India’s Northward Development Journey Will Be Complete After Reaching Gilgit-Baltistan: Rajnath

The defence minister, addressing the Shaurya Diwas function in Srinagar to mark India’s first military victory after independence, also said that Pakistan is “committing atrocities” against people in PoK.

Srinagar: India’s northward journey of development will be complete after reaching Gilgit and Baltistan, parts of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, defence minister Rajnath Singh said on Thursday while referring to the 1994 resolution passed in the Parliament on getting back the territories “under illegal occupation” of the neighbouring country.

Singh, who was addressing the Shaurya Diwas function here to mark India’s first military victory after independence, also said that Pakistan is “committing atrocities” against people in its occupied Kashmir and will have to bear its consequences.

Asserting that discrimination against the people of Jammu and Kashmir ended under the leadership and guidance of Prime Minister Narendra Modi as Article 370 was diluted, he said, “this brought a new dawn of hopes in the region.”

“Kashmir and Ladakh today are on an accelerated path of development. This region is touching new heights of development…We have only started our northward journey. Our journey will be complete when we fully implement the unanimous resolution passed by the Parliament on February 22, 1994 and we reach our remaining areas like Gilgit and Baltistan,” Singh said.

Prime Minister Modi also, in a rare departure from precedence, in his independence day speech in 2016 brought up the situation in Pakistan-occupied territories, and said the people of Balochistan and Gilgit thanked him for raising their issues.

Singh said Jan Sangh founder Syama Prasad Mookherjee had started a mahayajna for full integration of Jammu and Kashmir which was completed on August 5, 2019.

Referring to the atrocities committed by Pakistan against the people in PoK, the defence minister said the neighbouring country will have to “bear its consequences”.

“I would like to ask Pakistan about the rights given to the people living in our areas where it has maintained illegal occupation… We keep on hearing about the inhuman acts committed against innocent Indians for which Pakistan is fully responsible. And here I am talking about Pakistan-occupied Kashmir,” he added.

Accusing Pakistan of “shedding crocodile tears” in the name of human rights, Singh said, “the pain of the people of Pakistan-occupied-Kashmir also troubles us and not just them.”

“The tandav of terrorism that J&K has seen in the name of Kashmiriyat cannot be described,” he said while asserting that terrorism has no religion and the only aim of terrorists is to target India.

He claimed that in the last few years “some so-called intellectuals have cried human rights violations when actions were taken against terrorists”.

The Army hosted ‘Shaurya Diwas’ at the old airfield of Srinagar (Budgam airfield) to mark the 75th anniversary of the arrival of the 1 Sikh Regiment in 1947 to protect Jammu and Kashmir from Pakistani forces.

It was the first military operation of Independent India, a move that changed the course of the 1947-48 War.

The first of the Indian Army soldiers dispatched for the mission had landed at the airfield on October 27, 1947, to repulse Pakistani forces.

At the venue, huge cut-outs of Brig Rajinder Singh, Brig Mohd Usman, Maj Somnath Sharma and Maqbool Sherwani were mounted.

Usha Parmar, the octogenarian daughter of Brigadier Rajinder Singh and family members of other martyrs also attended the event.

Here’s Why Kashmir Is Anxious Over the Delimitation Exercise

While the redrawing of J&K’s electoral map has been on agenda of the BJP, stakeholders fear the exercise could be used to reduce Kashmir’s upper hand in J&K politics.

Srinagar: The ongoing delimitation exercise has deepened anxieties in Jammu and Kashmir, as it is being viewed by many as yet another attempt to disempower the Kashmir Valley and Muslim-majority Chenab and Pir Panchal regions of Jammu province.

The redrawing of the electoral map of J&K has been a longstanding agenda of the Bharatiya Janta Party, which has been raising the bogey of “under-representation of Jammu region” in the electoral politics of J&K since 1995 when the last delimitation exercise took place in the erstwhile state.

The exercise is part of the constitutional and legal changes effected by the BJP-led Union government in August 2019 when it stripped J&K of its special status and downgraded it into a Union Territory.

‘Under-representation and reality’

 The BJP’s two-decade old claim of Jammu’s under-representation does not withstand scrutiny.

Going by 2011 Census figures and the number of assembly segments that each region in J&K assembly has, Jammu region is better placed than Kashmir.

The total population of Jammu & Kashmir UT, according to the Census, is 1,22, 67,013 out of whom 68,88, 475 people are in Kashmir region and 53,78, 538 in Jammu.

Currently, Kashmir Valley has 46 seats in the Assembly and Jammu has 37 seats. This means Kashmir, which accounts for 56.15% of the population of the UT, has 55.42 % representation in the assembly and Jammu, where 43.84 % of the population resides, has 44.57 % representation.

Also read: Why the Delimitation Exercise in Jammu and Kashmir Calls for Caution

The average population per assembly segment in Kashmir is 1,49,749 and 1,45,365 in Jammu.

A cursory look at community-wise representation in the last assembly of the erstwhile state of Jammu and Kashmir reveals that Hindus are better represented than Muslims.

