Iran Foreign Minister Makes First Visit to Saudi Arabia Since 2016 Diplomatic Freeze

A Chinese-brokered deal announced in March this year saw the long-time rivals agreeing to re-establish relations.

Iranian foreign minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian is in Saudi Arabia for an official visit, the foreign ministry in Tehran said on Thursday (August 17).

It is the latest sign of improved relations between the two regional rivals since the resumption of diplomatic ties in March.

The one-day visit “is focusing on bilateral ties, regional and international issues”, Iranian state media quoted the ministry as saying.

Amir-Abdollahian will be accompanied by Iran’s new ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Alireza Enayati, to “officially start his mission”.

Rapprochement strengthening

Shiite-dominated Iran and Sunni Saudi Arabia severed ties in 2016 after the Saudi embassy in Tehran was attacked during protests. The demonstrations were in response to Riyadh’s execution of Shiite cleric Nimr al-Nimr.

A Chinese-brokered deal announced in March saw the long-time rivals agreeing to reestablish relations.

Since then, Saudi foreign minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan visited Iran.

According to Iranian state media, military officials from Iran and Russia met in Moscow during a security conference on Wednesday.

Iran and Saudi Arabia have backed opposing sides in conflicts across the Middle East, including Yemen, Syria and Lebanon.

This article was originally published on DW.

In ‘Jasmine Days’, Benyamin Centres the Migrants Living on the Margins

The novel shows how majoritarianism and dictatorship are equally evil.

When people migrate to different countries seeking better employment, education or freedom, they take for granted that they will be protected by the laws of their host country. But rarely do they think of the tangled and intimidating issues that emerge when the host country is engulfed in political turmoil.

The paraphernalia of security breaks the moment the host country spirals into political turmoil, with immigrants being the first to realise their fragile position in their adopted land. They are faced with questions of belonging, identity and what they might have to do to survive in the changing socio-political contexts. Try as they might to remain indifferent to the changes around them, they are still affected and at times forced to make their choices clear.

Benyamin
Jasmine Days
Juggernaut, 2018

In his new novel Jasmine Days, Malayalam author Benyamin deals with the onerous questions that define the immigrant’s dilemma. His characters, South Asian immigrants in the Gulf, are caught between ethnic majoritarianism that makes them outsiders in Arab society and a dictatorship that is harsh on citizens and immigrants alike.

In his earlier novel Adujeevitham – translated as Goat Days by Joseph Koyipally – Benyamin transported us to the deserts of Saudi Arabia, where a young Malayali immigrant, Najeeb, spends almost three years in bonded labourer by his Arab employer. The novel exposed the deeply disturbing but overlooked aspect of a young South Asian workforce being exploited for cheap labour, often in inhuman conditions under the kafala system in the Gulf.

The dark underbelly of the Gulf labour market remains underexposed as South Asian countries, including India, continue to show interest only in remittances and not the human rights violations of their citizens in foreign countries. Najeeb’s is more a personal story than political, focusing on the human capacity to endure hardship and humiliation as long as there is glimmer of hope of returning home and to freedom.

With Jasmine Days, Benyamin takes the reader into the heart of political turmoil in the Arab world. Sameera, a young Pakistani woman, lives with her father and extended family, in an unnamed Middle Eastern city. What could be taken for granted in several other parts of the world – working as a radio jockey, keeping male friends and accessing social media – are for Sameera, coming from a conservative household, instances of rare-found freedom.

It’s at the radio station that Sameera, a Sunni Muslim, meets Ali, a Shia Muslim whose identity as a ‘second class citizen’ in the country makes him rebellious and vengeful. Ali is deeply against the country’s monarch and Sunni Muslims in general. His anger derives from a long history of being denied citizenship and enduring violations of human rights at the hands of the Sunni majority. The allegedly Iranian roots and sectarian affiliations of Shias leave them reeling from systematic discrimination.

Also read: Data Reveals 24,570 Indian Workers Have Died in Gulf Countries Since 2012

The historical conflict between Sunnis and Shias finds political expression time and again among Muslim populations, sometimes in the form of cold wars between countries and communities, at other times violent confrontations.

The bitterness between Iran and Saudi Arabia is a reflection of such a cold war. It’s not uncommon for Shias in a Sunni-majority country to be subjected to humiliation and denial of equal rights, and in worse conditions, state-sponsored torture and killings.

