World Bank Plans To Replace Cancelled ‘Doing Business’ Report in Two Years

The flagship report on countries’ business climate was cancelled after a data-rigging scandal.

Washington: The World Bank plans to unveil in about two years a replacement for its flagship “Doing Business” report on countries’ business climate, which was cancelled after a data-rigging scandal, the bank‘s chief economist, Carmen Reinhart, told Reuters.

Reinhart, who was elevated to senior management as part of the bank‘s bid to rebuild its credibility after the ethics concerns, said some key concepts for the new product were already clear.

These included a mandate for more transparency about the underlying methodology, greater reliance on survey data from companies and less focus on ranking countries.

“The underlying nuts and bolts will be in the public domain,” Reinhart said. “Public disclosure is an important pillar in restoring credibility.”

The bank would also emphasize survey data to reduce the role of judgment and eliminate the “beauty contest” aspect of the rankings that incentivized countries to “game the system.”

In September, the bank‘s board scrapped publication of the annual “Doing Business” rankings after an external review of data irregularities in the 2018 and 2020 versions, claimed senior bank officials, – including then-chief executive Kristalina Georgieva, who now heads the International Monetary Fund – pressured staff to make changes.

The law firm WilmerHale is still working on a second report on possible staff misconduct about the data changes, which benefited China, Saudi Arabia and other countries.

The IMF’s board backed Georgieva after a lengthy review of the allegations, but she could still be implicated in the second review.

Reinhart said the saga has dented the credibility of the World Bank and that it would take time and effort to rebuild trust.

“It’s important that the metrics of credibility are not personality-based, that they’re systems-based,” she said, adding that the bank had instituted “a lot of safeguards” over the past year after reviewing several external reports.

“Nothing in life is failsafe but it reduces … the capacity for misuse and abuse,” she said. “Hopefully credibility will follow. You know, credibility is one thing that is difficult to establish and easy to lose. But time will tell.”

Reinhart commissioned a major review of the Doing Business methodology by an external advisory panel after concerns were raised internally about data manipulation involving the reports.

This resulted in a scathing 84-page review calling for a series of remedial actions and reforms, citing a pattern of government efforts to interfere with the scoring.

It faulted the bank for a lack of transparency about the underlying data and said it should stop selling consulting services to governments aimed at improving their scores.

Reinhart said the practice was halted in her development economics unit in 2020 and 2021 and that the bank had begun terminating Doing Business-related advisory services across the board after the cancellation of the report.

Reinhart said the bank would take a broader look at the consequences of the scandal and what other measures were required once the second WilmerHale report was completed.

“That is a bridge we will have to cross once the full report is in,” she said.

(Reuters)

World Bank Reports Continue to Mislead

Closer examination of the Doing Business Report suggests that the ‘evidence’ it cites is weak and heavily influenced by the experiences of developed countries.

Closer examination of the Doing Business Report suggests that the ‘evidence’ it cites is weak and heavily influenced by the experiences of developed countries.

Representative image. Credit: IPS

Representative image. Credit: IPS

Sydney and Kuala Lumpur: The World Bank’s Doing Business Report (DBR) 2017, subtitled ‘Equal Opportunity for All’, continues to mislead despite the many criticisms, including from within, levelled against the bank’s most widely read publication and bank management promises of reform for many years.

Its foreword claims, “Evidence from 175 economies reveals that economies with more stringent entry regulations often experience higher levels of income inequality as measured by the Gini index.” But what is the evidence base for its strong claims, for instance, that “economies with more business-friendly regulations tend to have lower levels of income inequality?”

Closer examination suggests that the ‘evidence’ is actually quite weak and heavily influenced by countries closer to the ‘frontier’, mainly developed countries, most of which have long introduced egalitarian redistributive reforms reflected in taxation, employment and social welfare measures, and where inequality remains lower than in many developing countries.

The report notes that relations between DB scores and inequality ‘differ by regulatory area’. But it only mentions two, for ‘starting a business’ and for ‘resolving insolvency’. For both, higher DB scores are associated with less inequality, but has nothing to say on other DB indicators.

