In an interview that is likely to create political tremors in Islamabad and both discomfort and delight in New Delhi, Pakistan’s former High Commissioner to India, Abdul Basit, has sharply and personally criticised former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif.
He has accused him of “pandering to India unilaterally and unconditionally”. Abdul Basit has also said two of Sharif’s closest foreign affairs advisors, Sartaj Aziz and Tariq Fatemi, had “apologetic mind-sets” and were more keen to accept “Modi’s contentions and work quickly to assuage Modi’s concerns” rather than stand up for Pakistan’s interests.
Read the full transcript below.
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Karan Thapar: Hello and welcome to a special interview for The Wire. Today, March the 23rd, is Pakistan Day, and it comes at a time when both in Islamabad and Delhi, there is increased speculation that the relationship between India and Pakistan could be poised to improve. It’s against that background that my guest today and the subject I’ve chosen are particularly apt and pertinent.
My guest is Pakistan’s former high commissioner to India Abdul Basit. Mr Basit was Pakistan’s high commissioner between 2014 and 2017. Those were, by the way, the first three years of the Modi government. And the subject today is his recently written book. It’s called Hostility, and it’s going to be released in India sometime next month. But Mr Basit has sent me by email the full book, which I’ve read, and let me tell you, it’s explosive. Some of its revelations are truly sensational. Many I would say are perhaps even shocking. If my hunch is correct, the book will create an earthquake in Islamabad, and I can bet some of those tremors will be felt very strongly in New Delhi. Joining me today by Zoom from Islamabad to talk about his book Hostility is Abdul Basit himself.
Mr Basit, I want to start with some of the astonishing and almost incredible things that you’ve written in your book. And let’s start with what you say about Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, who was Pakistan’s prime minister right through the three and a half years you were high commissioner in India. You say of Nawaz Sharif, “Sharif was overly inclined to pander to India unilaterally and unconditionally.” Now that is pretty strong criticism of a former prime minister. On what grounds do you say it?
Abdul Basit: Bismillah hir-Rahman nir-Rahim and thank you very much, Mr Thapar, for having me. Obviously I watched very, very closely, through our leader, and worked with him very closely on Pakistan-India relations. I make this assertion because what I have seen. For instance, when Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif decided to come to attend Prime Minister-elect Mr Modi’s inauguration, I thought it was kind of uncalled for to unilaterally free Indian fishermen as a gesture of good will.
Then during the meeting itself, when Prime Minister Modi raised the issue of terrorism and as well as Mumbai attack trial, despite the fact that we had discussed in detail before going to that meeting, the prime minister kept silent on Kashmir. He did not mention even the word Kashmir for a single time. Then subsequently yes, well, what we have seen, how he wanted to retain good relations with Modi, though there was nothing wrong about that, in diplomacy that does help at times, but then if you get carried away and start doing things unilaterally, for example, 9th December, 2015 joint statement, in my view, was poorly negotiated from our side. So we kept on giving, ceding, conceding too much unilaterally, both on Jammu and Kashmir as well as terrorism.
KT: The impression I get when I read your book, and I’ve read it literally cover to cover, is that you believe that Nawaz Sharif in his desire to do business with Modi and his eagerness to improve relations between India and Pakistan was willing to compromise Pakistan’s interests, or at least he did not defend and protect them as resolutely as a prime minister should have done.
AB: I would not say he was, was willing to compromise Pakistan’s interest. I think his approach was different, and he thought that by making such unilateral concessions, he would eventually be able to get concessions from Prime Minister Modi. But that was not the case in my view because the way Islamabad was reading Prime Minister Modi, that, in my assessment, was off the mark. That was not the, I mean, I was the point man in New Delhi, and I always thought that they would consider whatever I, suggestions I make from New Delhi, but I think he had his own approach towards India, and he was religiously and, pursuing that.
KT: So you’re saying that his approach was to make unilateral concession in the hope that Mr Modi would reciprocate, but Mr Modi did not, and as a result, those concessions meant that Pakistan’s interests were compromised.
