Tag: pangong

Behind the Modi Government’s Doublespeak on Ladakh, a Refusal to Acknowledge Reality

The Chinese know where they are and what they did. The government of India and the Army, too, are, hopefully, wiser after the event. The only ones who do not yet clearly know what transpired are the people of India.

Reading the Ministry of Defence press release following the failed 13th round of talks between Indian and Chinese senior commanders, one may wonder what the Sino-Indian dispute in eastern Ladakh is all about.

Look at these sentences:

1. “The Indian side pointed out that the situation along the LAC had been caused by unilateral attempts of [the] Chinese side to alter the status quo and in violation of the bilateral agreements…

2. It was therefore necessary that the Chinese side take appropriate steps in the remaining areas so as to restore peace and tranquillity along the LAC in the Western Sector….

3. The Indian side emphasised such resolution of the remaining areas would facilitate progress in the bilateral relations….

4. The Indian side therefore made constructive suggestions for resolving the remaining areas but the Chinese side was not agreeable and also could not provide any forward-looking proposals….”  (Emphasis added all through)

From the above, one would not learn that the PLA had, in the summer of 2020, surprised the Indian Army all along the Line of Actual Control in eastern Ladakh and occupied positions on or across the LAC which have denied the Indian forces access to large chunks of territory they had earlier patrolled.

After all, if the Chinese only made unilateral “attempts” to alter the status quo, in simple English it means that they did not actually succeed. But if those Chinese “attempts” did not succeed, what does it mean to talk of “appropriate steps” that the PLA needs to take? What is the issue of “resolution of remaining areas” or, for that matter, the  “constructive suggestions” that the Indians side made which the Chinese have rejected as “unreasonable and unrealistic”?

Surely the only “constructive suggestion” that can be offered is for the Chinese to pull back. But then why not say so? Why this obfuscation ?

Some claim that this is for diplomatic reasons of not wanting to name and shame the Chinese, so that they can be persuaded to pull back. Others declare that governments have to keep issues relating to the border confidential.

But let’s get this in the right order: The Chinese know where they are, and the parts of the LAC they have crossed, and so, of course, does the Indian government. So, the only people from whom the information is being kept are the people of the country. As for being sensitive to Chinese concerns, well good luck to that policy.

From the outset, the government’s stand on recent developments in eastern Ladakh have been bizarre and downright mendacious. It originated at the very top when Prime Minister Modi declared on June 19, 2020  – four days after the deadly events in the Galwan Valley that took the lives of 20 Indian jawans and led to some Indian soldiers being taken prisoner by the Chinese – that “neither is anyone inside our territory nor is any of our post captured.”

In fact, some unconfirmed social media posts doing the rounds this week  suggest things may have been  worse for India in the Galwan incident than has been so far acknowledged

As Modi’s remarks led to a controversy, the government quickly clarified that his statement related to the immediate situation in Galwan, not to what may have transpired earlier or for that matter elsewhere in Ladakh.

The statement did note that “that this Government will not allow any unilateral change of the LAC”, yet, it completely ignored the wider issue of the PLA’s sudden ingresses and actions that denied Indian forces the right to patrol parts of the LAC that both sides had hitherto patrolled. There were five such areas, north to south: the Depsang plains, Galwan, Kugrang river valley, north bank of Pangong Tso and Charding Nala near Demchok.

China’s 1960 claim line in Ladakh is marked in yellow, the LAC at Pangong Tso in in pink. As can be seen, Thakung, the site of the latest standoff, is inside the LAC but within the 1960 Chinese claim line. Map: The Wire

Needless to say, similar prevarication featured in the first authoritative statement on the developments in eastern Ladakh which came in parliament from Defence Minister Rajnath Singh in September 2020. He, too, fudged the issues. He said that in early May “the Chinese side had taken action to hinder the normal, traditional patrolling pattern of our troops in the Galwan Valley area.” An effort was made to address the issue through local commanders, but by mid-May, the Chinese began “several attempts to transgress” the LAC in other areas like Kongka La, Gogra and the north bank of Pangong Tso.”

So, “attempts” had been made and, presumably they were not successful. He conveniently ignored the important areas in Depsang, Kugrang river Valley or the Charding  Nala area, where the Chinese remain deployed and are the subject of the current senior officers’ talks.

By far the most serious Chinese ingress has been in the Depsang area (see map below). The Chinese have created a blockade at Y Junction as a result of which Indian soldiers who routinely patrolled the areas marked by Patrolling Points (PP) 10, 11, 11a, 12 and 13 have been prevented from doing their task. Reports suggest similar restrictions to the north of this area as well.

Daulat Beg Oldi (DBO) is India’s northernmost post, short of the Karakoram Pass. It is also the terminus of the Darbuk Shyok-Daulat Beg Oldi (DS-DBO) road. As can be seen from the map, Indian forces have been denied access to a huge area which provided defence to the road. Conversely, the Chinese presence near the road threatens Indian deployments in DBO.

Map: Manoj Joshi

 

 

Most recently this fudge is evident in External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar’s speech  at the India Today Conclave in early October 2021.He  said the Indian side still had no clear idea of the Chinese motives. “If attempts are being made to unilaterally change the LAC status quo and large forces are brought to the border in contravention of written agreements, then obviously the relationship will be impacted.” He said that while there had been progress in reversing the situation, “the larger problem remains which is a very sizeable Chinese force close to, if not at, the LAC.”

Nowhere is there an acknowledgement that what happened was not mere “attempts” to change the LAC status. Like it or not, the Chinese side had changed it by force and the action was not “close to the LAC” but in some instances across it. And that is what the talks with China, including his own repeated discussions with his counterpart Wang Yi were all about.

The saddest part of all this is that the Army brass, too, is going along with the government. No doubt, this is aimed at hiding their own culpability in lowering their guard last year. But take, for example Lt Gen Y.K. Joshi,  the northern army commander’s assertion that the situation in Depsang, by far the most serious, is a “legacy issue”, meaning it had unfolded before the 2020 events. Recall here that the Chinese have established a blockade at a key point that is preventing Indian patrols from surveilling several hundred square kilometres of territory.

The response to Joshi’s claim came from Lt Gen (retd) R.K. Sharma. Writing for the pro-government Vivekanand Foundation of India, he rejected this “legacy issue” argument, noting that 8-10 patrols a year had visited the area between 2013-2019. Sources say that the last Indian set of Indian patrols actually took place in February 2020.

The Chinese are not misled by all this. They know where they are and what they did. The government of India and the Army, too, are, hopefully, wiser after the event. The only ones who do not yet clearly know what transpired are the people of India who have been treated to this double-speak where the bravery of soldiers is praised to the skies even as those who should have been more vigilant get away scot free. This is similar to the Kargil incursion where again, soldiers paid the price, a great victory was declared, while nobody was held accountable for the intelligence failure.

Fortunately, at least in the case of eastern Ladakh, a fictitious narrative of victory has not been fabricated, at least as of now, though Modi’s June 19, 2020 statement comes close to it.

The government seems to have embarked on a peculiar course of information denial and manipulation with regard to events in eastern Ladakh. This, despite the sorry history of the tragic consequences of a similar policy followed by the Nehru government in the 1950s. Open societies have long known of the value of an informed citizenry. They do not believe that “bad” news  is “anti-national”.  On the contrary accepting setbacks is the best and perhaps only way to set things right.

The writer is a Distinguished Fellow, Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi

Disengagement at Pangong Tso a Win-Win Situation, but Long Way To Go: General Naravane

Speaking at a webinar, the Indian Army chief said there are strategies in place to address pending issues in the standoff with China in areas like Depsang.

New Delhi: The disengagement of the Indian and Chinese armies from the north and south banks of Pangong Tso is a “very good end result” and a win-win situation for both sides, Army chief General M.M. Naravane said on Wednesday, even as he said that “there is a long way to go” and admitted there is a trust deficit.

