In an exclusive investigation, Logically has found that Farhatullah Ghauri, a terrorist recruiter and financier for Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), a Pakistan-backed terror group, is using a network of accounts on Facebook, Telegram, and YouTube to amplify terrorist propaganda videos targeting religious minorities in the country. JeM is the group responsible for several terror attacks in India, including the February 2019 Pulwama bombing that led to the death of 40 Indian security personnel.
The network was identified by Logically before it could accrue a significant audience peaking with 200-400 subscribers across all the accounts. The terrorist propaganda has circulated across other encrypted messaging channels on Telegram, including those affiliated with Islamabad-backed proxy terror groups claiming to operate in the Kashmir region, such as the Hizbul Mujahideen and The Resistance Front.
Closer scrutiny of the amplification patterns of the videos on Facebook since January 2022 suggests a concerted attempt by malicious actors to post the videos in Facebook groups and pages dedicated to socialism, Islam, and minority rights. These groups are frequented by larger, more mainstream audiences of domestic users who are critical of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government. Moreover, these coordinated online campaigns coincide with offline incidents of communal violence in the country, revealing how malicious actors abroad are leveraging major social media platforms to exploit domestic tensions and radicalise the minority population.
Who is Farhatullah Ghauri?
Farhatullah Ghauri is listed among 38 individuals as a terrorist by the Indian Ministry of Home Affairs under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (amended in 2019). Also known as Abu Sufiyan, Ghuar is originally from Kurmaguda district in Hyderabad and primarily known for being a terrorist financier. He fled to Saudi Arabia in 1994 and finally settled in Pakistan in 2015.
In addition to being a close associate of Masood Azhar, a United Nations designated terrorist and the founder of JeM, Farhatullah is personally implicated by Indian intelligence services for planning and facilitating a series of terror attacks in the country. These attacks include an improvised explosive device (IED) attack at Sai Baba Temple in Saroornagar in 2002, a fidayeen (suicide) attack on the Akshardham Temple complex in Gujarat the same year, a suicide bomb attack targeting the Hyderabad City Police Commissioner’s Task Force office at Begumpet in 2005 and the attempted assassination of Nallu Indrasena Reddy, an Indian politician and current national secretary of the BJP in 2017.
According to intelligence from Indian agencies, Ghauri facilitates and finances these attacks without actively participating in them. He also actively recruits and indoctrinates individuals, including funding their travel from India to Dubai and Pakistan for radicalisation and training.
In April 2022, The Print reported on how the fugitive financier had decided to shed decades of anonymity in favour of amplifying propaganda on social media by following a more overt approach towards recruitment centered on personal outreach within close circles mediated by clerics and family ties. Through this approach, he seeks to recruit Indian Muslims to carry out domestic terror attacks on behalf of several other groups, namely, Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), symbolic of a broader effort by jihadist groups to leverage popular digital communication platforms to appeal to a new generation of ‘Jihad volunteers’ by exploiting domestic communal tensions.
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A clash of civilisations
As part of this investigation, Logically identified three encrypted Telegram channels, two associated Facebook pages, and three YouTube channels operated by the group.
Identifying the network
The three encrypted Telegram channels, two associated Facebook pages, and three YouTube channels operated by the group were all created from February to June of this year. During the course of the investigation, the content moderation teams took down one Telegram channel and one Facebook page linked to the group.
As with its other accounts managed by the outfit, the extremist recruitment videos amplified on the Telegram channels were also accompanied by targeted hashtags to expose the content to Indian-Muslim users frequenting the platform.
The group also used the Telegram channels to highlight the broader network of assets controlled by the organisation. A post uploaded on one of the Telegram channels on April 11, 2022, described the organisation as the ‘voice of Muslimeen in India’ and shared links to other accounts controlled by the organisation on Facebook, Telegram, YouTube, and Justpaste.it.
Justpaste.it is a free website that allows users to upload text and images to the site and distribute it via a link. It was previously used as a hosting platform by members of the erstwhile Islamic State of Syria and the Levant (ISIL) to upload propaganda and bypass content moderation policies of major social media platforms. The accounts also use tlgur.com, a similar free content hosting service and streamable.com, a video hosting website, to archive and amplify the extremist videos.
The network on Telegram cross-posts links to the YouTube channels created by the group suggesting an attempt to diversify their online footprint and leverage YouTube’s more extensive user base in the country. Posts from these channels are also amplified in other Telegram channels affiliated with Islamabad-backed proxy terror groups in the region, including Hizbul Mujahideen and The Resistance Front, suggesting that despite failing to accrue mainstream appeal, the videos had found an audience in online fora frequented by local terrorist sympathizers.
While platform officials also took down the main Telegram channel of the outlet, the group created a replacement channel which remains active at the time of publication, albeit with a smaller audience than the original channel.
Cycles of instability
According to the latest figures from January 2022 from Data Reportal, social media usage in India continues to skyrocket, with over 467 million users. Terrorist and extremist groups will persist in leveraging the anonymity and audience offered by social media platforms to amplify their extremist narratives, recruit disenfranchised and disaffected local youth, venerate dead and captured terrorists, and coordinate attacks against the Indian security services.
Pakistan-backed proxy terror groups will also seek to capitalise on the clash between communal groups and these offline incidents of unrest and incorporate them into propaganda videos. These videos are then disseminated across major social media platforms in a bid to foster the next generation of homegrown extremists. If left unchecked, the interplay between the fringe elements from both groups will likely continue to erode societal cohesion in India and portend a cycle of violence and domestic instability over the long term.
Ayushman Kaul is a Senior Threat Intelligence Analyst with a strong focus on geopolitics, violence perpetrated by non-state actors, cyber and information security in the South Asian regional context.
This article was originally published on Logically.