Karan Thapar: Hello and welcome to a special interview for The Wire. Once again, India-Pakistan relations are in a state of confusion. Some would even say, in a state of controversy. With me to talk about the pervading situation is one of India’s most highly-regarded former high commissioner to Pakistan, Sharat Sabharwal.
Mr Sabharwal, Let’s start with Sushma Swaraj’s speech at the United Nations last week. She said: “We believe that talks are the only rational means to resolve the most complex disputes.” Doesn’t that thought conflict with the Indian government’s stated position that talks and terror cannot go side by side?
‘Terror and talks cannot go together’
Sharat Sabharwal: The major problem, as you know, lies on the Pakistani side – which is the unwillingness of their security establishment to give up their instrumentality of terror. But there is a problem on our side also. I would like to take you back a few years to the closing years of the UPA government when a strong body of opinion had emerged that most of the problems with Pakistan were because we were weak-kneed, we were following a soft policy – that if we had only followed a muscular policy, all our problems with Pakistan would be solved.
Now, muscularity was not defined but to the extent that it was discernible from the outburst of its proponents on TV channels and so on. It had two elements – one, immediate retribution for every misdemeanour from Pakistan and second, terror and talks cannot go together. Now, this is the policy which is now causing some problems for us because it leaves no room for manoeuvre. At that time, elections were coming and therefore the presumption was this was geared towards the elections, but it has come to acquire a life of its own. Significant sections of the political class are strategic experts, are TV commentators and so on. So, I would say, yes, in the presence of this policy, we can discuss later on why I believe this policy doesn’t address the complex reality that faces us. But in the presences of this policy, it is clear that it’s very difficult to take any steps.
Thapar: Just to clarify your position – You are saying that we had developed that because we were weak-kneed, we were losing out to Pakistan, we ended up with a muscular policy and boxed ourselves into a corner. We are losing options that otherwise we should have. Is that what you are saying?
Sabharwal: That’s right and as I believe, this does not address the complex reality that we are facing.
Thapar: Why doesn’t it address that reality. Can you explain that?
Sabharwal: Well, you know the point is that Pakistan is not a monolith when it comes to India. There are multiple constituencies that we face there – we have the army, we have their terror proxies, we have politicians hanging on to their court tales who see no sense in a good relationship with India. In fact, they believe that low-level tensions with India is in their institutional interest. You then have politicians capable of winning power through electoral politics who believe that stabilisation of relationship with India would undercut the salience of the army in Pakistan.
You have a large section of the business communities and industries which want to open up the trade and economic relationship with India. When I was the high commissioner in Pakistan, there was a big push for that. Eventually, it fell through because we had tensions mounting from January 2013 onwards when two of our soldiers fell to the bullets of Pakistani assailants and their bodies were mutilated. But there is this strong constituency also when you talk about the people of Pakistan. The people’s focus in on bread and butter issues. It’s only during periods of tensions that they are driven into the arms of the Pakistani army. So now this idea that terror and talks cannot go together addresses only one part of this spectrum which is the army and those who are aligned with the army. We have to look at the total picture.
Thapar: And that total picture and its complexity is being ignored?
Sabharwal: That we are ignoring when we say terror and talks cannot go together.
Thapar: So in a sense, this is a narrow approach that is failing to understand the complexity of Pakistan and as a result of which we aren’t responding to Pakistan in the way we should and we could, had we been more open in our attitude to the country. It also means that Sushma Swaraj’s words at the UN, when she says that talks are the only rational means to resolve the most complex of disputes, actually is the contradiction with the terror-and-talks-can’t-go-together policy.
Sabharwal: I would also say that we have to admit that this government tried to stabilise the relationship. None of those efforts succeeded. Some because the response from the Pakistani side was offensive. When the prime minister went to Lahore, for example, followed by Pathankot, which made it very difficult for the government. But also because of this, ‘terror and talks cannot go together’, which has acquired a life of its own in India. That makes it very difficult, leaves no room for manoeuvre.
