Tag: VVPATs

Why Election Commission’s FAQs on EVM-VVPATs Don’t Clear Cloud of Suspicion Over Electoral Process

The levels of transparency that the Election Commission have adopted are hopelessly inadequate to meet the very high standards that the Supreme Court of India has set for our right to know, as citizen-voters. 

This article is part of The Wire‘s ‘India Black Boxed’ series. Read it here: Introduction | Part I | Part II | Part III | Part IV | Part V

A few days ago, the Supreme Court of India refused to grant the Association for Democratic Reforms (ADR) an urgent hearing of its 2021 petition about a host of matters relating to the 2019 Lok Sabha elections. One of the major issues raised by the petitioner as the basis for seeking an urgent hearing is the suitability of electronic voting machines (EVMs) and voter verifiable paper audit trail (VVPAT) units for ascertaining the people’s mandate. The Bench seemed visibly exasperated by what it called – the repeated filing of petitions which cast aspersions on the functioning of the EVM-VVPAT combo.

To a layperson, these remarks hint at the Bench’s faith in the infallibility of the machine-based voting system based on the Election Commission of India’s (ECI) claims as the respondent to the petition. A few weeks before this hearing took place, the ECI had released a revised set of 100 FAQs (frequently asked questions) with the objective of clarifying all doubts about these electoral machines. Several experts have commented about these FAQs in these columns already.

Once upon a time, I would also press the EVM button (both before and after the introduction of VVPATs) with full confidence in the reliability and infallibility of the electronic voting system. Having witnessed a demonstration of the electronic voting system at Nirvachan Sadan, several years ago, where a senior officer showed how these machines work and what fool-proof administrative measures are put in place to ensure their safe custody and transport, before, during, and after parliamentary and assembly elections, there was reason to entertain any kind of doubt.

In fact, this is what the ECI proudly claims in its FAQ 2 “…no technical knowledge is required for casting a vote on the EVM and ordinary citizens can easily cast their votes on ECI EVMs”. Consequently, the public education campaigns the ECI launches prior to every general or bye-election are limited to such demonstrations only. One such awareness drive is going on across the country even as I write this piece. We are expected to take the reliability of EVMs as an article of faith based on what the ECI shows and tells us.

The Election Commission building in New Delhi. Photo: Twitter/@PIB_INDIA. November 5, 2022.

But there is also a tricky thing called the ‘voters’ right to know’ which the Supreme Court of India discovered more than 22 years ago. The court recognised every voter’s right to receive information about the educational qualifications, financial background, and criminal antecedents, if any, of every electoral candidate, so that they choose wisely between those with a clean and tainted background. Incidentally, it was ADR that had moved the apex court, not once, but twice, to have this right read into Article 19 (1)(a) of the constitution which guarantees free speech and expression to every citizen.

Can it then be said that the voter’s right to know is limited to accessing details about the public character of electoral candidates and nothing more relating to the electoral process? Does it not extend to seeking adequate knowledge about the current voting system which is facilitated through machines, unlike the paper-based system that was the primary balloting method until a decade ago? Prior to pressing the EVM button of choice, voters play another equally important role. As taxpayers, we provide the funds with which the ECI buys these machines. So, these machines are made for our use and we have the right to ask questions to resolve every one of our doubts.

But why ask questions about these machines above and beyond what the ECI already tells us? A comparison between paper-based and electronic voting systems will reveal the foundation on which these doubts start to crop up. In a paper-based system, the ECI through its appointed functionaries gets a ballot paper printed with the names of all independent and political party-ticketed candidates along with their allotted symbols. All that the registered voter – literate and unlettered, both – had to do was simply take a ballot paper and a rubber stamp from the Presiding Officer, go to the polling booth, stamp the cross mark against the preferred candidate and drop it in the ballot box oneself.

The ballot paper was even pre-folded while being handed over to the voter. The voter was able to see every step of this action sequence with one’s own eyes or with the help of an assistant if the person was blind. On counting day, the counting agents of candidates could see every ballot paper – both valid and invalid – while it was being counted before the results were announced. Nothing was hidden from the naked eye (with or without prescription glasses) as everything except the recording of the voter’s choice on the ballot was clearly visible.

Now contrast this with the electronic voting system. There is a Ballot Unit (BU) with the names of candidates displayed on a printed label affixed on top of it. The voter presses the button next to the name and symbol of the preferred candidate in the polling booth and after it beeps something happens (we will explain below why it is not possible to say anything more specific than this). Then the VVPAT unit gets into action and prints out a slip which is visible to the voter for seven seconds through an illuminated window. This slip contains the name, serial number and symbol of the candidate in favour of whom the voter pressed the button. Then it automatically gets cut and falls down into the VVPAT’s drop box and the light is turned off. Next, a ‘loud beep is heard’, which according to the ECI, completes the action sequence of voting from casting to its registration in the EVM-VVPAT combo. Only one stage of this process is visible to the voter, namely, the printed VVPAT slip, to satisfy oneself that the vote has been printed as per one’s choice. What gets recorded on the Control Unit (CU) is not visible at all, the voter has to be satisfied by the mere sound of a beep.

On counting day, only the CUs are brought to the counting hall and the tally of votes is calculated by pressing the relevant button in the presence of candidates. Only the serial numbers, not the names of the candidates are visible on the CU. Further, according to the Supreme Court directives, VVPAT slips are counted from only five randomly selected units in Assembly elections. For parliamentary elections, five units are chosen randomly from the Assembly segments of the constituency for the purpose of tallying the VVPAT slip count with the candidate-wise totals that the CU calculates. This random selection process is not visible to the counting agents (having served as a counting agent to an independent candidate in the 2020 Delhi assembly elections, I know this for a fact).

So, when the transition is made from the starkly visual attributes of a paper-based voting and counting system to the present machine-mediated system (with only two very limited visual and even shorter audio feedback- beep! beep! Beep!), the ECI has a more onerous duty of transparency towards the electorate. Convincing the voter places a much higher burden of proof than what the ECI is currently willing to discharge.

In my opinion, the ECI’s answers to several of the 100 FAQs do not satisfactorily discharge this burden. Let us start with the most basic FAQs where the ECI has tried to explain how the EVM-VVPAT combo works, internally. 

1. FAQs relating to signal flow (FAQs #2, 39, and 86): In response to FAQ #2- “In what way functioning of EVMs is different from conventional voting through paper ballots? Whether technical knowledge is required for casting vote through the EVM?”, the ECI explains the process of electronic voting that I have summarised above and says that it is better than a paper ballot-based system which had problems like improper marking or smudging of ink. Further, the ECI says:

“When the voter presses a button against the candidate of his/her choice on Ballot Unit, a red LED glows against the chosen candidate’s button on BU. A paper slip showing the serial number, name and the symbol of the candidate of his/her choice is generated and is visible for about 7 seconds through transparent window of VVPAT. Hence the voter is able to see the “printed slip” and verify that vote is cast as per his/her choice. Thereafter, the printed paper slip gets cut automatically and stored in sealed Drop box of VVPAT. A loud BEEP is heard from the Control Unit which confirms that the vote is registered successfully.” (emphasis supplied)

But at FAQ #39 in response to the query- “Is it possible to vote more than once on an EVM by pressing the button again and again”, the ECI’s explanation (reproduced below) about how the EVM behaves is at complete variance with the explanation given against FAQ #2:

“No, it is not possible to vote more than once on an ECI-EVM by a particular voter. As soon as a particular button on the Ballot Unit is pressed, the vote is recorded for that particular candidate and a loud beep is emitted for officials and election agents to note that the vote has been completed.” (emphasis supplied)

Note the complete absence of any reference to the VVPAT stage of the voting process in this reply. Those with unshakeable faith in the electronic voting system may claim this is just a legacy response from the times when EVMs were not paired with VVPATs at all and it must not be seen in isolation from the ECI’s reply to FAQ #2. After all, the deployment of VVPAT units became mandatory only after the 2013 directive of the Supreme Court of India, in the matter of Dr. Subramanian Swamy vs the Election Commission of India. Let us accept that reasoning temporarily and move on.

