Ajai Shukla

US Drone Sale to India Unblocked Only After Key Senator Extracts Pledge on Pannun Plot Probe

Senator Ben Cardin, chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said ‘he had ended his ‘hold’ on the agreement now that President Joe Biden’s administration agreed to fully investigate an Indian assassination plot on U.S. soil and that he would hold the administration to this commitment.

New Delhi: The Biden administration’s proposal to make a major armed drone sale to India – blocked by Congress two months ago over allegations that an Indian government agency sought to assassinate a US national on American soil – is finally going to move ahead, but only after a key Senator said he received assurances from the White House that the plot would be properly investigated.

“My approval of this sale was the result of months of painstaking discussions with the Biden administration,” Senator Ben Cardin, a Democrat from Maryland who chairs the pivotal Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said in a statement shared with The Wire and later posted on the Senate website on Friday:

“While I’m fully aware of the significance of this sale for U.S. national security and strategic interests, I have consistently conveyed my concerns regarding the timing of this sale to administration officials in light of the alleged murder-for-hire plot involving Indian officials to attempt to assassinate an American citizen on U.S. soil. I have been assured by the Administration that the Indian government is committed to thoroughly investigating the situation and fully cooperating with the U.S. Department of Justice investigation so that there is credible accountability in this case. As the Chairman of this committee, I fully intend to hold the Administration to these commitments.”

On Thursday Reuters quoted Senator Cardin, as saying he had released his ‘hold’ on the agreement now that the administration had agreed to fully investigate an Indian assassination plot on U.S. soil against Sikh activist Gurpatwant Singh Pannun.

Senator Ben Cardon. Photo: Wikimedia

“I’ve had direct conversations with the administration. The administration has demanded that there be investigations and accountability in regards to the plot here in the United States and that there is accountability within India against these types of activities … and that has to be demonstrated,” he told reporters on Capitol Hill on Thursday. “So I’m confident that that process has been initiated by the Biden administration. And I have released my hold with regards to the sale of the drones.”

On January 31, The Wire reported on how the Pannun assassination plot had become an obstacle to the drone sale on the hill, quoting a source in Washington as saying, “The purchase is stuck in the US Congress because of anger over the brazen attempt to assassinate Pannun. US representatives have frozen the legislative movement needed for proceeding with the sale.”

Though the Indian information and broadcasting ministry was quick to label the story ‘fake news’, the ministry of external affairs – which knew the full picture – struck a more circumspect note. “See, this particular matter relates to the US side,” the ministry spokesperson said, when asked what was holding up the drone sale clearance. “They have their internal processes in place and we are respectful of that. So that is where I would like to leave my comment.”

Also read: US Blocks $3-Billion Drone Sale to India Until ‘Meaningful Investigation’ of Pannun Assassination Conspiracy

Clearance came day after news of linkage emerged in public

On Thursday, February 1, the US State Department notified the US Congress about the “possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of India of MQ-9B Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) and related equipment for an estimated cost of $3.99 billion.”

The Biden administration’s decision to issue its mandatory notification to Congress about the drone sale came just one day after this reporter broke the news about the Pannun linkage.

American legislative process requires the US Congress to be formally notified in advance of all significant defence sales.

“The proposed sale will support the foreign policy and national security objectives of the United States by helping to strengthen the US-Indian strategic relationship and to improve the security of a major defence partner…” the February 1, 2024 notification to Congress stated, according to a press release issued by the Defence Security Cooperation Agency of the Pentagon on February 1.

India’s proposed purchase of US drones was first mooted way back in 2016. In December 2017, India’s defence minister at the time, Nirmala Sitharaman, told Parliament in response to an MP’s question: “Request for Information (RFI) for Predator ‘B’ Sea Guardian [drones] was issued to the US Office of Defence Cooperation on 14.11.2017 (November 14) and response is awaited.” The drone quest moved into high gear last June when Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Washington on a state visit, with the government’s Defence Acquisition Council clearing the purchase.

State Department acknowledged questions raised by US Congress

Pannun, who holds dual US and Canadian citizenship, is a New York-based Khalistan activist accused by India of terrorism, and the federal indictment – on conspiracy to murder charges – of an Indian national allegedly working at the behest of an Indian security agency has raised concerns about the policies of the Modi government on Capitol Hill. Cardin himself spoke about the issue during Congressional hearings on transnational repression last December.

In its only formal reaction to The Wire’s story, the US State Department on January 31 referred to questions members of Congress had raised but refused to confirm or deny the claim that the drone deal had ended up getting linked to the Pannun matter.

“I will say that generally the U.S.-Indian Defense Partnership has seen significant growth over the past decade, State Department spokesman Mark Miller said in response to a pointed question about the veracity of the news report. “This is a proposed sale that was announced during Prime Minister Modi’s visit last year. We believe it offers significant potential to further advance strategic technology cooperation with India and military cooperation in the region. Of course, Congress plays – as you know – an important role in the U.S. arms transfer process. We routinely consult with members of Congress with the foreign – on the foreign affairs committees before our formal notification to – so we can address questions that they might have, but I don’t have any comment on when that formal notification might take place.” (Emphasis added)

The US embassy in New Delhi stuck to the same formulation: “We continue to discuss with U.S. Congress the potential sale consistent with standard processes and policies guiding such arm sales decisions.”

