Author: Vignesh Karthik K.R. and Jeyannathann Karunanithi

How M.K. Stalin’s Brand of Ideological Politics Sunk the BJP in Tamil Nadu

The DMK strongly opposed the BJP’s policies, projecting them as proponents of authoritarianism and the Hindutva ideology, a stance that was deeply rooted in the historical and ideological foundations of the secular Dravidian movement.

In the 2024 Lok Sabha elections, the INDIA alliance achieved a clean sweep in Tamil Nadu and neighbouring Puducherry, winning all 40 parliamentary seats.

The M.K. Stalin-led Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) formed the main plank of the win, winning 22 Lok Sabha seats and successfully supporting its alliance partners including Congress in other constituencies, which stopped the BJP from opening its account in the state.

The decisive victory in Tamil Nadu highlights a stark contrast with the YSR Congress’s defeat in Andhra Pradesh and the Biju Janata Dal (BJD) in Odisha despite extensive social welfare initiatives. The contrasting fortunes of these parties offer critical insights into effective political strategy and coalition building.

Illustration: Pariplab Chakraborty

Coalition Building: Inclusivity and Ideological Coherence

One of the primary drivers of DMK’s success was its dedication to nurturing and sustaining a robust and ideologically coherent coalition. Since the 2019 Lok Sabha elections, MK Stalin has diligently built and maintained the Social Progressive Alliance, which later became part of the INDIA.

This coalition includes a diverse array of parties including the Indian National Congress, Viduthalai Chiruthaigal Katchi, CPI, CPM, and the Indian Union Muslim League, alongside various social organizations and micro-regional parties – each representing different segments of Tamil Nadu’s complex socio-political landscape.

This inclusive approach ensured a broad base of support across different social and political spectra and representation to multiple communities, creating a formidable united front against the BJP. Unlike Jaganmohan Reddy or Naveen Patnaik, who relied heavily on their personal charisma and extensive social welfare schemes, Tamil Nadu Chief Minister Stalin’s approach focused on building a resilient alliance grounded in shared opposition to the BJP’s policies.

While inclusivity ensured a broad base of support, ideological coherence provided the alliance with a clear and unified purpose. The DMK strongly opposed the BJP’s policies, projecting them as proponents of authoritarianism and the Hindutva ideology. This stance was not merely oppositional but deeply rooted in the historical and ideological foundations of the Dravidian movement, which advocates for dignity, social justice, secularism, and state autonomy.

The communication of a sincere opposition, resonated deeply with the committed party cadre and the voters. The able management of the coalition dynamics and internal cohesion, which went beyond just seat sharing, helped the opposition present a united front against the BJP. For instance, the positive coverage of cadre cooperation across party lines within the coalition during the election campaign indicates consistent messaging from the leadership down to the hyper-local levels.

Ideological Clarity and Consistent Messaging

A key lesson from Tamil Nadu’s electoral success is the importance of ideological clarity and consistent messaging. MK Stalin and the DMK made it a priority to communicate their opposition to the BJP’s Hindutva ideology at every level. This involved not just high-profile leaders, but also district secretaries and local party structures, ensuring that the message permeated through every layer of society.

DMK’s extensive use of its various wings—Youth, Women, Students, and IT—to organise programmes over several years played a crucial role. These programmes continuously educated and mobilized party supporters and the general public against what they termed the BJP’s fascist policies.

Issues such as the overreach of enforcement and investigative agencies, judicial biases, fiscal policies like the GST system, the impacts of delimitation, threats to OBC reservations, inflation, the NEET examination, biased treatment during natural calamities, and the CAA-NRC legislations were effectively communicated, highlighting the perceived threats to empowerment of the marginalised, social justice and state autonomy.

Grassroots Mobilization and Hyper-local Structures

Under MK Stalin’s leadership, DMK underwent a renaissance in terms of hyper-local party structures. By focusing on grassroots organisation, DMK ensured a robust party presence down to every street in the state. This was mirrored in the branching out of similar structures in every wing of the party, fostering a culture of strong internal communication and coordination, which is vital in a state with high political engagement.

Stalin’s strategy involved leveraging every wing of the party—Youth, Women, Students, and IT—to organize continuous programmes and outreach efforts to communicate party stands on various issues, in particular, the disinformation campaigns by BJP. The hyper-local structures are evolving in their effectiveness to coordinate among themselves, and in its interaction with the traditional party infrastructure.

