Tag: s jaishankar external affairs minister

At All-Party Meeting, Jaishankar Says Govt Will ‘Wait and Watch’ the Evolving Afghan Situation

Mallikarjun Kharge said that the external affairs minister ‘regretted’ the deportation of Rangina Kargar, an Afghan MP.

New Delhi: External affairs minister S. Jaishankar told the all-party meeting that the Indian government had adopted a ‘wait and watch’ policy, with priority given to evacuating Indian nationals and Afghan nationals following the seizure of power by the Taliban.

Lasting over three and half hours, the all-party meeting was attended by 37 members from 31 political parties. After initial remarks by Jaishankar, a formal presentation was made by foreign secretary Harsh Shringla.

According to The Hindu, the meeting was attended by Congress leaders Adhir Ranjan Chowdhury, Mallikarjun Kharge and Anand Sharma; Nationalist Congress Party leader Sharad Pawar; Trinamool Congress leaders Saugata Roy and Sukhendu Shekhar Roy; former prime minister and Janata Dal (Secular) leader Deve Gowda; DMK MPs Tiruchi Siva and T.R. Baalu; Telangana Rashtra Samithi’s Nama Nageshwara Rao; Telegu Desam Party’s Jaydev Galla; CPI MP Binoy Viswam; and others.

From the government side, the Union minister and leader of the house in Rajya Sabha Piyush Goyal and parliamentary affairs minister Pralhad Joshi also attended the meeting.

“The message that we all want to give you is that on this matter, we have a similar view. We have a strong national position. The friendship with the Afghan people is something that matters to all of us. So we approach this situation in a manner of national unity,” the foreign minister told reporters after the meeting.

According to reports, Jaishankar told the political leaders that India was adopting a “wait and watch” policy, just like the rest of the world. He stated that the situation in Afghanistan continued to be critical.

“It is an evolving situation, and I request everybody to be patient so that once the situation normalises, we can tell you what India’s stand is,” Jaishankar said,

External affairs minister S. Jaishankar with Union ministers Piyush Goyal and Pralhad Joshi, briefs the all-party panel over the present situation in Afghanistan in New Delhi, August 26, 2021. Photo: PTI/Vijay Verma

During the meeting, the leader of opposition in the Rajya Sabha, Malikarjun Kharge, raised the issue of the deportation of Afghan women member of parliament Rangina Kargar on arrival at Indira Gandhi international airport last week.

“At the meeting, we raised the issue of deportation of a woman MP. He (Jaishankar) said it was a mistake, and such an incident will not happen in the future. They (government) regretted it,” Kharge told reporters.

The Congress leader said his party raised various issues and concerns at the meeting and suggested that the government keep the interest as well as the safety of Afghan citizens in mind, along with the safety of Afghan students in India.

“He (Jaishankar) replied to the issues raised by us. Now, we will see how much of this is implemented,” he said.

Kharge said the situation in Afghanistan is a concern for the entire country. “We want to talk unitedly. All parties have taken the same view,” he added.

Asked if the Congress was satisfied with the meeting, Kharge said, “We will wait and see. They (government) have replied. We will have to see how much they implement… We will see how they evacuate those who are still left in Afghanistan. We will see what will be our stand vis-a-vis other countries.”

Kharge also raised a series of questions on the government’s contingency plan to evacuate Indians if they are stranded beyond the August 31 deadline and the exact number of Indians yet to be evacuated. The Hindu reported that the government did not share the exact number.

The Congress also reportedly asked about the concerns about a rise in terrorism in Kashmir following the return of the Taliban to Afghanistan.

Some also questioned the absence of Prime Minister Narendra Modi.

Kharge, according to the sources, said the prime minister should have been present at such a meeting, citing the precedent set by Vajpayee.

Left leaders like CPI(M)’s P.R. Natarajan questioned whether the US had kept India in the loop when it decided to advance the withdrawal of American forces from Afghanistan.

India currently has no diplomatic presence in Afghanistan, after all its officials, including the ambassador, were brought back by a military plane on August 17.

(With PTI inputs)

After Fire at SBI and Anti-India Protests, Maldives Beefs up Security for Indian High Commission

The government handed over the security of the diplomatic premises from the police to Maldives National Defence Forces.

New Delhi: After a major fire damaged the office of the State Bank of India and opposition parties held a major rally through the streets of the capital against Indian development projects, the Maldives government on Saturday upgraded the security of the Indian high commission in Malé by handing over the perimeter to Maldivian defence forces.

