As India Gears up for Net Neutrality 2.0, Lessons From Ajit Pai’s ‘War on the Open Internet’

While the FCC and TRAI chairmen may share similar goals, India’s telecom regulator should pick and choose what it wants to take away from the US debate.

While the FCC and TRAI chairmen may share similar goals, India’s telecom regulator should pick and choose what it wants to take away from the US debate.

TRAI's RS Sharma should be careful when deciding what to take and what not to take away from US developments on net neutrality. Credit: Reuters

TRAI’s R.S. Sharma should be careful when deciding what to take and what not to take away from US developments on net neutrality. Credit: Reuters

Ajit Pai – Donald Trump’s chairman of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) – has been grabbing headlines since his appointment, with many fearing he plans on “destroying the open Internet.”

In May, the FCC voted to advance Pai’s proposal to repeal the commission’s 2015 net neutrality regulations, beginning the long process of undoing the rules. The decision to repeal is facing a fierce pushback from the US public and net neutrality activists. If approved by the FCC later this year, it is likely to be challenged in court.

Closer home, India’s telecom regulator, TRAI, seems keen on moving forward, building on its February 2016 regulations – with open house discussions on net neutrality held in Mumbai and Bengaluru in the last few months. Last year, the Indian regulator prohibited service providers from discriminating on the basis of content. The regulation banned providers from giving free access to select content, effectively disallowing ‘zero rated’ services. The regulator, with the release of a  comprehensive consultation paper in 2017, is now making headway in the net neutrality debate – exploring how to define core principles, regulate traffic management practices and monitor for violations. On the other hand, FCC earlier this year decided to stop investigating into zero rating practices altogether.

The juxtaposition of Pai’s unraveling of the net neutrality regulations against TRAI’s attempt at a granular examination is relevant on two counts.

First, both Pai and R.S. Sharma, the chairman of TRAI, essentially share the same outlook. Both have acknowledged the centrality of bridging the digital divide in their regulatory mandate – exploring how best to keep the Internet open while providing access to the unconnected.

Second, both regulators are also introspecting on whether they are best placed to identify and censure non-neutral practices. The question of whether net neutrality is better preserved on an ex-post basis by an antitrust regulator or by a telecommunications regulator ex-ante, bears heavily on both their minds.

The difference in their approach, however, is evident from Pai’s unequivocal support for evidence-based regulation. The FCC chairman thinks that Internet should be best left unregulated in the face of “hypothetical harms” to the consumer. Pai supports net neutrality – the Internet must be open and equally accessible to all – but he disagrees on how best to ensure it.

Sharma, in contrast, has so far seemed to disfavour evidence-based adjudication in his only binding regulation on the subject.

Pai’s approach

The FCC’s 2015 rules reclassified Internet services as “common carriers” subjecting internet providers to stricter regulation. This allowed the regulator to recognise and enforce the principle of net neutrality for the first time, prohibiting internet providers from giving preferential treatment to any data on the basis of source, content or destination. Two years later, FCC with Pai at its helm is looking to roll back these rules opting instead for ‘light touch’ regulation.

In April, Pai issued a notice of proposed rule-making, a 58-page document premised on the claim that since the 2015 Open Internet Order, infrastructure investments by Internet service providers had reduced – a claim that has been questioned by net neutrality proponents. He is also of the opinion that the 2015 order has created regulatory uncertainty, hindering ISPs from innovating and expanding access to unconnected regions. His approach calls for a reversion to the Clinton-era regulations that categorised the Internet as an information service (bereft of common carriage requirements) and not as a telecommunication service. Pai reposes trust in the market to correct itself and trust in existing regulators like the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice to step in on the evidence of harm to the market.

Pai is right about a hands-off approach in the absence of empirical evidence. His assertion, however, has been coloured by his sympathy for internet service providers – evident from his removal of the FCC’s privacy rules that prevented ISPs from competing with traditional over-the-top service providers in the data-for-advertising marketplace. He has also begun questioning the harm emanating from relatively clear violations of net neutrality such as throttling and faster lanes. His most compelling assertion about the reduction in infrastructure investments is also not as watertight as a numbers-driven claim needs to be. This has led to a lawsuit against Pai demanding the disclosure of all communication between his staff and ISPs.