FAQ #86 is a recent addition (January 2024), not found in the much shorter FAQs list the ECI released in August 2023. The query is: “How does signal/command flow between various units of EVM viz. BU, CU and VVPAT? Since the VVPAT is kept along with BU inside the voting compartment of the voter, does VVPAT receive any signal/command from BU and vice-versa?” To this, the ECI’s elaborate reply is as follows:

“In M3 EVMs, CU always acts as Master, irrespective of the position in which it is placed or connected. BU and VVPAT act as Slave units in the connected network, which receive commands from CU to act as per the application programme. BU and VVPAT do not communicate with each other. It is the CU that communicates with both the BU and VVPAT. When a voter presses a candidate button on BU, the BU sends the button number to CU and in turn, the CU communicates to VVPAT to print the slip of the corresponding button number. Only after printing and cutting of the printed VVPAT slip, the CU registers the vote.

 Votes are recorded only in CUs and not in BUs or VVPATs. When a particular Candidate’s button in BU is pressed by the voters, BU sends the button number to CU and CU commands printing of slip related to that button number to VVPAT. The VVPAT slip so printed remains visible to the voters for about seven seconds to verify their votes cast through the VVPAT display window. VVPAT then sends an acknowledgment to the CU to mark completion of printing of slip. The CU then initiates the cut of the printed slip and the slip falls in the sealed drop box of the VVPAT (Rules 49A and 49M, The Conduct of Elections Rules, 1961). After the successful completion of all these steps, i.e. printing and cutting of the VVPAT slips, the VVPAT sends an acknowledgement to the CU. Upon receiving the message from VVPAT, the CU records the vote electronically and emits a long BEEP. The BEEP marks the completion of the voting process for the voter. 

In M3 model, Master-Slave bus architecture is used. VVPAT can be connected anywhere in the EVM M3 bus. The Control Unit (CU) implements communication, command processing, handling of key operations and handling of all the commands/responses to/from BU and VVPAT. The Master-Slave protocol is used to control access to the communication bus. Communication on the bus is initiated by the “Master” (CU) with a “Command” to a “Slave” (BU & VVPAT). The “Slave” which is constantly monitoring the bus for “Commands” will recognize only the “Commands” addressed to it and will respond by performing an action and by returning a “Response”. Only the Master can initiate a command. CU is always the Master in the ECI M3 EVM system setup.”

The answer to FAQ #86 ends with a signal flow schematic and suggests that readers refer to Annexure-I as well for further clarity. Annexure-I contains a signal flow diagram (see Images 1 & 2 below):

Image 1: Signal flow schematic under ECI’s answer to FAQ #86

Image 2: Signal flow diagram at Annexure-I to ECI’s FAQs

II. What is problematic with these answers?

It is common knowledge that only two Union Government-owned public sector undertakings (CPSUs) namely, BEL (under the Ministry of Defence) and ECIL (under the Department of Atomic Energy) have been manufacturing the EVMs and VVPATs. According to the ECI’s answer to FAQ #7 they have a duopoly on the supply of these machines for parliamentary and assembly elections. However, few people know two related facts which the ECI has not bothered to mention in any of its FAQs.

First, in 2001, both BEL and ECIL applied for the grant of exclusive patent rights under The Patents Act, 1970, claiming that their EVMs are their unique invention/innovation markedly different from the electronic voting machines that were in use in other countries. After due examination of their claims the Patent Office, Chennai granted patent rights to both CPSUs in 2006 for a period of 20 years – the maximum duration permissible under the law. These patents expired in 2021 (as per law the 20-year period is calculated from the date of the patent application and not the date of the order granting the patent). How is exclusivity being maintained by the two CPSUs after the lapse of the EVM patents is a mystery because there is no provision in the patents law for extending the validity of a patent beyond 20 years (evergreening of a patent is not permitted under our law).

As patent-related documents are required to be publicly accessible to any person by law, the Office of the Controller General of Patents, Designs and Trademarks under the Union Ministry of Commerce and Industry publishes all documents from the application stage to the stage of grant of the patent on a dedicated website. The patent application, complete specifications of and claims related to the invention/innovation (what it is capable of doing and how) for which an applicant is seeking the patent, the drawings which visually portray the looks of the invention, corporate data about the applicant entity, details of the patent agent through whom the applicant interacts with the Patent Office, the report of the examiner who studies the claims and any amendments to the original documents submitted by the applicant etc. are all available through a very utilitarian database. If the patent is granted that order is also uploaded on this database along with a copy of its communication to the applicant.

All this transparency is an essential to enable any person to file an objection against the patent application or claim on the grounds permissible under the Patents Act. If the objection is upheld, the patent application will be rejected. EVM patent-related documents continue to be accessible on this database despite the expiry of the validity of the patents. After the successful completion of the application process, the patent holder may deploy his/her/their invention/innovation exclusively for commercial use unless he/she/it voluntarily grants a license to any other entity for a similar purpose.

Second, only BEL applied for a patent for the VVPAT machine in March 2018 and received the patent order from the Chennai Patent Office in May 2022 (after the completion of the 2019 Lok Sabha elections). To the best of my knowledge, ECIL’s patent application for a VVPAT machine is not available on this database, so it may be presumed that there is some working arrangement between the two CPSUs for manufacturing the VVPAT machines. All the aforementioned documents and many more relating to the VVPAT patent which BEL secured are downloadable free of charge from this database (no you do not need an RTI application to seek access to these documents!).

An extract from the detailed drawings BEL submitted to the Patent Office in March 2019 which shows the backend of the VVPAT machine is reproduced below:

Image 3: Backend view of the VVPAT unit as per BEL’s drawing submitted to the Patent Office

 The above image clearly shows two ports that permit connection of the CU and BU units of the EVM to the VVPAT unit’s backend. In the early versions of VVPAT machines, there were two units- a printer that printed the choice of the voter on paper slips and the VSDU (visual status display unit) which would display the functional status of the VVPAT especially any errors detected in the printer. However, according to ECI’s 2018 Status Paper on EVMs, in M3 model of EVMs (which are currently in use all over the country), VSDUs were integrated into the CU itself. This version of the EVM Manual has been replaced with subsequent versions and is unfortunately no longer displayed on the ECI’s website. As I happened to download a copy in 2018 itself, I am able to cite from this document.

Now according to the ECI’s latest Manual on EVMs and VVPATs, engineers of the two CPSUs who are tasked with the job of candidate-setting are instructed to connect the VVPAT with CU and BU with separate cables for this purpose (see Image 4 below). BEL’s MSPPT also says that in order to commission the VVPAT it must be connected to the CU and BU individually (see Image 5 below). So, there is no cable connection between the CU and BU at all. All communication is mediated through the bus architecture which is physically housed in the VVPAT unit. This is the inevitable and logical conclusion that one arrives at based on the information contained in the drawings of the VVPAT and the instructions of ECI and BEL mentioned above.