There is normally a gap of 20 to 40 days between the tiered review process – an informal notification exercise for a proposed major arms sale – and the State Department’s formal notification to Congress. . In a January 2024 report on the Congressional review process for arms sales, the Congressional Research Serviced cited the State Department Insector General as noting, “The State Department generally will not formally notify an arms transfer if a member of Congress raises significant concerns by placing a hold during the informal review stage… [though] the Department is not precluded from proceeding with an arms transfer subject to a congressional hold.”

Pannun plot as problem

Congressional sources say the tiered review began in December, and resulted in a hold. The fact that the State Department chose not to override the Congressional hold placed by Senator Cardin but to instead find ways to address the concerns he was raising suggests the Biden administration too was looking for ways to push the Modi government to properly address the Pannun matter. Conversations were taking place at various levels but the public airing of the linkage on January 31 appears to have raised the stakes and speeded the process.

On the morning of February 1, Shishir Gupta reported in the Hindustan Times that General Atomics – the California-based manufacturer of the drones – had been told by the State Department “that the US Congress today has cleared the ‘tiered review’ of the 31 MQ9B drone sale to India and [that an] official Congressional notification will be submitted within 24 hours.” The company reportedly informed the Indian government of this “at the highest levels”.

“My sense is the GOI is embarrassed, not so much about the sale issue but the lack of resolution of the Pannun issue…,” the Washington-based source told this reporter on Thursday, hinting at the possibility that high level bilateral conversations may have been held soon after the story came out to ensure the drones and other weapons purchases do not become a casualty of Congressional opposition, foot-dragging or inter-agency disagreements over a murder plot that India has publicly committed itself to investigating.

Gurpatwant Singh Pannun. Photo: X/@SFJGenCounsel.

Cardin’s own remarks about the seriousness of the Pannun issue – that the Biden administration “has demanded … that there is accountability within India against these types of activities… and that has to be demonstrated” – are a clear confirmation that the clearance process for the drone sale has involved some blunt speaking with the Modi government.

In his statement on Friday, Cardin emphasised the importance of human rights:

“The U.S.-India partnership plays a key role in Indo Pacific stability, including through regional mechanisms such as the Quad. I support deepening our bilateral relationship with India as long as that partnership is based on mutual trust and respect. Championing human rights and democratic values globally is one of my top priorities. Progress on these issues requires difficult discussions about our own democracy, as well as discussions with our closest allies and friends. I will continue raising human rights issues with the Administration, as well as our Indian counterparts, because I believe that our shared values are fundamental to the growth and longevity of our partnership.”

The Sea Guardian, built by US firm General Atomics, is the naval version of the storied Predator B armed drone (also termed the MQ-9 Reaper), with which the US has killed terrorists in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Yemen.

India had asked for the armed version, but Washington initially offered only the unarmed Sea Guardian, which performs maritime surveillance. However, the armed version now features in the notification issued to Congress.

There is some confusion over the nomenclature of the drone, with even the US government using different names — MQ-9, MQ-9A and MQ-9B — apparently interchangeably.

Travelling at 300 kilometres per hour at 50,000 feet, the Sea Guardian flies 14-hour missions to monitor waters 1,800 kilometres from base. It sends imagery in real time to a ground control room on base, which flies the drone through a two-way data link.

Being a “Category 1” system under the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), Sea Guardians drones are tightly controlled because of their presumed ability to deliver nuclear weapons.

Biden’s tightrope walk

The Biden administration has so far walked a tightrope between the strategic imperative of getting the Indian military to work more closely with it in the Indo-Pacific region and the concerns raised by its own officials about issues relating to religious freedom and human rights.

Against this backdrop, the Pannun murder plot has added a new complexity to the equation. Unlike in India, federal prosecutors are usually not known to follow the government’s instructions on how to handle a case.

The US and India clearly want the issue to go away but it is not clear what assurances, if any, the Modi government has given about its promised investigation or what demands the Biden administration is making. Senator Cardin, who has flagged the case as crucial, will exit the Senate next year, having said he will not be standing for re-election in November this year.

The indicted Indian, Nikhil Gupta, is currently in Czech custody and the high court there has cleared his extradition to the United States.

(With inputs from Devirupa Mitra)

‘Tawang Clash With China Extremely Serious; 35 Indian Soldiers Injured, 7 Serious’: Col. Ajai Shukla

Colonel Shukla has clearly contradicted the statement made by Defence Minister Rajnath Singh in the Lok Sabha that there were no serious injuries.

Colonel Ajai Shukla has said that his sources have told him the clash between Indian and Chinese soldiers at Yangtse in the Tawang Sector of the eastern border on December 9 led to 35 Indian soldiers having sustained injuries, seven of whom he believes can be called ‘serious.’

Colonel Shukla is one of India’s best informed and most widely read strategic affairs experts, whose detailed information about the India-China clashes in Ladakh in 2020 proved invariably correct.

Col. Shukla said this was “extremely serious (and) definitely not just a patrol clash”.

Whilst explaining that you cannot know for sure how many soldiers were involved on the Chinese side in a clash that happened reportedly at 3 in the morning and, therefore, in the dark, Col. Shukla added when “troops in their hundreds on both sides” clash, it is serious and you cannot minimise or deny that.

