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Bhutan National Elections: Voters Go to Polls With More Choice and Economy on Their Minds

Bhutan is the youngest democracy in South Asia, having transitioned from a monarchy to a parliamentary system in 2008. On Thursday, 496,836 voters are eligible to cast their votes to elect candidates to the 47 seats of the fourth parliament.

New Delhi: Bhutan will go to elections on Thursday for the fourth time after the erstwhile Himalayan kingdom transitioned to democracy, featuring the largest-ever field of five political parties, with economic issues taking centre stage.

Bhutan is the youngest democracy in South Asia, having transitioned from a monarchy to a parliamentary system in 2008. It has gone through three general elections, each of them having seen the incumbent defeated and a new party given the chance to helm the government.

On November 30, 496,836 voters are eligible to cast their votes to elect their candidates to the 47 seats of the fourth parliament. The number of registered voters has increased by around 56% since the first parliamentary elections, fifteen years ago. The voters would be going to the polls after a black-out period of 48 hours following the end of campaigning.

Bhutan’s constitution proscribes a two-tier system of National Assembly election. While all registered parties can take part in the primary round on Thursday, the two parties with the highest number of votes will go to the final run-off on January 9.

Who are the main parties?

From just two political parties in 2008, the number of political parties in this election has increased to five.

The two oldest are Druk Phuensum Tshogpa (DPT) and the People’s Democratic Party (PDP), which won the first and second parliamentary elections respectively. The current ruling party is the Druk Nyamrup Tshogpa (DNT), which caused an upset in 2018 by ensuring that the then-incumbent PDP did not even go into the final round of the 2018 elections. It won 30 out of the 47 seats.

The two youngest are the Druk Thuendrel Tshogpa (DTT) and the Bhutan Tendrel Party (BTP), both of which have had to conduct innovative campaigns and branding to capture eyeballs.

What are the main issues in this election?

The Bhutanese elections have had a distinctly calmer flavour which is unlike the frenzied electoral atmosphere of other South Asian polls.

Before the end of the official campaign period, the Office of the Media Arbitrator (OMA) had claimed that it had only identified 13 posts of political parties that potentially discredited their rivals, which was a decrease compared to previous elections. However, a day before polls, four political parties complained to the OMA that the PDP president, former prime minister Tshering Tobgay had circulated a video claiming that the Bhutanese king wanted his party to return to power.

For an outsider, there is not much difference ideologically between the political parties. But, from the manifestos and the televised party debates, it was clear that the economy was at the top of the agenda.

“All parties highlighted reviving peljore (economy), pronounced as Panjo, making it the most talked about during the campaign period, including providing content for social media memes,” noted the Bhutanese paper Kuensel’s editorial on Tuesday.

Incumbent Bhutan Prime Minister Lotay Tshering. Photo: Facebook

What is the state of the economy as Bhutan goes to the polls?

Less than two years into the DNT government, the world went into lockdown. Bhutan had some of the strictest COVID-19 restrictions, completely shutting down its borders to foreigners. It also loosened entry restrictions rather late compared to the rest of the world, opening its tourist industry after a hiatus of more than two years in September 2022.

Despite the opening of borders, Bhutan did not reap the anticipated benefits due to a substantial increase in the tourism levy at the same time. The levy has been partially relaxed recently this year.

The World Bank estimated that Bhutan’s economy would grow by 4% this year, which is lower than the 4.6% logged in 2022-23. However, this estimate is still higher than the previous forecast of 3.1% for the current financial year. The reason given for the upward revision is “in part due to a major salary increase for government workers”, the WB said.

Overall, Bhutan is anticipated to lag behind other small states, with private investment remaining subdued, credit supply constrained due to moratorium on new housing loans and high non-performing loans in the banking sector, according to the World Bank.

The Bhutanese government announced a hike of 55-74% in government salaries in June. This salary boost came against a backdrop of a high rate of attrition among Bhutanese civil servants which has seen a sharp increase in the past two years, with many migrating to foreign shores due to the rising cost of living. As per the Royal Civil Service Commission (RCSC), the attrition rate in 2021-22 was 4.65%, which jumped to 16% in 2022-23.