 

Images 4 & 5: Instructions for Engineers for candidate-setting in VVPATs

Given this logical conclusion, what do we make of this portion of the ECI’s answer to FAQ #86:

“…BU and VVPAT do not communicate with each other. It is the CU that communicates with both the BU and VVPAT. When a voter presses a candidate button on BU, the BU sends the button number to CU and in turn, the CU communicates to VVPAT to print the slip of the corresponding button number.”

How then do the BU and CU communicate with each other when both are required to be connected only to the VVPAT unit and not to each other? Is the ‘bus architecture’ on the VVPAT unit something like the bypass routes that are constructed on National Highways (like Agra bypass, Lucknow bypass, Chennai bypass etc.) to skirt around major cities and towns and travel faster to one’s destination? After the voter presses the button of choice on the BU is that signal somehow flowing to the CU unbeknownst to the VVPAT even though this communication is happening between the two units on the real estate of the VVPAT unit? The ECI ought to explain how this magical signal flow takes place to lay voters like me who are neither hardware nor software engineers.

Before ending this writeup, another element of the answer to FAQs #2 and #86 deserve critical examination. In response to FAQ #2 the ECI says, after the voter presses the button of choice on the BU, the VVPAT unit gets into action, prints the slip, turns its light on for the voter to see and verify that his/her choice has been correctly printed, cuts it and drops it into the drop box before switching the light off. Then “a loud BEEP is heard from the Control Unit which confirms that the vote is registered successfully.” In response to FAQ #86, the ECI explains how the CU is the Master and the BU and VVPATs are Slave units which receive commands from CU to act as per the application programme. Further the explanation says: “…The Master-Slave protocol is used to control access to the communication bus. Communication on the bus is initiated by the “Master” (CU) with a “Command” to a “Slave” (BU & VVPAT). The “Slave” which is constantly monitoring the bus for “Commands” will recognize only the “Commands” addressed to it and will respond by performing an action and by returning a “Response”. Only the Master can initiate a command. CU is always the Master in the ECI M3 EVM system setup.” (emphasis supplied)

If this is the set protocol, what do we make of these assertions of BEL before the Patents Office?:

“[0030] In an aspect, the apparatus [VVPAT] can be functionally or physically integrated with the ballot unit of EVM, the physical artefact of which provides the functionality of both the units.

 [0031] In an aspect, the apparatus [VVPAT] can be functionally or physically integrated as a single unit providing functionality of VVPAT, control unit and ballot unit of EVM… 

 [00120] In an aspect, if the printing is not successful for any reason, then the vote cast cannot be stored, and the VVPAT system can be put in an error mode and prevented from further use in the election process. This ensures number of votes stored in the CU and the number of slips in the VVPAT is same.” …

“[00125] In an aspect, proposed system [VVPAT] can, after successful printing, displaying and storing a ballot slip can send an acknowledgement of successful operation to the corresponding EVM.” (emphasis supplied)

Paragraphs #0030 and 0031 are part of the Complete Specifications submitted while seeking grant of a patent and paragraphs #00120 and 00125 are part of the Detailed description of the VVPAT-related drawings attached to these Complete Specifications (see Images 6, 7 & 8 below).

First, BEL claimed before the Patents Office that the VVPAT can be integrated with the BU physically and not the CU (as is the case from the evidence presented above). Second, even though according to the ECI’s reply to FAQ #86 the CU is initially aware of the choice made by the voter, according to BEL it can record the same only if the printing process is successful. If the printing process is unsuccessful, the CU cannot record the voter’s choice even if it somehow had prior knowledge of the same. In this respect at least, the VVPAT must be seen as acting like a Master and the CU as a Slave which records the voter’s choice digitally.

Image 6: Extract from BEL’s Complete Specifications of VVPAT machine submitted to the Patents Office.

Image 7: Extracts from BEL’s Complete Specifications of VVPAT machine submitted to the Patents Office.

Image 8: Extract from BEL’s Complete Specifications of VVPAT machine submitted to the Patents Office.

Which is the vote that must be counted?

Readers, wearied by all these technical details, may ask- “what is the point of all this argumentation and evidence-splashing?” Well, the point is very simple and goes to the very heart of the demand made by several opposition political parties and civil society groups like the Citizens Commission on Elections (CCE)- all VVPAT slips must be counted rather than a small sample of five randomly chosen VVPAT units which the ECI has defended to be scientifically of adequate size before the Supreme Court and in its reply to FAQ #62.

In the context of electronic voting which is the “vote” that must be counted on counting day after polling is over- is it the candidates’ tally of votes as calculated by the CU or the VVPAT slips which the voters see and verify to their satisfaction? This is the question that many opposition leaders and CCE have posed to the ECI. ECI deals with this issue at FAQ #63 in this manner:

“Q63. The ECI has to define which one is true representation of the will of the voter? Vote recorded on Control Unit or voter verified SLIP in VVPAT? If Counting is based on the Control Unit count what is the use of Verifiable paper SLIP?

 Ans. The system of VVPAT has been introduced only for the purpose of greater transparency and enhancing the confidence of voters by way of immediate verification of the printed ballot slip having the chosen candidate’s Name, Serial Number and Symbol and recording of vote in the Control Unit.

 As per existing legislation, Rule 56C of the Conduct of Elections (Amendment) Rules clearly states that after the returning officer is satisfied that a voting machine has not been tampered with, he shall have the votes counted by pressing the appropriate button marked “Result” provided in the control unit whereby the total votes polled and votes polled by each candidate shall be displayed in respect of each candidate on the display panel provided for the purpose in the unit. The candidate wise result so obtained from all control units used in the election is to be tabulated in a result sheet in Form 20 and the particulars so entered in the result sheet announced. 

Contesting candidates have the opportunity to request for the VVPAT slip count under Rule 56D of the Conduct of Elections Rules, 1961 after completion of counting of votes from the EVMs. Rule 56D (4) (b) clearly states that in case of a discrepancy between the Electronic Count in the Control Unit and the ballot slip count of the VVPAT, the VVPAT slip count shall prevail.”

However, at paragraph no. 00116 of the Complete Specifications submitted to the Patents Office BEL makes the following assertion about what is the vote (see Image 9 below):

 “[00116] In this manner, proposed system can faithfully record the digital choice (vote being cast) of the voter (using the BU of the associated EVM) in form of a printed ballot slip that is directly and easily understood by the voter as soon as the voter has exercised his/her digital choice; and thereafter store the printed ballot slip at a secure location for further audit if required.” (emphasis supplied)

Is it not the digital choice of the voter as recorded by the VVPAT on paper which must be counted, and not merely the electronic data recorded in the CU which the voter will never get to see at the polling booth?

: Extract from BEL’s Complete Specifications of the VVPAT machine submitted to the Patents Office.