Indian sources confirmed that Maldives had handed over the security of the diplomatic premises from the police to Maldives National Defence Forces. This is the first time that armed security personnel will be guarding the Indian diplomatic mission, since Maldivian police had been unarmed.

It is learnt that the Maldives government had increased the security on their own. There had been no request from the Indian side.

Sources stated that the Maldivian government had beefed up the security following a massive fire at a high rise building, half of whose floors are occupied by State Bank of India on Friday night. “We don’t know yet if it was an accident or sabotage. The police investigation is going on, but the government thought it prudent to increase security for Indian diplomatic assets,” a senior Indian official told The Wire.

In a statement, SBI Maldives, which is one of the biggest banks in the Indian ocean nation, stated that there was “substantial damage” in all the five floors that housed its offices. However, the bank announced that it would resume banking services on Sunday.

Besides the fire, the threat perception to the Indian high commission had also increased due to a high-voltage rally by the opposition on the same day, sources stated.

Also read: Maldives: India Bids to Overtake China in Funding ‘High Visibility’ Infrastructure

Earlier on Friday, the opposition coalition of Progressive Party of Maldives and People’s National Congress held a number of rallies across the nation to protest the so-called “selling off Maldives” to India.

In the capital, around 350 motorcyclists came out onto the streets with banners and flags, which was a major show of strength by the opposition in the small nation. The opposition demonstrations were also demanding the release of former President Abdula Yameen, who is currently in jail on money-laundering charges.

“Most of these motorcyclists were part of the gangs who had been patronised by the previous regime. So if anti-social elements are on back on the streets, increasing security of Indian assets becomes vital,” added diplomatic sources.

Maldives President Ibrahim Mohamed Solih and former president Mohamed Nasheed arrive at an election campaign rally ahead of their parliamentary election on Saturday, in Male, Maldives April 4, 2019. Photo: Reuters/ Ashwa Faheem

Maldives foreign ministry sources added that the motorcycle rally was being held in “direct contravention of the guidelines put in place by the Health Protection Authority, given the community spread of COVID-19 in the capital city”.

They asserted that security measures that have been instituted “are part of a routine security exercise in the Greater Male Region”.

The trigger for the Maldivian opposition protests, as per sources, was the slew of announcements made by the Indian external affairs minister S. Jaishankar, which included funding for the largest infrastructure project in the Maldives.

During a video conference with his Maldivian counterpart, Jaishankar had announced that India would fund the Greater Malé Connectivity Project that could potentially overshadow China’s Sinamale bridge that cost over $200 million. He also added that India would give another USD 400 million line of credit, appending to the USD 800 million soft loan already being used to finance high impact projects in the Maldives.

Sources claimed the opposition was trying to corner the Ibrahim Solih government on its ties with India as New Delhi has been able to deliver on many of the projects that the president had requested after his election victory. “The opposition had assumed that the projects would get delayed and they will be able to cache onto the dissatisfaction over it”.

Highlighting the strengthened partnership with India under President Solih and his close ties with Indian PM Narendra Modi, sources in the Maldivian foreign ministry added that both countries are committee to “delivering results”. The number of development projects being undertaken with Indian financial support are progressing at excellent speed and will soon deliver their intended benefits to the people of the Maldives,” they said.

Also read: A Visual Guide to the External Affairs Ministry’s Share of the Budget 2020 Pie

With an ultra-nationalist, Islamist platform and accusing the government of “selling” to India, the opposition is hoping to see a recap of the events that led to the fall of Mohamed Nasheed-led MDP government in 2012. Nasheed’s forcible resignation had been preceded by months of anti-GMR and anti-India protests by the opposition parties, which snowballed into a mutiny by security agencies in February.

However, sources asserted that the likelihood of the opposition’s current anti-India protests being similarly successful was unlikely due to the leadership. “Solih is a very seasoned, solid person. He is not going to take any impetuous steps unlike Nasheed, who was a maverick,” they stressed.

(The article has been updated to include comments from sources in Maldivian foreign ministry)

Maldives: India Bids to Overtake China in Funding ‘High Visibility’ Infrastructure

During a meeting between foreign ministers S. Jaishankar and Abdulla Shahid on Thursday, India also extended a financial package to the archipelago nation.

