New Delhi: Congress leader Rahul Gandhi recently began a new series of videos on current affairs that aim to break down the reasons that led China to initiate multiple stand-offs along the line of actual control in Ladakh. In reply to his critique of the Modi government’s foreign policy, external affairs minister S. Jaishankar took to Twitter with a rebuttal.
This is The Wire’s in-depth analysis of Rahul Gandhi’s critique from June 17 and Jaishankar’s response.
Gandhi began his first video with a question as to “why the Chinese have chosen this particular time” to have a confrontation with India. “A country is protected by its foreign relationships; it is protected by its neighbourhood. it is protected by its economy, it is protected by the feeling its people have, the vision that its people have,” he said.
Jaishankar’s replies came specifically on the claims raised by Gandhi about foreign policy. And while he made claims about and defended the Modi government’s record, many of his tweets were framed as an attack on the Manmohan Singh government’s record.
Major power relations
Gandhi: “Our relationship with the outside world used to be with multiple countries. we had a relationship with America; a strategic partnership with America. That is very important. We had a relationship with Russia. We had a relationship with Europe, and these countries used to help us manoeuvre in the world.
Today, we have a transactional relationship. We have a transactional relationship with the US. We have disturbed our relationship with the Russians. We have a transactional relationship with Europe.”
Jaishankar: The foreign affairs minister responded by asserting that our relationships with major powers are “strong” and that India’s “international standing” is going higher. He cited the “regular summits” and informal summits with the US, Russia, Europe and Japan.
Reality: Bilateral summits are a routine part of diplomacy in the modern world. Such summits have always taken place in both UPA and NDA years and there has been no change in their pace.
India and the European Union began their annual summits in 2000. The relationship was upgraded to a strategic partnership in November 2004. The tradition of annual summits between India and Russia began in October 2000 and has been followed diligently through the UPA years and beyond. With Japan, the annual summit between the prime ministers commenced under Manmohan Singh in 2006, when both countries established a “strategic and global partnership”.
There is no system of annual summits with the US. Manmohan Singh made eight visits to the US as prime minister between 2004 and 2013. These included a state visit in 2009, when the Obamas hosted their first state banquet for a foreign leader. His 2005 visit to Washington, followed by George Bush’s visit in 2006, led to the signing of the civil nuclear deal and associated agreements, while Barack Obama endorsed India’s candidature for a permanent seat in UNSC for first time during his visit to Delhi in 2010.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi has already visited the United States six times. During this period, there have been two presidential visits – by Obama for the Republic Day celebrations in 2015, and Trump in February 2020.
India under Modi has started the new concept of ‘informal’ summits with two countries – China and then Russia – to let the top leadership drive the relations that had either drifted or gone south. So while these summits could be considered the Modi government’s accomplishments, they also reflect the fact key relationships entered choppy waters on its watch. Thus, the Doklam crisis led to the start of the first such informal summit between India and China in Wuhan. When India announced the ‘informal summit’ with Russia in Sochi, informed observers felt that a meeting, sans deliverables, was necessary to affirm the relevance of the strategic partnership, amidst growing negative perception due to differences over Pakistan and Afghanistan.
Gandhi’s reference to a transactional relationship is more difficult to parse as there is an inherent sense of quid-pro-quo in bilateral relations. The strategic partnership has been lubricated by more than $10 billion worth of arms purchases by India over the past decade. And for all the bonhomie with the US, India has not been able to convince it to restart the GSP benefits, waive tariffs on aluminium and steel and stop the Damocles sword falling on visa matters,
However, the US has been helpful to India on other fronts which it deems as politically important to the Indian government – counterterrorism. At the same time, the US used its diplomatic muscle to list Masood Azhar as a global terrorist, but in return received assurances of India ending Iran oil imports.
China
Gandhi: The Congress leader did not mention China in a specific way, except to use the ongoing border conflict to frame the core question.
Jaishankar: The minister refers to China in three separate tweets. First, he claims that India engages with China on a “more equal terms politically”. In the following tweet, he states that India speaks its mind “more openly now” on issue related to China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, Belt and Road Initiative, South China sea and UN-sanctioned terrorists.
He then asserts that there has been incremental growth in infrastructure along the border with China during the NDA’s six years, compared to the previous six years under the UPA.
Reality: India’s statement that criticised the Belt and Road initiative was issued on the eve of the first summit by China on its flagship development partnership project in 2017. Jaishankar, as foreign secretary, had also obliquely criticised BRI in 2016. But, while the US, EU, Japan and Australia have joined the chorus, none of the alternate connectivity proposals mooted by them have fructified. Except for Bhutan, all of India’s neighbours have signed China’s BRI and continue to be part of it, despite concerns about burgeoning debt burden.