AB: That is correct and also weakened our principle position on Jammu and Kashmir in particular.
KT: You mean to say that the Pakistan prime minister weakened his country’s principle position on Jammu and Kashmir in particular. I’m repeating it because it’s such an important thing for a former high commissioner to say.
AB: Yes. The way we handled our, you know, interaction with India subsequently, and it is not only because of the prime minister himself. I think the entire team wanted to, or I do not know whether, what kind of instructions they had from the prime minister, but since he was at the helm, I would say that, yes, somewhat maybe inadvertently I do not know, but he was, he was kind of, you know, convinced that he would eventually extract some concessions from India.
KT: Which he failed to do.
AB: Which he failed to do, unfortunately.
KT: I come to the prime minister’s team in a moment’s time because there’s an awful lot to say about them as well in your book, but there’s one more point about Nawaz Sharif that you’ve written that I want to put to you. You say, “I could see that Sharif had an emotional attachment to India and Indians, which at times went beyond his stature as the prime minister.” It seems to me that you’re suggesting that the Pakistan prime minister’s emotions were conflicted.
AB: I would not go to that extent and say “conflicted”, but obviously he was a man, you know, who would reach out to Indians without keeping in view his statue. For example, I still strongly feel, even retrospectively, that his visit to Sajjan Jindal’s residence while he was in New Delhi was not really required. Then the way he received so many journalists and, you know, and, on his own, was again not required. The matter of the fact was that he did not seek a meeting with the Hurriyat leadership. I thought he would have been more careful in his meetings with, with the Indians. But he was all out to oblige everyone, and that, to me, was not the right thing to do.
KT: In other words, his closeness, his familiarity, his willingness to meet Indians compromised the stature and the position of the prime minister of Pakistan.
AB: Obviously, we have to observe protocols, we have to be very, very careful. And this is a kind of perennial problem which our side, you know, has vis-a-vis Indians. And this is what I tried my level best to inject some sanity into the entire exercise, in the sense that Pakistani leaders are very eager to reach out, and it’s not really confined to Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. We have seen in the past as well our leaders reaching out to Indians and get, and then in the process get carried away.
KT: So in other words, in a nutshell, Nawaz Sharif as prime minister didn’t live up to the high standards expected of the office of prime minister.
AB: I would say that because subsequently as well, on many occasions, he would oblige many private Indian citizens, which was not according to our procedures, our rules. There were many visits which took place from India, and I personally objected to those visits because I thought that those visits would not be commensurate with our interests.
KT: Let’s now come to what you have to say about Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s team. First I’d start with what you say about two of his closest special advisors of foreign affairs, Sartaj Aziz and Tariq Fatemi. You say, “They had apologetic mindsets.” You add, “One thing that particularly struck me was their accepting Modi’s contentions readily and working quickly to assuage his concerns.” In other words, these two gentlemen, Sartaj Aziz and Tariq Fatemi, were only too willing to respond to Mr Modi, to help Mr Modi, and less able to stand up for Pakistan’s interests.
AB: I think at the behest of the prime minister, yes. As I said earlier, if you look at the way we negotiated 9th December, 2015 joint statement or then at Ufa, on 10th July, 2015 as well. The way Pakistan negotiated, and then conflicting statements by these two principles on Maulana Masood Azhar and on other issues reinforce my assertion.
KT: In fact you mentioned the joint statement issued in December 2015 when Sushma Swaraj as foreign minister came to Islamabad for the Heart of Asia summit. At that time you say of Pakistan’s negotiators that they were brazenly apologetic and improvident. And again you say specifically of the role played by Sartaj Aziz and your former foreign secretary Aizaz in negotiating that December 2015 statement. You say, “They wanted to deliver to India no matter what.” In other words, your negotiators, and Aziz and Aizaz in particular, were keen to please India even at the cost of Pakistan’s interests and Pakistan’s principled position.