Muslim representation in J&K’s last Assembly was 66.66% (58 MLAs) against 68% population of the community in the erstwhile state. On the other hand, the Hindu community, which formed 28.44% of the population of the erstwhile state, had 31% (27 MLAs) representation in House.

The number of seats was increased in Jammu region in the past six decades is more than double when compared to Kashmir.

While Kashmir has seen an overall increase of three seats, Jammu’s seat tally has gone up by seven. In the first assembly election held in 1957, 43 seats were in Kashmir Valley, 30 in Jammu, and two in Ladakh, which is no longer part of J&K after reorganisation of the erstwhile state.

A simple calculation, on the basis of population (2011 Census), reveals that Kashmir’s seat tally should go up to 51 from existing 46 and Jammu should get two  more seats, which would increase its strength to 39 from 37.

Leaders of different political parties arrive to meet with members of Delimitation Commission, in Srinagar, Tuesday, July 6, 2021. Photo: PTI

Fears and fallout

A Muslim has always been head of an elected government in J&K. Many fear that the exercise could be used to fulfil BJP’s ambition of installing a Hindu chief minister in the Muslim majority region or leave a Kashmiri chief minister completely at the mercy of Jammu votes.

“There are apprehensions that the process is aimed at realising the political vision of a particular party in J&K wherein, like other things, the views and wishes of the people of J&K would be considered the least. It is widespread belief that contours and outcome of the exercise are pre-planned and the exercise, per say, is a mere formality,” Peoples Democratic Party’s general secretary, Ghulam Nabi Hanjura wrote in a letter to the delimitation commission, which is currently in J&K.

The political parties fear that disproportionate weightage to non-population factors like inaccessibility, tough terrain and facilities of communication during the delimitation exercise could be used to reduce Kashmir’s political supremacy.

Owing to these apprehensions, all major political forces on Tuesday, July 6, requested the delimitation commission to conduct the exercise of rearranging constituencies on the basis of population.

“Population has to be the only norm as has been the practice in the past in J&K and elsewhere in the country,” the National Conference said.

Former bureaucrat Lateef-ul- Zaman Deva told The Wire that the population is the primary factor for determining  delimitation of electoral constituencies and not the number of voters or size of an area.

“Delhi has an area of 1483 square kilometres but it has been given seven seats on the basis of its population. Uttar Pradesh with an area of 2.48 lakh square kilometres has 80 Lok Sabha seats whereas Madhya Pradesh with an area of 3.08 lakh square kilometres has 29 seats. The number of seats is more in UP than MP because the former has a population of 20 crore and the latter 7.27 crore. This establishes beyond any doubt that population is the main factor for delimitation and not the lifeless land mass,” he said.

‘Gerrymandering’

The biggest worry in Jammu’s Chenab Valley and in the Rajouri district of Pir Panchal region is that BJP could redraw boundaries of constituencies in such a way so that chances of its candidates winning increases.

“There are apprehensions that the whole exercise is being done to benefit BJP as they had also carved out constituencies as per their will during district development council (DDC) elections held last year,” says Asim Hashmi, a lawyer who defeated BJP’s former minister and vice-president Shakti Raj Parihar in the DDC polls.

Also read: DDC Poll Results Prove BJP’s Claim of Ending NC-PDP Rule in Kashmir Wrong

Asim, who won from Hindu-dominated Gundna DDC segment of Doda district, said that BJP would not be benefitted from the exercise in Chenab region if delimitation is carried out in accordance with laws governing the process.

“The commission should determine the seats on the basis of population and that ensure that they are geographically compact,” he said.

The buzz in political corridors of J&K is that two politicians, both from the Jammu province, have switched loyalties from their respective parties and ended up joining a political party which is seen close to BJP to protect their interests during delimitation.

Security personnel stand guard as members of Delimitation Commission arrive to meet leaders of different political parties, in Srinagar, Tuesday, July 6, 2021. Photo: PTI

But how did this come to be?

No delimitation exercise was possible in J&K till 2031. This was before August 2019 when BJP-led Union government, along with effecting other constitutional and legal changes, repealed the law governing delimitation in the erstwhile state.

The Union thus incorporated provisions for undertaking delimitation in The Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act, 2019.

Under the law, the J&K Assembly would have 90 seats, excluding the 24 seats reserved for areas which are part of what is known as “Pakistan Occupied Kashmir or PoK.”

The delimitation panel is also empowered to reserve seats for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in the Assembly.

NC participates, PDP boycotts

The constituents of Peoples Alliance for Gupkar Declaration (PAGD) are not on the same page over meeting the visiting delimitation panel. While National Conference, in a departure from its earlier position, met the panel, the Peoples Democratic Party stayed away from meeting the commission.

In its memorandum submitted to the commission, National Conference questioned the legal validity of the panel, saying the delimitation of constituencies can be undertaken once the figures of the first Census after the year 2026 are published.

The party, in its memorandum, submitted that the  delimitation exercise would be a credible effort in strengthening democracy only after full statehood is restored to J&K.