Conclusion

At the beginning of this piece, I raised these questions- “can it then be said that the voter’s right to know is limited to accessing details about the public character of electoral candidates and nothing more relating to the electoral process? Does it not extend to seeking adequate knowledge about the current voting system which is facilitated through machines unlike the paper-based system that was the primary balloting method until a decade ago? When I began writing this piece, these questions were open-ended. However, the Supreme Court’s Constitution Bench which struck down the electoral bonds route of funding political parties has answered them conclusively. While concurring with the judgement (Association for Democratic Reforms & Ar., vs Union of India) authored by Chief Justice D Y Chandrachud on behalf of the Bench, Justice Khanna in his separate opinion says- “

“19. The right to vote is a constitutional and statutory right,… grounded in Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution, as the casting of a vote amounts to expression of an opinion by the voter… The citizens’ right to know stems from this very right, as meaningfully exercising choice by voting requires information. Representatives elected as a result of the votes cast in their favour, enact new, and amend existing laws, and when in power, take policy decisions. Access to information which can materially shape the citizens’ choice is necessary for them to have a say in how their lives are affected. Thus, the right to know is paramount for free and fair elections and democracy.” (emphasis supplied)

Chief Justice Chandrachud records the views of the Constitution Bench about the importance of the voters’ right to know in the following words:

“77. The following principles can be deduced from the decisions of this Court in ADR (supra) and PUCL (supra): 

  1. The right to information of voters which is traced to Article 19(1)(a) is built upon the jurisprudence of both the first and the second phases in the evolution of the doctrine, identified above. The common thread of reasoning which runs through both the first and the second phases is that information which furthers democratic participation must be provided to citizens. Voters have a right to information which would enable them to cast their votes rationally and intelligently because voting is one of the foremost forms of democratic participation;…” (emphasis supplied)

 The issues discussed above are just a sample of the multiple doubts that crop up when the ECI’s answers to FAQs are compared with the contents of other publicly available documents about the EVM-VVPAT combo. Therefore, it must be said, our doubts will not go away by simply admonishing or ignoring them. The levels of transparency that the ECI has adopted are hopelessly inadequate to meet the very high standards that the Supreme Court of India has set for our right to know, as citizen-voters. 

Venkatesh Nayak is Director, Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, New Delhi. All facts narrated above are in the public domain.

Election Commission’s FAQs on EVMs Don’t Really Address Major Design Deficiencies

The use of electronic voting machines (EVMs) has changed the Indian election system to be an Electronic Election System (EES). In any system, it is not sufficient to scrutinise only one part of the system, irrespective of how important that part is. The system must hold its integrity as a whole for being trustworthy.

The release of new FAQs (frequently asked questions) by the Election Commission of India (ECI) on January 30 and now superseded by another version on February 7 is a very welcome step. Importantly, this is the first time ECI has released at least some technical details about the electronic voting machines (EVMs). The clarification that the trio of devices in the EVM uses RS-435 serial communication brings clarity about connections.

It is evident now that disconnecting the Voter Verified Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT) unit from the Control Unit (CU) is not a mere device rearrangement. It will need redesign. And therefore the weakest part of the Electronic Election System (EES) ecosystem and the election process will remain the weakest in the near future. The diagram below clearly shows how the signal flows and that the electronic vote will not reach VVPAT from the Ballot Unit (BU) without first going to the CU, i.e. without the VVPAT- CU connection.

Also read: Ahead of Lok Sabha Polls, EC Answers Longstanding Query on How EVMs Get Signals

As I said in my article in The India Forum on January 4, the use of EVM has changed the Indian election system to be an Electronic Election System (EES). In any system, it is not sufficient to scrutinise only one part of the system, irrespective of how important that part is. The system must hold its integrity as a whole, for being trustworthy. The EES being electronic now must demonstrate electronic integrity against physical, electronic, and digital threats. We need to scrutinise the EES on the combined criteria of physical, electronic, and digital integrity.

Looking at the EES holistically, based on the material made available on their website by the Election Commission of India (ECI), the following major design deficiencies continue to exist:

1. EVM is not entirely location agnostic: While the BU and CU are, the VVPAT is not, because it contains constituency-specific candidate data, uploaded only a few days before the polling. Location insensitivity is the first need for being fair and impartial. As such all the 2-stage randomization is not of much help when the computationally powerful component of the system is not location agnostic.

2. EVM is not entirely disconnected as claimed before. When polling is ongoing, it is completely disconnected; but only a few days before polling, it indirectly, via the Symbol Upload Unit (SLU) and PC, connects to the internet i.e. to the ECI website to download constituency-specific data, to store candidate data. (answer to Q 52)

3. The claim that candidate data is only a bitmap (picture) is not the full story. For the VVPAT to match the candidate data with the incoming numerical value of the electronic vote, the bitmap needs to be tagged with a numerical value or stored as elements of an array. It is unknown but entirely possible that the bitmap could be tagged with any additional value in either case. Such additional data can easily be used to alter the values returned by the VVPAT to the CU, and the way these responses are processed further by the CU.

4. The EVM is not a simple machine like a calculator as claimed before. While the BU and CU may be so (we must believe ECI – no details are made available as proof), the VVPAT is certainly not. VVPAT has a program that, at a minimum has to process incoming numerical data, match it with the stored list, pass the bitmap image associated with the matched number to the printer, print the receipt, cut it and send a confirmation back to the CU. This is a fairly advanced set of operations than a mere calculator. Such a programme could also be easily capable of counting the total number of votes, identify every nth vote, provide more “meaningful” response to the CU etc.

5. The VVPAT is not entirely One Time Programmable (OTP) as claimed before. While a part of its memory is OTP, one part is ECI clearly said so in its response (answer to Q 53) in the new FAQ. Considering this revelation, the VVPAT must now be accepted as a seriously vulnerable device. Now it is unbelievably difficult for any digital system expert to defend the integrity of the electronic vote in the CU with respect to the VVPAT receipt, more so because nothing is known about the program in the CU.Let us assume that the VVPAT responds with “Done x” in response to a “Print receipt for x” command.

Also read: Watch | EVMs Can Be Manipulated, Not Hacked But Remedy is Simple and Inexpensive: Expert

In a hypothetical but plausible scenario, in response to the “Print receipt for 3” command from the CU, upon printing the receipt (bitmap image of the candidate name, party name and symbol) for candidate at position 3, if the VVPAT responds “Done 3,5” and if the CU program is written to recognise the x,y part of the response as record the vote for x as vote for y, inaccurate registration of vote in the CU is possible even after accurate printing of the receipt was done.

This is possible because:

a. VVPAT has a programme.

b. This program is written specifically to receive a number from CU and match it with the number in the list uploaded by the SLU.

c. SLU must upload image data acquired from a PC connected to the internet. It is easily possible to add just one special byte to a specific bitmap.

The programme may be capable of executing additional functions like keeping track of vote count etc. It may therefore take specific action in its response to such specific counts.

6. Considering the accepted vulnerability of the VVPAT, it becomes necessary to provide a recourse to every voter who complains of a VVPAT slip that does not match their choice of button press; because now with a programmable part of the VVPAT, it must be admitted that non-transparent transformation of the vote is possible even within the VVPAT.

7. VVPAT is a misnomer because it allows only view, not verification. The choice of rejection is a very crucial part of the verification process. Mere viewing is not verification. For example, when any authority verifies a document, the authority does not merely view it, it reserves the right to reject if the document is found incorrect. If a discrepancy is detected, does the voter have any agency to not just highlight the discrepancy, but mark the paper vote as incorrect, discard it and then cast a correct vote?

As per the rule sighted (Rule 49), if the voter fails to demonstrate that an unintended vote is cast for the NEXT test vote, they become a culprit, liable to criminal prosecution. Besides being tyrannical, this is also entirely unscientific. This is like denying the existence of a previously connected “wrong number” from a phone if the next call connects correctly.

The Election Commission building in New Delhi. Photo: Twitter/@PIB_INDIA. November 5, 2022.