AB: That is correct because I, I never acquiesced in that joint statement, and I kept on opposing the language, especially on Mumbai, on Jammu and Kashmir, because that I thought, especially on Mumbai, and then on Kashmir, on both counts I thought that this is not in tune with our, with our interests.
KT: In fact you’re saying not just the statement, the joint statement of December 2015 but also the statement at Ufa, both let down Pakistan, they did not defend Pakistan’s positions. They, to use your words, “pandered to India” instead.
AB: Absolutely. I have no doubt about that, that they were poorly negotiated documents, and we could have done far better.
KT: So am I correct in saying that when it comes to Sartaj Aziz, Tariq Fatemi and former foreign secretary Aizaz, you’re not impressed with these people, you don’t think highly of them.
AB: No, I would not say, they’re all my senior colleagues, but obviously they had their own brief or instructions from the prime minister, but the outcome documents speak for themselves.
KT: Okay. So far, Mr Basit, we’ve been talking about what you’ve written in your book about Nawaz Sharif, Sartaj Aziz, Tariq Fatemi and former foreign secretary Aizaz. Let’s now come to the way your government and your foreign office, particularly senior colleagues in your foreign office, treated you. I get the clear impression from your book that they were wary of you, that they held you at arm’s length. In fact, you write, and I’m quoting you, “I was considered to be an outsider. My own ministry would prefer to conduct relations with India through its high commissioner in Islamabad and would not even keep me posted.” Let me ask you first, did they not like you, or did they not trust you?
AB: It could, it can be both of those, of the two. Because know this, the entire thing had some history to it. And I can imagine that they were not keeping me posted on different issues, and that did create problems for me to conduct diplomacy in India more effectively. And I hope that these situations do not recur in future.
KT: Let me take one example in particular. You write in your book that in 2015, when Nawaz Sharif wanted to reply to a letter that he’d received from Narendra Modi, he deliberately chose to give the letter to the Indian high commissioner in Islamabad. He did not give it to you thus denying you an opportunity to call on the Indian prime minister. Now your comment about that, and I’m quoting you, is “I was deliberately undermined by my own colleagues at home.” But in this instance, isn’t it more than just undermining? Isn’t this an example of the prime minister not trusting his own high commissioner?
AB: No, I would not blame the prime minister only, but, because it is the job of the advisors to counsel, advise the chief executive keeping in view the established, well established diplomatic practices. And that was a good opportunity for me that I would carry that letter and deliver it to Prime Minister Modi. But instead of doing that, they decided to hand over that letter to the Indian high commissioner. It is usually not done, done in the diplomatic practices. But they decided to do so, but what else I can say.
KT: In fact, they decided to deliberately give the letter to the Indian high commissioner in Islamabad to deliver to Mr Modi, not to you, knowing that had they given it to you, it would give you an opportunity to meet and get to know the Indian prime minister, and that in a sense would facilitate your job in Delhi. They denied you that, and they did it knowingly, not accidentally.
AB: That is correct, in a way, because I would have then requested the Indian ministry for external affairs to arrange my call on the prime minister, I wanted to deliver a letter from our prime minister, and then it was for the Indian side to decide whether they would oblige me, with, for a call or not. So, but, in any case, that opportunity was lost, and then subsequently I had, during my entire tenure in India, I was not really given the access to the Indian leadership which was available to my Indian counterpart in Islamabad.
KT: Absolutely. Had you delivered the letter from Nawaz Sharif to Mr Modi you would’ve had at least one initial point of access. That being denied, you never got that opportunity again. But in fact, Mr Basit, within weeks of this instance of the letter being given to an Indian high commissioner, not to you, actually things got, from your point of view, considerably worse.
In November of 2015, the Indian and Pakistani prime ministers met in Paris, and yet your prime minister reportedly told your foreign secretary, “Do not inform our high commissioner. Do not keep him in the loop.” Again, you were deliberately cut out. And then again weeks later, on Christmas day 2015, when Mr Modi suddenly appeared in Lahore, you were in Pakistan at that time, but you were not invited to join the meeting of the two prime ministers. Once again, you were excluded. And my question is this: this didn’t happen just once, it’s happened repeatedly. Did Nawaz Sharif or did your colleagues in the foreign office think you were an obstacle?
