A tense confrontation between a Philippine vessel and China’s coast guard took place in the highly disputed South China Sea over the Second Thomas Shoal.
The Philippines on Sunday accused a Chinese coast guard of “excessive and offensive” use of water cannons to stop a Filipino supply boat carrying food, water, fuel and new army personnel to a Philippine-occupied shoal in the disputed South China Sea.
“The Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) strongly condemns the China Coast Guard’s (CCG) dangerous manoeuvres and illegal use of water cannons against the PCG vessels,” the Philippine Coast Guard said.
Condemning the belligerence allegedly shown by the Chinese coast guard, the Philippines’ armed forces said the Chinese vessel’s actions were “in wanton disregard of the safety of the people on board and in violation of international law.”
The encounter between the Filipino boat and the Chinese vessel took place when Philippine navy personnel were moving towards Second Thomas in the Spratly Islands, according to Philippines officials.
Because of the clash, a second chartered boat was unable to drop supplies, military spokesman Colonel Medel Aguilar said in a statement.
“We call on the China Coast Guard and the Central Military Commission to act with prudence and be responsible in their actions to prevent miscalculations and accidents that will endanger people’s lives,” the armed forces said.
China’s coast guard has said that its actions were compliant with the law and responded by saying that China has “indisputable” sovereignty over the Spratly Islands and their adjacent waters, including the Second Thomas Shoal. It alleged that the Filipino boat was trespassing and carrying illegal construction material.
“Two repair ships and two coast guard ships from the Philippines illegally broke into the waters… in China’s Nansha Islands,” China Coast Guard spokesperson Gan Yu said, adding that Beijing “implemented necessary controls in accordance with the law and stopped Philippine ships carrying illegal building materials.”
Spate of skirmishes in South China Sea
Maritime disputes have remained a regular affair in the South China Sea, which is the busiest maritime crossroads for trade and holds geopolitical significance.
China claims that it holds sovereignty over almost the entire South China Sea – an assertion that is vehemently contested internationally. The tussle over the region very often leads to skirmishes between China and its neighbours.
The US too often intervenes and slams China for its aggressive actions but China has warned the US against interfering in what it calls an Asian dispute.’
In 2017, the four decades of geopolitical stability enjoyed by Asian countries came to an end with many countries facing internal and external battles.
In 2017, the four decades of geopolitical stability enjoyed by Asian countries came to an end with many countries facing internal and external battles.
China’s People’s Liberation Army soldiers march with their weapons at Tiananmen Square during the military parade marking the 70th anniversary of the end of World War Two, in Beijing September 3, 2015. Credit: Reuter/Damir Sagolj
In 2017 we finally realised that the four decades of geopolitical stability enjoyed by Asian countries and societies had come to an end. In 2018, the major patterns that will come to dominate the region will become increasingly clear.
China and the US worked out a way to live with one another in the 1970s, and that paved the way for the region’s remarkable economic growth. The US actively sought to engage China in the belief that Chinese economic integration with the world would eventually lead to the liberalisation of China’s political system.
But as Xi Jinping’s first five years in office have made clear, that optimism was misplaced. A more affluent China has become more authoritarian, more nationalistic and increasingly intent on changing the international environment to one it perceives better reflects its interests.
In his first year in office, US President Donald Trump surprisingly played a gentle hand with China. In contrast to this campaign rhetoric, his administration approached China with moderation, focusing principally on establishing a good personal relationship with Xi and trying to garner Chinese help to manage North Korea’s nuclear ambitions.
That is likely to change in 2018. As signalled in the National Security Strategy and the National Defence Strategy, the US sees strategic competition among major powers as the most important feature of the country’s security environment.
The active engagement of China by the US, even one tempered by a degree of containment, is coming to an end. China is viewed now as a country that seeks to mould the international environment in its own image. Expect the US to increasingly contest China’s power and influence, both in the region and globally.
This is likely to take both military and economic forms, as China is increasingly viewed by the US as a full-spectrum adversary. This will mean some kind of action on what the US perceives as China’s predatory trade policy, as well as a ratcheting up of military steps to push back on Chinese activities, particularly at sea.
China will not respond to the likely increase in American pressure with equanimity. Indeed, one real risk in 2018 is that China will overplay its hand. Its lesson from 2017 is that Trump is a paper tiger. Trump is perceived as being neither able nor willing to match his bombastic words with deeds. China could be emboldened to act provocatively because it miscalculates how the US might respond.
Much attention this year will focus on the power struggle between the US and China. Reuters/Jonathan Ernst
The disputed islands in the East China Sea are probably the most likely place for this to happen. The South China Sea disputes have a slightly lower risk in 2018, as China has largely achieved its objectives in that area and while the US would prefer that this hadn’t occurred, it can live with the consequences for the time being.