Other studies – by the OECD, IMF, ADB and the UN – negatively correlate inequality and the tax/GDP ratio. Higher taxes enable governments to spend more on public health, education and social protection, and are associated with higher government social expenditure/GDP ratios and lower inequality. The DBR’s total tax rate indicator awards the highest scores to countries with the lowest tax rates and other contributions (such as for social security) required of businesses.

Bias
The DBR’s bias to deregulation is very clear. First, despite the weak empirical evidence and the fallacy of claiming causation from mere association, it makes a strong general claim that less regulation reduces inequality. Second, in its selective reporting, the DBR fails to report on many correlations not convenient for its purpose, namely advocacy of particular policies in line with its own ideology.

The World Bank had suspended the DBR’s labour indicator in 2009 after objections – by labour, governments and the International Labour Organisation – to its deployment to pressure countries to weaken worker protections. But its push for labour market deregulation continues. For example, Tanzania’s score is cut in 2017 for introducing a workers’ compensation tariff to be paid by employers while Malta is penalized for increasing the maximum social security contribution to be paid by employers.

New Zealand beat Singapore to take first place in the latest DBR rankings following reforms reducing employers’ contributions to worker accident compensation. Nothing is said about how it has become a prime location for ‘money-laundering shell’ companies.

Meanwhile, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Belarus, Serbia, Georgia, Pakistan, the UAE and Bahrain – eight of DB 2017’s “top 10 improvers” –  have recorded poor and, in some cases, worsening workers’ rights, according to the International Trade Union Confederation. A DBR 2017 annex claims that labour market regulation can “reduce the risk of job loss and support equity and social cohesion,” but devotes far more space to promoting fixed term contracts with minimal benefits and severance pay requirements.

In support of its claim of adverse impacts of labour regulations, DBR 2017 cites three World Bank studies from several years ago. Incredibly, it does not mention the extensive review of empirical studies in the Bank’s more recent flagship World Development Report 2013: Jobs, which found that “most estimates of the impacts [of labour regulations] on employment levels tend to be insignificant or modest”.

DBR 2017 adds gender components to its three indicator sets – starting a business, registering property and enforcing contracts – concluding: “For the most part, the formal regulatory environment as measured by Doing Business does not differentiate procedures according to the gender of the business owner. The addition of gender components to three separate indicators has a small impact on each of them and therefore a small impact overall”.

Should anyone be surprised by the DBR’s conclusion? It ignores the fact that the policies promoted by the bank especially adversely affect women workers who tend to be concentrated in the lowest paid, least unionised jobs, for example, in garments and apparel production or electronics assembly. The DBR also discourages regulations improving working conditions, for example, for equal pay and maternity benefits.

Despite its ostensible commitment to ‘equal opportunities for all’, the DBR cannot conceal its intent and bias, giving higher scores to countries that favour corporate profits over citizens’, especially workers’ interests, and national efforts to achieve sustainable development.

Sadly, many developing country governments still bend over backwards to impress the World Bank with reforms to improve their DBR rankings. This obsession with performing well in the bank’s ‘beauty contest’ has taken a heavy toll on workers, farmers and the world’s poor – the majority of whom are women – who bear the burden of DBR-induced reforms, despite its proclaimed concerns for inequality, gender equity and ‘equal opportunities for all’.

Anis Chowdhury, a former professor of economics at the University of Western Sydney, held senior United Nations positions during 2008–2015 in New York and Bangkok. Jomo Kwame Sundaram, a former economics professor, was UN Assistant Secretary-General for Economic Development, and received the Wassily Leontief Prize for Advancing the Frontiers of Economic Thought in 2007.

Ease Of Doing Business and Paying Taxes: How To Jump a Hundred Positions On the World Bank’s Rankings

If India can bring down the total number of payments to 10 and the total hours to comply to 160, even without changing the total tax rate, the ‘paying taxes’ rank could jump by over a hundred positions to the 60s.

If India can bring down the total number of payments to 10 and the total hours to comply to 160, even without changing the total tax rate, the ‘paying taxes’ rank could jump by over a hundred positions to the 60s.