The Sunni-Shia conflict is deeply entrenched, to the extent that it is easier to be Hindu, Parsi or Christian in a Sunni majority country. The Shias “were not just second-class citizens in the City, they were kafirs to be detested like hell.”

This conflict finds expression in the novel, where ‘the city’, is factionalised into two – those who support His Majesty (the monarch) and those who oppose him. Sameera finds herself caught in a double-bind of familial loyalty – her family supports His Majesty – and her empathy with Ali, who she knows is not a rebel without a cause.

As she confronts the political changes in the tumultuous state – let’s call it the Arab Revolution – Sameera also finds herself negotiating deeply ethical questions such as forgiving her father’s killer and examining her loyalty to the existing government.

Also read: Book Excerpt: The Characteristics of New-Age Migration

Even as she tries to make sense of her identity, Sameera has personal devils to fight, like confronting her views on questions of truth, justice, ethics and duty. It is this scrutiny of the self vis-à-vis the larger political world that leaves her on the side of those who oppose His Majesty, unlike her fellow immigrants who support him.

Benyamin, who lived in Bahrain for a number of years before moving back to India, presents a gripping account of how crippling life under a dictatorship in the Middle East is, and that surmounting the lack of freedom is not an easy choice, or a choice at all. The resulting revolutions lead to further bloodshed and cost many lives but at the end, power is claimed by the majority, whose version of religious truth  is the ‘only’ version of it.

Benny Daniel
Kulanada (Pen name Benyamin). Credit: Wikipedia

He exposes the tyrannical politics of citizenship, nationality and the strategic reduction of a community to a non-entity. The question of belonging for immigrants in the Gulf is particularly complex, Benyamin shows, as these countries hardly ever grant citizenship to immigrants no matter how long they have stayed.

As acute as his understanding of the issue is, Benyamin startles the reader with the poignancy of his prose – which, of course, I read in Shahnaz Habib’s translation. The translator deserves praise for her ability to render the original Malayalam text into English and helping enrich Indian literature through translation.

In his earlier novel, Goat Days, he gave credit where it was due – by introducing Najeeb Muhammad, whose real-life story he had borrowed to write the novel. In Jasmine Days, too, he distances himself from the narrative, while foregrounding his characters as narrators.

Benyamin’s name appears as the ‘translator’ of the novel, Sameera – the protagonist – as the ‘writer’ and Ali as the ‘inciter’ of the revolution. Through this quasi role-playing, Benyamin cleverly acknowledges that the writer’s role is to remain in the background and let the stories come forward and speak for themselves.

Fathima M. is a PhD student at the Centre for English Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University. She was a Fulbright fellow at the University of Texas at Austin in 2017-2018.

Iranian Security Personnel, Revolutionary Guards Kidnapped on Border With Pakistan

Jaish al-Adl, a Sunni militant and separatist group, claimed responsibility for it and described the act as revenge for the oppression of Sunni Muslims.

London: At least ten Iranian security personnel including Revolutionary Guards were kidnapped on the border with Pakistan on Tuesday, state media reported, and a separatist group that claimed responsibility described the act as revenge for the oppression of Sunni Muslims.

The Revolutionary Guards, Iran’s top security force, said in a statement carried on state television that some of its members had been abducted by a militant group at a border post in the city of Mirjaveh in Sistan-Baluchistan province.

The Guards did not say how many were kidnapped, but state news agency IRNA quoted an unnamed official as saying 14 people had been kidnapped around 4 am or 5 am.

The Guards said it believed the Iranian forces had been deceived by several “insiders” but did not elaborate. Fars news agency said there were reports the Iranian forces had been poisoned by food before being captured and taken to Pakistan.

Ebrahim Azizi, the spokesman of Jaish al-Adl, a Sunni militant group, said the group had seized more than 10 people.

“This morning Jaish al-Ad forces attacked a border post in Mirjaveh, and captured all their weapons,” Azizi said in an audio message sent to Reuters.

The group also claimed responsibility on its Twitter account.

Azizi said the attack was a retaliation for what he called the Iranian state’s oppression of Sunni people in Sistan-Baluchistan, a mainly Sunni province that has a long history of unrest by separatist militants.

Also Read: How Balochistan Could Change Iran-Pakistan Relations. In a Way, That’s Not Good for India.