Speaking at a webinar organised by the Vivekananda International Foundation, General Naravane also said there were no signs of an “overt collusion” between China and Pakistan during the Ladakh standoff but India caters to a long term strategy for a “two-and-half front war”, with the half being internal security.

“These are threats in being. Whether they manifest or not, only time will tell. With the whole-of-government approach, such a worst case scenario should not be unfolding. But as a military, we are prepared,” he said, according to the Indian Express.

Speaking about the internal security situation in the Northeast, the Army chief said that China had created an “environment of confrontation and mutual distrust”.

“The internal dynamics in the Northeast are intricately linked to the regional security construct. This is characterised by rising Chinese belligerence in the Indo-Pacific, its hostility towards weaker nations and its relentless drive to create regional dependencies through debt traps like the Belt and Road Initiative. Also, the resultant Sino-US rivalry has created regional imbalances and instability. The increasing footprints of China in India’s neighbourhood and its attempt to unilaterally alter the status quo along our disputed borders have created an environment of confrontation and mutual distrust,” he said, according to the newspaper.

Watch | China Not Keen on Further Disengagement, Withdrawal at Depsang Looks Unlikely: Ajai Shukla

‘Trust deficit’

General Naravane said there are strategies in place to address other pending issues in eastern Ladakh. Though the disengagement process has commenced, there is a trust deficit, he admitted. The disengagement process began on February 10.

“We still have a long way to go. We have to move on to the stage of de-escalation. And of course, after that moving back of the troops, the de-induction of the troops which went to the higher reaches,” he said.

While doing so, India will be very cautious as the trust deficit remains, he said.

“In doing whatever we are doing, we are keeping in mind that we have to be wary. We will be very cautious. There is trust deficit. Unless that trust deficit is removed, we will, of course, continue to be very wary and watching every movement that happens on either side of the LAC,” he said.

Naravane exuded confidence that with continued engagement with Pakistan, there could be some sort of an understanding because “unsettled borders and violence on the borders help no one”.

He said China has been in the “habit of creeping forward”, making very small incremental changes wherein each change was not big or worthy of a very strong reaction.

“Because of these small incremental moves, which were never contested, it has been able to achieve its aims without firing any shot or loss of life.

He also cited the example of the South China Sea where China militarised some of the islands. Naravane said this strategy will not work with India.

“I think more than anything else, what we have achieved is that this strategy will not work with us and every move will be met resolutely,” he said.

He said right from the beginning of the standoff, all arms of government worked together. At the political, diplomatic and military levels, there were talks with the respective Chinese counterparts, he said.

“We were all in it together. We had our plan chalked out which we had discussed on what should be the way forward. Whatever has panned out, has happened as a result of that. What we have achieved so far is very good,” Naravane said.

“As a result of this whole approach, this disengagement has taken place. I think it is a very good end result. It is a win-win situation. For any agreement to last, both sides should feel that they have achieved something. I think a good outcome that has resulted out of the 10 rounds of talks which have taken place so far,” he said.

Last week, the armies of the two countries concluded the withdrawal of troops and weapons from the north and south banks of Pangong Tso in the high-altitude region.

Indian and Chinese troops and tanks disengage from the banks of Pangong lake area in Eastern Ladakh where they had been deployed opposite each other for almost ten months now. Photo: PTI/Indian Army handout

Depsang region

However, issues still remain. In the talks held on Saturday which continued till the wee hours of Sunday, India is learnt to have insisted on a faster disengagement process in areas like Hot Springs, Gogra and Depsang to bring down tension in the region.

Naravane said there are some issues which remain in the area of Depsang, in the area of eastern Ladakh and in other areas along northern border.

“But we have our strategies in place for that. Do we have anything to negotiate in future? Yes, definitely we have. But I would not like to say what those strategies would be to further progress our negotiations to get a favourable outcome,” he said.

When asked about the steps to ensure that China does not occupy the heights vacated by India, he said, “We will trust but we will verify and we have put our systems in place to make sure that there is no reoccupation of these heights. It is part of the agreement.”

The border standoff between the Indian and Chinese armies began on May 5 following a violent clash in the Pangong lake areas and both sides gradually enhanced their deployment by rushing in tens of thousands of soldiers as well as heavy weaponry even as the two sides continued military and diplomatic talks.

Last year, the Chinese military built several bunkers and other structures in the areas between Finger 4 and 8 and had blocked all Indian patrols beyond Finger 4, triggering strong reaction from the Indian Army.

In the nine rounds of military talks, India had specifically insisted on withdrawal of Chinese troops from Finger 4 to Finger 8 on the North bank of Pangong Lake. The mountain spurs in the area are referred to as Fingers.

On its part, the Chinese side was insisting on the withdrawal of Indian troops from several strategic peaks on the southern bank of the lake. Around five months ago, Indian troops occupied a number of strategic heights in the Mukhpari, Rechin La and Magar hill areas around the southern bank after the Chinese PLA attempted to intimidate them in the area.

(With PTI inputs)

China’s Ingress Into and Withdrawal From the LAC Remain Inscrutable

There are a host of possible reasons on offer for the People’s Liberation Army’s aggression, but Beijing’s moves remain swathed in obfuscation within a Chinese jalebi which defies unravelling.

Chandigarh: With the mutual pullback of Chinese and Indian troops from around the Pangong Tso having been successfully completed, Beijing’s jalebi, first in breaching the disputed Line of Actual Control (LAC) at multiple locations in eastern Ladakh in May 2020, and thereafter in agreeing to a withdrawal over nine months later, remains inscrutable.

Equally mysterious is the reason behind China’s recent admittance that four of its People’s Liberation Army (PLA) soldiers had died in Ladakh’s Galwan Valley region eight months earlier, following a clash with an Indian Army (IA) patrol. Twenty IA personnel, including a colonel-rank officer, died in the skirmish that involved hand-to-hand combat and the employment, by the PLA, of bespoke clubs studded with nails.

Beijing has offered no explanation for either the ingress or the subsequent pullback, but a polemical and propagandist one for admitting it suffered causalties. It claims to have revealed the deaths of four PLA soldiers to ‘set the record straight’ in view of distortions by India regarding the Galwan incident. Incredulously, the PLA further accused the IA of ‘slandering Chinese troops’ and released footage of injured regimental commander Qi Fabao who too was honoured for ‘defending the border’ from IA troops, along with the four others who died.

Many hypotheses

Various explanations, hypotheses and arguments at the wider geostrategic, regional and bilateral levels have been proffered for each of these three occurrences. But neither security, military, diplomatic or other officials in New Delhi engaged with these matters, or even analysts and media persons, for that matter, can pinpoint with any level of exactitude the rationale behind either of these interconnected events. For now, these remain swathed in obfuscation within a Chinese jalebi which defies unravelling.

Without belabouring the multiplicity of these innumerable cause-and-effect computations, the recent incursions along the LAC are, ironically reminiscent of earlier PLA actions in precipitously launching a border war against India in October 1962, in which the latter came off worse. Exactly four weeks later, on November 21, the PLA unilaterally pulled back, like it opted to withdraw 59 years later, in early February 2021 from the LAC at a juncture when Indian military planners were convinced that China was poised for an extended haul till the advent of summer, if not beyond.

On both occasions, China’s decision to pullback came as a welcome relief to Delhi that was militarily, diplomatically and economically stretched to meet the PLA’s superior numbers ‒ or waves of soldiers ‒ in 1962 and better infrastructure, logistics and overall equipment along the LAC in Ladakh some six decades later.

Furthermore, the standoff which currently endures in Hot Springs, Gogra, Depsang Plains and Demchok was, for India exacerbated by the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic that has wreaked financial havoc upon it over the past year. Nonetheless, India’s military, especially the IA, unlike in 1962, delivered a robust riposte by deploying steadfastly against the PLA at heights of over 15,000 feet along the LAC and in brutal temperatures averaging -30 degrees Celsius.