Amidst varying degrees of resistance to the change in how party operates on ground, there is an overwhelming agreement among the party workers that a resilient party structure is needed to counter the electoral machine of AIADMK, BJP and social media onslaught by a variety of actors. Parties such as BJD and YSRCP had delegated this function to non-party entities like the Self-Help-Groups (SHGs) in Odisha and a network of government recruited-volunteers in Andhra Pradesh.

Digital Savvy and Strategic Communication

In a state with high digital penetration and social media consumption, DMK’s proactive digital engagement played a pivotal role. The party’s IT Wing was instrumental in countering the BJP’s well-funded digital campaigns. DMK adopted a dual strategy–the tendency to utilize professional help from consultants for strategic insights while empowering its IT Wing to manage day-to-day digital operations.

This approach ensured a scalable and effective communication model that was responsive to the fast-paced digital landscape. Additionally, efforts are being made to establish year-round accessible capacity to handle the data requirements of modern election management through organisations like the Populus Empowerment Network (PEN). This is increasingly becoming a necessity for political parties in India.

The DMK’s efforts to streamline internal communication down to hyper-local structures, although challenging, is paying off. By leveraging digital tools, the party maintained a cohesive and dynamic presence across social media platforms, effectively countering misinformation, defending its ideological stance in the social media sphere and engaging with voters in real-time.

Revitalizing Ideological Foundations

A significant aspect of DMK’s strategy was the reintroduction and emphasis on the works of ideological icons like EVR Periyar, CN Annadurai, and Kalaignar Karunanidhi, through various forums, social media groups created by the party and its wings. At the same time it also supported and at times enabled the efforts by social organisations and social media groups.

The party believed that it is the ideological strength that is required the most to counter the “status quo-ist, back to the tradition” narrative of BJP, which implicitly doesn’t challenge the feudal and caste structures, that is routinely put forth by the BJP national unit, state unit alongside the broader Sangh Parivar ecosystem.

By reconnecting with its ideological roots, the DMK reaffirmed its commitment to social justice, rationalism, and state autonomy. This ideological renewal attracted new members and revitalised existing supporters, building a strong foundation for potential electoral success while countering the ideological assault from the Sangh ecosystem in both traditional and digital media.

Holistic Policy Approach

Stalin’s administration implemented comprehensive social welfare schemes tailored to address the needs of Tamil Nadu’s diverse populace. Initiatives like the Kalaignar Mahalir Urimai Thogai (Kalaignar Women’s Rights Grant Scheme), Vidiyal Payanam (free bus travel for women), Pudhumai Pen (Higher Education Assurance Scheme for women), and Thamizh Puthalvan (equivalent program for men) exemplify DMK’s commitment to social equity. These programs, alongside the Naan Mudhalvan skill-building initiative, addressed both immediate needs and long-term aspirations of the state’s citizens.

In contrast, Jaganmohan Reddy’s reliance on direct benefit transfers and extensive welfare spending in Andhra Pradesh to the tune of 2.7 lakh crore rupees, while significant, lacked the cohesive ideological and coalition support seen in Tamil Nadu. The over-reliance on consultants and non-party volunteers, coupled with insufficient grassroots organization, left BJD and YSR Congress vulnerable. Consequently, there is a strong need to critically evaluate the new party management prescriptions that are floating in the political landscape, that favour transactional relationships against the values of ideological adherence and party loyalty.

In the wake of an evolving political landscape, the 2024 Lok Sabha elections in Tamil Nadu underscore the importance of a well-rounded political strategy. The DMK has demonstrated that effective coalition building, grassroots mobilization, digital savvy, ideological clarity, and comprehensive social policies can together create a formidable electoral force. As political landscapes across India continue to evolve, the lessons from Tamil Nadu offer a blueprint for achieving electoral success in an increasingly complex and interconnected world.

 

Vignesh Karthik KR is a postdoctoral research fellow of Indian and Indonesian politics at the Royal Netherlands Institute of Southeast Asian and Caribbean Studies, Leiden and Research Affiliate at the King’s India Institute, King’s College London. He tweets @krvtweets

Jeyannathann Karunanithi is an independent researcher based in Chennai. He tweets @jeyankaruna

 

Read all of The Wire’s reporting on and analysis of the 2024 election results here.

Tamil Nadu Custodial Deaths Are a Reminder Not to Miss the Forest for the Trees

The events cannot be fully explained by readymade answers such as “caste conflict”. Instead, it is the slip-ups on the part of the state machinery that need to be problematised.

The infamous custodial deaths of two traders, Jeyaraj and his son Bennix, in Sathankulam town, Thoothukudi district of Tamil Nadu has sparked a country-wide discussion on impunity and excesses of the state. The incident in question is a manifestation of the decaying integrity of institutions, and reflects the incompetence of the executive wing and its lack of political imagination.

