On the sidelines of the UN general assembly, the foreign ministers of India, the United States, Japan and Australia met on Friday and issued a joint readout, which reiterated their commitments on a range of issues from Indo-Pacific to terrorism and Ukraine.
New Delhi: The foreign ministers of the Quad group reiterated that they are committed to combatting terrorism in “all its forms and manifestations” and called for adhering to UNCLOS in addressing “maritime claims” in South and East China seas.
On the sidelines of the UN general assembly, the foreign ministers of India, the United States, Japan and Australia met on Friday and issued a joint readout, which reiterated their commitments on a range of issues from Indo-Pacific to terrorism and Ukraine.
India was represented by External Affairs minister S. Jaishankar, who arrived in New York on Friday to kick-start a week of meetings at the UN’s annual jamboree.
As per the joint readout, the Quad ministers reaffirmed that “international law, respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, and the maintenance of peace and security in the maritime domain underpin the development and prosperity of the Indo-Pacific”.
Calling for disputes to be resolved peacefully, the Quad reiterated the importance of adhering to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) to address maritime claims in the South And East China Seas.
“We emphasise the importance of adherence to international law, particularly as reflected in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), to address challenges to the global maritime rules-based order, including with respect to maritime claims, and in the South and East China Seas.”
The sentence is nearly identical to the one in the Quad Leaders joint statement from May, with the exception of the newly introduced term “including with respect to maritime claims”.
Earlier in June, India has changed its position and called for abiding by the Arbitral Tribunal’s 2016 order that had struck down China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea. The Arbitral Tribunal was set up as per provisions of UNCLOS. This change in posture was mentioned in the India-Philippines joint statement issued after the meeting of the fifth Joint Commission on bilateral cooperation.
The joint press release also said that the group is “committed to countering terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, including preventing the international and cross border movement of terrorists, and countering terror finance networks and safe havens”.
Further, the Quad ministers “stressed the need for a comprehensive and balanced approach to effectively curb terrorist activities through the whole of nation and whole of international community efforts”.
A warm discussion with Quad colleagues to start my #UNGA78 participation. Welcomed Japanese FM Yoko Kamikawa to the meeting.
Discussed defending the rules-based international order in the Indo-Pacific and delivering on Quad commitments.
The next Quad summit is expected to be held in India, but the readout doesn’t refer to the meeting. It, however, notes that Japan will host the next in-person foreign ministers meeting in Japan.
India has sent informal feelers to all the Quad members to see if their leaders would be available to be the chief guest for the Republic Day parade. However, there is still uncertainty as Australia celebrates January 26 as the national day and Japan’s prime minister has a scheduling conflict with the parliamentary session.
The US ambassador to India Eric Garcetti confirmed that India had given an invitation to President Joe Biden, but demurred when asked about the rest of the Quad leaders. He, however, did not indicate that the invitation has been accepted so far.
The Quad, meanwhile, met in the shadow of the explosive allegation made by Canadian prime minister Justin Trudeau of involvement of India in the killing of a Canadian citizen, who is described as a pro-Khalistan terrorist by the Indian government.
The US and Australia had both termed the allegations as “serious” and urged India to join the investigations.
India had dismissed the allegations as “motivated and absurd” – and termed Canada as a “safe haven for terrorists”.
On Ukraine, the Quad ministers expressed “deep concern” over the Ukraine war and urged the need for a “a comprehensive, just, and lasting peace in Ukraine in accordance with the international law, consistent with the principles of the UN Charter”.
As per norm, the four countries also said that use of nuclear weapons or the threat of use was unacceptable and called for respect of territorial integrity and sovereignty of all states. “We are deeply concerned about the global food security situation and support the efforts of the UN in the resumption of the Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI),” the joint readout added.
Siddharth Varadarajan spoke to India’s former National Security Adviser Shivshankar Menon about Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s state visit to the US, the deals signed, the politics and economics involved, and China’s role in bringing the two nations together.
The Wire’s founding editor Siddharth Varadarajan spoke to India’s former National Security Adviser Shivshankar Menon about Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s state visit to the US, the deals signed, the politics and economics involved, and China’s role in bringing the two nations together. The following is the transcript of a video interview that was published on June 23, 2023. The text has been edited lightly for syntax, style and clarity.
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Joining me to discuss Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to the United States, his talks with US President Joe Biden, his address to the joint sitting of Congress and of course the joint statement issued by the two sides, is former National Security Adviser of India, Mr Shivshankar Menon.
Mr Menon, thank you so much for taking the time for this.
Thank you so much for having me.
And let’s start with the big picture. I don’t want to get too much into the weeds in terms of what the two sides agreed. The joint statement is a very lengthy document, covers all kinds of things. But at the heart of it, I suppose, if you were to focus on what the two sides are emphasizing, is the sort of push on cooperation in critical technology areas, as they call it; a whole host of emerging technologies and fields have been identified. And of course also in the sphere of defence, whether it’s talk also of potential joint production of GE engines for Indian fighter aircraft.
To your mind, what’s the grand bargain in this visit or in this document that the US is trying to strike when it comes to its dealings with India at this time?
I think for both sides, the other is an increasingly important partner in this new world that’s emerging. And I think what you see in the joint statement is a lot of strategic convergence. China is the glue, there’s no question. Both sides are increasingly bothered by what China’s rise means, how China has behaved, but it’s more than that. From an Indian point of view, I think the US is an essential partner in India’s transformation. If we want to build a modern, technologically capable state, then I think you can’t do that if you have bad relations with both of the two biggest economies in the world and certainly the source, the major source of technology in the world is the US today. So, there is that congruence on technology.
From the US point of view – and for me this is the qualitative change that I see. There aren’t very many places where you can actually use technology and manufacture cheaply. Not just, I don’t mean just assembly, but where you can actually find process engineers; find firms which are capable of helping you to produce things cheaply. Producing outside China, when you go to Japan or Korea or Western Europe or America, these are all expensive places to work in. So, India offers more than just the market. It offers, today, since it’s developed and grown and changed so much in the last 30 years… therefore, it offers a place where you can actually start thinking seriously of some co-production; of locating some manufacturing and that’s a thread that runs through the joint statement. If you look at most of these technological things that they’re talking about, ultimately from an Indian point of view, the aim is to produce in India. But, it would mean integrating into global value chains and supply chains, most of which originate one way or the other in the US – or end in the US. So, for me, that’s the big advance, if there is one.