Army soldiers stand guard at snow-bound Zojila Pass, situated at a height of 11,516 feet, on its way to the frontier region in Ladakh. Photo: PTI

The IA’s Special Frontier Force (SFF), comprising Tibetan expatriates, also exhibited operational brio, in seizing control last August of the strategic Rechin La and Rezing La mountain passes at a height of over 18,000 ft on the Kailash Ranges on Pangong Tso’s southern bank. The IA and other officials cite this operational one-upmanship, which resulted in the IA overlooking the PLA’s Moldo garrison, thereby rendering it vulnerable, as one of several reasons cited for China agreeing to pull back its troops from Pangong Tso.

“We occupied (those heights) with a purpose, to push the negotiations to disengagement,” declared Lieutenant General Y.K. Joshi, the IA commander overseeing operations along the LAC.

“It was meant to give us an advantage, but it cannot be an advantage in perpetuity,” he stated recently in an online interview with the Indian Express, adding that it had helped secure the PLAs disengagement along Pangong Tso’s north bank.

Perplexing parallels

But several senior retired and serving military officials remain sceptical.

They maintain that for years after the 1962 war, service officers, diplomats and analysts had speculated widely over China’s perplexing attack and equally sudden withdrawal, arriving eventually at a series of postulations, but without any great degree of accurateness. And though it is much too soon to expect any such plausibility for the military pullback from Pangong Tso ‒ and possibly other areas along the LAC following the 10th military commanders meeting on February 19-20 ‒ China’s operational volte-face is more than just intriguing.

Superficial certainties, however, abound in each of the military bushwhacks, separated by nearly six decades.

The 1962 conflict followed the Sino-Indian Agreement of 1954 ‒ better known as the Panchsheel Treaty ‒ in which both sides agreed upon mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual non-aggression and mutual non-interference in bilateral internal affairs. The neighbours also agreed upon mutual equality and above all, peaceful co-existence.

Eight years later the border war unexpectedly erupted and PLA troops captured Rezang La in the west and Twang in the northeast. Four weeks later, the PLA mysteriously withdrew as hastily as it had attacked, leaving behind 1,383 dead and 1,000 wounded IA soldiers. Another 4,000 were taken captive by the PLA, while 1,700-odd were declared missing.

But the PLA’s messaging was clear, permeating at least three future generations of IA officers, who continued to look upon the Chinese military as a boogeyman to be feared and treated with trepidation. In the meantime, the LAC remained nebulous, poised for reactivation at Beijing’s will.

The May 2020 violation of the LAC followed an analogous, but extended trajectory: five bilateral agreements, 1993 onwards, that included Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) and Border Defence Co-operation Agreements (BDCA) to manage the de facto frontier. These included elaborate measures that involved both patrolling armies, with their weapons sheathed, but on full display, waving their respective flags whilst on patrol and issuing warnings via foghorns in the event of a perceived transgression of the LAC by either side.

A signboard is seen from the Indian side of the Indo-China border at Bumla, in Arunachal Pradesh. Photo: Reuters/Adnan Abidi/File Photo

Video cameras to film the LAC patrolling, and cloth posters in Chinese and English, warning the other side against violating the line, comprised some of the IA’s and the PLA’s bag of props. Much buffoonery was enacted, said IA officers involved in such horseplay along the LAC for years, confident in the illusionary belief ‒ flowing from the 1962 fear syndrome ‒ that the border would remain peaceful if they followed these norms, however ridiculous.

Physical contact between rival patrolling parties was prohibited, as was ‘tailing’ each other. Like children playing hide and seek, both armies would frequently resort to cheekily transgressing areas claimed by the other side, absurdly leaving behind empty cigarette packs, biscuit wrappers, soft drink bottles or other gewgaws to indicate their defiance. Periodic meetings between commanders from the rival armies too were also part of these intricate protocols that kept the peace till May 2020, by which time Beijing had achieved global economic supremacy.

Unfortunately, and once again inexplicably ‒ much like the Panchsheel Agreement ‒ these protocols transformed overnight from CBMs and BDCAs into Distrust Building Measures and Border Defence Interference Measures BDIMs, to coin revised terms to elucidate Chinese duplicity. “Trust (between India and China) is low” General Joshi, told India Today television recently. It (trust) now has to be built up, he added in response to question on ways to deal with future Chinese chicanery.

Also Read: India-China Joint Statement Is Uncannily Similar to a Treaty Signed 66 Years Ago

Meanwhile, the host of multiple possible reasons on offer for the PLA’s ingress of the LAC include Beijing ‘probing’ India’s military reaction to its aggression, and its unpredicted pullback after gauging it.  Objections to Delhi abrogating Article 370 in Kashmir and declaring Ladakh a federally administered region and threats by senior Indian leaders of India re-taking the Aksai Chin, which China steadily occupied through the 1950s, and consolidated control over after the 1962 war, are some of the other causations tendered for the LAC transgressions.

Beijing’s reported nervousness regarding the Indian Navy (IN)-enabled Quadrilateral Security Dialogue or Quad involving the Australian, Japanese and US navies, is also part of this putative list. Previously, in 2007-08 China had viewed the Quad as a direct threat to its legitimate entry into the strategic Indian Ocean Region and successfully pressured India and Australia into ditching it. But in view of China’s growing militarism and hegemony, the Quad regrouped in November 2020, dividing its three-day-long joint exercises between India’s eastern and western seaboard.

India’s strategic and military cooperation with Washington and Joe Biden’s election as US president too are viewed in Delhi as reasons behind China’s recent calculated adventurism, which has successfully panicked Delhi into considering permanent manning of the LAC as it negotiates the path ahead with Beijing from a position of total distrust. “Having displayed military determination at the LAC, India must seek to move beyond just seeking peace and tranquility on the undefined LAC and seek to definitively define it,” said military analyst Major General (retired) A.P. Singh who has served in Ladakh. It’s time for Delhi to play hardball and continue to play a reactive role, he declared.

But as the fastmoving events imply, perhaps Beijing’s enigmatic jalebi strategy has more perplexing surprises in its spirals.

India Needs To Look Into LAC Lapses To Be Future-Ready

It is time for the government to consider launching a review into the intelligence and operational lapses resulting in the debilitating faceoff with China that erupted last May.

With the complementary withdrawal of Indian and Chinese troops from the bitterly contested Pangong Tso or lake region along the disputed Line of Actual Control (LAC) in eastern Ladakh underway, it is time for the government to consider launching a review into the intelligence and operational lapses resulting in the debilitating faceoff that erupted last May.

And though the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)’s ingress into the adjoining areas still awaits vacation, as does the restoration of the April 2020 military status quo ante along the LAC, a multi-disciplinary commission of inquiry needs establishing, similar to the one which followed the analogous 1999 intrusion by the Pakistan Army into Kargil, to manage the Chinese threat and Beijing’s future duplicity.

The 1962 ambush by China followed the placatory Panchsheel Treaty eight years earlier, much like the slew of five bilateral border treaties and confidence-building measures 1993 onwards aimed at managing the LAC. Thereafter, the Lt Gen Henderson Brooks inquiry into the disastrous border war was never made public, with successive governments incredulously claiming that the report, of which just two copies exist, remains ‘sensitive’ and of ‘current operational value’.

Also Read: Why It Is Imperative That Indians Come to Know What Happened in 1962

However, a cross-section of serving military officers, veterans and defence analysts concede that a ‘lessons learnt approach’ emanating from such a suggested inquiry commission or review committee would assist in future projection of India’s Comprehensive National Power, including military strength, to deal with a formidable foe like China. Such an endeavour would also help restructure tri-service cooperation, intelligence sharing, timely information dissemination and media management, amongst other aspects.