Also read: Interview | ‘We Shouldn’t Give Legitimacy to J&K Status by Participating in Polls’: Ruhullah Mehdi

“However, despite our basic reservations on the issue, the Hon’ble commission has decided to go ahead with the delimitation process. While reiterating our stand and without prejudice to the submissions made above, we request you and other Hon’ble members of the Commission to carry out the delimitation exercise in a free, fair and transparent manner so that the unity and integrity of the state is safeguarded,” read the memorandum.

Earlier the party had decided against participating in proceedings of the commission, saying the law under which it was established has been challenged by the party in the Supreme Court.

Its = three Lok Sabha MPs including president Dr. Farooq Abdullah boycotted a meeting of the panel held in February.

Peoples Democratic Party, a constituent of PAGD, decided against meeting the panel, saying it “lacks constitutional and legal mandate and its very existence and objectives have left every ordinary resident of J&K with many questions”.

Peoples Conference has cautioned the panel against “inventing” constituencies and demanded that population should be the guiding factor for delimitation.

The Congress unit of J&K demanded that statehood should be restored before the delimitation process.

“Restoration of Statehood for Jammu & Kashmir is a sine qua non for conducting the delimitation process. Until the full statehood for Jammu & Kashmir as part of Union of India is restored, there would be no meaning for the delimitation commission to undertake any exercise. Unfortunately, the meeting called by the Prime Minister gave no concrete assurance in this regard. This is an essential confidence building measure imperative for restoration of the democratic process in Jammu & Kashmir,” read the party memorandum.

Mehbooba’s mother gets ED summon

Interestingly, hours after PDP announced its decision to stay away from the delimitation panel, mother of its president, Mehbooba Mufti received a summon from Enforcement Directorate to appear before it on July 14 in connection with an alleged money laundering case.

A 10-Point Plan to Turn Gilgit Baltistan into a Zone of Development for All

The security concerns and development aspirations of India, Pakistan and China are genuine and must be addressed cooperatively.

This is the third and final of a three-part article on Gilgit Baltistan and India. | Part 1 | Part 2

In the first part of this article, I argued that any attempt by the Modi government to forcibly wrest Gilgit Baltistan (which has been under Pakistan’s control since 1947-48) would surely trigger a catastrophic and unwinnable two-front war with both Pakistan and China.

In the second part, we explained how, and why, Gilgit and Baltistan defied Maharaja Hari Singh and joined Pakistan. We also showed how the leaders of India’s freedom movement, including Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel himself, were not very insistent on the region joining the Indian Union.

In this third and concluding part, we shall argue that Gilgit Baltistan, instead of remaining a flashpoint, can become a hub for India, Pakistan and China coming together in a new bond of win-win-win cooperation. Of course, for this to happen, the genuine security concerns of the three countries and development aspirations of the local people will have to be properly harmonised.

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While addressing Indian troops at Nimu in Ladakh on July 4, Prime Minister Narendra Modi rightly said, “The era of expansionism has come to an end.” He was also absolutely right in saying one more thing: “This is the era of development.”

Therefore, the only relevant question is: Can Gilgit Baltistan become a catalyst for the development both of itself and also of all the regions and countries in its neighbourhood — Pakistan, India, Afghanistan, China and Central Asia? Yes, it can. Indeed, the very fact that has made India take Gilgit Baltistan more seriously in recent years — namely, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a flagship project under Chinese President Xi Jinping’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), that passes through this region — can be turned into a harbinger of co-development of the three countries and of South Asia as a whole.

India has opposed CPEC, and the BRI, principally because this 3,000-km-long corridor, which seeks to link Kashgar in China’s western province of Xinjiang with Gwadar port in the Balochistan province of Pakistan, enters Pakistan through Gilgit Baltistan. As we have shown, India’s protest that this violates its sovereignty and territorial integrity stands on weak grounds. Nevertheless, India security concerns in the region are genuine for three reasons. First, because of strong and rapidly growing China-Pakistan relations. Second, because the China-Pakistan corridor runs very close to India’s two newly created Union territories – the UT of Jammu and Kashmir, and the UT of Ladakh (in which Gilgit Baltistan is now included). Third, because the corridor ends at Gwadar port, which, India rightly apprehends, could be used by China for its naval dominance in the Indian Ocean.

A general view of the port before the inauguration of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor port in Gwadar, Pakistan November 13, 2016. Credit: Reuters/Caren Firouz/File Photo

Just as India has legitimate security concerns, so does Pakistan. Pakistan’s anxiety is understandably roused by hawkish voices in the Indian government and military establishment declaring India’s determination to “reclaim territories (PoK and Gilgit Baltistan) illegally occupied by Pakistan”. Furthermore, many Pakistani observers have noted that India building a strong road and logistical infrastructure in Ladakh along its side of the LAC, combined with the continued presence of its army on the nearby Siachen Glacier, could be a preparation for Indian military’s incursion into Gilgit Baltistan.

