Tag: India-Iran

‘Situation Doesn’t Benefit Anyone’: India, Iran Talk Red Sea Shipping Disruption

In Tehran, external affairs minister Jaishankar held a series of meetings with the Iranian leadership, with a primary focus on the Chabahar port draft agreement and the broader tense regional situation.

New Delhi: India and Iran on Monday, January 15, discussed the security of commercial shipping in the Red Sea due to attacks by Houthi rebels that has broadened the Hamas-Israel conflict, with external affairs minister S. Jaishankar underscoring its direct impact on the South Asian nation’s economy and claiming that it does not benefit any regional stakeholders.

On Monday in Tehran, Jaishankar held a series of meetings with the Iranian leadership, with a primary focus on the Chabahar port draft agreement and the broader tense regional situation.

Against the backdrop of tensions in the Gulf sparked by Israel’s military actions in Gaza after the October 7 terror attack by Hamas, the conflict in the region is further complicated by the attacks on commercial vessels in the Red Sea by Iran-backed Houthi rebels based in Yemen. 

In December, a Liberia-flagged merchant ship, carrying Saudi crude to an Indian port, was attacked by a drone, just 200 nautical miles off the coast of Gujarat. In response, the Indian Navy, alongside other nations, has deployed warships to conduct patrols.

Last Thursday, the United States and five of its allies conducted airstrike against Houthis in Yemen, but India is yet to officially react to the developments.

After their meeting, Iranian foreign minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian said at a joint press appearance that he underlined the importance of providing security in international waterways near Iran, even as he lambasted the United States for backing Israel in its military actions in Gaza.

Jaishankar pointed that there had been attacks near the Indian coast as part of the increased threats against maritime commercial traffic in that section of the Indian Ocean.

Stating that it was a “matter of great concern to the international community”, Jaishankar said, “Obviously, it also has a direct bearing on India’s energy and economic interests. This fraught situation is not to the benefit of any party, and this must be clearly recognised”.

The attacks by the US-led group against Houthi centres in Yemen was not mentioned in the public statements.

While stating that Tehran also wanted to ensure secure shipping lines, Amir-Abdollahian mentioned that a senior Yemeni official had committed during a visit to Iran two weeks ago that it would not disrupt the movement of merchant ships.

The Iranian minister, however, added that the Yemeni official also said that they would stop the passage of Israel-linked or Israel-bound ships as long as the war in Gaza continued, the state-run news agency IRNA reported.

Gaza

Speaking on the Gaza conflict, Jaishankar reiterated that India had an “uncompromising” position against terrorism, but that loss of civilian life had to be avoided.

“The deeply concerning situation in Gaza was naturally a subject of our discussions. The loss of civilian lives, especially that of women and children was our primary focus. There is a visible humanitarian crisis that needs to be addressed and the creation of sustainable humanitarian corridors is the need of the day,” the Indian minister noted. 

India is among the few nations in the Global South that has refrained from explicitly advocating for a ceasefire, despite casting a favourable vote on the most recent UN General Assembly resolution that urged the cessation of violence.

The Indian minister also referred to India’s support for a “two-state solution, where the Palestinian people are able to live freely in an independent country within secure borders”

“I stressed on the need for all parties to avoid provocative and escalatory actions, and to facilitate movement towards dialogue and diplomacy,” he said.

With connectivity high on the agenda, Jaishankar asserted that India wanted to benefit from Iran’s “unique geographical position to access markets in Central Asia, Afghanistan and Eurasia”.

Chabahar

While calling for re-energising the International North South Transport Corridor, the Indian minister also reiterated New Delhi’s commitment to developing the Iranian port of Chabahar.

“Given the importance of this project for both nations, I emphasised the need to monitor its progress under the direct supervision of the political leadership,” he said.

He also indicated that discussions were held on the draft agreement on Chabahar which will talk about India’s involvement in the port for next ten years.

While the Indian minister only referred to discussions, IRNA said that the text was finalised during Jaishankar’s meeting with Iranian transport minister Mehrdad Bazrpash.

After the meeting at the foreign ministry, Jaishankar also called on Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi. 

In his public remarks, the Indian minister said that India had “strongly” advocated for Iran’s entry into BRICS. The Wire had reported that Iran had been part of India’s list of potential candidates for expanding the grouping at the summit in South Africa.

With Taliban Dominance, India’s Chabahar Port Could Become a Dead Investment

Much of the blame for the slow pace at which the Chabahar project progressed should rest on India and its over-cautious attitude.

The spectre of the collapse of the Ashraf Ghani government of Afghanistan and the takeover by the anarchic, ragtag group of Taliban, even while the US has left the country to its miserable fate, is increasingly driving a nail in many bilateral and multilateral arrangements between Kabul and the world.

Undoubtedly, the most hurt would be India and its much vaunted project of the Chabahar Port in Iran’s east, which was meant to allow New Delhi an opportunity to side-step Pakistan and take the land route to Afghanistan and Central Asia.

Now Chabahar, from Iran and India’s perspective, seems like a dead investment — a dream gone sour.

“Indians just took too much time to complete the project. Now, changed circumstances and alternative connectivity routes are being conjured up by other countries to make Chabahar irrelevant,” claims an Iranian source.

He may be right.

Much of the blame for the slow pace at which the Chabahar project progressed should rest on India and its over-cautious attitude. The current government in Delhi did not want to do anything to antagonise the US government after it had imposed sanctions on Iran.

Also read: India Seems to Be Toeing the US Line on Chabahar. Here’s Why

Now, the Americans have partnered with Uzbekistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan to make a new connectivity corridor.

So where does it leave India?

Ironically, India’s Chabahar engagement, though old, gained momentum after former US president Barack Obama ended sanctions against Iran and signed the nuclear deal. His successor, Donald Trump, had other ideas. He, rather unceremoniously, canceled the deal and clamped claustrophobic sanctions on Iran, but gave freedom to India to carry on with the project as it benefited Afghanistan.