Safe havens 

Iran’s Shi’ite Muslim authorities say militant groups have safe havens in Pakistan and have said they will hit their bases there if Islamabad does not act.

“We expect Pakistan to confront these terrorist groups that are supported by some regional states, and immediately release the kidnapped Iranian forces,” the Revolutionary Guards said in a statement.

Iran has accused Saudi Arabia of funding separatist groups in the country. Riyadh has denied any involvement in Iranian internal affairs.

In September, the Revolutionary Guards killed four Sunni militants at a border crossing with Pakistan, including the second-in-command of Jaish al-Adl.

Brigadier General Mohammad Pakpour, the head of the Guards’ ground forces, told Fars news agency that Iran was ready to conduct joint military operations with Pakistan against the militant groups to release the kidnapped security personnel.

Jaish al-Adl kidnapped five Iranian border guards in 2014 and released four of them two months later after mediation by local Sunni clerics.

(Reuters)

This Muharram, Gilgit Gives Peace a Chance

Fed up with the decades-old rift on bloody sectarian lines, Shias and Sunni are taking steps towards sectarian harmony.

Fed up with the decades-old rift on bloody sectarian lines, Shias and Sunni are taking steps towards sectarian harmony.

Gilgit city with a view of the airport on the left. Credit: Herald

Gilgit city with a view of the airport on the left. Credit: Herald

This Muharram, Sunnis from Gilgit city vowed to protect their Shia brethren during the mourning processions that take place annually at this time of the year. This decision was the outcome of a collaborative process on a community level.

In the weeks leading up to ashura, which marks the 10th day of Muharram, officials from the local government and administration reached out to clerics and community elders. The parties decided that both sides (Shia and Sunni) would observe Muharram peacefully.

Several meetings were held at local administration offices, mosques and other neighborhood venues to spread the word of peace. A major boost to these efforts came when leading scholars from both sects – Shia cleric, Agha Rahat Hussain al-Hussaini, and his Sunni counterpart, Qazi Nisar – their followers to offer their prayers in the other sect’s mosques. This is not the first time Hussaini has made such a gesture towards sectarian harmony. In June 2013, he (along with 200 of his followers) attended a Deobandi scholar’s lecture.

Also setting an example for others to follow were two elders from the Sunni community, Maulana Maqsood and Nisar Wali, who took part in the Shia processions. These actions were well-received by the people in the city, as the word spread to other parts of Gilgit-Baltistan. Following the example set by their leaders, young people from the Sunni community are reported to have taken part in the arrangement and protection of the majlis and various processions.

Not so long ago, this show of religious harmony and solidarity seemed unlikely as a rekindled spate of sectarian killings gripped the region four years ago.

In August 2012, a bus carrying passengers travelling between Rawalpindi and Gilgit was ambushed: 20 Shias were dragged out of the vehicle and shot dead at point-blank range. This was the third incident in six months that year in which Shias were targeted and massacred in the Gilgit-Baltistan region. There were retaliatory killings in Gilgit city and its suburbs, by armed militants on both sides, which escalated the carnage.

As demonstrated in the aftermath of the violent clashes in 2012, the local government and police were ineffective in maintaining peace in the area. The army had to be called in to impose a curfew at that time. “The reason for the local administration’s failure to control the clashes is the association of officers and public representatives to their respective sects,” says Mahmood, a senior official who spoke under the condition of anonymity.

“I have three brothers and I have lost one. I don’t want the killing to continue. Revenge will not bring my deceased brother back. I wish peace on this land,” says Haider Ali, a local shopkeeper in Gilgit city, on a recent October day.

The majority in the valley share Haider’s sentiments. To them, peace and economic prosperity matter the most.

“This Muharram, we have decided we will not let the perpetrators of sectarianism sabotage peace in the valley. We will provide protection to the Muharram processions to make sure our Shia brethren are able to observe it peacefully,” says Abdur Rehman, a young Sunni student.

In the aftermath of these clashes, efforts were made by both the Shia and Sunni communities to relieve tensions and move towards a peaceful reconciliation. Residents hope to leave the violence behind them, as both communities are committed to curbing the menace of extremism and terrorism. This year, there has been considerable improvement in relations, residents say.