AB: I do not know, but their actions did suggest to me that I have perhaps lost the prime minister’s confidence. And at one stage I did try to get myself transferred from New Delhi as well, but my efforts did not succeed. And that’s why, you know, there are so many events, developments taking place, and I was not kept posted. And that was the problem from my perspective.
KT: But in fact, Mr Basit, it’s not just that you were repeatedly excluded. Sometimes at the specific instructions of the prime minister as the foreign secretary himself told you. For instance, in Paris in 2015, the foreign secretary said to you the PM had said, “Do not tell Abdul Basit.” But on top of that, there were also times when you were insulted. You recount how a junior officer in Islamabad told you, and I’m quoting, “The foreign secretary had instructed them not to send any communication to the high commissioner in Delhi without his permission.” That is not just insulting, did you at the time, when you heard this from a junior, feel humiliated?
AB: I did feel humiliated, but, and I protested accordingly. This is how things are done, and I, you know, for example, the meeting between the two national security advisors on the 6th of December in 2015 in Bangkok, I was not privy to that meeting, as that meeting has been scheduled between the two national security advisors. I came to know about it through my contact in India.
Nawaz Sharif, former Prime Minister and leader of Pakistan Muslim League (N) gestures during a news conference in Islamabad, Pakistan May 10, 2018. Photo: Reuters/Faisal Mahmood
KT: Tell me something—
AB: And when I informed—
KT: Tell me something, Mr Basit, how often in Pakistan, does a prime minister tell the foreign secretary, ‘I’m meeting another country’s prime minister, but don’t tell me ambassador in that country I’m doing so’? Or how often—
AB: It never, it—
KT: It never happens?
AB: It never happens. It never happens. I mean, I would not expect any ambassador or high commissioner to be kept, not to be kept informed of what is happening at the leadership level.
KT: Tell me something else: how often does the foreign secretary in Pakistan give instructions to juniors that his own country’s high commissioner or his own country’s high commission must not be given information until he gives, special, specific information? How often is this instruction given to junior officials by the foreign secretary?
AB: It is usually not done. I have served in the foreign office for years, and I know for a fact that it is not done that way.
KT: So both of these—
AB: I was the unfortunate one.
KT: So both of these instances of the prime minister telling the foreign secretary, ‘don’t tell my high commissioner I’m meeting Modi’ or the foreign secretary telling junior staff, ‘don’t send information to the high commission without my permission’, both of these are unique. You believe this sort of thing has never happened before.
AB: Never happened before, and then you know, Mr Thapar, let me here, I do not know if the prime minister really told the foreign office not to keep our high commission in New Delhi informed. This is what I got from the foreign office people.
KT: Absolutely—
AB: Because it is usually a very, very simple, you know, way of explaining things.
KT: In fact, you didn’t just get it from foreign office people, you got it from a junior officer who told you, which is why you said it was very humiliating.
AB: Absolutely. Absolutely, it was.
KT: You were one of the most senior high commissioners, one of the most senior people in the foreign service, I believe you were on grade 22, and yet a junior was telling you, ‘I’ve been told not to give information and details to the high commissioner.’ But the truth is, it happened yet again. When the Kulbhushan Jadhav issue blew up in 2016, you spoke to the foreign correspondents’ club in Delhi, and you dampened speculation that there could be some sort of reciprocal handling of the matter. And in response, once again a junior official this time sent you a letter of reprimand. A written letter telling you to seek “prior clearance from the foreign ministry before making policy statements”. This time, it wasn’t just exclusion, this time it wasn’t just humiliation, they were actually minimising you now.
AB: That is correct, but I, I responded back to that in very strong words. That either I’m staying here or I’m leaving this, this post. It makes no sense if for every statement I seek prior permission from the foreign office. I know my mandate, I know my state policies, I know my state interests, and I can, and I have enough experience to conduct myself keeping in view Pakistan’s interests.