In general, Bhutanese have migrated in large numbers, especially to Australia, with job generation scarce in non-hydropower sectors and youth unemployment recorded as high as 29% in 2022.

Another worrisome economic indicator is the external debt service ratio which has increased from 5.8% in 2019-20 to 15.1% in 2022-23. More than half of the debt servicing this year will be for the Mangdechhu power plant in Indian rupees.

As per the latest figures of Bhutan’s central bank Royal Monetary Authority, Bhutan’s external reserves reached a low of $467.05 million in September this year, which is near the minimum threshold of $464 million determined by the government to meet the cost of one year’s worth of essential imports.

What are the key indicators for Bhutan elections?

In the 2018 National Assembly election, postal ballots had been decisive in bringing the DNT to power. Despite the ruling PDP securing more votes through electronic voting machines at polling booths, it came in third during the primary round and could not advance to the final run-off. The pivotal factor was the DNT’s advantage in postal ballots, typically cast by civil servants, employees of state enterprises, students, and others who couldn’t vote in their hometowns. More than 36% of the votes cast in the primary and final round of the 2018 polls were through postal ballots. In a few constituencies during those elections, postal ballots surpassed electronic voting machine (EVM) votes.

However, things are being done differently this time. Unlike 2018, there are no facilitation booths available to assist voters who may find the process complex in casting their postal ballots. Additionally, the previous practice of generously distributing postal ballots is now limited exclusively to categories specified in the 2018 law, which are diplomats and officials posted abroad, armed forces, civil servants and students. It leaves out Bhutanese nationals residing in foreign countries, and employees in public enterprises and the private sector.

Concerns have been raised about the potential impact of restrictions on postal ballots on voter turnout in this election compared to previous ones. The highest-ever voter turnout was 79.4% in the 2008 election. It was followed by 71.46% in the final round of the 2018 elections.

There has always been a strong regional polarisation in votes for parties. DPT was known for its strong base in the eastern region, while PDP and DNT had both scored well in the southern and western constituencies in 2018. In the last round of the 2018 polls, PDP’s voters had supported the DNT over its rival DPT, which almost divided the kingdom between the two parties down the middle.

With the two more parties in the fray, there is going to be fragmentation of votes, which may lead to unpredictable results.

Is India a factor in the elections at all?

India is Bhutan’s largest source for development assistance and also the largest trade partner. Bhutan shares borders with only two countries, but it has no official diplomatic relations with China. Therefore, India looms large in Bhutan.

It is often said that India had been a factor in the 2013 elections, as the polls came just after New Delhi ended and then restored the subsidy for cooking gas. It was perceived as a sign of India’s unhappiness with the DPT government, which had made overtures towards China.

The Doklam stand-off took place a year before the 2018 elections, but it did not cast any shadow over the polls with voters focused on economic issues.

In the last year, there has been an acceleration in the border talks between Bhutan and China, after both sides signed an agreement on a “three-step roadmap” to resolve the border.

Despite this, India has not shown public concern and has not taken any actions indicating dissatisfaction with Prime Minister Lotay Tshering’s efforts to resolve the border issue with China.

Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi Bhutan’s foreign minister Tandi Dorji in Beijing on October 23, 2023. Photo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China

Incidentally, among the parties, only the DPT’s manifesto has a specific reference to India in terms of foreign policy. “Throughout all our foreign policy initiatives, our Party will prioritize strengthening our connections with the People and Government of India and maintaining friendly relations with our neighbouring nations,” promised the party.

All of them have proposals for increasing cooperation with India in the hydropower sector and facilitating trade ties, but with also an eye on diversification. The ruling DNT party noted that “our partnership with India will continue to be the cornerstone of our hydropower and energy sector”. “In addition, the projects to build small hydropower projects on our own will be further expanded,” it said.

The newly established DTT party proposed that while “India is our biggest development partner, we also need to explore other partners to meet the volume of investments that we are looking at”. The BTP advocated for the removal of the Sustainable Development Fee for tourists from India at border towns.