8. Answer to Q49 says “If a DRE produces a voter verifiable paper audit trail, it is software independent”. What is the basis for this definition? No reference is cited. The principle of “software independence” was introduced by Wack and Rivest and according to its application to a voting system, “A voting system is software-independent if an (undetected) change or error in its software cannot cause an undetectable change or error in an election outcome.” “Software System” in this definition includes both program and data constants. Since undetected data constants (like a * against an image or an x,y styled response as mentioned in “5” above) may be processed by the unknown program in the VVPAT and CU to cause error in the election outcome, undetected change can cause a detectable change in the election outcome and therefore the test for software independence of the VVPAT + CU fails even on theoretical grounds.

9. The answer to Question 37 talks about digital certificates and public key encryption for authentication. However, merely being from an authentic group is insufficient here. Unique pairing is necessary to eliminate an authentic but illegitimate / replacement unit being used. Authentication does not address the replacement of one unit by another. That can be done only by pairing. And there is no mention of pairing. While the entire pool of the BUs, VVPATs and CUs carries electronic certificates of authentication from the time of manufacture; individual BU, VVPAT and CU are not uniquely paired on the polling day, nor is the pairing verified on the counting day. This leaves ample scope for the CU used for polling to be replaced by another authentic CU stuffed with spurious votes.

A digital certificate is akin to an entry pass issued to the participants of a close-group meeting. The door keeper allows entry to the pass holder without knowing their identity. This allows person B to enter in place of person A so long as B carries the pass. In every high-security environment, a unique identification for every member is not just necessary, but it must be established and verified, as we experience it at the airport entry. A boarding pass is necessary but for sufficiency, we need a government-issued identifier to uniquely establish our identity. Person B cannot enter the airport using person A’s boarding pass. This simple example of routinely established security more than highlights the need for unique identification as a necessary and sufficient condition in every secure system. Only the act of pairing all three components of the EVM with a unique identifier for each passes this necessary and sufficient condition.

Considering the disconnected and dispersed nature of the EVM unit, at least one dynamic component must be a part of the unique identifier. Such a dynamic component is easily available in the form of the date and time of pairing.

10. EVM’s location is not tracked every moment. The less harmful fall-out of this laxity in surveillance is these units being stolen by anti-social elements and their following misuse in some constituencies. The more serious fall-out is a possible mass-scale rigging by unfriendly countries to sabotage the entire election. This must be seen as a national threat. In a country that talks of GPS tagging every car so that toll booths are eliminated, not tagging EVMs with GPS is not just baffling, it shows total disregard for national security.

11. The entire EVM documentation (FAQ) has no disaster recovery (DR) implementation, or even a Considering that the outcome of elections decides the fate of the nation for half a decade, and that accidents are not too rare even in the recent past, absence of DR is entirely unacceptable.

In addition to these immediate, major, serious, discomforting deficiencies in the EES itself, I notice that every voter now has two copies of votes: one in the form of printed paper slip via VVPAT and the other in the form of electronic vote stored in the CU. Kannan Gopinathan has been asking a fundamental question in this regard. It needs to be answered by not just the ECI, but also the Supreme Court of India. The question is: Which is the real vote? The one that the voter has seen though not actively verified or the one that is neither seen nor verified by the voter?

Considering the volume of the task of making design changes and implementing them across the EVMs, the time may be inadequate before the upcoming elections. However, looking at the real and existential possibilities of manipulation that are open as now seen even more after the new information in the FAQ, the most appropriate action for the ECI would be to adopt a “hybrid model” by using the EVM to print the slip and manually counting 100% of the VVPAT receipts (like paper ballots) across the country. The manual counting effort may take an additional few days, but then those who win, stay in power for five years. I am sure a three-day delay is worth the wait in the interest of Indian democracy. The solutions to address the problems discussed above should be taken up as a year-long project and implemented completely.

Madhav Deshpande is a former CEO of Tulip Software and a former consultant to the Obama administration in the United States. He is one of India’s foremost experts on electronic voting machines (EVMs). 

Election Commission Must Recognise VVPAT Paper Trail is Central to Infusing Trust in EVMs

Public demand for this in a resolution was initiated by civil society in August because ECI’s intention and capacity to hold free and fair elections as per its constitutional mandate has been fading fast.

At the first joint protest of the 28-party Opposition Alliance INDIA, on December 22, Congress president Mallikarjun Kharge called for unity, saying democracy is under threat under the Bharatiya Janata Party government. He, along with party leader Rahul Gandhi, Nationalist Congress Party chief Sharad Pawar, and other senior leaders, claimed that opposition parties came together to form the INDIA bloc because “Modi ji and Shah are trying to destroy democracy and the constitution”.

At its meeting a couple of days earlier, the INDIA bloc had resolved to fight authoritarianism with full might saying that democracy and constitution are under attack.

At this meeting, the INDIA bloc had adopted a resolution on electronic voting machines (EVMs): “INDIA parties reiterate that there are many doubts on the integrity of the functioning of the EVMs. These have been raised by many experts and professionals as well. There is widespread demand for a return to the ballot paper system… INDIA parties would be ‘happy’ if there was a return to voting through ballot paper… If ECI has any reservations, it is possible and desirable to have a hybrid ballot paper-EVM system for the 2024 Lok Sabha elections… It suggested that instead of the VVPAT slip falling in the box, it should be handed over to the voter who shall then place it in a separate ballot box after having verified his or her choice. 100% counting of VVPAT slips should then be done.”

Only solace is “better late than never!” But, with parliament election only weeks away, there has been no follow-up action so far.

This resolution is the INDIA bloc’s adoption of the public demand initiated by civil society on August 24, signed by over 7,000 voters and conveyed to the ECI:

“EVM/VVPAT voting does not comply with the essential ‘Democracy Principles’ – that each voter should be able to verify that her vote is cast-as-intended, recorded-as-cast and counted-as-recorded. Though the ECI has arranged for all EVMs to be accompanied with VVPAT-device, the ‘Voter-Verifiable Paper Trail’ has been reduced to the level of a ‘bioscope’ which shows up a tiny ‘paper slip’ for seven seconds which then vanishes and is NOT counted…. The VVPAT system should therefore be re-calibrated to be fully voter-verifiable. A voter should be able to get the VVPAT slip in her hand and cast it in a chip-free ballot box for the vote to be valid. These VVPAT slips should be fully counted for all constituencies before the results are declared. For this purpose, VVPAT slips should be larger in size and must be printed in such a manner that they can be preserved for a minimum of five years.”

This move was initiated because ECI’s intention and capacity to hold free and fair elections as per its constitutional mandate has been fading fast. It reached a nadir recently when the Commission filed a counter-affidavit in the Supreme Court containing these assertions which are alien to the very concept of free and fair elections.

  • ECI is under no obligation to cross-verify EVMs with VVPATs;
  • The purpose of VVPAT is only to ensure that a voter can verify that her vote has been cast as intended;
  • There is no fundamental right in voters to verify that their votes have been recorded as cast and counted as recorded;
  • Any increase in the number of VVPATs to be cross-verified will pose an administrative challenge;
  • 100% verification of VVPAT is a regressive step and takes the country back to manual counting of ballots;
  • Earlier ballot counting systems used to take between 1 to 6 days. It will take more time if VVPATs are counted and recounted;
  • EVMs cannot be tampered with. They have a one-time programmable chip. Cannot be hacked.

ECI seems to be under the archaic and colonial belief that elections are favours bestowed on the people of India and not instruments for the transfer of sovereignty from “We, The People” to our elected representatives to run the government on our behalf. This is a serious matter.

The Election Commission building in New Delhi. Photo: Twitter/@PIB_INDIA. November 5, 2022.