It would also assist in dealing with what is grudgingly accepted in military and security circles, that future Indian Army deployments along the LAC will duplicate those along the Line of Control and the Siachen glacier against Pakistan, as all previous Sino-Indian LAC-related protocols now stand nullified. New unassailable pacts, predicated to overarching distrust of China by India, will need to be concluded to ensure peace between the nuclear-armed neighbours till their 3,488-km-long LAC is eventually demarcated.

Doubtlessly, naysayers will assert that the Indian Army has, in recent months displayed flexibility, speed and steadfastness in its LAC deployments, as well as strategic chutzpah by seizing the commanding Kailash heights on Pangong Tso’s southern bank, which helped determine the February 10 pullback agreement. But many veterans differ, claiming that rushing an additional 50,000 troops to man the LAC, including critical Army Headquarters reserves, was more a rushed ‘battalion approach’ to man the 800-km-long LAC flank in eastern Ladakh, rather than a structured strategy.

For several decades, a resource-strapped and diffident India had followed the path of least resistance against China, sheltering behind multiple border treaties to ensure peace along the LAC with its more powerful neighbour. China, on the other hand, viewed the LAC accords as an abiding tactical measure, aimed at lulling an amenable India into a false sense of security for nearly three decades as it embarked on progressing its economy. It willfully ‘persuaded’ India, including its military into focusing on bilateral economic issues like trade and commerce, furthering diplomatic, political and even defence ties. Resolving the border imbroglio was interminably postponed despite 23 rounds of talks between the respective Special Representatives, but China’s 1959 claim lines in Ladakh, it now transpires, were not forgotten.

A man walks inside a conference room with Indian and Chinese flags in the background. Photo: Reuters/Adnan Abidi/File photo

It’s also known in Indian security circles that its military planners, especially the Army, had set a 2010 deadline to meet the proliferating security threat from Beijing. It was widely accepted at the time that the logistical, infrastructural and materiel inequalities would become too pronounced if this schedule slipped. Alarmingly it did, as was revealed by the frantic procurement of assorted ammunition, missiles, UAVs, varied ordnance and high-altitude kit, worth over Rs 20,000 crore, June 2020 onwards.

Those opposing a review or inquiry into the PLA’s ingress also point to the Army re-orienting its Mathura-based 1 Strike Corps – one of three such ‘sword arm’ formations – to convert it into a mountain strike corps for eventual employment in Ladakh. This envisages two of its infantry divisions being trained in mountain warfare, in what analysts consider a tactical, rather than a wider strategic and holistic approach to higher defence management.

Also Read: When it Comes to China, India Needs to Up its Deterrence Game

The Army also needs to abandon the Second World War concepts of attrition and manoeuvre warfare, familiar to generations of its commanders and ones they feel ‘comfortable’ planning for and executing like in the four wars with Pakistan. It requires desperately to shift focus to futuristic non-kinetic warfare technologies like robotics, artificial intelligence, cyber and network-centric operations to match the PLA capabilities.

The proposed review would especially need to focus on the slip-ups leading to the Chinese incursions despite the three-fold surveillance grid: regular joint foot patrols by the Army and the Indo-Tibetan Border Police supplemented by detailed imagery provided by UAVs and satellites. The federal government would do well to emulate the Kargil Review Committee (KRC) inquiry instituted by the BJP-led government of the then prime minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee on July 29, 1999, three days after the Kargil hostilities concluded, to evaluate the lapses that led to the Pakistan Army’s intrusion and the subsequent hostilities in which over 500 Indian Army soldiers died.

Headed by strategic affairs expert K. Subrahmanyam, the four-member KRC interacted with over 100 military and intelligence officers, bureaucrats and even journalists, for nearly five months, before submitting its report that was tabled in Parliament in February 2000 and also made public.

Some of its sensitive portions were redacted, but despite the expurgations, the report was instructive, revealing numerous intelligence collection failures, operational shortcomings and inter-service jointness, amongst other inadequacies. Thereafter, a Group of Ministers (GoM), headed by deputy prime minister L.K. Advani and four task forces led by seasoned officials further reviewed the KRC’s recommendations, precipitating manifold changes in India’s overall security apparatus. Obviously, these need to be reappraised following the PLA’s ingress into Ladakh and should be made public.

This article was first published on The Tribune.

India and China Are on the Verge of Lasting Peace, if Modi Wants It

Despite the caution expressed by Indian defence analysts, the de-escalation is likely to hold. But, the agreement to withdraw needs political endorsement from the prime minister.

A policy blunder of the greatest magnitude, a humiliating defeat, and six decades of hiding the truth about what really caused the war between China and India in 1962, has so completely embedded a visceral distrust of China in the Indian mind that whenever there is a turn for the better in our relationship, our media, and the majority of our China-watchers, look for the hidden catch in it first before allowing themselves to believe that our relations might actually start improving.

The reaction of some of our best-known commentators to Beijing’s announcement that China and India would begin a synchronised disengagement on the north and south shores of Pangong lake in Ladakh with the intention of eventually returning to our April 2020 positions, is a case in point. While General H.S. Panag welcomed the development in a recent video interview, his scepticism about China’s intentions was writ large in his words and his body language.

Colonel Ajai Shukla was more forthright in voicing his distrust of the Chinese: “a 10-km stretch between Finger 3 and Finger 8. Indian Army has patrolled this area since the 1962 Sino-Indian war but now cannot enter the zone. ….  China has been granted right to patrol to finger 4. that means LAC effectively shifted from finger 8 to finger 4,” he tweeted (emphasis added.) Others, including some in the political opposition, echoed his scepticism.

Criticising Shukla for creating a ‘false perception’, another Twitter user, ‘Sunny Shikhar’, claimed that “China (whose version of the LAC runs through Finger 4, the fourth of eight ridges coming down to the north shore of Pangong lake) has had a road till F4 since 1999 and a naval Radar base on F6 since 2006. “We patrolled till F8,” he points out, “on the road made by China because they let us, not because we controlled it. Now (under the terms of the disengagement)” China cannot even patrol on its own road between F8-F4”.

I have no idea who ‘Sunny  Shikhar’ is, but if the facts he cites are correct, it means that China has forfeited as much of its claimed right to patrol as India has.

If that is indeed so, then Shikhar’s clarification substantiates Rajnath Singh’s statement in parliament, that both sides have agreed that neither will patrol the intervening area after the mutual withdrawals, till ‘an agreement is reached through future talks’.

China’s 1960 claim line in Ladakh is marked in yellow, the LAC at Pangong Tso is in pink. As can be seen, Thakung, the site of the latest standoff, is inside the LAC but within the 1960 Chinese claim line. Map: The Wire

A breakthrough has been achieved

To say that this has been a crucial breakthrough in the longstanding border dispute would be an understatement. For the agreement is not only an explicit acknowledgement that a ‘Grey Area’ or ‘No Man’s Land’ has existed between the two countries’ conflicting definitions of the LAC, but also marks a formal elevation of this area to the status of a ‘buffer zone’.

The difference between the two concepts is that whereas both Chinese and Indian patrols were entering “No Man’s Land” frequently, and waving placards stating that ‘This is Chinese/Indian Territory, please withdraw’ at each other when they met, now neither side will enter it till the misunderstandings and apprehensions that have arisen between the two countries are cleared through talks.

To a generation that has grown up in the era of the nation-state, this will look like an unsatisfactory resolution of the issue, for don’t all countries need hard, clearly defined, constantly patrolled borders? What our generation can only learn from the study of history is that hard boundaries replaced porous border regions, or belts, only in the era of the nation-state which first took shape after the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, and attained its full, malignant form with the widespread introduction of passports as recently as in the 1880s.