The outline of the China Pakistan Economic Corridor had been doing the rounds well before the official launch in 2015. India expressed concern over some of the CPEC projects located in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK) after the details of the CPEC became public during the visit of Chinese president Xi Jinping.
In South China Sea, India’s catchphrases have not really changed from UPA to NDA years. As the latest statement from the MEA spokesperson on July 16 and the 2012 speech of then external affairs minister demonstrate, India has been using similar terms – “freedom of navigation”, “unimpeded lawful commerce” and “peaceful resolution of maritime disputes in accordance with international law” have been around since the UPA time.
In 2006, India allowed ONGC Videsh to explore block 128 in Vietnam, despite the territory being disputed by China. New Delhi had told Beijing that OVL’s project was commercial in nature. Despite no major finds, this agreement is renewed periodically by India.
Ahead of the 2016 ruling of the Arbitral Tribunal on the case borough by Philippines against China, India had been party to the Russia-India-China statement, where the line on South China Sea had words reflecting the Chinese position. However, India’s statement after the Tribunal ruling had positively noted the order, but stopped short of calling for its compliance. A few months later, Jaishankar had implied the binding nature of the verdict, but subsequent Indian statements have not repeated that formulation.
In the India-US context, these phrases had been included in the 2010 joint statement but without taking specific names. They were again repeated in the 2015 joint declaration, with explicit mention of “South China Sea”. However, the citation to ‘South China sea’ was dropped in the 2016 India-US joint statement, even though it had the accompanying catchphrases.
Navy personnel of Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy take part in a military display in the South China Sea April 12, 2018. Photo: Reuters/Stringer
Similarly, with Japan, the explicit reference to ‘South China Sea’ in bilateral documents has been ‘off and on’. The last two joint statements issued after the annual summits in 2017 and 2018 dropped the term, despite being mentioned in 2016. Unlike stand-alone statements from New Delhi, these joint statements are also a reflection not just of India’s relations with China, but also that of the other partner. For example, Japan had been warming up to Beijing in last couple of years.
Since 2009, China had put a technical hold on the proposal to list Azhar as a global terrorist four times. One and half months after Jaish-e-Mohammad claimed responsibility for the Pulwama terror attack, Beijing removed its hold in May 2019, largely under pressure from the West. The final listing, however, did not have any mention of his activities on Kashmir.
A major failing on the China front was the misreading of Beijing’s approach to Indian membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Ironically, this was a failure that is directly attributable to Jaishankar as foreign secretary. He over-anticipated India’s chances of membership being approved at the NSG’s Seoul plenary in 2016 and even convinced Modi that a one-on-one meeting with Xi Jinping in Tashkent would do the trick. But with the Chinese sticking to their guns, the Modi government ended up with a self-goal: eight years after it had recognised India’s credentials as a responsible nuclear power (compared to the other major country outside the NPT, Pakistan), the NSG did a U-turn and said it would evolve common membership criteria for both India and Pakistan.
Finally, on border infrastructure, the NDA vs UPA record may not be as cut and dry as Jaishankar suggests, certainly not in the Congress’s telling, as this analysis of border road construction suggests, with the big push, even under Modi, coming only after the Doklam wake-up call in 2017.
Sri Lanka
Gandhi: The Congress leader said that “our neighbourhood, other than Pakistan, was working with India and saw itself as being partnered with India”.
On Sri Lanka, Gandhi’s said that “Sri Lankans have given a port to the Chinese”.
Jaishankar: External affairs minister retorted by pointing out that the Hambantota agreement between Sri Lanka and China was concluded in 2008.
Reality: Sri Lanka did allow China Harbour Engineering Company to construct the Hambantota Port Development Project, but only after offering it to India first. None in the Indian public sector were willing to take it up as it was not economically feasible. That was when the UPA was in power.
When Mahinda Rajapaksa lost the elections in 2015, New Delhi was pretty pleased, with the new government promising to review all projects with the Chinese.
Instead, the new government signed an agreement with Chinese firms to hand over the port and thousands of acres of land around it for 99 years in December 2017. The saving grace was that the concession agreement spelled out prohibition of military activities and put the security of the port in Sri Lankan hands. The vessel arrivals at Hambantota still remains sluggish, compared to other Sri Lankan ports. After a hiatus, Sri Lanka also gave the green signal on the resumption of Colombo port city project in 2016, another China-led project that India has reservations on. All of this was on the NDA’s watch.
