Despite a comprehensive defeat in Karnataka, the BJP retained its 36% vote share in Karnataka. This was primarily because of a 5.4% gain in votes in Bengaluru followed by a smaller improvement in Old Mysuru. The saffron party’s performance in Bengaluru was the silver lining as it lost seats/votes everywhere else, and votes gained in the city compensated for its losses. It won 16 of the 28 seats in the capital, five more than the previous election. The Congress won the remaining 12. It received an impressive 46% of votes in the city, begging the question, why did Bengaluru buck the trend?
Pro-incumbent factor
The primary explanation is the persistence of an existing political trend of pro-incumbency at the constituency level in the city – very few seats change hands, and nearly 60% of seats have been won by the same party and MLA for the past three-four elections.
The BJP benefitted from ‘Operation Kamala’, or the defection of several MLAs from the Congress and the Janata Dal (Secular) [JD(S)] to the saffron party in 2019. The defections, which reportedly large sums of money, brought down the Congress-JD(S) alliance government headed by H.D. Kumaraswamy.
Of the five seats gained by the BJP in Bengaluru, four were gained in 2019 when sitting Congress and JD(S) MLAs defected. The BJP entered this election with 15 seats in Bengaluru and mainly succeeded in retaining them.
Seats gained by the BJP in Bengaluru (compared to 2018)
Constituency |
Winning BJP MLA |
How it was gained |
Rajarajeshwari Nagar |
Munirathna |
MLA defected from Congress in 2019 |
Mahalakshmi Layout |
K. Gopalaiah |
MLA defected from JD(S) in 2019 |
Yeshvanthapura |
S. T. Somashekhar |
MLA defected from Congress in 2019 |
KR Puram (Krishnarajapuram) |
Byrati Basavaraj |
MLA defected from Congress in 2019 |
Jayanagar |
CK Ramamurthy |
Won from Congress in 2023 |
Dasarahalli |
S Muniraju |
Won from JD(S) in 2023 |
Source: ECI, IndiaVotes
If we look at the BJP’s impressive vote share performance, the contribution of the MLAs who defected is even more striking. Of the 5.4% vote share gain, 4.1% came from the four seats where sitting MLAs defected! As the chart shows, the BJP’s vote share in Bengaluru grew from 41% to 46.4% – but it received a much larger share of these votes from the four defector seats. Clearly, the defections of popular incumbents and retaining existing seats played a huge role in the party’s Bengaluru ‘victory’.
Source: ECI, LokDhaba-TCPD, Author’s calculation
But this successful retention is simply consistent with Bengaluru’s particular and strong pro-incumbent tendency. Parties easily retain seats and incumbent MLAs keep getting re-elected in the city. Fifteen seats (54% of the total) have been held by the same party and MLA since 2008. A few MLAs have served up to five terms. Moreover, 24 seats (85%) have seen the same party or candidate win in recent elections.
Strikingly, this time only three seats changed hands, which means 25 seats (90%) remained with the party that held them before the election. This is extraordinarily low, especially in a state that shows very high seat volatility.
My conversations with residents across constituencies before the elections revealed that most were confident their incumbent MLA (and party) would retain the seat, and many supported their MLAs due to the “good work” they had done. This cut across party lines: even residents with clear partisan affiliations expressed support for sitting MLAs from a rival party. When I tried to understand this support, I found that these MLAs have found ways to reinforce their popularity and support through civic work, attentive grievance redressal and other initiatives to show that they care about their constituents.
A small restaurant proprietor in C.V. Raman Nagar reached out to sitting BJP MLA S. Raghu when he faced issues and found him to be helpful and responsive. The residents felt he cared and spoke up for them. Residents talked about MLAs getting houses built for them and delivering other types of civic work like building hospitals. There has been some debate led by civic action groups about whether this is in a legislator’s mandate – and whether this has contributed to delayed elections and reduced funding to Bengaluru’s municipal body, BBMP. MLAs also demonstrated they care during the pandemic by providing food relief during the lockdown. This relatively easy initiative had recall value for voters in Mahadevapura.