Equally disturbing is that ECI has been falsely claiming that the EVM (BU-VVPAT-CU) units are “totally standalone machines having one-time programmable chips.” With the introduction of VVPATs, the name and symbols of the candidates will have to be uploaded to EVM using an external device after the announcement of elections and finalisation of the candidate list.  ECI Manual itself states at 8.4.2 that BEL and ECIL engineers are to use a device called Symbol Loading Unit (SLU) to electronically upload these details to the VVPAT. The same Manual in 8.4.4 make it clear that these devices need not be stored in the strong room along with EVM/VVPATs and are to be released to the engineers immediately after the poll thus making them outside of the custody chain of Returning Officers.

This wired connection of EVM/VVPATs to an external device not maintained within the custody chain of Returning Officers/District Election Officers after election is announced, candidate sequence is firmed up, and second randomisation and booth allotment of EVMs finalised makes the ECI’s practices in conducting elections extremely suspect. This has exposed the voting and counting to insider/outsider manipulation with ECI being a party to it. This cannot be countenanced.

Also read: Are India’s Elections Free and Fair?

In the actual voting process, a voter presses the ballot button opposite the symbol of the candidate of his/her choice on the EVM and will hear a beep sound. A slip appears in the transparent window of the VVPAT machine. The slip with the Candidate serial No., Name and Symbol are visible for 7 seconds before they drop in the sealed VVPAT box. The slip is too small to handle, printed on thermal paper and evaporates in a matter of weeks/months. This is suspect and non-transparent. A voter should be able to get the VVPAT slip in his/her hand and cast it in a chip-free ballot box for the vote to be valid.  VVPAT slips should be larger in size and must be printed in such a manner that they cannot be altered and can be preserved for a minimum of five years.

Presently, votes recorded in the EVM is counted by pressing the appropriate button marked “Result” provided in the Control Unit whereby the total votes polled and votes polled by each candidate are displayed in respect of each such candidate on the display panel provided for the purpose in the unit. Corresponding entries made in a result sheet in Form 20 and the particulars so entered in the result sheet is announced. Rule 56D(4)(b) of the Conduct of Election (Amendment) Rules, 2013 provides for the primacy of the VVPAT slip count over the electronic tally of ballots cast and calculated on the EVMs. So, it is the VVPAT slips that should be fully counted for all constituencies before the results are declared.

Presently, any candidate, or in his absence, his election agent or any of his counting agents may apply in writing to the returning officer to count the printed paper slips in the drop box of the printer in respect of any polling station or polling stations. On such application being made, the returning officer shall decide the matter and may allow the application in whole or in part or may reject in whole, if it appears to him to be frivolous or unreasonable. This is a highly arbitrary and undemocratic process which can be brazenly misused/abused by election officials under political pressure as has been happening. The correct process is to count only VVPAT slips. If needed, results of the counting of VVPAT slips could be cross-verified with the electronic tallies of the EVMs before the results are declared. In case of any mismatch, the counting of the VVPAT slips should be treated as the final result. Forms 17A (Register of Electors) and Forms 17C (Account of votes recorded) must be tallied with the manual count of VVPAT slips before the declaration of results.

These essential aspects of Electoral Democracy, which are well within the remit of the ECI and are doable within a short time, are the demands contained in the public petition to the ECI which the Commission refuses even to acknowledge obviously under directions from the ruling establishment who are the beneficiaries of the current flawed and undemocratic system. In the event is it not the duty and responsibility of the opposition to take up this issue vigorously to ensure a free and fair election with integrity? But so far INDIA Block has failed in their duty while in our neighbouring small countries-Pakistan and Bangladesh-EVMs have been discarded because of joint action by opposition parties.

INDIA bloc should realise that the words “election” and “democracy” have become synonymous. As of now the only way to choose our representatives to govern ourselves is through the electoral process. “Resolving to fight authoritarianism with full might to defend Democracy” is a noble thing to do. But it should start with ensuring the fairness and integrity of the electoral process. Otherwise, the seriousness of the I.N.D.I.A Block to defend India’s Democracy would become a question mark. And in an election year, this could be disastrous!

M.G. Devasahayam is a former Army and IAS officer.

Four Years Since General Election, Centre Yet to Obtain Info on EVM-VVPAT ‘Discrepancy’

The parliamentary Committee on Government Assurances told the Law Ministry to prioritise the matter without any delay. It said the issue is crucial to ensure the security of the voting process.

New Delhi: A parliamentary panel has said that the Union government is yet to provide a reply for the last four years after it promised parliament that it would obtain information from the Election Commission about possible discrepancies between the Electronic Voting Machines (EVMs) and Voter Verifiable Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT) tallies during the 2019 elections.

The Committee on Government Assurances tabled its report in Lok Sabha on Thursday regarding pending assurances pertaining to the Law and Justice Ministry. It referred to an unstarred question on whether any discrepancy between the EVM and VVPAT counts was found in the 2019 Lok Sabha elections and if so, what corrective measures had been taken. The question was asked on June 26, 2019, and the government had back then said that information was being collected and would be laid on the table of the House.

However, four years have passed and no information of such kind has been forthcoming, the committee pointed out. It also added that identifying such issues is necessary for the security of the voting process.

The committee, headed by BJP MP Rajendra Agrawal, was told by the Law Ministry that it had asked the poll body for the required information on March 12, 2020, and had sent reminders on September 3, 2020, February 19, 2021, October 7, 2021, November 26, 2021 and June 3, 2022.

“The requisite information from the EC is still awaited,” the ministry said, according to the Indian Express.

A legislative department secretary in January this year had said that the EC had been called, but it could not attend as it was “having discussions with some political parties”. The committee then gave the ministry a month’s extension to fulfil the assurance.

“The Committee note that finding discrepancies between EVMs and VVPAT is a crucial aspect of ensuring the integrity and transparency of the electoral process. The Committee feels that the need for identifying such issues is all the more necessary to ensure the security and reliability of the voting process. EVMs and VVPATs are designed to provide an accurate reflection of voters’ choices…The Committee, however, regret to note that precious little has been done in this direction…The Committee is deeply concerned to note that the requisite information is still awaited from the Election Commission,” the report tabled by the committee in the parliament said.

The committee blamed the delay in obtaining requisite information on the “lack of coordination” between the law ministry and the poll body. The panel also instructed the legislative department to prioritise the matter to ensure that information from the EC is available without any further delay

For the first time in Indian electoral history, all EVMs were covered by VVPATs in the 2019 general elections. A VVPAT lets a voter see a paper slip printed in the VVPAT for a period of seven seconds, displaying the name and the symbol of the selected candidate. It then drops into a sealed drop box of the VVPAT. According to Supreme Court guidelines, the Election Commission verifies VVPAT slips in five randomly selected polling stations in each Assembly constituency.

The Association for Democratic Reforms has recently moved the Supreme Court, seeking directions to the poll body to cross-verify the count in EVMs with the VVPAT slips. “There is no way for any of the voters to verify that their vote has actually been ‘counted as recorded’ because there is no procedure provided for by the EC for them to match the VVPATs that they had certified as being ‘recorded as cast’ with what is actually counted,” the ADR petition argued.

The top court, in response to the ADR petition, issued directions to send a copy of the petition to the poll body and asked the poll panel to respond to the same.

ECI Denies VVPATs ‘Defective’, Says Only 3.4 Lakh Machines Need ‘Preventive Maintenance’

However, ECI documents say 6.5 lakh VVPAT machines are ‘defective’ and being sent to the manufacturer for repairs.