Also Read: Harsh Winter Conditions Contributed to India-China Pullback from Pangong Tso

For reasons best known to itself, China has been studiously avoiding giving India its maps of the Ladakh-Aksai Chin area ever since the 1993 Agreement was signed. But it has been equally reticent about this in 15 out of the 24 border agreements it has signed. This has created unease in other countries as well, and has vindicated the belief among China watchers here and in the West, that Beijing is following a salami-slicing strategy to acquire more and more territory in Ladakh.

But we need to be as wary of preconceptions and prejudices imported from the West as we are of the inexplicable reticence of the Chinese. For the unalterable fact is that if the disengagement that has now begun at Pangong is completed without any hitches, a similar process is likely to take place all along the LAC, at least in the Western Sector. If that takes place, a de facto border belt, as distinct from a de jure border line, will come into being between the two countries in the Himalayas, in an area that China considers vital to its security, but for reasons totally unconnected with India. That has the potential to finally bring to our countries the lasting peace that both have been seeking ever since they signed the Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility in 1993.

Such historic breakthroughs are usually made at the highest political levels. What makes the present disengagement very different, perhaps unique, is that it has emerged almost entirely out of an intense, and continuous discussion between the two military commands, with no overt intervention by the political leadership.

Since June last year, there have been nine well-publicised conferences between the corps commander of the 14th corps stationed in Leh, and his Chinese counterpart from the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Western Theatre Command. But, behind these, there have been between 25 to 30 meetings, many of them online or telephonic, at every level from battalion to brigade to division commander, to answer questions, allay suspicions, and clear misunderstandings that could have led to flare-ups of the kind that so nearly happened on the South Bank of the Pangong Tso when our forces’ foiled the PLA’s attempt to establish its presence opposite Finger 4 in late August by pre-emptively occupying several commanding heights over the area.

That confrontation was the closest China and India came to war, but it showed to the Chinese that India was building up its forces around the lake in earnest, and that any more covert attempts to establish advantageous positions to use as bargaining chips in future negotiations would be met with military force. It, therefore, acquired for the Indian Army a respect that had previously been lacking in the PLA.

Two other factors reinforced this: the first was the Indian Army’s resolute reinforcement of its troop strength, including artillery and armour, throughout the killing winter months. The Chinese were, of course doing the same, albeit outside the Indian definition of the LAC, so they fully understood India’s determination not to give any more ground.

The second was the army’s preparation of launchpads at places where it had the advantage of terrain, from where it could capture ground inside China’s definition of the LAC if the PLA crossed a Lakshmana Rekha into our territory. These preparations sent a clear signal that, should the PLA be tempted to try any more salami slicing of territory in Ladakh, it would become an extremely expensive operation.

But as the tragic Galwan incident (triggered by a Chinese soldier from a newly inducted unit manhandling Colonel Babu) showed, muscle-flexing can be a dangerous strategy if it is not backed up by confidence-building measures that reassure both sides that the promises being made will indeed be kept.

Indian Army vehicles moving towards the Line of Actual Control (LAC) amid border tension with China, in Leh, Sunday, September 27, 2020. Photo: PTI

The crucial ingredient

This is the crucial ingredient in the negotiations that has brought China and India from the brink of war to the brink of peace. For, as of February 2020, the army commander of Northern Command has been Lieutenant General Y.K. Joshi, who has served four tenures at various levels in Ladakh, from brigade commander to army commander in Leh, to the chief of staff of the Northern Command, based in Jammu, and finally Army Commander in February 2020.

What may have been far more important from the point of view of confidence-building is that from 2005 till 2008, General Joshi served as India’s defence attaché in Beijing, and developed a good working knowledge of Mandarin when he was there.

Since the formal talks held so far have been at the corps commanders’ level, General Joshi had to work with the Leh Corps Commander Lt General Harinder Singh, who did a creditable job in the first six rounds of talks despite not having served previously in the Himalayan Theatre, his specialty having been in counter-intelligence.

But on October 15, when General Singh was replaced by General P.G.K. Menon, who had served as a  brigadier in the Leh-based XIV corps some years earlier, India finally had a negotiating team that had the necessary knowledge of the terrain and a far better understanding of its Chinese counterparts and was, in turn, understood better by them.

On the Chinese side, although one can at most hazard a guess, it would seem that President Xi Jinping also made a crucial change at the top of the Western Theatre Command that has helped to bring about the present agreement. On December 18, he replaced General Zhao Zongqi with General Zhang Xudong. Relatively little is known here about General Zhang, but General Zhao had headed the Western Theatre Command during the 2017 Doklam standoff. He could hardly not have been miffed at the way that Prime Minister Narendra Modi had claimed a victory of sorts – what the hyper-nationalist section of our media hailed as ‘a draw’ when the PLA withdrew its bulldozers from the ridge where the confrontation took place. President Xi may therefore have been advised that after that searing experience, General Zhao would be the least suited person to take the risk that a negotiated withdrawal entailed.

Chinese and Indian Army troops. Credit: PTI/Files

Chinese and Indian Army troops. Photo: PTI/Files

The full story of how the disengagement was achieved will only be available decades later, when official documents get de-classified, if at all they ever are, but what cannot be denied is the magnitude of the achievement. By agreeing to create a buffer zone around Pangong, the two commands have opened the way to the settlement of the seven decade-long border based upon a new, ‘post-national’, concept of an international border. They have therefore taken the first essential step towards a lasting peace between China and India.

But the peace is tenuous, and will not last if Modi and his policymakers do not give it an explicit and public endorsement. For, the Chinese have developed an almost neurotic, and well-founded, distrust of Modi’s sudden, radical and secretive changes of policy towards China and the US, since his government came to power.

This is because in all of the 25-30 less formal interactions that have taken place in the lead up to the agreement, the single, almost neurotic, refrain from the Chinese side has been “will your government live up to the commitments we have chalked out”. The anxiety arises from their lack of understanding of the adversarial way in which democracies function. They are therefore extremely sensitive to the statements of sundry government and opposition political leaders, and to the overt hostility to China they see displayed almost daily by TV anchors and the defence analysts they hear and read in the Indian media.

The nervousness of the Chinese has increased as the two sides have inched closer to an understanding. The Indian interlocutors have therefore had to spend as much as half of the time at each meeting convincing their Chinese counterparts to disregard this ‘democratic noise’ and concentrate on what the government is doing and not saying.

Generals Joshi and Menon have succeeded in conveying the needed reassurance, but if the current agreement is even to last, let alone become the foundation of a final resolution of the border issue, it absolutely needs political endorsement from Prime Minister Modi himself.

This is because it was Modi who, without any prior discussion with his foreign office, and possibly even his national security adviser Ajit Doval, made an unannounced, volte face from the long term strategic cooperation with China that had been the policy of all previous governments since 1993, and joined the US-led bid to ‘contain’ China in the Indian Ccean, but also the South China sea.

He did this only 11 days after hosting President Xi in a state visit to India that could have restored China-India relations to where they might have been, had the 1962 war not taken place.

Today, Modi has an opportunity not only to do this, but do it without loss of face. All he has to do is restore all the economic and digital ties with China that he broke so abruptly in May after the Chinese occupation of the grey zone at Pangong lake. The rest will follow.

India Hasn’t Conceded Territory in Disengagement Pact with China in Pangong Tso: MoD

Congress leader Rahul Gandhi alleged that the government has “ceded” Indian territory to China and raised questions over the agreement.

New Delhi: The government on Friday stated that India has not “conceded” any territory following the disengagement agreement with China in Pangong lake areas in eastern Ladakh as political sparks flew thick and fast over the pullback process.

Hours after Congress leader Rahul Gandhi alleged that the government has “ceded” Indian territory to China and raised questions over the agreement, the Ministry of Defence(MoD) and the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party came out with a response.