Soldiers perform yoga in Siachen, June 21, 2016. Photo: PTI/File

Similarly, China too has legitimate security concerns in Gilgit Baltistan. To understand this, one must first know why CPEC is so crucial for China. The Chinese government is investing billions of dollars on this corridor because it will provide access to the Indian Ocean at Gwadar. This sea access will serve as an alternative route for China’s exports and imports in case the crucial Malacca Strait near South China Sea, through which 40% of its exports and 90% of its oil imports currently flow, gets blocked due to the intensifying US belligerence in that area.

China is also understandably concerned by growing military and strategic cooperation between India and the US. Beijing believes the sole aim of the US-led Quadrilateral Alliance (in which India, Japan and Australia have come together) is to contain China’s rise. Some influential Americans have said the US might have to militarily assist India in Jammu and Kashmir to ward off the combined threat from Pakistan and China. For example, even though Steve Bannon is now disgraced in a corruption scandal, this one-time close advisor to US President Donald Trump had very recently (June 4) said in an interview to the Straits Times: “China and the US are not in a cold war but a hot war. It is a hot war right now and it is going to get a lot hotter…This kinetic war is going to happen in the South China Sea and on the border of China, Pakistan, and India.”

Thus, we have a situation where all three countries – India, Pakistan and China – have legitimate security concerns. In addition, with China claiming Aksai Chin to be its own, all three also have territorial claims in the region. History has amply shown that nation-states tend to act irrationally, and develop a militaristic mindset, when they feel insecure, and when that insecurity is compounded by their unwillingness to understand similar concerns of their neighbours.

Can these concerns and claims of the three large countries be settled through military action?

  • Can any government in New Delhi take back PoK and Gilgit Baltistan by defeating Pakistan in a war?
  • Can the rulers in Islamabad and Rawalpindi realise their dream of securing ‘azaadi’ (independence) for Kashmir or merging it into Pakistan (“Kashmir Banega Pakistan”) by defeating India in a war – or by sponsoring terrorism in Kashmir and elsewhere in India?
  • Can India retrieve Aksai Chin by defeating China in a war?
  • Can China defeat India in a war and occupy Arunachal Pradesh, which borders the eastern sector of the LAC and which China, baselessly, claims to be its own?

The answer to all these questions is an emphatic NO! War, involving three countries that are nuclear-armed, cannot settle any of these inter-connected issues. What can resolve them with win-win benefits to all is mutual cooperation for collective development and progress.

Also read: With New China Faceoff, India’s Nightmare of a Two-Front War May Be Coming True

How can this be achieved? Here are some ideas and suggestions for the consideration of the governments, political establishments and thought leaders in India, Pakistan and China – and also the international community.

1. India, Pakistan and China should begin a trilateral dialogue for dispute-resolution, cooperation and common development. The problems in Jammu and Kashmir have become trilateral in nature, especially after the India-China standoff at the LAC in eastern Ladakh. Therefore, the solutions to these problems, acceptable to all concerned, can only come out of a trilateral dialogue. Of course, a three-nation dialogue does not preclude India-Pakistan, India-China and Pakistan-China bilateral dialogues.

2. The most important component of any trilateral dialogue must be a firm and solemn commitment by the three countries that none of them shall pose a security threat to the other.

3. As has been elaborately argued in this series, India has no historical, legal or practical basis to insist on the ‘recovery’ of Gilgit Baltistan. It should accept Pakistan’s de facto control over this area. Pakistan also has no historical, legal or practical basis to claim Kashmir to be its own. It should accept India’s sovereignty over the side of Kashmir that is under India’s administration since 1947, just as India should accept Pakistan’s de facto sovereignty over the side of Kashmir that is under Pakistan’s uninterrupted control and administration for the past 73 years. Neither side can alter this status quo now. After all, India and Pakistan accepted the division of Punjab and Bengal at the time of partition. There is no reason why they should not do the same in the case of Kashmir.

4. However, in deference to the legitimate aspirations of the people of Kashmir on both sides, and also to end the horrific conflict in Kashmir and prolonged suffering of Kashmiri people, India and Pakistan should agree on the following:

  • Converting the LoC into a “soft border” (thus making it “irrelevant”);
  • De-militarising both sides of Kashmir, ending gross violations of human rights, and ensuring the honourable return and rehabilitation of displaced people, regardless of their religion, such as the Kashmiri Pandits;
  • Enabling free trade and free movement of people;
  • Guaranteeing maximum self-governance, and even joint governance on relevant subjects;
  • An India-Pakistan joint mechanism to make this fair and innovative solution work.

These were the underpinnings of the Musharraf-Manmohan Singh formula, on which a large degree of consensus had been reached. This plan, under a different name and with mutually acceptable modifications, has the best chance of ending the Kashmir dispute.

5. If — and it is a big IF — India and Pakistan can make this peaceful and innovative solution to the Kashmir dispute work, the next natural step would be for them to make the border in Punjab and Sindh also more and more porous, enabling smooth trade, people-to-people travel and cultural exchanges between the two countries. The same should be done to make the menacingly fenced-up border between India and Bangladesh also irrelevant. This is the way to undo the negative effects of the blood-drenched partition of the Indian subcontinent, and move towards the social, economic and cultural integration of South Asia, on the lines of the European integration.

