A recent statement by Sri Lankan President Ranil Wickremesinghe on implementing the 13th amendment to the Constitution of Sri Lanka, an integral part of the 1987 Indo-Sri Lanka Accord, is significant. Thirty-seven years have lapsed since the singing of the Accord, which was an effort to find a political settlement to Tamils’ long-pending demands. While political leaders, including the present chief minister of Tamil Nadu M.K. Stalin, have consistently called for the implementation of the 13th amendment as a starting point to resolve the ethnic conflict, this was often ignored by the Sri Lankan establishment.
The Sri Lankan issue is mainly a conflict between majority Sinhalese, whose forefathers are the Saivite Tamils who embraced Buddhism along with Saivite Tamil king of Anuradhapura Devanampiya theesan (Son of King Mootthasivan meaning Lord Siva), and minority Saivite Tamils and those who migrated from Tamil Nadu as plantation workers during British rule.
Tamils, who lived mainly in the northern and eastern provinces and were educated, and occupied important and disproportionately higher positions in the government until the 1960s, leading to envy among the Sinhalese. The ethnic discord can be traced back to the national independence movement, when the Ceylon National Congress split into two factions in the 1920s on ethnic lines: the Sinhalese faction (Sinhala Maha Sabha) and Tamil faction (Tamil Congress).
The Tamil Congress appealed for parity in rights and opportunities with the Sinhalese during independence in 1947. This suggestion was rejected by the Soulbury Commission that introduced a Constitution that was inherently weak in ensuring the rights of the minority. While granting independence in 1948, the British did not attempt to create two nations like that of India and Pakistan, and left the fate of Tamils to the United National Party government to decide. Tamils lost out due to several successive legal provisions; the Citizenship Act that rendered millions of Tamil plantation workers stateless, the Sinhala-only Act that penalised Tamils, and planned colonisation aimed at changing the demography of the north and east had a profound impact. The organic relationship between Tamils across the border (Sri Lanka and Tamil Nadu) defines not just the idea of solidarity but also political justice.
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The ethnic tensions fuelled a call for a separate Tamil state. The Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) won all 18 Tamil seats in the 1977 general elections and became the primary opposition party. It joined hands with different armed groups such as the LTTE, EPRLF, TELO, PLOTE, EROS and others, and called for an armed insurrection. Sri Lanka did not take India’s involvement in training and funding the insurgents on its soil lightly. However, the Indian state had to respect the sentiments in Tamil Nadu which was the site for lakhs of refugees following a systematic pogrom, that peaked in 1983. The significant aspect of the armed insurrection was it made the ethnic conflict an international crisis, and was no longer an internal matter of the island-state.
Indian intervention and the 1987 Accord
The ethnic conflict and geopolitical considerations made successive Prime Ministers Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi intervene in the affairs of Sri Lanka. In addition to diplomatic moves to protect Tamils’ rights based on power sharing, Indira Gandhi had secret plans to invade Sri Lanka and capture crucial Sri Lankan air strips in August 1984, but couldn’t execute this as the secret plan including the invasion strategy were leaked to the press by a French agent. Further, Indira Gandhi’s assassination in October 1984 effectively sealed the lid on the invasion plan.
After her death, political parties in Tamil Nadu appealed to the Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi for a negotiated political settlement which was seconded by major political parties in Sri Lanka. Accordingly, the Government of India negotiated with the Sri Lankan government on one side and Tamil moderate and militant organisations on the other to arrive at the Indo-Lanka accord which was signed on July 29, 1987. The Accord proposed a provincial council system to merge the northern and eastern provinces with partial police, school education and other devolution of powers.
However, both sides in Sri Lanka were not satisfied with the terms of the Accord. The government thought it was ceding too much control for too little in return. Both the government and the LTTE claimed that India used its hegemonic status to coerce the Lankan government to sign the Accord, without allowing any discussion or debate in parliament. The signing was even opposed by then Prime Minister Premadasa, who refused to attend signing ceremony. The Accord was signed by President Jayewardene. On the LTTE side, its supremo Prabhakaran alleged that he was flown to Delhi, held in captivity by Indian black cat security and coerced to agree to the contents of the Accord. However, other Tamil parties accepted the accord – albeit with reservations – as a starting point for resolving a bloody civil war.
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Thus, on returning from Delhi, Prabhakaran refused to surrender arms, which was one of the conditions of the Accord. The Sri Lankan government requested India to disarm the LTTE as a condition for implementing the Accord. Further, the LTTE provoked Indian security forces, the IPKF, wilfully dragging them into a conflict so as to nullify the goodwill Indian security forces enjoyed with Tamils in Sri Lanka. This blew up into a full-fledged war between the IPKF and LTTE, resulting in the death of hundreds of Indian soldiers and Tamil civilians. It also led to the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi by the LTTE, as a retaliation for the alleged human rights violations committed by the IPKF on Tamil civilians, which made the Indian side rework its strategy in dealing with the ethnic conflict.
The civil war ended in May 2009, with the killing of LTTE supremo Prabhakaran. The final stages of the war witnessed scores of human rights violations including allegations of genocide and crimes against humanity.
Even after the elimination of the LTTE, the Sri Lankan side is hesitant to implement the 13th amendment despite consistent demands by Tamil leaders in Sri Lanka and Tamil Nadu. Though Indian counterparts have consistently tried to persuade Sri Lanka to implement the 13th amendment, the Indian intervention post 2009 seem to be soft, particularly in the international fora, including abstaining from voting on a UNHRC resolution brought against Sri Lanka.
India has directly intervened in the affairs of Sri Lanka since the 1980s (in both humanitarian and armed ways); the Indo-Lanka Accord is a result of India’s intervention. India has negotiated and signed the Accord in its capacity as a trustee/guardian of Tamils living in Sri Lanka. Further, the IPKF proceeded to disarm the LTTE, which resulted in the deaths of hundreds of Indian army men and the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi – all for attempting to implement the Indo-Lanka Accord.
Therefore, any impression that India is incapable of enforcing the Indo-Lanka Accord would not only be seen as a failure in India’s international human rights diplomacy but also cast a cloud on India’s claim to be a regional super power. To protect the interests of Tamils (a responsibility assumed by India in the Accord) and further to raise India’s reputation in international politics and human rights diplomacy, India should prevail upon Sri Lanka to implement the 13th amendment within a given timeframe. This will pave the way for a lasting solution to a century-old ethnic conflict.
Puhazh Gandhi P. is a lawyer, spokesperson and joint secretary (NRI affairs) of the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam, and member, Non Resident Tamils Welfare Board, Government of Tamil Nadu. Views expressed are personal.
With inputs from Dr Kandiah Sarveswaran, former education minister, Northern Province, Sri Lanka and M.A. Sumanthiran, Member of Parliament, Sri Lanka.