Note: A correction was made regarding the regional bases of DPT, PDP and DNT to this article after it was published.

Bhutan PM’s Rare Remarks on China; India’s ‘Soft Power’; Duterte’s Delhi Outburst

A weekly round-up of diplomatic matters that went below the radar.

Every year, Bhutan’s prime minister gets up in the middle of the year to present the annual report of his government to the parliament as stipulated in the constitution. This year, was no different. For Tshering Tobgay, it was his sixth and last ‘state of the union’ speech before the National Assembly is dissolved in August.

With an eye on the elections, the focus of Tobgay’s speech on June 30 was improvement in the economy during the 11th five year plan, which coincided with his tenure.

As expected, the report also dwelled on Bhutan’s foreign policy with the aim of “protecting our sovereignty and security to ensure that we remain independent for all times to comes,” he said.

After the customary reference to excellent relations to India, Tobgay then came to China. India obviously gets multiple mentions in the annual reports due to multi-layered ties, but the current prime minister has also referred to China in five out of six speeches delivered to Bhutanese parliament since 2013. It usually follows a template of a statement about Bhutan’s “warm” relations with China, followed by the latest update on boundary talks.

This formula was also followed this year, but with significant difference.

“Our relations with China, the second largest economy in the world and an emerging global power is increasing and we continue to maintain peaceful and cordial relations,” said Tobgay.

On the border talks, he noted, “24 rounds of boundary discussions have been held so far and both sides are committed to finding a mutually beneficial solution.” This was, of course, the first annual report following the 72-day-long standoff between Indian and Chinese troops on Doklam region claimed by Bhutan in 2017.

Tobgay ended this section with a noteworthy sentence: “The government continues to take a strategic long-term view of our engagement with China to ensure that our national interests are secured.”

This comment on Bhutan-China relations was striking, since mentions about the northern neighbour have been boilerplate in previous speeches.

For example, Tobgay said in 2017 that “relations with China is good” and “boundary talks are proceeding well”. “The 24th round of boundary talks was held in August 2016, followed by an expert group meeting in China in April 2017. The 25th round of boundary talks will be held in Thimphu this year,” he added. Of course, the scheduled 25th round never took place in 2017 with the Doklam crisis rolling out.

Bhutan does not have formal diplomatic relations with any of the permanent five, including China. But, as an immediate neighbour, ties with China have extra sensitivity.

In 2012, India was annoyed when the previous Prime Minister Jigmi Thinley met with the Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao in Rio. Bhutan had denied that Thinley had wished to “forge” diplomatic relations with China at an early date, but there were serious concerns in Delhi.

Tobgay is known to have a good rapport with the Indian government, which has certainly helped New Delhi to be more responsive in issues like demonetisation. This statement may not be a signal to external players, as much as targeted towards the domestic audience.

As the Doklam crisis made clear, there is also a vocal group, which may still be tiny and largely confined to social media, who have been advocating normalising relations with China and reducing dependency on India.

When Tobgay talked about a “strategic long-term view” on engagement with China, he was likely speaking to this small, but vocal constituency within Bhutan. “It is not about what the (Bhutan PM’s) statement actually says. It is more important to look at what led to this sentence being included in the speech. What concerns was it addressing?” asked Omair T. Ahmad, author of a book on Bhutan’s history and politics.

Celebrating Gandhi to project India’s soft power

The annual gathering of Indian ambassadors for three days is the in-house equivalent of foreign policy conferences that dot the Indian capital, but with the advantage of being candid in their discussions as there are no ‘outsiders’ in the room. It is also the time for ambassadors, who have been away from the headquarters for long periods of time and looking for their next prestige posting, to get some attention amidst their peers and seniors with their enthusiastic participation.

Unlike previous editions, there was no separate session which discussed the immediate neighbourhood. Instead, it became clear that the priority for the next year would be projection of India’s ‘soft power’ – with Mahatma Gandhi as the ‘face’ for these efforts.