A section of the media has taken recourse in conventional discourse on caste conflict to explain these deaths. However, several complex factors are at play here, as social relations between communities in the state have been going through changes. This progression of events cannot be fully explained by readymade answers such as “caste conflict”. Instead, it is the slip-ups on the part of the state machinery that need to be problematised. Like anywhere else in the country, inter-community relations are at times marked by restiveness and mistakes on the part of the state have a cumulative effect on social harmony.

Custodial deaths as a worrying symptom of incompetence

According to the National Crime Records Bureau annual reports, between 2001 and 2018 there were over 1,727 custodial deaths in India in which 26 policemen were convicted, 334 charge-sheeted and 810 had cases registered against them. Over the same period, TN and four other states – Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Maharashtra and West Bengal – recorded over 100 custodial deaths each and zero convictions.

Also read: What Public Reactions to Police Brutality in the US and India Say

In TN, it is widely perceived that the police force under All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (AIADMK) in comparison to Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) is stronger and enjoys greater autonomy. The organisational structures of these parties and their governance styles correlate with this perception.

Table-1 presents year-wise and term-wise breakup of custodial deaths in TN, which reaffirms this viewpoint. On a broader note, it has been argued that the socio-political movement in the state has ushered in a sense of tolerance and effectively contained inter-community conflicts. Therefore, recent rise in incidences of police excess and the spike in average custodial deaths squarely point towards the inability of the executive to manage the police and absence or failure of checks and balances that curb impunity.

Table 1: Custodial Deaths in TN 2001-2018

Year Total Deaths (TN) Average

DMK vs AIADMK Govts
2001 5 AIADMK

 

5
2002 6
2003 4
2004 7
2005 3
2006 6 DMK

 

3.2
2007 2
2008 1
2009 5
2010 2
2011 6 AIADMK

 

7.6
2012 7
2013 15
2014 7
2015 3
2016 5 AIADMK

 

8.3
2017 8
2018 12
Total 104 5.77

The Sathankulam episode is an apt example of this: we have a seemingly concerted communiqué by state officials, elusive responses from the chief minister, a delay in initiating a probe against the alleged offenders in the police force. The Madurai bench of the Madras high court suo motu ordered a probe into the deaths and the officials at Sathankulam police station refused to abide the ruling. Consequently, for the first time since independence, revenue officials were directed to take over the police station and police officers concerned were transferred.

While the CB-CID has made arrests and is investigating this case, the indifference of ministers and spokespersons of the ruling party, who all but refuse to acknowledge the crisis at hand, is a worrying departure from how their predecessors had responded to similar incidents.

Sathankulam as a misfit in the prevailing discourse on caste conflicts

The deceased father and son were Christian Nadars, a merchant backward caste. As news of their custodial death found its way to TV screens and sparked social media chatter among Tamil-speaking people, there surfaced a slow crystallisation of the public imagination in alignment with conventional caricatures of caste enmity. That is, the history of clashes between Nadars and Mukkulathors briefly became the focal point of the discussion on why the duo was killed in custody.

Soon, however, there were reports regarding the caste identity of the policemen involved – the two sub-inspectors and the inspector – which did not match the earlier Mukkulathor-Nadar narrative. It turned out that the sub-inspectors and inspector are not Mukkulathor. So now it came to be widely speculated that two of the police officers involved were Konar and Naicker by caste. But there is a problem with this version too, for there is no history of pronounced antagonism between Konars and Nadars. Therefore, the Sathankulam incident has to be analysed above caste binaries, especially given the similar social status of the parties involved.

Selvarani, wife and mother of the deceased duo, mentioned in her complaint that members of a Joint Governmental Organisation (JGO) for community policing, Friends of Police (FoP) were involved in this incident of custodial deaths. Once this came to light, a debate was kick-started in the mainstream and social media on the role of community policing volunteer outfits including FoP and their association with local religious and caste groups from where they draw volunteers. There is widespread speculation that Seva Bharati, an affiliate of the RSS, had a role in this incident too. Along with FoPs, the Seva Bharati has been providing local police assistance in enforcing the COVID-19 lockdown. However, the FoP has categorically denied the role of its volunteers. With these two organisations now in the crosshairs, a religious angle entered the existing institutional and caste angles.