The Indian government, through the periodic visits of its external affairs minister, S. Jaishankar, and other officials, has routinely expressed its commitment to complete the project. However, the Iranians have a different story to tell.

And it is not a happy story with a happy ending.

Chabahar. Credit: Beluchistan/Flickr CC 2.0

Not only did India baulk at its promise to provide a line of credit in 2018 to build the railway route from Chabahar to Zahedan, the Indian company that is supposed to build and manage port Shahid Behesti, India Port Global, is a leaderless entity that is in a state of drift.

Iranian sources allege that there is a conscious attempt by China, which is furiously building its Gwadar project in the Sea of Oman, and, now, the US, to puncture Chabahar. Or else, what was the reason that the US should announce a ‘connectivity project’ in Tashkent with Uzbekistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan that does not include Iran or India?

Jennifer Murtazashivilli from the Center of Governance, University of Pittsburg, was quoted by the Voice of America arguing: “Given the difficult relations between the US and Iran, it would be difficult to secure funding for that southward route, so it is more politically feasible to connect Uzbekistan through Afghanistan and Pakistan, than to go through Iran right now.”

Also read: India Could’ve Been a Step Ahead With Afghanistan, But Is Left Clutching at Straws

Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev had earlier shown inclinations to be part of the Afghanistan-Iran project. However, the manner in which the country has been hustled into a new connectivity project that culminates in Pakistan, suggests that the Uzbeks are preparing for a new arrangement in their neighbourhood.

Meanwhile, the Indian external affairs minister tried to sell the idea of building connectivity through Chabahar and aligning it with the Russian-backed North South Corridor. However, it seems that the mood in the Tashkent conference has changed.

Significantly, the Uzbeks revealed that they had good relations with the Taliban and could work closely with them.

Ironically, this is not the only setback that the Iranians talk about. In their reckoning, they kept their gas field Farzad-B, which was discovered by the Oil and Natural Gas Company’s (ONGC) OVL for 15 long years for India, but India continued to negotiate without getting on with the task of developing it and commercialising it. The net result, according to them, is that Saudi Arabia managed to deplete much of the gas from this field. “Now we are developing the field on our own,” said the Iranian source.

However, there seems to be a silver lining too, however faint and futuristic. Despite the terribly pessimistic scenario for India, all is not lost, according to the Iranians. If the Taliban do take over Afghanistan and use the Karachi port, then India could look at using Chabahar to access the Central Asian and European market in the turbulent days to come.

But, then, there is always a big ‘if’ in this rapidly changing scenario on the ground. Indeed, will India be in a totally lose-lose scenario, or, will it retrieve some minimalist gains at least in the days to come – that is the question which should worry the current government in Delhi.

This article was first published on Hard News. You can read the original article here.

Jaishankar Meets Iran’s President-Elect Raisi, Hands Over PM Modi’s Personal Message

Jaishankar is the first foreign official to meet Raisi after his electoral victory.

New Delhi: External affairs minister S. Jaishankar on Wednesday handed over a personal message of Prime Minister Narendra Modi to Iran’s President-elect Ebrahim Raisi in Tehran as he made a stopover at the Iranian capital on his way to Russia.

Jaishankar said he also held “useful” discussions on regional and global issues with Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif.

“Thank President-elect Ebrahim Raisi for his gracious welcome. Handed over a personal message from PM @narendramodi. Appreciate his warm sentiments for India,” Jaishankar tweeted.

“Deeply value his strong commitment to strengthen our bilateral ties and expand cooperation on regional and global issues,” he added.

Raisi, the head of Iran’s judiciary and known to be close to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, won last month’s presidential election by a landslide. Jaishankar is the first foreign official to meet Raisi after his electoral victory.

“Always a warm welcome from FM @JZarif. Useful discussion on regional and global affairs,” Jaishankar said after his meeting with Zarif.

It is understood that the evolving situation in Afghanistan figured prominently in the talks.

Along with Russia, Iran has been playing a major role in the Afghan peace process that has witnessed a renewed momentum in the wake of the withdrawal of the US forces from Afghanistan by September 11.

Iranian media reported that the two foreign ministers stressed the need to strengthen intra-Afghan dialogue that could result in a comprehensive political partnership in Afghanistan.

Iran on Wednesday hosted an intra-Afghan dialogue and the Afghan delegation at the talks was headed by Yunus Qanuni, the former foreign minister of Afghanistan. The Taliban delegation was headed by the deputy head of Taliban’s political office Shir Mohammad Abbas Stanikzai, according to the IRNA news agency.

Afghanistan witnessed a series of terror attacks and attempts by the Taliban to expand its territorial control over the last few weeks, triggering concerns among several key stakeholders.

It is learnt that Jaishankar and Zarif also deliberated on the situation in the Gulf region and the prospect of the Vienna talks on reviving the Iran nuclear deal and the Chabahar port project.

Located in the Sistan-Balochistan province on the energy-rich Iran’s southern coast, the port is being developed by India, Iran and Afghanistan to boost trade ties.

The first phase of the project was inaugurated in December 2017.

A few months back, India, Iran and Uzbekistan held their first trilateral talks to explore ways for a joint use of the port for trade and enhancing regional connectivity.

Jaishankar is paying a three-day visit to Russia to discuss the entire range of bilateral issues as well as key regional and international developments.

Sources said his visit is aimed at preparing the ground for the annual India-Russia summit and discuss the situation in Afghanistan.

Dismissing Allegations, Iran Points Fingers at ‘Third Parties’ for January 29 Blast

The embassy questioned the plausibility of Iran benefitting from such an act when relations between India and Iran are growing.

New Delhi: Iran on Monday indicated that the January 29 blast near the Israeli embassy was the handiwork of “third parties” who wanted to see a rupture in India-Iranian ties.

