air strike on Iran

US Launches Airstrikes Against Iran-Backed Militia in Iraq

Secretary of Defense Mark Esper has said that President Trump had given him the “authority to do what we need to do consistent with his guidance if that becomes the case.”

The US on Thursday launched airstrikes in Iraq on five weapons storage facilities connected to the Iran-backed Shia militia Kataib Hezbollah. The group is believed to be responsible for the attacks on the Taji military base in Iraq a day earlier, the Pentagon said.

“The United States conducted defensive precision strikes against Kataib Hezbollah facilities across Iraq,” the Pentagon said in a statement. “These weapons storage facilities include facilities that housed weapons used to target the US and coalition troops.”

Three personnel from the US-led coalition in the country were killed in the rocket attacks on Wednesday.

According to an Iraqi military statement, the strikes hit four different locations of the country’s paramilitary forces, police and army around 1:15 am local time.

Also read: Three to Tango: With the US Looming Large, India-Iran Ties Over the Years

The areas hit included Jurf al-Sakher, Al-Musayib, Najaf and Alexandria, where the paramilitary Popular Mobilization Units, as well as emergency regiments and commandos of the Iraqi army, are stationed.

An airstrike also hit an airport that was under construction in Karbala, an airport official told Reuters.

Earlier on Thursday, Secretary of Defense Mark Esper said that President Donald Trump had given him the “authority to do what we need to do consistent with his guidance if that becomes the case.”

“The United States will not tolerate attacks against our people, our interests, or our allies,” Esper said. “As we have demonstrated in recent months, we will take any action necessary to protect our forces in Iraq and the region.”

The article first appeared on DW. Read the original here.

‘If We Have a Trump Deal, How Long Will It Last’: Iran’s Foreign Minister

At the Raisina Dialogue 2020 in New Delhi, Iran’s foreign minister Javad Zarif said his country was interested in diplomacy but not in negotiating with the US.

New Delhi: Iran’s foreign minister Javad Zarif on Wednesday said his country was interested in diplomacy but not in negotiating with the US, remarks that come amidst spiralling tensions between the two countries over the killing of Iranian general Qasem Soleimani.

Hitting out at the US, Zarif said Soleimani’s killing showed ignorance and arrogance.

Addressing the gathering at the Raisina Dialogue, he said 430 Indian cities saw protests against Soleimani’s killing.

“Iran is interested in diplomacy. We are not interested in negotiating with the US. US did not keep its commitments under the nuclear deal. We had a US deal and US broke it. If we have a Trump deal, how long will it last?” Zarif said.

“We need to create hope in the region. We have to get rid of despair,” he said.

Iran incurred hundreds of billions of dollars in damages because of current tensions, Zarif said.

He said Soleimani was the single biggest threat to ISIS and his killing was now being celebrated by the terror group and US President Donald Trump.

Also read: US Lawmakers Back Limits to Trump’s War Powers After Soleimani Killing

Referring to the Ukrainian jetliner that crashed earlier this week killing all 176 aboard, Zarif said shooting down of the civilian plane was a mistake.

Iran’s Revolutionary Guard has acknowledged that it accidentally shot down the Ukrainian aircraft.

Zarif’s remarks come amidst the global focus being on Iran and the US over the confrontation between them following Soleimani”s killing.

Maj Gen Soleimani, the head of Iran’s elite al-Quds force, was killed when a US drone fired missiles on his convoy in Iraq on January 3.

Also read: Informants in Iraq, Syria Helped US Kill Qassem Soleimani

Last week, Iran launched over a dozen ballistic missiles targeting at least two bases where US military and coalition forces are stationed in Iraq.

Soleimani’s killing has been the most dramatic escalation yet in spiralling tensions between Iran and the US.

Iran Crisis: India-US Defence Pacts May Limit Ability to Say ‘No’ to Military Assistance

With a carrier battle group led by the INS Vikramaditya deployed to the North Arabian Sea already – possibly for evacuating Indian nationals – the military calculus that might emerge could put New Delhi between a rock and a hard place.

New Delhi: India has been deftly playing all sides since the January 4 killing of Iranian general Qassem Soleimani, but a series of defence pacts could severely limit its ability to say a firm “no” should the US request Indian military assistance if hostilities in the Gulf escalate.

These pacts have been negotiated and/or signed through successive regimes in both the US and India from the time that A.B. Vajpayee was prime minister, through the Manmohan Singh tenures and now the Narendra Modi administration.