These developments stateside have been driven by, in equal parts, technology and politics – the change in the administration has resulted in a change in the outlook of the regulator. The debate, however, still stands to inform India’s regulatory approach – there is more than one way ensure net neutrality and protect the ethos of an open Internet. India should avoid the same pitfalls and introduce regulations that are not shortsighted and reliant on clear market evidence.

The Indian data market is currently undergoing an upheaval with high investment in infrastructure, lowering of data pricing and plummeting device costs. Many of these changes have been brought about by Reliance Jio’s entry into the market and the consequent shake up of India’s telecom incumbents. On the other hand, revenues this past year have taken a hit, partly as a result of these changes and partly due to TRAI’s ban on differentially priced services. However, as the dust settles and the disruptions pass, it is revenue generation that will determine continued investments and innovation – pivotal to bridging India’s digital divide.

TRAI’s recent exploration of an unbiased third party data aggregation for providing free Internet is definitely a step in the right direction because it is mindful of India’s need for data affordability. The regulator is also seeking stakeholder inputs through its open house discussions instead of reacting in a knee jerk manner. TRAI must now bolster its regulatory inputs through evidence of market effects of free data services and consult the Competition Commission of India, going forward.

The question of which regulator is best suited to promote net neutrality was inadequately considered the last time around. One of the problems with a preemptive approach generally and TRAI’s 2016 regulation specifically is that there is likely to be a degree of ambiguity around which practices are permissible and which practices are not.

The US has interestingly turned existential, questioning whether regulations are needed at all and if so, which regulator is best placed to keep the net neutral. For governing the Internet, it is choosing to abandon legacy laws but is turning to its legacy institutions to protect its openness. TRAI must learn from this debate what it can and ignore what it must. The Indian regulator must be careful to avoid what ails the US – an attempt at a regulatory rehaul – by drafting rules that accommodate competing interests, evolving technologies and the access imperative.

Sharma would do well to heed the advice of the former chairman of the FCC when he noted that a regulatory proposal on net neutrality should offer three things: an agency with full authority to protect consumers, rules that can evolve to fit new devices and networks and consistent guidelines that make it clear what behaviour is and isn’t appropriate.

Lawyers by training, Madhulika Srikumar (@madhumachi) and Bedavyasa Mohanty (@darth_beda) are with the Cyber Initiative, Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi.

How Do We Value Water?

On July 31, ministers, senior and local government officials, businesses and representatives from NGOs and development partners will attend the fourth consultation on valuing water to be held at the BRAC Center in Dhaka.

On July 31, ministers, senior and local government officials, businesses and representatives from NGOs and development partners will attend the fourth consultation on valuing water in Dhaka.

A woman carries a container of drinking water in the coastal area of Bangladesh. Credit: Rafiqul Islam/IPS

A woman carries a container of drinking water in the coastal area of Bangladesh. Credit: Rafiqul Islam/IPS

Dhaka: In the wake of recent water-related disasters in Bangladesh, including water-logging and floods that displaced thousands of families, a high-level consultation in the capital Dhaka on valuing water will look at ways to optimise water use and solutions to water-related problems facing South Asia.

While Bangladesh has been heavily affected, it is hardly alone in grappling with both chronic shortages and overabundance. According to the UN World Water Development Report, critical transboundary rivers such as the Ganges, Indus and Brahmaputra have come under severe pressure from industrial development, urbanisation, population growth and environmental pollution.

In India, nearly two dozen cities face daily water shortages; in the Nepali capital, Kathmandu, people wait in lines for hours to get drinking water from the city’s ancient stone waterspouts; in Pakistan, the Council of Research in Water Resources (PCRWR) warned that the country may run dry by 2025 if authorities didn’t take immediate action.