On Monday, the Iranian embassy issued a detailed statement, two months after an explosion took place on the evening of January 29, near the Israeli embassy on APJ Abdul Kalam road. The low-intensity IED blast took place when the Indian capital was under heavy security cover due to the beating retreat ceremony that was taking place a few kilometres away.

The reaction from Embassy of Iran also came after Hindustan Times reported that India’s central counter-terrorism agencies have concluded that the “Iranian Quds force was behind the terror plot but that the bomb was planted by a local Indian Shia module”.

The HT article claimed that “deliberate false-flag cyber markers were left by the perpetrators, pointing to the role of the Islamic State, but the counterterror agencies are clear that the blast was part of the asymmetric warfare campaign being carried out by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps against Israel”.

A letter found at the incident was addressed to Israel’s ambassador to India, Ron Malka, and apparently swore revenge for deaths of Quds Force creator Qassem Soleimani and Iranian nuclear physicist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh.

Also read: Saudi Crown Prince Approved Operation That Killed Jamal Khashoggi: US Report

The Iranian embassy said that after the blast, there has been an “unfair onslaught and unsubstantiated defamatory accusations against Iran”, adding that it condemned any “act any act which ensues intimidation and fear, disruption of order and security, and jeopardizing the lives and property of the innocent people”.

The statement denied allegations of involvement in the January 29 blast and stated that Iran was ready to “cooperate” in the investigation.

“While respecting the honorable government and authorities of India in their endeavor to thoroughly investigate and probe into the above-mentioned incident in order to identify the orchestrators of such actions and to bring them to justice, this embassy strongly repudiates any unsubstantiated allegations or irresponsible comments in this regard and considers them as steps towards realizing the sinister intentions of the enemies of Iran- India relations. Meanwhile, the Iranian authorities have always expressed their readiness to cooperate with the Indian friends in order to unravel the wicked intentions of the spoilers of bilateral relations.”

The embassy questioned the plausibility of Iran benefitting from such an act when relations between the two countries are growing. It hinted that the perpetrators may have been “third parties” who have been “angry and dissatisfied” with the progress in India-Iran relations.

Also read: Iran President Accuses Israel of Killing Country’s Top Nuclear Scientist

“In the current juncture in which the long-standing and cordial relations between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Republic of India is further being boosted and developed in all domains, including in the form of exchange of the two countries’ high rankings political, economic, security and defense delegations, this question deems serious attention whether the said suspicious blast has any benefit for bilateral relations or who would indeed gain from this action?! Is the presumption that this act must have been conducted by third parties who are angry and dissatisfied with the progress in the relations between the governments of Iran and India illogical?”

The Iranian embassy asserted that not only does its culture and history not allow for terror acts, but also that Iran has been victim of terrorism, including the assassination of notable scientists like Fakhrizadeh.

In 2012, the wife of the defence attache of the Israeli embassy was critically injured after a magnetic bomb was stuck to her car.

Defence Minister Rajnath Singh Discusses Ties, Regional Security with Iran Counterpart

Singh reached Tehran from Moscow on Saturday on a transit halt after concluding his three-day visit to Russia.

Tehran: Defence Minister Rajnath Singh on Sunday said he had a “very fruitful” meeting with his Iranian counterpart Brigadier General Amir Hatami and discussed ways to bolster bilateral cooperation and exchanged views on regional security issues, including the situation in Afghanistan.

Singh reached Tehran from Moscow on Saturday on a transit halt after concluding his three-day visit to Russia where he attended a meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) defence ministers. He also held bilateral talks with his counterparts from Russia, China and the Central Asian countries.

“Had a very fruitful meeting with Iranian defence minister Brigadier General Amir Hatami in Tehran. We discussed regional security issues including Afghanistan and the issues of bilateral cooperation,” he said in a tweet.


“Both the Defence Ministers discussed ways to take forward bilateral cooperation and exchanged views on regional security issues, including peace and stability in Afghanistan,” Singh’s office said in a separate tweet on the meeting held on Saturday at the request of the Iranian defence minister.

The meeting between the two ministers took place in a “cordial and warm atmosphere,” it said, adding that the leaders emphasised upon the age-old cultural, linguistic and civilisational ties between India and Iran.

Singh’s visit to Iran is considered to be significant as it came a day after he voiced India’s deep concern about the situation in the Persian Gulf and called upon the countries in the region to resolve their differences through dialogue based on mutual respect.

A series of incidents in the Persian Gulf involving Iran, the US and the UAE in recent weeks have flared up tension in the region.

Also read: When China Chips Are Down, ‘Diamonds’ in India’s ‘Necklace’ of Allies Lack Sparkle

“We are deeply concerned about the situation in the Persian Gulf,” Singh said in his address at a meeting of the SCO in Moscow on Friday.

“We call upon countries in the region – all of which are dear and friendly to India, to resolve differences by dialogue based on mutual respect, sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs of each other,” he said in his address at the combined meeting of defence ministers of the SCO, Collective Security Treaty Organisation and Commonwealth of Independent States member states.

Last month, Iranian navy briefly seized control of a Liberian-flagged oil tanker in what the US said were international waters near the Strait of Hormuz, which links the Persian Gulf with the Gulf of Oman to the south and the Arabian Sea beyond.

Iran has threatened to disrupt oil shipments through the Strait of Hormuz if the US, which has already imposed crippling sanctions on Tehran over its nuclear programme, tries to strangle its economy.

India-Iran commercial ties were traditionally dominated by Indian import of Iranian crude oil. In 2018-19 India imported US $ 12.11 billion worth of crude oil from Iran.

However, following the end of the Significant Reduction Exemption (SRE) period on May 2, 2019, India has suspended importing crude from Iran, according to the Indian Embassy here.

The US had asked countries, including India, to cut oil imports from Iran down to “zero” by November 6, 2019 or face sanctions.

The bilateral trade during 2019-20 was US $ 4.77 billion, a decrease of 71.99% as compared to the trade of US $ 17.03 billion 2018-19. What is significant is that Indian exports to Iran between 2011-12 and 2019-20 have grown by 45.60%, according to the website of the mission.