Reconciliation efforts in bringing peace through Aman committees is one mechanism that was adopted in 2013. Built on the concept of community policing, these platforms include local elders and clerics from diverse sects as well as administration officials. Every committee is responsible for protecting residents in its own area, irrespective of caste and creed.

The committees have added a new dimension to how communities interact in society. “Every area and mohalla has its own Aman committee. We invite residents and scholars on alternate days to discuss the security situation,” says Abdur Rahim, a superintendent of the police in Gilgit.

Another step taken towards maintaining peaceful coexistence between the two sects is to invite volunteers from both Shia and Sunni groups to deliberate and organise security arrangements for Muharram processions.

Zubair, 20, lives in Jutial, located in the upper area of Gilgit city. He attends the processions every day. Though a Sunni, Zubair makes sure to manage security for Shia participants on the occasion. He joined the ranks of citizen police after his area’s Aman committee asked that people – the youth, in particular – volunteer their services for the processions’ safekeeping.

“I have so many childhood memories with friends who happen to be Shia. I have many class fellows and friends who are not from my sect. Firqawariat (sectarianism) should not keep us away from each other,” he says.

As local Shias, clad in black, walk slowly towards the imambargah, lightly beating their chests in mourning, Zubair walks on the side of the procession attentively. He is not alone, as there are many other young men like him who have volunteered this Muharram to ensure peace in their hometown.

This delicate peace is crucial for the country’s only Shia-majority region. Locals fear the area remains vulnerable to sectarian violence and can implode if the provocation warrants it. Sectarian clashes since the 1980s have been so intense that, on most of the occasions when violence has erupted, a curfew is declared to control the situation.

In the early 2000’s, major clashes occurred due to ongoing tensions over the curriculum being taught at government schools. Members from the Shia community were demanding that the local and federal government include chapters on Shia imams in the Islamic studies textbooks or perhaps a separate reader that traced the Shia version of Islamic history. This point of contention led to a series of boycotts, routine clashes – which were sometimes deadly – and arrests.

The incident which intensified the textbook controversy was the the assassination of a prominent religious scholar, Syed Agha Ziauddin Rizvi, who was injured in an armed attack on January 8, 2005. He was known to be a proponent of sectarian harmony in the region. The killing sparked a fresh series of violent incidents – claiming at least 45 lives – and curfews imposed by the army.

It is because of this bloody history that clear lines were drawn to distinguish Sunni and Shia areas. Located on one side of the Gilgit airport, Kashrote and Sonikot are areas known for Sunni residents. On the other side, Basin and Jutial are areas marked as predominantly Shia. Ismailis generally live in the nearby town of Danyor.

The area was not divided on sectarian lines in the past. The first major sectarian clash occurred almost 30 years ago, after anti-Shia riots broke out in May 1988 over the sighting of the moon, which ushers the end of the holy month of Ramzan. When Shias in Gilgit celebrated Eidul Fitr, a group of extremist Sunnis, still fasting because their religious leaders had not announced the sighting of the moon, attacked them. This led to violent clashes between the two sects. In 1988, after a brief calm of nearly four days, the military regime allegedly used certain militants along with local Sunnis to ‘teach a lesson’ to Shias, which led to hundreds of Shias and Sunnis being killed.

This year, however, residents remain hopeful that there will be no violence.

In market places, people gather around sabeels (milk and water stalls) set up outside imambargahs and venues that host majlises. Many Sunnis set up sabeels in their respective areas as well.

“We have always arranged sabeels in Muharram. It is for everyone, Shia or Sunni or anyone else. ‘Gham e Hussain’ is our belief and we mourn the death of the Holy Prophet’s grandson,” says 34-year-old Umar Ahsan, while setting up a sabeel at the entrance of his place in Sonikot.

While driving around during the month of Muharram, one can observe the strong presence of security personnel at key places in Gilgit city. The market rooftops, mosques and imambargahs have a heavy deployment of police and paramilitary Rangers personnel holding guns and keeping a watchful eye on every vehicle passing by. Check posts set up by the Gilgit scouts, clad in light brown uniforms, add a sense of heightened security in the city.

Another major reason why locals are banking on peace in the region is that violence disturbs economic development and that is bad for everyone.

The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), for example, has given a hope to the people of the area.