KT: Absolutely. You did register your protest, but that letter of reprimand was not withdrawn. It remained on the records.
AB: Yes, it remains on the record, and my response too.
Kulbhushan Jadhav. File image.
KT: And so on the records is an instance when a junior official instructed the Pakistan high commissioner in India, “Please seek prior clearance from the foreign ministry before making policy statements”. In other words, they virtually tried to handcuff you so that you couldn’t speak. They minimised you.
AB: That is correct. I, I gave all the details, and when the foreign secretary himself visited New Delhi for the Heart of Asia conference senior officers meeting, I think it was August 2016, he never mentioned that to me, and neither did I raise that issue with him.
KT: Now, Mr Basit, I’ve deliberately begun this interview by talking about what I call the ‘India-Pak revelations’ because I think, to use a colloquial phrase, they’re almost dynamite. But the truth is your book begins with an account about how you were offered the foreign secretaryship by the prime minister of Pakistan. At the time, you were Pakistan’s ambassador in Germany. You were specifically summoned home to Islamabad, you met the prime minister, and he himself, Nawaz Sharif himself, offered you and told you you would be the next foreign secretary. But you never got the job. Nor did you get any explanation why the prime minister had changed his mind. Now it’s quite clear as I read your book that a lot of it is written in hurt. But I have to ask you another question: is this book also written in revenge?
AB: Not in revenge. I wanted to put the record straight because there’s so much ambiguity surrounding those issues. I thought that it would be better for the coming generations, young officers of the foreign service, and for our seniors to understand that these things should not be taken lightly. I never had any claim to become the foreign secretary because at that point in time I was not the senior-most officer. But since I was called at short notice to Pakistan, I was, the whole thing was announced, I was asked to come in writing, to come back to Islamabad, and then, you know, my only grouse and gripe was that our foreign office should have done their homework before they had even suggested my name to the prime minister. So there is, I mean, it is obviously hurtful. There was no need to create this bitter situation for me, where I’m—
KT: I take your, I take your point that the book is not written in revenge, but many people when they realise that you claim Nawaz Sharif “pandered unilaterally and unconditionally to India”, many people when they realise you say that Nawaz Sharif had “an emotional attachment to India and Indians, which went beyond his stature as prime minister” might feel that feels a bit like revenge. That personal level of criticism feels like revenge—
AB: No, no—
KT: How would you respond to that?
AB: I, you know, I always, you know this, there, how diplomacy is conducted, that is important. Especially when you have an adversarial relationship, one has to be more careful. Because I have seen too many things happening, so I could safely, you know, say that the then-prime minister did have some emotional attachment. For example, you know, he’s even said many a time in public that Pakistan and India, we are the same people, we have the same culture, and so on and so forth. So his emotional attachment was there, and we have Jati Umra in Lahore as well. So there is nothing wrong, but, you know, I have seen many journalists travelling to India, Pakistan, at his, to meet him, to meet him, many other people travelling to Pakistan to meet him, so I felt, you know, bad about those things.
KT: So you’re saying this was not said or written in revenge, this is the truth, you wanted it known, you were placing it on record. But there’s no revenge element in it.
AB: Absolutely not because you know I also critiqued the present, the incumbent government as well on many issues.
KT: Okay.
AB: How many, how many times Prime Minister Modi or foreign minister Sushma Swaraj or foreign minister Jaishankar would see Pakistanis, you know, like this, the way our prime minister would interact with Indians. So that was my basic contention, that Pakistani prime minister should not be easily accessible because that can create problems as happened during one of the journalist’s visit to Pakistan.
KT: Let me raise one other point with you. You took all of this, being excluded and cut up, being insulted, being humiliated, being minimised, you took all of this on the chin. You never resigned. The impression I get as I read your book is that you’re sucker for punishment who readily swallowed his pride and his honour. Why did you not resign? I know you asked for a transfer—
AB: No, no, no
KT: …but you did it as you say in your book “informally”. You didn’t resign. And yet your treatment, your humiliation, your being minimised, are grounds for resignation. Why did you not resign?