Three to Tango: With the US Looming Large, India-Iran Ties Over the Years

Despite years of a personalised relationship with India, Iran seems to have decided to take the bull by the horns perhaps after a cost-benefit analysis.

Post-US intervention in Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003, India-Iran relations always had – as Princess Diana once famously said about her marriage, “Three of us in it”; the third being the US.

Prior to that, strategic convergence between India and Iran grew from the mid-1990s, driven by common objectives in Afghanistan and the shared threat from Taliban and its sponsor Pakistan. This was exacerbated after the capture of Kabul by Taliban in 1996 when only the Northern Alliance stood in its way of overrunning all of Afghanistan.

In 2001, then prime minister A.B. Vajpayee visited Teheran and was hosted by reformist and then ascendant Iranian president Mohammad Khatami. The resulting Teheran Declaration reflected the growing engagement.

The Iranian president returned the visit in 2003 and was the chief guest at Republic Day. But by then, the Taliban had been deposed by the US and had found sanctuaries in Pakistan. US troops already controlled Afghanistan and would attack Iraq two months later.

From mid-2003, when the clandestine enrichment programme of Iran was revealed – including links to rogue Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan – India-Iran relations began to sputter. Iran was being pilloried for its nuclear programme, for what it thought were activities allowed to it as signatory of the Non-Proliferation treaty (NPT). India, on the other hand, as a non-signatory was, according to Iraq, unfairly negotiating a nuclear deal with the US.

Also read: Iran Foreign Minister Calls on India to ‘Not Let Senseless Thuggery Prevail’

The US had begun to interpose in India-Iran relations, and this still persists. From 2003 onwards, India-Iran bilateral relations began to feel the impact. The US pressured India to vote with them and against Iran at International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), curtail trade and oil purchases from Iran and comply with US sanctions.

India maintained it would only comply with UN sanctions and not additional ones mandated by US laws. Iran turned its attention westwards and with patience and shrewdness through proxies it ensnared US militarily in a sectarianism and terrorism fed civil war in Iraq. From this militant brew arose the first al-Qaeda clone under Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and then the ISIS hybrid under Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.

While president George W. Bush managed to push back and stabilise Iraq enough to get notional democratic processes going, his successor President Barack Obama first dithered and then chose to completely alter US approach to the region.

He calculated that the suddenly emergent ISIS, which created an Islamic Caliphate literally overnight across large swathes of territory in northern Iraq and Syria, could either be controlled by a third US war – for which US was unprepared – or the co-option of Iran.

He chose the latter and that led to the signing of the nuclear deal with Iran by P-5 and Germany.

With this entente with the Western nations, Iran began to slowly assert influence and then control via proxies all across West Asia, running through Iraq, Syria and Lebanon to the Mediterranean. While India-Iran relations regained some normalcy, the old warmth was missing as both nations had different strategic priorities. While Iran’s Quds Force, led by late major general Qasem Soleimani, shored up the beleaguered Syrian government of Bashar al Assad, with the Russians jumping in to provide air cover, the Hezbollah and Kurds pitched in with ground forces.

Iranian President Hassan Rouhani shakes hands with India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi during a photo opportunity ahead of their meeting at Hyderabad House in New Delhi, February 17, 2018. Photo: Reuters/Adnan Abidi

Prime Minister Narendra Modi, after assuming power in 2014, began a personal outreach to Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates. Even though these two nations were in open conflict with Iran in Yemen and via their surrogates in Syria India-Iran relations were insulated from it. This changed with the arrival of President Donald Trump in 2016. He reversed the Obama outreach to Iran, aligned openly with Saudi-Emirati alliance, withdrew from the Iran nuclear deal and literally armed the sanctions against Iran.

Also read: Policy Paralysis Cannot Be India’s Response to the US–Iran Impasse

Trump personalised his diplomacy to an extent that he broke past conventions by openly interfering in the elections of leaders he found likeable. He shifted the US embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem and declared the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps as a terrorist organisation on the eve of Israeli elections to give a boost to beleaguered prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

He repeatedly urged the British to go for Brexit and even support Boris Johnson against the incumbent Conservative prime minister of his own party. In India, he played a critical role, as his own tweet claimed, in getting a quick resolution to the Pulwama-Balakot near-war Indo-Pakistan confrontation, which an election-bound PM Modi fully used to his benefit.

Inherent in this was the likelihood that countries opposed to the US-Saudi-Emirati alliance in the region would start viewing India as partisan. This danger was enhanced by Modi government, after being swept into power again in 2019, by front-loading their ideological and sectarian agenda. Starting with amendments to Article 370 to Triple Talaq Bill and eventually the Citizenship Amendment Act, there was breathless pursuit of a to-do list of things, like all parties, in their election manifesto which are normally implementable after consensus building.

Even the BJP has been taken by surprise by the lack of electoral benefit from this agenda in a series of state elections, which they either lost or barely scraped through. Even more so, they fail to understand the damage it is doing to Indian image abroad and relations particularly with the Islamic nations.

Verbal spats with Turkey, Malaysia and even Indonesia were followed by Iran very strongly reminding India of its constitutional duties. Despite India remonstrating with the Iranian ambassador, Iran upped the ante with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who only intervenes in public when Iran is prepared for confrontation, urging India to “confront extremist Hindus & their parties & stop the massacre of Muslims in order to prevent India’s isolation from the world of Islam”.

Also read: India Summons Iranian Envoy Over Comments by Foreign Minister on Delhi Violence

Iran seems to have decided to take the bull by the horns perhaps after cost-benefit analysis. India having largely succumbed to US sanctions, something India resisted since 2003 as India only recognised UN sanctions, there is little relief Iran perceives coming from India through trade and investment.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s highly personalised dalliance with the Saudi and Abu Dhabi crown princes and now with Trump at Motera stadium has been read as India siding with Iranian antagonists with visible enthusiasm. Iran calculates that India needs them more than the other way around as after the Taliban-US deal only they control the access to Afghanistan, other than Pakistan.