New Delhi: Two years after China completed the Maldives’ biggest infrastructure project till date, India is attempting to overshadow Beijing by financing a multi-island connectivity proposal envisaged to be longer than the Sinamalé Bridge.

India’s decision to finance the Greater Malé Connectivity Project (GMCP), along with new budgetary support and an air travel bubble, was announced by external affairs minister S. Jaishankar during a meeting with his Maldivian counterpart Abdulla Shahid on Thursday.

While the Maldivian government highlighted the $250 million financial package, the Indian side gave top billing to the investment in GMCP.

The Maldives China Friendship project, a 1.39-kilometre bridge linking the capital city Malé to Hulhule island, was opened in April 2018. Then Maldives president Abdulla Yameen, whose term witnessed strained ties with India and stronger alignment with China, had described the $200 million project as the “biggest achievement in our diplomatic history”.

After the opposition MDP candidate Ibrahim Solih defeated Yameen, India has been trying to leverage its friendlier disposition to expand its presence in the strategically located Indian Ocean archipelago.

‘Largest civilian infrastructure project’

Announcing the decision to support the GMCP, Jaishankar noted, according to a Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) press release, that it will be the “largest civilian infrastructure project in the Maldives”. The financial package will have a grant component of $100 million and a new Line of Credit of $400 million.

An electoral promise of President Solih, the project will connect Malé with three neighbouring islands through a bridge and causeway link that will be 6.7 kilometres long. “Once completed, this landmark project will streamline connectivity between the four islands, thereby boosting economic activity, generating employment and promoting holistic urban development in the Malé region,” said the Indian foreign ministry.

It is said that the Maldivian president had reportedly sought India’s aid for the project during Jaishankar’s visit to the country in September 2019.

According to government sources, the “high visibility” GMCP will render the Maldives China Friendship bridge ‘insignificant in comparison’. “It will help in demonstrating India’s overarching presence in the Maldives through a high-visibility project in the Greater Malé region and showcase India’s expertise in conceptualising and implementing a complex infrastructural project of this scale,” they said.

India had previously extended an $800 million line of credit, which is being used to implement seven projects ranging from a water supply and sewerage system to a port project.

An aerial view of the Maldives China friendship bridge. Photo: Wikimedia Commons/Panda 51 CC BY SA 4.0

Extension of financial assistance

For the Maldives, the key assurance received during the meeting was the extension of financial assistance.

The Maldives foreign ministry headlined the readout of the video conference – “extends financial support of 250 million US Dollars to the Maldives”. The Indian press release stated that the “exact modalities of the loan arrangement are being finalised by the two sides”.

“Given the financial challenges faced by the Maldives due to the COVID-19 situation and India’s commitment to assist the Maldives in its economic recovery, EAM announced that the Government of India has decided to extend in-principle urgent financial assistance to the Government of Maldives, by way of a soft loan arrangement,” said the MEA press note.

Indian sources pointed out that India had earlier signed a $400 million bilateral currency swap agreement with the Maldives, out of which $150 million had already been withdrawn.

“The Government of Maldives can draw the remaining $250 million anytime till July 2021 to increase forex liquidity and exchange rate management. On the GoM’s request, the currency swap agreement has been further extended for a period of one year,” the sources said.

Tourism and travel

The restrictions on travel and lockdown have badly impacted the Maldives due to its dependence on tourism, with the government projecting a GDP contraction of 11% this year.

Last month, the Maldives opened its international airport to foreign tourists after a gap of nearly three months.

Jaishankar announced that India will create an air travel bubble with the country, with the first flight expected to commence on August 18. Until now, India has largely negotiated air travel bubbles with western countries, so this is the first in the neighbourhood.

“He (the Maldivian foreign minister) emphasised the importance of easing travel, especially for Maldivians seeking to visit India for urgently required medical treatment, as well as Indian tourists wishing to visit the Maldives,” said the Maldivian statement.

A resort island in the Maldives. Photo: Reuters

Besides, India and Maldives agreed that a direct cargo ferry service, announced during the Indian PM’s visit last year, will “commence shortly”.

“A direct cargo ferry service presents an opportunity for India to replace other countries and become the top trade partner of Maldives. In this context and with many bilateral projects slated to commence in the next few months, it is the right time to start a cargo ferry service with the Maldives,” explained government sources.

India has also offered a larger annual quota for this year of supply of essential commodities as defined by the 1981 bilateral trade agreement.