A MoD statement said that India has enforced observance and respect for the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and prevented any unilateral change in the status quo.

BJP president J.P. Nadda asserted that Gandhi’s claim was an “insult” to the armed forces who are leading the disengagement strategy.

The war of words erupted a day after Defence Minister Rajnath Singh announced in Parliament that India and China have reached an agreement on disengagement in the North and South banks of Pangong lake in eastern Ladakh that mandates both sides to “cease” forward deployment of troops in a “phased, coordinated and verifiable” manner.

Also read: ‘India, China to Remove Forward Deployments in Phased Manner’: Rajnath Singh

In the statement countering Gandhi’s claims, the MoD said the assertion that Indian territory is up to Finger 4 in the northern bank of Pangong lake is categorically false, adding the permanent posts of both sides in the area are “longstanding and well-established”. The mountain spurs in the region are referred to as Fingers.

“Even the Line of Actual Control (LAC), as per the Indian perception, is at Finger 8, not at Finger 4. That is why India has persistently maintained the right to patrol upto Finger 8, including in the current understanding with China.”

The MoD further said the territory of India is as depicted in the map of India and includes more than 43,000 sq km currently under illegal occupation of China since 1962.

“India has not conceded any territory as a result of the agreement. On the contrary, it has enforced observance and respect for LAC and prevented any unilateral change in the status quo,” it added.

The ministry also asserted that permanent posts of both sides at the north bank of Pangong Tso are longstanding and well-established.

“On the Indian side, it is Dhan Singh Thapa Post near Finger 3 and on the Chinese side, east of Finger 8,” the MoD said, adding the current agreement provides for cessation of forward deployment by both sides and continued deployment at these permanent posts.

In his statement, Defence Minister Singh had said China will pull back its troops to east of Finger 8 areas in the northern bank of Pangong lake while the Indian personnel will be based at their permanent base at Dhan Singh Thapa Post near Finger 3 in the region.

Singh had also assured Parliament that India has not conceded anything in the sustained talks with China and it will not allow even an inch of its territory to be taken away by anyone..

The MoD statement said it has taken note of some “misinformed and misleading” comments being amplified in the media and on social media regarding the disengagement currently underway at Pangong Tso, asserting it is necessary to set the record straight and counter certain instances of wrongly understood information.

It further said the defence minister’s statement also made clear that there are outstanding issues to be addressed, including at Hot Springs, Gogra and Depsang, adding they are to be taken up within 48 hours of the completion of the Pangong Tso disengagement.

Addressing a press conference, Rahul Gandhi questioned why the Prime Minister did not make a statement on the LAC situation, and said Singh “sheepishly” made a statement on the issue in both Houses of Parliament.

“The Prime Minister should say – I have given Indian land to China, this is the truth,” he said targeting Modi.

He said it has emerged that Indian troops are now going to be stationed at Finger 3 at Pangong Tso lake.

“Finger-4 is our territory, that is where our post used to be. So, now we have moved from Finger-4 to Finger-3. Why has Prime Minister Modi given up Indian Territory to the Chinese? This is the question that needs to be answered by him and by the Defence Minister,” Gandhi said.

He asked why have Indian troops, after the hard work that they had done in capturing Kailash ranges been asked to move back.

“What has India got in return for this? Most importantly, the more important strategic area, Depsang plains, why have the Chinese not moved back? These are the real questions. Why have they not moved from Gogra-Hot Springs”.

Gandhi said it is the responsibility of the prime minister to protect the territory of the country.

“GOI must explain – Why our forces are withdrawing from dominant positions in Kailash Ranges? Why we are ceding our territory & withdrawing from forward base at Finger 4 to Finger 3? Why has China not withdrawn from our territory in Depsang Plains & Gogra-Hot Springs,” he asked in a tweet.

Asked at the news conference if India will lose its strategic advantage once status quo ante is restored, Gandhi said there was no strategic advantage as the Chinese were on our land in Depsang and Pangong.

“Our soldiers risked everything, they had, to go to Kailash ranges. That’s where the strategic advantage, if any, arose. Now, the prime minister has given back the land. Status quo ante is irrelevant. Kailash has been given back and nothing has happened on the key area of which China wants, Depsang plains.”

“This is absolute 100 per cent cowardice. This is nothing else. The prime minister is a coward who cannot stand up to the Chinese…He is betraying the sacrifice of our army,” he charged.

In a statement, Congress’s chief spokesperson Rained Surjewala claimed that Singh’s address and the Defence Ministry’s statement “completely omit” the fact that the Government has agreed to withdraw Indian armed forces from dominant positions in Kailash ranges (southern Bank, Pangong Tso Lake Area), where the Chinese are at a disadvantage, without any quid pro quo by China.

Union minister Pralhad Joshi accused Gandhi of “lying left, right and centre” and denigrating the country’s security forces.

‘India, China to Remove Forward Deployments in Phased Manner’: Rajnath Singh

‘India and China will remove forward deployments in a phased, coordinated manner,’ the defence minister said at the Rajya Sabha on February 11.

New Delhi: China and India have agreed on disengagement on the north and south banks of Pangong Tso Lake and respective forward deployments of troops will now be removed slowly, defence minister Rajnath Singh said in his 14-minute statement at the Rajya Sabha, on the border standoff with China in eastern Ladakh.

The defence minister’s statement comes a day after the Chinese defence ministry said that frontline troops of China and India had started a “synchronised and organised” disengagement from Wednesday, February 10.


As The Wire has reported, the spokesperson for the Chinese Ministry of National Defence Senior Colonel Wu Qian said in a brief statement in Beijing, “The Chinese and Indian frontline troops at the southern and northern bank of the Pangong Tso Lake start synchronised and organised disengagement from February 10.”

Singh said while military and diplomatic channels have always been open through the nine-month standoff, “India has never will and nor will it ever accept the intrusions” that China has made. In June, 2020, Prime Minister Narendra Modi had contradicted his government’s stand to assert that “no intrusions had been made” into Indian territory, leading to confusion first and a shot in China’s arm later.

“During the talks, we told China that we want solution of the issue based on three principles. First, both parties must agree on the LAC and respect it. Secondly, there should not be an attempt to change the status unilaterally, by any party. Thirdly, all the compromises should be completely agreed upon by both parties,” Singh said in his address.

Military tankers carrying fuel move towards forward areas in the Ladakh region, September 15, 2020. Photo: Reuters/Danish Siddiqui

“Our sustained talks with China have led to agreement on disengagement on the north and south banks of Pangong Lake. After this agreement, India-China will remove forward deployments in a phased, coordinated manner,” Singh said to applause from the Upper House.

Based on this understanding, China will now move its soldiers to Finger 8 and India will move towards Finger 3 to the administrative camp to restore the status quo, Singh said.

Also read: How Does the Indian Army’s Winter Deployment in Ladakh Fare Against the PLA’s?

“Many fraction areas are built near LAC in Eastern Ladakh. China has collected heavy force and arms and ammunition near LAC and in the nearby area on their side. Our forces have also adequate and effectively done counter deployment,” he said.

“I want to assure this House that we have not lost anything,” he also said.

Singh said that while there are some outstanding issues on deployment and patrolling in LAC, both sides are united on the issue of disengagements.

“Our security forces have proved that they are ready to face any challenge to protect the sovereignty of the country,” he said. Twenty Indian soldiers died in an escalation of the standoff last year at Galwan Valley and are deployed in Ladakh in a demanding winter.

Singh also stressed on India’s commitment to maintaining peace at the LAC. “India has always emphasised on maintaining bilateral ties, along with peace and tranquility,” he said.

Chinese, Indian Border Troops to Start ‘Synchronised’ Disengagement in Eastern Ladakh

While the Chinese defence ministry made the announcement, there was no official statement from the Indian side. Rajnath Singh will make a statement today in the Rajya Sabha.