Also read: Sathankulam Case: Tamil Nadu Government Bars Activities of ‘Friends of Police’

The primary question being raised is with respect to how volunteer groups (like Seva Bharati) find their way into the policing system and engage with (or influence) the nature of policing of any given region. The apparent emergence of parallel extra-constitutional policing structures at a time when checks and balances in formal police structures face a breakdown raises serious questions.

The third TN Police Commission Report submitted in 2008 had cautioned against possibility of undesirable elements taking advantage of the FoPs arrangement. The Sathankulam custodial deaths warrant a relook at community policing, keeping in mind the interplay of religion, caste, and institutional integrity of the police force.

With chief minister Edappadi Palaniswami in charge of home affairs, it is imperative that he redresses this situation, so that the people of the state can be convinced of the integrity of public institutions. At the same time, approaching such incidents through a narrow caste-conflict framework trivialises patent social complexities. In other words, the discourse on the Sathankulam incident serves as a timely reminder to not miss the forest for the trees.

Vignesh Karthik KR is a doctoral researcher at the King’s India Institute, King’s College London. Jeyannathann Karunanithi is a political analyst based in Chennai.

Will BJP’s UP Model of Mobilising Scheduled Castes Work in Tamil Nadu?

The appointment of L. Murugan as its state president hints that the saffron party will try and gain the support of non-dominant SCs, but this approach has its limits.

The run-up to the 2019 general elections was marked by a discussion on the incumbent Bharatiya Janata Party’s (BJP) strategy for Uttar Pradesh in response to the alliance of the two major regional parties, the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) and the Samajwadi Party (SP). The BJP sought to accentuate the fissure stemming out of inter-caste competition through moves like sub-categorisation of the Scheduled Castes (SCs) and Other Backward Classes (OBCs) in the context of affirmative action quotas. In other words, the approach of the BJP was marked by the mobilisation of non-dominant SCs and non-dominant OBCs. The approach worked and the BJP-led alliance won 64 of the 80 constituencies.

A year later, the same approach seems to be replaying in Tamil Nadu, with the BJP’s appointment of its state president, a post that was vacant for over six months. On March 11, L. Murugan, the vice-chairman of the National Commission for Scheduled Castes (NCSC), was appointed as Tamil Nadu’s BJP state president. Murugan, an advocate, was an active member of the student wing of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), the ideological parent organisation of the BJP. The appointment came as a surprise, and was hailed a praiseworthy move by many. Inter alia, one reason was that he belonged to a non-dominant SC-jati, the Arunthathiyars.

PM Narendra Modi with L. Murugan. Photo: Twitter/@VC_NCSC

At this juncture, a question is pertinent: Why would a party that had a vote share of 3.71% in the state in the 2019 general elections resort to such a decision? Drawing from the work of professor Amit Ahuja, we argue that the move by the BJP might not yield electorally, as bloc voting among SCs is significantly lower in Tamil Nadu in comparison to UP. Ahuja locates the reason for such voting behaviour in the broadbasing and mainstreaming of the SC grievances through socio-cultural movements. The article situates the BJP’s move in the context of how it seeks to undo the outcomes of the century-long socio-political movement aimed at instilling agency among the marginalised communities.

Mainstreaming of SCs: The Tamil Experience

The publication of A Comparative Grammar of the Dravidian or South-Indian Family of Languages by Robert Caldwell in 1856, actuated the re-reading of Puranas as the clash between natives of the land (Dravidians) and the invading Aryans. Meanwhile, the politics of and around SCs in Tamil Nadu went through the “Dravida”, “Casteless-Dravidians”, and “Adi-Dravida” identities, thanks to the efforts of pioneers like John Rathinam, Iyothee Thass, and Rettamalai Srinivasan from the late 1880s.

Given the assertiveness associated with the nomenclature of “Adi-Dravida” (Original/Early/Native Dravidians) and the popularisation of its usage by E.V. Ramasamy in the 1930s, it remains strong in the state. The Adi-Dravida construct met the “Harijan” identity – a Gandhian construct and an import from the national Independence movement discourse. The “Harijan” terminology persisted, albeit to a lesser degree post-1967, with the steady decline of the Indian National Congress in Tamil Nadu.

However, its persistence is due to the scope it gave for the privileged sections to engage in a clientelist fashion with the oppressed classes, given the condescending nature of Harijan i.e., the ‘Children of God’ who needed the benevolence of the privileged.

Post-Independence, around the 1970s, the “Dalit” identity entered Tamil Nadu’s political discourse, with ideas of Dr B.R. Ambedkar as the vehicle for communicating the vocabulary of assertion.