New Delhi: The Election Commission of India (ECI) has said that 3.4 lakh Voter Verifiable Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT) machines require “preventive maintenance”.

However, The Wire had reported on April 18, citing ECI documents, that 6.5 lakh VVPAT machines are ‘defective’.

These are the latest M3 generation machines of which 37% were “defective”, per the ECI documents. These machines need to be sent back to the manufacturer for rectifying the defects.

However, in some places, it appears that the defective machines are being replaced with new ones instead of the ones that have been repaired.

A letter exchanged between ECI officials and representatives of political parties in one state, which was seen by The Wire, clearly says that these are new machines.

However, representatives of political parties involved in the first level checking (FLC) or commissioning of the machines say, “Any defects are detected when the machine is first brought for an FLC or at the time when the candidate has been announced and the machine is commissioned. During the election process, if a machine is found to be defective, it is automatically weeded out. The machines kept in strongrooms are always those that have been cleared as functional.”

Unnamed officials at the ECI told PTI that the defective VVPATs mean they only stop functioning during the poll process. It does not give erroneous results, they told the news agency. The ECI said it could not check these machines earlier because of the COVID-19 pandemic.

The ECI has still not responded to The Wire’s questionnaire on this matter.

Reacting to claims that the machines could not be properly tested due to the pandemic, the representatives cited above said, “Elections were held during COVID-19 as well and the process of weeding out defective machines was followed even then.”

ECI officials also told mediapersons that some machines have more than one defect, which is why the number of machines that are defective are higher than the functional ones.

The defects, as noted by the ECI, are called T1, T2, T3, T4 defects.

But going by the ECI’s own letter, it appears that entire series are being replaced. For instance, among machines that will be sent to the Electronics Corporation of India Limited, Hyderabad, the series beginning EVTEA 0001 to EVTEA 99999 have been marked as ‘defective’. So also are the rest of the series, namely, EVTEB, EVTEC, EVTED, each comprising a batch of 99999 machines.

Similarly, the machines which will be sent back to Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL), Bengaluru, have been also marked as ‘defective’. These machines fall under the series BVTAK 00001 to BVTAK 30000, BVTEA 00001 to BVTEA 30000, and BVTEC 05001 to BVTEC 75000, among others.

In all, 2.53 lakh machines from BEL have been found to be ‘defective’. Of them, the series BVTEH 00001 to BVTEH 68500 will be sent to BEL in Panchkula.

These are M3 machines which were first introduced in 2018 and were used in the 2019 elections as well.

To put this in perspective, in the 2019 Lok Sabha elections, a total of 17.4 lakh VVPATs were notified for use for the Lok Sabha polls and also for the assembly elections being held simultaneously. This means that over one-third (37%) of these machines have now been found to be defective by the Election Commission.

PTI reported that after the 2019 polls, a technical expert committee, along with BEL and Electronics Corporation of India, carried out an exhaustive analysis of the performance of VVPAT machines. But the analysis got delayed due to the pandemic.

The analysis concluded that some corrective actions were required to improve the performance of M3 VVPATs.

Disclose Number of EVMs, VVPATs That Showed Defects in Firmware Audit: CIC

The CIC ruling came on a petition of activist Venkatesh Nayak, who had sought audit details of firmware of EVMs and VVPATs used in the 2019 Lok Sabha election, from the IT ministry.

New Delhi: The Central Information Commission (CIC) has ordered the disclosure of the total number of EVMs and VVPATs that showed defects and errors during testing and evaluation of their firmware by the Standardization, Testing and Quality Certification (STQC) Directorate.

The ruling of the CIC came on a petition of activist Venkatesh Nayak, who had approached the STQC Directorate under the Ministry of Electronics and IT, seeking information related to audit and testing of firmware of electronic voting machines (EVMs) of M3 and M2 generation and voter verified paper audit trail (VVPAT) units manufactured by ECIL and BEL, and used in the 2019 Lok Sabha election.

He had also sought to know the total number of M3 and M2 EVMs and VVPATs whose firmware were tested and evaluated by the STQC team, the total number of machines whose software was found not to be a perfect match with the reference software provided by ECIL and BEL for the purpose of testing and evaluation, and the number of machines that revealed other kinds of defects or errors during the testing and evaluation of firmware.

The information was denied to him citing section 8 (1)(d) of the RTI Act which allows exemption of information pertaining to commercial confidence from disclosure.

On the question of total number of machines that were tested and those which showed defects, information commissioner Vanaja N. Sarna held the plea of Nayak “justified”, calling it “statistical information” which can be given and “there is no exemption applicable in disclosing the numbers”.

In addition, Nayak had also asked for the details of officers of the STQC, a third-party independent audit agency, who did the audit, its dates and geographical locations where it was conducted among other details.

Also read: ECI Must Clear Air of Suspicion Over EVM-VVPAT Manipulations Says Former IAS Officer

The commission allowed the STQC to withhold names and designations of auditing officers, but asked it to disclose dates and geographical locations of the audit done by it.

“…the dates are eminently disclosable and can be given to the appellant. In respect of point no. 3, the geographical locations without specifying further details can be given. During the hearing, the CPIO stated that the testing was done at various locations including at BEL and ECIL. The specific locations can therefore be provided,” she said.

Nayak had said his RTI application was aimed at obtaining information to ascertain the role and duties and the performance of such duties by the public authority while carrying out third-party audits of the software or firmware embedded in the EVMs and the VVPATs in compliance with the recommendations of the TEC constituted by the Election Commission.

The issue of EVMs in an election is hotly contested among political parties and sections of people.

BEL Refuses to Disclose EVM, VVPAT Data Even After Demanding Fees. What Does It Mean?

The Election Commission and manufacturing companies are reluctant to place detailed information about the working of EVMs and VVPATs beyond what they decide that the citizenry must know.

Readers may remember the bold declaration that the Union Minister of State for Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions made about the NDA II government’s commitment to transparency while replying to the debate on the Bill to amend The Right to Information Act, 2005 in the Lok Sabha.

On July 22, the minister said:

“Now, coming straight to RTI, as far as RTI is concerned, let me first make it clear this government has been absolutely committed, as in other wings of governance, to ensure full transparency and full accountability.”

Sadly, this philosophy of governance does not seem to have percolated downwards beyond the corridors of the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) with which the Union minister is associated.

In June, 2019 I had sought detailed information about electronic voting machines (EVMs), voter verified paper trail (VVPAT) units and symbol loading units (SLUs), from Bharat Electronics Ltd (BEL) and Electronics Corporation of India Ltd (ECIL) by filing identical requests under the RTI Act.

When compared with the ECI’s claims about the maximum capacity of VVPATs to print votes cast through EVMs and contrasted against the polling station level voter turnout data as compared with the number of voters registered on the electoral rolls (all of these are public documents), the nature of the RTI replies throw open disturbing questions about the entire electoral process.

Background

The April-May 2019 general elections brought the NDA government to power with a thumping majority.

Dissatisfied with the scanty information about the manner in which the polls were conducted across the country, several private citizens and media persons have used the RTI Act to seek information about voter turnout data mismatches, complaints about EVMs malfunctioning, complaints about mismatch of EVMs and VVPAT printouts, movement of EVMs and VVPATs to the electoral constituencies from the manufacturing companies and details of action taken on complaints received against high profile politicians for violating the Model Code of Conduct.

Several private citizens and media persons have used the RTI Act to seek information about voter turnout data mismatches. Photo: PTI

Many of these requests have been turned down by the relevant public authorities.