There was an entire session during the three-day conference on harnessing the 150th birth anniversary of Gandhi worldwide. The government has already set up a national committee on the commemoration which would start from October 2 this year and will continue till 2020.

Among the suggestions thrown up during the discussions included the release of thousands of balloons across the planet on October 2. There was also a proposal to hold ‘charkha talks’ along the line of Ted Talks, but with a Gandhian bent of mind. No decision has so far been taken on the final shape of events that missions will have to undertake over the next two years.

The annual Heads of Mission conference. Credit: Raveesh Kumar/Twitter

On the last day, Prime Minister Narendra Modi set the tone on foreign policy priorities by putting an emphasis on soft power. He talked about India being the “thought leader” in the international community,

Modi also flattered the phalanx of Indian diplomats by telling them that the Ministry of External Affairs was the only ministry which had not courted any significant controversy. He also praised the external affairs minister Sushma Swaraj. His speech was on July 2, when the social media storm over a passport for an inter-faith couple was at its height, especially after Swaraj had highlighted the abusive tweets directed at her.

Earlier during the conference, there was a session on the Indian Ocean region, where discussants noted the idea of a networked maritime geography was “our concept”. There was a stress on Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), but there was still ambiguity about the ‘Quad’. While India had to look at Indian Ocean in an integrated fashion, there was also awareness that particular sections had their own dynamics. A side discussion on whether it would be beneficial to consider the Arabian Sea as part of the Indo-Pacific was also held.

During a session on the duality in the great power structure, quite a few Indian ambassadors were sceptical that the world had become bipolar. With China on their mind, the Belt and Road initiative (BRI) was not too far. India, obviously, has one of the strongest positions on China’s BRI, but there were also enough views in the hall at Pravasi Bharatiya Kendra that India had to find a way to work with Beijing and not box themselves in a way that there was not much room to navigate.

Monsoon effect on return of Indian gift to Maldives

The two Advanced Light Helicopter will not be back in India in a hurry. Maldives had asked India to take them back by end of June. But, despite the end of the ‘deadline’ and some media reports of imminent return of choppers, New Delhi is waiting for Maldives to take the next step.

“This was a gift from us on Maldives’ suggestion. They are asking us to take it back, but the timing has to be right for us to take it back also. Would you jump and go straight to someone’s house just because they asked to take back a gift?” said a source.

India has a plausible reason to keep the two choppers in Maldives. Because of their short flight range, the two helicopters have to be transported by ships to the Indian mainland. “The sea is very choppy from July to October. Not sure if there will be a weather window to get them out”.

Maldives has to still to extend the visas of the Indian crew which expired last month.

India had promised to deliver a Dornier, but the paperwork is still to be completed.

On the other hand, India and Maldives held a joint staff meeting last month, where the whole gamut of defence ties was discussed, especially training.

Duterte’s outburst in Delhi

Filipino president Rodrigo Duterte has garnered a reputation of being ‘soft’ on China, largely based on his initial policy of not pursuing Philippines’s legal victory on South China sea at the Permanent Court of Arbitration. But, for many diplomats and observers, Duterte’s policy is more pragmatic, rather than being pro-China.

Chinese President Xi Jinping (R) shakes hands with Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte. REUTERS/Etienne Oliveau/Files

In fact, Duterte had surprised his host and fellow guests at the Asean-India commemorative summit by not following the tight script during such protocol-heavy events and expressing his ‘true feelings’ about the Asian giant at the closed-door plenary on January 25.

Just like other leaders at the summit, he read out a written statement. But, once he finished, Duterte said while the written speech was what his diplomats wanted him to say, now he could really tell what he felt about the current regional situation. For the next six minutes or so, Duterte went off the script to talk about how China’s aggressiveness was a major threat and concern, according to sources who are in know about the contents of the meeting. The Filipino leader made his candid remarks on China despite being aware that a couple of South-east Asian close friends of Beijing were also sitting at the round table. Therefore, New Delhi does not certainly believe that Philippines is in the same category of ASEAN members with pro-china policy such as Cambodia.