month-long Shaheen-VIII joint exercise was reportedly most advanced. According to PLA commander, Xin Xin,

“The Shaheen series joint exercises started as one-on-one dog fight, but now it has evolved into systematic mock battles featuring more war planes, multiple military branches which include ground forces that deploy missiles and electronic counter-measures.”

Another commentary on this exercise noted that there were two opposing teams: Red team comprising the PLA Air Force, and Blue team constituted of PLAAF and Pakistan Air Force. The scope of such exercise does not require elaboration.

What could be the strategic, political, military and diplomatic objectives of the likely joint combat?

The Pakistan Army’s strategic objective for a localised war in north Ladakh could be to provide depth to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC);
The political objective could be to make India’s hold over the Kashmir Valley more tenuous;
The military objective could be to force the Indian Army out of the Siachen Glacier; and
The diplomatic objective could be to draw the international community’s attention to the possibility of a full-scale war between adversaries with nuclear weapons.

China is likely to endorse the above war objectives, as well as its participation with a caveat: the PLA will not use its kinetic war capabilities until attacked by the Indian military.

Map of the Siachen area. Credit: KBK Infographics

What could be a likely joint war plan? In a military pincer, Indian positions on the Saltoro ridge and the Siachen glacier could be outflanked by Pakistan and China. The Pakistan Army could attempt to capture NJ9842 in sub-sector west presently held by India. The PLA, while throwing its weight behind the Pakistan military could (a) sever India’s operational logistics by land and air maintenance to Sub-Sector North (SSN) facing the Chinese in Ladakh, and (b) share its non-kinetic capabilities.

Why Galwan matters

The PLA’s strong objection to the Indian Army’s attempt to construct a feeder road in the Galwan valley to link up with the 224km long Durbuk-Shyok-Daulat Beg Oldie road as well as the bridge (explained below) should be understood in the context of such a war plan. This construction provided the trigger for the PLA’s present moves across the LAC.

This is also the reason why in the high-level military talks on June 6, the Chinese insisted that their incursions in the Galwan Valley were off the table. Clearly, the importance of the Galwan Valley lies in what it means in relation to other objectives in Ladakh.

The Siachen glacier lies between two mountain spurs of the Karakoram Range: the Saltoro ridge in the west which separates Indian and Pakistani forces fighting for the glacier. And the Sasser ridge which separates the glacier from east Ladakh where the PLA has gradually been shifting the 1993 LAC westwards towards its 1960 claim line closer to the Sasser ridge. This area, called Sub Sector North (SSN), with extreme weather conditions at altitudes of 18,000 feet and lacking adequate infrastructure on the Indian side, is extremely vulnerable to ingress by the PLA as they have roads on their side right up to the LAC.

To the north of SSN lies the famous Karakoram (KK) pass which provides the shortest route from Leh in Ladakh up into China. The PLA has a road from its garrison having a combined-arms battalion (basic tactical unit capable of conducting independent operations) near the KK pass to its post on the pass. From atop Teram Sher Glacier, west of the KK pass, the north and central portions of the Siachen glacier are in full view.

The Daulat Beg Oldi road passes through Galwan. Image: The Wire

Having dug itself into the Galwan valley (hitherto a non-disputed area), the PLA, with a combined arms brigade – backed by artillery and armour elements in the rear – is well positioned to check the Indian Army’s use of the 224km Durbuk-Shyok-Daulet Beg Oldie (DBO) road, the easier of the two routes available to reach the SSN. Starting from Tangtse northwards to Darbuk, this route goes along the Shyok River, crossing it at two points — one downstream and the other upstream — to finally reach DBO. In the summer months, between May to October (when the winter stocking for troops is done), this route is unavailable as the Shyok River gets flooded because of the melting glaciers, making crossing it downstream impossible.

During this period, only the other difficult route across the Sasser ridge is available to the troops to reach SSN. Lacking a proper road, it takes Indian troops anything from 18 to 25 days to trudge the treacherous track along Sasoma, Sasser La to Chungtash, Margo and Burtse near Daulat Beg Oldi (DBO). The Indian Army has a vehicle relay service on this route — once troops cross the Sasser La and come to Chungtash they are ferried onwards towards DBO in vehicles. In order to make the Darbuk route to DBO available round the year, the defence minister, Rajnath Singh on 21 October 2019 inaugurated the 430-metre long Colonel Chewang Rinchen Setu (bridge) across the Shyok river. The bridge, while facilitating troops movements to SSN, also reduced the travel time by half. This will be compromised by the PLA’s move and dominance of heights in the Galwan valley. Hence, its refusal to bring Galwan to the discussion table.

With Indian Army reinforcements being difficult to come through, what stops the PLA from helping the Pakistan Army with good observation from Teram Sher Glacier? Aided by the observation provided by the PLA, the Pakistan Army could fire its cruise missiles to both interdict the Indian Army’s logistics lifeline from the base camp to the glacier and on troops’ positions itself.