Thapar: Let me put it like this – It’s often said that Le Duc Tho and Henry Kissinger could continue talking to each other even when their countries were at war. How do you respond to the view that India-Pakistan talks should be both uninterrupted and uninterruptible?
Sabharwal: My view is that there are occasions when it becomes very difficult for an elected government to carry on with that policy. I have in mind Mumbai. When Mumbai (attack) happens or something like that happens, it becomes extremely difficult for a democratic government to carry on with talks as if nothing had happened. This is what I told my Pakistani audiences always. But should every incident, every act of terror from Pakistan lead to that situation? I would say no. So there are situations where talks will get interrupted if something of that scale happens. But if it keeps on happening and every small incident is to lead to it, then I am afraid it leaves no room for manoeuvre. Then we can address only one constituency and not all the other constituencies that I spoke about.
Pakistan army
Thapar: So we need a more calibrated approach. We need to be clearer in our mind what sort of incident will interrupt talks and what sort of incidents needs to be taken as part of the reason why we are talking rather than the interruption of the talks. Let me put this way – It is often said in India that India’s best relationship with Pakistan is when the army is in power in Islamabad. That being the case, should we also find a way of talking to the Pakistan army chief in the middle of establishment? After all, countries like Russia, the US, China, even little Afghanistan regularly talk to the Pakistan army chief. Should we follow suit?
Sabharwal: I am of the view Karan that the Pakistan army has not changed its worldview. In that worldview, a normal relationship with India is not in their institutional interest. In fact, low-level tensions with India is something which they continue to regard as being in their institutional interest. Now, there are two different things – one is to change Pakistan’s behaviour and the other is to manage the relationship. Now to manage the relationship, I believe we should be willing to talk to any and everyone who is willing to talk to us, including the army. We can talk to the chief, there are other channels through which you can talk to them if they are willing to talk to you. You know they are not always willing to talk to you but if they are willing to talk to you, certainly for managing the relationship. But if the assumption is that by talking to them you are going to transform the nature of this relationship, that’s not going to happen till they change their worldview.
Thapar: Except it is possible that a process that is intended to manage could lead to an understanding that also eventually, further down the road, changes the relationship. That transition is possible.
Sabharwal: Yeah, Well you know you can never rule out miracles and this is my assessment that until their worldview changes, management yes – to bring down the levels of violence, manage this relationship by reducing tensions and so on. But a transformation, I don’t think that is possible by talking.
Thapar: But for management, talk to anyone including the army chief if he is willing to talk to you.
Sabharwal: Including the army, through whatever context. Yes, if they are willing to talk to.
American intervention
Thapar: Last week, speaking to the Asia Society New York, Pakistan’s foreign minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi said that Pakistan was going to ask America for assistance, easing the relationship with India as a quid pro quo for Pakistan assisting President Donald Trump with his plans to stabilise Afghanistan. Do you believe America might agree? And secondly, what should India’s response be if that happens?
Sabharwal: This is nothing new Karan. Pakistanis have done this all the time and their position is a little conflicted I must tell you. Traditionally, they used to say that Americans should intervene and resolve the problems between India and Pakistan. When I was the high commissioner, many audiences to which I spoke, they raised questions. They said why are you building the closer relationship with the Americans. Our relation with them hasn’t worked and so on and so forth. So you know, the equations had changed there and you know I often used to ask them. Look, you used to tell us that you should be utilising the good offices of the Americans to solve our problems and now you are saying something different. Qureshi has said nothing new, I believe. The Americans, I don’t think will intervene openly. They know our position which is that it is a bilateral issue. You know whatever issues we have is a bilateral matter and we don’t want a third party intervention. Behind the scenes, they may be talking to us all the time.
Thapar: But we therefore shouldn’t overreact to what Qureshi said to the Asia Society?
Sabharwal: No, not at all. This is nothing new.
Thapar: Take it in our stride.
Sabharwal: Take it in our stride. This has been happening in the past also.
