Author: S.D. Muni

Read: In Memoir, Ex-Envoy Says Modi, Yogi May Have Supported Nepal’s Return to Monarchy

‘Dr Shah once bragged that the Indian establishment, under the Narendra Modi regime, had assured the King that monarchy and Hinduism represent two faces of the same coin that India would support in Nepal.’

Below is an excerpt from Dabbling in Diplomacy – Authorised & Otherwise: Recollections of a Non-Career Diplomat by S.D. Muni.

I was also active, in different ways, in opposing the King’s move and supporting the ‘Peoples’ Movement’ led by the Maoists and the SPA [Seven Party Alliance]. I spoke at several conferences and meetings, wrote opinion pieces in Indian newspapers and appeared on various TV news channels to speak in favour of the ‘Peoples’ Movement’.

In ORF [Observer Research Foundation] we organised a meeting which was participated by M.K. Rasgotra and Professor Lok Raj Baral (who was on a short visit to India) soon after the King’s takeover in February 2005. Professor Baral was detained and harassed on his return to Nepal for his statement at the ORF meeting.

The Nepal embassy in New Delhi was also active in propagating the legitimacy of the King’s coup and securing public support for him. I participated in two conferences organised by them, one at the India International Centre (IIC) and another at the Constitution Club.

S.D. Muni Dabbling in Diplomacy Konark Publishers (February 2024)

In the IIC meeting, the King’s foreign minister Ramesh Nath Pandey’s son, Nishchal Nath Pandey, who was also the director of Nepal’s Foreign Service Institute, vigorously pleaded that the King would be able to finish the Maoist insurgency within six months with an enlarged and well-equipped RNA [Royal Nepal Army]. I strongly rebutted his arguments by referring to the past record of RNA in dealing with the Maoists.

In the Constitution Club meeting, I said that the best way for the King to resolve Nepal’s political crisis was not through direct rule but abdication of his throne. If he wants to be politically relevant and active in the years to come, he should form his own political party, and contest elections. I was confident that he will win popular support as many old princely rulers had done in India.

The King had detained all the major political party leaders when he took direct control of the government. Girija Babu called me from his house arrest in Kathmandu asking me to do something in Delhi to get him released. I was in Mumbai for my periodic lecture at the Naval War College. I telephoned my contacts in MEA [Ministry of External Affairs] requesting them to extend whatever help they could.

On my return from Mumbai, I was invited to a closed-door consultation meeting in MEA called by foreign minister Natwar Singh. Among other invitees were India’s former ambassadors to Nepal, M.K. Rasgotra, K.V. Rajan and Arvind Deo. Issue on the table was to continue or not the pipeline of arms supplies to the King after his takeover.

While most of the other participants were in favour of continuing the supplies, I and Arvind Deo strongly opposed it. I submitted that the King will use these arms against his own people and for suppressing democratic movement.

In support of my argument, I narrated the incident of the 1976 lunch of Mrs Gandhi for then Prince Gyanendra. I did that in the hope that Mrs Gandhi’s reference, suspecting the King’s democratic pretentions, may be found more persuasive by Natwar Singh.

The decision taken a few days later by Government of India was to stop the supplies and force the King to make-up with the mainstream political parties.

During my studies on Nepal, I had hardly any contacts with the Royal Palace. I had known Kumar Khadga Bikram Shah, the son-in-law of the royal family, in his capacity as the executive director of the Centre for Nepal and Asian Studies (CNAS), Tribhuvan University.

I participated in the international seminar on South Asian Security organised by the Centre in 1985. I met him every time I went to Kathmandu after that in his CNAS office but never discussed Nepali politics with him.

Kumar Khadga Bikram Shah, unfortunately, got killed in the royal massacre of 2001.

Kathmandu’s Narayanhiti Palace, the former residence of Nepal’s monarchy. Photo: Antoine 49/Flickr. CC BY NC-ND-2.0.

In the pursuance of my Nepal studies, on a couple of occasions, I had interviewed the then personal secretary to King Birendra, Chiran Shumshere Thapa.

In June 2002, King Gyanendra visited India to garner support for his regime. The Nepal embassy in New Delhi organised a reception for him. I met the King in that reception and asked him if he remembered my meeting him at Mrs Gandhi’s lunch in 1976. He complained that I have not been meeting him during my Kathmandu visits. I promised to do so next time.

I did call the palace secretariat on my next visit to Kathmandu and requested for an audience with the King, giving reference to the exchange of words with His Majesty in New Delhi. The office assured me that they will get back to me, but that never happened.

On another visit to Kathmandu after the King’s direct rule, former foreign minister Ramesh Nath Pandey invited me for lunch at his residence. He described to me in detail how he succeeded in securing arms both from a reluctant India and a responsive China to help the King fight the Maoist insurgency. Details of his diplomatic efforts have been now recorded in his memoir, Kootniti Ra Rajniti (Diplomacy and Politics, Shangri La Books, Kathmandu, 2015).

While leaving after lunch and discussions, he asked me for a favour saying, ‘Please convey a message to foreign minister Natwar Singh that the King will happily accommodate all of India’s economic and security concerns in return for support to his domestic political actions.’ I personally conveyed this message as desired.

Also read: Will Nepal PM’s Upcoming Visit to Beijing Balance Geopolitical Interests for India and China?

One Dr Asarfi Shah used to meet me both in Kathmandu and New Delhi to seek my support for the King. Once in Kathmandu, he organised a special worship (abhishek) by me at the Lord Pashupatinath Temple. During a meeting in my IDSA [Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses] office, Dr Shah once bragged that the Indian establishment, under the Narendra Modi regime, had assured the King that monarchy and Hinduism represent two faces of the same coin that India would support in Nepal.

Questioning the need for additional support, I asked Dr Shah, ‘If that is the case, then why does the King need support from someone like me?’ It is, however, not in my DNA to support autocratic monarchy. I made this stance clear to Dr Shah on every occasion.

In 2017, a retired R&AW [Research and Analysis Wing] officer, whom I knew for many years because of our common Rajasthani origin, invited me for lunch at the Delhi Gymkhana Club. He conveyed that Uttar Pradesh chief minister Yogi Adityanath was keen to get monarchy restored in Nepal and suggested that I support these efforts.

I firmly communicated that he had approached the wrong person for a wrong cause.

S.D. Muni is Professor Emeritus at JNU and former special envoy and ambassador, the government of India. 

The above excerpt has been taken with permission from Konark Press.

Bamboo Architecture: Bali’s Green School Inspires a Global Renaissance

Bali’s Green School founders John and Cynthia Hardy and their daughter Elora inspire Global renaissance of Bamboo.

Bali’s Green School recently celebrated its first decade of educating toddlers through teenagers (and their digital nomad parents) about eco-ethical design and cooperative living.

Set in a village near Ubud, this tropical jungle campus of quirky bamboo pavilions has become a globally influential exhibition of one of this century’s significant architectural trends.

There is a major renaissance in correctly growing, cutting, treating, drying and laminating bamboo so it can be used with confidence for substantial and near-permanent structures. Much of the inspiration for this has come from Green School founders John and Cynthia Hardy and their daughter Elora. Their TED talks and YouTube videos have been widely watched.

Bamboo always has been a basic construction material in tropical latitudes. But generally, it has been used for inexpensive shacks, stalls, fences, scaffolding, and sunscreens. If not treated, bamboo is highly susceptible to fire and naturally degrades within two or three years, because insects and fungi rapidly devour the sugar-and-starch-rich sap inside the canes.

In Bali during the 1990s, Irish-Australian designer Linda Garland pioneered contemporary uses of bamboo. She worked with University of Hamburg scientist Walter Liese to treat bamboo against the ravages of powderpost beetles and turn it into a commercially viable building material.

Also read: ‘Don’t Be a Fossil Fool’: Hundreds Skip School to Protest Climate Change in Delhi

One essential preparation technique is to drill through the centres of the canes with long steel rods, then apply repellent and fire-resistant chemicals. Often this involves a soaking solution that includes borax salt powder. The bamboo is then dried out for several days to weeks.

Technology helps transform practices

Ancient practices in China and Japan remain the gold standard for durable bamboo buildings.

Traditional Japanese rectilinear designs had gable roofs and rooms matching the dimensions of tatami mats.

Some Chinese bridges date back as far as the 10th century AD. Floating villages (bamboo platforms with clusters of huts) supported dozens of families as recently as the 17th century.

In Ecuador, archaeologists found a bamboo funeral chamber carbon-dated to 7500 BC. Ecuadorian bamboo, known as caña de Guayaquil (or Guaya), is exported to Peru, Colombia and other Latin American countries. Here bamboo buildings tend to be weatherproofed by thick coatings of mud. (David Witte has written a thesis on historical and contemporary bamboo buildings in South America)

Today, Bali’s Green School and several associated enterprises, are prominent in a third-millennium movement to build geometrically irregular, often sinuous, structures.