The 1990s, saw the emergence of Viduthalai Chiruthaigal Katchi (VCK) [Liberation Panthers Party] under Thol Thirumavalavan from the Dalit Panthers Movement and the formation of the Puthiya Thamizhagam Party [New Tamil Nadu Party] (PTP) by Dr Krishnasamy from the Devendra Kula Vellalar Federation (DKVF) – both backed by dominant SC-jatis – the Parayars and the Devendra Kula Vellalars (DKVs). The Aathi Thamizhar Peravai [Native Tamils’ Federation] (ATP) led by Athiyaman was backed by the non-dominant Arunthathiyars. The three political parties reflected how emerging parties surfaced as a counter to the limitations of one or all of the prevalent identities like “Dravidian”, “Harijan”, and “Dalit” in order to help them express the particular grievances of the individual SC-jatis better.

Also Read: ‘Ambedkarite Parties Must Oppose CAA’: Thol Thirumavalavan Speaks to The Wire

The emergence of the Dravidian movement infused the notions of self-respect, primacy of Tamil language and culture, and militant rejection of Brahminical exclusion leading to greater politicisation of the oppressed communities since the 1920s, followed by a slew of social justice-oriented interventions that fostered their upward mobility.

The support of the oppressed communities, which was split between the INC and the two Dravidian parties – Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) and AIADMK until 1980s, witnessed a churn within, as a reaction to the apparent hegemony of middle castes in their immediate geographical periphery. The developments in the 1980s, inter alia, include the renewed caste consciousness owing to the demand for revisiting the existing reservation quotas to accommodate a significant section of the population that lagged, mixed responses to the introduction of populist policies under the leadership of M.G. Ramachandran, the perceived slant of the ruling dispensation towards middle castes, and the episode of religious conversion in Meenatchipuram and reactions by civil society, which in itself was a defining moment.

A fertile ground for the departure from status quo was in place, which led to the coming together of individuals from Dravidian movement, INC, civil society groups, professionals from oppressed sections, individual caste forums, Christian clergy, Marxists, and Communists. A gradual coalescence of these groups ensued and they sought to reinstate the process of mainstreaming the grievances of the marginalised communities.

The new political parties for oppressed sections pursued multiple objectives, including the attempt to weave a coalition of oppressed sections under the broader “Dalit” identity, while using the nomenclatures of “Tamil” and “Dravidian” identity on one hand, and pursuing greater allocation of benefits for individual SC-jatis on the other. Moreover, these parties also allied with other small parties working for the interests of middle castes on the plank of broader Tamil interests, and at times Tamil nationalist interests.

VCK Leader Thol Thirumavalavan. Credit: PTI

The Turn of the 21st Century

The following decade saw SC parties working in tandem with the dominant Dravidian parties, who also have a strong cadre and vote share of SCs from all the individual SC-jatis. The Dravidian parties – influenced by E.V. Ramasamy, whose understanding of caste system has its points of congruence with Ambedkar – have a long history of interventions against caste oppression and have always been keen on addressing the issues concerning the SCs.

In the context of Arunthathiyars, the DMK elected V.P. Duraisamy, an Arunthathiyar, as the deputy speaker of the Tamil Nadu legislative assembly for two terms, 1989-91 and 2006-11, and nominated him to the Rajya Sabha in 1995. Further, in 2009, in response to the demands from the community and groups like the ATP, the Karunanidhi-led DMK government passed the TN Arunthathiyar Special Reservation Act based on the recommendations of the Justice M.S. Janarthanam Committee. The Act grouped seven individual SC-jatis together as Arunthathiyars and carved out a sub-category within the SCs, which was given 3% out of the 18% reservation for SCs in the state.

The AIADMK, on its part, has elected Dhanapal, also an Aruthathiyar, as the speaker of the legislative assembly. Moreover, between the 1950s and 2016, over 35 MLAs across parties have been Arunthathiyars. In other words, the SC mobilisation in TN has ensured all three elements of Nancy Fraser’s triad – recognition, redistribution and representation vis-a-vis all SC-jatis at varying degrees.

As a result, the BJP is left with little scope to accentuate hostility among individual SC-jatis, unlike in UP, where the BSP catered almost exclusively to Jatavs. Moreover, the interventions by SC leaders like A. Raja (Dravidian-fold) and Thirumavalavan (Panthers-fold) are not restricted to the particularities of the SCs or their specific grievances, which serve as evidence to the mainstreaming of the marginalised communities.

Also Read: Can the BJP Breach the South?

Vilifying agency and a turn to patronage?