In a 25-minute interview to Karan Thapar for The Wire, Col. Shukla, who is the Strategic Affairs Editor of the Business Standard, clearly contradicted the statement made by Defence Minister Rajnath Singh in the Lok Sabha that there were no serious injuries.

Col. Shukla said that his sources have told him the 7 serious injuries have been evacuated to Guwahati.

Col. Shukla told The Wire that the Yangtse area of Tawang is periodically prone to clashes and skirmishes between Indian and Chinese soldiers and this sort of thing has happened several times earlier in the recent past but he added that the incident on Friday the 9th was by far the most serious.

Col. Shukla also said the fact Indian and Chinese commanders held a flag meeting 48 hours after the clash on the 9th is a sign the two armies have responded in a far better way this time compared to the 2020 incidents in Ladakh, when meetings only occurred after several weeks.

Col. Shukla also discounted reports, on at least two television channels, of stepped up Chinese activity. He told The Wire that his sources in Arunachal Pradesh have told him there is no heightened or enhanced Chinese air force activity. He also said the scrambling of jets by the Indian air force is a routine response and we must not read too much into it.

Watch the full interview here.

Watch | Navy or IAF Officer Should’ve Been Made CDS but Lt Gen Chauhan a Good Choice: Ajai Shukla

In an interview with Karan Thapar, the journalist strongly praised Lt Gen Anil Chauhan’s knowledge of the Chinese border, particularly in the east.

In an interview to discuss and assess the appointment of Lieutenant General Anil Chauhan as the new Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), journalist Ajai Shukla said that the government should have appointed an officer from the Navy or Air Force rather than a second consecutive Army officer to the post.

Ajai Shukla, a retired Army Colonel and the strategic affairs editor of the Business Standard, said: “I would say ideally one should choose the best man rather than the senior most … but given the many dimensions of the CDS post … there are other aspects must be taken into account… Therefore, it was the time to appoint a Navy or Air Force officer as the CDS.” Shukla said it was “an error” not to appoint the new CDS from these two forces but added it’s not a “major error”.

In a 15-minute interview with Karan Thapar for The Wire, Shukla was asked about the difficulties that may arise from a retired three-star officer being senior to the four-star officers who helm the three services. When Chauhan retired 16 months ago in May 2021, he was a Lt General in command of the Eastern Command and is, therefore, junior in terms of rank to the present three serving chiefs. Shukla said this would not create a problem even though now as CDS, Lt Gen Chauhan will be the permanent chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee and, therefore, senior to the three chiefs.

The journalist also commented on two other aspects of Lt Gen Chauhan’s past. First, the fact that he was the military advisor to the National Security Council headed by Ajit Doval before his appointment as CDS and continued in that post for nine months whilst the post of CDS remained vacant. Shukla said: “I certainly think it sends out a very worrying message that being an advisor to Doval is more important than that of CDS.”

Shukla also commented on statements made by Lt Gen Chauhan who, as Army Commander Eastern Command, applauded the government for taking “hard decisions” such as the Citizenship Amendment Act and the dilution of Article 370. He said: “There is no question those statements should never have been made”. He said they show “a lack of judgement”.

However, Shukla strongly praised Lt Gen Chauhan’s knowledge of the Chinese border, particularly in the east. He made a point of speaking about “how deep his knowledge is of the border”. He added: “I have never had a discussion as enlightening and as deep on the issue of border policy as I had with Lt Gen Chauhan.”

Finally, when asked whether the appointment of Lt Gen Chauhan as CDS was a good one or whether there are a few questions that need to be answered before he can give his response, Shukla, who had begun the interview by saying this was the time to appoint a Naval or Air Force officer as CDS, now said: “It’s possibly one of the better choices that could have been made.”

In the interview, Shukla also discusses if Lt General Chauhan can further jointness between the three services, which is his main responsibility as CDS. Please see the full interview for complete details

Watch | ‘Modi Govt Hasn’t Told Us Full Truth About Disengagement With China’: Ajai Shukla

Shukla says that all four disengagements since April 2020 – Galwan, Pangong Lake, Gogra and Hot Springs – have been disadvantageous to India.

Colonel Ajai Shukla, the editor of strategic affairs of the Business Standard and one of the most informed senior journalists when it comes to the disengagement between the Indian and Chinese armies along the Ladakh border, has said that the Modi government has not given the Indian people the full truth on the matter and has consequently mislead them.

Shukla says that all four disengagements since April 2020 – Galwan, Pangong Lake, Gogra and Hot Springs – have been disadvantageous to India. He specifically says that in all four areas the buffer zones that have come into existence are entirely on territory both claimed and previously patrolled by India but now, as a result, India is denied the right to patrol up to where it previously could.

Shukla says in China’s case the buffer zones are not on territory claimed and previously patrolled by China and, therefore, China can continue to patrol up to the point where it previously did.

In a 30-minute interview to Karan Thapar for The Wire, Shukla said that he “absolutely concurs” with recent reports that the disengagement at Hot Springs has been disadvantageous to India. Speaking specifically about the buffer zone created at Hot Springs, he said: “They are all on Indian territory. Chinese soldiers can come in to a greater extent than before. With Indian soldiers it’s the other way round. Areas that were accessible before are no longer accessible.”

