Satinder Lambah’s Accounts Are an Eye-Opener for Pakistani Hawks Who Drum up Anti-India Chauvinism

The diplomat played a pivotal role in drafting a settlement that would have rendered the LoC just a line on the map.

Late Satinder Kumar Lambah’s memoirs about India-Pakistan relations under six prime ministers of India are quite revealing in terms of chronically detailed reminiscences of three decades spent directly or indirectly handling India’s policy towards what he perceives to be a problematic offshoot of Partition on the ‘inviable’ basis of religion. 

It is full of consistent derogation of an adversary he sees as not worthy of engagement on an equal footing and what he alleges to be consistent and deceitful conduct of Pakistan. Yet he portrays his diplomatic manoeuvrings “in pursuit of peace” from the standpoint of a ‘big brother’.  

A diplomat par excellence that he undoubtedly was, he never deviated from his line of duty to South Block, which continued to match and counter-match its equally stubborn counterpart in Pakistan’s Foreign Office. 

In a revealing off-the-cuff remark at a reception hosted by the South Asian Free Media Foundation (SAFMA) in Lahore, the then foreign minister of India, Natwar Singh – while eulogising the babus of Pakistan Foreign Office’s capacity to have kept alive the Kashmir dispute on the international stage – said that the diplomats from both the foreign offices are so equally competent that they can serve in one or the other’s foreign office equally well. Quite cynically, the Lahoris applauded the absurdity of keeping the zero-sum game of diplomatic logjam driven by animosity-by-rotation.

It is no surprise then that in his memoirs, one couldn’t find a single fault with any of his governments that he served so faithfully, except Prime Minister I. K. Gujral and his doctrine of non-reciprocity with neighbours whom he believed were “soft on Pakistan”. His view even on an unnecessarily lingering issue such as Siachen is so stubborn that he remarked that “the subsequent discussions between Rajiv Gandhi and Benazir Bhutto were bereft of strategic content, with the focus narrowed to just a Siachen settlement on mutual force withdrawal from recorded actual ground positions (AGPLs) and establishment of a jointly demilitarized zone (DMZ).” Nor did he mention any Pakistani move without mischief or appreciate any of the peace overtures from across the border with the honourable exception of former prime minister Nawaz Sharif.

Also read: A Book on the Negotiations That Got Kashmir Closest to a Solution

However, he is enamoured with the, somewhat behind the scenes, bold initiatives taken by successive military rulers starting from F. M. Ayub Khan and General Ziaul Haq to General Pervaiz Musharraf. Along with him, there seems to be a consensus among former Indian high commissioners to Islamabad that India must engage with the Pakistan Army. All those warrior generals who perpetually played an anti-India card and initiated adventurous wars were quite eager to mend fences with New Delhi while scuttling the efforts of various prime ministers to find a détente with India. Pressed hard by the military establishment whose national security paradigm revolved around and thrived on “India’s eternal threat to Pakistan’s national security”, the civilian leaders were not powerful enough to assert their will on an issue that had a direct bearing on the sustainability of a fragile democracy. It must be mentioned that the India-Pakistan conflict reinforced the military’s authoritarianism in Pakistan while undermining civilian authority and democratic institutions. It also promoted religious exclusivism and extremism in both countries.

File photo of the fence separating India and Pakistan. Photo: Abhishek Baxi/Flickr CC-BY-NC 2.0

Lambah neither takes a considerate view of the civilian leadership’s dilemma, nor does he entertain any significance to a very vibrant civil society of Pakistan that is consistently fighting martial rule and war-mongers. For misguided Pakistani patriots, his memoirs should be quite frustrating as they reveal how successive military dictators used  the “eternal enemy” card and tried to reach a No War/Peace and Cooperation treaty with India at the same time. It’s an eye-opener for the Pakistani hawks who have continued to drum up anti-India chauvinism at the behest of their masters.

Being a displaced child of a bloody partition and a migrant from a “migrant state”, he selectively picks up references to prove not only his point against the creation of Pakistan on an “unviable” basis of religion but also ignores the minority question that remains unaddressed in all three countries of the subcontinent with the rise of fundamentalism in Pakistan and Hindu majoritarian nationalism in India.