The homegrown right-wing organisations and the BJP in Tamil Nadu have been wary and at times cynical of the rise of marginalised communities. Two instances are considered in this context. Firstly, the leader of the Hindu Makkal Katchi [Hindu People’s Party] (HMK), which pledges its support to the BJP, calls Athiyaman, the leader of the ATP, unfit to represent the Arunthathiyars as he is a Christian. Also, Thirumavalavan, is tagged as a non-Hindu (Buddhist), thereby regarded unfit to raise the qualms of the SCs.

Secondly, the suicide of Anitha, a Dalit girl who could not secure a medical seat owing to the introduction of NEET (National Eligibility cum Entrance Test) in 2017, is noteworthy. The death of Anitha was preceded by the indifference of the governments, both state and Centre in taking a firm stance against NEET, while it was stalled in TN since its introduction until the demise of former chief minister J. Jayalalithaa. The whole of TN came together in solidarity with Anitha and protested against NEET. However, responses from the other side were two-fold. First, the PTP, which was working towards the exclusion of DKVs from the SC list, welcomed NEET and disregarded the death of Anitha.

Also Read: It’s Time to Defang ‘Meritocracy’, an Argument That Claims Lives

The BJP’s Murugan, as the vice chairman of the NCSC, sought to blame Anitha’s death on ‘external pressure’ and reiterated the need for NEET to foster competitiveness among students, a justification that alludes to the merit argument placed against the marginalised. In other words, Murugan’s statement belittled the state-wide emotion around Anitha’s death.

Tamil Nadu has been witnessing massive protests by students unions and youth outfits ever since the death of Anitha. Credit: PTI

A protest in Tamil Nadu to ban NEET after the death of Anitha. Photo: PTI

At this juncture, elevating Murugan, who is both located within the conventional Hindu fold and talks the language of the privileged, as a true representative of the SCs or Arunthathiyars is a move that hints at the BJP’s patronising approach towards the SCs, which is more feudal than the Harijan project, and is inimical to the idea of instilling agency among marginalised groups.

Vignesh Karthik K.R. is a PhD student at the King’s India Institute, King’s College London. Jeyannathann Karunanithi is a political analyst based in Chennai.

Federalism Is at the Heart of DMK’s Tryst With Jammu and Kashmir

The DMK’s opposition to the sidelining of Kashmiris while diluting Article 370 is rooted in urging the Centre to abide by the Constitution.

The discussion around the dilution of Article 370 and the reorganisation of the state of Jammu and Kashmir saw zealous participation of the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK), the third-largest party in the Lok Sabha. On August 22, DMK MPs reached the heart of the country’s capital and staged a protest at Jantar Mantar. The event saw addresses by leaders across parties in the opposition and demanded the release of political leaders of the state. Earlier this month, the DMK voted against the Bill in parliament.

A few questions are worth answering. What lies at the core of DMK’s opposition? Can one trace this back to similar actions in the past and if so, how similar are the actions? Why is DMK doing this? How does this play out in the larger framework of the ‘idea of India’?

The what and how

The DMK’s opposition in the Lok Sabha started with MP T.R. Baalu’s speech, where he remarked that the Bill “does not reflect the will of the people” and further went on to say, “the net result is that you are making a mighty state government into a municipality. Two municipalities are being created”.

Also Read: Opposition Leaders Come Together in Show of Solidarity With J&K

Subsequently, an all-party meeting was called on August 10. The party took a stand and began to incisively question the means adopted by the government through its spokespersons. The protest in Delhi marked the culmination of the opposition to the government’s move. The demands were two-fold i.e., the release of political leaders and lifting restrictions imposed on the public. The members of the ruling party tagged the DMK as anti-national, separatist, terror-sympathiser etc. That said, the party’s focus on federalism and human rights garnered wider support across parties in the opposition.

Notes from the past

To understand how the Kashmir issue falls within the scope of politics espoused by the DMK, one needs to go back to the days of anti-Hindi imposition protests of the 1950s. These protests, among other things, paved the way for the assertion of distinctness (if not uniqueness) by a community of people from a region within the Indian nation. In a famous speech delivered in April 1962 in the Rajya Sabha, the DMK’s chief C.N. Annadurai remarked:

“I belong to the Dravidian stock. I am proud to call myself a Dravidian. That does not mean that I am against a Bengali or a Maharashtrian or a Gujarati. As Robert Burns has stated, ‘A man is a man for all that’. I say that I belong to the Dravidian stock and that is only because I consider that the Dravidians have got something concrete, something distinct, something different to offer to the nation at large. Therefore it is that we want self-determination.” 