AB: No, I, I think that I, as I said, I did try to get myself transferred first and that unfortunately did not happen because of a hot of reasons which I would not like to divulge or discuss—
KT: But, but why, can I ask, can I interrupt? Why did you not resign? You were repeatedly humiliated, you were insulted by junior officers, the prime minister was giving instructions you should not be kept in the loop, the foreign secretary was giving instructions you should not be kept in the loop, yet you didn’t resign.
AB: Resignation would have been, you know, the ultimate thing to have been done by me. I thought if I’m being excluded from our diplomacy with India, then it is better for me to get myself transferred. Resignation would—
KT: But even when that, but even that transfer didn’t happen. As you mention it in you book—
AB: Yeah, it did not happen, yeah, but, you know, if it was important—
KT: As you mention in your book, you only asked for the transfer informally. It didn’t happen. Despite that you continued to be humiliated and minimised, and you still didn’t resign. Why did you not resign?
AB: Because, because at one, because at one point I did think that my, my stay, my continuing in India would be helpful in many ways because my job was to keep, keep the issues in their correct perspective, keep warning my, Islamabad, my headquarters. So there was, I could also see the positive side as well by remaining in New Delhi.
KT: In fact you’re almost saying something that I was going to put to you as a hunch or a guess. My hunch as I read your book is that you decided it was important to continue in Delhi because you felt it was important someone stand up to Narendra Modi. You had convinced yourself that your government and your colleagues in the foreign office in Islamabad would not do so, and therefore you believed it was your duty to stand up to Modi. You first hint at this when you write, “I was not willing to pander to Modi at the cost of Kashmir.”
And it seems to me you more or less confirmed this when later in your book you say that you had repeatedly told your government “we should dispense with our delusional unilateral approach in the hope that Modi is some sort of a saint who will reciprocate and accommodate our concerns.” You were determined to stand up to Modi because you felt no one else in your government would do so. This is why you took the humiliation, so that you could continue in Delhi and stand up.
AB: Not stand up to Prime Minister Modi but to protect my country’s interests, my national interests, and our principled position on Jammu and Kashmir.
KT: So in other words, you swallowed you honour and pride, you took the humiliation from your own side because you thought someone in Delhi has to stand up for Pakistan’s principled position.
AB: That was one of the reasons for me.
KT: Alright, we’re coming to the end of this interview, Mr Basit, but there are three other things I want to briefly touch upon. First of all, it seems from your book that the Indian industrialist Sajjan Jindal played a critical role in carrying secret messages between Nawaz Sharif and Narendra Modi. Judging by your book, look at the things he did: he facilitated Sharif’s congratulatory phone call when Modi got elected, he ensured Sharif did not meet the Hurriyat when he came to India for Modi’s swearing in, he arranged for that conversation in Paris, and he even carried messages between them over the Kulbhushan Jadhav matter. How do you explain Jindal’s critical importance to both Sharif and Modi?
AB: I do not know, but Mr Jindal was the first person who, you know, invited me for a lunch, and that was before Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif came to India. And I could see that he was well connected with Prime Minister Modi as well as Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. And to a certain extent that is helpful, I would, because he wanted, was doing everything, with all, I mean, whatever he thought was good for Pakistan and India. But in—
KT: In fact, correct me if I’m wrong, your book reveals there were many instances when Jindal knew something Nawaz Sharif was going to do before you did.
AB: Absolutely, that is correct, for many things, so. There are, there were occasions and I felt, and I had to feign, you know, that I already know all these things. But that was, you know, again a kind of problem which existed throughout my say in New Delhi.
KT: Am I right in saying that one of the instances where Jindal had prior information before you did was Nawaz Sharif’s decision to come for Modi’s swearing in? Am I right in saying that?
AB: You’re absolutely right.