The Indian Navy on January 10 deployed its carrier battle group led by the INS Vikramaditya to the North Arabian Sea near the eastern mouth of the Persian Gulf, alongside which Deputy Chief of Naval Staff (operations), Vice Admiral M.S. Pawar has been embarked. The unscheduled deployment marks a new level of seriousness on events in the Gulf.

On the morning of January 11, India’s indigenous Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) prototype carried out the first test of landing and taking off from the Vikramaditya even as the carrier is in operations.

Prototype of the naval LCA on the deck of the INS Vikramaditya aircraft carrier today. Source: DRDO

The deployment may be benign because the flat-deck (carrier) can accommodate more people than other ships/aircraft for evacuation of its nationals – estimated at some 8 million. Even in 1991, India had to execute the largest airlift of its citizens from West Asia.

The economic cost for India would also be huge if it has to stop importing oil from Iran. But it is the military calculus that might emerge that will put New Delhi between a rock and a hard place.

This week, US Defence Secretary Mark Esper telephoned Indian defence minister Rajnath Singh. It followed conversations between US President Donald Trump and Prime Minister Modi and talks between the two foreign ministers.

Also read: Iran Will Welcome Any Indian Initiative to De-Escalate Tension With US: Envoy

“Secretary Esper briefed defence minister about the recent developments in the Gulf Region. The defence minister shared India’s stakes, interests and concerns,” a statement from the defence ministry said.

Among the India-US defence pacts – some of which are described as “foundational agreements” – are, first, the General Security of Military Information Agreement (G-SOMIA), followed by the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA), Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA), and, as recently as last month, an Industrial Security Annex (ISA) between the Pentagon and the India defence establishment.

While India’s stated interest in signing these pacts has been that they would facilitate defence technology infusion for its domestic industry, it is the LEMOA that specifically allows the US to use Indian military facilities. The rider is that the decisions would be taken on a “case-by-case basis”.

Also read: ‘Risking an All-Out War’: How US Papers Responded to the Killing of Iran’s Soleimani

The use of Indian facilities, if permitted, would not be unprecedented. In August 1990, the Chandra Shekhar government permitted US military aircraft flying from the Philippines to refuel at Bombay, Chennai and Agra. But it led to a furore with even the largest partner in the then coalition government – the Congress(I) led by Rajiv Gandhi – threatening to pull out and the Left objecting to the move. The refuelling continued for about six months before the Indian government withdrew the permission to avoid being seen as part of the US-led Gulf War (Operation Desert Shield) against Iraq after Saddam Hussein’s forces had invaded Kuwait.

Beyond that, India in 2001 offered use of its facilities to US-led forces for the war in Afghanistan after 9/11 and the attack on India’s parliament. But the US was heavily reliant on Pakistan mainly because India does not share a border with Afghanistan (except a sliver of land along the Wakhan Tract that is in PoK, territory that New Delhi does not control but claims).

Kataib Hezbollah Iraqi militia hold the picture of the Iranian Major-General Qassem Soleimani, as they gather ahead of the funeral of the Iraqi militia commander Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, who was killed in an air strike at Baghdad airportJanuary 4, 2020. Photo: Reuters/Thaier al-Sudani

In 2003 again, the US asked India to be part of the coalition forces that invaded Iraq but India’s Parliament condemned the invasion. Then prime minister Vajpayee had apparently told opposition CPI leader A.B. Bardhan “thoda ooncha boliye” (speak a little louder please) so that the US would register the protest.

India has never deployed troops abroad since its own experience with the Indian Peacekeeping Force (IPKF) in Sri Lanka that met with tragic consequences in 1987. Indian troops have been deployed only in UN-mandated “blue helmet” operations or for military exercises under a UN charter.

Also read: US-Iran Tension: Jaishankar Speaks to Iran Foreign Minister, US Secretary of State

In the last two decades, however, India is involved with an increasing and the largest number of joint drills with US forces, all of which have had “interoperability” as the objective. These have involved the armies, navies, air forces and marines of both countries.

These military interactions with the US have increased and intensified even as India’s military interactions with Iran have decreased. Till a few years back, India would even service or help repair Iranian submarines. Their navies enjoyed a certain compatibility because both operate Soviet/Russian-origin boats.

Despite years of sanctions, however, Iran demonstrated that it can still target bases in Iraq that house American troops more or less accurately. Even if the Iranian missiles that struck the bases in Al-Assad and in Erbil in retaliation for Soleimani’s “killing” (or “assassination”) are said to have not resulted in casualties, the fact that they could penetrate defences in the way they did would make both US and its coalition forces nervy.