Hambantota port. Credit: Reuters
Incidentally, Ranil Wickremesinghe as prime minister offered another project – the airport at Mattala near the Hambantota port. But India did not finalise the contract despite several rounds of talks, due to its economic feasibility. When the Rajapaksa brothers came back to power, it was no longer on the table.
Under the previous government in Colombo, some of India’s long pending rail projects were completed, but progress couldn’t be made on the strategic projects like the Trincomalee oil tank farm and the East Container terminal project, largely due to concerns of previous President Maithripala Sirisena.
As per tradition, Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s first presidential visit was to India in November 2019, with both sides finding common ground in counter-terrorism. But in other areas, the gap may be widening. India’s agreement to operate Colombo port’s East Container terminal with Japan is now in the doldrums with the unions and the opposition targeting it, with an eye on the coming parliamentary polls. Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa has already put a question mark by announcing a review of the project.
Maldives
Gandhi: The Gandhi scion said that the “Maldives is disturbed”
Jaishankar: The minister replied saying that relations with the Maldives have been difficult and accused the Indian government of doing nothing when President Mohamed Nasheed was “toppled” in 2012. He said that India’s ties with the Maldives now stand “transformed” and claimed that Indian businesses have been a beneficiary.
Reality: After the rout of Abdulla Yameen and the return of the Maldivian Democratic Party (MDP) to power in late 2018, relations have certainly improved a lot. However, China continues to be economically entrenched in Maldives.
Due to the current economic crisis exacerbated due to COVID-19, India offered a $150 million foreign currency swap, which was part of a $1.5 billion financial package announced in 2018. In June, China offered to partially suspend debt repayment for four years and review the terms for the remaining loans. Maldives also remains a part of the Belt and Road Initiative, which it had first signed in September 2014.
Bangladesh
Gandhi: Made no specific reference to Bangladesh.
Jaishankar: The minister cited the signing of the land boundary agreement in 2015, which he said opened the “path for more development and transit”. He also stated that “terrorists no longer find safe haven there”.
Reality: The Manmohan Singh government revived and signed the land boundary agreement with Bangladesh in 2011. It required parliamentary approval due to its territorial handover aspect, but it was strongly opposed by BJP. It was only after BJP came to power that the Bill was brought out of backburner and parliament approved it in 2015.
As with the UPA, the NDA government has invested considerable diplomatic and financial capital in maintaining ties with the friendly Sheikh Hasina government, which has resulted in close relations on the security front.
Prime minister Narendra Modi and his Bangladesh counterpart Sheikh Hasina. Photo: Twitter/@MEAIndia
Dhaka had been relatively circumspect during the National Register of Citizens process in Assam, even though there were rumblings of concern. on the home front. But, public opinion over the Citizenship (Amendment) Act, along with anti-Bangladeshi statements by BJP leaders, led even Sheikh Hasina to speak out publicly ad express scepticism about the necessity of this Act. After home minister Amit Shah mentioned Bangladesh as a country where minorities face persecution in parliament, the MEA had to step in that the criticism was only directed at previous regimes in Dhaka and that the present government was protecting minority rights.
As a signatory to BRI, Bangladesh maintains close ties with China even under Sheikh Hasina. From this month, 97% of Bangladesh’s exports will have duty free access to the Chinese market. The economic crisis precipitated by the COVID-19 crisis would certainly open more doors for Beijing in South Asia.
Nepal
Gandhi: “Today, Nepal is angry with us. If you go to Nepal and speak to the Nepali people, they are furious with what has happened.”
Jaishankar: The minister cited Modi’s visit to Nepal in 2015 as a top achievement that led to a “swathe of developmental projects: power, fuel, housing, hospital, roads, etc”.
“Ask their citizens,” he added.
Reality: Out of all the countries in South Asia, the minister’s reply to this question was most perplexing, as relations with Nepal are visibly at an all-time low at this time. A certain portion of the blame can be put on the ultra-nationalist platform of Prime Minister K.P. Oli, who has also cultivated close ties with China. But it is also true that Oli got a boost in the last parliamentary elections due to his hardline stance, as perceived by the Nepali population, against India during the so-called border blockade of 2015.
The deterioration in ties over the new constitution and the consequent five-month long blockade took place just a year after Modi’s successful visit to Kathmandu. There is visible discomfort in the Nepali establishment over the strained relations with India over the new political map and a string of provocative statements from Oli.