Connecting Pakistan with China, the Gilgit-Baltistan region is expected to play a vital role in the future of this massive economic endeavour. The announcement of developmental projects by the federal government has given much hope to the people, as 450 kilometres of the CPEC route passes through the region. The federal government also announced that it would set up industrial zones and declare Gilgit-Baltistan a free trade zone. Training institutes are also being planned to advance the technical skills of local residents.

Situated near the rocky and barren Chilas area, 180 kilometres downstream from Gilgit city, the Diamer-Bhasha Dam is considered another mega-project that will boost the local economy in addition to relieving the energy crisis in the country. In May 2016, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif inaugurated the Pakistan-China Optical Fiber Cable project in Gilgit, which is a part of CPEC and is scheduled to be completed in two years at a cost of 44 million rupees. Locals view sectarian violence as a threat to these economic opportunities, which have the potential to alleviate poverty.

Muharram is a month of grief, but this time, it brings an opportunity for people in Gilgit and other parts of the region to unite for peace.

The writer is a journalist based in Islamabad and tweets at @ShamilTaimur

This article was originally published in Herald. Read the original article here. 

Why ‘You Cannot Build Democracy With a Gun’

Vijay Prashad’s The Death of the Nation and the Future of the Arab Revolution provides a helpful interpretation of the processes that have led to the current state of the Arab world, but hazards little about the future prospects for the region.

Vijay Prashad’s The Death of the Nation and the Future of the Arab Revolution provides a helpful interpretation of the processes that have led to the current state of the Arab world, but hazards little about the future prospects for the region.

Residents of a Damascus suburb pick up the pieces after an airstrike. Credit: Bassam Khabieh, Reuters/Files

Residents of a Damascus suburb pick up the pieces after an airstrike. Credit: Bassam Khabieh, Reuters/Files

Vijay Prashad’s The Death of a Nation and the Future of the Arab Revolution tries to detect sparks of hope in the morass of the 21st century Arab world. Despite the author’s inclination to spot ideological markers that augur new beginnings and his conviction that the Arab Revolution “remains alive and well in the hearts of the Arab masses”, there is little to relieve the spectre of unremitting chaos in those unfortunate countries.

In the past fifteen years, four Arab nations – Iraq, Libya, Syria and Yemen – have been laid to waste as a consequence of theories of regime-change and humanitarian intervention, and a fifth –  Egypt – has relapsed to military rule belying the dreams spawned in Tahrir Square in that distant 2011 spring. Prashad, a professor of history and a veteran journalist, meticulously dissects the demise of Arab nationalism, de-mystifying the politics while humanising the tragedy.  The blame for the interminable tragedy, he places squarely on Western powers espousing neo-liberal ideas supported by misplaced policies of the Bretton Woods institutions.

Vijay Prashad, The Death of a Nation and the Future of the Arab Revolution, Leftword 2016

Vijay Prashad, The Death of a Nation and the Future of the Arab Revolution, Leftword, 2016

The spearheads of the Arab Spring, Tunisia and Egypt experienced, in Prashad’s eyes, bourgeois revolutions, where unpopular leaders were deposed through mass political action. “The tentacles of elite power remained intact,” however, and both countries today are not significantly different from what they were five years ago. While in Egypt a Western-backed military coup removed the elected Muslim Brotherhood government that had replaced Hosni Mubarak, Tunisia’s elected government was spared that fate by an organised working class whose presence in the streets precluded the sort of crackdown that took place in Egypt. The West allowed the old guard, in a pliable new form, to return in Egypt and Tunisia; but stopped at nothing short of complete destruction of the old Arab nationalists of Iraq, Libya and Syria, even while the Arab monarchies were granted freedom to pursue their own repressive agendas.

Prashad asserts that however real the Sunni-Shia divide is, it does not drive the political turmoil in the region. That narrative is authored by the geo-political rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia, spurred by the machinations of the West and Israel. There was no inherent antipathy between the sultans of Arabia and the king of Iran. It was the Iranian Revolution of 1979 that posed issues which the Saudi monarchy saw as an existential challenge to itself and as an insidious influence on its neighbourhood. The fact that a Muslim king had been replaced by an Islamic form of republicanism, with the introduction of an elected parliament and the establishment of modern institutions which even allowed women to participate. Early on, the US had decided that its own preservation lay in protecting the Arab monarchs and their oil wealth. For its own interests, the US government deepened the sectarian divide by fanning Saudi fears about Iran.