Also read: A Two Front War Was Never on the Cards

6. Even before India gives up its sovereign claim over Gilgit Baltistan, Pakistan should declare it as the nation’s fifth province — alongside Punjab, Sindh, Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa — by introducing necessary constitutional measures for this purpose. Indeed, as per recent reports, Pakistan has decided to make Gilgit-Baltistan a full-fledged province.

India has already effected a major material change in the status of the former state of Jammu and Kashmir by amending Article 370 of its constitution and by bifurcating the state into two Union territories. This Indian action is almost surely not going to be reversed in future by a non-BJP government. Therefore, there is no reason why Pakistan cannot bring about a constitutional change to make Gilgit Baltistan its fifth province, which has been a longstanding demand of the people of this region. Certainly, the time has come for Pakistan to acknowledge and respect their choice of being its full-fledged citizens.

7. A major reason for Pakistan to keep the status of Gilgit Baltistan ambiguous and liminal, while at the same time exercising administrative control over it from Islamabad (and, in the process, denying the people of this region their legitimate democratic rights) is that Pakistan regards this as a part of the disputed territory of Jammu and Kashmir. The rulers in Islamabad-Rawalpindi think that granting provincial status to Gilgit Baltistan would weaken Pakistan’s claim on Kashmir under the UN resolutions.

Pakistan should realise that there will never be a plebiscite in Jammu and Kashmir as per the UN resolutions, since so much water has flown in all the rivers of the region. Even the demography has undergone significant changes in different parts of the former princely state. Besides, there is very little support in the international community for the idea of a plebiscite. Therefore, the sooner Pakistan accepts this reality – and gives up its obsession with demanding a plebiscite – the better it is both for itself and for India-Pakistan normalisation.

Asma Khan Lone, who is a native of Gilgit and author of the forthcoming book ‘The Great Gilgit Game’, opines: “There is no social or political connect with India in Gilgit-Baltistan. Yet, even under Pakistan’s administration it remains in a state of marginalised liminality, devoid of fundamental and constitutional rights. Much of this is due to its unresolved political status as part of the Kashmir issue. In the interim the region needs to be provided constitutional guarantees and be legally empowered to safeguard its indigenous rights and privileges. An amicable settlement of the status of Gilgit Baltistan as part of the larger Kashmir dispute needs to be arrived at, more so as the region undergoes geo-political shifts as part of the evolving Great Power competition.”

8. A via media for Pakistan to declare Gilgit Baltistan as the nation’s fifth province is to make this constitutional change provisional in nature – subject to the final and holistic settlement of the Jammu and Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan. There is a longstanding precedent for doing so on a provisional basis. When Pakistan ceded 5,180 sq km of Shaksgam Valley to China in 1963, as part of the boundary settlement between the two countries, Article 6 of the agreement stated: “The two parties have agreed that after the settlement of the Kashmir dispute between Pakistan and India, the sovereign authority concerned will reopen negotiations with the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the boundary as described in Article Two of the present agreement, so as to sign a formal boundary treaty to replace the present agreement.”

9. The bane of governance in this entire region — be it India, Pakistan or China (in the Tibet Autonomous Region) — is excessive concentration of powers in central government. Given the extraordinary religious, linguistic and ethnic diversity of the people living in this region, it is extremely important to ensure genuine democratic autonomy, people’s effective participation in the affairs that impact their lives, protection of the rights of minorities, and strict action against majoritarian chauvinism.

10. India should join CPEC and BRI as an equal partner, and, together with Pakistan and China, make Gilgit Baltistan the starting point of a grand connectivity and cooperation initiative linking and benefiting all of South Asia. Physical and digital connectivity, along with the connectivity of markets and social sector projects, is the surest way to create new inter-dependencies among communities and countries. Such inter-dependencies are the best guarantor of peace and dispute resolution. There is practically no limit to what India, Pakistan and China, along with other countries in the South Asian and Central Asian region, can achieve by way of shared prosperity and progress through connectivity and cooperation.

Indus River at Skardu in Gilgit-Baltistan region. Photo: Wikimedia Commons, CC BY-SA

Conclusion

The Himalayas are the heavenly abode of Gilgit Baltistan. Since time immemorial, the Himalaya Sphere and the mighty river civilisations it engendered — the Indus and Ganga on the India-Pakistan side and the Yangtse and Huanghe on the Chinese side — have proclaimed the unity of humanity. Indeed, unity of everything in the universe has been the profounder wisdom of all the sages who meditated in the Himalayas. As passionately explained by Prof Tan Chung in his book Himalaya Calling: The Origins of China and India, there is undeniable resonance between the Indian spiritual goal of ‘Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam’ (the whole world is one single family) and the Chinese spiritual goal of ‘Tianxia Datong 天下大同’ (grand harmony of all-under-Heaven).