This helped the BJP, partly because it had more incumbents, but more because support for these incumbents mitigated the electoral impact of general anti-incumbency against an unpopular government. Even supporters acknowledged the Basavaraj Bommai government’s corruption and lack of development. While defectors who joined in 2019 won (and brought a lot of votes), the only seat the BJP lost to the Congress was Govindraj Nagar, where it didn’t nominate the incumbent MLA. This shows how dependent the party was on its incumbent MLAs and how its success should be credited to them.
The two seats retained despite a change in the candidate were Mahadevpura, where the sitting BJP MLA’s wife won, and Pulakeshinagar, where the fallout of the DJ Halli violence led the Congress to sideline its incumbent and still retain the seat. Three seats changed hands: Govindraj Nagar, where the BJP didn’t nominate the incumbent, Dasarahalli was lost by the flailing JD(S), and Jayanagar was lost after five recounts by a slim margin of 16 votes amid a lot of controversy. Parties mostly re-nominated sitting MLAs and won.
Five incumbents changed parties (four during the 2019 defections) and four of them won (all but Pulakeshinagar). Conversely, in the three seats where the parties changed the candidates, one was lost, one was won by the candidate’s wife and the last was Pulakeshinagar. And of course, most of the BJP’s vote share gain happened in seats where popular incumbents had defected to the party. In Bengaluru, parties are more dependent on their MLAs than the reverse.
Not everyone was happy. Many felt legislators hadn’t improved their lives or developed the constituency. There was potent disaffection with the political class: “everyone is corrupt and equally bad”. Many talked about facing acute economic suffering, but some such disaffected voters didn’t intend to vote as they didn’t “see a point”.
Siddaramaiah outside a polling station in Varuna Vidhan Sabha constituency. Photo: Twitter@INCKarnataka
Bengaluru has consistently seen the lowest voter turnout in Karnataka, only 54.8% this time, compared to the state’s 74%. Though there might be many disillusioned voters, they choose to stay home instead of exercise their franchise. This is likely because they are disillusioned with all parties and don’t see a credible alternative. This strengthens the pro-incumbency effect because voters unhappy with the incumbent don’t turn out to vote him/her out, which mutes the impact of anti-incumbency in the city. Turnout actually dropped in Bengaluru in 2023 though it rose across Karnataka, suggesting that anti-incumbency brought people out to vote out the BJP across the state, but they stayed home in the capital city – consistent with past voting behaviour.
Also Read: Decoding the Karnataka Election Results in 18 Charts
Resonance of BJP’s narrative and the role of class
Despite the unpopularity of their government, the BJP retained its position and increased its votes. Its votes share of 46.4% is the party’s best performance since the 2008 delimitation, widening the gap with Congress. So why did Bengaluru residents vote for the BJP?
The many BJP supporters I encountered didn’t dissent from the narrative of economic suffering or claim things were good. Few liked Bommai or B.S. Yediyurappa. When asked why they were voting for the BJP, what emerged was a resonance with the party’s narrative on Prime Minister Narendra Modi, national issues and the opposition. The biggest factor was support for Modi. Part of this was national security: “Modi has made the country and military strong, and he’s needed to counter threats to India.” Another was his economic management during the present crisis: “Though things are bad, look at Sri Lanka and Pakistan’s collapse.” Despite struggling to make ends meet, some believed ‘the economy’ was strong. The “double engine” narrative justified the choice: “Modi needs the BJP in the state to work properly.”