PLA’s priorities vis a vis Indian Army

Meanwhile, the PLA’s non-kinetic capabilities ensconced in its unique Strategic Support Force (PLASSF) comprising cyber, space, electronic and electromagnetic spectrum management could dominate the electromagnetic spectrum. This would disallow and disrupt Indian Army and Indian Air Force’s communications; command and control; Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR), satellites, and Position, Navigation and Timing essential for the firing of cruise missiles. A potent capability, the SSF has been exercising extensively under the Western Theatre Command since 2018. It has done a series of force-on-force exercises and has vastly improved PLA Army and PLAAF joint operations in advanced electromagnetic environments.

I had asked a former director-general military operations (DGMO) before the 2017 Doklam crisis what he thought of collusion between the PLA and the Pakistan military in north Ladakh. According to him, the army had amply war-gamed this and concluded it to be unlikely. The main reason was that China had no political and military objectives in this area and little reason to build up troops close to the LAC. This situation has now changed.

The volatile Kashmir valley after the August 5, 2019 revocation of Article 370 can play havoc with the Indian Army’s lines of communications. What’s more, the PLA forces-in-being would keep the army tied down on protecting the LAC instead of reinforcing numbers in SSN and Siachen. Besides, nothing stops the PLA Special Forces from capturing the Advanced Landing Ground and air-strip at Daulat Beg Oldie. This could be done as part of reaching their 1960 claim line. It needs to be remembered that China and Pakistan are non-status quo nations with a willingness to use military power in support of their foreign and security policies.

What are India’s options now? Since it has little military capability to change things on the ground against the PLA, the two joint secretary level interactions are unlikely to to end the crisis. The meeting between the two general officers (GOC 14 corps, Lt Gen. Harinder Singh and PLA’s Maj. Gen. Liu Lin) held on June 6, which ended with no results to show, is proof of the Indian military’s weak hand at the negotiating table.

Aware that little would be achieved, the Indian Army did what no serious interlocutor does: it announced to the media beforehand its red lines – including the demand for restoration of the status quo ante positions held by both sides as of April 2020. While this was meant to project it as an equal interlocutor at talks, it had the opposite effect. An official told this writer that the PLA agreeing to the meeting (at the last minute) was itself the breakthrough. India would be reluctant to request China to raise the talks’ level to that of national security advisor or chief of defence staff. Given the expansive PLA’s incursions and China’s agenda for discussions, the raised level, unlike previous times, would leave India red-faced.

Chinese aims

What do the Chinese want from diplomatic talks? Two things: Indian adherence to the mutually agreed Wuhan consensus, and revocation of the new constitutional status of Ladakh. Cleverly inbuilt into the second demand is revocation of the status of Jammu and Kashmir as well. After all, one cannot be done without the other.

China is willing to walk half-way on the diplomatic and military fronts. Should India agree, the PLA, in a phased manner, would be willing to withdraw troops as well as its tanks and artillery guns from the rear. Defences and roads made by it would remain, implying that the change on the ground would be irrevocable.

What is the Wuhan consensus?

In April 2018, Prime Minister Narendra Modi informally met with President Xi Jinping in Wuhan. This was after the 2017 Doklam crisis. Both sides agreed that they would ‘cooperate with each other’ and not be rivals. According to China, India has reneged on that consensus. Their long list citing instances of betrayal includes India’s growing strategic footprint in support of the Indo-Pacific strategy and the Quadrilateral dialogue meant to contain China, and a host of bilateral trade issues where India has acted against the interests of Chinese companies keen on business in India; ostensibly at the behest of the US.

The immediate provocation for China was the August 5, 2019 constitutional and legal change made to the state of Jammu and Kashmir when it was divided into two separate Union Territories: Jammu-Kashmir and Ladakh. Within days, China had protested, saying that the creation of the UT of Ladakh has altered the status quo. Unmindful of China’s protests, Union home minister Amit Shah declared in parliament that Aksai Chin (under Chinese occupation) was part of the Ladakh UT. External affairs minister S. Jaishankar’s explanation given in Beijing that the new constitutional status of Ladakh had not changed things on the ground did not assuage the Chinese leadership.

The reason for this is that China never had a boundary (i.e. well-defined jurisdiction limits) with Ladakh. Right from the time when British India annexed the state of Jammu and Kashmir in 1846 till it left the subcontinent, it had failed to persuade China to convert the existing frontier (undefined areas which allows free passage of people, trade and other civilizational matters) into a boundary. As inheritors of the British mantle, India, in its maps of 1950, issued to announce proclamation of the Republic, showed the western sector (Ladakh) as ‘undefined boundary.’

Also Read: Why It Is Imperative That Indians Come to Know What Happened in 1962

In his letter of November 7, 1959, written to Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai proposed a boundary settlement where China agreed to de facto accept the McMahon Line (which it did not recognise) in the eastern sector in exchange for India accepting the actual positions held by the two sides in the western sector, read eastern Ladakh. While Nehru rejected the proposal, China called its actual position line as the Claim Line in Ladakh. Consequent to the 1962 war, China, after declaring a unilateral ceasefire, ordered the PLA to withdraw 20km behind their Claim Line – thereby creating an unofficial demilitarised zone. Over time, the Chinese Claim Line was forgotten by both sides.

In 1993, under the agreement of peace and tranquillity, the two sides agreed to call the entire disputed border as the Line of Actual Control (LAC). With this, there were three lines to contend with: the boundary as India believed; the boundary as claimed by China; and the LAC. Indian diplomats did not understand that the LAC, by definition, is a military line which could be tactically shifted by the side with greater power and political will without being called an act of war. So, the LAC, which was to usher in tranquillity became a millstone around the Indian Army’s neck.

Commensurate with the PLA’s improved border management – coupled with the 1998 nuclear tests where China was cited by India as the reason for conducting them – the PLA’s transgressions across the LAC increased. They were emboldened by India’s appeasement policy, which was reflected in the way successive Indian governments explained the transgressions by telling the domestic audience that since the LAC was not an agreed line, these happened both ways. In reality, all transgressions since the creation of the LAC had been done by the PLA, none by the Indian Army. This fact was finally acknowledged by the Ministry of External Affairs in its May 21, 2020 statement which said that the Indian Army was fully aware of the how the LAC ran on the ground and always abides by it.

Impact of Doklam

The threat from the PLA’s comparatively excellent border management got a huge fillip after the 2017 Doklam crisis. With this, two things happened: One, the PLA’s border management threat to India increased exponentially. Unlike earlier, when the PLA’s mobilisation and combat readiness in case of a crisis was estimated to be 15 to 20 days, this warning time available to the Indian Army after Doklam has reduced sharply. With the PLA’s forces-in-being in TAR, the threat has risen exponentially. And, since the PLA has been exercising regularly in TAR, it could turn around its exercising troops to surprise the Indian Army anywhere on the LAC. This is precisely what they did in large numbers, estimated between 10,000 to 15,000 troops, in eastern Ladakh with deep ingress (estimated three to five kms) across the LAC at three points – Demchok, Pangong Tso and Galwan valley. The ingresses, authenticated by satellite imagery, compelled defence minister Rajnath Singh to concede that the “Chinese have come in large numbers”.

With few available options – political, diplomatic and military – and unmindful of the sizeable land grab done by the PLA and the growing threat to Siachen and SSN, the Modi government decided to do what it does best: Adopt a tough posture and build an alternate narrative of victory for domestic consumption. In the middle of the border crisis, Prime Minister Narendra Modi in a virtual summit with Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison raised the level of bilateral relations – giving a fillip to the Quadrilateral Dialogue and the Indo-Pacific strategy, much to Beijing’s dislike. This led to a further hardening of positions between China and India at the diplomatic and military level talks.

At the same time, government officials and government media started spinning yarns of victory in the Himalayas. The most bizarre claim being that since the LAC is a concept and a mythical line, the PLA’s three-to-five-kms occupation of Indian territory was still outside India’s perception of the LAC – i.e. the PLA had not “entered the Indian side of the LAC”. Never mind, the MEA’s recent confession that the army was aware of the LAC’s alignment on the ground. No one bothered to ask the government that if this was indeed the case, what line had the Indian soldiers been holding for 27 years (starting 1993), round the clock, at an average elevation of 15,000 feet, without proper habitat, roads or even pony tracks at some places?

Meanwhile, the government has asserted that the pace of infrastructure development would be hastened. Once the pandemic gets over, 11 special trains would be commissioned to bring thousands of labourers for building operational roads close to the LAC. How will that help? For one, the PLA would only object to infrastructure building in Ladakh, and not on the rest of the LAC. Since India has changed the status quo of Ladakh on its maps, the PLA will object to any status quo change on the ground. So, expect these workers to toil in Arunachal Pradesh. For another, the Algorithm war that the PLA is preparing for (and which the Indian military is oblivious of) would make the Indian soldiers fighting on the frontline meaningless.

While India believes that its strategy of hardened posture would overtime work to it advantage, it would have the opposite effect. To ensure that the PLA gives no more surprises, large numbers of the Indian Army would be committed permanently to policing the LAC. This would include theatre reserves and troops of the 17 Mountain corps. The army’s plans of substituting technology on the LAC in order to relieve troops for training would die a natural death. While the PLA would hone itself for futuristic ‘algorithm war’ – including the use of artificial intelligence, autonomous weapons etc – the Indian Army would be compelled to abandon its military reforms which, are in any case, still geared to the concept of network-centric warfare that China and the US have already gone well beyond.