Therefore, it is time for India, Pakistan and China to rediscover this civilizational wisdom and strive for “expansionism” of a different kind — expansion of the minds and hearts in South Asia. After all, Gilgit Baltistan is the region, full of some of the world’s tallest mountains and stunningly beautiful valleys, which served as the pathway for prosperity-promoting traders and peace-preaching saints, monks and dervishes along the ancient “Silk Road”. The hope that it can yet again become such a pathway in modern times is sustained by the following memorable words of India’s national poet and global citizen Rabindranath Tagore.

Also read: Why the Delimitation Exercise in Jammu and Kashmir Calls for Caution

“The most memorable fact of human history is that of a path-opening, not  for the clearing  of  a  passage  for  machine-guns,  but  for  the  helping  the realization  by  races  of  their  affinity  of  minds,  their  mutual  obligations  of  a common humanity. Such a rare event did happen and the path was built between our  people  and  Chinese  in  an  age,  when  physical  obstruction  needed  heroic personality to overcome it,  and  the  mental barrier a moral power of uncommon magnitude. The two leading races of that age met, not as rivals on the battlefield, each claiming the right to be the sole tyrant on earth, but as noble friends glorying in their exchange of gifts.”

The writer, who served as an aide to India’s former Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, is founder of the ‘Forum for a New South Asia – Powered by India-Pakistan-China Cooperation’. He tweets @SudheenKulkarni and welcomes comments at sudheenkulkarni@gmail.com.

Why the Delimitation Exercise in Jammu and Kashmir Calls for Caution

From problems with the Census data to changes in the population, there are various limitations that require broad consultation with the people of the UT.

The dramatic reorganisation of the state of Jammu and Kashmir into two Union Territories after a change in its constitutional status has reopened the delimitation question that otherwise would have remained dormant until 2031. A fresh delimitation is necessary due to the change in borders, introduction of reservation for Scheduled Tribes in the assembly, implicit extension of the right to vote in assembly elections to West Pakistan refugees and increase in the number of assembly constituencies. It is not, however, necessary to conduct delimitation just before the next census, that too in the middle of a pandemic when public hearings are difficult to hold.

Even otherwise, the government should not rush, as the erstwhile Jammu and Kashmir was a complex state. Consider, for instance, “vacant” constituencies. The last delimitation was carried out in 1995 ahead of the 1996 assembly elections. It changed the overall strength of the legislative assembly from 100 to 111 adding five, four and two seats to Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh regions, respectively. However, 24 out of the 111 seats were left vacant “until the area of the State under the occupation of Pakistan ceases to be so occupied and the people residing in that area elect their representatives”. The Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act, 2019 misallocates the vacant constituencies.

The revised Political Map of India and the map of the Union Territory of Ladakh issued by the Survey of India assign Gilgit and Baltistan (GB) to Ladakh. As per the earlier distribution of constituencies, 24 seats were set aside for all the territories under the occupation of Pakistan. The Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act, 2019 (Sec 14(4)) assigns all the 24 seats, including those of GB, to the Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir. So, GB is territorially included in Ladakh that does not have a legislature, while it falls in Jammu and Kashmir for legislative and electoral purposes.

New map of the UTs of Jammu and Kashmir, and Ladakh. Source: GOI

Denying seats to GB could have been interpreted as withdrawal of claim to the disputed territory. This perhaps explains the awkward solution of mapping GB to two different administrative units, but it means that the people of Ladakh are denied a right that has been extended, even if notionally, to the people of GB. (In passing note, that the revised map betrays ignorance of the cultural and administrative history of the erstwhile state.)

There are other difficulties, too, in conducting delimitation. The 1991 Census could not be conducted in the state and the 2002 delimitation was deferred by the state government. So, the existing distribution of seats is based on the 1981 Census, when Kashmiri Pundits were present in Kashmir in large numbers, Scheduled Tribes were not yet recognised in the state and West Pakistan refugees could vote only in parliamentary elections but not in assembly elections as they were not “permanent residents”.

The proposed exercise is, therefore, not a routine delimitation in which seats are adjusted to account for the natural growth of population. The next delimitation will have to deal with entirely new categories of population because of which the change in seat allocation will not be a linear extrapolation of past allocations.

Also Read: Election Commission Raps J&K LG For Remarks to Media Outlets on Timing of Election

What does the government intend to achieve?

Given these complexities, one wonders what the government and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), intends to achieve through the delimitation process. Ideally, the government would, on the one hand, want the exercise to be seen as fair in the demography-conscious Kashmir. On the other, it should transparently address longstanding concerns about underrepresentation in the Jammu region and ensure adequate representation to Scheduled Castes (including among the West Pakistan refugees) and Scheduled Tribes (including the smaller tribes such as Gaddi, Sippi and Shina). The decision to use the 2011 Census data for delimitation will, however, compound the difficulty of addressing the concerns of all sides.

The erstwhile Jammu and Kashmir comprised of three regions – Kashmir (Muslim majority), Ladakh (Buddhist-Shia) and Jammu (Hindu majority). Kashmir region (55% of the population), Kashmiri-speakers (53%) and Muslims (68%) accounted for the majority of the erstwhile state’s population as per the 2011 Census. In the erstwhile state meta-electoral conflict over delimitation was limited to Jammu and Kashmir regions, which were locked in a zero-sum competition that affected census operations too because winning censuses was seen as key to winning the inter-regional battle for the chief minister’s office. All the chief ministers of the state were Kashmiri-speaking Muslims of Kashmir, except for Ghulam Nabi Azad.

