Kofi Annan’s Life and Work Epitomises the Power of Possibility

At the same time, the former UN chief’s legacy also brings out how the major powers have managed to limit the effectiveness of the secretary general.

Kofi Annan, UN secretary general from 1997 to 2006, passed away in his sleep at his home in Geneva on August 18. He was 80.

How will his legacy be defined? A rock star Nobel Laureate who dedicated himself to the cause of peace, or someone on whose watch genocide took place in Rwanda and Bosnia and who then went on to rationalise a doctrine of intervention to stop and prevent such mass atrocities from taking place?

The first black African to head the United Nations, he was, in many respects, a secretary general with a difference. He rose to the highest position from within the ranks of the UN itself. Prior to being elected secretary general, he was undersecretary general for peacekeeping having served in his early career on the human rights and humanitarian side of the UN.

He firmly believed that the UN should use its position to provide cover for ‘interventionism’. In fact, there is a view that had Annan not been acting secretary general, the authorisation for military action in Bosnia may not have been forthcoming. His own book, in fact, is interestingly entitled Interventions – A Life in War and Peace. It is, however, useful to recall, that he sought intervention because he wanted to use the external stimulus to stop gross and egregious violations of human rights and avoid large-scale killings in the form of mass atrocities.

Former UN chief Kofi Annan addresses an advisory commission in Sittwe, Myanmar, September 6, 2016. Credit: Reuters/Wa Lone

The doctrine that later came to be known as responsibility to protect or ‘R2P’ then came to be misused. When it was used in the case of Iraq, Kofi Anan had the following to say in April 2002:

‘The decision to go to war without specific authorisation by the Security Council has created a deep division that will need to be bridged if we are to deal effectively, not just with the aftermath of Iraq, but with other major challenges on the international agenda.’

Noting that threats to international peace and security may require a searching review of the adequacy of existing instruments, with a view to coming up with a collective response, he added:

“I say ‘collective response’ because I remain as convinced as ever that we are all safer – the large and powerful as well as the small and weak – in a system where all are governed by the international rule of law and principles set out in the United Nations Charter.”

Emphasising the obligations of the occupying powers, he continued:

“In the first instance, I hope the coalition will set an example by making clear that they intend to act strictly within the rules set down by the Geneva convention and the Hague Regulations regarding the treatment of prisoners of war and by demonstrating through their actions that they accept the responsibility of the occupying power for public order and safety and well-being of the civilised population.”

Just as Marx and Lenin should not be blamed for atrocities committed by Stalin in the name of what came to be characterised as communism, the doctrine of R2P went on to be misused by the Security Council in the military action in Libya in 2011. The problem is not with the doctrine per se because its pillars one and two call on every individual to do all that is possible to prevent the occurrence of mass atrocities. The problem lies in its pillar three and the use of outside force. Since it is the Security Council that has to make that determination, it has to do so with a sense of responsibility. In the case of Iraq, the UNSC authorisation was not forthcoming. In the case of Libya, the unravelling of the country took place with the council’s authorisation.

The genocide in Rwanda and Bosnia took place on his watch. It was the traumatisation from these genocides that prompted him to intellectually and politically prepared for the use of force from the outside to prevent such atrocities.

The jury is still out on Annan’s legacy. He won the Nobel Peace Prize in 2001. He will also be remembered with admiration for the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) which came under his watch. He will continue to be admired for the emphasis he placed on human rights and humanitarian law and for standing up to the West when force was used without authorisation. He cannot be blamed for the misuse of the R2P doctrine being put to use in the case of Libya. The Security Council must accept full responsibility for that.

He also held high profile mediation roles in Kenya and Syria. He complained that discussions among world powers at the Security Council had termed his job as Syria envoy into Mission Impossible.

Kofi Annan’s life and work epitomise the power of possibility that an extraordinary secretary-general can exercise but at the same time clearly brings out the limitations enforced by major powers in the discharge of that responsibility.

Hardeep S. Puri is a diplomat and the author of Perilous Interventions, Harper Collins, 2016.

This article has been republished from his blog.