The Sushma-Qureshi meeting
Thapar: Lets come at this point Mr Sabharwal to the talks that were scheduled between the two foreign ministers in New York which then got cancelled within 24 hours of being scheduled. To begin with, there is a viewpoint that I want to put to you. Some people say: Was India wise in the first place to agree to these talks at a time when the situation in Kashmir is fast-deteriorating and we squarely blame the Pakistanis for it and 24-48 hours after a BSF jawan had been killed and his throat slit and just days before India was going to actually celebrate surgical-strike day? In those circumstances, was it wise to agree to talks?
Sabharwal: Look, I have been of the view that Imran Khan’s election to the office of prime minister was made possible by solid backing of Pakistan army. Having said that, I was also one of those who supported Prime Minister Modi’s reaching out to Imran Khan on the logic that you cannot ignore your neighbour. Whoever is in power there, you have to talk to him; we have dealt with military dictators. So, therefore, why shouldn’t we talk to someone like Imran Khan regardless of the circumstances of his election. Now, given that, I think it is a right step for us to take to have a meeting with the foreign ministers and we rightly announced that this wasn’t going to be a resumption of the structured dialogue and that this was meant to be an exploratory meeting within new dispensation. Now, in that light, I think it was the reasonable thing to do. But of course, you know with whatever ends, that incident had happened I know, that became a cause for cancellation. But to have planned a surgical strike, day two days later, that I think could have been avoided.
Thapar: You know, you said that Imran Khan was elected with the solid support of the army. Yet, it was Imran Khan who actually wrote to the Indian prime minister suggesting talks and saying that he was happy to discuss terror in particular. Could it be a case that this offer from Imran Khan actually had a tacit support of the army. Would he have written such a letter specifically offering to talk about terror if the army was opposed to the idea?
Sabharwal: That, of course, is the advantage of having someone who is beholden to the army, you will not have false starts. So when he makes an offer, you can be sure that he has discussed it with the army and so on. Now, I am not saying that his offer meant that they were going to roll back terror and give up the instrumentality of terror and sort of transform the nature of relationship. But here was an opportunity to explore if with this new dispensation we could work to reduce the tensions, we could bring down the levels of violence, to end the volatility of relationship that we have seen over the last four or five years.
Thapar: Let me take up this point that the talks are going to be exploratory and not the start of the structured dialogue process. Just how exploratory would they have been, clearly the two sides, had they met in New York, would have talked about terror and clearly that would have meant talking about Kashmir because that’s where the terror happens. In addition, the MEA spokesperson had made it clear that access to the Kartarpur Gurdwara would also be raised, that’s another fundamental issue. In this instance, therefore, aren’t we talking of a situation where the talks would have been pretty substantive. Obviously, they wouldn’t have been a structured dialogue but they wouldn’t have just been a hello chat or getting to know each other chat.
Sabharwal: No, they would be substantive in the sense of an exploratory meeting. We haven’t talked for a long time as you know, in a structured dialogue. So this would have been an opportunity for the two ministers to talk for us to assess what the Pakistanis were willing to offer. At least are they willing to roll back their terror machines to end the volatility in relationship and so on and then take it from there to see. This is how I saw it!
Thapar: And how useful would this have been?
Sabharwal: This would have been useful. When a new dispensation comes to power, you have to have exploratory talks with them. First to see what they intend to do, what are they willing to do? And then take it on from there.
Thapar: In that case, let’s come to the fact that 24 hours after the talks were announced, they were called off. What do you make of that?
Sabharwal: We did that and that made us come across as very fickle-minded Karan, if I may say so. And it was done on the grounds which were not convincing at all. We spoke of the brutal killing of our army personnel by Pakistani entities but as you said, we knew that one of our soldiers had fallen to their bullets a day before his body has been mutilated. It is true that three policemen were killed after the talks were announced. But that has been happening, the killing of J&K policemen have been happening before the talks were announced also. We spoke of issuance of postage stamps glorifying terrorists and so on. And that happened in July and then we spoke of the true face of Imran Khan having been revealed. That raises two questions – one, didn’t we know the true face of Imran Khan a day earlier? Two, I asked myself, was it necessary for us to attack him personally?
