India Convinced Bangladesh to Drop Objections to Myanmar’s IORA Membership

IORA will adopt a document on the role of dialogue partners. With China in mind, India had argued that dialogue partners should not lead the direction of group.

New Delhi: A recent series of backroom moves by India helped defuse a diplomatic tussle between Myanmar and Bangladesh over the former’s entry into the influential Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), according to people with knowledge of the matter.

The association is the only multilateral platform for littoral states along the Indian Ocean, but it has remained inconspicuous for the first 15 years of its existence.

With the geopolitical spotlight on the Indian Ocean and the rising cache of the ‘Indo-Pacific’, IORA has attracted much more active interest not only from its key members, but also from external players who have the status of dialogue partners. New Delhi had to expend considerable diplomatic capital so that dialogue partners, like China, did not “dominate” the direction of this group.

When the ministers of the member countries meet this week in South Africa for the 18th edition of their annual meeting, they are expected to welcome Myanmar into their fold as the 22nd member. India will be represented by the minister of state for external affairs V.K. Singh.

However, the inclusion of Myanmar has not been an easy task.

The Wire has learnt that Bangladesh, along with Somalia, had serious objections to the entry of Myanmar ahead of the meeting of IORA committee of senior officials on July 30-31. “Their opposition was due to Myanmar’s treatment of Rohingyas,” said a diplomatic source.

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In July this year, there had been rising frustration in Bangladesh over the delay in starting the repatriation of Rohingya refugees by the Myanmar government. The one-year anniversary of the exodus of 700,000 refugees into Cox’s Bazaar was also looming.

Multiple sources confirmed India was key in expending diplomatic elbow grease to persuade Bangladesh to drop its objections. “The argument used was they cannot let the state of their bilateral relations affect their behaviour at a multilateral forum,” a senior government official told The Wire.

Diplomatic sources in Dhaka also confirmed that Bangladesh was swayed to drop its protest against Myanmar’s membership by India. “You cannot win everything,” said a senior Bangladeshi diplomat, when asked about Dhaka’s response.

Most of these diplomatic discussions were taking place behind the scenes even before the IORA committee of senior officials held their meeting.

When Myanmar’s membership was taken up formally in July, there were only statements of support from Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand for their fellow ASEAN colleague.

Along with Myanmar’s entry, Bangladesh would also be confirmed this week as the vice-chair of IORA for the term 2019-2021.

There was another country whose membership application was also considered, but it got a very different reception at the committee of senior officials in July.

Maldives, the Indian ocean archipelagic nation of 1,200 islands, had applied to join IORA in May 2017.

But when Maldives’ request was discussed, the Mauritian representative wondered whether Malé was serious at all. “They wondered if Maldives, which had not contacted even one member to ask for support, was interested in the membership at all,” said a diplomatic source.

Also read: Bangladesh: Concerns Over Free Speech Continue With Opposition-Linked Lawyer’s Arrest

Despite being neighbours, there has been a bit of friction between the Maldives and Mauritius, especially after the former voted ‘no’ in the United Nations General Assembly on the resolution asking the International Court of Justice to give its opinion on the question of sovereignty of the Chagos archipelago.

In the end, India suggested that Maldives’ membership application could be deferred, which was accepted.

Maldives’ application is also listed on the agenda of session four of the Council of Ministers on November 2. It remains to be seen if there is renewed interest in allowing Malé into the club, especially since there is now a change in leadership after the presidential elections.

Meanwhile, France’s efforts to get membership continues to be thwarted by their former colonies of Madagascar and Comoros, with the three having unresolved sovereignty claims over Scattered Islands in the Indian Ocean.

During the last visit of French President Emmanuel Macron to New Delhi, India had welcomed “prospect of France’s enhanced participation at the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA)”.

This is finally likely to happen when the IORA Council of Ministers adopts the draft Declaration on Enhancing Dialogue Partners Engagement on November 2.

The text was finalised in July, after some rounds of negotiations between countries having their own view about how much space should be given to dialogue partners – China, France, US, UK, Germany, Egypt and Japan.

Their assessment was largely coloured by their perception of the spreading influence of China – one of the seven dialogue partners – in the Indian Ocean region.

South Africa, the current chair, has been interested in getting more involvement from various dialogue partners, including China with which it has a close relationship.

In the run-up to the meeting, the South African foreign office’s deputy Director General for Asia and Africa, Anil Sooklal, claimed that a “legacy” of South Africa’s chairmanship would be this document that “articulates the relationship between dialogue partners and member states”.

“We need to ensure that we balance the anxieties of some member states that we don’t want to be swamped, while also giving a meaningful role to dialogue partners. The document that we have all agreed at the senior officials level has this balance,” said Sooklal.

India, as per sources, led the group of countries in IORA who were concerned that dialogue partners can help, but only in a limited way.

One dialogue partner had proposed posting of personnel at the IORA secretariat based in Mauritius. This was expectedly frowned upon by the India-led bloc.

While dialogue partners could help in capacity building and funding support, it was asserted that they should not dictate how their money should be spent. “We don’t want dialogue partners to dominate the direction of the organisation,” said the senior government official.

Sooklal emphasised that the dialogue partners, who have made “significant contribution” to IORA special fund like China, United States and Germany, have determined their special focus area “in consultations with us”.

The US have shown special interest in programmes related to women’s empowerment and small-scale enterprises, while China is keen on ‘blue economy’.

IORA member states are also expected to approve Turkey and South Korea as the two new dialogue partners.

While IORA was largely seen as a group focused on development issues, maritime safety and security was added as one of the six priority areas at the 2011 ministerial meeting in India.

India was perceived to be keen in navigating IORA through the realm of maritime security, albeit via the Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) route so as to calm any concerns of securitisation of the grouping.

Therefore, it was a bit of a surprise for other member states when Sri Lanka volunteered to be the lead coordinator for the permanent working group on maritime security at the July senior officials meeting.

The terms of reference for this IORA working group was finalised at an initial workshop in Colombo in September. It includes establishing a common understanding and integrated policy approach on risks, threats and opportunities, capacity building and enhancing maritime domain awareness.

Sri Lanka has shown interest in becoming a more active player in Indian Ocean, especially after Ranil Wickremesinghe became prime minister.

Last year, Wickremesinghe, as well as, members of the government, had enthusiastically lobbied for a drawing up a code of conduct to ensure freedom of navigation in the Indian Ocean, claiming that UNCLOS was outdated. This was reiterated at several public platforms throughout 2017.

But just like Sri Lanka’s historical support for an Indian Ocean Nuclear Weapons Free Zone was stymied by New Delhi, India’s strong feedback to Colombo in April 2018 that a code of conduct was unhelpful, has also apparently led to its disappearance from Lankan diplomatic priorities. In a 2018 July speech, Wickremesinghe said, “There is no need for a new code of conduct”.

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Author: Devirupa Mitra

Devirupa Mitra is Deputy Editor and Diplomatic Correspondent at The Wire. A journalist with over 15 years of experience, she has covered nearly all beats, from transport to the civic beat at city desks. For the past seven-odd years, she has been focused in tracking developments in Indian foreign policy, with special interest in India’s neighbourhood – from the big picture trends to the minutiae of policy-making within the Ministry of External Affairs. Her twitter handle is @devirupam.