According to Political Conflict in Pakistan author Mohammad Waseem: “[In 1947] Pakistan got out of India. But India did not get out of Pakistan. That has made all the difference. The genesis of the first major conflict in Pakistan can be traced to the mandatory requirement for Pakistan to de-Indianize itself… It became an unconscious and instinctive commitment to living with the new ‘other’, mainly across, but also within, the border…(subsequently) the rise of religion as a marker and shaper of the national identity first in Pakistan and a generation or two later in India”. 

Was Partition then a ‘closure’ or a ‘rupture’ asks political scientist Ranabit Samaddar. He adds that Jawaharlal Nehru thought, “Partition offered a way out and we took it”. Meanwhile, professor Sanjay Chaturvedi questions ‘whether the Partition is a solution to the conflict or a breeding ground of the conflict itself.’  

Partition in India was seen as “the great divide” of Indian civilization, which distinguished historians like Romila Thapar’s questions on a monolithic nation or an Aryan ‘race’. Despite a bloody Partition that the Congress party leadership finalised by rejecting a loose federalist scheme propounded by the Cabinet Mission Plan, the ‘menace’ of the ‘Two-Nation Theory’ continues to haunt all three (former) parts of the subcontinent to this day with the rise of respective majoritarian communalism. 

Regarding Pakistan’s evolution toward a ‘military state’, which was premised on a self-serving ‘eternal-enemy threat’ from India, various independent scholars describe it in terms of an “over-developed” steel-structure of Pakistan.  It was no less reinforced by India’s rejectionist view about the creation and survival of Pakistan and its persistent insistence on the Nehruvian version of the Monroe Doctrine in its sphere of influence in South Asia. If India felt threatened by Pakistan’s alliance with the US, Pakistan suffered dismemberment and sought countervailing strategic alignments.     

Satinder Lambah’s memoir ‘In Pursuit of Peace’ was launched earlier this year in New Delhi.

The high point of diplomacy between India and Pakistan was during General Ziaul Haq’s  military reign as he negotiated with  Prime Minister Indira Gandhi on a Friendship Treaty/No War Pact. The treaty could not be finalised because of Gandhi’s insistence on “emphasising bilateralism in Article IV and second non-grant of bases in Article V (2)”. Without justifying Pakistan’s joining of US military blocks, however, a medium-sized country living next to a huge but ‘hostile’ neighbor found ‘safety’ in alliances opposed to the Soviet Union that India had also joined and now US-led QUAD against China. 

But he will not take the pain of mentioning the offer of military bases to the US in the aftermath of 9/11 by Home Minister L. K. Advani during his most favoured premiership of A. B. Vajpayee. Faced with a bigger neighbour and potential or ‘perceived’ Indian threat and its larger military power, the Pakistani leaders from Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan to all the successive military dictators sought to counter the military imbalance in favour of India by joining US-led military blocks. Lambah is right in saying that the Cold War between the two superpowers further pushed the subcontinent into opposite camps.

With the change in international alignments since 1951, India’s policy towards Pakistan and Kashmir changed qualitatively. We also see a sea change in Indian National Congress’s position on Kashmir, despite recourse to the UN and the passage of Article 370 that continued to be diluted and finally scrapped according to A.G. Noorani’s book on Article 370. 

Ambassador Lambah is partially right about how Pakistan didn’t insist much on UN resolutions in the early 1950s, but he doesn’t have any democratic reason to defend the Indian Republic’s annexationist position on the right to self-determination of the divided and subjugated Kashmiris living on both sides of the Line of Control (LoC). India became a status quo power and Pakistan took an irredentist position on Kashmir as both consider it a territorial dispute and not an issue of a disenfranchised people. While declaring Jammu and Kashmir as an integral part of India and asking Pakistan to vacate “PoK”, India has been engaging Pakistan in prolonged talks based on various kinds of give and take beyond its stated official positions on the back of the Kashmiri people. So did Pakistan.

In his book, Lambah informs us of a lot, with choreographed details of behind the scenes diplomacy and numerous backchannels. But what he conveniently missed is a mission undertaken by a real man of peace R. K. Mishra over the Ministry of External Affairs’ head (MOEA) as a personal emissary of Prime Minister Vajpayee to Prime Minister Sharif that culminated in the Lahore Declaration, despite Pakistan’s subsequent infiltration into Kargil by General Musharraf at the back of his prime minister. 