India will think twice before putting that in danger, unlike barring palm oil imports from Malaysia. Thus, traditional Indian ability to play all sides in a region riven by fault-lines and animosities now stands degraded.

Will the BJP live in denial or adapt its domestic agenda? Only time will tell.

K.C. Singh is a retired Indian civil servant and was the Indian ambassador to Iran.

India Summons Iranian Envoy Over Comments by Foreign Minister on Delhi Violence

In a tweet on Monday, Zarif said, “Iran condemns the wave of organised violence against Indian Muslims.”

New Delhi: India on Tuesday summoned Iranian Ambassador Ali Chegeni and lodged a strong protest with him over the comments made by Iran’s foreign minister Javad Zarif over violence in Delhi.

Official sources said that the Iranian envoy was conveyed that Zarif commented on a matter which is purely internal to India.

In a tweet on Monday, Zarif said, “Iran condemns the wave of organised violence against Indian Muslims.”

“The Iranian Ambassador in Delhi was summoned on Tuesday and a strong protest was lodged over the comments made by Zarif on the matter internal to India,” a source said.

In response to a media query regarding remarks made by the Iranian foreign minister in a tweet, MEA spokesperson Raveesh Kumar said:

“The Iranian Ambassador to India Mr Ali Chegeni was summoned and a strong protest was lodged against the unwarranted remarks made by the Iranian Foreign Minister. It was conveyed that his selective and tendentious characterisation of recent events in Delhi are not acceptable. We do not expect such comments from a country like Iran.”

(With PTI inputs)

Policy Paralysis Cannot Be India’s Response to the US–Iran Impasse

India should not easily forgo the goodwill and advantage that it enjoys with Iran merely to accommodate the whims of the Americans.

Observing the entire imbroglio play out in the Middle East, one gets the impression of a replay of events in Iraq or Libya, followed by a sensation of dread. Just like the bogey of WMDs, the accusation against Iran, led by the US for attacks on Saudi Arabia’s Abqaiq oil refinery and Khurais oil fields, appears to be based more on prejudice and less on evidence.

Veritably the spark for the current crisis was provided by the attack on the Saudi Arabian oil company, Aramco, the tinderbox is the enduring animosity between the US and Iran. Relations between the US and Iran have ranged from limited to non-existent over the past 40 years.

Through this summer, senior American officials kept making statements to link Iran with Al Qaeda. It was speculated that this connection to the Al Qaeda was being invoked to justify the use of use military force against “associated forces” responsible for the 9/11 attacks, by the American President without seeking Congressional approval.

However, the strategy to connect Iran with Al Qaeda and justifying the application of presidential authorization for use of military force has not had buyers within the US. Parenthetically with past American behaviour in the region as a precedent, comments from a fabricating President Trump are already casting doubts on allegations of Iran’s involvement in the attack.

Is Iran isolated?

Many traditional US allies do not appear to support the idea of isolating Iran and favour the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) nuclear agreement. In an indication of rising disenchantment of global powers to US multilateralism, China, Russia and Japan declared that they had not seen any intelligence showing Iranian involvement in the attacks.

Also read: Expected India to Be More Resilient to US Pressures, Says Iran’s Foreign Minister

While many nations feel that the unilateral imposition of US sanctions on Iran is unfair, it has been difficult to practically circumvent American wishes on the issue. Following the Trump administration’s withdrawal from the nuclear deal, Germany, France and the UK had set up a special payment channel INSTEX (Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges) to circumvent US sanctions. The payment channel theoretically shields European companies from penalties.

US President Donald Trump signs a proclamation declaring his intention to withdraw from the JCPOA Iran nuclear agreement in the Diplomatic Room at the White House in Washington, US, May 8, 2018. Credit: Reuters/Jonathan Ernst

US President Donald Trump signs a proclamation declaring his intention to withdraw from the JCPOA Iran nuclear agreement on May 8, 2018. Photo: Reuters/Jonathan Ernst

However, businesses were disinclined to trade with Iran as they fear that non-compliance with US sanctions could result in losing access to the American market. The National Iranian Oil Company set up the Iranian energy exchange (IRENEX) to permit Iranian private companies to buy the crude and sell the purchased cargo to foreign customers, but this too hasn’t worked out.

Given its lack of choices, Iran is pursuing a closer relationship with China, despite the country’s reputation as a predatory lender. Beijing is doubling-down on its strategic partnership with Tehran, ignoring US efforts to isolate the Islamic Republic from global markets. China has committed to invest $400 billion in Iran’s energy-related manufacturing sectors over the next 25 years.

CAATSA sanctions and implications for India

US withdrawal from the JCPOA last year and the enactment of Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA, P.L. 115–144, July 2017) contains provisions that could penalise Indian individuals and companies for dealing with the ‘targeted’ sanctioned countries through application secondary or extraterritorial sanctions.

In May 2018, after the US decided not to extend the six-month secondary sanctions waiver for countries importing Iranian oil India stopped all oil imports from Iran, increasing its imports from the US. India, bought about 184,000 barrels per day (bpd) oil from the US over November 2018 to May 2019, compared with about 40,000 bpd in the same period a year earlier; a surge of nearly a 100 million barrels.

Watch | #BeyondTheHeadlines | As Trump Pushes for War, India Needs to Speak Out

In June 2012, India was given a waiver against sanctions measures by the US. This time as well India should build a case for continued financial relations with Iran based on two factors. First, that cutting down crude imports from Iran will impair India’s energy-security needs affecting inflation and slow down economic growth. And secondly, that in the absence of Indian infrastructural development projects in Iran, the vacuum created is likely to be filled by China amid fast-changing geopolitics.