KT: So this means—
AB: Because it was, it was Mr Jindal who informed me through an SMS that prime minister would be coming on this date, he would have this programme, he would also visit my residence and so and so forth.
KT: In other words, not only did Jindal know that the prime minister was coming before his own high commissioner knew, but Jindal also knew the prime minister’s programme in India after he arrived. You didn’t know it at all.
AB: Absolutely. And that kind of, you know, pre-empted me in a way because I was thinking to suggest to Islamabad that we could also arrange a meeting with the Hurriyat leadership, but then I was not given enough time to do that.
KT: In fact, Jindal had already carried some sort of understanding between the two prime ministers on the backstairs that there would be no meeting, and in fact there was no meeting.
AB: There was no meeting.
KT: But doesn’t this whole, doesn’t the whole Jindal episode show that Nawaz Sharif was closer, perhaps he trusted more, an Indian industrialist than he did his own high commissioner?
AB: I do not know, but I think he, he really trusted Mr Jindal. And I do not know why. And there was no reason for him not to trust me because after all he took a decision earlier to appoint me as foreign secretary, then he also transferred me from Berlin to New Delhi, so there was no, explicitly speaking, there was no reason for him not to trust me. But I think other people in the foreign office also played some role in creating some problems between me and the prime minister.
KT: Now the second thing I want to take up before I end this interview is to do with the Kulbhushan Jadhav matter. You write, and I’m quoting you, “Right from the word ‘go’, Pakistan mishandled the case and is gradually losing its credibility in the matter.” Tell me, how did Pakistan mishandle the Kulbhushan Jadhav case?
AB: I think if you go through the two statements, especially the statement made by the then-advisor Sartaj Aziz, he openly said that, he mentioned a few things about the dossier which we submitted to the UN secretary-general. That was, that was not required. Then our prime minister during his speech at the UNGA session did not really mention Kulbhushan Jadhav at all. And then the dossier itself, instead of being, you know, handed over by our advisor, it was kind of given by our PR at the UN. And then secondly, I would say that there were problems vis-a-vis the consular access. Then we made some amendments to our own rules in Pakistan but then allowed the whole matter to go to the ICJ. So there were many things which we could have done in a better manner and to make a good case for Pakistan, that how Kulbhushan Jadhav was actively involved in subversion and terror activities in Pakistan.
KT: Okay. Now you say, and I’m again quoting you, “Pakistan has reached a situation where it can neither free Jadhav nor it seems hang him. Perhaps the only option left for Pakistan is to complicate the matter legally and drag it on indefinitely so that it is saved from taking the difficult decision of either hanging or freeing Jadhav.” What brings you to this conclusion?
AB: Now I’m no more in the government service and I’m not privy to details, this is what my assessment is. That it would be very difficult for any government to let Kulbhushan Jadhav go because of the seriousness of his crimes and his confessions and his trial and his conviction. So I think it also serves India’s purpose so long as he is not executed and we keep on dragging this issue indefinitely.
KT: In other words, Pakistan’s reached a point where it can neither let Jadhav go and return him to India nor can they hang him, and the only option is to just drag the matter on legally because that’s the only outcome.
AB: I think this is also what India wants. India is also kind of, you know, in a situation where they absolutely understand they cannot get Kulbhushan Jadhav back. So—
KT: But, but leave India aside for a moment. You’re saying that Pakistan has boxed itself into a corner, it can neither hang nor release.
AB: Yeah, and the way we have seen the recent developments taking place it becomes far more difficult.
KT: And this is another element of the mishandling of the Jadhav case.
AB: Yeah. If we had done, we had dealt with this case in a more diligent and effective manner, perhaps we could have avoided this, we have come to this pass. So we could have avoided this.
KT: Okay. Now the third thing I want to raise before we end this interview is, you write, “India is doing everything it can to keep the so-called insurgency in Balochistan going by funding militancy and terrorism in the province through its proxies inside Balochistan and Afghanistan.” Can you give me some details of what you claim India is doing, what you accuse India of doing?