Such calls for self-determination were brought to control with the enactment of the 16th Amendment Act of the Indian Constitution also known as the Anti-Secession Bill. That said, the aspect of diversity and its significance in the making of India raised by Annadurai in his speech remained relevant.

The focus subsequently shifted from the sidelines to the constitutional realm i.e., division of powers, state autonomy and the spirit of federalism, which found takers across the nation. This led to a series of developments between the late 60s and mid-80s.

It started with the Centre-State Relations Inquiry Committee constituted by then chief minister M. Karunanidhi in 1969, also called the Rajamannar Committee, which recommended the setting up of an inter-state council that would oversee and approve legislations affecting states and the federal structure. It also recommended prudent use of Article 356.

Five years later, in 1974, the DMK passed a resolution in the Tamil Nadu legislative assembly urging the Union government to implement the Rajamannar Committee recommendations to ensure ideal federalism.

Also Read: Lessons from the Supreme Court on Cooperative Federalism

With the Emergency (1975-77), serving as an exposition of the scope offered by Indian Constitution to the Union government to unilaterally disrupt the democratic and federal tendencies, the question of ‘Centre-State relations’ garnered further support, with the ‘West Bengal Referendum’ (1977), a resolution passed by A.K. Antony as chief minister of Kerala (1978) and discussions in the Conference of South Indian Chief Ministers (1983) led by Ramakrishna Hegde.

Eventually, the Sarkaria Commission was set up in 1983 to deliberate on the Centre-state relations by the Indira Gandhi led Central government. It is also worth noting that during the Emergency years, Tamil Nadu and Gujarat refused to ratify the amendment in the Constitution of India that sought to make the proclamation of Emergency non-justiciable.

The Kashmir question

While Annadurai had commented about the internal politics of Jammu and Kashmir as early as 1948, even before the DMK’s inception, the party’s significant contribution in the issues pertaining to Jammu and Kashmir can be located in the historic Srinagar Conference (1983) that led to the ‘Srinagar Resolution’. This conference saw the participation of 17 political parties and talks delivered by 59 leaders, effectively communicating the need for a movement to bolster the principle of federalism and its realisation in practice.

Also Read: In Case Against Shehla Rashid, a Glimpse Into Centre’s Approach to Kashmir Crisis

It is worth noting that in the conference, lines from ‘Hail, The Dawn! written by Annadurai, published in Home Rule (January 1969) were evoked.

“We have a federal structure. That is why the framers of the Constitution wanted a federal structure and not a unitary structure, because many political philosophers have pointed out, India is so vast – in fact it has been described as a sub-continent – the mental health is so varied, the traditions so different, the history so varied that there cannot be a steel framed unitary structure here.”

After taking over the mantle from Annadurai, Karunanidhi and the party always articulately defended regional identities on the grounds of plurality espoused by the constitution makers as against reductive ethnic distinctiveness.

Former DMK chief M. Karunanidhi. Photo: Facebook

In this context, one can argue that the press statement released by the DMK on August 19 opposing the sidelining of Kashmiris in the decision taken on their future evokes the faint memory of the collective efforts in negotiating the federal rights with the Centre, that was common between Jammu & Kashmir and Tamil Nadu, right from the times of Annadurai. Put otherwise, this is not a support for separatism, but a move to urge the government to abide by the Constitution and its values.

One can argue that the protest staged by the DMK around liberty and federalism, when seen as metonyms for the upkeep of diversity, conveys the larger message regarding the idea of building an inclusive India – both in its structure and spirit.

Vignesh Karthik K.R. is a PhD student at the King’s India Institute, King’s College London. Jeyannathann Karunanithi is a political analyst based in Chennai.

What Happens to the ‘Many’ in BJP’s India of ‘One Nation, One Constitution’?

A hard unitary framework could cost the nation its invaluable diversity.

Following the reading down of Article 370 of the constitution of India in the first week of August 2019, the Bharatiya Janata Party-led government has decided to launch an outreach programme across the country in September, to spread awareness about its decision.

Union minister for Jal Shakti, Gajendra Singh Shekhawat has remarked, “The outreach programme will focus on informing the people about the importance of the decision. The dream of ‘one nation, one constitution’ has been fulfilled by Prime Minister Narendra Modi.”


In this context, it would be pertinent to discuss the idea of India and its plurality envisioned by the constitution in letter and spirit.

The debates around Centre-state relations have been extensive ever since the late 1960s, through the 70s, culminating in the Sarkaria Commission of 1983, whose report continues to be widely referred and quoted. The trigger to these developments can be located in the difference in the tenor of the constituent assembly debates between pre-and post-Partition periods.