The unilateral application of extra-territorial sanctions on third countries and their entities as a means of enforcing US foreign policy goals has been strongly disapproved by the international community. Nonetheless, it is in India’s self-interest to introduce domestic legal countermeasures to prevent Indian companies from automatically complying with unilateral extraterritorial American sanctions, so that these laws are not enforceable on Indian entities.

US President Donald Trump speaks during a bilateral meeting with India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi on the sidelines of the annual United Nations General Assembly in New York City, September 24, 2019. Photo: Reuters/Jonathan Ernst

Iranian banks have shown keenness to open branches in India for which the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) is yet to give necessary permissions and regulatory clearances. Even if one gets around the problem of sanctions, payment for Iranian crude continues to be a big hurdle.

Prevailing US responses and the effects of sanctions on Iran

In the aftermath of the Aramco attacks the Trump administration issued a new round of economic sanctions against Iran, targeting the Central Bank of Iran and the National Development Fund of Iran, preventing them from purchasing dollars.

Sanctions have had an adverse effect on the Iranian economy which shrunk by 3.9% in 2018 by IMF estimates. In 2019 IMF forecast that it will shrink by a massive 6%. The costs of food and medicines are affecting the lives of ordinary Iranians. The sanctions have prevented any rise in foreign portfolio investment into Iran. Foreign companies like Daimler, Peugeot and Total have closed operations in Iran. International insurance agencies are not extending risk covers as a result of which shipping companies are not able to transport Iranian crude. Iran faces also the devaluation of the Rial.

India’s policy options

India’s policy towards Iran and developments in the Middle East has been largely reactive. By any stretch of imagination, this is not the best strategy especially given Indian interests in the region to meet its energy requirements and the presence of a large contingent of Indian workforce in many countries of the Middle East.

Also read: Trump Sees Kashmir – and Pakistan Too – Through the Prism of Iran

India should not so easily forgo the goodwill and advantage that it enjoys with Iran, to its strategic competitor, merely to accommodate the whims of the Americans. While India has halted purchasing Iranian crude completely since May this year when it was announced that Significant Reduction Exception (SRE) extension would not be extended, China continues to buy an average of 161,000 b/d, as of Oct 2019 from Iran. Albeit this has come down from 828,000 b/d in October 2018, China remains Iran’s largest single buyer.

Despite the US sanctions, China remains a large investor in Iran. Recently Iran and China expanded their 2016 25-year strategic partnership which involves a series of multi-sector agreements. Of course, there have been glitches such as the CNPC withdrawal from Iran’s South Pars gas field but the Chinese state commitment remains.

It may be noted that in the past there have been instances of Chinese companies suspending work in the wake of sanctions only to resume subsequently. China National Offshore Oil Company (CNOOC) which had invested in Iran’s North Pars Gas field suspended work in 2011 resumed after the sanctions were lifted in 2016. CNPC’s current withdrawal may be a temporary manoeuvre.

While Iran seems assured of continued Chinese interest and support, this sort of reassurance is something that India has failed to provide. Iran has historically relied on India’s support through the various cycles of sanctions, but a certain disenchantment has crept in given what it perceives to be India’s lack of ‘resilience’ in the face of Washington’s bullying attitude.

Iran’s foreign minister Mohammad Javad Zarif recently voiced this disillusionment when he stated that, “India has certainly taken a stance against the sanctions… so that’s been encouraging, (but) of course, we expected our friends to be more resilient vis-a-vis US pressure.”

Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif. Photo: Reuters

India did try to work out an alternative payments’ arrangement under the sanctions’ regime to import at least some Iranian oil which has been zero since May this year. Iranian private bank Pasargad, opened a branch in Mumbai in 2018 to facilitate Rupee-Rial trade. It was being planned that payments would also be routed through UCO Bank and IDBI Bank like done previously. However, the US has been pressuring India to prevent the escrow account mechanism from materialising.

In fact, recently US Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin met the Reserve Bank of India, governor Shaktikanta Das to garner support for US sanctions on Iran. China, on the other hand, might indeed manage to maintain a hard currency escrow account with an estimated value of about $20 billion ostensibly to pay for China’s infrastructure projects.

India must make most of the exemption granted by the US under section 1244 (f) of the Iran Freedom and Counterproliferation Act (IFCA) which allows work to continue at the Chabahar port for the purpose of “Afghanistan Reconstruction.” Although India is developing the first phase of the Shahid Beheshti Port in Chabahar, the pace and scope of the work has reduced because of reluctance to finance projects in Iran.

Also read: India Seems to Be Toeing the US Line on Chabahar. Here’s Why

This is because Indian banks and private sector view Iran as a controversial market prone to financial and reputational risks. The Indian government should address these fears among investors and explain the exemptions from sanctions involving the development of the Chabahar port.

Finally, India should forcefully and consistently cite the lack of UN sanctions to continue bilateral trade with Iran while at the same time employ its special relations with both the US and Iran to mediate cordial relations between them, or at the least try to revive the JCPOA. In conclusion, India needs to take a leaf out of Beijing’s playbook and do much more. Or else, despite cooperating with the US, India may receive the short end of the stick.

Vaishali Basu Sharma was a consultant with the National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS) and tweets at @basu_vaishali.

Expected India to Be More Resilient to US Pressures, Says Iran’s Foreign Minister

“Countries want to be on the right side of President Donald Trump. But the bully is never on the right side,” Javad Zarif said.

Tehran: Iran’s foreign minister, Javad Zarif, is a seasoned diplomat with an easy charm, but does not mince his words when it comes to expressing disappointment with India for giving in to US diktats on sanctions. He spoke of the “global strategic mistake’’ in complying with President Donald Trump’s orders.

He warned India that it could one day become a target, much like other countries that resisted “US hegemony”. China and Russia were now targets. Asked if a broad alliance was shaping up consisting of China, Russia and Iran against the US, Zarif said that there was no alliance as such, but acknowledged there is understanding and commonality between nations wanting to oppose American hegemony. India was not part of this as Trump was wooing Narendra Modi to win him votes, he said, in an obvious light-hearted reference to the ‘Howdy Modi’ extravaganza in Texas.