These outré styles obviously have been influenced by the trans-millennial technology revolution in digital modelling and manufacturing. Extremely asymmetrical architecture can now be fabricated precisely with metal, glass and masonry components.

However, the Hardys and their international team of bamboo building experts craft small-scale physical models of their designs. The artisans then copy these models on site at full scale. This manual system need not stop designers from sketching initial concepts on their screens.

What happens at school?

The Green School educates more than 500 students from pre-kindergarten to year 12. It complements standard curriculum subjects with various practical tasks and projects that build healthy and ecological skills and habits. Teachers, and parents co-opted as project leaders and mentors, encourage pupils to design and build specific structures that provide useful amenities for the campus.

One recent middle-school project produced a series of tiny shelters as quiet retreats. Each one is to be occupied by only one child at a time. A campus guide notes that Sir Richard Branson recently climbed into one of these cubby houses, a tiny netted bamboo platform hanging from a tree branch, without upsetting the apparently fragile enclosure.

Also read: From the Embattled Lanes of Srinagar, Two Young Men Have Taught Themselves How to Build Robots

Elora Hardy’s team at architecture, interior, and landscape design company Ibuku designed and made most of the school’s buildings. They also have created yoga and cooking school pavilions, hotels, houses, restaurant interiors and permaculture gardens around Bali and in some Asian cities.

An affiliated venture also operates Green Camp residential courses for children and their parents visiting for one to 11 days. Their meals are cooked with vegetables grown at the Hardys’ Kul Kul permaculture farm.

Another family venture, Bamboo U, led by Orin Hardy, provides hands-on training for potential builders. The courses cover bamboo selection (different uses of seven preferred Balinese species), treatment, building design, modelling and on-site fabrication, including professionals from Ibuku as teachers.

A global embracing of bamboo

During the Green School’s first decade, a new generation of studios led by young Asian architects gained prominence and international awards for their creativity with bamboo.

They include: Vo Trong Nghia (VTNA) and H&P Architects in Vietnam; Nattapon Klinsuwan (NKWD), Chiangmai Life Architects and Bambooroo in Thailand; Abin Design Studio and Mansaram Architects in India; Bambu Art in Bali; Atelier Sacha Cotture in the Philippines; HWCD, Penda (Chris Precht) and Li Xiaodong in China; and William Lim (CL3) in Hong Kong.

And some long-established, internationally renowned architecture firms have completed projects with significant uses of bamboo. They include Japanese architects Kengo Kuma, Arata Isozaki and Shigeru Ban, London-based Foster + Partners and Italy’s Renzo Piano.

Many bamboo buildings today include timber or concrete slab floors because these can be laid consistently flat. But researchers at Empa, the Swiss Materials Research Academy, have developed highly durable and temperature-inert floor and deck boards made with a composite of bamboo fibers and resin. These prototype boards are being tested in one of the Vision Wood student apartment modules slotted into Empa’s NEST testing facility at Dübendorf.

Meanwhile, the Green School is expanding from Bali. An associate campus opens next year on the west coast of New Zealand’s North Island – where bamboo is not naturally grown or legally used as an architectural material. Instead, the Taranaki school will build aerial classrooms – pods on poles – using various local species of pine.

Davina Jackson is Honorary Academic at School of Architecture, University of Kent

Featured image credit: Twitter
The Conversation

The Sri Lankan Crisis Has Been a Long Time Coming

Differences between Sirisena and Wickremesinghe may explain part of the crisis, the real cause in the rise of a nativist Sri Lankan leadership embodied by the president.

In a shock move on October 26, President Maithripala Sirisena of Sri Lanka dismissed the prime minister of the country, Ranil Wickremesinghe, and appointed in his place a former nemesis – Mahinda Rajapaksa.

Two weeks later, President Sirisena dismissed the parliament and announced new elections early next year.

Both moves are in violation of the 19th Amendment of the Sri Lankan constitution, which was adopted in April 2015, soon after the Sirisena-Wickremesinghe coalition came to power, and on Tuesday the country’s Supreme Court pulled the plug on them. That particular amendment was an initiative of Sirisena himself – designed to curb the powers of the president, which had been grossly abused by none other than Rajapaksa.

Sirisena dissolved the parliament on November 9 out of desperation. Together, Sirisena and his new prime minister control 97 legislators in a house of 225. A delay in convening parliament was meant to help them cobble together a majority – but they could only take their tally to 105.

Sirisena even lobbied with the Tamils and other smaller parties, but in vain. The Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna and the Tamil National Alliance refused to endorse the so-called ‘constitutional coup’.

The conflict between Sirisena and Wickremesinghe

Sri Lanka’s crisis has been brewing for a long time. In January 2017, Sirisena appointed a presidential commission to investigate the Central Bank Bond scam, which implicated Prime Minister Wickremesinghe and his close associates. In April 2018, Sirisena promised to support a vote of no-confidence against the prime minister moved by the Joint Opposition led by Rajapaksa, only to dither at the eleventh hour.

The Sirisena-Wickremesinghe conflict has generally been explained on three counts:

  1. The fundamental ideological incompatibility between Sirisena’s Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) and the Wickremesingh’s United National Party (UNP);
  2. The working style of Prime Minister Wickremesinghe;
  3. External factors.

The SLFP and the UNP have been rivals for six decades. In spite of harbouring sharp differences on issues of language, ethnicity, development strategy and foreign policy, they joined hands in 2015 – primarily to oust Rajapaksa. Upon his defeat, both the UNP and the SLFP leadership consolidated their respective constituencies for future electoral battles. This spirit of coalition waned, and its promises of good governance was the casualty – rendering the government very unpopular.

Also read: Explained: The Constitutional Crisis in Sri LankaConsensual decision-making also began to fail. Sirisena has since complained that the prime minister did not inform him about decisions. He underlined this in his address to the nation on October 29, after sacking Wickremesinghe:

“Once in the Government, Mr. Wickrermesingeh arrogantly and stubbornly avoided collective decisions and tended to take individual decisions. This behaviour led to many conflicts… When many senior leaders were around, I have suggested to him to work together and work collectively… However, he ignored.”

In a cabinet meeting prior to Wickremesinghe’s dismissal, Sirisena also blamed the prime minister for not investigating conspiracies aimed at assassinating him. India’s intelligence agency, R&AW was also dragged into this conspiracy though this was publicly denied subsequently.

Maithripala Sirisena with Ranil Wickremesinghe. Credit: Reuters

The Sirisena-Wickremesinghe government was also under pressure from the international community. The US, UK and the EU have been pushing the government to establish accountability for the military victory over LTTE under Rajapaksa that caused severe human rights violations in 2009.

These violations involved the killing of thousands of innocent Tamils, hundreds of disappearances and responsibility for countless acts of repression. Resolutions adopted at the Geneva Human Rights Commission list specific mechanisms to establish accountability. While Wickremesinghe has been soft on implementing these resolutions, Sirisena also has reservations and does not want to hurt Sinhala sentiments or offend the army and other security establishments.

Also read: Srisena’s Assaults on Democracy Make a Mockery of Parliamentary SystemInternational pressures

Regarding international pressures, Sri Lanka is home to a deepening strategic competition between China on the one hand and India and the West on the other. China’s expanding economic and strategic presence in Sri Lanka is a matter of concern to India and many others. Many Indian projects have faced delays in clearance and slowdown in implementation. For instance, the Economic and Technical Cooperation Agreement still awaits finalisation.

On the question of Colombo Ports Eastern Container Terminal, there appear to be serious differences between President Sirisena and Wickremesinghe. Sirisena reportedly told Prime Minister Narendra Modi at the Kathmandu BIMSTEC summit in August 2018, that he was not aware of Wickremesinghe’s offer of this project to India, indicating that he does not want to relinquish such national assets to foreign interests. Curiously, he has not taken this position on any of the projects given to China.

While the ideological differences between the SLFP and the UNP, working styles of the two leaders, coupled with the roles of India, China and the international community may explain part of the present Sri Lankan crisis, the real reason lies somewhere else – in the rise of a new, native Sri Lankan leadership embodied in President Sirisena.

While being aware that he is the longest serving Secretary General of the SLFF, Sirisena always felt that he was not given his due. Sometime around 2010, Rajapaksa assured Sirisena on a campaign trail that after winning, he would make him his prime minister. That never happened.

Sirisena’s hidden ambition was harnessed when Chandrika and Wickremesinghe offered him the presidential reigns of the anti-Rajapaksa coalition in 2014. After winning the presidency in 2015, he committed himself to only one term but soon changed his mind. The growing unpopularity of the Unity Government and Wickremesinghe’s behaviour led him to believe that he would not be able to win again in this coalition.

Mahinda Rajapaksa. Credit: Reuters/Dinuka Liyanawatte

In February 2018, the routing victory of Rajapaksa’s SLPP (Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna) led Sirisena to explore the possibility of an alliance with his former adversary, in the hope of securing a second presidency. Whispers in Colombo do not rule out a deal where Rajapaksa would support him for a second term. This may suit Rajapaksa’s needs as he cannot contest for the third time; his brother Gotabaya has the handicap of having US citizenship (Dual citizenship provision).

Setting the stage for 2019 parliamentary elections

As a prime minister, Rajapaksa can exercise real power and exploit the provisions of the 19th Amendment, keeping Sirisena on the margins, just as Wickremesinghe has allegedly been doing. As a strong prime minister, Rajapaksa can also close many of the criminal and corruption cases pending against him and his family members. Sirisena’s suppressed power ambitions and his consciousness of being marginalised are aggravated by his sense of belonging to a humble social class.

The emerging dimensions of power rivalries in Sri Lankan politics cannot be fully understood without reference to the gradual rise of marginalised social groups against the high caste, westernised Sinhala elites. Its beginning were made in 1956, when SWRD Bandaranaike, even as an upper-caste, anglicised leader, won on the platform of Sinhala Only against the dominance of the English language.

President Premadasa, Rajapaksa and Sirisena belong to this rising leadership from lower social strata, which is not fluent in English. Instead, they are more comfortable wearing traditional Sri Lankan attire, eating the local cuisine and taking pride in their rural background and native Sinhala nationalism. Recall Sirisena’s national address on October 29, when he said,

“I believe that Mr. Wickremesinghe and his group of closest friends [belong] to a privileged class and [do] not understand the pulse of the people”.

Sirisena has made it abundantly clear that he will not reverse his decisions. Elections to parliament can only be stalled if the judiciary intervenes in favour of Wickremesinghe, who has so far not moved to the court. Who knows, maybe the court will eventually let the issue be decided by the ballot.

Also read: The Second Coming of Sri Lanka’s Mahinda RajapaksaSri Lankans, therefore, are prepared for aggressive campaigning in the months ahead. Rajapaksa won local elections on the failure of ‘good governance’, but parliamentary elections will be fought on the issue of the constitutional coup. Sirisena cannot absolve himself from his flawed governance, and Wickremesinghe will present himself as a victim of his president’s ambitions.

India has adopted an ostensibly neutral position. The MEA’s official statement expressed India’s respect for “democratic values and constitutional process”, hinting at disapproval of Sirisena’s actions. Deep down, India may not sympathise with the new alliance. Its native brand of anti-Western nationalism does not resonate. If this alliance holds onto power, it will bank on China as a counterbalance to pressures from India and the West.

S.D. Muni is Professor Emeritus JNU and member, IDSA EC. He was also India’s Special Envoy and Ambassador. Was awarded Sri Lanka Ratna, Sri Lanka’s highest honour for a foreigner in 2005. This article also draws from his visit last month to Colombo under Kalinga International Foundation.

Redefining India-Nepal Engagement Is Easier Said Than Done

India’s attempts to reach out to Oli have been a serious exercise towards course correction in its neighbourhood approach, but is that enough?

Upon his return from India, Nepal’s Prime Minister K.P. Sharma Oli said in Kathmandu that his visit was “significant and fruitful”. The visit was indeed significant as it sought to repair the serious rupture in the relations between the two neighbours since 2015.

It was also fruitful on all visible counts. India relaxed all protocols to send home minister Rajnath Singh to receive Oli at the airport. This was just short of Prime Minister Narendra Modi himself going there, as Manmohan Singh did in June 2006 when he welcomed then Nepali Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala.

Koirala had been put up in a hotel; Oli, on the other hand, was accommodated in the Rashtrapati Bhavan and offered a ceremonial guard of honour. He was also awarded an honorary doctorate degree by the Pantnagar Agricultural University. A long-pending proposal on linking Kathmandu with Raxaul through an electric rail track was inked and a new link, what Modi referred to as “Sagarmatha (Mount Everest) with the sagar (Indian Ocean)” through waterways was also promised this time around.

Oli also had a somewhat unscheduled, hour-long one-on-one discussions with Modi prior to official delegation-level talks. While the content of the meeting remains unknown, the Nepali side officially accepted that the discussion were serious and “any misunderstandings have already been eliminated”.

The explicit intent of Oli’s visit has been to redefine his country’s engagement with India. He said, “Nepal wants to develop a relationship with India and our neighbours (read China and Nepal) in line with the changing times in this 21st century”. The basis of this relationship, as Oli succeeded in spelling out in the joint statement issued on April 7, should be based on “equality, mutual trust, respect and benefit”. In his view, such a relationship could only develop through “friendship and trust” and not through treaties or/and agreements.

Throughout the discussions between Indian and Nepali interlocutors, the much-flaunted phrase of  ‘special relations between the two countries’ was not even uttered. Nor did the Nepali side come up with reassuring words when Modi said, “India and Nepal have close and deep connection on the matters of defence and security. We both agree to prevent the abuse of our open border, and to pursue our shared security interests.”

Oli discarded the widespread notion of Nepal’s dependence on India. He repeatedly underlined the importance of sovereignty, equality, non-interference and interdependence in Nepal’s dealings with India. Replying to Modi at the joint press conference after delegation level talks, Oli said: “Our countries…have many things to offer to each other. Interdependence takes many forms between our countries”. His foreign minister, on the eve of his visit to Delhi, had even calculated the amount of remittances that the Indian workers in Nepal send back home, without even referring to the reciprocal advantage accruing to Nepal from many more millions of the Nepalese residing and employed in India.

Oli left no one in India in any doubt that he had come to talk tough. He told Modi at the joint press conference, “I remember sharing this podium with Modiji two years ago. Since then, Nepal has experienced great transformation.”

The transformation he was referring to was the adoption of a new constitution, the defiance of India’s advise of accommodating the Madhes aspirations, the massive electoral victory for the Left Alliance forged under his leadership and the rise of China in Asia. His strongest political constituency is the rise of new Nepali nationalism under his leadership that seeks identity and comfort in asserting itself against India.

He is also backed by China’s generous economic support for infrastructure development in Nepal under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which India can never match in quantum and speed, as well as strong political support for the newly-forged Communist alliance. China’s support to Nepal, besides being an expression of the so-called neighbourly love, is an integral part of its strategic expansion in South Asia and the Indian Ocean.

Nepalese Prime Minister Khadga Prasad Oli inspects the guard of honour during his ceremonial reception at the forecourt of Rashtrapati Bhavan in New Delhi. Credit: PTI

Oli’s assertion vis-à-vis India is to a great extent his emotional outburst in relation to his felt sense of hurt and humiliation by India. This was clearly evident in Oli’s address at the civic reception organised by the India Foundation where he recounted nearlt all of his complaints against India. While intervening in Nepal’s constitutional process and deploying economic coercion, India had also been seen as obstructing Oli’s personal access to power.

After the adoption of Nepali constitution, India prompted and supported the then prime minister and Nepali Congress leader Sushil Koirala to contest in October 2015 against Oli to deny him a pre-agreed prime ministership. Then, in July 2016, India welcomed the defection of the Maoist leader Pushpa Kamal Dahal ‘Prachanda’ to become prime minister with the Nepali Congress support by toppling Oli’s government. In the December 2017 elections, India’s sympathies and support clearly lay with the forces pitted against the Oli-led Left coalition. It may not be too far off the point that Oli is asking for India’s trust and confidence not only for Nepal but in himself and his leadership. He is warning India against interference not only in Nepali affairs but also against him and his politics.

Pushpa Kamal Dahal ‘Prachanda’. Credit: Reuters

India realises that its moves against Oli-led Nepal have been excessive, unwarranted and counterproductive. It is also realising that there is a limit to its muscular and aggressive diplomacy, which has alienated one after another neighbour and been exploited by China to its advantage in South Asia. India’s attempts to reach out to Oli have, therefore, been a serious exercise towards course correction in its neighbourhood approach.

India is also willing to improve its project performance and enhance its economic support to Nepal in this exercise. Modi said publicly that “Both of us have agreed to speed up all possible connectivity projects, be it an oil pipeline, or integrated check posts, or the Terai roads”. However, it remains to be seen as to what extent India will succeed in delivering these projects expeditiously.

Modi’s promise of 2014 on connectivity hardly moved on the ground over the past four years, despite assurances of efficiency. Oli underlined this gap in his civic address. On the Kathmandu rail link project, first document has been signed only now, though the project proposal has been under discussion for over a decade. India will take a year to survey the project, then only will the two sides sit down to firm up the Indian commitment in terms of financial allocations and the timeline. Nepal wants this project to be completed in five years, but India is not ready to commit.

It may not come as a surprise to the Nepalese if China lays down the Kathmandu-Tibet rail link as promised by 2022, much before India makes a visible progress on the ground in its competing rail project. If India can establish smaller rail and road links and complete the petroleum pipeline project efficiently, much against its past record of delivery, its political standing in Nepal may surely improve. The project delays are not always and entirely politically driven. Real hurdles also come from lack of financial commitments, proper coordination amongst various Indian departments and agencies involved, and India’s diplomatic style. One wonders if there will be appropriate and early efforts to remove them.

But these changes may in no way suggest that India is prepared and willing to radically redefine its approach towards Nepal. India’s political security concerns were politely, gently, but firmly conveyed to Oli. Recall Modi’s references to security interests, abuse of open borders and “inclusive” democratic and federal order (reflective of Madhes concerns). A great deal of India’s response to Nepal in the coming months would depend upon the extent to which Oli will be able to moderate his dependence on the two most powerful sources of his political support, namely the India-assertive nationalist constituency and China.

In Delhi, Oli gave no indication of softening on these two counts. When asked about India’s apprehension on Chinese BRI, Oli said: “I think we are neutral. We are in centre between the two countries.” No one in Delhi’s strategic establishment wants to see Nepal at an equidistance between India and China. Even before coming to India, Oli had asked for equidistance between India and China and went to the extent to say that he would leverage his China policy to extract a better deal from India. China’s growing financial and political investments in Nepal behind Oli’s leadership may not even let Oli revisit his present foreign policy profile and priorities.

If Oli’s power permutations do not change in response to India’s sensitivities, there is no reason to assume that India will let its engagement with Nepal be redefined to its dislike and disadvantage. While Nepali leadership is charged with rising aspirations and confidence, so is its Indian counterpart, ambitious of playing a larger and assertive role in regional and world affairs. Keeping neighbours in its fold is a necessary precondition for the Indian policymakers with regard to their emerging role perception.

S.D. Muni is professor emeritus at Jawaharlal Nehru University and former special envoy and ambassador, government of India.

With the Left Alliance Now Dominant in Nepal, India Must Reach Out With Positive Agenda

There are strategic planners in the Indian establishment to whom the option of breaking the Left Alliance would come easily. Any such shortsighted move will be a disaster for India’s Nepal policy.

There are strategic planners in the Indian establishment to whom the option of breaking the Left Alliance would come easily. Any such shortsighted move will be a disaster for India’s Nepal policy.

The national flag of Nepal is waved during a mass gathering in Kathmandu. Credit: Reuters/Navesh Chitrakar

The national flag of Nepal is waved during a mass gathering in Kathmandu. Credit: Reuters/Navesh Chitrakar

In the recently concluded elections in Nepal, the Left Alliance of the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist) (UML) and Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist Centre) (MC) – has registered an impressive victory. They may not gain a two-thirds lead as claimed by them during the campaign but have a firm, comfortable majority in the national parliament. They are also a dominant force in six of the seven provincial assemblies.

The elections were held under Nepal’s new constitution adopted in September 2015. These elections will elect 275 members to the House of Representatives (HoR) and 550 representatives to the assemblies of the seven newly-created provinces.

In the parliament, while 165 seats have been filled by direct elections, on the basis of first-past-the-post (FPTP), another 110 will be filled by proportional representation (PR), for which separate ballots were used. At the provincial level, 330 posts have been filled through the FPTP system, and another 220 will be nominated on the PR basis. Both these bodies will have 33% representation of women as mandated by the constitution. Any shortfall in women’s representation – as it is huge under the declared FPTP results – will have to be made up by the political parties through the PR system.

What led to Left Alliance’s victory?

What explains this impressive performance of the Left Alliance, forged just on the eve of elections? In the first place, credit must go to the alliance leaders, K.P. Sharma Oli of the UML and Pushpa Kamal Dahal of the Maoist Centre. Both of them carry a bit of a charisma – they are articulate and effective communicators, have the organisational acumen and are politically agile and manipulative. They were backed by strong organisational support and campaigned for giving Nepali people stability, peace and prosperity.

There were doubts if the cadres of these two communist parties, which have been locked in adversarial conflict and rivalry for years, would support each others’ candidates. The elections results have set such doubts aside.

The victory of the Left Alliance has been greatly facilitated by a weak and directionless opposition put up by the Nepali Congress (NC) led by Sher Bahadur Deuba. There was an attempt by the NC to forge a democratic alliance with the Madhes-based and other non-Communist parties in order to counter the Left Alliance, but this grouping failed to firm up. Considerations of personal egos, political turf and the lack of organisational resilience came in the way, so much so that in some places, Madhes-based leaders not only ended up contesting against the NC but even fought and won on UML tickets. Some ranking Congress leaders like Bimalendra Nidhi were trounced by their rivals like Rajendra Mahto of the Madhes-based Rastriya Janata Party (RJP).

Pushpa Kamal Dahal, known as Prachanda, (left) greets K.P. Sharma Oli. Credit: Reuters

Pushpa Kamal Dahal, known as Prachanda, (left) greets K.P. Sharma Oli. Credit: Reuters

The Nepali Congress also ran a lacklustre campaign. Its main plank was to scare people against the possibility of the Left Alliance imposing a totalitarian state, which did not cut much ice with the Nepali voters. In their assessment, Nepal’s communist parties, barring their alienated extremists factions, have been democratised as they have come to power through ballot in the past and learned to share power and governance with the other democratic parties including the NC and the Madhes parties.

The Nepali Congress said very little about its development agenda for Nepal and even failed to highlight many of its own achievements, such as always being in the forefront of Nepal’s struggle for democracy, ushering in the new constitution and holding all the three constitutionally mandated elections at the local, provincial and parliamentary levels in a short time of 18 months against heavy odds. No wonder that it has ended up with only 23 elected seats at the national level, though they are very close to the UML in PR votes.

The Madhes parties also did not put up a strong electoral showing. Except in province 2, they lost in the other six provinces to the Left Alliance, both at the provincial as well as national level. With the exception of a couple of leaders, most were uninspiring in their campaign. They could not forge firm unity amongst themselves and had two competing formations – the RJP and the Federal Socialist Forum of Nepal led by Upendra Yadav. Yet another important Madhes-based group of the Tharu community led by Bijay Gachhadar even merged with the NC on the eve of the elections. But this helped neither the NC nor the Tharus. Another emerging Madhesi leader, C.K. Raut, boycotted the elections and campaigned for voters to cast negative votes. He has been asking for an independent Madhes. As a result of fragmentation among the Madhes groups, the cause of Madhes accommodation pleaded by them has suffered a loss of political credibility at the national level.

An important aspect of the Nepal election has also been the rout of regressive forces that want Nepal to become a Hindu state under a constitutional monarchy.

This is evident in the miserable failure of the two Rastriya Prajatantra Party factions. All their leaders have lost and their vote count has suffered so severely that they will not be able to secure 3% of the total PR votes required to be recognised as ‘national parties’. Against them, two smaller parties which have also failed in securing ‘national party’ status, have done better. They are Bibeksheel Sajha Party led by Rabindra Mishra and the Naya Shakti Party led by former Maoist Prime Minister Baburam Bhattarai. While the Sajha Party has failed to get elected at the national or provincial level, it has secured nearly two lakh PR votes and stands sixth after the RJP in that order. The Naya Shakti Party has failed to garner much PR votes but has succeeded in sending one representative to parliament and two to the provincial assemblies. Both these new parties stand for a corruption-free and transparent political system and good, people-centric governance.

Nepalis want stability, development

It would be a mistake to read the emergence of the Left Alliance as Nepal’s preference for communism. In their vote for the alliance, Nepali voters have clearly expressed their new nationalism which has three key components – the search for political stability and peace, the demand for fast and comprehensive development and assertion against India.

While it was a monarchy, Nepal was governed as a rentier state without any concern for the well-being of the people. Since the beginning of the 1990s, Nepalis have lived with violence and instability precipitated by the Maoist insurgency.

The successful people’s movement of 2005-06 and the mainstreaming of the Maoists unleashed the hopes and aspirations of ordinary Nepalis for stability and development. These aspirations were, however, belied by the Nepali politicians’ continued power struggle and lack of institutionalisation of democracy due to perennial political instability. Even the reconstruction of earthquake-inflicted destruction was ignored in the midst of political games. Now after the adoption of the new constitution, Nepalis want order, stability and development.

Also read: Eleven Years in the Making, Left Alliance Could Herald New Era of Political Stability in Nepal

The main question before the new Left Alliance government will be to address these aspirations by measuring up to the promises made during the election campaign by the top UML and Maoist leaders. The very first pre-condition for the Left Alliance to perform on its promises is to maintain unity, even if they fail to forge the promised merger of the two parties. A merger may not be easy for the UML and the Maoists as they have serious ideological differences, and divergent political approaches regarding some of the key political and constitutional issues like constitutional amendments for accommodating the remaining Madhes demands, working of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission to complete the peace process, creation of new institutions like the ‘Executive/Effective Presidency’ and working out credible power-sharing arrangements to satisfy their respective cadres.

A man cast his vote on a ballot box during the parliamentary and provincial elections at Chautara in Sindhupalchok District November 26, 2017. Credit: Reuters/Navesh Chitrakar

A man cast his vote on a ballot box during the parliamentary and provincial elections at Chautara in Sindhupalchok District November 26, 2017. Credit: Reuters/Navesh Chitrakar

The Left Alliance is not going to get a two-thirds majority after the PR votes are added and this will force them to take the opposition groups on board for any constitutional change. Both Oli and Prachanda have led governments at different times and under different political arrangements. They are known for efficient power management and political consolidation. They have to desist from the politics of patronage and party/personal control of constitutional and governing institutions they have been apt in pursuing so far.

This is a tall order and time will tell how the Left Alliance conducts itself. Strains in any of these areas can impinge heavily on the unity of the alliance. In the final analysis after the PR vote counting, the UML may not have an absolute majority on its own (The UML has 80 seats and they may need 50 plus more for absolute majority from the PR quota which does nook look possible), prompting the Maoists to look for greener pastures elsewhere if the alliance keeps them uncomfortable as a subordinate partner. The possibility of Oli reaching out to either NC or Madhes-based parties to liberate himself from the Maoists is a rather remote proposition.

Challenges from outside Nepal

Outside the domestic challenge, the Left Alliance also has to cope with Nepal’s two giant neighbours – India and China. The UML under Oli had opened Nepal’s option of cultivating China to diversify its heavy dependence on India in the matters of trade and transit. Prachanda and the Maoists have always looked towards China as a counterbalance to pressures from India. Since the launching of its Belt and Road Initiative, China is also keen to expand its economic engagement and strategic space in Nepal under the excuse of facilitating Oli’s and Prachanda’s developmental agenda. China was looking forward to the victory of the Left Alliance, and is assiduously working to see this alliance turn into a single party to help it carry forward its economic and strategic initiatives in Nepal.

The Left Alliance had objected to the Deuba government’s cancellation of the Budhi Gandaki power project with a Chinese concern and promised to reverse this decision. In pursuing its engagement with China, the Left Alliance may find it prudent to be careful on two counts. One, it should avoid entering into such projects with   China that can lead it into a long-term debt-trap, as has been the case with countries like Sri Lanka, Myanmar, the Maldives, or even Pakistan. Secondly, it may be well advised to steer clear of such projects that may trigger India’s security sensitivities and concerns. Both Oli and Prachanda are intelligent and experienced leaders. They are acutely aware of the structural constraints and avoidable red lines inherent in India-Nepal relations. That is why they have repeatedly and publicly been stating their desire to bring a balance in building co-operative relations with both their northern and southern neighbours. Let us hope they create a new and credible framework of Nepal’s foreign policy to do so.

How India contributed to rise of Left Alliance

If the  victory of theLeft Alliance is seen as bad news in New Delhi, the fact is that India has unwittingly contributed to the rise of both the Left Alliance and the new Nepali nationalism with anti-India undertones. Recall some of the recent developments in India-Nepal relations – Delhi’s brazen diplomatic intervention in Nepal’s constitutional process through the sending of its foreign secretary to halt that process in September 2015; its coercive economic diplomacy to punish Oli for not responding to its constitutional preferences regarding accommodation of Madhesi demands; its blessings for unseating Oli once by supporting Sushil Koirala against him in 2015 and then by encouraging Prachanda to defect and align with the NC in 2016.

Also read: What the Success of the Left Alliance Means for Nepal

All this not only alienated Oli, who had remained a friend of India for several decades, but also infuriated the Nepali people – who bore the brunt of this coercive economic diplomacy. This created conditions for Oli to cleverly exploit Nepali sentiments against India and the Madhes to crystallise an anti-India nationalism and consolidate his power base on it. By opening up the Chinese option in the ‘wake of coercion from India’ he successfully projected his image of being a strong leader who could brave Indian pressures. The election results are a reward for his deft political moves in this respect.

Prachanda with India PM Narendra Modi. Credit: PTI

Prachanda with India PM Narendra Modi. Credit: PTI

India must now to cope with the victory of the Left Alliance and the rise of new Nepali nationalism. There are strategic planners in the Prime Minister’s Office, the external affairs ministry and other parts of the establishment to whom the option of breaking the Left Alliance would come easily. Any such shortsighted move will be a disaster for India’s Nepal policy. If the alliance has to break, it will do so on its own as many of its internal tensions have been identified earlier. There are also political heavyweights within the ruling BJP who want to turn Nepal into a Hindu state and revive its constitutional monarchy for resisting the rise of the communists and China in Nepal. They need to learn from the electoral outcome that the Nepali people have smashed the forces of feudalism and Hindutva.

India, instead of launching down the path of these disastrous adventures, must help the alliance stabilise and give good governance to the Nepali people. India has to take initiatives to firmly demonstrate, not through words but actions, that it is a true friend of the Nepali people and sincerely wants to cooperate in their developmental efforts. It must complete long pending projects in Nepal and initiate new ones that create confidence and goodwill among ordinary Nepalese.

This is not the first time that India has had to deal with a communist regime in Kathmandu. As Nepalis, particularly the communist parties, are keen on revising some of the old agreements and treaties, like the one of 1950 on Peace and Friendship, India must respond with sincereity and ensure that while protecting its core interests, Nepal’s sentiments are also respected. India has done this in case of Bhutan and should do the same for Nepal now. Though the Chinese challenge is becoming formidable for India in its immediate neighbourhood, Indian policymakers must accept that the neighbouring countries’ affection for China is shaped considerably by their alienation from India. Part of the challenge of China in the neighbourhood can be met by India revisiting and recasting some of its own critical policy options towards smaller neighbours.

S.D. Muni is Professor Emeritus at JNU and former special envoy and ambassador, the government of India. 

As Nepal Prepares to Exhale, the Challenges it Faces Remain as Intractable as Ever

As a coalition headed by Prachanda takes charge, settling the remaining constitutional issues and resetting relations with India will be top priority.

As a coalition headed by Prachanda takes charge, settling the remaining constitutional issues and resetting relations with India will be top priority.

UML leader K.P. Oli, who resigned as Nepal's prime minister on Sunday, greets Maoist leader Prachanda after announcing his decision. Credit: Reuters

UML leader K.P. Oli, who resigned as Nepal’s prime minister on Sunday, greets Maoist leader Prachanda after announcing his decision. Credit: Reuters

Sooner or later, Prime Minister K.P. Sharma Oli of Nepal had to go. In his enthusiasm to emerge as a strong hill upper caste nationalist leader, he had ruffled the feathers of all powerful stake holders in Nepal by opening several fronts of confrontation simultaneously. He offended the Nepali Congress (NC) by refusing to accommodate the last-minute constitutional changes proposed by the late Sushil Koirala. The Madhes and Janjati groups saw him as a staunch opponent of their federal aspirations. Maoists found him untrustworthy as he reneged on a gentlemen’s agreement to hand over power to Maoist leader Prachanda after the budget.

Oli was also seen as encouraging his party-backed human rights organisations in their quest to get criminal charges slapped on Maoists leaders for crimes committed during the insurgency period while apparently assuring them that such issues would be dealt with only under a ‘Truth and Reconciliation’ process. The Maoists were also worried that Oli’s party was trying to encroach upon their grassroots support.

Finally, his own colleagues in the Communist Party of Nepal (United Marxist Leninist) (UML) like Madhav Nepal and Jhalanath Khanal criticised him for concentrating power in his hands and governing national and party affairs with the help of a small coterie of loyalists. New Delhi too was upset with Oli for his hyper anti-India nationalism – reminiscent of the royalist days – and his use of the China card to erode India’s traditional strategic space in Nepal.

With Oli gone, Maoist leader Prachanda is now all set to succeed him with the support of the NC.  The process is expected to proceed smoothly, though there are vested interests who may try to mislead President Vidya Bhandari – UML leader and a close Oli associate – and drag the issue of succession to the courts on the pretext of constitutional complexities. But Bhandari is a seasoned politician and understands well the dynamics of democratic transitions.

Broadly speaking, it was the alliance of the Nepali Congress and the Maoists that led Nepal’s grand transition of 2005-2006 from traditional monarchy to republican state. It is now hoped that this coalition would be able to give Nepal some much-needed stability and governance. There are of course strong reservoirs of mutual distrust between the two parties but hopefully – since their break in 2008 on the issues of power sharing when the Maoists backed away from supporting the late Congress leader G.P. Koirala for the presidentship – the past eight years have made them mature and moderate towards each other. The NC and the Maoists are ideologically poles apart but this also means they do not have eyes on each other’s grassroots constituencies. The power-sharing arrangement worked out for the present coalition in the form of nine months leadership for each one of them until the next scheduled elections and division of labour for the electoral schedule – with the Maoists conducting local body elections and the Nepali Congress conducting provincial and national elections –  may work, provided both Prachanda and Sher Bahadur Deuba assert their leadership in their respective parties and manage to keep their flock disciplined.