According to I. K. Mishra, even the PAF maps of the Kashmir region were directly provided to Vajpayee who wanted to keep his initiative secret from his bureaucratic establishment. It was an out-of-box initiative in the spirit of Vajpayee’s dictum: “Insaanyiat, Jamhooriyat and Kashmiriyat”. And the Chenab formula was to be the framework of the final settlement within one year. Before him, Prime Minister Narasimha Rao had coined the idea of absolute autonomy with “the sky as its limit”.

Retreating from the Kargil Heights with the help of Sharif and support from PM Vajpayee, General Musharraf after staging a coup against his benefactor had his metamorphosis and took a chance to make peace with India. Vajpayee was upset with the coup in Pakistan. Yet, he asked R. K. Mishra to start a fresh back-channel diplomacy with President Musharraf. But the General avoided engaging with Mishra–who told me that he had to wait to get a visa from the Pakistan High Commission in Singapore– to perhaps take a very seasoned Indian politician by surprise, which resulted in the fiasco of the Agra Summit.

And when Vajpayee restarted the process, he made Musharraf agree to end “cross-border terrorism” during the SAARC Summit in Islamabad. Later, when Dr Manmohan Singh became the prime minister, he in consultation with Vajpayee picked up the reconciliation process from where it had been left.  

Former PM Atal Bihari Vajpayee. Photo: PTI/File

Both Lambah and Tariq Aziz played a pivotal role in almost agreeing on a settlement based on General Musharraf’s 4-point formula. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, according to his advisor Sanjaya Baru. was even ready to name the accord as the ‘Musharraf Formula’. Indeed, this was an exceptional breakthrough that would have rendered the LoC just a line on the map with Kashmiris allowed maximum autonomy, a joint mechanism between the two sides of Jammu & Kashmir, and the military forces’ exit from the urban areas. One wonders why both countries don’t go back to the Musharraf-Manmohan accord.

What is worth mentioning is that the Congress prime ministers like Nehru, Indra Gandhi, Rajiv Gandhi and Manmohan Singh have moved through the MOEA while Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) prime ministers bypassed it  to reach out directly to their interlocutors in Pakistan.

Vajpayee essentially relied on R. K. Mishra and Brajesh Mishra. Lambah was quite upset when before he could proceed to Islamabad as Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s special envoy, Indian businessman Sajjan Jindal met Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif as Modi’s trusted emissary in Muree on 28 April 2017. 

What surprised everybody was the unscheduled visit of Prime Minister Modi to Lahore to meet Prime Minister Sharif at his Jati Umra farmhouse. Modi’s boldness was disrupted by the terrorists against whom Sharif had registered cases and both prime ministers allowed joint investigation of the attack on the Pathankot air-base. But it was scuttled by the forces inimical to peace.

A beleaguered history of bilateral diplomacy between India and Pakistan is full of ups and downs – from wars to peace and long spells of no-peace/no-war intervals. The fundamental question is that they must get over the hangover of an exotic partition and shed all shades of enmity while continuing to live as peaceful neighbours and finding solutions to their conflicts. Peace is not an option; it’s a neighbourhood compulsion of the states of the common heritage of our subcontinent.

Imtiaz Alam is a freelance journalist and Secretary General of SAFMA.

A Book on the Negotiations That Got Kashmir Closest to a Solution

Satinder Lambah says in his book ‘In Pursuit of Peace: India-Pakistan Relations Under Six Prime Ministers’ that great powers should not wait passively for events to unfold, but should seek to shape their environment in pursuit of their national interest.

The India-Pakistan relationship has been blighted by animosity, prejudice, lack of trust and war – both overt and covert. In recent years, the anger of the Indian people at Pakistan’s conduct and electoral politics on the issue have given rise to an increasingly ill-informed discourse in sections of our media and political space. 

Against the above backdrop, the posthumously published book of Satinder Kumar Lambah, who passed away in June last year, titled In Pursuit of Peace: India-Pakistan Relations Under Six Prime Ministers comes as a breath of fresh air. It is a valuable account of diplomatic history, in-depth analysis and policy recommendations, which could have come only from the pen of someone like Lambah, who spent more than half of his public service of nearly five decades dealing with matters relating to Pakistan. 