Look, for better or worse, he is the civilian face of the army. Better or worse, he is going to be there and remain the civilian face of Pakistan for some time to come. So, whenever we re-commence engagement, we will be talking to him, we will be engaging with him, his government. So was it necessary for us to attack him personally almost in an attempt to burn our boats with him? Now his reaction was also not wise. He is no great statesman to call elected leaders ‘small men’ and so on. But this whole thing, I think, could have been avoided. Announcing it one day and cancelling it the next day on the grounds which are not very convincing.
Thapar: Would the world have picked this up and noted that India is (to use your word) fickle? That India is impetuous? That india seems to be uncertain and unsure?
Sabharwal: It doesn’t give a good impression to the outside world. That’s not the impression we wish to convey.
Thapar: Let’s briefly pick up on the two reasons actually given for calling off talks. First was that three policemen have been killed in Shopian. Now as both the Hindustan Times and The Hindu have reported, 37 police officials have fallen to militant bullets this year alone in Kashmir. Separately, 13 BSF jawans have died either on the line of control or the international border. If the death of 50 had not precluded the talks being called, isn’t it a bit strange that the death of three should have scuppered?
Sabharwal: That’s the point I made. The reasons given were not convincing. I wish we had given some convincing reasons if at all we had to cancel the talks.
Thapar: And the second reason, that the postal stamps issued by Pakistan were offensive because they glorified people in terror and terrorists including Burhan Wani. Those postal stamps were actually issued not just in July but before Imran Khan took over. You can hardly blame the Imran Khan government for something that happened when he wasn’t even the prime minister.
Sabharwal: That’s the point I made earlier.
Thapar: So then why do you think the talks fell out? What was the real reason? Because it seems that the officially given reasons are not convincing. Is there a subterranean hidden reason that we not be officially told about?
Sabharwal: That’s what I spoke of earlier. This muscularity constituency has come to acquire a life of its own. And you know when the position that we take is terror and talks cannot go together, it’s a very rigid position. It leaves you no room for manoeuvre. And this muscular constituency reacted very strongly, I feel. You know the question alway arises – look you said terror and talks cannot go together. Terror continues, why are going for talks? And that may have forced the hand of the government to cancel the talk.
Thapar: Is it possible that there may have been a constituency within the government or within the BJP that actually fought back or pushed the prime minister to change the decision they had taken even though in doing so the prime minister and government embarrassed itself?
Sabharwal: Look, the muscularity within the constituency which I spoke of, it comprises a significant section of our political class including within the ruling party. You know our strategic experts, our TV studios now which are actively involved in discussions on these issues and sometimes very jingoistic positions are taken. So it is this whole constituency which then reacts to any move whatsoever.
Thapar: So, in other words, muscularity has created a multi-headed monster that we cannot control, that has the capacity to check us even when we want to do something. It becomes an obstacle to our own intentions.
Sabharwal: I think we have painted ourselves into a corner by doing this thing.
Thapar: Do you think the government is aware of this?
Sabharwal: As I said, they did make attempts to stabilise the relationship which means they are realising the importance of stabilising this relationship, election rhetoric apart. The same thing was happening, for example, when I was high commissioner towards the end of the tenure of the UPA government because of the strong reaction each time. Each time you took a little step, it was said that this was weak-kneed; this was biryani diplomacy; this was surrender to Pakistan so on and so forth. And the same situation continues.
Thapar: So there is the real sense in which we are hoist by our own petard.
Sabharwal: Yes, in a sense, yes.
Sushma Swaraj’s comments on Pakistan at the UN
Thapar: A moment ago, you were critical of the language that was used by the Indian side when the talks were called off, Pakistan’s evil agenda was spoken off, evil agenda was spoken about, personal comments were made about the prime minister saying that the true face of the new prime minister has been revealed. Let me draw your attention to what Sushma Swaraj said of Pakistan at United Nations. Just a few days later, she said Pakistan is an expert in trying to mask malevolence with verbal duplicity. How would that language have gone down at the UN.