Prime Minister Narendra Modi and other BJP leaders at a rally in Shimoga. Photo: Twitter/@narendramodi
The second factor was a lack of confidence in the opposition. Many BJP voters felt crime and lawlessness would increase in the city under the Congress. This had a communal undertone, as the third factor was Hindutva: particularly tropes about Muslim violence and criminality, enabled by the opposition. With specific instances, this also drew on national debates – feeding into a narrative that the opposition was favouring Muslims and sheltering criminals, generating a sense threat and insecurity for which the BJP was the bulwark.
This shows the penetration of the BJP’s messaging: people voted for the party despite facing hardship and knowing the government hasn’t performed. Importantly, there was a class divide: lower-class respondents emphasised economic suffering and favoured Congress, while middle-class respondents tended to be ambivalent or pro-BJP. For those facing acute economic distress, the focus was anger against the government for doing little to alleviate their situation; while those who are more secure could claim that things aren’t so bad and focused on other issues. Exit polls showed an 11% lead for the Congress among lower-class voters, indicating strong support.
Bengaluru has seen growth and prosperity contrasting with the rest of Karnataka and has a concentration of people with better economic outcomes. Its per capita GSDP is double the state’s average.
Since economic pain drove the Congress’s success, Bengaluru’s divergent growth trajectory might have contributed to the result. The BJP’s narrative had greater resonance here as economic suffering wasn’t as acute.
Collapse of JD(S) and increasingly bipolar contest in Bengaluru
Another factor in the BJP’s success was the JD(S)’s collapse, as in other parts of the state. The party’s vote share declined by over 7% and it lost both the seats it won in the city five years ago. The BJP’s substantial vote gain appears to be at the expense of the JD(S), as Congress slightly improved its vote share. Here too, the defections played a role, with one of two seats lost through defection. The JD(S) entered the 2023 election holding just one seat.
Bengaluru has become an increasingly bipolar contest as the JD(S)’s vote share has dropped significantly over the past two elections, and this time few residents talked about the party. The incumbency effect exacerbates this: all seats but one was held by a Congress or BJP incumbent, who was the clear favourite in most. Voters who wanted to unseat the incumbent ended up consolidating behind the strongest challenger, usually the Congress or BJP candidate. This is also a reflection of a more bipolar state election. The JD(S) was the runner-up only in 2 seats.
Source: ECI, Author’s analysis
But it would be a mistake to think the BJP just gained from the JD(S)’s losses. First, in an increasingly bipolar contest, the BJP won out against the Congress in attracting voters leaving the JD(S). Second, at the seat level, it is clear that Congress voters switched to the BJP (e.g., where Congress lost to defectors). In seats retained by either party (90%), this time, the JD(S) voters chose either the BJP or the Congress, but more such voters picked BJP because of the other factors substantiated above. It is some consolation to the Congress that it did not lose voters in aggregate and that wherever it did lose voters, it compensated by gaining JD(S) voters elsewhere.
Conclusion
While the BJP appears to have done very well in Bengaluru, a closer analysis of the reasons for this performance suggests little for the party to celebrate. Their gains were primarily due to an existing political trend in the city of re-electing incumbents, and most seats and votes they added were acquired through defections of popular incumbents. Incumbent MLAs have specific ways to reinforce support, and anti-incumbency that hurt the BJP elsewhere did not translate in a city where disaffected voters stay home. They also benefitted from an increasingly bipolar contest, where votes against incumbents were consolidated by a primary BJP/Congress challenger, though more JD(S) voters switched to the BJP. Resonance with the party’s narrative on Modi, national issues, the opposition and Hindutva motivated BJP voters, owing to Bengaluru’s distinctive economic trends. Economic pain that drove the saffron party’s defeat elsewhere wasn’t quite as acute and these other issues had traction. Despite this, the BJP’s celebrations should be muted as the big message from Bengaluru is that voters are so disillusioned that they don’t turn out, and don’t see a credible alternative to incumbents who keep getting re-elected.
Sumer Sharma is an independent political analyst, formerly with the Policy & Insights division at The Economist Group. He holds an MSc in Political Sociology from the London School of Economics.