And the deal is simple, frankly. We agree on how the world looks; we’re both worried about the same thing, so you see the reference to the Quad right at the beginning; you see what they both say about the Indo-Pacific; you’ve seen the speeches that they’ve made. But more than the geopolitics I think, there’s now also an economic basis. Because for a long time, it was the politics that drove the relationship, not so much the economic complementarity. But, by bringing high-tech into it, I think you’re now seeing much more. Now, that means both sides have to, I think find a new balance in that economic relationship. It’s not easy because protectionism has risen on both sides. So there is a lot of work still to be done to realise this.
Just so we understand clearly, in the area of defence and critical emerging technologies, part of the political economy of de-risking – if that’s the current trend on the part of the US – is to look for partners which are much less risky than say, of course China, but also Taiwan, Vietnam – places that may be vulnerable to disruption in a way that India perhaps would not be.
Yeah. I think you’re right and for any company that’s looking for a “China plus one” strategy, it’s not necessarily moving things out of China but looking to hedge their bets, then India is a logical place to come and India has been growing. India looks today as a good, as a very good prospect.
The Indian side and the Indian media are very bullish on the prospect of high-tech transfer. There’s been a lot of breathless coverage about the GE engines deal. The GE press release itself speaks of potential production in India. It’s not clear to what extent finally production or joint production will happen and if so, with technology transfer not. Given your experience with how these kinds of agreements work, not just with the United States but also with other partners with whom we’ve done similar things like the Russians, how easy do you think it would be for India to actually accomplish transfer of technology in these kinds of areas?
There’ll always be a very complicated negotiation in all these and the higher the technology, the more closely it’s held, the more sensitive it is. But, I think if both sides are reasonable, they will both find some accommodation and then as they learn to work with each other, it’ll develop. I mean we’ve seen this happen with the Russians in certain aspects of defence technology and we’ve seen that process. As you get comfortable, as you learn to work with each other, you learn more and more about the technology, your own capability and your ability to absorb the technology and to use it also improves. So for me, many of the things mentioned so far in the visit are potential. [US chip manufacturer] Micron [has promised to invest] up to $825 million [in a Gujarat factory]. So, a lot of this is indicating potential lines of advance and if even half of this is done, it would be a huge advance on where we are today, certainly.
But…
So, there is a net gain…
Right.
…In the process. It’s not going to be easy; it’s not going to be complete; it’s not going to be everything is transferred. I mean nobody does that. There are commercial interests here as well.
The devil is often in the detail. I mean back in 2005, you were part of the Manmohan Singh government which negotiated the Indo-US civil nuclear deal. There was language in the joint statement of 2005, which to the Indian mind was very clear about what we were agreeing to give and what we were expecting to receive. But the actual negotiations saw a lot of pushing and pulling where attempts were made to claw back and extract more from the Indian side.
And we tried as well. That’s normal. I think that’s the normal business of give and take between states, between countries. But in this case, the interesting thing I think – unlike the civil nuclear [deal], which in India at least is almost entirely government. Unlike that, many of these things that we’re seeing talked about now are with private firms and companies which are used to doing this and know the limits of what they can do. And I think the Indian industry also today is capable of this. You’ve seen what Tata has done with the aircraft industry, with Boeing for instance. So, I think over time, I think we’ve now got to the stage where we can think a little more ambitiously and I think that’s what we’re seeing now.
Right. If I come back to the sort of the larger geopolitical bargain that the US thinks it’s entering into, going back even to 2005. The Bush administration clearly was motivated by or driven by the idea that the rise of China in Asia and the world required some kind of balancing and it was a good proposition to bring India inside the tent in some ways. Clearly, the Biden administration also has the same concerns, perhaps, even heightened concerns given the deterioration in US-China relations. But then you have sceptics or analysts like Ashley Tellis, who say that the US is making a bad bargain. At the end of the day, India will not deliver what the US expects it will. Do you think there is a danger of some kind of mismatch?
You know, I think obviously, both sides are not identical. So, we will have slightly different points of view. I think for the US, China is a much bigger factor in the calculus of the India-US relationship. For India, it’s India’s transformation that the US is very important for. So, also China is a factor but it’s not the factor that the way India’s transformation or development is. So yes, there’ll be some differences. But you know when Ashley Tellis says it’s a bad bet, frankly it depends… bet for what. What are you betting for? I mean it’s not a defence alliance, certainly not. We’re not committed to defending America and America is not committed to defending India. But who asked for a defence alliance? Not us. The Americans never offered one. We’ve never offered one. We’ve never sought one. So, we’re not an ally and when people say, “Oh India won’t fight America’s wars.” Yes, we won’t. We don’t expect America to fight ours either.
But what we do today, if you look we do more military exercises with the US than we do with anybody else; than we’ve ever done with anybody. You look at the kind of interoperability, now that we have all the foundational agreements in place. Now that we’re talking about sourcing, we’re talking about repairing U.S navy ships in Indian shipyards, we’re talking about a level of military engagement and defence cooperation. We’re talking even of sharing underwater maritime domain awareness, through the Indo-Pacific. These kinds of things are significant.
Frankly, to my mind, you are doing with the US everything that allies do, more than many of their allies do with them, short of that Article 5 NATO commitment to defend each other. So, I’m not sure that it’s a bad bet or a good bet. I think the fundamental decision, as Condoleezza Rice said in her Foreign Affairs article before President Bush was elected, that the rise of India is in the US interest and that’s been common through administrations, whether it was the Obama administration… the Bush administration certainly.. but Obama and Trump as well. And now, the Biden administration. I think that conviction remains. If anything, the state of the world makes it even more so.
And I think that’s why you see the bipartisan consensus. That’s why you see the administration going out of its way to make the visit a success in every which way. I mean this is only the third state visit we’ve had, apart from President Radhakrishnan and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. This is only the third state visit by an Indian leader to the US. That’s big. The second address to joint sessions of Congress and they’ve really gone out of their way.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi addressing the US Congress. Photo: Twitter/@SpeakerMcCarthy
Right. Given the salience of China, you mentioned the reference to the Quad and the very first para of the joint statement. Later on, there’s references to you know, freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. Mr Modi in his address to Congress emphasized, used the pet American phrase, “Free and open in Indo-Pacific.” Do you think going from here on, that say the securitisation of the Quad is more likely? So far India has been a bit reluctant to embrace that dimension. Do you see that happening to a greater extent?
You know a lot of this is in the mind. I mean already the Quad members do a great deal with each other – in terms of maritime security…
At a bilateral level.
Bilateral and some trilateral. [The] Malabar [naval exercise] is more multilateral. Some of the exercises are multilateral. But when you look at where they exercise, what they do, what they exchange, the kinds of intelligence they share… you know that’s a whole quantitative leap over what there was 20 years ago or even 10 years ago. So, if it’s the deterrent effect of what the Quad does, when you say securitisation I, think that’s already there. How much they put in a communique, whether they mention the word China and so on… Frankly, that is, those are matters of detail and depends on… It’s contingent on what you see at a particular moment. But it is already securitised. And the Chinese, in their mind at least – they have already said it’s the beginning of an Asian NATO – see it as a security pact which is aimed at them. So, they respond accordingly.
So, in practice, I think, the securitisation that you’ve mentioned has already happened. Maybe not in the words, not in the expression. But there is more to Quad than just that. It does try and provide public goods, global public goods, by what it’s doing for resilient supply chains, what it did for vaccines for instance and so on. And I think that actually a lot of Maritime security is a public good because everybody benefits.
If I were to invert Ashley Tellis’s concept of a bad bet and ask whether there is a risk in India actually putting itself in a situation of de facto military confrontation with with the Chinese because of groupings like the Quad, because of the US expectation of India being more active in the wider Indo-Pacific region, is there a risk that we go down that path and end up further complicating our relations with China without necessarily getting any tangible benefit of payoff that would help you deal with China? Is there a risk of that?
Theoretically? Yes. But I have two responses to that. One is, it depends on how confident you are of your own ability to deal with the world. If you don’t get anything out of it, after all this… you know, it’s basically an open door, an invitation to collaborate, to gain things. If you choose not to walk through the door, that’s your problem. So, it really depends on your self-confidence and how well you handle this situation and the opportunities that it’s thrown up.
Secondly, India-China relations are sui generis. I mean they have gone… you know, if you look at your trouble with China, it’s not because of the Americans. And if you look at that triangle – India, China and the US. When there are bad relations between China and the US, you’ve had trouble with China; you’ve also had periods when you’ve had a stable, managed relationship. When there are good relations between China and the US, same thing. You’ve had trouble with China; you’ve also had periods when you’ve managed the relationship. So, I don’t see… frankly, when you think of this, if it’s a triangle it’s a very weak triangle. And it’s not a triangle that…
So, I don’t see what you’re doing with the US. If the Chinese are unhappy with what they see India doing with the US and this qualitative step forward in – especially technological and defence cooperation between India and the US – then frankly, they should actually be blaming themselves. What they did in 2020 in Galwan and the progressive pressure on the border and various small things that they’ve done over time to build up pressure and to not address the irritants in the relationship which could have easily been addressed – things like the trade deficit and so on. It was within their power to actually deal with them. So, I’m not so sure whether I would say that there’s a big risk of going that way. Yes, theoretically, there’s always a risk. But it would be the result of your own foolishness and a lot of it would I think be because of the inherent dynamic of India-China relations rather than what the US [has done]. And ultimately, you have to take charge and responsibility for your own relationships. You’re not going to work yourself into a position where somebody else determines what you do.
Right. The other big part that would be watching the Modi visit and the joint statement is Russia, which of course, has its own reservations about the quad but is today preoccupied with Ukraine. Ukraine doesn’t seem to have figured very prominently in the public part of the visit. Of course, there was a reference to it that Joe Biden made in his opening remarks at the press conference. Prime Minister Modi mentions it in Congress but he said he was willing to do whatever it takes, which to my mind is a kind of very general statement and the joint statement also makes a broad reference without getting into specifics. Two parts to my question. Do you feel that Ukraine is not an irritant between India and the US and that, you know, the US has kind of accepted that the two sides will not look at Russia-Ukraine in the identical, in the same way, and secondly how do you think Russia is going to react to the increasing bonhomie, particularly, on the defence side, between India and the US?
Well, you know to my mind, Ukraine is a European problem primarily. And I think for any realist in the US to expect India to take the same attitude and be as involved as the US or NATO countries are in the Ukrainian issue, I think that would be very unreasonable. And as far as I understand, the Americans are always ultimately pragmatic. They might clothe their presentation of foreign policy in various ways, in ideological ways; in principled ways, but basically, they’re pragmatic. And my best example is really our purchase of Russian oil. You see a lot of noise in the media and the Western media and so on. But if India and China were to stop buying from Russia and buy oil from the same places that Western Europe is now buying from, having cut off Russia. Think of where the price of oil would be and think of the strain it would place on trans-Atlantic relations, on the Western alliance itself. Because the Europeans would really… I mean inflation would be through the roof. It’s bad enough already. Which is why sanctions, no sanctions apply to our buying [Russian oil]. It’s legal.
And the US and the Europeans are buying refined Russian oil…
Refined Russian oil from India. And for all the noise that you hear, ultimately the world comes to an arrangement which works best for everyone. I think therefore one shouldn’t overstate… Now, the Americans would be happy if you were close, much closer aligned to them on Ukraine. But I think they understand also. They are realists. And they also know that our ability to actually affect the outcome in Ukraine is very limited, just as China’s is. It’s not as though there’s much that we can do about what’s actually going to emerge out of Ukraine. About the Russian reaction to what they see, I don’t think they’d be happy. But it’s part of an ongoing trend. If in 2005, 80% of our defence imports were from Russia, by 2019 the Russian share was down to about 30%. But it’s fairly solid. I mean that 30%, because of the legacy platforms [like] tanks, fighter aircraft that we still have. So they might not be happy to see us shifting out. We’ve bought more US defence equipment in the last three years than we have Russian. But I think they are also going to be sensible enough to realise that their own capacity to supply right now is limited. They’re stuck in Ukraine. They need what they have and they’ll probably need their own production as well.
Seems to have dried up. And I assume that this is part of the readjustment that will happen as a result – not just of Russian actions in Ukraine – but also of the general readjustment that we see. In fact, what we’re seeing now is a rebalancing in Asia as well. And it’s not because of Ukraine so much as the larger issue of people reacting to China’s rise and China’s behaviour. And it’s not only China-US relations determining everything. If you look at Japan, she’s hedging. She’s actually going her own way. So is the Philippines, so are various countries. India also. South Korea suddenly has a very active Indo-Pacific policy. So, for me, you’re watching a much broader realignment where India-US congruence is a very important component.
Right. Do you think the sudden rescheduling… or not rescheduling but the decision to turn the SCO, the upcoming Shanghai Cooperation Summit in Delhi, into a virtual rather than an actual meeting was in some way linked to Indian concerns about American sensitivity?
I have no idea. I really don’t know. I’m out of the loop. I don’t want to speculate on why it happens. It’s very hard to tell.
And G20, upcoming in Delhi, do you foresee a situation where Joe Biden and Mr Putin will be together at the summit? Or do you think one of them will stay away?
In an ideal world, they should all be there. And actually, they should all be talking to each other. And that’s something that is traditional Indian policy you know that. Jaw-jaw is better than war-war. But let’s see, let’s see where it goes. I think there’s going to be a fair amount… I noticed the last line in the joint statement looks forward to Mr Biden’s visit, President Biden’s visit, for the G20 in September.
And Mr Modi is going to go to APEC in San Francisco in November. Mr Menon, you’re a foreign policy analyst so I don’t want to burden you with political questions. But in the run-up to Prime Minister Modi’s visit, President Biden received a letter from 75 members of Congress expressing concerns about the US giving a pass to Mr Modi for violation of you know, press freedom and minority rights and to the extent to which the US does foreground shared values and the importance of democracy. The D-word figures very prominently in the joint statement and in various other things that President Biden said. He was asked to make sure that he raised some of these concerns. Clearly, publicly nothing has happened. Mr Biden at the press conference was pretty guarded when he was asked to direct question…
He said he had a long discussion on democratic values.
Yeah. It was a very broad and sweeping statement where he said India and the US, both share democratic DNA.
And we had a big discussion on democratic values or something.
We had a frank… You know, there’s a phrase used in the last two or three years. But privately, we don’t know what might have happened. Give us your sense of how this issue might be playing out in the US policymaker’s mind. Is it something that they reckon they just don’t need to factor in or is it something that they do feel they need to talk to Mr Modi about?
Judging by the way the administration has gone out of its way to boost this visit… it seems to me that they’ve made a clear choice. That they’ve muted the D-word as it were and that factor. That can’t be based on just a gut feel. I mean, because both leaders face an election next year and clearly, they’ve come to the conclusion that a stronger relationship, a visible partnership and this support for each other is going to play well in the domestic political constituencies. They’re both politicians and they’re both pretty consummate politicians, I mean as they’ve proven. So, as I said, the US foreign policy establishment, to my mind, has always been pragmatic and realistic rather than driven by ideological or principled considerations. In fact, it’s when they have been driven by ideology that they’ve gone wrong.
Now, you know on both sides you will find people criticising the other’s democracy and… But it seems to me that flawed or not flawed, both democracies I think are still works in progress. And ultimately, we have to decide for ourselves. We have to settle our issues ourselves, just as the Americans have to settle their issues. I don’t think the Americans are going to let that get in the way. I mean Ukraine was hardly a wonderful democracy and yet that hasn’t stopped the US from committing itself and they have good geopolitical reasons to do so.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi and US President Joe Biden at the White House, in Washington, DC on June 22, 2023. Photo: PIB
So just as Prime Minister Modi bet on Donald Trump getting a second term when he said, “Ab ki baar, [Trump] sarkar” at that rally. Is Joe Biden or the US system making a bet that come 24, they expect Narendra Modi to be back in the saddle and that they want get in, to make sure that they’re in on the ground floor?
They’ll never say so but by the behavior, it would appear to be so.
Once again, however, the grouping did not criticise Russia for its invasion, a position India has been unwilling to take.
New Delhi: The leaders of the four so-called Quad countries, including India, on Saturday jointly expressed “deep concern” over the Ukraine war and implicitly criticised China’s actions in the Indo-Pacific region.
The Quad summit was earlier scheduled for later in Australia. But after US President Joe Biden cut short his foreign tour to engage in domestic debt ceiling talks, the four countries decided to meet on the sidelines of the G7 summit in Hiroshima.
In a joint statement issued after the meeting chaired by Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese, the leaders of India, the United States, Japan and Australia said that they wanted to express “our deep concern over the war raging in Ukraine and mourn its terrible and tragic humanitarian consequences”.
“We recognise its serious impacts on the global economic system including on food, fuel and energy security and critical supply chains,” it added.
While India has individually expressed “very deep” concern about the Ukraine war, it is the first time that it is part of a joint statement with the Quad. The significance is also due to India’s co-signatories, the US, Australia and Japan, all of whom are leading the Western camp against Russia on the Ukraine conflict.
The statement, however, did not condemn or criticise Russia for its invasion of Ukraine – a stand the other three countries have regularly taken but which India has so far refrained from.
With strong ties with Russia in defence and energy, India had earlier resisted any strong language in Quad joint statements. Last year’s outcome document issued after the first in-person summit at Tokyo had carefully curated, but relatively muted, language on Ukraine, even though it was held just three months after the Russian invasion.
While India this time endorsed the stronger ‘anti-war’ language, the Indian prime minister’s line to Russian President Vladimir Putin last year found a place this time: “Conscious that ours must not be an era of war, we remain committed to dialogue and diplomacy,” the Quad statement said.
Asserting that the four countries stood for adherence to international law, respect for territorial integrity and UN principles, the joint statement said that they supported “a comprehensive, just and lasting peace consistent with the UN Charter”.
“In this context, we concur that the use, or threat of use, of nuclear weapons is serious and inadmissible,” said the joint statement.
Among the four leaders, Japanese PM Fumio Kishida was the most strident, mentioning Russia by name in his remarks at the start of the meeting.
“During this one-year period, Russia’s outrage has continued, and the security environment has become even more severe. Free and open international order based on the rule of law is under threat,” he said.
Implicit reference to China
While not mentioning China by name, the joint statement was clearly taking a swipe at Beijing when it said that the four leaders would “strongly oppose destabilising or unilateral actions that seek to change the status quo by force or coercion”.
It also expressed “serious concern” at the “militarisation of disputed features, the dangerous use of coastguard and maritime militia vessels, and efforts to disrupt other countries’ offshore resource exploitation activities”.
Calling for peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific, the Quad asserted, “We seek a region where no country dominates and no country is dominated – one where all countries are free from coercion, and can exercise their agency to determine their futures. Our four countries are united by this shared vision”.
The joint statement, as well as the accompanying vision statement, unveiled several measures for improving infrastructure and connectivity in the region.
“We’re now launching new initiatives to keep that progress going, from projects to build secure telecommunications in the Pacific region, to strengthen our cooperation in submarine cables, new joint efforts between our private sectors to invest in infrastructure and clean energy projects in the region,” US President Joe Biden said in his opening remarks.
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi said that the Quad was moving forward with a “constructive agenda based on shared democratic values”.
“Through our shared efforts, we are giving a practical dimension to our vision for a free, open, and inclusive Indo-Pacific. Climate action, disaster management, strategic technologies, reliable supply chains, health security, maritime security, counterterrorism are examples of areas in which our positive cooperation is increasing,” he said.
Modi also announced that India will host the Quad Summit in 2024. It is not, however, clear if the dates have been decided since India will be in election mode one year from now.
Earlier in the day, Modi had a series of bilateral meetings with leaders from France, South Korea, Vietnam and Ukraine. He also unveiled a bust of Mahatma Gandhi and took part in outreach sessions of the G7 Summit.
The Chinese president’s visit to Moscow has many implications, including an indication that “China and its friends are no longer obliged to conform to a US-led global order”.
The first visit by Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to Moscow since the start of the Ukraine war was much anticipated. For Russia, it was a demonstration of friendship with an economically powerful country – a crucial show of strength when it is facing sanctions on nearly every aspect of its economy. Keen to keep Moscow firmly in its camp, Beijing also wanted to project Chinese President Xi as a ‘peacemaker’, to further his diplomatic credentials in the wake of the Saudi-Iran agreement.
What were the main deliverables?
Despite the hype over the visit, the main joint statement issued by Russia and China on the second day of the visit on Tuesday was relatively measured.
Just weeks before the start of the Ukraine war last year, the two leaders had pledged that there were “no limits” to the friendship of the two countries. But, that phrase did not make an appearance this time.
“The friendship between the two peoples from generation to generation has a solid foundation, and all-around cooperation between the two countries has broad prospects. Russia needs a prosperous and stable China, and China needs a strong and successful Russia,” said the joint statement on deepening comprehensive strategic partnership.
The second joint statement was an affirmation towards the establishment of a stronger economic relationship, with a large laundry list of proposals that were part of a long-term plan to be implemented by 2030.
Russia specifically noted that the two countries could join forces to become world leaders in information technology and artificial intelligence.
The Chinese state media highlighted that Russia was increasingly going to use the renminbi in trade. President Vladimir Putin said the share of use of the ruble and yuan had already reached 65% of bilateral commercial transactions. It would allow “us to protect mutual trade from the influence of third countries and negative trends on global currency markets,” said Putin.
According to Reuters, the summit produced 14 agreements but did not result in inking a deal for a new gas pipeline to China via Mongolia. “China is well placed to drive a hard bargain, as Moscow needs the deal more: Gazprom [the Russian majority state-owned multinational energy corporation] is looking to China to make up for the collapse of the European market that used to account for 80% of its exports,” observed the Reuters analysis.
The South China Morning Post noted that the joint statement had a more vague reference to the proposed Power of Siberia 2 pipeline, while the Russian President had claimed that it was finalised. Quoting experts, the newspaper reported that the new pipeline would further support the notion that China and Russia are getting even closer with each other in the face of Western sanctions and confrontations.
How has the West reacted?
The two main narratives in the Western media have been that the visit showcases the global ambitions of China and that Moscow has wilfully marked itself as the junior partner.
“A strong China is bolstering a weak Russia. That’s the real headline that describes the showy meetings in Moscow this week between the two countries’ leaders. The Chinese aren’t providing weapons (yet), but Xi certainly offered moral and psychological support in what might be described as a get-well visit to an ailing relative,” wrote David Ignatius in the Washington Post.
For major newspapers like The Guardian and the Financial Times, the main headline was also about Putin playing second fiddle to Xi.
The Wall Street Journal analysed that China’s willingness to wade into conflict marked a “new phase in the country’s vision for itself and its role in the world”. “It sends a message that China and its friends are no longer obliged to conform to a US-led global order, and poses a challenge to Washington, as it tries to shape a world it sees as divided between democracies and autocracies.”
US President Joe Biden with his Ukrainian counterpart Volodymyr Zelenskyy. Photo: Twitter/@POTUS
How did the ongoing Ukraine conflict and its resolution feature in the visit?
As mentioned earlier, China had described Xi’s visit as that of a peacemaker, especially as a follow-up to the 12-point peace plan released last month.
The joint statement said Russia “welcomed China’s willingness to play an active role in resolving the Ukrainian crisis through political and diplomatic means” and also appreciated the “constructive propositions” set out in the Chinese foreign ministry paper.
It said that the “settlement of the Ukraine crisis must respect the reasonable security concerns of every country and prevent the formation of confrontational blocs that add fuel to the flames”.
Russia reiterated that it was ready to restart peace talks, which was welcomed by China.
There was a caustic response from Washington. “If China wants to play a constructive role in this conflict, then it ought to press Russia to pull troops out of Ukraine,” US national security spokesperson John Kirby said.
According to CNN, Xi’s visit to Moscow “failed to move the needle on bringing [the Ukraine] conflict to resolution”.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky told reporters on Tuesday that he had invited China to get involved in talks, but had not yet got a reply.
“We proposed that China become a partner in the implementation of the peace formula… We conveyed our formula across all channels. We invite you to dialogue. We are waiting for your answer. We are receiving some signals, but there are no specifics yet,” he said.
In response, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said that Beijing’s lack of response to the Ukrainian peace formula was “a matter that concerns China-Ukraine bilateral relations”.
He also that President Putin pointed out to Chinese President Xi that many provisions of the Chinese peace plan on Ukraine may be taken as the basis for the Ukrainian settlement when the West and Kyiv would be ready for it. At the same time, he pointed out that so far, no such readiness had been observed, reported TASS, the Russian state-owned news agency.
What does the visit mean for India?
The direct implication for India from the Russia-China joint statement is the criticism of Indo-Pacific policy and the Quad. According to a machine translation, the statement said:
“The two sides expressed grave concern over NATO’s continued strengthening of military-security ties with Asia-Pacific countries and the undermining of regional peace and stability. The two sides oppose the patchwork of closed and exclusive bloc structures in the Asia-Pacific region to create bloc politics and camp confrontation. The two sides pointed out that the United States adheres to the Cold War mentality and pursues the ‘Indo-Pacific Strategy’, which has a negative impact on peace and stability in the region. China and Russia are committed to building an equal, open and inclusive Asia-Pacific security system that is not aimed at third countries, so as to maintain regional peace, stability and prosperity.”
The other mention was the two countries pledging to strengthen coordination on multilateral fora and trilateral formats like “China-Russia-India”.
Since India is also the chair of the G-20, the joint statement does not bode well for reaching a consensus at the September summit. “The two sides strongly condemn politicisation of multilateral platforms and attempts by certain countries to cram extraneous issues into the agenda of multilateral platforms and dilute the primary tasks of relevant mechanisms,” the statement said.
Russia and China had failed to re-endorse the language on Ukraine used in the Bali declaration in the last two ministerial meetings of the G-20 in India.
The Indian establishment has consistently cautioned that the West’s tough approach towards Russia would ultimately drive Moscow closer to China. Thus, the present alignment in the aftermath of the Ukraine conflict comes as no surprise. While India would prefer Russia to distance itself from Beijing’s sphere of influence, that appears highly improbable in the near future.
According to well-known China watcher professor Jabin T. Jacob, the concern that Russia is becoming a junior partner to China is “valid”. While China claims to promote peace, it may be beneficial for them to prolong the Ukraine conflict, which would drain Russia politically, economically, and militarily. This would allow China to expand its influence in Eurasia – it has already begun to provide security assurances to countries such as Kazakhstan and called Belarus an “all-weather strategic partner”, as it does Pakistan.
Despite India’s claims of maintaining strategic autonomy, it has been unable to convert it to effective use. China was able to swing the Iran-Saudi deal and even Japan seems more active by comparison, as seen in its prime minister’s visit to Kyiv. With more external players becoming active in India’s near and extended neighbourhood, New Delhi’s own ability to take the lead and its room for manoeuvre will become constrained, according to professor Jacob.
According to Claude Arpi, the India-based French expert on India-China ties, there are doubts regarding China’s ability to serve as a mediator and a responsible global player. One significant constraint could be the Chinese economy, which has exhibited indications of deceleration and might serve as a barrier to China’s ambitions, as per Arpi.
India’s current focus is on organising a seamless G-20 summit in September, which means navigating through choppy waters, is a task that will be challenging.
The US, India and several other world powers have been talking about the need to ensure a free, open and thriving Indo-Pacific in the backdrop of China’s rising military manoeuvring in the region.
Washington: The United States and India will work together both in the bilateral and multilateral setups to support their shared vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific, the Biden administration’s National Security Strategy said on Wednesday as it identified China as “one of the major threats” to American national security.
“As India is the world’s largest democracy and a major defence partner, the US and India will work together, bilaterally and multilaterally, to support our shared vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific,” said the Strategy, a declassified version of which was released here.
The Strategy, which identified China as “one of the major threats to American national security,” reaffirmed US’s iron-clad commitments to its Indo-Pacific treaty allies Australia, Japan, South Korea, the Philippines and Thailand.
“We will continue to modernise these alliances. We reaffirm our unwavering commitment to the defence of Japan under our mutual security treaty, which covers the Senkaku Islands,” it said.
The US, India and several other world powers have been talking about the need to ensure a free, open and thriving Indo-Pacific in the backdrop of China’s rising military manoeuvring in the region.
China claims nearly all of the disputed South China Sea, though Taiwan, the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia and Vietnam all claim parts of it. Beijing has built artificial islands and military installations in the South China Sea.
“We have entered a consequential new period of American foreign policy that will demand more of the US in the Indo-Pacific than has been asked of us since the Second World War,” according to the National Security Strategy document.
“No region will be of more significance to the world and to everyday Americans than the Indo-Pacific”, it said. “We are ambitious because we know that we and our allies and partners hold a common vision for its future.”
The White House said the National Security Strategy outlines how the United States will advance its vital interests and pursue a free, open, prosperous and secure world.
“We will leverage all elements of our national power to outcompete our strategic competitors; tackle shared challenges; and shape the rules of the road,” it said.
On China, it said the US will effectively compete with Beijing, which is the only competitor with both the intent and, increasingly, the capability to reshape the international order, while constraining a “dangerous” Russia.
“Strategic competition is global, but we will avoid the temptation to view the world solely through a competitive lens, and engage countries on their own terms,” it said.
The White House said the US places a premium on growing the connective tissue on technology, trade and security between its democratic allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific and Europe because they recognise that they are mutually reinforcing and the fates of the two regions are intertwined.
“As we deepen our partnerships around the world, we will look for more democracy, not less, to shape the future. We recognise that while autocracy is at its core brittle, democracy’s inherent capacity to transparently course-correct enables resilience and progress,” said the White House about the national security strategy.
“As an Indo-Pacific power, the US has a vital interest in realising a region that is open, interconnected, prosperous, secure and resilient. We are ambitious because we know that we and our allies and partners hold a common vision for the region’s future,” it said.
Does a memorial statue for Radhabinod Pal, the iconic dissenter in the Tokyo war crimes trial, really belong at the Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo?
In a country where spirits of the dead inspire reverence, anxiety, and fear, the matter of holding a state funeral for a former prime minister – post-War Japan’s longest-serving, and one of the most consequential – should not be controversial. Yet the state funeral to be accorded to Shinzo Abe on September 27 has become contentious. Critics accuse the Fumio Kishida government of politicising Abe’s death and disregarding the divisive nature of his legacy.
In India, Abe will be long remembered for his role in bolstering the country’s relations with Japan. It was appropriate for India to observe a day of national mourning at his passing. But Abe’s push for a revisionist rewriting of Japan’s wartime history, which is a major factor in what makes his legacy controversial, runs the risk of implicating India.
It could present a prickly problem for India’s broader interests in Asia, not only vis-à-vis China, but also other countries that Imperial Japan invaded and colonised or occupied. Japan’s imperialistic aspirations may have been partly a function of its quest for parity with European colonial powers. But the atrocities committed by Japan during that period – mostly felt in Asia – were real.
Abe was, of course, instrumental in the founding of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue or Quad – the grouping that brings India together with Japan, Australia, and the US. He first laid out his vision of the Indo-Pacific as a single strategic space in a speech to the Indian parliament in 2007.
Abe didn’t specifically mention the Quad in that speech. He spoke only of a new “broader Asia”, which is “at the confluence of the two seas”, and of the imperative that “democratic nations located at opposite edges of these seas” come together. Abe, however, mentioned an item on his itinerary for that visit, whose significance cannot be overstated.
Abe said to the Indian parliament that he was flying to Kolkata the next morning to meet the son of Justice Radhabinod Pal (1886-1967), the iconic dissenter in the Tokyo war crimes trial. Justice Pal, he said, “is highly respected even today by many Japanese for the noble spirit of courage he exhibited during the International Military Tribunal for the Far East”.
Pal, in fact, rejected the legitimacy and authority of the tribunal. He famously called the majority view an instance of victor’s justice. He took the position that “each and every accused must be found not guilty of each and every one of the charges in the indictment and should be acquitted of all those charges”.
Twenty-eight high-ranking Japanese military and political leaders were tried and 25 of them were found guilty. Seven, including Japan’s wartime prime minister Hideki Tojo, were sentenced to death by hanging, 16 to life imprisonment, and two to lesser terms.
Abe’s extraordinary gesture of respect for this dissenting Indian jurist – six decades after the trial – can only be understood in the context of the history wars that have riven Japan domestically, and in its relations with countries in East Asia.
Nariaki Nakazato is a distinguished Japanese historian of South Asia, especially of colonial Bengal. His 2016 book on Pal’s dissent Neonationalist Mythology in Postwar Japan provides important insights on this issue. The mythologizing of Pal in Japan didn’t happen spontaneously; a section of the Japan’s conservative and pro-military elite created and propagated the “Pal myth”.
When the Tokyo trial verdicts were announced, the Japanese public accepted them quite readily. Pal’s dissent didn’t generate much interest. Most people thought their leaders had led them to a reckless war that caused them extreme distress and hardship; they deserved punishment.
Only those convicted or accused of war crimes and their supporters treated Pal’s dissent as an exoneration. Before going to the gallows, Tojo left a haiku written in Pal’s honour with his wife. Conservative and right-wing politicians, intent on restoring the dignity of Imperial Japan, says Nakazato, seized on Pal’s dissent as vindication of the view that the Japanese fought a just war for self-defense and the liberation of Asia, not an aggressive war for which it bears political and moral responsibility.
By the 1990s, Pal became a symbol of an ascendant neonationalism in Japan. His dissent came to be cited by polemical neonationalists, who draw upon its authority to criticise the Tokyo trial.
In 2005, a monument dedicated to Pal was installed at Tokyo’s Yasukuni Shrine that honours the nation’s military war dead. The monument has a photograph of Pal magnified many times, and a silver plaque with an engraved inscription of four key lines from his dissent. In effect, Pal was accorded canonical status in the “Yasukuni view of history” that challenges what is pejoratively called the “Tokyo-trial view”. The Pal monument sits between the Yasukuni Shrine and the Yushukan, Japan’s military history and war museum.
In 1978, the souls of 14 convicted war criminals including Japan’s wartime leader Hideki Tojo and Iwane Matsui, who ordered the Nanjing Massacre of 1937, were quietly enshrined at Yasukuni. Visits to the shrine by serving Japanese prime ministers, which includes Abe, have since become a great source of regional outrage.
Remarkably, the Pal monument at Yasukuni was inaugurated during the 60th anniversary year of the end of the Second World War. That was a time when Japan’s post-war pacifism came under growing pressure from neo-conservatives like Abe; and Japan’s history problem – the perception that Japan has not shown enough contrition for its imperial excesses – had escalated to a new level.
Fortunately, the monument in Yasukuni – the ultimate appropriation of Pal by Japan’s war revisionists – is not the only memorial for Pal in Japan. There is, for instance, a stone monument dedicated to the memory of Pal and Yasuburo Shimonaka – educator, publisher, World Federalist, and a friend of Pal – on the shore of Lake Ashinoko in Hakane near Tokyo. On it is inscribed a humanist verse written in Bengali in Pal’s own hand, “Sobar upare manush satya, tahar upare nai (Man is the ultimate truth, there is nothing above man)”, which is attributed to the fifteenth century Bengali poet Chandidas.
Does a memorial statue for Pal really belong in Yasukuni?
For a region that supposedly lies at the “heart” of India’s foreign and security policy, the absence of Indian defence ministerial representation at the annual Singapore meeting was inexplicable.
Asia’s link to the war in Ukraine, US-China tensions and maritime security were the highlights of Asia’s just-concluded (June 10-12) premier defence and security summit, the Shangri-La dialogue, amidst the notable absence of an Indian political narrative on the Indo-Pacific region.
The annual dialogue, named after the Singapore hotel at which it is held, is organised by the leading London-headquartered global strategic studies think tank, the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), where I am a senior staff member. This dialogue, held after a hiatus of two years due to COVID-19, brought together 32 defence ministers of the Indo-Pacific region along with military chiefs, diplomats, influential experts, commentators and defence-industry executives from 40 countries. During the dialogue, the US and Chinese defence ministers met ‘in person’ for the first time; and the IISS was asked to facilitate 127 bilateral meetings among official delegates.
The consequences of the Ukraine war are being felt around the world, including the loss of lives, oil and fertiliser price rises, food shortages, supply chain shocks and inflationary pressures; exacerbating economic pressures from the ongoing pandemic.
Delivering the keynote address, Japanese prime minister Kishida Fumio reiterated his view that “Ukraine today may be East Asia tomorrow” in the event the rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific was illegally flouted as in the case of Ukraine by Russia. His remarks were directed towards the possibility of an attack on Taiwan by China, although neither country was named.
Japan’s Prime Minister Fumio Kishida delivers the keynote address at the opening dinner of the 19th Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, June 10, 2022. Photo: Reuters/Caroline Chia
Strongly condemning Russia’s aggression and violations of the UN Charter, he advocated strong sanctions against Russia to demonstrate visible consequences for its aggression against Ukraine. This may have been due to concerns in some quarters in Asia that Chinese president Xi Jinping may have interpreted US President Joe Biden’s decision not to intervene directly in the Ukraine war as a signal that Washington would not defend Taipei.
The new French defence minister, Sebastien Lecornu, pointedly noted that the “problems of the Indo-Pacific are problems of France”, seemingly countering an official Indian viewpoint that ‘Europe’s problems were the world’s problems; but the world’s problems were not Europe’s problems’.
For the first time, a virtual interaction took place with a special address by the president of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelensky, who said that “preventive sanctions” should have taken place against Russia before the war began. Its meaning was not lost on the delegates in relation to Taiwan. There were no Russian participants at this year’s Shangri-La dialogue.
Clearly, aware of some regional concerns over the US commitment to Taiwan, US defence secretary Lloyd J. Austin III emphasised that the US would uphold a rules-based international order and defend its interests in the region “without flinching”. Emphasising US commitment to a ‘one-China’ policy and denying support towards an independent Taiwan, he sharply criticised China’s “more coercive and aggressive approach” to its territorial claims in the Indo-Pacific and “tensions with neighbours”. But, Austin maintained that lines of communication were open with China’s defence leaders.
In response, China’s state counsellor and minister of national defence General Wei Fenghe rejected American “threats against China” noting that China would “counter-attack if attacked” and “would not hesitate to fight back and defeat the aggressor”. In a tone not heard before in the Shangri-La dialogue series, he noted that China “would fight to the very end” to prevent the independence of “China’s Taiwan”; while maintaining that “no one can stop” the re-unification of Taiwan.