Sabharwal: You know sometimes, it needs to be said. It is a reality, it is a fact that Pakistan has brazenly carried on with the instrumentality of terror. So I make a distinction there. I have some view on whether we should talk at that length at the UN general assembly about Pakistan, we can come to that a little later. But having said that, look it is quite clear that they have carried out brazenly and you know there is duplicity involved. They would say ‘Let’s cooperate on terror; let’s talk about terror’ and so on. And under the surface, all that activity is carried on.
Thapar: So there are times when you need to call a spade a spade.
Sabharwal: You need to say that. So I make a distinction between what she said here and our personal criticism of Imran Khan saying, his real face has been revealed.
Thapar: The reason why I bring Sushma Swaraj’s comments at the United Nations is because Shashi Tharoor, a former senior UN official who understands the United Nations, having worked there for most of his life, has gone on record to say that not just were Sushma Swaraj’s words aimed and directed at voters in India but more importantly, they would not project India internationally in a constructive and positive light. You disagree there?
Sabharwal: On this particular aspect, I would disagree. This duplicity of Pakistan needs to be said. Now it’s a whole different question as I said whether we should have talked at that length about Pakistan in our UNGA speech. But if you speak about it, there is no harm in talking about Pakistan’s duplicity.
Thapar: Lets come to the length at which the issue of Pakistan and terror was raised by Swaraj in a UN speech. The Indian Express says that she has spent seven minutes, which is almost one third of her 22-minute speech, on the subject of terror, which I assume, is a code for Pakistan. You believe that it is excessive, not understandable.
Sabharwal: I believe our reference to Pakistan could have been much shorter for the record, saying that Jammu and Kashmir is an integral part of India, that Pakistan should stop interfering in our internal affairs, return the territory illegally occupied, stop exporting terror to India and so on. Something needs to be said for the record and this could have been said, but Karan I have sat through Indo-Pak sparring in UN meetings and I know nobody else pays attention to what we say. If at all they pay attention, they sit in boredom/amusement.
Secondly, Pakistanis always try to bring us down to their own level of debate and they are very frustrated when we do not rise to their bait. So my view has always been that it should always bear short reference for the record. Having said that, I must also admit that there has been no uniform policy. There have been governments I remember, Mr Gujral’s government which gave a dismissive response to Pakistan’s hands on terror. There are others including the current one which believes in giving a detailed reply. And I believe this is all basically with the eye on their constituency back home. In fact, both countries, if I may say so, speak at that length, our positions are very well-known on our relationship, on Jammu and Kashmir. So when we speak time and again at length, it is their eye on the constituencies back home.
‘We cannot agree on a definition of terror’
Thapar: Now one of the issues that Swaraj did raise was the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism, which India, I believe, proposed in 1996. Although the United Nations still hasn’t endorsed and accepted it. In that context, she said, ‘On the one hand we want to fight terrorism, on the other, we cannot define it’. And that is clearly a problem. How does India set about solving this?
Sabharwal: I don’t see it getting resolved. That’s a legitimate point to make. You know this is the convention that we proposed, and it has not been finalised for so long because we cannot agree on a definition of terror. And that’s a difficulty. Pakistan would say they are freedom fighters. There are other countries who have interest in the matter and so on. A legitimate point to make – but if you are asking me is it going to resolve anytime soon? I would say no.
Thapar: In fact, that is the key problem, isn’t it? That in many instances one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter and it’s not just India and Pakistan over Kashmir, that they can’t agree what is terror, what is terrorism. It is also true of the Palestine organisation Hummus, it is true of the Syrian rebels, it is the Chechnyas and so many others. Will there ever be an internationally agreed consensus agreement on what is terrorism and what is terrorist?
Sabharwal: As I said earlier, I don’t see an early finalisation of this convention. But that doesn’t mean we shouldn’t keep on making the point.
Thapar: In a sense, we are making an academic point because we know that the point can’t be resolved.
Sabharwal: But sometimes you have to keep on speaking out your position.
Thapar: The effort is more important than the end result.
Sabharwal: It is there on record at least.