“Anti-Iran morphed rapidly into anti-Shia rhetoric and practice,” notes Prashad. “It is how Saudi proxies have operated in Syria and in Iraq and why Saudi Arabia began its endless war in Yemen.”

Wahabism would have been unthinkable in the diverse and secular Iraq that existed before the US invasion in 2003. The occupation forces dug into fissures between the Shia and Sunni sects to smother any chance of reconstruction of Iraqi nationalism. The US occupation provided oxygen to al-Qaeda and its ilk, who the locals began to refer to as “the Saudis of Iraq”. Nothing in the soil of Iraq, says Prashad, suggested incipient sectarian brutality; under US sponsorship it developed and bloomed fully. The global war on terror declared by the US and its allies “did not erase the terrorists; it manufactured them”. ISIS dates its origin to the anti-US insurgency in Iraq. The danger of sectarian wars, he points out “is that they have no endgame. They will not end with a utopian outcome. They can end only where life becomes evil.”

Prashad adds that in similar fashion “the West – and Israel – have been content to see Syria bleed and weaken. No outcome is desirable to them.” Since the Syrian government was incapable of fulfilling people’s aspirations, Arab money intervened – backed by the adventurism of Western powers – to play out their own respective agendas. From a political dispute, the Syrian stand-off plunged into a confounding war among a number of proxy armies from neighbouring countries, the al-Qaeda, ISIS, the Kurds and Assad’s forces, with overt and covert gimmicks of Russia, France and the US further poisoning the quagmire.

The Death of the Nation maintains that the lessons from Iraq were not learned: they were repeated in Libya and again, calamitously, in Syria and Yemen. Was there an alternative to regime-change that might have saved these countries from devastation and chaos? If the West and its allies had not chased total victory, could a negotiated settlement have been fashioned to forestall the resultant catastrophe? Bear in mind that bodies like the African Union had offered to mediate; and Saddam Hussein, on his capture, begged to negotiate; while [Muammar] Gaddafi, before he was lynched, pleaded that he be allowed to surrender.

Vijay Prashad. Credit: Twitter

Vijay Prashad. Credit: Twitter

The Arab Revolutions were the outcome of the inter-play of three forces, contends Prashad. First, ‘political Islam’ which had originated as an Islamic component of the anti-colonial struggle. Exemplified in the Muslim Brotherhood, this was also a modernising influence and therefore, distinct from Wahabism. While it remained largely in the shadows, political Islam incubated in mosques everywhere, touching the lives of large numbers and developing a mass base and strong cadre. Second, the “youth bulge” in the Arab demographic presented a phalanx of under-employed, educated young people frustrated at the lack of economic and social opportunity and at the stultifying political atmosphere. The third strand – and in Prashad’s view the most significant – comprised of the organised working class and migrant residents of urban slums, who came together on everyday issues to demonstrate and strike, and to provide the spark for insurrection.

These forces combined to spur large sections of the population to rise against dispensations representing the security state on the one hand and neo-liberal policies on the other,  triggering a revolution against economic deprivation and political suffocation. Prashad views the Arab Revolution as a “civilisational” uprising, but he does not offer anything more than anecdotal basis to support his wishful assertion that the memory of the popular upsurge “makes an irreversible slip backward impossible”.

On his extensive travels, Prashad comes upon a cross-section of individuals dreaming of revitalised Arab nationalism “as a cord that binds people across the widened sectarian divides”: Iraqi women’s activist Yanar Mohammed challenges the Americans: “You cannot build democracy with a gun”; journalist and theatre person Hadi al-Mahdi laments: “I am sick of seeing our mothers beg in the streets”; a young al-Nusra militant in Lebanon confides: “If I had a job, I would not do jihad”; Omar Abdulaziz Hallaj, “a wise and distinguished architect from Aleppo” works quietly with others like him to build trust to bridge the sectarian divide and buttress Syrian diversity.

Looking at visuals of the apocalyptic devastation in Aleppo and other parts of the region, one despairs for Hallaj and other voices of reconciliation.  The Death of the Nation provides a helpful interpretation of the processes that have led to the present state of the Arab world but – unsurprisingly, for Prashad is no soothsayer – it hazards little about the future prospects for the region.

Govindan Nair is a civil servant who has retired to his books and seaside home after more than three decades in Uttar Pradesh, Delhi and overseas.