Though Indian officials like to say that Iran understands New Delhi’s compulsions, it is unlikely that political ties will remain unaffected. Zarif did not say so, but Tehran will remember that India did not stand by Iran.

Despite a US waiver on Chabahar, the work is already being affected by the crippling sanctions that make procuring machinery and other equipment difficult. Chabahar is of strategic interest to India as it opens up Afghanistan and the Central Asian Republics to the Indian market. Iran is also part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative.

Also read | Kashmir: I&B Ministry Directs Cable Operators to Block Channels From Turkey, Iran

The foreign minister was much more optimistic on the cultural and people-to-people contacts between India and Iran. Many in India, especially the older generation, can speak Persian. They continue to recite Sadi or Hafez or Rumi and other poets and mystics, indicative of the bonds that exist. “These bonds are very difficult to be broken by political  alignments or short term global changes…So it is important to keep this communication going,’’ Zarif said.

India and Iran’s approaches to many global issues are similar. He explained that no two countries have identical views on everything and this applies to Tehran and Delhi as well. But from an overall perspective, “…we share more ideas and concerns and interests than the ones that divide us.’’

Here are some of the excerpts from Zarif’s  interaction with visiting Indian journalists in Tehran.

You have spoken about Iran’s close ties with India. How disappointed are you that India has stopped importing oil from your country?

India has certainly taken a stand against sanctions. India does not accept sanctions unless imposed by the United Nations. So that has been encouraging. That said, of course, we expect our friends to be more resilient vis-à-vis US pressure. And the reason we believe that countries need to reject this pressure is that – if you remember high school, where we all had bullies. The bully starts with the smallest kids and goes on. The more you allow the bully to bully others, the more you put yourself at the receiving end. And this is the global strategic mistake that is being made. Countries want to be on the right side of President Donald Trump. But the bully is never on the right side.

On sanctions and its effects on Iran

I can assure you that with the toughest of sanctions, we won’t be destroyed. We have huge resources, we have huge manpower potential, in addition to natural resources, which is immense. We have one of the largest per capital number of engineers and graduates. Yes, our economy suffered from a shock…that is why within a few months of the US’s latest sanctions our currency lost 70% of its values and inflation was up many many folds.

That was a psychological shock when the sanctions were imposed in May, but it did not impact our oil industry till November. The impact on currency rates was psychological. Now we have absorbed much of the psychological impact. That is why now that we don’t sell as much oil as we used to in May 2018, we have regained 40% of the value of our currency since then.

Also read | A 20th-Century Iranian Intellectual’s Praise for – and Disillusion With – Israel

The intention of the US, as stated by its Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, is to deprive Iranian people of food and medicine in order to compel the Iranian government to obey the US. So you have the effect and the intent, and that’s the whole range you need to prove criminal activity. That’s why I accuse the US of engaging in crimes against humanity.

In Iran, thankfully we produce 97% of our medicine, we only depend on the outside world for a very small percentage of the most sophisticated medicine that is not feasible or that cannot be done here. But for 97% of medicines, we are self-sufficient. We produce our own, we even export sophisticated medicines to the outside world and we export them at a very low cost.. The international pharma industry is not very happy with us because they are sucking the blood of the people. The global pharma industry is a huge business and it not a humanitarian business. Economic sanctions  affect the economy but they do not produce political results. They only increase people’s resilience.

Sanctions have been imposed on Iran for the last 40 years and it has only made Iran strong. Let me give you a few examples. When we had the war with Iraq, they refrained from sending us military equipment. …We used an Iranian anti-air system to shoot down a sophisticated US  drone. We did it in order to show that if you deprive us..for many years they put pressure on our friends and Russia to take away SAM 300 missile systems from us. We finally got it, but we depended on our own and shot down the American drone with our own missiles.

We want to co-operate with the rest of the world but we won’t lie down and die if they tell us that we cannot do this. So even this round of sanctions will make us stronger but it will be at immense cost to our people. As the government, it is our obligation to reduce the suffering of our people… Not because the country is in great need of global commercial transactions, but our people require an easier life, they deserve an easier life and that is why we are doing our best in order to achieve that.

Pompeo, as I said earlier, believes that Iran must heed the US or its people will have to starve. We won’t allow that. …We will find ways of selling our stuff and we will find ways of feeding our people. But that is their intention (to starve Iran into submission). And I don’t know which country in its right mind will allow the US the possibility of succeeding in this inhuman policy.

On how much oil Iran exports today

For this you have to ask the oil minister. But I doubt he will tell you. Iran will sell its oil and countries will continue to buy its oil. But the nature of this new business is the lack of transparency.  One of the greatest victims of US’s coercive economic measurers is transparency…Gainers will be the corrupt who will make a lot of money because transactions will always be conducted. Iranian oil always has customers. Only difference is a bunch of people will make a lot of money – buying oil at a discount from us and selling it at a profit.

On US fears that Iran’s nuclear programme was destabilising the region

We never wanted to build nuclear weapons. Had we seriously wanted to, we would have done that much earlier, when we were under UN sanctions between 2007 and 2012, and there were no intrusive IAEA inspections. We had an agreement with the US and five other countries to ensure that Iran would never have nuclear weapons. For us that was not a big deal, because we never wanted to build nuclear weapons. Trump did not like Obama and did not like whatever Obama had achieved, so he withdrew from the agreement… It was not because Iran violated any of its clauses. It was because he wanted to walk out.

Also read | Why an India-US Free Trade Agreement Would Require New Delhi to Reorient Key Policies

If you want to talk about regional behaviour, then you got to look at what is happening in our region. Who supported the Taliban in Afghanistan, was it Iran? I am talking about 1994-1995 up to 2001, not now. Who supported al-Qaeda? Who supported Saddam Hussain when he invaded Iran? Who supported ISIS? Anywhere, can you find the name of Iran?