The MEA also added that President Solih is likely to visit India this year “subject to the COVID-19 related conditions”

Sri Lanka, India and China: Here’s What Keeps Neighbours Friendly – and What Doesn’t

Ahead of the announcement of the Lankan poll results, a look at the changing dynamic of relations.

The other day on the show Gravitas, it was claimed that China is pushing Sri Lanka to drop India and her other allies.

The examples to substantiate this assertion were: confusion regarding India and Japan’s Eastern Container Terminal (ECT) Project, suspension of the Japan-funded Light Rail Project, and the possibility of abandoning the US-backed Millennium Challenge Corporation Project (MCC). In sum, the telecast insinuated that Sri Lanka was losing longstanding friends and drifting deeper into China’s orbit.

Since India is our neighbour and friend, such commentary gives a negative perception of the relationship between the two countries. Relations have a changing dynamic. They must be evaluated in the context of changing world order and as a comparative exercise.

A comparative analysis will need to holistically explore relations, not only between India and Sri Lanka, but also those between India and other countries, Sri Lanka and other countries and amongst third party countries.

India: ‘The Big Brother’

Historically, the two countries boast of great mutual relations. At independence and the following few years, Ceylon was economically prosperous, stable, and had no security or political conflicts with any nation. Ties with India were excellent.

Nevertheless, Avatar Singh Bhasin stated that the Joint Planning Staff of the Chiefs Committee of the British government had assessed that a threat to Ceylon’s territorial integrity from India was plausible, although a full-scale attack was only likely if the littoral state was overrun by, or had thrown in her lot with a hostile power. The source indicated that the danger of India interfering with Ceylon’s internal politics was a probability.

Having read Asoka Raina’s Inside RAW – The Story of India’s Secret Service which cited the role of India’s intelligence agency in Bangladesh, promoting the Mukti Bahini, training guerillas and the youth on sabotage, clandestine transmission, and hit-and-run guerilla tactics, I cautioned the then Prime Minister R. Premadasa, forewarning that Sri Lanka could be subjected to this unfriendly behaviour one day.

And it happened. It was not a friendly neighbour’s best behaviour.

Also read: Explainer: Why Sri Lanka’s Election Results Are Crucial for the Rajapaksas

Let us face facts: When Sri Lanka’s territorial integrity was challenged, India was arming and training terrorists, dropping food supplies as humanitarian assistance and violating international air-space norms. In Choices: Inside the Making of India’s Foreign Policy, Shivashankar Menon said:

“India’s external intelligence agency The Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) was therefore tasked from the 1970s on to keep an eye on the LTTE and other groups. (PLOTE, EROS, TELO, EPRLF, TELA, and so on.) Most accounts say that RAW also trained and supported these groups between August 1983 and May 1987. The logic was that contact and control over them would be useful to further the peaceful evolution of a solution to the Tamil problem in Sri Lanka.”

Rita Manchanda has quoted Rohan Gunaratna as having said that foreign secretary M.K. Rasgotra said that the Sri Lankan operation was “to give a message to J.R. Jayewardene” due to the influx of refugees. It was supposedly to neither subvert Sri Lanka nor divide the island. Menon’s reading was different. If refugees were the issue, India would act similarly with Bangladesh given that millions of refugees from there have crossed borders to enter India.

Secretary Rasgotra had reacted to this reference as “sheerest nonsense.”  With due respect to the amiable secretary Rasagotra, I would like to state that the consequences of such training, arming – irrespective of mixed intentions – were not “sheerest nonsense.” They destabilised Sri Lanka. Therefore, any relation-building approach must take the past into consideration, as the past was likely to repeat.

Though not publicly discussed, Indian involvement in domestic political issues was also allegedly there. The best example was the Indian high commissioner J.N. Dixit. He was not the only one. Later, President Mahinda Rajapaksa stated that he had lost the 2015 presidential elections due to interference by Indians and others. Indians were displeased with President Rajapaksa for several reasons. Anyway, if his allegations were true, the question arises over whether India suffers from a ‘big-bossing syndrome,’ 67 years after Sri Lanka’s independence. Similarly, regular visits by Sri Lankan Tamil political leaders to Delhi and Chennai could not have been for chapatis!

The threats are embodied in another quote by Bhasin regarding the British cabinet delegation that attended Colombo’s independence celebrations. They reported that then Ceylonese prime minister regarded a potential Indian problem as dangerous. Therefore, Ceylon signed a military tie-up with the British. It confirmed a fear of India in Ceylonese leadership.

Again, Bhasin said that small states in the region fell in India’s security perimeter and therefore must not follow policies impinging on India’s security concerns:

“They should not seek to invite outside power(s). If anyone of them needed any assistance it should look to India. India’s attitude and relationship with her immediate neighbors depended on their appreciation of India’s regional security concerns; they would serve as buffer states in the event of an extra-regional threat and not proxies of the outside powers…”

Also read: Sri Lanka’s COVID-19 Response Is Proof That Demonisation of Minorities Has Been Normalised

Again, big bossing!

This overbearing nature was evident even at a personal level by no less a person than former Prime Minister Nehru, according to B.N. Pandey who, referring to Bandung Conference, in Nehru wrote:

“He received it rather unexpectedly, from the Ceylonese Prime Minister Sir John Kotelawala who interrupted the Bandung chorus of anti-colonialism by launching an attack on another form of colonialism- Russian domination in Central and Eastern Europe. Chou and Nehru were both agitated, but when Nehru asked John Kotelawala, “Why did you do that, Sir John? Why did you not show me your speech before you made it?” The Ceylonese Prime Minister rebuffed him with “Why should I? Do you show me yours before you make it?”

India and the neighbourhood

In the current context, India has several problems with its neighbours. At these junctures, there is no official demand for neighbours to support India, though the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) would have been pleased if it had happened. Some “India dependent” countries who received this message reacted suitably.

Historically India has had issues with Pakistan – recently in Pulwama and Balakot. The cancellation of a Bangladeshi dignitary’s visit to India after the passage of the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) embarrassed India. The recent skirmishes with China along the Sino-Indian border and China declaring unpreparedness to withdraw challenged Indian security.

The issues with Bhutan on electricity pricing and younger Bhutanese favouring reduced Indian engagement are also unfavourable developments. Nepal has border issues with India in the Kalapani-Limpiyadhura-Lipulekh border. The Nepalese PM recently vowed that Nepal would bring this area back “at any cost”.  Only Sri Lanka, Mauritius and Maldives have no issues to complain of, though the Maldives may be displeased over the treatment of Muslims in India.

Sri Lanka’s relations with India are at a peak. We have no critical issues other than an occasional shout on Kachchativu or Palk Bay fishing or the implementation of the 2017 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) or finalising the Economic and Technology Cooperation Agreement.

For India, the issues could be political (Tamil Nadu), security (intelligence sharing and ISIS), social (refugees), religious (pilgrims), international (UNHRC or China and Indian Ocean Region (IOR) security), geographic (Palk Bay/Kachchativu). Currently, there are no major barriers for closer relationship building with Sri Lanka for India compared with other neighbours.

However, learning from the Nepalese experience, I may construct a parallel. The Kalapani issue may be a minor one for India, but not for Nepal. But a similar situation may occur between India and Sri Lanka on the Palk Bay, if the two are not cautious with new fishery operational arrangements proposed at the meetings with Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa in February 2020. It is because the international boundary line of Nepal is challenged by India. Can India not challenge the international maritime boundary in Palk Bay? If India challenges us, there is hardly anything we could do, other than to express dissatisfaction. Our experience at the Indian food drop in June 1987 showed how other countries avoided responding negatively against India or issued lukewarm responses.

Also read: How the Return of the Rajapaksas Spells Anxiety for Tamils in Sri Lanka

There is danger that certain nationalistic acts – relating to the CAA or the NRC  – may serve as justifiable precedents to chauvinists for dealing with Muslims in Sri Lanka. These also could be considered negative influences.

Unusual evolution of relationships

Diplomatic engagements between India and Sri Lanka have evolved over decades – going from interventionism between 1983-1989 to distancing with displeasure between 1990-2014 to cordial post-2015. The current era is customised: patching-up with Rajapaksas.

It had been traditional for the newly elected Sri Lankan president or prime minister to visit India first – for ‘offering poojas’, we called it. When India’s external affairs minister, S. Jaishankar met president Gotabaya Rajapaksa immediately after elections and invited him to Delhi, it appeared as India was ‘offering pooja’ this time around. President Gotabaya Rajapaksa visited Delhi, ten days after the election, and PM Modi, with unusual swiftness, pledged US $ 450 million assistance, probably in an attempt to patch up and checkmate China.

Indian cooperation    

India and Sri Lanka have enjoyed positive economic relations. India is Sri Lanka’s major trading partner and Sri Lanka is a recipient of various grants and loans. During the terrorist conflict, India supported Sri Lanka and at international fora, India has mostly stood alongside Sri Lanka which has reciprocated the same. As between any two countries, there have been disruptions. Thus, before 2015, India had issues with the Mahinda Rajapaksa regime. Now, those issues seem to have subsided.

Regarding recent economic interventions, there appears to be uncertainty on the ECT, though a Memorandum of Cooperation (MOC) between India, Japan, and Sri Lanka exists. However, Sri Lanka may not deviate from the MOC, irrespective of various promises extended to trade unions during an election season, because it reflects negatively on the state’s attitude, will politically frustrate India, and usher in Indian wrath. Still, being considered a regime favourable to China, the prospect of comparative gains could change Sri Lankan stances and render it amenable to outsider influence.

This also applies to other projects (i.e. Liquified Natural Gas, Trincomalee Petroleum Tanks, etc.) earmarked under the MOU signed in 2017. I am aware that external affairs minister Jaishankar sent an officials’ team to Colombo before the presidential elections to push Colombo. Therefore, the ECT may be a restarting point for the new government.

India has liberalised shipping and ports businesses faster than Sri Lanka. Huge trans-shipment business with India is a cognisant factor. However, newly built Indian ports will be Sri Lanka’s competitors.  These are challenges and motivators to look elsewhere, if not controlled. Hence, cooperation is essential. Therefore, Sri Lanka must develop new strategies and convince domestic troubleshooters of the changes in port management cultures and the political fallout.

Financial assistance responses

A comparison of Indian financial assistance is an important yardstick to evaluate bilateral relationships. In the current budget, finance minister Nirmala Sitharaman has planned to disburse Rs 8,415 crore amongst the neighbourhood countries – Nepal (Rs 1,050 crore), Bhutan (Rs 2,802 crore), Mauritius (Rs 1,100 crore), and the Maldives (Rs 576 crore). But Sri Lanka gets Rs 250 crore. When compared to their respective populations, the disparity is clear. Additionally, India’s contribution to Sri Lanka in the last decade is less than the annual commitment to Bhutan. The discrimination is clear.

Anyhow, pledging $450 million to Sri Lanka heralded a new beginning in relations. However, Bhutan, Maldives and Nepal have received larger financial assistance in comparison, owing to their strategic importance. Similarly, Sri Lanka is also strategically important for India. Otherwise, why would Indians grumble about Chinese footprints at the Hambantota port?

Also read: Sri Lanka’s New President Gotabaya: The View From New Delhi

I cite a recent comparative experience of Sri Lanka’s. The Hindu reported that officials of both countries met five months after PM Mahinda Rajapaksa had sought a loan moratorium in Delhi. PM Modi’s decision to pledge US $ 450 million within twelve days after Rajapaksa’s election after a five-month delay may be interpreted as a show of hesitancy. In contrast, China signed an agreement with Sri Lanka giving it access to a US $ 500-million facility with concessional terms in mid-March, just as a COVID-19 induced financial crisis erupted. No delays were observed.

Sri Lanka-China-India Axis

Neighbouring countries drifting towards China is a worrying sign for India. Sri Lanka is under the microscope on this count. The above-mentioned package compared with Chinese assistance explains the attraction. Adarsha Varma, in the East Asia Strategic Review, noted that Chinese foreign direct investments exceeded 220 billion dollars in 2016, surging 246% from 2015, mostly to BRI countries. He added that Chinese loans to many Indian Ocean Region (IOR) littorals in Asia and Africa far exceed the loans they received from IMF or other developed countries. This cannot be an exaggeration.

Therefore, anyone competing with China should possess huge finances. It is necessary to find India’s financing capacity and hence alternative Indian strategies must be found.

As M.K. Narayanan noted in The Hindu:

“Again, notwithstanding the “Wuhan spirit”, India cannot but be concerned about China’s true intentions, given the regional and global situation and its desire to dominate the Asian region. Within the next decade, China will become a truly formidable military power, second only to the US. The ongoing India-US entente could well provoke a belligerent China to act with greater impunity than previously….”

If the latter happens, Sri Lankan or any Indian neighbour will forcibly have to review its stand.

We may look at realistic examples. If we observe the railway sector expansion (Map I) extending to Europe, parts of Africa, and the maritime sea route as guidance, the spread is humongous. Is it within India’s capacity to compete? If so, well enough. Financial resources matching those of China must be deployed.

Grumbling Chinese assistance to neighbourhood is because the Chinese combine investments with politics. Therefore, more important is to find alternative approaches that could combat both Chinese approaches. It is because China will not stop monetary and political interventions to dominate the global and regional order, as pointed out by M.K. Narayanan.

If India expects greater collaboration, the Chinese, or US or Russian or Japanese approaches should be used. To prove how sudden and difficult it is, I quote Ana Pararajasingham’s article in Asia Times which stated that when Sri Lanka collaborated on the ETC issue with India and Japan, the media divulged that China was gifting a 2,300-ton warship to Sri Lanka and President Xi had offered a fresh grant of USD 295 million. India has also supplied ships to Sri Lanka, but the timing is paramount. It was interpreted as a “clear indication that Beijing is looking to further expand its influence over Colombo”. It was transparent, competitive, and ‘comparative compensation’ for furthering relations. In such a scenario unless with positive action, enticing any neighbouring country is difficult.

This ‘outsider’ relationships must be viewed carefully. The IOR has several international power mismatches. The US, China, Japan, India, etc. have interests in sea lanes. India has shown keenness for the security of the Indian Ocean. Sri Lanka is on the Maritime Sea Route through Hambantota Port which has Chinese involvement becomes an important region for India. Therefore, India-Sri Lanka relationships cannot skip this concern.

Also read: Sri Lanka Should Not Turn a Blind Eye to the Ascent of Wahabi Extremism

With China, these systems, principles, and ideologies change. Decision-making process by the Chinese is very quick, whereas with India or Japan or a western nation it is bureaucratically delayed. This swiftness attracts recipients. This explains why Belt and Road Initiative or One Belt One Road project have captured the world’s attention. If closer ties are expected, India and Sri Lanka may have to develop competitive systems, principles, and ideologies.

Due to the politicised selection of projects and programmes, the Chinese always try to fill voids or deficits in the benefiting country. It helps the benefiting country’s politicians by investing in what their people require. Thus, the Mahinda Rajapaksa regime has gained from Chinese assistance in infrastructure.

In the sly, this can lead to corrupt practices; also, because most infrastructure projects are huge. Even the World Bank that said the OBOR initiative has spread over to every continent. Even the countries in the Indian initiative BIMSTEC are supported by OBOR and BRI, except in India and Bhutan. Even Bhutan has been approached by China; however, they do not actively engage with the Chinese due to their treaty with India. Even without any such treaty with us, the Indians question Chinese interventions.

Let me compare Indian assistance to Bhutan with that to Sri Lanka. India had been very lavish in assisting Bhutan (USD 800 million for the five-year plan of Bhutan). Bhutan is the largest recipient of Indian foreign assistance. Its population is 800,000 while that of Sri Lanka is 21 million. However, India gains from electricity purchases from Bhutan and Indian military presence in Bhutan, etc. which are not offered by Sri Lanka to India. While many Bhutanese are thankful to India for its assistance, many, particularly the youth, want Bhutan to chart its course. Analyst Gopilal Acharie thinks that, with maturity, Bhutan should step out of India’s shadow and that India also should not think of Bhutan as a ‘vassal state’.

Even in Sri Lanka, some consider our status also in a somewhat similar tone. I quote Anura Kumara Dissanayaka, leader of the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna, who said that the US and India acted together to replace the incumbent government to enable them to get their plans executed (e.g. the US’s MCC project and India’s Sampur power project, Mattala Airport Project), in which the Sirisena-Wickremesinghe government miserably failed to satisfy them. Less is spoken here of Chinese intrusions.

Saheli Chattaraj’s explanation of Chinese five factors of connectivity (i.e. policy coordination, facilities connectivity, unimpeded trade, financial integration, and people-to-people bonds) and the three commonalities (i.e. common interest, common destiny, and common responsibility) seem to have worked in the neighbourhood.

Since India is a ‘continent’ for us, we should positively look up to India as a huge marketplace, a country from where Sri Lanka can also boost investment. However, there are domestic compulsions to freely operate due to Indian policies that are relaxed to some extent now. This is where trade arrangements and investor boosting connectivity should be negotiated. It is disheartening that trade arrangements have been lying on tables for long. Relations building will include accelerating the progress of these arrangements.