‘National’ government

There are also strong possibilities of the Maoist-NC coalition growing into a national consensus government. Madhes-based parties have already decided to back this coalition. The Tharu section of the Madhes-based parties, led by Bijoy Gachchadar, has already expressed a desire to join the government. Similarly inclined is the Rastriya Prajatantra Party (RPP) led by Lokendra Bahadur Chand and Pashupati Shumsher, which is planning to unite with the Kamal Thapa faction of the RPP in the coming weeks. There are clear indications that even Oli’s UML may not be averse to joining the new government if the Maoists and the NC come forward. Prachanda has in fact personally expressed his hope of cooperation from the outgoing prime minister. The UML in power may be more amenable to accepting the agenda of the new government than out of power. If the UML joins the government, Nepal may have a broad-based national consensus government. In establishing such a government, the working out of a power-sharing arrangement that satisfies each constituent may pose some difficulties but the ingenuity and resilience of the Nepali politicians have always found a way out of such challenges.

The new government in Nepal faces many fold challenges, the most  difficult of which are those related to  accommodating the demands of the Madhes and Janjati group, and of the Maoists concerning a truth and reconciliation process on the excesses of the insurgency period. While the NC and the Maoists appear to be accommodative towards the Madhes-related issues, the Madhes and Janjati groups will have to become more flexible and accept a layered approach towards their aspirations. Their demands are genuine but Nepal’s tangled political reality can be moulded only gradually. As far as the excesses of the insurgency period are concerned, the Maoists are not the only guilty party; the Nepal army and the government leaders of that time were equally responsible in contributing to human misery through violence and destruction. The victims of such excesses have to be adequately compensated and their psychological wounds healed by the society as a whole, but the ends of transitional justice cannot be met through political witch-hunting or selective criminalisation.

Among the other major challenges facing the new government are relief and rehabilitation of the quake affected areas, and economic development with good governance. For long, the issues related to quake reconstruction and relief have been used to reinforce political fiefdom and patronage. The new leadership will have to rise above this template and show greater efficiency and dedication. Nepal’s developmental and governance issues have also remained mired in corruption and bureaucratic lethargy. It remains to be seen if the new government will be able to make any difference in this respect.

India’s view

India may be rejoicing at Oli’s exit but there is no way New Delhi can be complacent about its Nepal policy. India may hope to turn Nepal away from its recently gained strategic proximity towards China, but that may be easier said than done. The reason is that China is determined to push itself strategically in South Asia and Nepal is a strong component in this approach. China has its well-crafted and attractive Belt and Road Initiative and it has the political will and economic muscle to back it to the hilt. If India itself is looking for Chinese investments, how can it dissuade any of its neighbours from welcoming tempting Chinese offers? Indian policy makers must learn from their recent experience in Sri Lanka where they tried their best to get the Chinese out of the Colombo Port City project but could not succeed. Even a substantial redefining of the project could not be achieved. For meeting the emerging Chinese challenge in South Asia, India has to improve its own delivery deficit and overall approach towards the issues of political transition in the neighbourhood. When India alienates its neighbours through its flip-flop approach, it can’t expect that China or any other country will not cash in on its lapses. Nepal is no exception. We have a new Nepal, a young and acutely self-conscious Nepal, an aspiring and ambitious Nepal. India cannot approach this Nepal with a ‘business as usual’ mind set.

Besides the bilateral dynamics of relations, India must speak with one voice on the unfolding issues of political transition in Nepal. For long, different stake holders in India have been speaking in divergent and even conflicting voices, thus keeping Nepal confused on what New Delhi really expects out of it. It would be counterproductive to mix up the issues of inclusive democracy and the rights of the Madhesis with the current ruling party’s agenda (or at least sections of it) of a Hindu state and revival of the monarchy. Nepal is itching to redefine the nature of its engagement with India and India must encourage Nepal to present a credible blue print of the aspired changed relationship in a manner that does not hurt India’s core security and developmental interests in Nepal. India has already done so in the case of Bhutan, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. The similar challenge in Nepal has to be met resolutely.

S.D. Muni is Professor Emeritus, JNU; Distinguished Fellow, IDSA, and a former Indian ambassador and special envoy of the Government of India

We Haven’t Seen the Last of Nepal’s Unfolding Internal Political Contradictions

India will continue to be affected by the spill-over of internal turbulence in Nepal. India’s challenge is also becoming more formidable with the emergence of China as an assertive competitor for greater economic and strategic space in the sensitive Himalayan region.

India will continue to be affected by the spill-over of internal turbulence in Nepal. India’s challenge is also becoming more formidable with the emergence of China as an assertive competitor for greater economic and strategic space in the sensitive Himalayan region.

Nepali Maoist leader Pushp Kumar Dahal 'Prachanda' and Prime Minister K.P. Oli. Credit: Reuters

I can give you a bit more time: Nepali Maoist leader Pushpa Kamal Dahal ‘Prachanda’ and Prime Minister K.P. Oli. Credit: Reuters

The Oli government in Nepal has barely saved itself from collapse. On May 4, 2016, one of its major coalition partners, Pushpa Kamal Dahal ‘Prachanda’, the Unified Nepal Communist Party (Maoist) leader, decided to withdraw support and join the main opposition party, the Nepali Congress (NC) in a new government of national consensus. It took Prime Minister K.P. Oli and his colleagues in the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist Leninist), or UML, a couple of days of intense bargaining to dissuade him from breaking the Left-dominated coalition.

The crisis was precipitated by the internal contradictions of the Oli government. The prime minister is clearly in conflict with Nepal’s three key political players – the opposition NC, which lost the race to the prime ministership in October 2015; the Madhes and Janjati groups, on the question of constitutional accommodation; and its major coalition partner, the
Maoists. Even within the UML, there are leadership rivalries. Senior leader Madhav Nepal has blamed Oli for ruling with the support of his coterie and without consulting other colleagues. For the past two months, several voices have been raised against the inefficiency, corruption and non-performance of the Oli administration. Criticism has been centred on the government’s irritatingly slow movement on post-quake reconstruction, and,against a thriving black market in petrol and cooking gas, even after the normal flow of supplies from India was resumed. The Oli government has been charged with lack of political will to address the Madhes issue. The Madhes-government task force set up in January 2016 to address the issue of federal re-demarcation could not even finalise its terms of reference. After months of indifference and casualness, the first formal invitation for talks was sent to the Madhes parties by the government only a day after the present crisis of regime survival was resolved.

The Maoists have been particularly upset with the Oli government on four counts:

  • Carrying forward the peace process,
  • Constitutional amendments and implementation,
  • Power-sharing, and
  • Development and economic progress.

Of these, problems with the peace process and power-sharing have been critical. Maoist cadres have been restless over their inadequate share in the perks and patronage distributed by the Oli government, as also because of Maoists being kept out of key governmental decisions. The question of taking the peace process forward has arisen on account of a number of court cases slapped on important Maoists leaders in relation to disappearances and murders committed during the insurgency period.

The Maoists have been asking that such issues be dealt with under the “truth and reconciliation” process as stipulated in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between them and other political parties, rather than through traditional criminal proceedings. Under the latter, many key Maoists leaders could suffer life-imprisonment. Maoist chief Prachanda and his general secretary, Krishna Bahadur Mahara had publicly voiced concerns in this respect. In their assessment, the Oli government, under the influence of non-governmental human rights organisations and some European Union donors, was keeping this Damocles’ sword hanging over the Maoists to keep them politically subdued. Since the Oli government was not acting on its assurances to the Maoists on addressing these issues, Prachanda first decided to withdraw support and join hands with the opposition NC.

What prompted Prachanda to withdraw the threat he held out to the government was a written commitment from Prime Minister Oli that these issues would be resolved within weeks. A nine-point agreement signed by Prachanda and Oli clearly states that the procedures for withdrawing “political cases slapped for acts during insurgency” and the grant of amnesty for such acts would be expedited without any delay. This agreement also commits the prime minister to the granting of relief in respect of the “martyred” and “disappeared” victims (including Maoist cadre), as also action regarding transactions of land deals made during the political transition in Nepal. Prachanda has also been assured – informally but in good faith – that the prime ministership will be handed over to him after the budget session of parliament.

With these commitments, Prachanda found the NC’s promise of prime ministership and the other assurances of the Nepali Congress less credible. Hence the retraction of his threat to the Oli government. The key mediator for the Oli-Prachanda deal was senior UML leader Bamdev Gautam.