Jammu region complains that its seat share has almost always been less than its share of population and electorate. And, that the census is not reliable for the post-1991 period as Jammu region’s reported population share has declined despite heavy outmigration from Kashmir. There has been a massive exodus of Hindus and, to a lesser extent, Sikhs out of Kashmir Valley due to the insurgency. Muslims too have migrated out of the Valley in large numbers in search of employment and education. Many Muslims have also settled in Jammu to escape the disturbed conditions in the Valley. Moreover, Kashmir has suffered relatively higher conflict-induced mortality.

Armed forces were relocated from other states to Kashmir in the 1990s and thereafter only the levels were adjusted. Moreover, there was a similar deployment in the hill districts of Jammu too. So, the changes in the deployment of armed forces cannot explain the unexpected spike in Kashmir’s population share, particularly, during 2001-11.

An elderly couple show their inked fingers after casting their votes at a polling station in Kupwara district in North Kashmir on April 11, 2019. Credit: PTI/S. Irfan

Demographic changes

Jammu argues that all these should have tilted the demographic balance in their favour, whereas their population share has declined, which is counterintuitive. Further, Gujjars and Bakerwals claim that their actual population share is higher than suggested by the census because their community was not recorded as belonging to the Scheduled Tribes in many places where they were a minority. Likewise, the Scheduled Castes doubt the census as their population share should have grown owing to their relatively poorer socioeconomic conditions. However, their population share has been decreasing in Jammu and Kashmir since 1981, contrary to the trend observed in the rest of the country.

Most of these anomalies are explained by abnormal changes in Kashmir’s population. For instance, during 2001-11 population share of Kashmir increased due to, among other things, an unexpected increase in the child population contrary to improvements in socioeconomic indicators such as literacy that should lead to a fall in fertility.

Also Read: Ladakh LAC on the Boil, India Must Avoid Stirring Gilgit Baltistan Cauldron With Pakistan

The government is aware that the use of the 2011 Census will decrease the seat share of Jammu and Scheduled Castes. The strength of the assembly seems to have been increased from 107 to 114 to assuage concerns about the decrease in seat share by increasing the absolute number of seats. This will, however, not address the concerns of Jammu that is complaining against the use of flawed census data and the fact that delimitation based on population overlooks the fact that constituencies in Jammu are larger in size than in Kashmir and their terrain is also more difficult.

If Jammu region and Scheduled Castes, in whose name the state was restructured, are going to lose in relative terms, why is the government rushing? Is it to assuage Kashmir and secure a toehold there through the reservation of seats for Scheduled Tribes as Jammu alone cannot bring the BJP to power? Or, is the government going ahead as it hopes that the delimitation commission will relax the population criterion in Jammu as happened in case of select districts of Uttarakhand in the 2002 delimitation?

Whatever may be the motives behind delimitation in Jammu and Kashmir, a rushed exercise could instead of furthering peace and reconciliation end up as another instance of top-down imposition that deepens the communal and regional divides. It is, therefore, advisable to postpone the exercise and accommodate the views of all stakeholders through dialogue and public hearings.

Vikas Kumar teaches at Azim Premji University, Bengaluru, and is co-author of Numbers in India’s Periphery: The Political Economy of Government Statistics, Cambridge University Press (2020).

The Real Googly: More than Imran, the Pakistan Army Wants Peace With India

The Pakistan Army no longer derives its raison d’etre from the lack of peace with India. If the Kashmir problem gets resolved on the army chief’s watch through his appointed prime minister, GHQ would gain domestically.

One way to minimise the significance of the recent Kartarpur corridor ground-breaking ceremony for Pakistan-India relations is to say that Prime Minister Imran Khan’s intentions are unclear and don’t matter. This knee-jerk assessment would be correct if we were to read only the politics behind the ceremony and ignore the fact that Khan’s statements on the need for peace with India clearly have the backing of the one institution in the country that matters – the Pakistan Army.

There is little argument that the present dispensation in Pakistan is unique. Imran Khan, truth be told, owes and holds his office at the pleasure of his army chief, General Qamar Javed Bajwa. It was Bajwa who, in the presence of his supposed boss, Imran Khan, first broke the news on the Kartarpur corridor to Punjab’s minister Navjot Singh Sidhu – which led to the hug between the two.

I believe Bajwa took that initiative because he wants peace with India. But New Delhi and its mostly jingoistic media threw a fit over why Sidhu hugged the ‘enemy’ who is directly responsible for terrorism in India. Consequent to having read the tea leaves wrong, the Indian verdict, based upon Pakistan’s turbulent political history, was that the optics of the Kartarpur ceremony were irrelevant because Imran is not the one calling the shots.  In fact, Khan’s words should be seen as an indicator of Pakistan’s real intentions precisely because he was being his master’s voice.

Also read: Why Is Modi Not Accepting Pakistan’s Offer of Talks?

There are several reasons why Bajwa wants peace with India. One, he is under Chinese pressure to do so; two, he wants to show the world, especially the United States (in order to recover the blocked aid of $3 billion) that India is the spoiler; three, he agrees with his government’s main concern that trade should be Pakistan’s priority when its economy is in doldrums; four, he has assessed that he would be negotiating with India from a position of military strength; five, he is on top of the Kashmir situation; and six, he has unambiguously conveyed to India that nothing short of talks on resolving the Kashmir issue (alongside other irritants) will get the peace process moving. The time for confidence-building measures is long gone.

Instead of recognising the brutal reality staring India in the face and dealing with it, the Modi government has stuck to its known position. The said part is that if Pakistan’s intentions for peace talks are genuine, it should stop terrorism. The unsaid part, which a senior serving diplomat told me recently, is that the Pakistan Army does not want peace with India. Why? Because it would lose its raison d’etre. Unfortunately, both assumptions do not hold water.

What if Bajwa were to stop terrorism in the hope that India would start talks on Kashmir? This would be akin to a big trophy for Prime Minister Narendra Modi even before his political fate is tested in the 2019 general elections. The Modi government would vociferously go to town claiming that the Pakistani army was worried about another surgical strike. Once Modi gets the trump card for his political win, why would he talk Kashmir with Pakistan? Especially when, speaking from the ramparts of the Red Fort, he has already made his policy clear: Getting back Pakistan-occupied Kashmir is the only unfinished Kashmir agenda.

General Bajwa wants to follow the format of 2002-2007 on terrorism: bilateral talks (then back-channel talks between the Manmohan Singh and Musharraf governments) and spigot to terrorism to be coterminous. Credit: Wikimedia Commons

Moreover, halting terrorism at this crucial juncture — when home-grown terrorists far outnumber the Pakistan-exported ones — would not go down well with the people of Kashmir. Incensed by India’s high-handedness and with no political respite on the horizon, Kashmiris have become defiant. For Pakistan to not support their cause at this moment would amount to hara-kiri; surely, Bajwa would not be stupid to do that. Bajwa wants to follow the format of 2002-2007 on terrorism in which the terror spigot was shut in tandem with progress in bilateral talks – which took the form of back-channel negotiations between the Manmohan Singh and Musharraf governments.

As for the belief that the Kashmir imbroglio is essential to the Pakistan Army’s existence, India seems not to have noticed its neighbour’s elevated geopolitical stature in recent years. A look at the organisational structure of the Pakistan army puts things in perspective. It has four verticals which converge at the office of the chief of army staff. The irregular warfare or terrorism vertical is led by the director-general, Inter-Services Intelligence; conventional warfare is the responsibility of the chief of general staff through the director-general, military operations; the director-general, strategic plans division is responsible for all aspects of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons; and the army chief himself works in close collaboration with the foreign office to further its proactive (muscular) foreign policy.

Also read: With Imran Khan in the Saddle, Chinese Influence on Indo-Pak Ties Grows

Given this, if the Kashmir issue gets resolved under the Pakistan Army’s direct watch through its appointed prime minister, GHQ would gain domestically by finally closing what is seen there as the outstanding core issue of the Partition, with added geopolitical heft for itself.

Unfortunately, India has not realised that its 1998 nuclear tests helped the Pakistan Army enormously. With complete control of the ultimate weapon of power, it no longer needs the Kashmir issue for either survival or progression. Nuclear weapons give it the authority to (a) direct Pakistan’s foreign policy and (b) project Pakistan as the leader of the Muslim world. China, to be sure, announced the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor as the flagship of its ambitious Belt and Road Initiative predicated on the assurances of Rawalpindi and not Islamabad.

Coming back to the Kartarpur ceremony, Khan, fully backed by Bajwa, has done his bit. Knowing well that the Modi government would not start talks anytime soon, he announced his decision to wait out India’s impending general elections. Pakistan is counting on the Modi government not coming back. Having learnt the hard way, they realise that Modi, unlike Vajpayee, is ideologically rigid. Recall what Strobe Talbott, who was deputy secretary of state in the Bill Clinton administration, wrote in his book Engaging India: “The session with Advani (deputy prime minister) was unnerving. He mused aloud about the happy day when India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Myanmar would be reunited in a single South Asian confederation.”

While Vajpayee as prime minister could overrule his deputy’s hard-line ideology, Modi is a different ballgame altogether. It is another matter that Rawalpindi believes it will still have the upper hand should Modi come back to power: the deteriorating political situation within Kashmir, the tightening geo-strategic noose of China, the diminishing capabilities of the Indian armed forces and the growing geo-political clout of GHQ do not augur well for India. Pakistan understands all this. The hand of peace that Imran Khan proffered on behalf of General Bajwa is for Pakistan’s own geopolitical benefit. The ‘googly’ lies in the fact that even if a future Indian government chooses not to play ball, Pakistan does not stand to lose anything.

Pravin Sawhney is editor, FORCE newsmagazine.