Between counter-insurgency ops in J&K, political strikes on the Line of Control against Pakistan and policing the LAC, modernisation and reparation for futuristic wars would necessarily get put on the back burner. After all, there is only this much that the forces can do, and that the nation can afford, economically. One can only hope that this does not spur the Pakistan military and the PLA to further adventurism.

Pravin Sawhney is editor, Force newsmagazine and co-author of the book, Dragon On Our Doorstep

India to Set up Separate Theatre Command for J&K: CDS General Rawat

India will also have a separate training and doctrinal command and logistics command, he said.

New Delhi: India is looking at setting up a separate theatre command for Jammu and Kashmir, Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) General Bipin Rawat said on Monday.

The air defence command is to be rolled out by the beginning of next year and the Peninsula command by the end of 2021, Gen Rawat told a select group of journalists.

The Indian Air Force will helm the air defence command and all-long range missiles as well as air defence assets will come under it, he said.

“India is looking at setting up a separate theatre command for Jammu and Kashmir,” Gen Rawat said.

Indian Navy’s Eastern and Western commands will be integrated into the Peninsula command, he said.

India will also have a separate training and doctrinal command and logistics command, he said .

He also favoured a policy of staggered procurement of big ticket purchases, including acquisition of 114 fighter jets.

The Navy’s demand for a third aircraft carrier will be considered after assessing performance of indigenously-built aircraft carrier, he said.

Gen Rawat also said that submarines are a priority over aircraft carrier for the Navy.

India is also looking at overseas bases for logistics, he added.

Who Said the American Model of Fighting Terror is Best for India?

The merit of the US strategy in the War on Terror is highly suspect. It would not be wise to ape the Americans blindly.

General Bipin Rawat is reported to have said that the model adopted by the United States to take on terror networks after 9/11 needs to be replicated. “We have to bring an end to terrorism and that can only happen the way Americans started after the 9/11 terror attack. They said let’s go on a spree on global War on Terror. To do that you have to isolate the terrorists and anybody who is sponsoring terrorism has to be taken to task,” he reportedly observed.

In other words, India’s top military officer presented the American approach to fighting terror as the best for India too. That is fine, but before the nation adopts this strategy, the taxpaying public must keep in mind that their money and their lives are at stake. Adopting a failed strategy could be disastrous for the nation. It is, therefore, imperative that we evaluate the merit of the American approach to fighting terror critically without being overawed by anyone’s rank or position.

First, let us see the costs. The War on Terror has cost the US $2.407 trillion so far. This is 5.76 times the Union budget of India for 2019-20, which stood at $0.41795 trillion. The cost crosses $5.9 trillion taking into account the medical care of wounded veterans and expensive repairs, etc. Had it gone toward education instead, it would have created almost 42 million jobs and would have added $3.1 trillion to the economy. At least 1.598 million soldiers served directly in Iraq and Afghanistan as ‘boots on ground’—2.7 million by other estimates. The war in Iraq killed 4,419 US soldiers and wounded 31,994 more. By July 2018, as many as 2,372 US soldiers had been killed in Afghanistan and 20,320 wounded, besides 1,720 civilian contractors killed. More than one million Americans who served in a theatre of the War on Terror receive some level of disability compensation from the Department of Veterans Affairs.

Should we attempt a War on Terror on this scale and in that style of taking the war to the enemy, the question is, can we really afford it? Second, even if we can afford it somehow, there is still a fundamental difference with the US. We face a nuclear-armed adversary and we cannot push matters beyond a point without risking a full-fledged war, possibly a nuclear one. Given our ‘national habit’ of collective wailing on TV over a few casualties in counterinsurgency operations, it is doubtful whether the people are prepared for the horrors of a full-fledged or nuclear war; all the media bluster, chest thumping and daily threats of sending Pakistan back to the Stone Age notwithstanding.

In the Kargil War, we suffered just 527 fatalities and 1,363 men wounded. However, as a nation we were rattled. In any case, the US has been bashing up countries and terror groups who are not nuclear powers and do not stand anywhere near its awesome military might.

Turning to the toll on others, Brown University’s Costs of War Project puts the total death toll from the wars in three countries, namely, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan at 480,000 including more than 244,000 civilians. The number of indirect deaths from disease, displacement, and the loss of critical infrastructure could go into millions—internally displaced or refugees also run into millions. Are we morally prepared to commit this sort of outrage?

Second, we must examine how successful the War on Terror has really been. In February 2019, the New York Times editorial board concluded, “The plan is failing. More bombs and boots haven’t brought victory any closer…It is time to face the cruel truth that at best, the war is deadlocked, and at worst, it is hopeless.”

In a US Army War College paper, Col. Erik W. Goepner unambiguously concludes that US efforts in the War on Terror have been largely ineffective in achieving the stated objectives. The number and strength of terror groups with similar ideology have increased as US efforts actually exacerbated conditions like traumatisation, amplifying grievances that increased the motivation to join terror groups.

The Center for Strategic and International Studies estimates that today there could be as many as 230,000 ‘jihadists’ worldwide, quadruple the number from 18 years ago. The talks with the Taliban are an acknowledgement of the bitter reality that they could not be defeated in 18 years and that the US is desperately trying to save face.

A Cato Institute study categorically pronounces that the War on Terror – defined by military intervention, nation building, and efforts to reshape the politics of the Middle East – has been a failure with the staggering costs far outweighing the benefits. Jim Sauer, a former Marine, described the sheer arrogance of the American approach, “Try to be nice, but if they don’t go along with the program manipulate them. If that doesn’t’ work, kill them—every one of them.” Even during the Vietnam War, a quip went like, “Let us win your hearts and minds or we’ll burn your damn huts down.”

The Cato Institute pointed out that one of the sources of failure was the adoption of an aggressive strategy of military intervention stemming from a widespread belief in the indispensable nature of American power and the utility of military force in international politics. The other source was an inflated assessment of the terrorist threat. Together, these factors produced an American strategy that is both ineffective and counterproductive. India runs the risk of falling in the same trap if it blindly apes the United States.

Dr. N.C. Asthana, a retired IPS officer, has been DGP Kerala and a long-time ADG CRPF and BSF. Views are personal.

No, Gen. Rawat, ‘Radicalisation’ is Not a Drug Habit, You Can’t Send Boys to ‘Camp’ for it

It is naïve to think that gimmicks like these can address the complex problems of Kashmir.

General Bipin Rawat has suggested that Kashmiri children influenced by “radicalisation” ought to be “put in de-radicalisation camps”. His views have since been echoed by the director-general of police in Jammu and Kashmir, Dilbagh Singh.

Besides reminding one of quarantine laws or worse, this proposal betrays a poor understanding of the phenomena of both radicalisation and de-radicalisation. I wonder how General Rawat proposes to read the subconscious mind of children and determine their ‘degree of radicalisation’ before he forcibly packs them off to de-radicalisation camps.

Etymologically, the word radical comes from the Latin radix-radicis meaning ‘root’. According to the Concise Oxford Dictionary, the word radical means affecting the foundation, going to the root; seeking to ensure removal of all diseased tissue. The Cambridge Dictionary defines it as believing or expressing the belief that there should be great or extreme social or political change. The dictionary opposite is ‘conservative’.

As such, there is nothing problematic or illegal about being radical or radicalised. A similar misconception exists among counter-terrorism strategists regarding the word “fundamentalism”. The Niagara Bible Conference (1878–1897) had used the word fundamentalism first when it defined certain things that were fundamental to belief.

In general, George M. Marsden and others define it as a “deep and totalistic commitment” to a belief in, and strict adherence to a set of basic principles (often religious in nature), a reaction to perceived doctrinal compromises with modern social and political life. Once again, there is nothing objectionable in it.

Also read: ‘Unconstitutional Outburst’: Sharp Response to Army Chief’s Criticism of Anti-CAA Protests

Wahabism, criticised for its ‘fundamentalism’, happens to be the state-sponsored form of Sunni Islam in Saudi Arabia and that nation is not a terrorist state. Thus, Wahabism per se, cannot be synonymous with terrorism. Still, Western prejudices result in scholars like Ira Lapidus sweeping all that the West may not like at some point of time inside the rubric of fundamentalism. There is no universally accepted definition of radicalisation either. Various governments define it arbitrarily in view of their peculiar biases and concerns.

People talking of simplistic solutions like de-radicalisation camps do not understand that if somebody were prepared to die a horrible death in a strange land, resisting the temptation of a comfortable family life and everything that he cherished, obviously something more powerful than the lure of 72 houris is at work. We have to address that.

As Lt. Gen. Asad Durrani, a former chief of the ISI, described it very astutely in his article ‘CT Made Easy’ in the Dawn:

“Nothing comes close to a non-remedy to fight the menace of terrorism than our latest gimmick—‘the terrorists have been brainwashed, so let’s read to them another narrative’. Anyone who believes that those committed to a cause deeply enough to blow themselves up could be ‘reprogrammed’ by a mantra, obviously has no idea what ‘de-radicalisation’ entails.”

Michael Scheuer, former CIA officer, professor at Georgetown and author of Imperial Hubris: Why the West is Losing the War on Terror, points out that their politicians had sold the narrative “They hate us for how we live and what we think”. In reality, Islamist terror attacks against the US are motivated by the perception that US foreign policy is a threat to Islam—“They hate us for what we do, not who we are”.

At an individual level, some people might also suffer from a persecution complex for real or perceived wrongs committed on them or their community at large. Those who have read Frederick Forsyth’s The Afghan may recall how Izmat Khan swears revenge against the US and joins the Taliban after a missile hits a slope in the Tora Bora, resulting in a landslide that buries his village and his entire family. These are deep psychological wounds. They cannot be healed by offering some creature comforts or making them watch Keeping up with the Kardashians.

Also read: Armed Forces’ Officers Must Think Twice Before Making Their Political Views Public

In the study titled Terrorism in America 18 Years After 9/11, Peter Bergen, David Sterman and Melissa Salyk-Virk concede that the most likely threat to the US today comes from terrorists inspired by ideologies across the political spectrum—it could be ISIS-inspired and ISIS-enabled, but not necessarily ISIS-directed. Even as al-Qaeda and ISIS have been largely decimated, the “idea” has proven resilient to military strikes.

To claim that ‘radicalisation’ is so easy that their technical or ‘secular’ education notwithstanding, some people could be brainwashed by a relatively poorly educated Mullah in a few minutes, amounts to denying the complex causes of terrorism. There is no reason to believe that certain words of religious texts alone could exercise that kind of power over the minds of people. Moreover, one cannot insinuate that there is something wrong with their religion per se for then the solution would be to exterminate the religion itself.

In the end, the “idea” is more important than the tool. If one is intrinsically susceptible to and receptive to a certain “idea”, it is because of a complex interplay of personal, social, and historical reasons. It is utterly naïve to expect that the “idea” could be banished by a pep talk or time spent in a de-radicalisation camp.

As Medgar Evans had said, “You can kill a man, but you can’t kill an idea.”

Complex problems demand complex solutions. Let us not run away from grappling with that complexity.

N.C. Asthana, a retired IPS officer, has been DGP Kerala and a long-time ADG CRPF and BSF.

CDS Rawat’s ‘De-Radicalisation’ Plan Will ‘Dehumanise’ Kashmiri Kids: Child Rights Activists

Shantha Sinha and Enakshi Ganguly also criticised the NCPCR’s reaction to the presence of children at anti-CAA protests.

New Delhi: Child rights activists Shantha Sinha and Enakshi Ganguly have taken strong exception to Chief of Defence Staff General Bipin Rawat’s comments that there may be a need to put Kashmiri children in ‘de-radicalisation camps’, saying it echoes the ‘worst excesses of colonial regimes across the world’. They also expressed disappointment at the way the National Commission for Protection of Child Rights (NCPCR) has reacted to the presence of children in anti-Citizenship (Amendment) Act (CAA) protests.

Shantha Sinha was the first chairperson of the NCPCR, while Enakshi Ganguly is a child rights expert who recently filed a PIL in the Supreme Court against alleged illegal detention of minors in Kashmir.

In their statement, Sinha and Ganguly said that they were deeply disturbed by General Rawat’s referring to 12 year olds as ‘radicalised persons’, without any description of or discussion on what ‘radicalisation’ might even entail. “Is General Rawat referring to ‘thoughts’/ ‘opinions’/ speech and suggesting that the way a child thinks might still land him pre-emptively in a ‘de-radicalisation camp’?” they asked, saying such a move would destroy “the social fabric of any community”.

They said that it would be “meaningless to speak of ‘radicalisation’ in terms of how Kashmiri children feel or behave, without first considering their everyday lived realities”.

“Children in Kashmir have grown in an environment of fear and violence. That would include Kashmiri Pandit children who have had to leave their homeland because of militancy. Their particular experiences and memories do not afford them the luxury of lives sanitized from ‘radical’ political opinions. Likewise in the valley, children have experienced the security apparatus acting in opposition to the local community. As any good child psychologist will tell us, distrust is formed not through ‘external brainwashing’, but more often through affective memory and experience.”

They said children need love, safety and security and instead, the CDS is “selectively looking upon some children as a threat to the country”. Sinha and Ganguly said that both domestic laws such as the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act and international conventions provide for a system that seeks to “engage even with an offending child in a non-punitive manner”.

“We sincerely hope that the CDS will consider that children growing up in conflict situations need special care and protection and not institutionalisation, which will only dehumanise them,” they said.

The duo also expressed surprise at the NCPCR first sending a letter to the director generals of police (DGPs) asking them to take note of “misuse of children in protests” and then asking the district magistrate of South East Delhi to identify children protesting in Shaheen Bagh to ‘offer them counselling’.

“We had expected that the National Commission of Protection of Child Rights (NCPCR) would take note of General Rawat’s statement and at least initiate a discussion on the subject. We had also hoped that, as is its mandate, it would take note of the reported arrests and detentions of children in Delhi and Uttar Pradesh in the wake of the recent Anti-CAA protests,” they said.

They said the protest at Shaheen Bagh represents the “abstract values of the constitution such as secularism, equality and freedom of expression”, which children are being able to immediately relate to, learn, absorb and celebrate. “We cannot deny our children exposure to constitutional values of equality, secularism and democracy, love and respect for all. They are learning about peaceful protest and spirit of voluntarism,” they said.