Indian PM Narendra Modi and Nepal PM K.P. Sharma . Photo: PTI
But the fact is that public opinion in Nepal has become more stridently anti-India since the blockade. The constitutional amendment to incorporate territories claimed by India in the national coat of arms was supported unanimously by all political parties in Nepal. Even if Oli’s days in power are numbered, which is looking increasingly unlikely, no party will initiate any process to overturn this amendment.
Bhutan
Gandhi: “Bhutan is disturbed.”
Jaishankar: The minister used the disruption in LPG supply just before the 2013 elections to point out that Bhutan doesn’t “worry about their cooking gas” anymore. India is now a “stronger security and development partner” for Bhutan, he said.
Reality: Bhutan was and remains India’s closest ally in South Asia, with Thimphu being the largest recipient of New Delhi’s foreign aid. Jaishankar was recalling the events before the second general elections in Bhutan, when there was disruption in LPG supply from India. Despite denials from New Delhi that it was a “technical lapse”, it was widely perceived in Bhutan as a political move to snub the Druk Phuensum Tshogpa (DPT) government for its outreach towards China. In the 2013 elections, the DPT was defeated and the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) came to power.
Despite close ties between the two countries, Bhutan dropped away from BBIN motor vehicles agreement due to fears among the populace of being swamped by vehicles from India and Bangladesh. A similar popular undercurrent against the rising number of Indian tourists had led to the Bhutan government imposing an entry fee on regional tourists, despite protests from the hospitality sector.
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Bhutanese Prime Minister Lotay Tshering inaugurate the Thimphu Ground Station of the South Asia Satellite. Photo: PTI
India did come to Bhutan’s aid when Chinese troops entered Doklam, which led to a two-and-half-month long stand-off in 2017. The two sides withdrew from the face-off site and the vicinity, which the Indian government has projected as a victory. However, as former foreign secretary Shyam Saran has stated, China has consolidated its position in Doklam plateau since then and altered facts on the ground.
Afghanistan
Gandhi: Again, Gandhi made no mention of specific problems with Afghanistan.
Jaishankar: The NDA years has led to completion of projects like the Salma Dam and Afghan parliament and expansion of training. He also stated that there was expansion in training and “serious” connectivity.
Reality: Construction for Salma Dam and Afghan parliament began in 2002 and 2005, respectively. The long delays in the project, along with the escalating costs, have been due to the security environment, lack of manpower and resources.
That New Delhi has learnt its lesson from this experience is evident that India has not taken up any major big-ticket projects in Afghanistan. Instead, it has concentrated on small community projects that can have a quick turnover in Afghanistan.
Meanwhile, India remains invisible in the current developments in Afghanistan, where almost all external actors, including the EU and US are pushing for the start of intra-Afghan talks. New Delhi does have some influence, with Abdullah Abdullah having been appointed as chairman of the High Council for National Reconciliation as part of the resolution of dispute over 2019 presidential elections. As a recent Carnegie paper advocated, India will have to recalibrate and take hard policy choices in Afghanistan, despite potential costs.
Pakistan
Gandhi: Made no mention of Pakistan.
Jaishankar: To buttress his view that the UPA’s foreign policy with Pakistan was disastrous, the minister raked up two controversial meetings with the Pakistani leadership – at Sharm-el-Sheikh and Havana – and the 26/11 Mumbai terror attack. The minister then mentioned the air strikes and “surgical strikes” after the Pulwama and Uri terror attacks to bolster the NDA’s case.
Reality: As the principal opposition party, BJP had been highly critical of UPA government’s so-called appeasement of Pakistan through the reference to Balochistan after the 2009 Sharm-el-Sheikh meeting, as well as, the setting up of a joint anti-terror mechanism at Havana in 2006. While the BJP’s accusation in 2009 was that India had scored a self-goal by allowing Pakistan to hint at Indian interference in Balochistan, the direct reference Modi made to that province in his independence day speech of 2016 was seen by analysts as grist to the Pakistani establishment’s rumour mill that India was aiding secessionism there.
In any case, the Sharm-el-Sheikh and Havana meetings Jaishankar reminds Rahul Gandhi of have had their counterparts during the first term of Prime Minister Modi, especially his uninvited dash to Lahore to meet Pakistan PM Nawaz Sharif and the approval to a Pakistani probe team, including an ISI official, to visit Pathankot air base, despite opposition protests
The Uri surgical strikes, by its public announcement, and the Balakot cross-border air attack did push the envelope on retaliation against Pakistan after a terror attack. The number of terror incidents in Kashmir have gone down significantly in 2019, as recorded by South Asia Terrorism Portal. However, for 2020, there may be an upward trend, with the first six months recording 216 incidents in Kashmir, compared to 369 in 2019.