Regional cooperation will be a critical component in solving these interrelated problems. On July 31, ministers, senior and local government officials, businesses and representatives from NGOs and development partners will attend the fourth consultation on valuing water to be held at the BRAC Center in Dhaka.

The consultation is being held as part of a high-level consultation on water called the ‘Valuing Water Initiative’.

Bangladesh is one of the most densely populated countries in the world, with 160 million people living within 57,000 square miles. Although it has made great strides against poverty in recent years, some 13% of Bangladeshis still lack safe water and 39% lack improved sanitation.

In January 2016, World Bank group president Jim Yong Kim and then UN secretary-general Ban Ki-Moon convened a high level panel on water (HLPW), involving 11 heads of state and government to accelerate change in the way governments, societies, and the private sector use and manage water.

The members of the panel are heads of state from Australia, Bangladesh, Hungary, Jordan, Mauritius (co-chair), Mexico (co-chair), Netherlands, Peru, Senegal, South Africa and Tajikistan.

According to Global Water Partnership, an organiser of the Dhaka water event, Bangladesh is one of several countries to host a HLPW consultation meeting, which aims at providing the leadership required to champion a comprehensive, inclusive, and collaborative way of developing and managing water resources, and improving water and sanitation-related services.

Khondaker Azharul Haq, president of Bangladesh Water Partnership, said that apart from its direct economic value, water has indirect value for environmental protection, religious, cultural and medicinal practices.

This non-economic value is very high because water is declining across the world day by day, both in quality and quantity, he said.

Even a moderate rainfall inundates the Bangladeshi capital Dhaka, creating severe water-logging. Credit: Rafiqul Islam/IPS

Even a moderate rainfall inundates the Bangladeshi capital Dhaka, creating severe water-logging. Credit: Rafiqul Islam/IPS

As a lower riparian country, Bangladesh faces multiple water problems each year. The country must depend on the water of trans-boundary rivers, experiencing plenty of water during monsoon and scant water during the dry season.

During this monsoon season, Dhaka and the port city of Chittagong are facing severe water-logging and urban flooding due to the lack of proper storm water drainage systems.

While visiting a water-logged area in the capital last Wednesday, Dhaka north city corporation mayor Annisul Huq expressed frustration, wondering aloud to reporters, “Will any one of you please tell me what the solution to it is?”

During monsoon, water-logging is also a common phenomenon in Chittagong city. But this year, a vaster area of the city than usual has submerged due to heavy rainfall coupled with tidal surges.

Azharul Haq says the “nuisance value” of water is also going up, with a good deal of suffering stemming from these problems. “So water management should be more comprehensive to obtain the [full] potential value of water,” he said.

He added that the “nuisance value” of water, along with its economic and non-economic values, will be discussed at the July 31 event.

Experts have long warned that if the authorities here don’t take serious measures to address these issues soon, within a decade, every major thoroughfare in the capital Dhaka will be inundated and a majority of neighbourhoods will end up underwater after heavy precipitation.

A 42-mm rainfall in ninety minutes is not unusual for monsoon season, but Dhaka will face far worse in the future due to expected global temperature increases.

“If the present trend of city governance continues, all city streets will be flooded during monsoon in a decade, intensifying the suffering of city dwellers, and people will be compelled to leave the city,” urban planner Maksudur Rahman told IPS last year.

He predicted that about 50-60% of the city will be inundated in ten years if it experiences even a moderate rainfall.

Dhaka is home to about 14 million people and is the centre of the country’s growth, but it has practically zero capacity to cope with moderate to heavy rains. On September 1st, 2015, for example, a total of 42 mm fell in an hour and a half, collapsing the city’s drainage system.

The HLPW’s Valuing Water Initiative is a collaborative process aimed at building champions and ownership at all levels, which presents a unique and mutually reinforcing opportunity to meet all 17 of the sustainable development goals.

Freshwater – a finite resource – is under particular pressure from population growth worldwide and other causes, compounding the challenges of extreme climate events like droughts and floods.