 Chapter 1 of the book contains some deep insights into the evolution of a military state in Pakistan, the dominant role of the army and ISI and Pakistan’s ‘India-centric’ and ‘Kashmir-oriented’ strategic culture. The plight of civilian leaders in Pakistan is clear from an account of the then Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto signalling to a senior Indian interlocutor in Karachi in 1988 that the meeting room was likely to be bugged and sensitive issues would be communicated by handwritten exchanges on a notepad. The book is replete with other interesting anecdotes. In contrast, the author mentions the prominent role of prime ministers in India in shaping the Pakistan policy and underlines the importance of top-down decisions in view of the absence of clear-cut answers and the tendency of bureaucratic and political processes to favour safe options and the status quo. 

Satinder Kumar Lambah
In Pursuit of Peace: India-Pakistan Relations Under Six Prime Ministers
Penguin, 2023

In the remaining chapters, the author takes the reader through a fascinating diplomatic journey during 1980-2014 with six prime ministers, introducing important personalities and landmark events on the way, such as Mrs Indira Gandhi’s announcement in the Lok Sabha on December 16, 1971 of the emergence of Dhaka as the free capital of a free country and the tumultuous welcome she received in Dhaka in March 1972. It was also a journey of discovery for him and his wife, whose families hailed from Peshawar and Lahore respectively. 

The author describes December 6, 1992, when he was High Commissioner to Pakistan, as one of the most difficult days in his professional career in view of the strong and violent reaction in Pakistan to the destruction of Babri Masjid. He and his colleagues faced criticism regarding the condition of Muslims and the treatment of minorities in India, with jibes at Indian secularism. They countered it by highlighting the role of Muslims in secular India and the outstanding contribution of minorities in comparison with conditions in Pakistan. He regrets  that “decades later, the situation in India too is undergoing a change.”

The author describes Atal Bihari Vajpayee as the “Persistent Statesman with a Vision of Peace” and quotes him as telling the Pakistani ambassador in 1977 on becoming the external affairs minister that there would be no change in policy towards Pakistan as the existing foreign policy ‘was based on more or less a national consensus’. Later, Vajpayee played a leading role in 1994 in the successful efforts of the Narasimha Rao government to thwart Pakistan’s attempt to get a resolution, alleging human rights violations in Jammu and Kashmir, passed by the UN Commission on Human Rights. These instances are worth recalling in the backdrop of foreign policy issues, particularly the policy towards Pakistan, becoming a matter of political slugfest in recent years. 

The book has an interesting and revealing account of the Bonn Conference on Afghanistan in December 2001, in which the author led the Indian delegation.  

The chapter titled “A New Sustained Approach and a Near Solution” covers the back channel discussions on Kashmir between the Musharraf-Manmohan Singh governments, in which the author was the Indian interlocutor from 2005 to 2014. It brings to light some hitherto unknown aspects of the process and why it could not be taken to its logical conclusion. Besides consultations within the government, former PM Vajpayee, leader of the opposition in the Lok Sabha L.K. Advani, former NSA Brajesh Mishra and some important J&K leaders were also kept informed. 

The back channel agreement not having been made public, the text of the author’s speech on a possible solution to the Kashmir issue, made in Srinagar in May 2014 and contained in the book, is the best indicator of its content. It refers, inter alia, to no redrawing of borders, disavowal by Pakistan of terrorism as a state policy, respect for ceasefire along the Line of Control (LoC) and LoC to be like a border between any two normal states. 

The author states that he briefed PM Modi on the back channel after he assumed office. The file on the subject was reviewed by the incoming government and he was even told that no major change was required. In April 2017, a senior PMO official told him that Prime Minister Modi wanted him to go to Pakistan to meet his counterpart Nawaz Sharif, but the visit did not take place.  

The author refers to but does not address criticism of the back channel in India. He was perhaps unable to do so due to the non-availability of the back channel agreement in public. He, however, believed that it could be taken forward with or without modifications and rightly stated that great powers should not wait passively for events to unfold, but should seek to shape their environment in pursuit of their national interest. 

Also Read: A Diplomat’s Memories of India-Pakistan Back Channel Talks

The author offers some valuable suggestions for a way forward: memories should not become perpetual shackles on shaping our future; while responding appropriately to Pakistan’s covert operations, the process of engagement need not be frozen; not engaging with a strongly antagonistic neighbour with a growing nuclear arsenal and worsening stability is not a wise choice; expectations have to be kept at a realistic level and policies structured to manage the relationship. 

