A Hurried US Exit Might Do More Harm Than Good For Peace in Afghanistan

The flurry of activity by US special representative for Afghan reconciliation Zalmay Khalilzad, and his remark that the US is in a hurry to find a peaceful solution for the war-torn country, has raised more concerns than it has assuaged. As the US war in Afghanistan enters its 18th year, a mad dash for exit and setting up of an arbitrary April deadline for a negotiated settlement smack of a desperation in the US camp. Pulling off in four months something that has remained elusive for two Afghan and three US presidents, and nine administrations among them, will be truly miraculous.

The precipitous efforts and a rather whimsical timeframe are reminiscent of the monumental blunder former President Barack Obama made by setting up a withdrawal date in 2011. Obama’s declaration left Afghanistan with no peace and a buoyed Taliban. The result this time around is likely to be the same.

Just like then, the Taliban today are in no hurry to cut a deal with an adversary who they perceive is about to cut and run. The Taliban smell blood – and a victory – but they are not yet rushing to the finish line. As a Taliban fighter once summarised: “The US has the watches, but we have all the time!”

Also read: Designed to Fail: The American Misadventure in Afghanistan

The US may have to pull out, but the Taliban have nowhere to go to. They – and their principal backer Pakistan – are in it for a longer haul than anyone thinks. The Taliban intend to go through the song and dance of the talks while there’s a lull in fighting due to the harsh winters. Come Nawruz, the Afghan new year which marks the spring and also the start of the fighting season, and they’ll be back to the battlefield – with a vengeance.

US commanders and civilian officials might portray the recent surge in coalition airstrikes and backup for the Afghan forces as gains, but it indicates stalemate rather than strength. As the old maxim goes, the guerilla wins by not losing while a conventional force loses by not winning. And this most certainly is not lost on the Taliban and Pakistan.

In an attempt to play a catchup, the coalition forces have dropped more munitions in airstrikes this year than in any year since 2011. This has yielded some battlefield successes such as the elimination of Mullah Abdul Mannan, drug baron and Taliban’s shadow governor for Helmand province. The tactic, though, has drawn criticism from within Afghanistan, including former President Hamid Karzai, and the UN for increasing civilian casualties such as the tragic killing of two dozen people in a Taliban-controlled area last month.

Although the Taliban remain a perfidious enemy that uses civilian areas for sanctuary and combat, the bombings raise concerns about rights violations and alienate a population increasingly skeptical of the Afghan state’s ability to protect them.

Also watch: Watch | One Year of Donald Trump’s New South Asia Policy

The Pakistani state’s ability to protect and harbour its Taliban proxy has gone unchallenged and unchecked. A recent report by the US Department of State concluded that Pakistan continues to harbour the Taliban and its most lethal wing, the Haqqani Network. The net effect, therefore, is that while the Afghan forces have fought valiantly, both they and their coalition support troops are essentially engaged in an endless, bloody game of whack-a-mole. The Afghan forces trounce many assorted Taliban contingents on the battlefield, only for them to regroup and resurface elsewhere thanks to a massive sanctuary across the Durand Line in Pakistan. The losses that the Afghan troops are bearing – on an average 20 caskets per day – are hard if not impossible to replenish.

The Taliban leadership enjoys a hospitable, safe environment in Pakistan. Taliban chief Mullah Haibatullah is free to summon his Qatar office staff to Pakistan for a powwow about the negotiations with the US. One previous Taliban chief, Mullah Mohammed Omar, died in Pakistan while his successor Mullah Akhtar Mansour was killed there in a US drone attack. An Afghan Taliban spokesman, Zabiullah Mujahid, was recently interviewed in Urdu by a civil servant-turned-analyst for a Pakistani TV channel. Prior to that, an “arrested” Pakistani Taliban spokesman, Ehsanullah Ehsan, was interviewed by a major TV network in Pakistan. In a country where the army has a chokehold on the media, there is no way that these Taliban spokesmen could speak on primetime TV without a nod and a wink from the Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR).

Despite multiple military operations, ostensibly to neutralise the Taliban, the Pakistan Army has not killed or punished a single top-ranking Afghan or Pakistani Taliban leader. Even the leaders of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) – the so-called bad Taliban who target the Pakistani state – killed thus far were all eliminated by the US. This shows that Pakistan preserves the Taliban leadership while occasionally staging operations to go after the foot soldiers.

It is against this backdrop that an American rush towards a negotiated settlement, without a full buy-in from the Afghan state and the people, is rife with pitfalls. Hamid Karzai has rightly warned that the US must not talk peace with Pakistan over the heads of the Afghans. While the 17 years of war have cost the US a ton of treasure, the Afghans have paid for it with an ocean of blood. A solution geared for expediency because President Donald Trump might want to check off the withdrawal for his reelection resume is bound to fail.

Also read: A Middle Finger to the Past: Afghanistan Votes, Despite the Odds

The recently deceased former US President George H.W. Bush, declaring a victory of sorts, had walked away from Afghanistan after the Soviets pulled out in 1989 and had left the country to its own and – more disconcertingly – Pakistan’s devices. As a result, the whole country was turned into what James C. Scott calls a geopolitical shatter zone, i.e. an ungovernable area where the Taliban, its Haqqani Network affiliate, their Pakistani jihadi guests, and above all the al-Qaeda, roamed free and prepared for and perpetrated the 9/11 terror attacks. The US, after all, came back to Afghanistan in the aftermath of the deadly attacks those originated in Afghanistan-Pakistan, thus aptly brandishing the abbreviation Af-Pak.

Individuals or states do not change their behavior without an incentive or coercion. After decades of playing its sugar daddy, the US is dangling little today, if anything, to incentivise Pakistan into changing its behavior. And the American will – not capacity – to coerce its erstwhile South Asian ally into submission is limited, if not non-existent. Pakistan, and more specifically its Army, have played their hand exceptionally well. They are virtually under zero pressure, from the outside or within, to change their tack in Afghanistan.

Pak Army has a tremendous clarity in its sinister desire to see its preferred jihadist proxies at the helm in Kabul. Trump’s Twitter tirade against Pakistan or his schmoozing letter to PM Imran Khan – dubbed often as the Taliban Khan for his obscurantist views and sympathy for the jihadists – means zilch in the grand scheme of things. As far as its Afghanistan policy goes, Pak Army can be many things but not casual or capricious. They have steered their Taliban proxy with a steady hand and with an eye out for the distant future. If their strategy was to wear the US out – a death by a thousand cuts, as it was called against the Soviets – it would pay off, if the US planners continue to pin their hopes on a quick fix and withdrawal.

It is unlikely that the Taliban would simply put down their arms and agree to the present Afghan constitution and legal system. Even if they do, they would demand the lion’s share in it. Additionally, there are no guarantees that 0after an abrupt US withdrawal, the Taliban would not revert to violence to take it all.

Also watch: Wide Angle: What Role Can Regional Powers Play in Afghanistan’s Security?

The US would do well to step back from ramming a so-called peace process, which has little or no guarantees for civil and constitutional rights, down the Afghan throats. They should detangle the peace process from the upcoming Afghan presidential elections in April 2019 and remove the artificial deadline imposed on themselves and the Afghan government. Delaying the elections or appearing to coerce the Afghan government to do so would also be highly ill-advised.

The contours of the current initiative by the Trump administration and its point man Zalmay Khalilzad are opaque and prejudicial to an Afghan-led peace effort. Any effort for a so-called peace at the expense of the Afghans is bound to fail and restart the cycle of death and destruction that was the hallmark of the hapless land in the 1990s.

Mohammad Taqi is a Pakistan-American columnist. He tweets @mazdaki.