In the interview to The Wire, Shukla also spoke at length about the earlier disengagements at Galwan, Pangong Lake and Gogra. He said the same story is true of these three disengagements. Buffer zones have come up in such a way that India can no longer patrol on territory that it believes is Indian and where previously it could patrol.

Shukla gave details of the extent to which India has lost the right to patrol because of the buffer zones that have been created. In Galwan, its between 1 and 1.5 km, in Gogra, where the Chinese ingressed 4 km into Indian territory they have gone back 2 km and the other 2 km have become a buffer zone. This buffer zone, he added, is therefore, entirely on Indian claimed territory. At Pangong Lake he said India could previously patrol between Fingers 3 and 8 but can no longer do so. China, on the other hand, can and still does patrol up to where it did previously.

Also read: India-China Disengagement at Patrolling Point 15 ‘One Problem Less’ on Border: Jaishankar

Shukla also spoke about Depsang and Demchok and said that at Depsang India had lost the right to patrol in approximately 15 km of its claimed territory. At Demchok he said it was around 5 km.

Shukla also discusses the “extremely damaging” implications of the Prime Minister’s statement of June 2020 when Modi said, as reported by PTI, that there are no Chinese on Indian territory and never have been. Shukla says this is precisely what the Chinese claim and the Prime Minister’s statement endorses their position. In other words, he says, the Chinese must be extremely pleased because the Prime Minister has seemingly let them off the hook.

Finally, Shukla addresses the likelihood of disengagement at Demchok and Depsang as well as the question will the Chinese agree to restoring the status quo of April 2020. As of now, the Chinese government has clearly indicated that it will not agree to either. It considers Demchok and Depsang legacy issues that predate the 2020 standoff. As regards the status quo of April 2020 it has said this “was created by India’s illegal crossing of the LAC.”

Watch the full interview here. To support The Interview with Karan Thapar, click here.

Chinese Intrusions and the National Security Fallout of BJP’s Quest for Domestic Political Dominance

To establish complete control over India’s polity and the information that reaches Indian voters, the ruling BJP has over the past few years moved to capture every institution of India.

On September 30, 2021, reports surfaced showing that over 100 soldiers of China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) had crossed across the Line of Actual Control (LAC) into the Barahoti sector of Uttarakhand in August. The PLA soldiers damaged some infrastructure on the Indian side, including a bridge, and then retreated back. In June 2020, 20 Indian soldiers were killed in clashes with Chinese troops in Ladakh’s Galwan Valley. This incident marked the first instance of lethal conflict between India and China in over 45 years. Earlier, in mid 2017, a standoff took place between Indian and Chinese troops as India intervened to stop the expansion of a road into the Doklam region of Bhutan.

While the crossing of PLA troops into Uttarakhand this year hasn’t been acknowledged by India yet, the government’s reaction to the other two instances of conflict demonstrates how little strategic attention it is paying to understand China’s motivations and the future course these conflicts would take. The first public reporting of Chinese intrusions in Ladakh was by the journalist Ajai Shukla on May 23, 2020, where he claimed that China violated its own claim line. His report stated that “There is little clarity within the government about why the Chinese have triggered this intrusion, along with another simultaneously in Sikkim,” which indicates total surprise on the part of the government in even anticipating intent.

The government immediately denied the reports, but India’s defence minister, Rajnath Singh, spoke to his US counterpart, defence secretary Mark Esper, on May 30, 2020 about these intrusions and confirmed it on June 3, 2020. What came afterwards makes the matter more worrying for India’s national security than past disputes. Prime Minister Narendra Modi came on national television on June 19, 2020 and categorically stated that ‘No one entered Indian territory, no border posts were occupied’, two days after 20 Indian soldiers had lost their lives.

The prime minister’s statement was interpreted by the Chinese side as implying that the Indian soldiers had died on Chinese territory, thus handing a PR victory to China. As Ajai Shukla pointed out later, all official acknowledgements that the Chinese had indeed transgressed into Indian territory disappeared from the website of the Ministry of Defence after the prime minister’s statement.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi at an all-party meeting to discuss the India-China standoff in Ladakh in 2020. Photo: PTI

While the events leading up to the border skirmishes raise several important questions about India’s intelligence and military operations, the stance taken by India’s political leadership and the lack of demand for fixing responsibility from citizens is important to understand. The explanation for this isn’t found in any changes in India’s foreign policy or strategic thinking, it is instead found in the transformations that have taken place within India’s domestic political setup.

As a chapter of our book The Art of Conjuring Alternate Realities (HarperCollins, 2021) outlines, in a quest to establish complete control over India’s polity and the information that reaches Indian voters, the ruling BJP has over the past few years moved to capture every institution of India. From the media, bureaucracy, investigative bodies, intelligence organisations to statistical bodies, the BJP successfully established control that allows it to set and sustain its own narratives regardless of factual accuracy.

Since the primary focus of India’s political dispensation is in maintaining these internal narratives, it focused on showcasing victories against China during the Doklam conflict even when evidence exists that Chinese construction activity in the region did not stop after the conflict. When the PM proclaimed that Chinese troops never entered India, he was attempting to maintain his strongman image for a domestic audience, even when it weakened India’s strategic position.

The repurposing of institutions has also ensured that they are headed by ‘yes men’ who, in order to protect their own career interests, would not bring conflicting viewpoints to the leadership. Though this has ensured the BJP’s supremacy in domestic politics, illustrated by the fact that the citizenry is not demanding any governmental accountability on issues, it inevitably deprives decision makers of multiple perspectives because diversity in perspective is often interpreted as dissent and crushed.

Revelations such as the use of Pegasus spyware being deployed against journalists, activists and political opponents also showcases how India’s intelligence agencies have been repurposed to focus on domestic surveillance for political purposes – something that would inevitably lead to a detraction of focus from the actual work of intelligence gathering for the maintenance of national security.

Also Read: Modi’s Attempted Image Makeover After COVID Debacle Has Morphed into Worrying Sycophancy

Viewed from these perspectives, it is clear why India failed to anticipate China’s moves across the LAC and doesn’t even acknowledge the issue. The total and complete hegemony of the ruling party in setting the narrative, and the ensuing institutional capture, has obliterated critical thinking at a structural level within the highest levels of decision making in government, while the political need for doing so has also evaporated. The capability to defend a country against external aggression is not permanent; it is based on the bureaucracy selected to serve for this purpose working consistently, and when those selection decisions become political, it inevitably weakens the systems designed for the nation’s protection.

Through India’s handling of the Doklam conflict and the border skirmishes in Ladakh and Uttarakhand, it has become increasingly clear that the Modi government’s priority is the maintenance of domestic narratives and political power. This has created significant and lasting vulnerabilities in India’s national security, a fact that if not addressed will inevitably be exploited to India’s detriment.

Shivam Shankar Singh and Anand Venkatanarayanan are authors of The Art of Conjuring Alternate Realities (HarperCollins, 2021), from which the arguments in this piece have been adapted.

Watch | ‘Indian-Chinese Troops Clashed in May, Casualties Possible’: Col. Ajai Shukla

Colonel Ajai Shukla has made serious claims which, if true, suggest there had been an increase in tension between the Indian and Chinese armies in eastern Ladakh leading up to the clashes in May.

In an interview where he strenuously and repeatedly defends revelations made in an article he wrote for today’s Business Standard the paper’s Strategic Affairs Editor Colonel Ajai Shukla, has revealed further details of an alleged clash between Indian and Chinese troops at Galwan in eastern Ladakh.

Col. Shukla said it happened on May 2, a date which was not mentioned in his Business Standard article. He says, theoretically, there could have been casualties on both sides.

“We simply don’t know about the Chinese, because they do not reveal the truth. Of possible Indian casualties,” he says, “it would be hard to hide serious injuries but smaller ones can be withheld from the public.”

In a 25-minute interview to Karan Thapar for The Wire, Col. Ajai Shukla said he has got his information from reliable and credible sources. As he put it: “I make sure they are credible and authentic”.

He added: “I cross-verify with at least one more source”. That means he has two sources for every revelation he has made. Some are from the Ministry of Defence and also the military.

Col. Shukla has made four very serious claims which, if true, first suggest there has been an increase in tension between the Indian and Chinese armies in eastern Ladakh, culminating in the Galwan clash of May 2.

Second, they suggest a deployment of S-400 missiles by the Chinese which has eroded India’s superiority in air power. And third, a reneging by the Chinese on the disengagement agreement of February 2021 in the Pangong Lake area.

First, Col. Shukla says there has been “at least one clash between the two sides…on the Galwan River, close to where 20 Indian soldiers were killed on June 15 last year”. He said this happened “when PLA soldiers set up a tent at the bend of the Galwan River near PP-14. India demanded it be removed as it was in the buffer area that both sides had agreed to.” He says the date of this clash was May 2.

Col. Shukla says there could have been casualties on both sides. He adds that serious casualties on the Indian side cannot be hidden but lesser ones may not have been revealed.

Also read: Indian and PLA Troops Clash Again in Galwan: Report; Army Denies Claim

Second, Col. Shukla says, “The PLA has apparently flouted the February 2021 demilitarisation agreement, which had envisioned a mutual withdrawal of troops in the Pangong Sector”. And he specifically adds that “on the south bank of Pangong Lake, Chinese troops have reportedly reoccupied the positions on the Kailash Range, such as Black Top and Helmet, which they had vacated.”

Asked if he was absolutely sure of his claim the Chinese have reoccupied Black Top and Helmet, he said “My sources are absolutely sure of it”. He said his sources have given him specific details. They told him the Chinese found it easy to breach the demilitarisation agreement because the infrastructure they have set up over the years gives them a clear advantage over India.

Third, Col. Shukla said, “The PLA has deployed at least one and probably two regiments of S-400 air defence missiles, which would drastically erode India’s superiority in air power.” Again, asked if he was sure of this he said his sources had told him they were absolutely sure one regiment has been deployed and a second, they said, was in the offing and may well have been deployed by now.

Finally, Col. Shukla said as a result of adverse developments tension in eastern Ladakh has been increasing since early April. He said: “In the first week of April 2021…Chinese drones began entering Indian air space in large numbers.” He added: “In mid-May…the PLA began reoccupying many of the positions that have been vacated.”

Col. Shukla said the April and May developments were told to him by sources in the Ministry of Defence. Details of the S-400 deployment were revealed by military sources.

Indian and Chinese troops and tanks disengage from the banks of Pangong lake area in Eastern Ladakh where they had been deployed opposite each other for almost ten months now. Photo: PTI/Indian Army handout

Army’s response

Now, in a strong rebuttal, the Army has said in a statement it has issued: “The article is riddled with inaccuracies and misinformation”. Col. Shukla responded to this by saying the statement does not mention a single inaccuracy. It simply asserts there are inaccuracies without giving even one example.

The Army’s statement also says the claim that agreements with the Chinese have collapsed is “false and baseless”. Col. Shukla says the Army statement does not mention, leave aside deny, his report that one or may be two regiments of S-400 air defence missiles have been deployed by the Chinese in eastern Ladakh.

The Army statement says: “There’s been no attempt by either side to occupy the areas from where the disengagement has been undertaken”. It also says specifically: “There have been no clashes in Galwan or any other area.”

To this Col. Shukla says even last year, when the Chinese were at various points encroaching on Indian territory in eastern Ladakh, the initial response from the army and the Ministry of Defence was silence and denial. He says it was only after he broke the story that hesitant confirmation started to emerge. Col. Shukla says the same pattern is being repeated this year.

Finally, the Army statement says: “The intention of the reporter is mala fide and not based on any truth”.

Col. Shukla brushed this aside and added: “I don’t take the army’s rebuttal seriously.” In a more jocular vein he added, “I am surprised the army knows so much about my intentions.”

Finally, Col. Shukla said it’s very unlikely that Foreign Minister Jaishankar and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi will discuss these developments at a meeting they may have today in Dushanbe because the official Indian position is that nothing has happened and, therefore, there cannot be anything to discuss.

Watch the full interview here.

Indian and PLA Troops Clash Again in Galwan: Report; Army Denies Claim

According to a Business Standard report, the Chinese have reoccupied several positions which they had vacated as part of the disengagement plan.

New Delhi: China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has once again crossed the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Eastern Ladakh, a report in Business Standard said, adding that there was “at least one clash” between the two armies.

Defence analyst Ajai Shukla said that the clash took place near the Galwan river, close to where 20 Indian soldiers were killed in a violent clash in June last year. He said it was unclear if there had been any casualties in the new clash.

In an interview to Karan Thapar for The Wire, Shukla revealed that the clash happened on May 2 and that theoretically, there could have been casualties on both sides.

The Indian Army has denied the claims made in the Business Standard report, saying, “Ever since the disengagement agreement in February this year, there has been no attempt by either side to occupy the areas from where the disengagement had been undertaken. There have been no clashes in Galwan or any other area, as reported in the article.”

The Army also said that the report’s claim that agreements with China have collapsed is “false and baseless”.

“Both sides have continued with negotiations to resolve the balance issues, and regular patrolling in respective areas continues. The situation on ground continues to be as hithertofore. PLA activities, including turnover of troops continue to be monitored by the Indian Army,” the statement said.

The BS report said that the PLA had reoccupied many places on the South Bank of Pangong Tso, like those in the Kailash Range, which they had previously vacated as per the disengagement agreement.

The Army’s denial comes as external affairs minister S. Jaishankar and his Chinese counterpart Wang Yi are scheduled to meet in Dushanbe on Wednesday.

The Business Standard report said that the confrontation between the two armies took place when PLA soldiers set up a tent at the bend into the Galwan river, near patrolling point 14, which India demanded to be removed as it was in the buffer area.

The report said that during the winter, though the PLA had withdrawn from many of the positions it had occupied on the Indian side of the LAC in summer 2020, “the freeze of winter gave way to renewed confrontation in April 2021”. It was then that Chinese drones began entering Indian airspace in large numbers, the report said.

“In May-June, Indian patrols in Demchok and Chumar, in southern Ladakh, reported an increased presence of PLA [Chinese People’s Liberation Army] men in civilian clothes,” Shukla’s report says. “In mid-May, without Indian provocation, the PLA began re-occupying many of the positions that had been vacated, boosting tensions and triggering counter deployments by the Indian Army.”

The story says that the PLA may have deployed two regiments of the Russian S-400 air defence missiles, which could erode India’s superiority in air power. The defence system has the capability to shoot down Indian aircraft up to 400 km away.

Other reports have also suggested that the PLA was strengthening near the LAC, though none of them mentioned a clash. An India Today report said that satellite imagery shows that China’s winter deployment positions have been “reinforced with permanent structures, accommodations and military buildings in a long arc through the Aksai Chin bulge”.

The Business Standard report says that New Delhi assesses that Depsang is the central Chinese objective, as it provides Indian soldiers with a route to China’s road G-219, which connects Tibet with Xinjiang.

“It also provides the PLA and the Pakistan Army with complementary thrust lines on which they can simultaneously advance and link up. This would cut off India’s northern tip, including the Karakoram Pass, DBO [Daulat Beg Oldie] and the Siachen Glacier Sector,” the BS report says.

Shukla stands by his story

In the interview to Karan Thapar, Shukla stood by his reportage, saying his sources are “absolutely sure” that the Chinese have reoccupied Black Top and Helmet on the Kailash Range and that his sources have given him specific details.

To the Army’s statement that the article is “riddled with inaccuracies and misinformation”, Shukla said the statement simply asserts there are inaccuracies but does not give even one example.

On the Army denial that there have not been any attempts by either side to occupy the areas from where the disengagement has been undertaken, Shukla says even last year, when the Chinese were at various points encroaching on Indian territory in eastern Ladakh, “the initial response from the army and the Ministry of Defence was silence and denial”.

He told Karan Thapar that only after he broke the story that “hesitant confirmation started to emerge” and that the same pattern is being repeated this year.

Note: This article was updated to include details of Ajai Shukla’s interview to Karan Thapar for The Wire.

Watch | ‘India Has Moved 4 Divisions from Pak to Ladakh Border, Creating Vulnerability’

Colonel Ajai Shukla analyses for Karan Thapar the possible outcome of such a decision if Pakistan is aggressive.

India has moved four divisions from the Pakistan border to the Ladakh border with China and if Pakistan is aggressive this will have left India more vulnerable compared to last year. So says Ajai Shukla, one of India’s leading Strategic Affairs observers and Strategic Affairs Editor of the Business Standard.

Prior to the India-China stand-off in Ladakh India had 12 divisions facing China on the Ladakh front and 25 facing Pakistan on the west. This ratio has now changed. Today there are 16 divisions positioned on the Ladakh front compared to 21 on the western front, Shukla told Karan Thapar for The Wire in an interview.

Bloomberg has reported that “all in all” India now has a total of roughly 200,000 troops on the Ladakh front, which the agency says is “an increase of over 40% from last year”.

In his comprehensive 43-minute interview, Col. Ajai Shukla spoke about nine tactical and strategic adverse outcomes from India’s point of view of the 15-month old India-China stand-off in Ladakh. He said “the two-front threat that strategists have long regarded as the worst-case military scenario for India is now a reality”. He also identified two further implications for the Indian Army.

First, the army has had to “pivot to the north, shifting its traditional emphasis from the Pakistan border to that with China”. For instance, in December 2020 the operational role of the mechanised 1 Corps was switched from the plains bordering Pakistan to the mountains bordering China. Also, he adds, “Northern command has deployed at least two mountain divisions to block the PLA’s incursions in Ladakh”. He says “another division has switched roles from Pakistan to a new deployment against China on the Himachal and Uttarakhand borders”.

The second implication for the army of the two-front threat is that “this has left the army unbalanced – stretched to the limit with no further reserves at hand.”

Unlike in 1965, 1971 and the Kargil War of 1999, when New Delhi could take military action against Pakistan without worrying about China interceding, that’s no longer the case. “Now India would have to factor-in the likelihood of China’s intervention on behalf of Pakistan” he said and This had clearly limited India’s options and its capacity to handle Pakistan militarily.

The new situation on the Ladakh front also has serious implications for India’s defence budget. It would have to be seriously stepped-up and this could result in cutbacks to the country’s maritime ambitions in the Indo-Pacific, which may not be funded so well hereafter, as well as affect the need for greater health spending in the wake of COVID-19. The Indian defence budget was already been under pressure for several years. As a share of GDP it has shrunk from 2.3% to 2.1%.

In the interview, Col. Shukla identified serious damage to the image of the army as an independent, non-political institution, looked up to by all Indians, as one of nine adverse consequences facing India as a result of the 15-month old India-China stand-off in Ladakh.

The chances of further disengagement in Depsang, Hot Sprints, Gogra and Galwan are “a non-starter”, he also said.

Watch the full interview here.

Watch | China Not Keen on Further Disengagement, Withdrawal at Depsang Looks Unlikely: Ajai Shukla

He said at Saturday’s meeting there was “recitation from both sides of their positions but nothing new. No real discussion on disengagement”.

A top strategic affairs analyst, widely considered the best informed in India on military matters, has said that at Saturday’s 10th round of commander-level talks between India and China, China was dragging its feet which clearly suggested it was not keen on further disengagement.

Colonel Ajai Shukla, the strategic affairs editor of the Business Standard, said: “The feeling I get, and it’s based on people I have talked to who are close to or involved in the talks, is that the Chinese are not keen on further disengagement. They are dragging their feet. They claim Hot Springs and Gogra as their own territory. They are not even willing to talk about Depsang”.

He said at Saturday’s meeting there was “recitation from both sides of their positions but nothing new. No real discussion on disengagement”.

Debate: India Cannot Emulate Anwar Sadat’s Yom Kippur War Model

We must not to give the US an opportunity to manipulate the Indian security establishment’s penchant for surgical solutions to achieve Washington’s strategic goals vis-a-vis China.

Limited wars are more than a bilateral duel.

Short wars in the peripheries are linked to the global political economy. Many scholars of strategy, especially in small and medium countries, tend to ignore the global context in which limited wars in the peripheries are fought. These wars have a larger political purpose, which is determined by the power at the centre of global affairs. Limited understanding of limited wars leads to flawed strategic conclusions.

Based on flawed conclusions drawn from the 1973 Yom Kippur war, a reputed defence journalist in his recent article in the Business Standard has nonchalantly compared the current trajectory in India-China relations to that of Arab-Israel ties in the late 1960s.