AB: I think we all know. If you go through the confession of commander Kulbhushan Jadhav, you will immediately come to understand that what kind of activities India is engaged in. And then you all, I’m sure you are aware of Mr Ajit Doval’s “defensive offence” doctrine. And after Kulbhushan Jadhav, we have, we had arrested hundreds of operative who were being funded by, by India. So and then this DisinfoLab information. So there are many things, you know, which point to India’s, India’s policy to destabilise Pakistan, particularly Balochistan.
KT: You referred, you referred in that answer to Ajit Doval’s “offensive defensive” doctrine, you’re referring, I take it, to a remark he made one his, in one of his speeches where he said that Pakistan should remember if they carry on inflicting terror on India, we can also take steps and measures in Balochistan. That’s what you’re referring to.
AB: Even Prime Minister Modi in one of his, I think it was in 2016 where he mentioned Balochistan as well. So, I mean, there is no doubt as far as Pakistan is concerned that India does not want Balochistan or the Gwadar port or CPEC for that matter to, to complete. The CPEC project, so they have their strong reservations.
KT: My last question, my last question: your book is called Hostility. Many people who knew you in India when you were high commissioner would say that hostility is Abdul Basit’s dominant emotion towards India. How do you respond to that?
AB: That is not correct. I think I would not brag about it, but the way I was invited, received by the people of India of all religions, I think that was unprecedented, phenomenal. I was invited to, you know, mandirs, to gurudwaras, to Jamia masjid. So my public diplomacy I think, I’m very kind of, you know, content that I made many friends in India, and I continue to be in touch with them, so I would not, there is no hostility to, with or towards India. My job was to, you know, I would like to emphasise here, that, as a diplomat, as Pakistan high commissioner, my mandate was to strengthen the relationship or to explore possibilities between the two countries, and I tried my level best to do that.
KT: The view that some have, or maybe I should say that many have, that Abdul Basit was hostile to India, that Abdul Basit wasn’t really keen to improve relations, you’re saying that view is mistaken, you were never hostile to India?
AB: No, not at all, if you, no, I was correct, I would say, because it was me who suggested to prime minister to come and attend Prime Minister Modi’s oath-taking ceremony. It was me who, at the suggestion of some of Modi and Mr Mohan Bhagwat’s friend, we deferred granting the most, or the non-discriminatory market access to India. So I was all, you know, there to accommodate the new government and to deal with them. But unfortunately the tipping point was when the Modi government rejected to my introduction with the Hurriyat leadership. That was enough for me to understand as to where Modi government stands in terms of Kashmir.
KT: And after that moment, in August 2014, when they objected to your meeting Hurriyat and as a result the planned meeting between the two foreign secretaries got called off, after that moment it was downhill for you with the Indian government all the way.
AB: No, even after that I had, had very good, detailed meetings with both Mr, then Ms Sujatha Singh, the then-foreign secretary, and Mr Ajit Doval. One meeting lasted for almost two hours with Mr Modi (?) 43:39 , and we discussed many, many things like Sir Creek and Siachen and so on and so forth, how to—
KT: In other words, the public perception that you weren’t liked in India and that you were yourself hostile to India is mistaken. The truth is you had a good relationship with Jaishankar when he was foreign secretary, you had a good relationship with Ajit Doval, who was national security advisor. The public perception that you were hostile to India is mistaken. Give me a quick yes or no?
AB: I don’t think so because, even, the Indian public showed so much affection that I could not pay them back.
KT: Okay. Let’s then end it there. Mr Basit, thank you very much for this interview.
AB: Thank you very much.
KT: As I said, your book is explosive. As I half-predicted, it’s going to create earthquakes in Islamabad and I imagine those tremors will be felt in India as well. Now what you say in particular about Nawaz Sharif, about his unconditional and unparalleled pandering to India or about his emotional attachment to India, that will definitely shake up people on both sides of the border. I thank you for this interview, take care, stay safe.
AB: Thank you very much, sir. Very kind of you.