This would, if hostilities escalate, make stand-off attacks on Iranian targets possibly the first choice for the US with aircraft and/or missiles. That would increase US requests for use of military facilities outside West Asia.

The US has facilities across West Asia but they would need to stay out of the range of Iranian missiles because a ground war with an enraged Iran would further complicate the quagmire. So deep is Iranian hatred for the US that students in Tehran University still walk into campus by treading on the US flag.

Sujan Dutta covered the Kargil War for the Telegraph.

Trump Administration Hits Iran With New Economic Sanctions After Missile Strike

“It’s already been done. We’ve increased them. They were very severe, but now it’s increased substantially,” Trump told reporters at the White House. “I just approved it a little while ago with treasury.”

Washington: US President Donald Trump said on Thursday the United States has increased sanctions on Iran after a missile strike this week on Iraqi bases housing American military personnel, but gave no other details.

Also read: ‘Risking an All-Out War’: How US Papers Responded to the Killing of Iran’s Soleimani

Trump did not elaborate on the new sanctions and said the Treasury Department would make a statement.

The US president on Wednesday promised to “impose additional punishing economic sanctions on the Iranian regime” after Iran launched missile strikes on the bases in Iraq.

There were no casualties in Tuesday night’s attacks, which were carried out in retaliation for a US drone strike last week that killed senior Iranian leader Qassem Soleimani.

US Lawmakers Back Limits to Trump’s War Powers After Soleimani Killing

President Trump’s decision to kill a senior Iranian general “endangered Americans,” said House Speaker Nancy Pelosi.

The US House of Representatives on Thursday voted in favour of a resolution to curb President Donald Trump’s ability to wage war against Iran.

The vote was mostly split along party lines, with 224 in favour and 194 against in the Democrat-controlled legislature.

“Last week, in our view, the president — the administration — conducted a provocative, disproportionate attack against Iran, which endangered Americans,” House Speaker Nancy Pelosi told reporters.

The resolution was put forward in response to Trump’s unilateral decision to assassinate Iran’s Quds Force leader Qassem Soleimani, considered one of the Islamic Republic’s most important battlefield commanders.

Also read: Informants in Iraq, Syria Helped US Kill Qassem Soleimani

Preventing ‘another forever war’

Although the majority of Republicans in the lower house voted against the resolution, three backed it, including Matt Gaetz of Florida, who is considered one of Trump’s most ardent supporters in Congress.

“Engaging in another forever war in the Middle East would be the wrong decision,” Gaetz said. “If the members of our armed services have the courage to go and fight and die in these wars, as Congress we ought to have the courage to vote for them or against them.”

The resolution will now head to the Senate, where Republicans command a three-seat majority. But two Republican senators have already expressed their support for the resolution.

“To come in and tell us that we can’t debate and discuss the appropriateness of military intervention against Iran? It’s un-American, it’s unconstitutional and it’s wrong,” said Republican Senator Mike Lee of Utah.

Why There is No Exit Strategy for Iran-US Tensions

The more the US puts pressure on Iran, the more the strategies pursued by Tehran become riskier – simply because Iranian authorities are desperate and they feel that they have nothing to lose.

The attack on the Saudi crude-processing installation last week is also being considered as an assault on American credibility in the Middle East. But the instigators of this attack (either Iranians, Houthis or a third country) are quite aware of the Carter Doctrine formulated on January 23, 1980, after the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet troops. According to this doctrine: “An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.”

The doctrine was explicitly aimed at Soviet designs on the Persian Gulf. However, the doctrine clearly defined the Persian Gulf as a vital US national interest related to the normal functioning of the global economy. If the Carter Doctrine still holds today, the US along with its NATO allies needs to ensure its Arab allies in the region that it will be able to guarantee the stability of the region to protect the world economy.

However, this is a tricky task, which is easier said than done. Undoubtedly, the Pentagon analysts were surprised by the high precision of the attack against the two oil facilities in Saudi Arabia. The satellite images show damages to oil/gas infrastructure at Abqaiq are not only from drones, but also from missiles.

In that case, Houthis could certainly not have done the attack alone. These were, most probably, cruise missiles of the Quds-1 type which are fabricated in Iran. Twenty-two weapons were fired in all, of which 19 hit their targets with precision. One way or another, this attack was not only aimed at Saudis because of their participation in the war in Yemen, but it was a warning to all those countries who have an interest in the future of the oil fields in the Middle East and are supporting the American sanctions against Iran.

But the central question is: why would Iran attack Saudi oil installations while its economy is suffering daily from the American “maximum pressure”? Does the Iranian regime intend to provoke the US and its allies in the Persian Gulf and get them involved in a zero-sum game war which will blow up the global economy?

The answer is simple: to understand Iranian military operations, one needs to think like the Iranian Revolutionary Guards. What Javad Zarif, the Iranian foreign minister, or President Rouhani say in the front of the world TV cameras is not exactly what is happening behind the scenes in Tehran.

Also read | The US-Iran Conflict Is Heading Towards a Point of No Return

The Iranian Revolutionary Guards are cornered by the economic pressures and thus defensive. They know that they cannot win a war against the US, and its partners, but they need support from the Iranian population, among whom they are not popular. Let us not forget that the Iranian revolutionary guards are notorious for their internal authoritarianism and appalling human rights record.

However, with the US sanctions strangling the Iranian economy, the Iranian population is also becoming more anti-American. Actually, the economic war with Iran is very much anti-humanitarian because it targets not only food but also medicine. Despite the humanitarian “exemptions” to the sanctions, as it is underlined by Washington, the data shows that the American export of an average of $26 million of pharmaceutical products to Iran annually during the Barack Obama has dropped to $8.6 million a year in the last two years under the sanctions of Trump administration. The Trump administration has also made it more difficult for European countries to export medicine to Iran.

Swiss pharmaceutical exports to Iran fell 30% from $240 million in 2017 to $167 million last year. Similarly, French pharmaceutical exports to Iran fell 25% from $218 million to $164 million last year. So, what may seem like sanitised financial sanctions are truly much more. Iranian society is feeling the economic war against the Islamic regime with all its guts.

The Iranian regime is very conscious of the economic ticking bomb in its backyard. Maybe that is why the more the US puts pressure on Iran, the more the strategies pursued by Tehran become riskier, simply because the Iranian authorities are desperate and they feel that they have nothing to lose.

Also read | Saudi Aramco Blast: US Builds Coalition, Iran Warns Against War

The attacks on Saudi Arabian oil facilities at Abqaiq exemplify the risks that the Iranian regime is ready to take to demonstrate that they can be a serious threat to the strategic interests of the US and Europe in the region. Iran is reinforcing partnership with China for economic relief.

According to news reports, the first investments will take place in the first five years, with $280 billion being injected into the Iranian petrochemicals sectors and $120 billion into transportation and manufacturing infrastructure. In addition, China is supposed to increase its imports of Iranian oil, which, accordingly, will be at discounted rates. But Iran’s economic and security dependency will not solve the bigger geostrategic problem of the Iranian regime.

The Iranian regime will continue to be seen as a threat to international security and stability. However, the strategic outlook inside Iran continues to consider the Strait of Hormuz and the Iranian regime with it as a point of dispute and controversy in the US-China and US-Russia rivalries.

Maybe that is why, the de-escalation of tensions and the end of hostilities between Iran and the US are not for tomorrow, although both Iran and the US seem to be rowing back from a possible confrontation. Ultimately, there are no exit strategies which could fit nicely within the Iranian Revolutionary Guard’s or Trump’s parameters.

Ramin Jahanbegloo is the director of the Mahatma Gandhi Centre for Peace at Jindal Global University.

Israel Jets ‘Hit Targets’ in Syria to Prevent Iranian Drone Attack

The announcement came unusually quickly on the heels of the airstrikes.

Israel’s military said in the early hours of Sunday morning that its fighter jets had attacked targets in Syria on Saturday in order to prevent what it described as a “very imminent” drone attack launched by Iran.

While Israel has carried out hundreds of airstrikes against Iranian targets in Syria over the past years, Saturday’s appeared to be one of the most intense.

Killer drones stopped

In a briefing to reporters, military Spokesperson Lt. Col. Jonathan Conricus said that Iran had been planning to send explosive-laden attack drones into Israel.

He added that the country had been monitoring the plot for several months and on Thursday had prevented Iran from an even earlier launch.

“The threat was significant and these killer drones were capable of striking targets with significant capacity,” Conricus said. He described it as an attack planned from the top down rather than a low level attack.

Conricus said Iran’s Revolutionary Guards’ Al Quds force, as well as allied Shiite militias, were behind the attempted attack.

He added that the Israeli strikes were aimed at “a number of terror targets and military facilities belonging to the Quds force as well as Shiite militias” in the area southeast of Damascus.

Iran supports the regime of Syrian President Bashar Assad and Israel wants to prevent Iran from establishing a permanent foothold in Syria, where its Shiite proxy Hezbollah increasingly operates in support of Assad’s government forces.

Conricus said that Israel’s chief of staff was meeting with senior officers and that military forces were on high alert near the border with Syria.

Major airstrike, fast response

In the past Israel has not been quick to announce its airstrikes. However, the military announced Saturday’s strikes very shortly after they took place.

Immediately after the military’s announcement, President Benjamin Netanyahu tweeted a statement on the operation. He described the Israeli airstrikes as a “major operational effort” and warned that Iran would not be immune from Israeli strikes, regardless of location.

“Iran has no immunity anywhere,” he added in his Tweet. “If someone rises up to kill you, kill him first.”

The airstrikes triggered Syrian anti-aircraft fire. Syrian state TV reported that air defenses had responded to “hostile” targets over Damascus and shot down incoming missiles but did not provide further details.

This article was originally published in DW.

‘Iran Is Not a Threat, Trump Is’

Trump’s eagerness to wage war against Iran is reckless, irrational – and murderous. Iran is simply not a threat.

Late last week, Donald Trump reminded the world that he’s a loose cannon at heart. Calling off a strike against Iran at the eleventh hour, Trump – goaded on by a coterie of hawkish advisers – briefly put the world on edge. And despite retreating at the last moment, Trump announced harsh new sanctions against Iran this week and warned that any assault against the United States would be met with “obliteration.”

So what’s behind Trump’s drive to war? Who are the regional allies backing escalation? And why does Iran continue to be such a bogeyman in the minds of US elites?

In this interview, Jacobin contributor Daniel Falcone talks with Richard Falk, professor emeritus of international law at Princeton University and former United Nations special rapporteur, about Trump’s hard-line foreign policy, the mainstream media’s complicity in US war-making, and the causes for optimism amid lethal sabre-rattling.

What are the chances that the Trump administration will launch a war against Iran? Are there any reasons to be optimistic?

There are many reasons to be deeply concerned about this warmongering drift in US-Iran relations. American foreign policy in the Middle East has for decades been distorted by “special relationships” with Israel and Saudi Arabia. These distortions have been carried to dangerous extremes during the Trump presidency, especially the embrace of this punitive, confrontational approach toward Iran.

The goal of this coercive diplomacy is to induce Iran to accept more stringent restrictions on its nuclear program than were written into the 2015 nuclear agreement that Trump repudiated on his first day in the White House. A less acknowledged goal is to exert economic pressure through sanctions so as to cause instability and unrest in Iran, with the hope of producing a desired regime change in Tehran. Also in the mix for Washington is the Israeli and Saudi interest in pushing back against Iran’s alleged expansionism in the region, with Israel stressing security threats and the Saudis emphasising regional and sectarian rivalry.

There are other scenarios that are more hopeful, although maybe reflecting wishful thinking more than realistic prospects. The rhetoric from the US government and from Iranian leaders continues to insist that war is to be avoided while upholding respective rights in the spirit of tit for tat. Such interactions are inherently vulnerable to misperception and manipulation, especially when both sides have hawkish factions ready for war.

Also read: Iran Claims to Have Shot Down US Drone Over Its Territory

It is probably helpful that most policy planners in the Pentagon and State Department view the confrontation with Iran as a distraction from what they deem to be the principal geopolitical challenges facing the United States: China and Russia.

Assuming the parties don’t stumble into an unwanted military escalation, it is almost impossible to predict how this conflict will evolve. Its intensity and momentum at present suggest that such a crisis atmosphere cannot persist much longer. There will either be a dramatic de-escalation of tensions or their further intensification, which is almost certain at some point to involve uses of force and losses of life, creating circumstances where unintended consequences are bound to occur.

What are roles of Mike Pompeo and John Bolton in all of this? How strong are they pushing for war?

Both Bolton and Pompeo seem determined to push Iran so hard that it forcibly retaliates or surrenders. The recent incidents suggest a testing time. Bolton, in particular, seems to want Trump to move away from proposing a diplomatic option at this stage. At the same time, it is difficult to tell whether Trump’s supposed top foreign policy advisers exert much influence. Trump famously follows whatever his gut inclines him to do, and whatever happens is allowed to happen.

Pompeo professes religiously grounded opposition to Islam, and like Bolton seems to be in search of pretexts for causing the downfall of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the only Islamic theocracy that rests part of its legitimacy on elections and a written constitution. This Iranian governing framework, while far from ideal, compares favourably with our dynastic ally operating out of Riyadh, as well as with the repressive secular government in Egypt that came to power through a military coup staged against an elected leadership.

US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo delivers remarks on the Trump administration's Iran policy at the Heritage Foundation in Washington, US May 21, 2018. Credit: Reuters/Jonathan Ernst

US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo delivers remarks on the Trump administration’s Iran policy at the Heritage Foundation in Washington, May 21, 2018. Credit: Reuters/Jonathan Ernst

How is the mainstream media approaching the potential for war? Does it look like the corporate media is cooperating like it normally does?

As is so often the case in war-threatening situations, the mainstream media in the United States seems to dutifully follow the signals sent by the Pentagon and Wall Street. What this means in practice is a tendency to accept as credible the claims issued by official sources in Washington, with almost no consideration given to anti-war counter-narratives or of the quite different explanations of contested behavior given by the adversary government, in this case Iran.

Also read: Iran Warns US to Drop Sanctions as Time Runs out for Nuclear Deal

The citizenry of the United States should have learned the lesson of being dragged into an unlawful and disastrous aggression against Iraq in 2003. In the lead-up to that unlawful war, the media endorsed the transparently misleading and untruthful justifications for war. The print and TV media in these prewar situations seems mainly to function as an extension of the government, basically transmitting what is being fed to it by retired high-ranking military and intelligence officials, as reinforced by spokespersons for State and Defense.

The fourth estate, which is now badly needed, can no longer be counted upon to act as a check on the abuse of power in the war/peace context, but functions as a conduit for state propaganda.

Trump spent much during the 2016 campaign trying to divorce himself from the Bush-Clinton-Obama doctrines of intervention and occupation in order to get elected. Of course this was a myth, but could Trump finally be exposed as a neocon?

I doubt that Trump, even if he so desired, can exhibit the coherence and consistency to be considered a neocon, or for that matter, as holding any generic worldview by which to identify “a Trump approach.”

If one really insists on labelling Trump, then I regard “alt-right” as much closer to his chaotic reactionary outlook than “neocon,” especially as the neocons were ideologically motivated to push American globalism after the collapse of the Soviet Union and what they called “the unipolar moment”.

It is of course correct that the neocons, as with Trump, affirmed a special tie to Israel, but for them this expressed itself more through “democracy promotion” and “force projection” than by the mindless endorsement of Israeli expansionism in the manner of Trump.

The perception of Trump as pro-Russian and pro-Putin is a shot across the bow of the neocon image of the American ship of state. Actually, Trump directly challenges the global imperial grand strategy of the neocons by affirming and adopting ultra-nationalist values, policies, and identities, as well as rejecting the postulates of free trade and the centring of American security policy on the NATO alliance and Western diplomatic solidarity.

Unfortunately, Trump is not the only one talking about the “Iranian threat.” Can you comment on the bipartisan support for hawkishness toward Iran?

The bipartisan hostility to Iran can, I think, be traced back to the hostage crisis of 1979, which humiliated the United States on the world stage, creating a resentment and retaliatory impulse that lingers on. Of course, this is not the whole story. The anti-Iran flames were also fanned by the anti-Zionism of Iran’s leaders, which most provocatively expressed itself in the inflammatory language of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Iran has consistently opposed the establishment of an exclusivist Jewish state. (Ahmadinejad never advocated the ethnic cleansing of Israeli Jews, although his words were often mistranslated to foster the most extremist impressions.)

These two bipartisan ideas hold firm: America as globally engaged dominant military power, and Zionism as the legitimate ideological cornerstone of support for Israel as a Jewish state. These two ideas have been challenged ever since the Islamic Republic took over the governance of Iran from the Shah.

Also read: With No Clear Foreign Policy, Trump Is Pushing US Into a Corner on Iran

This has led both political parties to share the view that Iran is a threat and illegitimate as a political actor. There are some differences in tone and approach within the frame of this consensus, depending on attitudes toward the use of force, risks of war, leadership in the United States, and overall situation in the Middle East.

On the Iranian side, bad memories about the United States shape the outlook and behaviour of its leaders. These memories go back at least to 1953, when the CIA took part in a coup that restored the Shah to his throne, and are reinforced by the ill-disguised American opposition to the revolutionary movement that brought Islamic leadership to Iran. Such memories and perceptions also infuse the debate surrounding Iran’s nuclear intentions and the double standards applied to Israel and Iran with respect to nuclear weapons.

What is Israel’s role in the conflict with Iran?

Israel pushed hard in 2014 to block the Iran deal negotiated during the Obama presidency, as highlighted by Netanyahu’s speech to a joint session of Congress in which he bashed Iran and exaggerated the proliferation threat posed by Iran’s nuclear program. As was often pointed out in the pre-Trump years, the most constructive approach would have been the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East, an initiative favoured by all governments in the region except Israel.

Such a step, while far from a panacea, seemed the most effective means to bring stability to the region. Israel was successful in making sure that such an enlightened approach was never formally put forward or even seriously discussed in an open forum to avoid the awkwardness of exposing its attachment to a regional monopoly on nuclear weaponry, a monopoly achieved by stealth and with the covert assistance of the West.

It is worth observing that this lost opportunity seemed unrelated to Israeli security, its claimed justification, as Israel was reliably assured by the United States that it would sustain a strategic edge with respect to non-nuclear or conventional weaponry. It also validates Iranian claims of hypocrisy, being forbidden to acquire the dangerous weaponry that its adversary is free to possess and develop. I suspect that if Israel had renounced nuclear weapons, there would be no confrontation and no threat of regional war.

In the Trump years, the US government has gone further in concrete policy than earlier equally partisan American presidents. Trump has uncritically pursued every policy direction that might please Israel, even when considerable political costs are immediately incurred, as when the American Embassy was moved from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem in early 2018.

There is every reason to think that the Israeli government supports confronting Iran to a maximum extent, but it recently seems somewhat wary of having confrontation culminate in a war. Israel seems understandably concerned that it could be badly damaged in such war, including the possibility of missile strikes fired by Hezbollah from its northern neighbour, Lebanon.

Could Trump be using the threat of the war to get reelected? And is there any chance that this would backfire? This conflict looks to have a unique potential to be excruciatingly awful.

If Trump’s election prospects begin to look really bleak, then his temptation to summon patriotic support by recourse to war against Iran might have irresistible political appeal, but even then it seems problematic as an effective tactic. At best, recourse to war with Iran would have huge backlash risks for the Trump campaign. Recollections of Bush’s “mission accomplished” assertion at the beginning of the Iraq occupation in 2003 would almost certainly be revived, including reminding the American people of the costly and political failures arising from Iraqi resistance to the Anglo-American occupation, which, among other unintended side effects, led to the formation of ISIS and the discrediting disclosures of Abu Ghraib.

As with the Vietnam War, American leaders have failed to respond adequately to an important shift in historical agency. They have consistently failed to grasp the significance of the fact that in the period since the end of World War II, military superiority only achieves political victory under special circumstances.

In the First Gulf War (1992) and the Kosovo War (1999), overwhelming force could be applied and core identities were not at stake on the weaker side. In such conflicts, and few others, the stronger side prevailed. The more typical combat situation in this period – as in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq – involves reliance on military power by the intervening side, which generates a nationalist mobilisation of resistance on the weaker side militarily.

High-tech military superiority can kill and destroy without limit, but it can rarely win a war if the national mobilisation is robust and persevering. This lesson was mostly learned after the Second World War by the European colonial powers, sometimes painfully. It was learned in some instances by withdrawal (Britain) or through lost wars (France), but remains unlearned by the United States because learning would undermine the military foundations of global security policy, along with eroding the bureaucratic hegemony of the military/intelligence/industrial establishment.

Also read: Trump-Xi Meet, Iran Tension to Overshadow G-20 Summit in Japan

This limitation on military agency applies to other countries as well. The Soviet Union never recovered from its devastating political defeat in Afghanistan, and Iraq’s inability to prevail in Iran despite possessing decisive advantages on the battlefield was the beginning of the end for Saddam Hussein’s dictatorial regime in Iraq.

Trump has displayed a soft spot for militarism since becoming president, which may lead him to think his best option for “keeping America great” is to make war with Iran at some point and then ride an ensuing wave of patriotic enthusiasm to victory in the 2020 elections. We know that the Pentagon refuses to acknowledge the limits of American military power for fear of having its budget reduced. But what about the American people? I am somewhat hopeful that enough Americans, including some Trump supporters, would see through the war ploy as an electoral tactic that could lead to a spectacular backlash.

Richard Falk is an international law and international relations scholar who taught at Princeton University for 40 years.

Daniel Falcone is an activist, educator, and journalist in New York City.

This article was first published in Jacobin. Read the original here.

Trump-Xi Meet, Iran Tension to Overshadow G-20 Summit in Japan

The Trump-Xi meeting, expected to take place on Saturday, has been highly anticipated as the two sides revive trade talks.

Tokyo: Concerns over trade, conflict and oil will dominate a summit of the Group of twenty major economies in Japan this weekend, with attention focused on a meeting between the leaders of the United States and China, embroiled in a lengthy trade war.

Donald Trump and Xi Jinping will meet for the first time in seven months to discuss deteriorating ties between the world’s two largest economies. But prospects of progress look slim, as neither side has given ground after talks broke down in May.

Many G-20 members have a stake in the outcome of the meeting because the row has disrupted global supply chains, slowed world growth and prompted dovish views on interest rates among some of the group’s central banks.

But some have expressed disquiet that the trade row might overshadow efforts to tackle pressing international issues.

The Sino-US trade clash is “serious”, but it shouldn’t “take a multilateral body hostage”, said an official of French President Emmanuel Macron’s Elysee office.

Trump will arrive in Japan’s western city of Osaka just a week after calling off a retaliatory air strike on Iran after it shot down an unmanned US aircraft. The threat of Middle East conflict has driven up global oil prices.

The leaders of Russia and Saudi Arabia, both G-20 members, will also attend the two-day summit that starts on Friday, ahead of a meeting of oil cartel OPEC on July 1 and 2 to discuss oil supply policy.

Financial markets have rallied since Trump and Xi spoke by telephone last week and agreed to meet in Osaka and revive trade talks that collapsed in early May after the US accused China of reneging on its pledges.

The two sides have slapped tariffs on hundreds of billions of dollars of each other’s imports in the nearly year-long trade war, even as they have tried to hammer out a broad trade deal.

Also read: Breakdown of US-China Relations Will Leave the World Scrambling to Cope.

“Any Outcome”

Trump views his meeting with Xi, probably to be held on Saturday, as a chance to see where Beijing stands and is “comfortable with any outcome”, a senior US official said, on condition of anonymity.

White House officials have declined to discuss expectations ahead of the summit, saying only they are hopeful for Chinese leaders to follow through on commitments to compete fairly.

Beijing counters that the US demands for a host of economic reforms amount to a violation of its sovereignty.

Publicly, Chinese officials say the trade war’s effects are controllable, and they are in no hurry to reach a deal.

Many in Beijing hope the prospect of the 2020 US election campaign could deter Trump from trade measures that risk upsetting farmers and businesses among his voter base.

“Right now we feel, actually, that we have more stamina than the US side,” said Liang Ming, a trade expert at the Chinese commerce ministry’s Academy of International Trade and Economic Cooperation.

“New Trajectory”

Xi is unlikely to delve into the details of a potential trade deal, as he did at a meeting with Trump in Buenos Aires in December, said a source who recently met Chinese trade officials.

Also read: Trump to Meet Modi, Xi on Sidelines of G-20 Summit in Japan

Instead, Xi will try to “set a new trajectory” for ties, the source quoted the trade officials as saying.

Privately, Chinese trade experts acknowledge disagreement in policy circles about confronting Washington on trade, with many wary of further US tariffs.

American sanctions on China’s telecoms giant Huawei Technologies could also figure in the leaders’ talks.

A truce in the trade spat is more likely than a deal, however, said Matthew Goodman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, formerly an international economic adviser to former President Barack Obama.

Several other G-20 members, such as India, Japan, Mexico and European Union nations, have had to grapple with the Trump administration’s effort to remake trade ties in ways more favourable to the US.

Tensions in the Gulf

Ominous prospects of Middle East conflict loom over the summit, as the drone shootdown followed a series of explosive strikes on oil tankers in the Gulf.

A White House official said Trump would also meet at least eight world leaders, including Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan and Russian President Vladimir Putin, to win support for sanctions on Iran.

Japanese host Prime Minister Shinzo Abe wants the G-20 summit to focus on reforming the World Trade Organization, empowering female workers and reducing plastic trash in the ocean.

He also wants to discuss global rules for data governance that balance protection of personal and intellectual property with a freer flow of medical, industrial and non-personal data.

Also read: US Sanctions Have Permanently Closed the Path to Diplomacy: Iran

However, the US believes China will only gather data but not share it, a Japanese government source said.

Such differences could make it difficult for the leaders to craft a final communique, officials say.

“There are not many topics all participants can agree on,” another Japanese government official said. “Maybe plastic garbage reduction is the only area no one opposes.”

(Reuters)