He argues that Israel came to the table because it was made to taste the combined military power of the Arabs. He further suggests that India must emulate Egyptian actions in the Yom Kippur war, disregard the existing power asymmetry with China and initiate a surgical strike against it, even if the prospects of defeat are high.

Unlike the Egypt-Israel relations in the early 1970s, the current India-China equation is not beyond redemption. Employing “forward policy” or surgical strikes to solve the cartographic dispute is as undesirable as it was in 1962.

Army trucks move towards Ladakh amid LAC border tension, at Manali-Leh highway in Kullu, Friday, July 31, 2020. Photo: PTI

India doesn’t need a war to bring Beijing to the table. The India-China diplomatic channels are wide open. Recently the defence ministers of the two countries met in Moscow to discuss the ongoing border issue.

Also read: India Is Headed For a War With China No One Wants, Here’s What It Should Do to Prevent It

It is a mistake to imagine that Yom Kippur was the brainchild of Anwar el-Sadat and was carried out in absolute secrecy. There were enough intelligence reports of action by Egypt-Syrian forces but both US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and as well Prime Minister Golda Meir ignored them and decided to play a defensive game.

Israel lost one-fifth of its airforce, yet it emerged victorious. It defeated the Arabs for one more time and increased its territorial holdings in the Golan Heights.

Egypt was mollycoddled and Syria was badly defeated. The latter felt cheated because of the unexpected Egyptian-Israeli ceasefire and the peace accord which followed. More importantly, war splintered the Arab unity and provided a greater sense of security to the Zionist regime.

The war helped Anwar el-Sadat consolidate his political position. After all, the rise of Sadat was a by-product of the Six Day War of 1967, which was as disastrous for Gamal Abdel Nasser as the India-China war of 1962 was for Jawaharlal Nehru. Naseer died in 1970 and Anwar Sadat took-over the reins of Egypt.

Like Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Sadat was also the darling of the United States. He undertook the de-Naseerisation and de-Sovietisation of Egyptian politics and polity. One more benefit that accrued to Egypt was the reopening of the Suez Canal and the associated revenue stream that had been closed for eight-long-years.

The US too extracted its pound of flesh from the war. In the post war scenario, Kissinger’s “shuttle diplomacy” won him plaudits and he was hailed by the Arabs as a “superman” and “mediator of peace”. He used both the war and peace to “rebuild America’s strategic position in a critical part of the world, gently elbowing Russia out of her prewar pre‐eminence in the middle east region”.

The peace plan was also necessitated by the fact that in the 1970s there was an oil crisis in the world and Suez Canal, the main maritime thoroughfare connecting the Mediterranean and the Red seas, was closed.

Also read: When it Comes to China, India Needs to Up its Deterrence Game

It was imperative to open it to prevent the global economic crisis from escalating. On June 5, 1967, at the beginning of the Six Day War, Egypt closed the Suez canal, which reopened on June 5, 1975. The disruption of a shipping chokepoint led to a sudden surge in shipping rates, insurance premiums and operating costs rates as oil tankers from Asia to Europe had to take a longer route around the Cape of Good Hope.

However, the supertanker business, boomed in the wake of Suez crisis. There was a sudden upswing in the demand for 200,000 tons and more ships that could not use the Suez Canal but were suitable to ply on the longer route around the African coast.

The supertanker growth was reflected in the Forbes first list of richest Americans published in 1982, the top spot was occupied by Daniel Keith Ludwig, a shipping magnate and the producer of supertankers.

The above narrative informs us that, like the majority of limited wars, the Yom Kippur war too was not an isolated event. It was very much a part of the larger Cold War politics and also dictated by the needs redefining of the postwar economic and financial order by the United States in the 1970s.

‘You can never, in American public life, underestimate the advantages of complete and total incomprehensibility.’ Kissinger meets Anwar Sadat in 1976. Credit: Wikipedia

Kissinger meets Anwar Sadat in 1976. \Photo: Wikipedia

Currently, when the US is employing a strategy of pressuring China from all quarters, should Modi act like Sadat and become a part of the American grand strategy in the region? Sadat still had the opening of the Suez Canal to gain, India would gain nothing by occupying a few kilometres of land where not even a “single blade of grass grows”.

The current India-China conundrum has to be solved peacefully and diplomatically. Some surgical strikes against China using the “Two-Two” Tibetan fighters may appease America, and allow our political leadership to indulge in some chest-thumping in the midst of chronic economic crisis. But, in the long run, such a policy will be counter-productive. We will only end up spending more on armament without gaining an inch.

Also read: A Few Questions on China That Narendra Modi Cannot Evade

War with China will increase our economic vulnerabilities and make us more dependent on the US both for arms and economic well-being. Let us not forget that one of the outcomes of the 1962 war was the 1966 financial crisis, which eventually led to the devaluation of rupee on June 6, 1966, on the advice and assurances of a loan by the World Bank.

The lesson that India needs to learn from the Six-Day war of 1967 and the 1973 Yom Kippur War is not to give the US an opportunity to manipulate the Indian security establishment’s penchant for surgical solutions to achieve Washington’s strategic goals vis-a-vis China.

Atul Bhardwaj is a former naval officer and currently an honorary research fellow at the Department of International Politics, City, University of London.