Ostensibly, the US fought on the same side as Iran, against the Taliban, against al-Nusrat and al-Qaeda. US allies were supporting these organisations. Only three countries supported Taliban and recognised their government: Saudi Arabia, UAE and Pakistan. We were the ones who supported the Northern Alliance (Russia, India and Iran).

On terrorism emanating from Pakistan

What is happening in Pakistan is not, as far as Iran is concerned, Pakistani-sponsored terrorism but basically Saudi-sponsored terrorism, using areas which are not in the effective control of the Pakistani government to carry out attacks.

We are engaged with the government of Pakistan and its armed forces to contain those elements. We will continue to work with our friends in Pakistan in order to safeguard our borders from cross-border terrorism. They (Pakistan) have complaints about terrorism from Iran, we have serious complaints about cross-border terrorism coming from Pakistan. We are hoping to resolve this issue by working together.

Seema Guha was part of a team of 11 Indian Women’s Press Corps journalists who visited Iran.

Decisions on US-India Issues Will Not Be Taken by the Pompeos and the Jaishankars

Has all the carefully articulated outcome of Pompeo’s Indian visit gone up in smoke after a Donald Trump tweet?

Has all the carefully articulated and sensibly structured outcome of the Pompeo-Jaishankar meeting gone up in smoke after a Donald Trump tweet demanding that India withdraw the tariffs it has recently imposed on US goods?

Difficult to say. It is quite possible that President Trump and US secretary of state Mike Pompeo are playing “good cop-bad cop” with a view of pushing India down the road they want us to take.

But what’s clear is that the decisions on issues between India and the US will not be taken by the Pompeos and the Jaishankars, but at the level of their principals – Prime Minister Modi and President Trump.

On the other hand, it could also signal that of all the irritants that have emerged in Indo-US relations – the S-400 deal, Iran, data localisation, tariffs – the one closest to the president’s heart remains tariffs. Trump has, to the bafflement of Indians, visited the issue several times in the past. Recall his demand for a lowering of tariffs on Harley Davidson motorcycles

External affairs minister S. Jaishankar noted that both sides now had a “better understanding of each other’s concerns” on issues like trade, energy, defence, investment concerns, people to people contacts, the issues relating to Iran and Afghanistan.

What we have heard from Pompeo, are his priorities, not his president’s. In an interview with the Times of India, Pompeo spoke of the challenges on trade and the S-400 deals. He said “We will work through those,” suggesting that there could be some negotiated settlement on both the issues.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi hugging US President Donald Trump in 2017. Image: Reuters

Data localisation and excluding China

Equally interesting was his response on the issue of data localisation, where he suggested that the two countries will try and arrive at a technical fix that could meet India’s “law enforcement” needs.

This issue is connected with another Pompeo project – blocking China from becoming a dominant player in the world’s digital economy. The first and urgent step here is to block the spread of Huawei’s 5G technology. The eventual goal is a technosphere that excludes China in terms of moving, saving, handling and protecting data.

Also Read: Iran Slams Pompeo’s Remarks in Delhi, Accuses US of ‘Pushing for Instability’

India was able to navigate the Cold War period because the US and Soviet Union were indeed autonomous spheres – they had their own standards for products, their own protocols and procedures and there was little trade between the two blocs.

In the current period, we are in a situation where China and the US are closely entangled and the process of decoupling that the US wants to bring can be a messy and expensive affair, not just for India, but other parts of the world.

The vexed issue with India is not just about tariffs and reducing the trade imbalance. The US wants greater market access for its agricultural goods, dairy products, medical devices, IT and communication products. But many of these are sensitive in India because they would be deeply unpopular among farmers, the IT industry and ordinary consumers. It is possible that Trump sees India as a good replacement fit for what his base back home is losing with regard to China in the area of agriculture and dairy products.

US secretary of state Mike Pompeo with external affairs minister S. Jaishankar. Photo: Twitter/Raveesh Kumar

Defence cooperation with the US

We did not hear much about the S-400 from Pompeo. Maybe he has clearly heard Jaishankar’s comment that India’s position would be guided by its national interest and that “it is important to display trust and confidence in each other” if India and the US want to make defence cooperation a going concern. Pompeo’s remarks suggest that the US has little option but to stand and watch as India goes ahead with the deal.

But we have not heard the last of it. The ambitious US goal is to completely detatch India from its ex-Soviet connection and link it to its own military industrial complex. Another approach towards the same goal is to emphasise the importance of interoperability of Indian and US military forces.

As for Iran, Pompeo conveniently shifted the blame on Tehran, as if the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on Iran’s nuclear programme never existed and the US had never signed up to it. It is one thing to claim that the US is playing a huge role in India’s energy security, and quite another to prevent India from accessing hydrocarbons from the cheapest and most proximate source – Iran. As for India, it may have stopped importing oil from Iran under US pressure, but it certainly does not view Tehran as an international outlaw and a threat to regional peace.

Also Read: Let’s Speak out Strongly in Favour of Religious Freedom: Mike Pompeo in Delhi

The value of the relationship

What is clear is that both sides have a healthy appreciation of the value of the relationship to them, though both sometimes privately question it and accuse the other side of not delivering. Pompeo put it directly when he said that “not only is the US important to India, but India is very important to the US”.

In line with this, both sides are interested in resolving issues, rather than precipitating crises. However, Trump has his own agenda and his own timetable. This adds uncertainty to the efforts of the ministers of both sides to smoothen things.

Washington’s approach to New Delhi is certainly advantageous and useful for India. As we have seen in the last five years, besides direct gains, benefits also flow from US allies and friends like Saudi Arabia, Japan and UAE. The challenge for India is to be able to effectively exploit the US connection without compromising its vital interests. The real problem begins when you realize that this country, which still lacks a written National Security Strategy (NSS), has no common understanding of what those are.

Manoj Joshi is a distinguished fellow, Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi.