Former Bihar chief minister Jitan Ram Manjhi’s son Santosh Suman exited the Nitish Kumar-led Bihar state cabinet on Tuesday, June 14. He said there were differences between Hindustani Awam Morcha (Secular) [HAMS], led by his father, and Kumar’s Janata Dal (United) [JD(U)]. Ratnesh Sada, a former rickshaw puller and three-time JD(U) MLA, replaces him in the cabinet. Both Sada and Suman belong to the Musahar community, categorised as a Scheduled Caste in Bihar.
Suman’s exit from the cabinet will most likely see the re-entry of HAM(S) into the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) led by the BJP.
The BJP claims that Manjhi’s exit from the grand alliance is a “big setback” to its constituent parties ahead of the scheduled opposition meeting in Patna on June 23. Earlier too, the BJP and its supporters had dubbed the exit of Koiri leader Upendra Kushwaha’s exit from the grand alliance a couple of months ago as an equally similar loss to the Kumar-led ruling coalition. Kushwaha had walked out of the JD(U) to form his own party in February this year, citing issues with Kumar.
In the state’s 2015 assembly elections, both Jitan Manjhi’s HAMS and Upendra Kushwaha’s outfit – known as Rashtriya Lok Samata Party (RLSP) then – were part of the NDA. So was the Lok Janshakti Party (LJP). The RLSP and LJP had bagged two seats each and HAMS one out of the NDA’s tally of 58 seats against the grand alliance’s 178. The Mahagathbandhan had secured 41.8% votes against 34.1% votes cast in favour of the BJP and its allies in 2015.
Upendra Kushwaha. Credit: IANS
A realistic analysis based on empirical data and ground reality suggests that the BJP is inherently weak in the state. It can’t win elections in Bihar unless it has a powerful JD(U) headed by Nitish Kumar in its fold, or in a scenario where the JD(U) is pitted against Lalu Prasad Yadav’s Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD).
Background
A close look at the elections from 2014 to 2020 makes it easy to understand the broader electoral trends in Bihar. In 2014, JD(U) and RJD fought separately against the BJP, which had the LJP and the RLSP on its side. The BJP and its allies won 32 out of 40 Lok Sabha seats. While the RJD had bagged four seats, JD(U) and Congress won two each.
When Kumar joined hands with Lalu Yadav in the 2015 assembly elections, the RJD-JDU-Congress grand alliance won 178 seats against the NDA’s 58. And when the JD(U) again returned to the BJP in the 2019 Lok Sabha elections, the NDA won 39 with the RJD drawing zero and Congress winning the solitary Kishanganj seat.
Back then, the RJD was demoralised due to its leader, Lau Yadav, being in jail for a prolonged period. However, it still retained its support base. Lalu’s son Tejaswhi Yadav proved his mettle in the 2020 assembly polls and the RJD won 80 seats to emerge as the single largest party in Bihar. To Tejaswhi’s advantage, the BJP played spoilsport with the JD(U) by propping up Chirag Paswan – late Ram Vilas Paswan’s son – against Nitish’s outfit from behind the scene.
Thus, it is abundantly clear that the BJP doesn’t have the wherewithal to win elections in Bihar either on its own or with the support of small players like Jitan Manjhi and Upendra Kushwaha.
Moreover, Manjhi and Kushwaha, apparently, feared that they might not get the desired number of seats in terms of their share in Mahagathbadhan which has RJD, JD(U), Left, and the Congress with larger bases. Their fear was genuine as Kumar insisted Manjhi merge his party into the JD(U).
It was not without reason that the BJP accepted Kumar as the chief minister despite the fact that the JD(U) had only won 45 seats against the BJP’s tally of 77 seats in the 2020 elections.
BJP’s weakness
The BJP is weak against the Mahagathbandhan on three broad parameters.
First and foremost, the Mahagathbandhan has the support of a larger voter base which is hard for the BJP to cope with. It is stronger than it was in 2015, with the addition of some left parties. The CPI-ML-Liberation, which has 12 MLAs and a strong cadre base in several districts, has boosted the alliance.
The Mahagathbandhan enjoys the support of Other Backward Classes (OBCs), Extremely Backward Classes (EBCs), a large section of Dalits, and the minorities, whereas the BJP’s support base is still confined to the upper castes and the Banias (business community) – which together constitute barely 17% of the state’s population.
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If the BJP expects Kushwaha and Manjhi to draw a significant number of voters from their respective castes, it might be left disappointed. The Mahagathbandhan has a larger base across the state, which is divided into five linguistic regions and is very diverse.
Secondly, the BJP can’t depend only on Prime Minister Narendra Modi to pull votes. Lalu Prasad Yadav and Nitish Kumar are more acceptable faces, at least, for the voters belonging to the OBCs, EBCs, Dalits, and the minorities in the state.
Moreover, Tejaswhi – particularly after performing stupendously in the 2020 assembly elections – has emerged as a strong leader.
And thirdly, Modi and Union home minister Amit Shah’s repeated efforts to polarise Bihar’s society on communal lines – the way they have done in neighbouring Uttar Pradesh and their home state of Gujarat – have failed.
But their efforts to polarise Bihar society failed with Lalu’s RJD cadres acting tough against the Hindutva militants on the ground, and Kumar using the administration to sternly deal with them to win the confidence of the minorities.
With the BJP or away from the BJP, Kumar has taken various steps to ensure the social and economic betterment of the Muslims whereas Lalu’s name brings about a certain kind of fear among the Hindutva operatives.
Nalin Verma is a senior journalist, media educator and independent researcher in social anthropology