New Delhi: The frontline troops of China and India started a “synchronised and organised” disengagement from Wednesday at the south and north banks of the Pangong Lake in eastern Ladakh, the Chinese defence ministry said, in what appears to be a step towards the overall disengagement process to defuse the more than nine-month long border standoff between the two countries.

There was no official comment by either the Indian defence ministry or the Indian Army on the Chinese statement, but media reports said both sides are in the process of pulling back their armoured units like tanks and armoured personnel carriers.

Both sides will return to to the pre-April 2020 positions in Eastern Ladakh along the Line of Actual Control (LAC).

According to news agency PTI, “specific steps” like the withdrawal of armoured elements from the friction points were discussed threadbare at the ninth round of high-level military talks on January 24 that lasted for around 16 hours.

Defence minister Rajnath Singh will make a statement in the Rajya Sabha at 10:30 am on Thursday on the situation in eastern Ladakh, according to a tweet from his office.

“Raksha Mantri Shri @rajnathsingh will make a statement in Rajya Sabha tomorrow regarding ‘Present Situation in Eastern Ladakh’,” it said.

PTI reported that “authoritative sources” in the Indian defence and military establishment did not refute the Chinese defence ministry’s statement on the developments in the northern and southern banks of Pangong lake, an area that witnessed major face-offs since the row erupted on May 5.

People familiar with the situation in eastern Ladakh said both sides are in the process of pulling back their armoured units in line with steps agreed upon for overall disengagement in the last round of military talks, adding a “clear picture” will emerge soon.

According to The Hindu, the agreement effectively means that China will have to retreat to its original positions on the Finger area of the north bank of Pangong Tso and India will have to climb down from the advantageous position it has occupied on the southern side of the lake. The mountain spurs in the area are referred to as Fingers.

The newspaper also reported that Depsang and Charding Ninglung Nallah junction in Demchok sector are not part of the “current disengagement plan”. These will be discussed in the next meeting.

China’s 1960 claim line in Ladakh is marked in yellow, the LAC at Pangong Tso is in pink. As can be seen, Thakung, the site of the latest standoff, is inside the LAC but within the 1960 Chinese claim line. Map: The Wire

The spokesperson for the Chinese Ministry of National Defence Senior Colonel Wu Qian said in a brief statement in Beijing, “The Chinese and Indian frontline troops at the southern and northern bank of the Pangong Tso Lake start synchronised and organised disengagement from February 10.” The statement did not provide details.

“This move is in accordance with the consensus reached by both sides at the 9th round of China-India Corps Commander Level Meeting,” the statement added.

Separately, a Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson said the frontline troops of the Chinese and Indian militaries began to conduct simultaneous and planned disengagement in the Pangong Lake area on Wednesday as per consensus reached at a meeting of the foreign ministers of the two countries in Moscow in September and the ninth round of Corps commander-level talks.

“We hope the Indian side will work with China to meet each other halfway, strictly implement the consensus reached between the two sides and ensure the smooth implementation of the disengagement process,” Wang Wenbin said in a statement.

“This move is in accordance with the consensus reached by both sides at the 9th round of China-India Corps Commander Level Meeting,” the official added.

FILE: Army trucks move towards the LAC in eastern Ladakh, amid the prolonged India-China stand off, September 12, 2020. Photo: PTI

‘Some forward movement’

A source in the Indian military and defence establishment told PTI that there has been some “forward movement” but added that India will “only go by what is happening on the ground”.

A senior official told The Hindu that the ground commanders are meeting “twice a day” and that the Indian Army is hopeful of achieving a “pre-April 2020 status in all sectors”. Reduction of troops will be visible on the ground in the next two-three days, the official said.

Both sides rushed a large number of battle tanks, armoured vehicles and heavy equipment to the treacherous and high-altitude areas of the region after tension escalated following a deadly clash in the Galwan Valley in June last.

Twenty Indian soldiers were killed in the fierce hand-to-hand combat on June 15 in Galwan Valley, an incident that marked the most serious military conflict between the two sides in decades.

China is yet to disclose the number of its soldiers killed and injured in the clash though it officially admitted to have suffered casualties. According to an American intelligence report, the number of casualties on the Chinese side was 35.

At their ninth round of military talks, the Indian and Chinese armies agreed to push for an “early disengagement” of troops and resolved to continue “effective efforts” to stabilise and control the situation in eastern Ladakh.

“The two sides agreed to continue their effective efforts in ensuring the restraint of the frontline troops, stabilise and control the situation along the Line of Actual Control in the Western Sector of the China-India border, and jointly maintain peace and tranquillity,” said a joint statement after the talks.

India has all along been maintaining that the disengagement process has to start simultaneously at all friction points and no selective approach was acceptable to it.

India was specifically insisting on the withdrawal of the troops of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) from Finger 4 to Finger 8 on the north bank of Pangong Lake.

On its part, the Chinese side was insisting on the withdrawal of Indian troops from several strategic peaks on the southern bank of the lake.

Around five months ago, Indian troops occupied a number of strategic heights in the Mukhpari, Rechin La and Magar hill areas around the southern bank of the Pangong lake after the Chinese military attempted to intimidate them in the area.

Close to 100,000 Indian and Chinese troops are deployed in eastern Ladakh amid continuing diplomatic and military talks to find an amicable solution to the standoff.

Last month, Army chief General M.M. Naravane said that Indian troops will hold their ground as long as it takes to achieve the “national goals and objectives”.

In December last, India and China held another round of diplomatic talks on the border row under the framework of Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination (WMCC) on India-China border affairs.

Following the sixth round of military talks, the two sides had announced a slew of decisions including not to send more troops to the frontline, refrain from unilaterally changing the situation on the ground and avoid taking any actions that may further complicate matters.

This round was held with a specific agenda of exploring ways to implement a five-point agreement reached between external affairs minister S. Jaishankar and his Chinese counterpart Wang Yi at a meeting in Moscow on September 10 on the sidelines of a Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) conclave.

The pact included measures like quick disengagement of troops, avoiding action that could escalate tensions, adherence to all agreements and protocols on border management and steps to restore peace along the LAC.

(With PTI inputs)

Chushul Heights and Why India Must Dispel Thoughts of a Disengagement Tradeoff With China

Any thought of trading commanding Chushul heights on Kailash range for a couple of Fingers overlooking the Pangong Lake is insane. 

The Chinese are delaying the announcement of dates for the ninth military dialogue as some People’s Liberation Army commanders feel disengagement sought by them may be seen as loss of face even as there are reports of fresh incursion in the form of a Chinese village near Doklam in Bhutan.

According to Indian sources New Delhi will react only to presence of PLA and let Bhutan sort out Chinese civilian intrusion.

The government (and military) will be committing a strategic blunder if it were to agree with the Chinese proposal leaked to the media about vacating the dominating Chushul heights on Kailash range as part of a selective disengagement and de-escalation process on north and south bank of Pangong Lake. Curiously, Army Chief Gen M.M. Naravane hopes this will be a ‘mutually beneficial’ pact.

Given that accuracy of leaks is inevitably suspect, China had wanted Indian forces to withdraw from Chushul heights and the Chinese from the Fingers area to positions they held earlier, with India moving first. The Chinese nationalistic tabloid, Global Times has reported that China will withdraw from North Bank only when India vacates South Bank.

Indian Air Force’s Apache helicopter is seen in the Ladakh region, September 17, 2020. Photo: Reuters/Danish Siddiqui

This sequence of withdrawal has been rejected by India which believes in the principle ‘first in first out,’ or as the Chinese like to put it, ‘those who tie the knot must untie it’. With trust and protocols buried in Galwan, India will be forfeiting the only overwhelming military advantage it has over China’s multiple pressure points, especially at Depsang, the albatross around Daulat Beg Oldie.