Pakistan’s judiciary
Thapar: Now one of the issues that rankles with India in particular is that Pakistan has either failed to or refused to prosecute Hafiz Saeed. But you have been high commissioner in Pakistan and you are aware better than me that at least on three occasions the Pakistanis have arrested him but he has been released by the courts. Even recently, when the Pakistan government moved to curb the activities of Jamaat-ud-Dawa, the courts give them permission to resume. What do we do about the way the Pakistani courts seem to thwart a prosecution?
Sabharwal: It is not that simple, Karan. This is the Pakistani argument that is given to us – look our judiciary is free. We have seen the free judiciary. you know what it did to Nawaz Sharif and I thought it was under the influence of the army.
Thapar: But the same judiciary now seems to be exonerating him and suspending the charges against them.
Sabharwal: Let’s see what happens. There are some doubts around that issue whether Pakistan’s judiciary is free or not. It has endorsed the positions of dictators and so on.
Thapar: But they have dismissed prime ministers, twice at least.
Sabharwal: Lets come to the issue at hand. Now, this is the standard argument that our independent judiciary has exonerated him. The judiciary will exonerate him assuming the judiciary is free. The judiciary will exonerate him if you do not produce the evidence. That’s what I used to tell them on the Mumbai trial also. They would often ask us for evidence. We gave them lots of evidence that was there is our possession. But I used to tell them that the conspiracy was hatched here, the attack was planned here, the weapons were procured here, the financing was arranged here, the communications network were set up here. And everything having been done here, a lot of evidence would lie within Pakistan.
The problem, of course, is that initially, in 2009-10, they seem to be keen to dosomething. Their federal investigating agency gave us a report in which they admitted that Lashkar-e-taiba… a report that was handed over to me by Rehman Malik. But as we went down the line, it became clear that the security establishment was not cooperating fully. And most of the evidence that I talk of lies with the security establishment not with the civilian government. That’s the reason that courts would continue to exonerate him because if you don’t produce the evidence, that’s the result you have.
Thapar: Do you believe that Pakistan will ever successfully prosecute Hafiz Saeed, or will many attempts be made to suggest hoodwink us but nothing more?
Sabharwal: I have doubts on that.
Thapar: So we will have to live with this problem that this man who we believe is responsible for some of the worst acts of terror will continue to walk a free man in Pakistan with protection from their security? That there is nothing we can do about it?
Sabharwal: Nothing we can do for the moment except to keep on stressing it in the international community that this is the man who needs to get justice.
Thapar: How much support do we have from the international community? I know that America has put a price on his head of ten million dollars but that happened several years ago and nothing has happened thereafter.
Sabharwal: Not much. This is not something on which others are… People know what Pakistan is doing, but they react to that situation according to their own interest, not according to our interest.
Thapar: Is there a danger that this is receding with time? It is now ten years ago that Mumbai happened and the world is moving on?
Sabharwal: Yes, that’s true.
Future of India-Pak relations
Thapar: Before I end, I want to broaden our discussion Mr Sabharwal. Over the last four years, there is a clear impression that India-Pakistan relations have yo-yoed, zigzagged between moments of euphoria and great hope and moments of despair and collapse. In 2014, foreign secretary talks were scheduled and then got called off before the event happened. In 2015, the prime minister surprised everyone by visiting Lahore. There was enormous euphoria, and a week later, the Pathankot terror attack happened. And then this year, there were the scheduled talks in New York, which 24 hours after they were scheduled between the two foreign ministers were called off. You know India-Pakistan relations, you have studied them and you understand them. Is this sort of yo-yoing, the cycle of hope and despair inevitable and unavoidable? Or can the situation be handled better?
Sabharwal: No, I think we will continue to have this situation if we continue to hold unrealistic expectations. Now, let me explain to you what I mean. When you say terror and talks cannot go together, what you are saying is that we will not deal with Pakistan until it becomes a country that we expected to be and I often say that we have to deal with Pakistan as it is, not as we want it to be. And we need to recognise a few ground realities. We were just talking about terrorism, that Hafiz Saeed would be brought to justice and so on. Two-three realities if we recognise…
First, that Pakistan is not going to change anytime soon. The Pakistani reality is not going to change. It is going to remain a dysfunctional state with a stranglehold of his army, and an army which hasn’t changed its worldview. You saw Nawaz Sharif tried to defy them, and the way they have overcome that challenge. So it is not going to change anytime soon.