Water is essential for human health, food security, energy supplies, sustaining cities and the environment. Valuing water more appropriately can help balance the multiple uses and services provided by water and inform decisions about allocating water across uses and services to maximise well-being.

The main objective of the July 31 water consultation is to obtain views from a wide array of country-level stakeholders on the proposals from the HLPW on the valuing water preamble and principles.

The water meet will encourage governments, business and civil society to consider water’s multiple values and to guide the transparent incorporation of these values into decision-making by policymakers, communities, and businesses.

The HLPW consultation will also create awareness and discuss the regional or country level relevance of global perspectives.

(IPS)

South Africa and the ICC: The Travails of ‘Enforcing’ International ‘Cooperation’

The repercussions of the Omar al-Bashir case go beyond the African continent and are relevant to discussions relating to the efficacy of international justice.

The repercussions of the Omar al-Bashir case go beyond the African continent and are relevant to discussions relating to the efficacy of international justice.

Sudan's President Omar Hassan al-Bashir speaks during a press conference after the oath of the prime minister and first vice president Bakri Hassan Saleh at the palace in Khartoum, Sudan March 2, 2017. Credit: Reuters/Mohamed Nureldin Abdallah

Sudan’s President Omar Hassan al-Bashir speaks during a press conference after the oath of the prime minister and first vice president Bakri Hassan Saleh at the palace in Khartoum, Sudan, March 2, 2017. Credit: Reuters/Mohamed Nureldin Abdallah

The International Criminal Court (ICC) recently ruled on the failure of South Africa to arrest and surrender Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir to the court. The repercussions of this case extend beyond the African continent and are relevant to discussions relating to the efficacy of international justice.

In the Asia-Pacific region, only 19 states have ratified the Rome Statute. However, developments pertaining to the law and practice of the court are relevant, with implications for states parties and non-state parties in the region. Cambodia and the Philippines (both state parties), as well as Myanmar are on the radar of the ICC. In addition, states in the region, including India and China (neither are state parties), have hosted al-Bashir despite the arrest warrant. While there has not been a referral by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) relating to non-state parties in the region, it is not a far-fetched possibility.

The decision highlights the duties of state and non-state parties to cooperate with the ICC, immunities of heads of states, the dynamics of regional blocs related to international justice, interaction between domestic law and international law, as well as the relationship of the ICC and the UNSC. This case may be viewed as a litmus test in the enforcement action for referrals, and added impetus to argue for reform of the UNSC and its relationship to the ICC.

Al-Bashir and South Africa

Based on a referral from the UNSC on March 31, 2005 (UNSC Res 1593), the office of the prosecutor of the ICC took cognisance of the situation in Darfur from July 1, 2002, and commenced an investigation. Two warrants of arrest were issued for Omar al-Bashir (in 2009 and on appeal, in 2010), containing three counts of genocide, two counts of war crimes and five counts of crimes against humanity. Despite the issuance of these warrants, thus far, al-Bashir is free and continues to function as the head of state of Sudan. He has visited countries that are state parties to the Rome Statute, which have an obligation to arrest and surrender him to the ICC. South Africa ratified the Rome Statute on November  27, 2000, and is still currently a party to the ICC. While Sudan has signed the Rome Statute, it has not ratified the treaty, and has signalled the intention not to do so anymore. Hence, it is not a state party to the treaty.

Al-Bashir attended the African Union Summit in Johannesburg from June 13- 15, 2015. Legal proceedings for arrest were initiated and the high court ordered that al-Bashir remain in the country, pending the hearing of the matter. However, despite the order and assurances that he was still in South Africa, al-Bashir was permitted to leave the country. The high court, in its decision, affirmed the obligations of the South African government to arrest and hand over al-Bashir. On appeal by the government, the Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa labeled the departure of al-Bashir from South Africa as ‘disgraceful conduct’ and in violation of the constitution.