While Sino-American competition will increase the regional temperature, it is by no means the only way in which great power rivalry will shape the region.
Last year’s Doklam crisis reminds us that the extensive border between China and India is highly contested. Expect India’s ambitions and China’s confidence to lead to further tensions in the Himalayas.
China was slightly surprised by India’s response in Doklam and will have learned from that occasion. When, and not if, China next tests India, it will probably involve a higher level of military risk.
The move is publicly framed as efforts to coordinate policies of countries that value an open and free Indo-Pacific. In substance, it is about collaborating to limit Chinese influence and sustain the liberal order. The “new quad” will take further steps in 2018 and China will respond in ways that will further heighten regional tensions.
This year will also see a further decline in the stock of liberalism in Asia. For a period in the early 2000s, liberalism seemed ascendant. China joined the WTO, democracy was on the march in Southeast Asia and economic globalisation was seen as an unalloyed good thing.
No longer. There are no democracies in continental Southeast Asia. Rodrigo Duterte is undermining liberalism in the Philippines, shutting down a vibrant news website and some fear that the martial law he imposed in the restive south may be expanded across the country in 2018.
Cambodia has stripped away its thin democratic veneer, while Myanmar’s democratisation process remains highly limited. Even in Japan and India, liberal ideas are under challenge from thin-skinned nationalists.
In 2018, liberal ideas in Asia will face an increasingly difficult environment, particularly as the geopolitical competition will encourage erstwhile champions of liberal ideas to put interests ahead of values in order to manage that contest.
This year will sadly see the Rohingya crisis linger on, with insufficient political incentives for international actors to help end the crisis. The alignment of interests between the military and the government in Naypidaw will mean the region’s worst humanitarian crisis in decades will continue.
There is also a good chance that in 2018 we will work out how to live with a nuclear North Korea. The US will ultimately realise that it has no options for managing the crisis – or at least none that carry acceptable costs – and that a nuclear north can be managed. Indeed, a North Korea that feels secure may finally undertake the kind of economic reforms that its populace needs, and which could integrate the isolated country into the regional economy.
Contested Asia has become a geopolitical and geo-economic reality. In 2018 we will see just how sharp the contests will become. The wounded nationalism of China, the erratic and unpredictable US, and the weak political leadership in many regional powers mean the coming year in Asia is going to be even more challenging than 2017.
Foreign ministers from the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) ended an impasse over how to resolve South China Sea disputes, calling for militarisation and island-building to be avoided.
Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Kono (6-L) joins foreign ministers and representatives of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) in the ASEAN-Japan Ministerial Meeting of the 50th ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting (AMM) and Related Meetings in Manila, Philippines August 6, 2017. Credit: Reuters/Rolex Dela Pena
Manila: Southeast Asian foreign ministers ended an impasse on Sunday over how to address disputes with China in the South China Sea, issuing a communique that called for militarisation to be avoided and noting concern about island-building.
The South China Sea has long been the most divisive issue for the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), with China‘s influence looming large over its activities. Some countries are wary about the possible repercussions of defying Beijing by taking a stronger stand.
ASEAN failed to issue the customary statement on Saturday, over what diplomats said was disagreement about whether to make oblique references to China‘s rapid expansion of its defence capabilities on artificial islands in disputed waters.
China is sensitive to even a veiled reference by ASEAN to its seven reclaimed reefs, three of which have runways, missile batteries, radars and, according to some experts, the capability to accommodate fighter jets.
The communique late on Sunday takes a stronger position than an earlier, unpublished draft, which was a watered-down version of one issued last year in Laos.
The agreed text “emphasised the importance of non-militarisation and self-restraint”.
It said that after extensive discussions, concerns were voiced by some members about land reclamation “and activities in the area which have eroded trust and confidence, increased tension and may undermine peace, security and stability”.
ASEAN‘s deadlock over the statement highlights China‘s growing influence on the grouping at a time of uncertainty over the new US administration’s security priorities and whether it will try to keep China‘s maritime activities in check.
Several ASEAN diplomats said that among the members who pushed for a communique that retained the more contentious elements was Vietnam, which has competing claims with China over the Paracel and Spratly archipelago and has had several spats with Beijing over energy concessions.
Another diplomat, however, said there was no real disagreement on the contents of the communique and stressed that the initial draft was seen by some members as weak.
Also on Sunday the foreign ministers of ASEAN and China adopted a negotiating framework for a code of conduct in the South China Sea, a move they hailed as progress but seen by critics as a tactic to buy China time to consolidate its maritime power.
Contested Asia has become a geopolitical and geo-economic reality. In 2018 we will see just how sharp the contests will become. The wounded nationalism of China, the erratic and unpredictable US, and the weak political leadership in many regional powers mean the coming year in Asia is going to be even more challenging than 2017.