If India were to institute specific reforms, it could climb in the Doing Business rankings. Credit: Reuters

If India were to institute specific reforms, it could climb in the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business rankings. Credit: Reuters

The latest ‘Ease of Doing Business’ report of the World Bank Group was released this week. Once again, everyone waited with bated breath to see how many ranks India jumps up in the list of 190 countries. Once again, everyone has been left disappointed; India climbed just one position to 130 this year.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi raised the stakes two years ago when he declared, rather sanguinely, that India will move to the top 50 positions within a couple of years. Clearly, that optimistic confidence was unjustified, mainly because perhaps no one briefed him that it is quite a complex exercise to implement specific reforms that will favourably impact the ‘doing business’ indicators.  It is particularly complex in India, where gigantic central, state and local governments exist, with their decades-old legacy of labyrinthine procedures and bureaucratic controls, each of which needs to be tackled carefully and tenaciously. Creating the sound bite was easy, delivering is tough.

The World Bank’s ‘doing business’ report takes into account ten indicators of the ease of doing business in an economy, including starting a business, obtaining construction permits, getting electricity, registering property, enforcing contracts and paying taxes. Paying taxes is one of the worst indicators for India – this year the country’s rank dipped to a lowly 172 out of 190 countries, a big fall from previous reports where it ranked 157. To make a serious attempt at an improvement, we need to try to understand why this is particularly egregious. The reason for fall this year is because for the first time the World Bank report has also begun to look at the performance of tax administrations after a tax return is filed; that is, post-filing compliance. India fares particularly poorly since it takes long to obtain refunds, especially on the VAT/CENVAT, and because the processes of audits and appeals are cumbersome.

To be able to effect reforms that will impact India’s ranking, we need to understand the World Bank’s methodology. The report’s methodology has three sub-indicators: time to comply in hours, the number of payments and the total tax rate. On the sub-indicator for the total tax rate, India gets a score of 60.6, which is far worse than the OECD average of 40.9. This is being exacerbated not by the corporate income tax rate, which at 30% is moderate, but by other factors: first is the fact that you have two indirect taxes, the VAT and the CENVAT being implemented; second is the employees’ provident fund (EPF) and employees’ insurance; third is that India has a number of cesses. Now, with the GST being rolled out next year, we can hope to have a reduction in the indirect taxes, especially if a standard rate of 18% is agreed to. If the labour taxes remain at their current levels, and so do the cesses, there is not much of a chance of an improvement on this front.

As for the ‘number of payments’ sub-indicator, in India, owing to the significant spread of electronic filing both at the central and state tax administration levels, the number of payments for corporate income tax and VAT is in line with the best international practices; this is because if e-filing is prevalent, the ‘Doing Business’ report takes even multiple payments as one.  However, the number of payments on the labour taxes, that is, the EPF is 12, one for each month, and on employees’ insurance is four. Now, if these are completely made online, the total number of payments will also be counted as one, marking a huge improvement; the number of payments will go down to just 10, lower than the OECD average.

Another area where India fares poorly is in the number of hours taken for compliance. This is also counted for the three major taxes, based on common international tax structures – corporate income tax, VAT and social security contributions. It takes just 45 hours to comply with the corporate income tax, which is in line with international good practice. The time to comply with VAT, CENVAT and central sales tax is taken together at 105 hours, which is high. In respect of the labour taxes – EPF and employees’ insurance – the time to comply is also a high 91 hours in a year, more than double the time it takes for corporate income tax compliance. The total time to comply comes to 241 hours, far higher than the OECD average of 163 hours. It is hoped that with the GST implementation the number of hours taken to comply with the GST would come down. Overall, there needs to be a concerted strategy to fix the compliance time on GST and labour taxes to bring down the total hours needed to comply. If the number of payments and the compliance time could be reduced in the EPFO, the ‘paying taxes’ indicator can improve. To achieve this, the finance ministry needs help from the labour ministry.

A rough calculation shows that if India brings down the total number of payments to 10 (very doable) and the total hours to comply to 160 (harder to achieve but possible), even with no change in the total tax rate, the ‘paying taxes’ rank could jump by over a hundred positions to the 60s. What is needed is a clear understanding of the specific reforms needed and a roadmap to implementing them. Sound bites are nice, but delivering on promises is far better.

Rajul Awasthi leads the tax policy and revenue administration work stream for the Europe and Central Asia region of the World Bank.  Views expressed here are personal