The children are not “being used”, they said, but are being “involved in some of the finest of human sentiments”. “It is so contrary to what children experience and hear in times of tension and conflict. This is a lifetime learning and they cannot be insulated from it,” they said.

“Contrary to the NCPCR’s advice to DGPs and the District Magistrate of South- East Delhi, it is in fact incumbent upon the State to ensure that children are able to demonstrate their agency, to exercise their right to self-expression – either to dissent or to endorse, to exercise their right to peaceful assembly and to engage meaningfully in public discourse. The State is duty bound to provide safety and security to children and adolescents to ensure that rights of young persons are upheld not only prior to or during their engagement, but also that they do not face any backlash for their views.”

The statement has been reproduced in full below.

We are deeply disturbed to read the first Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) of India, General Bipin Rawat’s statement on the need for to put children in ‘de-radicalisation camps’ and by the reaction of the National Commission for Protection of Child Rights to the presence of children in the ongoing anti-Citizens (Amendment) Act and National Register of Citizens agitations.

Destroying a community

Rawat’s statement echoes the worst excesses of colonial regimes across the world.

It is disturbing to see 12 year olds being referred to as ‘radicalised persons’, without any description of or discussion on what ‘radicalisation’ might even entail. Is General Rawat referring to thoughts, opinions or speech and suggesting that the way a child thinks might still land him pre-emptively in a ‘de-radicalisation camp’? The ‘de-radicalisation camp’ would presumably teach him that whatever he had experienced at home, the memories that were handed down to him and the ideas he had learnt were false and motivated; that his family was manipulative and traitorous. It is undoubtedly one way of destroying the social fabric of any community.

Does ‘radicalisation’ mean that the child has pelted stones? The juvenile justice system is capable of dealing with graver offences; surely pelting stones does not merit mass ‘de-radicalisation camps’? In fact, we believe that the suggestion that children are being ‘radicalised’ is quite melodramatic and capable of causing unnecessary panic amongst the susceptible.

We also believe that it is meaningless to speak of ‘radicalisation’ in terms of how Kashmiri children feel or behave, without first considering their everyday lived realities. Children in Kashmir have grown in an environment of fear and violence. That would include Kashmiri Pandit children who have had to leave their homeland because of militancy. Their particular experiences and memories do not afford them the luxury of lives sanitised from ‘radical’ political opinions. Likewise in the Valley, children have experienced the security apparatus acting in opposition to the local community. As any good child psychologist will tell us, distrust is formed not through ‘external brainwashing’, but more often through affective memory and experience.

Children need love, safety and security. Instead we find the CDS selectively looking upon some children as a threat to the country. Clearly, he has not taken into consideration the compelling factors that drive children to react to what they see as injustice around them, causing stress and anxiety within them.

In any case, both domestic laws (such as the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, national and in Kashmir) and international conventions that India has ratified provide for a system that seeks to engage even with an offending child in a non-punitive manner. Its guiding principles stress on non-discrimination, best interests of the child, dignity, importance of family and institutionalisation as the last resort. Putting children away in ‘de-radicalisation camps’ is violative of all of the above.

We sincerely hope that the CDS will consider that children growing up in conflict situations need special care and protection and not institutionalisation, which will only dehumanise them.

What it means to protect child rights

We had expected that the National Commission of Protection of Child Rights (NCPCR) would take note of General Rawat’s statement and at least initiate a discussion on the subject. We had also hoped that, as is its mandate, it would take note of the reported arrests and detentions of children in Delhi and Uttar Pradesh in the wake of the recent anti-CAA protests.

First, it sent a letter to director generals of police (DGPs) asking them to take note of the ‘misuse of children in protests’ and take necessary action under the JJ Act. Inexplicably, the letter does not raise questions about the alleged detentions of children, or any excesses by the police during the protests.

Today it has issued an order to the district magistrate of South East Delhi to ‘identify children in Shaheen Bagh and send them for counselling’. This is preposterous . What is the basis of this? These children are neither offenders, nor are they victims. They are merely part of society and what they are witnessing around them. We have visited Shaheen Bagh ourselves and have been witness to children’s presence and participation.

What we witness in Shaheen Bagh is that abstract values of the constitution such as secularism, equality and freedom of expression are values that children are being able to immediately relate to, learn, absorb and celebrate. We cannot deny our children exposure to constitutional values of equality, secularism and democracy, love and respect for all. They are learning about peaceful protest and the spirit of voluntarism.

The NCPCR, in its silence on the illegal detentions of children, has not only chosen to exonerate the state from all reports of excesses committed against children, but also exhibited an ignorance of the practical lives of working class children and their families, some of whom have been protesting or caught up in protests happening across cities in India. There are areas even in Delhi where there are no separate playgrounds for children; they play on the streets, which is indeed the site of all communal activity – including festivals and also of protests.

It is perhaps much more reasonable to demand that the state treat peacefully protesting adults and their children with dignity and care. The NCPCR must also recognise that children are also affected by the same sense of fear and insecurity that pervades their families – they cannot be segregated from it.

In this case children are not being used but are getting involved in some of the finest of human sentiments. It is so contrary to what children experience and hear in times of tension and conflict. This is a lifetime’s worth of learning and they cannot be insulated from it.

We take this opportunity to reiterate that children’s right to participate and be heard in all matters concerning them is enshrined in the constitution as a fundamental right and complemented by the UN Convention of the Rights of the Child (CRC) as well as the National Policy for Children.

Contrary to the NCPCR’s advice to DGPs and the district magistrate of South East Delhi, it is in fact incumbent upon the state to ensure that children are able to demonstrate their agency, to exercise their right to self-expression – either to dissent or to endorse, to exercise their right to peaceful assembly and to engage meaningfully in public discourse. The state is duty bound to provide safety and security to children and adolescents to ensure that rights of young persons are upheld not only prior to or during their engagement, but also that they do not face any backlash for their views.

Our mythology shows how children fought valiantly against injustice and stood for truth. Young Ram and Lakshman, not even in their teens, bravely combatted the rakshasas. So did Krishna, who battled the serpents and monsters and kept their entire community in peace. Prahalad defied his own father Hiranyakaship, questioned his atrocities on common people and even threatened him that the people as ‘Narayan’ would revolt against him in their fight for justice and Truth. Enraged, the rakshas father connived to kill his son. He tried to throw him down from the mountains, drown him at sea, send him to detention camps. Nothing deterred Prahalad: he rose again with the support of people, the ‘Narayan’, and finally emerged victorious in his battle against his own father for truth and justice.

Our own General Rawat must be aware that normally children are innocent, submissive and obedient, and that they listen to their loved ones. They are pure and ‘innocent’. But when children are compelled by circumstances, not of their making, but of those in power and authority, they can see where the harm is coming from. They become Ram, Lakshman, Krishna and Prahlad, and seek justice.

To the NCPCR we have this to say – as a statutory body set up for protecting children, they cannot be selective in what they take notice of. It is their duty to protect children from even the state if it is violating their rights. They have to uphold the values of non-discrimination, best interest and children’s right to be heard.

The remedy lies in creating just conditions, where children are treated with love and respect. In creating an atmosphere of safety and security, and making them feel secure and empowered. And this responsibility falls on the state and also the NCPCR that is constituted for this very purpose.

Shantha Sinha and Enakshi Ganguly are child rights activists. Shantha Sinha was the first chairperson of the NCPCR from 2007 to 2013.

Owaisi Hits Out at Bipin Rawat Over Comments on ‘De-Radicalisation Camps’

In a series of tweets, Owaisi said this is not the first time that Rawat uttered comments undermining the civil administration.

Hyderabad: Hitting out at the Chief of Defence Staff General Bipin Rawat’s comments advocating ‘de-radicalisation camps’ for children, AIMIM chief Asaduddin Owaisi has questioned who would deradicalise attackers of Muslims and Dalits.

Speaking at a public meeting at Adilabad on Thursday night, the Hyderabad MP said de-radicalisation is needed for those who lynch and kill Dalits and Muslims.

“I want to inform the chief of defence staff, General saab, if you want to deradicalise, then listen, you first read the Juvenile Act. IPC is not applicable to children. What kind of de-radicalisation you are talking about,” he said.

“General saab says that they will bring new law to deradicalise children. Meerut SP says in Muslim localities that they (Muslims) eat here and sing songs in favour of Pakistan. He says go to Pakistan. Who will de-radicalise such SPs. Dalits and Muslims are being lynched. Who will de-radicalise those attackers?” the AIMIM chief said.

Rawat on Thursday in an address at the Raisina Dialogue, said de-radicalisation camps are operating in the country as it was necessary to isolate people who are completely radicalised.

The MIM supremo alleged that names of five lakh Bengali Hindus and an equal number of Muslims are missing in Assam and the Hindus will be given citizenship under Citizenship (Amendment) Act (CAA), leaving out the Muslims.

He said the names of some family members of former president of India Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed were also missing in Assam and questioned who would de-radicalise those responsible for the blunder.

In a series of tweets, Owaisi said this is not the first time that Rawat uttered comments undermining the civil administration.

“This is not the first ridiculous statement he has made. Policy is decided by civilian administration not by any General. By speaking on policy/politics, he is undermining civilian supremacy,” he tweeted.

“Who’ll deradicalise lynchers & their political masters? What about those opposing citizenship for Assam’s Bengali Muslims? Maybe deradicalise “Badla” Yogi & “Pakistan jao” Meerut SP? Maybe deradicalise those imposing hardship on us through NPR-NRC?” the MIM leader said in another tweet.