China’s state councilor and defence minister General Wei Fenghe answers questions from the audience at a plenary session during the 19th Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore June 12, 2022. Photo: Reuters/Caroline Chia
An influential US expert attending the dialogue, Dr Roger Kangas, Dean of the Near East & South Asia (NESA) Centre of the US National Defence University, noted the heightened US-China tensions on display in contrast with the Shangri-La dialogue three years ago, with “different narratives over events and the role they each want to play in the region”.
Although General Wei ignored India in his speech, in response to a query, he blamed India for “frictions along the border”, adding, “We have found a lot of weapons owned by the Indian side, they have also sent people to the Chinese side of the territory.”
There was no official Indian response to counter this view.
In contrast, Austin mentioned India’s border tensions with China and stated that India’s “growing military capabilities can be a stabilising force in the region”. While Austin noted the “historic crisis” caused by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, with consequences that were global, not just in Europe, he emphasised that the Indo-Pacific region lay at “the heart of US grand strategy”.
In response to a query, General Wei characterised China’s ties with Russia as a “partnership, not an alliance” which “will continue to grow”.
On maritime security, a top Indian naval officer, Vice-Admiral Biswajit Dasgupta, chief of the Vishakapatnam-based Eastern Naval Command, admirably articulated India’s adherence to maritime codes of conduct and the importance of crisis communication. This was based on India’s compliance with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) (1982), which laid the foundation for a rules-based international order at sea. He advocated leveraging regional dialogue mechanisms and crisis communication strategies. In response to queries, he indicated improvement in ties with the US Navy and the ‘almost permanent’ presence of the Chinese navy in the Indian through its long-standing anti-piracy missions off the Gulf of Aden. Although China’s presence in the Indian Ocean needed to be watched, it was “not a major challenge” for the Indian Navy, he concluded.
For a region that lies at the “heart” of India’s foreign and security policy, as described by Prime Minister Narendra Modi at the launch of India’s vision for the Indo-Pacific at the IISS Shangri-La dialogue four years ago, the absence of Indian defence ministerial representation was inexplicable. This was perplexing when two days earlier, defence minister Rajnath Singh visited Vietnam to expand bilateral defence engagements and ink a memorandum of understanding on Mutual Logistics Support. More so, when an Indian defence ministerial plenary address at the Shangri-La dialogue would have highlighted India’s leadership role in the Indo-Pacific region at a time when a new, post-COVID world order is emerging. A strategic opportunity for defence diplomacy missed.
Rahul Roy-Chaudhury, senior fellow for South Asia, the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), London.
Dr Toby Dalton, co-director and Senior Fellow of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment, discusses a key document which explains Biden’s China policy and the changing nature of the US alliance structure in the Indo-Pacific.
In this episode of ‘National Security Conversation’, Dr Happymon Jacob speaks with Dr Toby Dalton (Co-Director and Senior Fellow of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment) and discusses the ‘Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States’ document released in February 2022.
Dalton explains President Biden’s China policy and the changing nature of the US alliance structure in the Indo-Pacific. He discusses the convergences and differences between the American and the Indian visions for the Indo-Pacific.
Dalton also explains how US Indo-Pacific strategy can be a holistic approach to contain China’s intention to recenter the international order while shaping the strategic environment in which China operates. He dwells on the possible implications of the ongoing crisis in Europe on the geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific and the lessons regional powers might draw from it.
The discussion came a day after delegation-level talks between foreign secretary Harsh Vardhan Shringla and Victoria Nuland, who is on a three-nation tour of India, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka.
New Delhi: External affairs minister S. Jaishankar on Tuesday said he held a “good discussion” with US Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Victoria Nuland on issues like ways to expand bilateral ties, Indo-Pacific and the Ukraine situation.
The discussion came a day after delegation-level talks between foreign secretary Harsh Vardhan Shringla and Nuland, who is on a three-nation tour of India, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka.
“Pleased to meet @UnderSecStateP. Good discussion on expanding our bilateral cooperation, on South Asia, Indo-Pacific and the Ukraine situation,” Jaishankar tweeted after the meeting.
A statement issued after the Shringla-Nuland talks held under the framework of India-US Foreign Office Consultations (FOC) had said both sides looked forward to the India-US 2+2 ministerial meeting. The 2+2 defence and foreign ministerial talks were originally slated to be held in November.
The top Indian and Chinese leaders haven’t met or even talked to each other on the phone but there have been meetings between the foreign and defence ministers, focussing on resolving the military stand-off.
New Delhi: India on Thursday gave a non-committal response to the announcement by Russia that a trilateral summit with Indian and Chinese leaders was in the offing “in the near future”.
On Wednesday, Russian President Vladimir Putin held a virtual conference with Chinese President Xi Jinping, during which they discussed their growing close ties and opposition to western policies in Indo-Pacific to geo-economic issues.
At a media briefing, Kremlin presidential aide Yury Ushakov said that since the cooperation about the ‘Russia-India-China’ format came up, the two leaders “agreed to continue exchanging opinions in this regard and to endeavour to hold the next summit within the RIC framework in the near future”.
The possibility of a RIC summit has significance since there has been no meeting between the top leadership of India and China at the highest level since the second informal summit in October 2019.
There has been no summit-level meeting between the Indian and Chinese leaders, either in-person or virtual, with the armies of both sides continuing to be in a stand-off since May 2020. They have, however, participated in multilateral summits like the G-20 and SCO meetings.
While the top leaders haven’t met or even talked to each other on the phone, there have been meetings between the foreign and defence ministers, focussing on resolving the stand-off.
A day after the Russian announcement, India’s Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) gave a measured reaction, which didn’t confirm or deny the prospect of a RIC summit.
In answer to a question, MEA spokesperson Arindam Bagchi first recalled that there had been a virtual meeting of the RIC foreign ministers on November 26. “Beyond that, I have not got any specific development to share with you,” he added.
To another query if Russia wants to be a “peacemaker” between India and China, he answered, “We have very good relations with Russia, and categorising them as that is not something I am comfortable with.”
The Russian president had visited India on December 6 to take part in the first annual bilateral summit in two years.
According to Putin’s aide, the Russian president “informed Xi Jinping about the visit to New Delhi on December 6 in this context”, referring to the RIC cooperation and possibility of a summit soon.
The three leaders had previously met in a trilateral format on the sidelines of the G-20 summit in Osaka.