The Indian tragedy about the Chinese aggression across LAC is that even after seven months, no one from government has spelt out the scale of PLA perfidy. That there is a Chinese proposal was confirmed by External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar in mid-October (and Gen Naravane later) when he informed the media but refused to disclose details as it was ‘confidential’.

Print and electronic media have attributed their stories to unnamed government and military officials who have communicated different versions of events like hot air balloons over Pangong Lake to test these ideas. Four versions were floated:

First, withdrawal of heavy weapons and equipment like tanks and guns from rear areas. This was  de-escalation sans disengagement.

The second was disengagement from North and South Banks of Pangong Lake including tanks and guns.

The third included disengagement from all friction points except Depsang.

And the fourth was withdrawal covering all areas including Depsang.

After the eighth military commanders’ meeting on November 6 it was reported that the ninth military dialogue to be held shortly would tie up the loose ends of the withdrawal so that it could start in mid December. As roads will be snow-covered and passes  closed on the Indian side, only limited air withdrawal will be possible.  

Also read: India Tells China it Wants Complete Disengagement at All Friction Points

The three-step withdrawal plan confined to both banks of Pangong Lake consists of

a) Removal of heavy weapons from both banks of the lake;
b) Full vacation by PLA from North Bank from Fingers 4 area, back to the original Finger 8. Similarly Indian Army will pull back to Dhan Singh Post near Finger 3. The area between Fingers 4 and 8 will become a buffer zone;
c) Vacation of Chushul heights by Indian Army followed by PLA from Black Top. Withdrawal will include dismantling of structures on North Bank like barracks, fortifications, jetties, etc. 

The partial implementation of the first and only China-imposed disengagement plan culminating in the Galwan clash has placed Indian Army in tactically adverse positions. In Galwan, Indian garrison was pushed back beyond Shyok river; only cosmetic disengagement was carried out in Hot Spring-Gogra areas and none at all in Fingers area where Chinese encroachment and domination were  significant. The intrusion at Depsang, which is 18 km deep, was not even discussed.

The PLA has denied the Indian Army’s patrols access to five patrol points – PP 10, 11, 11a, 12 and 13 – by blocking them at Bottleneck/Y junction around 18 km inside the LAC. Map: The Wire.

The PLA has established a blockade preventing Indian forces from patrolling upto their traditional patrolling points. Add to this infamous Chinese diktat, the proposed patrolling ban between Fingers 4 and 8, and a new buffer zone will pop on the Indian side of LAC. The Chinese have declared a virtual lockdown. This is not a happy situation to be in with the Chinese clearly calling the shots. 

The question is: does the current proposal constitute a complete and comprehensive disengagement and de-escalation across all intrusion points or is it confined to the Pangong Lake area?

If as it seems it is the latter, India will be committing high altitude hara-kiri by abandoning strategic heights on Kailash range which are on Indian side of LAC and ground which was defended feebly in 1962.

Also read: With China, India Has Revealed a Blind Faith in Diplomacy

The Indian Army is probably visualising some difficulty in maintaining 3,000 troops at 18,000 feet with temperatures ranging from between -20°C and -40°C and with winter yet to set in. Gen Naravane clarified there was no shortage of winter clothing and equipment and according to US sources 30,000 winter kits have been supplied by Pentagon. Stocking and maintaining supply chains nearly 200 km beyond Leh with passes closed and roads snowed out is not easy.

With much shorter interior lines, it took more than a decade to stabilise the survival status in Siachen. Up at unfamiliar  forbidden heights, the Chinese have a more fundamental problem: finding acclimatised troops for the harsh winter though they are occupying only one or two posts including Black Top near the Kailash range. Chinese do not normally occupy posts along LAC. 

Army sets up upgraded living facilities for troops in eastern Ladakh. Photo: PTI

The degree of difficulty in holding such formidable heights notwithstanding the overwhelming moral and strategic benefits far outweigh the teething problems in holding them. The commanding Chushul heights provide direct observation over PLA Moldo garrison and Spanggur Gap which was used by the Chinese for the November offensive in 1962. Withdrawal from Kailash range will only benefit the Chinese as it would surrender a high value bargaining chip for negotiations especially  removal of Depsang. 

For the Chinese, the Special Frontier Force seizure of strategic heights on Kailash range was like snatching victory from the jaws of defeat. After failing to evict SFF, the PLA managed to secure a foothold near Indian posts on Kailash range with symbolic  presence on Black Top. The SFF did not occupy Black Top as it was across LAC and would have violated protocols. The Chinese are rattled and getting the Kailash range vacated has become an obsession. 

The latest  Chinese ploy is reporting that PLA has used microwave weapons (direct energy weapons) against Indian posts on Kailash, dissolving the withdrawing of Indian troops and occupying the posts. This is PLA’s latest salvo of psychological warfare through fake news. 

With the breakdown in trust and faith, the probability of Chinese seizing vacated heights after disengagement is highly likely. Suspicion of Pakistan committing such travesty following a proposed demilitarisation in 2005 had deterred the Indian Army from quitting Saltoro Ridge on Siachen. On extreme heights like Kailash range and Siachen, mere occupation of crest line is victory, as dislodging the holder off heights is near impossible. As news of likely withdrawal from Kailash range is gaining traction, military commanders and veterans are crying foul and calling it a sell out. The ultimate vacation of Chushul heights must be part of the return of status quo ante April 2020 and it must include Depsang.

The framework of the comprehensive disengagement and de-escalation mechanism should include a joint statement by the two foreign ministers outlining steps towards its implementation in a time bound manner with a verification and monitoring mechanism. Any thought of trading commanding Chushul heights on Kailash range for a couple of Fingers overlooking the Pangong Lake is insane. 

Major General Ashok K. Mehta, a founder member of Defence Planning Staff in MoD, was part of monitoring team on China’s first intrusion at Sumdorong chu near Towang in 1986. He later commanded IPKF (South) in Sri Lanka.

PLA Troops Approached Indian Post With Rods, Spears, Clubs: Reports Quote Govt Sources

The sources quoted by PTI said Indian troops did not use any firearms.

New Delhi: Chinese troops carried rods, spears, clubs and sharp weapons in trying to close in on an Indian position in Mukhpari area of Rezang-La ridgeline in eastern Ladakh on Monday evening, government sources said on Tuesday.

As tension escalated at the Line of Actual Control (LAC), the sources said around 50-60 soldiers of Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) approached the Indian post in the southern bank of Pangong Tso lake area at around 6 PM but the Indian Army personnel posted there strongly confronted them, forcing their retreat.

It may be recalled that the Chinese troops had mounted a savage attack on Indian soldiers with stones, nail-studded sticks, iron rods and clubs during the Galwan Valley clashes in eastern Ladakh on June 15 in which 20 Indian Army personnel were killed.

Also read: India Denies China’s Allegation, Says it Was Chinese Troops Who Fired Near the LAC

On Monday evening too, the Chinese troops were carrying rods, spears, clubs and sharp weapons, the sources said.

When the Indian Army forced the Chinese troops to return, they fired 10-15 rounds in the air to intimidate Indian soldiers, in the first use of firearms along the LAC after a gap of 45 years. The previous instance of shots being fired at the de-facto border was in 1975.

The sources said Indian troops did not use any firearm.

They said the attempt of the Chinese troops was to remove Indian Army from the strategic heights in Mukhpari peak and Rezang-La areas.

The PLA has been eyeing to capture the strategic heights in the last three-four days, the sources said, adding the Chinese troops damaged an iron fence on Monday evening which was put up by Indian troops in the area.

India continues to dominate strategic peaks around the southern bank of Pangong lake area overlooking key Chinese formations in the Moldo area.

The PLA late on Monday night alleged that Indian troops crossed the LAC and “outrageously fired” warning shots near the Pangong lake. The Indian Army on Tuesday rejected the charges.