To camouflage the government’s internal contradictions, Gautam and other UML leaders have dragged India in. The Oli government’s moves to cancel President Bidya Bhandari’s scheduled official visit to India and recall Nepal’s ambassador in New Delhi for his alleged political role are part of the cover-up. The intention seems to be to buttress the Oli government’s nationalist image and its Left ideological stance in order to generate political consolidation.

There is no denying the fact that New Delhi is upset with the Oli government and would welcome its exit. But since January 2016, India has been trying to control the damage done by its “blockade” diplomacy and categorical support of the Madhes issue. India wants relations with Nepal to stay normal. India went out of the way to make Oli’s India visit in February 2016 comfortable, and invited President Bhandari in order to soothe Nepal’s hurt feelings. It is possible that both NC leader Sher Bahadur Deuba and Maoist leader Prachanda sought India’s blessings in their efforts for regime change in Kathmandu. India’s joining hands with them in the toppling game would amount to a tactical blunder as these leaders had also failed India on the constitutional issues New Delhi considered important. There are, in fact, media reports from Kathmandu that suggest China’s active role in ensuring a favourable Left-dominated regime under Oli’s leadership.

How long the Oli-Prachanda deal will last is anybody’s guess. It may not be easy for the Oli government to implement its nine assurances to Prachanda. Will the Maoist leader plan yet another coup if and when Oli fails to deliver – especially since his U-turn on withdrawing support to the UML-led government has further dented his credibility?

One wished Nepal would come out of the vicious circle of fragile governments and even-more fragile governance so that the country can focus on reconstruction, stability and development in the interest of its suffering people. But will it?

Sukh Deo Muni is Professor Emeritus at Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi 

This article was originally published by the Institute of South Asian Studies, Singapore

India and Nepal Must Step Back from the Precipice

Since the constitutional issue is primarily internal to Nepal, Kathmandu has to move towards accommodating Madhes. Likewise, Indian policy makers need to realise that any amount of coercive diplomacy, intended or unintended, declared or undeclared, has its limits.

Since the constitutional issue is primarily internal to Nepal, Kathmandu has to move towards accommodating Madhes. Likewise, Indian policy makers need to realise that any amount of coercive diplomacy, intended or unintended, declared or undeclared, has its limits.

End of the Road. Credit: Bo Jayatilaka/Flickr CC BY-NC 2.0

End of the Road. Credit: Bo Jayatilaka/Flickr CC BY-NC 2.0

India-Nepal relations have been trapped into an uncomfortable and undesirable bind. If the recent statements made by the two countries at the UN Human Rights Council meeting in Geneva – where Nepal’s Universal Periodic Review was up for discussion –  are of any indication, the bind is getting from bad to worse.

This bind has been created and is being driven by untenable and irrational perceptions at two levels – between Kathmandu and the Madhes people, and between Kathmandu and New Delhi.

In Kathmandu’s assessment, the Madhesis who are agitating for inclusiveness and justice under the recently promulgated constitution do not deserve anything more than what they have already been given; i.e. two provinces and inadequate (disproportionate) representation. In the perception of Kathmandu’s rulers, the Madhesis are incapable of waging a sustained agitation; they are like “flies” that will run away just with a “few shots fired in the air”. They believe the Madhes leadership is fragmented, opportunist, and can be browbeaten or bought. The fact that the Madhes agitation has not been controlled even after more than two months and nearly fifty deaths, they believe, is primarily due to India’s support. If therefore, as is being argued, Kathmandu can force India to distance itself from the Madhes issue, the agitation will tire out and the issue would wither away.

Indian assumptions

As for Indian policy makers, they believe Kathmandu’s leaders took India for granted, ignoring New Delhi’s pleas for an inclusive constitution. They refused to honour promises made by them to the Madhesi and marginalised tribal (janjati) groups, and also to Indian leaders, that these groups will be taken on board. The constitutional process was fast tracked to deliver a pre-designed constitution ignoring the legitimate claims of the Madhes. Therefore, the Indian strategists assert, calibrated coercive diplomacy is the only instrument left with New Delhi to make Kathmandu see reason. Hence, not only disapproval of the new constitution and expressions of open support for Madhes, but also a calculated restrictive movement of essential good to Nepal by India has been woven into this diplomacy. New Delhi does not believe Kathmandu’s attempt to mobilise China is a viable and long-term option. It hopes, therefore, that eventually Kathmandu will be forced to see reason and seek ways to accommodate the Madhes. India also hopes that international pressure from elsewhere – particularly from the US, Japan and the European Union – will come into play to discourage Nepal from using the China option and persisting with its aggressive policy towards the Madhes.

There are obvious flaws in both these assessments. The Kathmandu leadership needs to realise that the social and political dynamics in the Madhes have been radically transformed, particularly since the 2005-06 Jan Andolan (Peoples’ Movement)-II. The so-called dhoti-clad Madhesis are now backed by aware, assertive and organised jeans-wearing youth. This generation has no stakes in accepting the domination of the Kathmandu based hill-upper castes and is willing to pick up arms and even raise the separatist flag if pushed to the wall. The Madhes-Maoist clash of 2007 was a clear indication of this kind of a change. Recall the breakaway of Matrika Yadav from the Maoist mother organisation and the rise of leaders like C.K. Rout to enhance Madhes identity. The Tharu leader, Vijay Gachhadar is being disowned by many of his rank and file because of his alliance with the Kathmandu rulers. Those Madhesi leaders who still hang on for political crumbs from the big parties dominating Kathmandu, are finding it difficult to visit their home constituencies in the Terai. This new and agitated Madhes will surely take help from India or any other source available, but will not be used as pawns in anybody’s strategic games. The sooner the Kathmandu rulers recognise this, and rework their approach towards Madhes, the better it is. The sharpening of the ethnic divide is not in the interest of Nepal’s unity, stability and progress, now or ever. There are umpteen instances to draw lessons from the neighbourhood and elsewhere for Nepal in this respect.

Likewise, Indian policy makers need to realise that any amount of coercive diplomacy, intended or unintended, declared or undeclared, has its limits.

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The unofficial Indian blockade has led to petrol shortages in Nepal. Credit: dainiknews.com

The situation in Nepal today is not akin to 1988-89, when the trade and transit treaty had collapsed and the erstwhile king was whipping up anti-Indian nationalism. Post the 2005-06 Jan Andolan-II, Nepal is a different place. It is democratic, awakened, vibrant and assertive. To punish a whole population in order to put pressure on a powerful ruling coterie is counter-productive. A huge new constituency of India haters has been created in Nepal as a consequence of Modi’s coercive diplomacy. Even if the Beijing card is not immediately viable, opportunities have been opened for China in Nepal that may not give comfort to India in the long run. The international community for its own diverse reasons may not question India’s approach towards Nepal but its loud claims to carrying its smaller neighbours along have suffered credibility in the light of the pain being inflicted on ordinary Nepalis.

Urgent need to step back

In sum, both Kathmandu and Delhi have to stop pursuing their current approaches and must step back from their aggressive stances. Since the constitutional issue is primarily internal to Nepal, Kathmandu has to move towards accommodating Madhes. There are a set of constitutional amendments already registered by the outgoing Koirala government that need to be fast tracked and adopted for building confidence with the Madhesis. This will automatically facilitate the smooth flow of goods from India. This should also enable India to exercise whatever good-will it has with the Madhesis and other political constituencies in Nepal to keep their engagement productive and meaningful. The question of re-demarcating provincial boundaries is also not a really complex issue so long as inflated and hurt egos are not allowed to come in the way. The vested interests of a bunch of critical leaders in the dominating parties cannot be preserved and promoted at the cost of broader Nepali national interests. Madhes may be persuaded to take up the provincial boundaries re-demarcation issue under other provisions of the constitution (eg. the setting up of a designated commission) for the time being in response to representational accommodation through constitutional amendments, provided additional credible assurances of a sincere rethink on it in Kathmandu are extended. Other methods of resolving the demarcation issue may also be explored like seeking public opinion in the disputed districts or a mutually agreed arbitration mechanism.

During his first visit to Nepal, Prime Minister Narendra Modi had powerfully articulated the view that India has no desire to compromise Nepal’s sovereignty, independence or resources. This has to be reiterated again, publicly or even in writing, if Nepal wants to enter into a new treaty to that effect. This is needed because Nepal’s policy makers and strategic community are alleging that India has its eyes on the country’s national resources and sovereign independence. Nepal’s refusal to harness its hydro-water resources did not stop India from growing and it will not do so in future also. Nepal can keep its waters flowing if it finds profitable to do so. India also has to shed its preference and prejudice for a certain religious and ideological orientation in its Nepal policy. Until 2005-06, a Hindu and monarchical Nepal delivered nothing on India’s national interests. Most of India’s present security and strategic concerns in Nepal originated during that period. India has lived with a communist Nepal earlier and can very well do so now as also in future. If the Vietnamese communists can assert themselves against the Chinese communist for their national interests, why will the Nepali communist not do the same if need arises? The China card in Nepal’s hand becomes an option only when Nepal feels uncomfortable with India. India needs to be alert towards its security interests in Nepal and other neighbouring areas but an excessively security driven policy towards the neighbours is not always a smart thing to pursue.

S.D. Muni is Professor Emeritus, JNU and a Distinguished Fellow, IDSA

India’s Nepal Policy Needs Caution, Not Grandstanding

The Constituent Assembly in Kathmandu. Credit: Swapnil Acharya/Flickr CC 2.0

The Constituent Assembly in Kathmandu. Credit: Swapnil Acharya/Flickr CC 2.0

India has reacted strongly to Nepal’s new constitution. In India’s official statements issued on the subject, the promulgation of the new Constitution has just been “noted”, not welcomed. Concern has been expressed over the disturbed situation in the Terai region that borders India. Nepal has been urged to resolve differences “through dialogue in an atmosphere free from violence and intimidation” so as to “enable broad-based ownership and acceptance”. India’s ambassador in Kathmandu spoke to Nepal’s Prime Minister about the difficulties being faced by India’s “freight companies and transporters” in “movements within Nepal” due to prevailing unrest. This may, if allowed to persist, result in essential supplies from India to Nepal getting disrupted.

The statements and the underlying warning on the issue of supplies have brought a sudden low in the bilateral relationship which had received a boost after Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s first visit to Nepal in 2014.

In some ways, the situation is reminiscent of 1989, when King Birendra’s decision to import anti-aircraft guns from China and refuse to reform the Panchayat system in the face of the democratic movement precipitated tensions in India-Nepal bilateral relations. At the same time, the India-Nepal trade treaty lapsed and the Rajiv Gandhi government closed down the special entry points for trade and transit – resulting in the severe shortage of essential supplies in Nepal.

India’s objections

India has its reasons to be upset with the way Nepali leaders have gone about the constitution-making process. Three of them are obvious and openly stated. First, the constitution as promulgated is not inclusive. It ignores the aspirations and sensitivities of the Madhesis, the janjatis (tribal groups), dalits and women. This is contrary to the spirit of the Jan Andolan-II that created a vision of New Nepal and against the assurances given by the late Girija Prasad Koirala as Prime Minister in 2007 during the Madhes agitation. Janjatis and women had also been repeatedly assured that their concerns would be accommodated. Then, the manner in which the promulgation was effected is clearly in conflict with the principle of consensus adopted in Nepal’s interim Constitution. The leaders of the major political parties belonging to the dominant hill social groups have ignored the wishes of the marginalised groups in the new constitution. The marginalised groups are accordingly agitating against the bulldozing of the constitutional process. The use of force by the government to suppress the agitation has resulted in the loss of more than 40 lives, with many more injured. Life has come to a standstill in nearly 20 of the 22 Terai districts of Nepal. There are also agitations in Kathmandu which have been joined by monarchists, Hindutva forces and extremist Maoist splinter groups.

The second reason for India’s reaction is that the violence in the Terai region can spill over into the bordering Indian areas. Particulalrly sensitive in this respect is Bihar, which is in the midst of a crucial electoral process. The ruling BJP has very high stakes in the Bihar elections and fears that violence and instability in the Nepal Terai will help its opponents led by Nitish Kumar, Lalu Prasad and the Congress party. It is feared in New Delhi that if the conflict between the Kathmandu authorities and the marginalised groups, particularly the Terai people, is not resolved amicably soon, the persisting turbulence will continue to adversely affect India’s bordering region.

The third and most important factor behind New Delhi’s displeasure arises from the Modi government’s feeling of being ignored in the constitutional process. India had been encouraging Nepali leaders to draft an inclusive and democratic constitution. In his address to the Constituent Assembly in August 2014, Modi had hoped that Nepal’s new constitution would be like a bouquet of flowers representing the different shades of Nepal’s communities, regions and opinions – and reflecting a broad national consensus. His address had been universally acclaimed in Nepal. He underlined the same theme during his second visit to Kathmadu during the SAARC summit in November last year. He has also done his best to lift Indo-Nepal relations by trying to fulfil pending Indian promises and committing India’s support and help in Nepal’s development. During the earthquake in Nepal, India went out of its way in extending all possible support. The Nepali leaders, have, however, been unresponsive to Indian concerns regarding the constitutional process.

Modi ignored

Some prominent Nepali leaders like Sher Bahadur Deuba of the Nepali Congress, Madhav Nepal of the Communist Party of Nepal–United Marxist Leninist (UML) and Prachanda of the United Communist Party of Nepal – Maoists, were invited for consultations to New Delhi to make them appreciate India’s concerns. All of them endorsed these concerns and assured India that marginalised groups would be accommodated. But there were no signs of this being done as the process started moving towards conclusion.

Barely a week before the promulgation of the constitution, External Affairs minister Sushma Swaraj in a statement on September 14, 2015, recalled “the encouraging voices… from Nepalese leaders” that “the Constitution will carry along all regions and sections”. She expressed India’s concern “over the ongoing protests and strife in several parts of Nepal” and urged “continuing flexibility on the part of all the political forces so that all outstanding issues are addressed through dialogue and widest possible agreement, in an atmosphere free from violence”.

Not only did this not make any difference to the situation in Nepal and the direction of the constitution making process, but instead India was blamed for inciting violence in the Terai and interfering in Nepal’s internal affairs. Prime Minister Sushil Koirala’s press adviser wrote an article in a Nepali newspaper asking India to desist from such interference.

Finally, the Nepal Constituent Assembly adopted the constitution on September 17, by voting for its remaining clauses but without any accommodation towards the demands of the marginalised groups and India’s appeals. This led Prime Minister Modi to send a special envoy, Foreign Secretary S. Jaishankar to see if any last minute effort could be made to redress the situation, but in vain. Therefore, the Indian establishment has felt frustrated and dismayed.

Where India went wrong

The Modi government’s frustration with Nepal’s constitutional process seems to have been fuelled further by two other factors that have not been publicly and officially expressed.

One is that sections of the ruling party, particularly the Hindutva forces were keen to make Nepal a Hindu state and possibly create space for the future reinstatement of the monarchy. Considerable effort and material support had been extended to Nepali monarchists and Hindutva forces to mobilise support and raise their voices in this regard by the concerned political sections of the ruling party. Nepal’s new constitution has only accommodated them to the extent of making the cow a national animal, discouraging cow slaughter and adding a definition of “secularism” that covers respect and protection of all religion, including Hinduism. Second, India feels that the Nepal’s major parties have been more accommodative in the constitutional process towards the lobbying efforts of China and the European Union on issues of religion and federalism than to India’s concerns.

Notwithstanding the attitude of the dominant social groups which have driven the process of Nepali constitution making, New Delhi ought to have bee cautious and cool in its reactions. It should have welcomed Nepal’s first Republican and democratic constitution worked out by popularly elected representatives. This was the promise made by India way back in 1951, when the anarchical Rana system was being transformed, initiating a process of democratisation. India should also realise that the fragmented Terai leadership was unable to throw its proportionate weight in the constitutional process. Many of the Madhesi, janajati and women members of the Constituent Assembly have also voted for the new constitution – though under the pressure of their political bosses.

The new constitution has sharply polarised Nepal along ethnic and regional lines. This polarisation will keep Nepal unstable and turbulent, which is not at all in India’s long term interests. To jump into such a polarisation by taking sides is neither a prudent policy or effective diplomacy. India’s effort should have been to nudge both sides of the polarised debate through quiet and sustained diplomacy so that an amicable resolution was found. Instead, India’s policy unfolded in three different stages within the broad parameters of Prime Minister Modi’s Constituent Assembly address in Nepal last year. These stages have moved from being (i) “hands off”, to (ii) “having a Constitution is better than no constitution at all” and finally (iii) insistence on specific issues.

India could not sensitise itself adequately to understand the internal dynamics of posturing and power-sharing within and between Nepali political parties, so as to move them in the desired direction. This failure has now landed India in the company of monarchists, Hindu fanatics and left extremists (break away radical Maoists) within the Nepali political spectrum. Some of these disruptionist forces are joining marginalised groups in burning copies of the new constitution and creating turmoil in Nepal. They are exploiting the situation to their advantage at the cost of India. There is need for India to approach the issues involved coolly and carefully so as to get justice for the marginalised groups – rather than reinforcing the already existing forces of anti-Indian pseudo-nationalism in Nepal.

S.D. Muni is Professor Emeritus, JNU. A Distinguished Fellow, IDSA he is a Former Special Envoy and Ambassador of India