ICC decision: Non-compliance and its (lack of) consequences

The ICC has scrutinised the actions of South Africa, in light of its failure to arrest and surrender al-Bashir while on South African territory. After hearings and submissions in April 2017, Pre-Trial Chamber II issued its decision on July 6, 2017. The decision was two-fold: findings regarding whether South Africa violated the obligation to cooperate under the Rome Statute; and if so, whether South Africa ought to be referred to the Assembly of State Parties (ASP) and/or the UNSC.

The case hinges not only on the lack of cooperation by a state party, but also the relevance of head of state immunity. Article 27(2) of the Rome Statute excludes official immunities from barring the jurisdiction of the court. Part IX of the Rome Statute relates to “International cooperation and judicial assistance”, elaborating on the role of states in facilitating the work of the ICC. State parties are under a “general obligation” to cooperate with the ICC (Article 86), as well as a specific obligation to comply with requests of the ICC. Article 87 (1)(a) provides that a state “shall” comply with requests for arrest and surrender. Article 87(7) details the consequences of a failure to cooperate, including a referral to the ASP and/or the UNSC (if the case was referred by the latter). Article 98(1) also provides that the court may not ask for arrest or surrender if this would violate international law obligations pertaining to immunity of officials of a third state.

The decision of the chamber regarding non-compliance with the obligation to cooperate addressed aspects of the immunity argument. The chamber held that as South Africa was a state party, Article 27(2) would apply, permitting the courts jurisdiction regardless of head of state status. Customary international law granting immunity to heads of state and other officials, as well as the terms of the African Union-South Africa Host Agreement were not applicable in this case. In regard to Sudan, the UNSC referral to the ICC would result in the application of Rome Statute obligations on Sudan, regardless of non-state party status. Hence, this would result in the ensuing rights and obligations (except for procedural aspects such as contributions to the court and participation in the ASP). Also as a result of the application of UNSC Resolution 1593, Article 98(1) did not apply. In obiter, the chamber clarified that the provision was limited to state party and a non-state party interactions. Placing Sudan in the position of a state party, therefore, precluded the requirement of a waiver of immunity and exception to the courts jurisdiction in Article 98(1). In sum, the court found that head of state immunity would not apply and would not bar South Africa from its obligations to arrest and surrender al-Bashir.

The pre-trial chamber concluded that while South Africa did not comply with its obligations under the Rome Statute, it however, did not merit a referral to the ASP and/or the UNSC. The chamber noted that the aim of a referral was to facilitate cooperation and to enable the court to function better. Furthermore, there was no automatic referral and this course of action was based on the discretion of the chamber. In dissecting the actions of South Africa, the chamber noted that it was the first state party to request consultations with the court to determine its legal obligations and that the delay in approaching the court was reasonable. The chamber was generous in its interpretation, despite the prosecutors allegation of legal impediments created by South Africa. The chamber also referred to the domestic legal proceedings within South Africa, which confirmed the obligation to arrest al-Bashir. In deciding not to refer the matter further, the chamber noted that in the six previous referrals to the UNSC, there had been no follow-up and a suggested referral mechanism had not materialised. Hence, there was limited benefit to be gained from a referral.

The entrance of the International Criminal Court (ICC) is seen in The Hague, Netherlands. Credit: Reuters/Jerry Lampen

The entrance of the International Criminal Court (ICC) is seen in The Hague, Netherlands. Credit: Reuters/Jerry Lampen

Internal dynamics, regional politics and institutional dimensions of international justice

Within South Africa, the backdrop of domestic litigation pertaining to not only the arrest of al-Bashir, but also the potential withdrawal of South Africa from the ICC is of significance. The South African government formally notified its withdrawal from the ICC on October 19, 2016. However, this was challenged in court, with the judgment of the high court of South Africa stipulating on February 22, 2017, that parliamentary approval is required prior to notification of withdrawal. The government then revoked the withdrawal notification on March 7, 2017. The ruling ANC party however reaffirmed the commitment to withdraw just days before the ICC ruling. The ICC decision may also harden the resolve to withdraw.