Also read: The Curious Case of Chhattisgarh’s Voter Turnout

After closely scrutinising some of the information and statistics published by the ECI, on June 17, 2019, I decided to file two identical RTI applications seeking the information from BEL and ECIL. Neither these companies nor the ECI have placed this information in the public domain.

BEL’s replies

The CPIO of BEL, a navaratna public sector enterprise under the Union Ministry of Defence, sent a fee intimation letter for INR 1,434 for a total of 717 pages after almost a month had passed since the submission of my RTI application.

He agreed to supply most of the information but denied access to the VVPAT patent application filed with the office of the Controller General of Patents by citing Section 8(1)(d) of the RTI Act. Then I waited for more than a month for this information thinking that the delay might be because of the time taken to copy more than 700 pages of records. After 40 days had passed, on August 28, 2019, I filed a first appeal under Section 19(1) of the RTI Act challenging the non-supply of information.

Believe it or not, the CPIO who was silent until then, sent a reply returning the bank draft and claimed that BEL did not have most of the information which he had agreed to supply in his first reply.

The CPIO also rejected one of the queries stating that disclosure would “endanger the life of its engineers” and returned the bank draft that I sent them as fee payment.

ECIL’s reply

Earlier, ECIL had uploaded some of this information on the online RTI portal but rejected access to some crucial bits of information I had sought in my RTI application. I have not received a formal reply from ECIL that has been signed by its Central Public Information Officer, via email or post till date.

Although ECIL’s CPIO had disposed of my RTI application earlier, in August, 2019, I decided to wait for the BEL CPIO’s reply before going public with these RTI interventions.

What is problematic with these replies?

BEL’s CPIO had initially agreed to supply information about the number of EVMs (control and ballot units), VVPATs manufactured by the company, and the thermal paper rolls used in the VVPATs which had been sent to the districts for use during the 2019 Lok Sabha elections. He had also agreed to supply a list of the names of engineers who took part in and coordinated and supervised the preparation of these machines for the elections.

He had physically counted the number of pages relatable to each RTI query and demanded fees accordingly. In his revised reply, however, he states that BEL does not hold most of the requested information.

Also read: Amending the RTI Act Is About Cutting Troublesome Citizens Down to Size

So which papers did he count before sending the first reply? Only one of these replies, not both, can be true.

Perhaps the latest reply is an afterthought arising out of pressure exerted, probably by an external agency, against making this information public. I hope the identity of this external agency is revealed during the appeal proceedings in the coming months.

What do these replies reveal?

The total number of votes cast in an assembly or parliamentary constituency is recorded on Form 20 (called the ‘final result sheet’) by its presiding officer and submitted to the ECI.

This information for every constituency, collected in Form 20, has been uploaded on the ECI’s website for the Lok Sabha elections and state assembly elections up to 2018. However, similar data is not available for the 2019 Lok Sabha elections on the ECI’s website.

Any interested person is now compelled to visit the websites of the chief electoral officers (CEOs) of every state and Union Territory, separately, to access this information.

The polling station-wise data throws up some crucial questions when compared with the ECI’s claims. Photo: PTI

Even here, there is no uniformity. While many CEOs have uploaded Part 1 of Form 20 which contains polling station-wise data of the number of votes cast (for example, see the Delhi CEO’s website), a few have published only Part 2 of Form 20 which contains aggregate data for each assembly segment of a parliamentary constituency (for example, see Bihar CEO’s website).

Also read: Who’s Afraid of the RTI Act?

It is, however, the polling station-wise data that throws up some crucial questions when compared with the ECI’s claims and the RTI replies of BEL and ECIL. The details of the issues can be found here.

A credible basis 

Two-stage randomisation of EVMs and VVPATs, once before their allotment to each constituency and then before sending them to each polling station, is one of the two pillars on which the ECI, the manufacturing companies and technical experts rest their arguments for the non-tamperability of these machines.

If the capacities of the VVPATs produced by BEL and ECIL vary, can there ever be a true randomisation, given the lack of uniformity in the number of voters registered for each polling station?

This is a seminal question that the ECI as the owner of the EVMs and VVPATs must answer urgently.

I would like to end this piece with a caveat. I am not alleging any wrongdoing by any authority through this research and analysis. All that I am pointing out is that the ECI and the manufacturing companies are reluctant to place detailed information about the working of EVMs and VVPATs beyond what they decide that the citizenry must know. This is just not acceptable.

Venkatesh Nayak is programme head of the Access to Information Programme of the Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative.

EC Sets Up 24-Hour Control Room to Monitor EVM-Related Complaints

In an earlier statement, the EC clarified that reports and allegations of security breaches were “absolutely false and factually incorrect.”

New Delhi: On the day it dismissed allegations that the voting machines used in the Lok Sabha election were being switched with fresh ones ahead of counting of votes on May 23, the Election Commission Tuesday set up a 24-hour control room in Delhi to monitor complaints relating to EVMs.

“The complaints related to storage issues at strongrooms, security of strongrooms, permissions to candidates to post their agents at strongrooms, CCTV monitoring, movement of any EVMs, and any complaints during counting related to EVMs can be informed at control room, number is 011-23052123 (with 5 hunting lines),” it said in a statement.

Referring to the allegations and complaints, the commission earlier in the day said that it would like to “emphatically and unambiguously” clarify that all such reports and allegations are “absolutely false and factually incorrect.”

Also read: Reports of Security Breach of EVM Strongrooms Cast Greater Shadow Over EC’s Functioning

The visuals on TV and social media “do not pertain to any EVMs used during the polls”, it said.

In an earlier statement, the EC said that after the conclusion of polls , all polled EVMs and VVPATs are brought under security cover to designated strongrooms, which are sealed with double locks in the presence of candidates and observers of the commission.

The entire process of storage and sealing of the strongroom is videoed.

“Continuous CCTV camera coverage is done till completion of counting. Each strongroom is guarded with round-the-clock security by Central Armed Police Forces.”

Pranab Mukherjee Expresses Concern Over Reports of Alleged EVM Tampering

He said the Election Commission must “put all speculation to rest”.

New Delhi: Joining the ongoing controversy over EVMs, former President Pranab Mukherjee on Tuesday expressed concern over the alleged tampering of voters’ verdict, saying that the onus of ensuring institutional integrity lies with the Election Commission, which should put all speculation to rest.

He also said that there can be no room for speculations that challenge the very basis of Indian democracy.

“I am concerned at reports of alleged tampering of voters’ verdict. The safety and security of EVMs which are in the custody of ECI is the responsibility of the Commission,” he said in a statement posted on his Twitter handle.

People’s mandate is sacrosanct and has to be above any iota of reasonable doubt, he said.

Also read: SC Dismisses PIL Seeking 100% Matching of VVPAT Slips With EVMs, Cites CJI Order

“The onus of ensuring institutional integrity in this case lies with the Election Commission of India. They must do so and put all speculation to rest,” he said.

Mukherjee said as a firm believer in the country’s institutions, it is his considered opinion that it is the ‘workmen’ who decide how the institutional ‘tools’ perform.

Protests broke out in some parts of Uttar Pradesh on Tuesday after videos of alleged movement and tampering of EVMs went viral on social media, a charge dismissed by the EC as “frivolous” and “unfounded”.

The Congress said that the EC should take immediate and effective steps to address the complaints of movement of EVMs from strongrooms from various parts of the country.

Top opposition leaders, who met on Tuesday, also decided to move the EC to press for their demand of tallying the paper trail of votes (VVPATs) with the EVM figures.