Also read: Neither Abrogated Nor Removed: The Ploy Behind Centre’s Article 370 Move

Kripalani on a 1989 stamp of India. Photo: Wikimedia Commons

For instance, in November 1946, at the 54th Annual Congress Session, the then president, J.B. Kriplani – a renowned Gandhian – spoke in favour of maximum autonomy to the states and regarded centralisation as inimical to liberty (Kriplani, 1948).  Such ideas around maximum autonomy to states took a hit in the post-Partition phase and safeguards were put in place within the constitution to ensure territorial integrity of the country.

Commenting on the emergency provisions contained in Article 365, which is one such safeguard, during the constituent assembly debates on November 15, 1949, Biswanath Das from Odisha remarked:

“Why is it that we want to look into the horrors of revolt of the states? That means failure of the president and the cabinet. If the states get out of control and try to revolt, then it would mean that there is not that cordial a relation between the government of the Union and the states, and anybody who is not a lawyer – even a layman like myself – when he reads this constitution which we are shaping, will see that it does not leave the provinces any power. The provinces are today glorified municipalities and corporations. If that be so, why go to the horrors of Article 365? We are not going to evolve a fascists´ democracy. We are going to evolve democracy. Why this fear? Why this suspicion?”

In other words, scholars have argued that the federal characteristics of the constitution are strong enough to let the states assert themselves only to the degree to which the Centre lets them. A majority government can go ahead to effect changes to a region even without the consensus of a given state.

The 1950s and 1960s saw instances of both confrontation and accommodation by the Centre, be it the events that transpired in 1953 in Jammu and Kashmir or the States Reorganisation Act (1956). On the other hand, the dominant party of the day, the Indian National Congress had a number of regional leaders who enjoyed considerable freedom and popularity.

Regional aspirations found expression steadily both in the formation of new states and in support from the Centre in according exemptions to them on specific matters. This process got a fillip after the defeat of Congress in six state elections in 1967. The ball was set in motion with the Rajamannar Committee constituted by the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam, a party known to be an advocate of federal autonomy.

The fall-out in the Indian National Congress and the Indira Gandhi-led government through the 1970s was marked by majoritarian tendencies. In response, this period also saw the emergence of regional leaders and parties who opposed these tendencies. Furthermore, the period saw a rich discussion around Centre-state relations, which also helped a lot of regional groups negotiate with the Centre for better autonomy and exemptions to help their interests. 

Role of regional parties

Towards the 1990s, the coalition government led by V.P. Singh, was the coming of a time when the regional parties played a significant role in the formation of central governments. This electoral development provided a leverage for the parties from states with sub-national identities to negotiate their space within the larger framework. Moreover, the voices from sections within national parties who subscribed to a narrow idea of the nation at the cost of linguistic diversity and economic aspirations of states mellowed down. 

The examples, Jammu and Kashmir, Telangana, and Nagaland to name a few, provide us with an array of decisions made by successive governments since Independence, revealing the pacifying influence provided by the empathetic hearing of demands or grievances of concerned sections of people.

Given the constitutional constraints discussed earlier, it can be argued that the negotiations from various regions were weighed only to a limited extent towards hard structural power relations or autonomy and more towards space for expression and conservation of their distinctiveness.

This in a way, makes the negotiation very personal to the people belonging to such identities or cultures. Therefore, creating a space for the democratic political class to put forward the interests of people and the subsequent accommodation of the same was necessary. Consequently, the diversity in thought and being thus found expression and evolved to become constituent elements of India.

Also read: Meet the Original Anti-Nationals

Put otherwise, the exhibition of dissent against a dominant Centre while negotiating specific demands was not confronted with the tag of being anti-national. As a result, it helped with both quelling the spirit of secession and accommodating differences towards making an inclusive framework.

A telling example of such accommodation is Article 371. To site a few others, one could talk of Schedule 6 of the Constitution, policy on official language, and so on. This was possible because a large section of the political class of the period foregrounded the spirit of pluralism in the political realm and attempted to accommodate the same constitutionally too at varying degrees. 

The question currently confronting the plurality and federal structure of India is: will a majority government push for a hard unitary framework by misusing the constitutional provisions and demonise its own people? With the cost being the nation’s invaluable diversity, it does not sound like a good prospect. 

Vignesh Karthik K.R. is a doctoral student at the King’s India Institute, King’s College London. Jeyannathann Karunanithi is a political analyst based in Chennai.