Second, that it is multiple constituencies which we have to address and it is not just one constituency – the security establishment and we say ‘terror and talks cannot go together’ and we’ll just address that.
Third, a bitter reality which we don’t recognise – More than 70 years after independence, and the accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India, the Pakistanis continue to retain the capacity of creating trouble in the Valley. So what do they do? Each time we refuse to talk, they stir up trouble there. And we need them to roll back their terror machinery to stabilise the position of the situation. So we need to recognise these realities instead of having unrealistic expectations and that’s why I say that you know since the reality is complex, you cannot have a simple answer.
The answer has to be more nuanced, it has to better thought out and what is that answer? My answer is to manage this relationship, try and reduce the level of violence as much as possible by combining dialogue with discretely exercised deterrence. Some kind of deterrence has to be main and integral part of this strategy. But it has to be a combination of dialogue with discreetly exercised deterrence and simultaneous attempt, as we were doing few years ago to move Pakistan even if one step at a time in a constructive direction on trade, transit etc.
Thapar: You know you mentioned three realities that India will not recognise or needs to recognise. Do you see that recognition happening anytime soon?
Sabharwal: If we continue to say terror and talks cannot go together, if we stick to this policy, we are addressing only one constituency. And that means we don’t recognise the complex reality. Either we don’t recognise or we recognise and for whatever reason, we refuse to see it.
Thapar: There is the view that India and Pakistan need a constant active back channel to constantly address the numerous misrepresentations and mis-perceptions that bedevil the relationship. Do we need constant active back channel?
Sabharwal: I think that’s useful. But the problem is the Pakistanis would agree to that channel but they are very keen always that visible talks take place, especially on Kashmir. And when that doesn’t happen, they stir up trouble in the Valley. That’s our problem.
Thapar: It seems to be that we have to check their capacity to stir up problems in the Valley for us and that means integral to handling and managing Pakistan is the handling and management of our own internal problem in Kashmir.
Sabharwal: Absolutely right. That’s what I said earlier. Why do they retain this capacity more than 70 years after the accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India? Why do they continue to retain this capacity? Now that’s a whole different subject and we don’t have the time to discuss it. But the truth is, that unless we do something about that, we have to manage the Pakistani dimension.
Thapar: So any sensible Pakistan policy has to be interrelated to our own internal Kashmir policy. You cannot divorce the two.
Sabharwal: To calm things down and to take away the opportunity that Pakistan has of creating trouble there.
Thapar: And the truth is, that the muscularity that is dominating our attitude to Pakistan at the moment is also a reflection of the way we are treating Kashmir at the moment. We are taking a very muscular approach to the problem in Kashmir and that too is creating problems rather than solving them.
Sabharwal: Yeah, well that’s a whole different subject and probably we don’t have the time to discuss it here. But I would again come back that when we talk of terror and talks cannot go together, we take into account only one side of Pakistan and not the entire Pakistani reality and that’s a simplistic answer to a very complex problem.
Thapar: My last question Mr Sabharwal, in five or six months, India will begin voting in the national elections. And clearly, there is not going to be any major development on the India-Pakistan front before the elections are over. But what would your advice, as one of the most highly-regarded former high commissioners to Pakistan be to the new government whatever its shape or colour?
Sabharwal: Karan, my advice would be to not treat it as a unidimensional problem. We have a problem in Pakistan, a serious problem which is their security establishment, which is all those aligned with security establishment. As I said, a major problem lies in Pakistan, but there is a much more complex reality which we must recognise. Our policy should also not be a unifocal policy. It is a policy which takes into account that complexity and you know, tries and answers that complexity. So if we continue with the unidimensional policy of ‘terror and talks cannot go together’ we’re not going to reach…
Thapar: See the reality of Pakistan and response to that?
Sabharwal: And respond to that accordingly, and that doesn’t rule out discretely-exercised deterrence.
Thapar: Mr Sabharwal, a pleasure speaking to you.