Based on the tenor of the ICC decision and its reception internally, it could provide further ammunition to argue for withdrawal, with obligations perceived as too onerous. However, the conciliatory tone of the chamber regarding the bonafide intentions of South Africa as well as its lack of referral to the ASP/UNSC may be a reason to reconsider withdrawal. The impact of the decision is not easy to discern, with a bland statement by the government, and the government declining to appeal the decision of the pre-trial chamber.

In conjunction, regionally, there are ongoing efforts by the African Union to encourage mass withdrawal of African states from the ICC. Much has been made of the threatened potential mass withdrawal, pursuant to the assembly resolution at the 28th African Union Summit in January 2017. In the time since the 28th summit, a significant number of African states have however reiterated their support for the ICC, or have cancelled their withdrawal (Gambia), adding to the confusion. The 29th AU summit concluded on July 4, 2017, with no reports (as yet) of any follow-up of the implementation of the resolution of the previous summit, as was required by the 28th summit resolution. The discussion seems to have been left off the agenda, and for a future summit.

The elephant in the room is the relationship of the UNSC and the ICC, and the arguments of the politicisation of international justice. Detractors of the court often conflate these two aspects with allegations of an over-emphasis on situations in Africa. In the chorus alleging a biased court, it is however important to note that five out of the nine situations under investigation relating to Africa (Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda, Central African Republic (CAR), Mali and CAR II) are the result of self-referrals, i.e., initiated by the states themselves and not due to the UNSC referral or the prosecutors initiative.

While this distinction is important, a key factor in this instance is the UNSC referral of al-Bashir to the ICC. The fact that three of the five permanent members of the UNSC are not state parties to the Rome Statute is particularly problematic. As per the Rome Statute, the UNSC has the power to refer cases to the ICC (Article 13(b)), as well as defer any potential investigation (Article 16), both of which have been used. Darfur (2005) and Libya (2011) are the only cases so far based on referrals by the UNSC. For Darfur, state parties and non-state parties opted to vote for the resolution, with four abstentions. In the Libyan referral, the unanimous vote included non-state parties (such as India), voting for the resolution, believing that this would be the best chance to stem the violence. Hence, despite protesting the ability of the UNSC to refer matters, in reality states – including non-state parties – have supported this course of action. In other instances such as Syria, Sri Lanka and Yemen, the referral power of the UNSC has not been exercised when it arguably should have. While undoubtedly there are legitimate fears of a politicised referral and legal concerns relating to the substance of the UNSC resolutions, this is more attributable to flaws in the composition and functioning of the UNSC rather than the ICC itself. And this still does not vitiate the obligations that emanate from the Rome Statute in the event of such a referral.

Commensurate to this ability to refer is the obligation of the ICC to report violations of obligations to the UNSC. However, the disinterest of the UNSC in any follow-up of the actions of the ICC, emanating from the lack of cooperation is remarkable. The ICC has issued previous decisions on the lack of cooperation by various states for the failure to arrest and surrender Omar al-Bashir. These include Malawi (2011), Chad (2011 and 2013), DRC (2014), Sudan (2015), Uganda (2016) and Djibouti (2016), all resulting in a referral to the UNSC. However, no consequences have resulted from these referrals, despite pleas for action from the prosecutor. Hence, not referring the matter should be perceived as a vote of no confidence in the UNSC by the court.

Implications

These are testing times for the ICC, on its 15th anniversary. What makes this case significant is the interplay of multiple factors, including domestic and regional dynamics that impact the functioning of the court.

In the context of Asia-Pacific, the implications of this decision are that obligations for arrest and detention can apply to non-state parties, as well as state parties. Further, the deficiencies of the system of international cooperation may be linked to the ineffectiveness of the UNSC, providing impetus to the argument espoused by many in the region for UNSC reform. However, this is no substitute for political will to support international justice mechanisms, which many states in the region lack. If the ICC is to weather current questions of legitimacy and efficacy, and to be an effective justice mechanism, there must be a redoubling of efforts to support the institution, starting with cooperating with the court at the very least.

Priya Pillai is an international lawyer, with a PhD in international law from the Graduate Institute in Geneva. She has previously worked at the Red Cross, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, and is now based in Manila.