The book’s narrative makes it clear that though the author worked relentlessly for peace, he was a realist. He was a hard-nosed diplomat, but not uncompromising when he saw an opportunity to promote India’s interest; above all, he was true to his calling as a diplomat and never lost faith in the value of diplomacy and engagement even in the most difficult circumstances. 

A gripping book, it will be of as much interest to general readers as to professionals and scholars in the domain of foreign affairs. 

Sharat Sabharwal is a former High Commissioner to Pakistan.

In Book, Satinder Lambah Reveals Plan to Meet Nawaz Sharif as Modi’s Envoy in April 2017

The plan was stymied even before the veteran diplomat left Delhi because of industrialist Sajjan Jindal’s trip to Islamabad.

New Delhi: Satinder Lambah, a veteran of back-channel talks, had been asked by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi to travel as his personal envoy to Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in April 2017, but the plan was stymied even before he left Delhi by industrialist Sajjan Jindal’s trip, the diplomat reveals in his memoir.

Released earlier this month, Lambah’s posthumously published book, In Pursuit of Peace: India-Pakistan Relations Under Six Prime Ministers chronicles his insider role in managing the India-Pakistan relationship and the back-channel talks that nearly led to an agreement over Kashmir. Lambah passed away last year at the age of 81.

While his book does not cover the period after 2014, Lambah said that he had met with PM Modi on the latter’s request on a couple of occasions. It began with a meeting before the swearing-in ceremony when all SAARC leaders, including Pakistan PM Nawaz Sharif, travelled to India. He later met with Modi again, when he briefed the prime minister on the back-channel talks.

Lambah claimed there had been an “intent” to restart the back-channel process. “The file on the subject had been reviewed. I was even told that no major change was required.”

The veteran Indian Foreign Service officer wrote that he was “asked” to meet with a “distinguished diplomat” who was being considered a special envoy by PM Modi. But, that path did not go further. “However, when I checked with the PMO, I was told that there had been a change in thought and I would be informed regarding the briefing.”

But, there was a more concrete proposal for him to act as a messenger, which nearly happened.

In an excerpt published by The Wire, Lambah wrote about a previously unreported incident in which the PMO instructed him to travel to Pakistan and meet with PM Nawaz Sharif on behalf of Modi.

“On 20 April 2017, a senior official of the PMO came to see me at my house. He said the prime minister wanted me to visit Pakistan to meet Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. I reiterated that such meetings are more valuable if the envoy has the public confidence of the prime minister. However, on the 22nd, I was told I would be given details of the points to be discussed and was asked to give my travel documents to enable me to travel to Pakistan.”

Prime Minister Modi’s plan to send Lambah to Pakistan took place after a period of intense strain.

While Sharif’s visit to Delhi and Modi’s sudden stop in Lahore had fostered optimism, those hopes were eventually shattered by the terror attacks on the Pathankot air force base in January 2016 and the Uri army camp in September 2016. In retaliation, the Indian army claimed to have carried out “surgical strikes” against terror camps across the Line of Control.

Lambah wrote that on April 22, 2017, along with the senior PMO official, he met with lawyer Fali Nariman “to refresh some points”.

However, the next day, he came across a news report that an Indian industrialist had gone to meet PM Nawaz Sharif “in his personal plane” as an “emissary”.

“I rang the official, who appeared surprised at this development. I told him that under the circumstances, it would not be proper for two people to represent the prime minister for the same purpose. Clearly, the emissary had not coordinated his visit to Pakistan with the PMO. This was the last conversation I had on this subject,” he wrote.

Lambah was referring to the visit of Industrialist Sajjan Jindal, whose meeting with Nawaz Sharif at Murree, was leaked and created a political furore in Pakistan. The grapevine during that period had speculated that the leak was done by security agencies, worried that Sharif was taking a more soft and independent approach towards India.

The media reports had speculated that Jindal’s visit was related to the Indian national and former naval officer, Kulbhushan Jadhav, who had been sentenced to death by a Pakistan military court on April 10, 2017.

Lambah did not mention the nature of the message that he was to discuss with PM Sharif. However, he mentions Nariman in the book in a separate instance, when the latter was consulted for his legal opinion on whether the draft agreement was in line with the Indian constitution.