Cautious Indian diplomacy

India can be rough and cautious in maintaining relationships and its responses depend on differing situations. Voting at the UNHRC to oppose President Mahinda Rajapaksa in 2012, India had displayed its reaction to Sri Lanka for not heeding to the global approaches supported by it. Domestic compulsions by the Dravida Munnetra Kazagam also forced India’s hands at this instance proving outsider influencing.

This attitude has been repeated elsewhere too. Currently, Bhutan is faced with challenges regarding unemployment and foreign debt to India. As the Bhutanese government seeks to shift from dependence on hydropower for economic growth, Chinese investment has caught the attention of both young people and the private sector as one with the potential to offer a better future. The Chinese had been trying to entice Bhutan for such development projects and even to start diplomatic ties, which Bhutan has avoided. But after the Doklam standoff, the Chinese dropped tourist arrivals warning Bhutan about the country’s vulnerability in Chinese hands. Hence, pricking small nations seems to be a habit of big nations and could be a lesson for Sri Lanka, especially to have some reserve breathing space.

Also read: Interview | No Need to Play India, China Against Each Other: Maldives Foreign Minister

Nevertheless, India is cautious in dealing with Sri Lankan politics. In October 2018, when Mahinda Rajapaksa was appointed prime minister, the MEA spokesperson Raveesh Kumar said:

“India is closely following the recent political developments in Sri Lanka. As a democracy and a close friendly neighbor, we hope that democratic values and the constitutional process will be respected.”

Indian feeling was legally right. But it would have been anathema to Mahinda Rajapaksa. India respected the rule of law, when the rule of law was deliberately negated, as later proved by the Supreme Court. Please note that this was weeks after Mahinda Rajapaksa had visited Delhi and been received by prime minister Modi in the presence of eminent personalities like Subramaniam Swamy.

Pakistan and the Chinese reacted differently. The Pakistani high commissioner in Colombo, Shahid Ahmad Hashmat called on Mahinda Rajapaksa and congratulated him on his appointment as the prime minister. The Chinese ambassador to Sri Lanka Cheng Xueyuan visited PM Mahinda Rajapaksa to present a congratulatory message from the Chinese premier Li Keqiang.  The levels of attachment differed. One must ask Mahinda Rajapaksa with whom he will go. Sometimes cautious diplomacy may not pay dividends.

Contrarily, in November 2019, Indians rushed to Colombo swiftly, before Pakistan and China. The reasoning may be the frustration India experienced and to be the first to stand with Gotabaya Rajapaksa. In November 2019 and mid-February 2020 when PM Modi met with both the Rajapaksas – the president and the prime minister of Sri Lanka – the atmosphere had changed proving that there are no permanent friends or foes in international diplomacy, but only permanent national interests. India could only be expecting reciprocation from Sri Lanka.

Of course, platforming them at openings could help. For example, a video (on the show Gravitas, titled ‘China links to Lankan Buddhists’) introduced another Chinese approach (people-people bonds) to cultivate the Sri Lankan Buddhist establishment. India must face this in Sri Lanka. It should be easy due to historical status and considering that the President’s brother Basil Rajapaksa has a vision for his party to develop like the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) or India’s Bharatiya Janata Party.

Since the Modi-Rajapaksas commonalities match, it has been a matter of grabbing opportunity before the Chinese do. If the Rajapaksas prioritise the CCP, India will lose. Writing for The Quint, P.C. Dheeraj discussed similar opportunities on how India could offset China in Sri Lanka through Buddhist ties.

The attempt here had been to look with an open mind about how our relations have been and the challenges ahead. It was seen that inter-country relationships rest on complex platforms. The references to other country experiences prove that there are outside influences that affect relations, sometimes indirectly. Therefore, reminiscing about past relations may be unfit at times in diplomacy.

Hence, countries should dissect these complexities, create environments and affect changes to relationship strategies. This is because we cannot survive as loners and cooperation becomes key for development, understanding, and diplomacy. It is time for both governments to address their strategies positively.

However, Sri Lanka may be reminded that Indians neutralise opposition, within and outside, through reason, rent, pressure, and intrigue, (the ancient saam, daam, dand and bhed), as quoted mildly, and she will not hesitate to use these strategies if we are on the wrong path.

Austin Fernando is the former Sri Lankan high commissioner to India.

The MEA’s Structural Reforms Are Promising, but Not Sufficient

The MEA starts with real assets: a lean structure; a cadre of dedicated officials. The challenge is to optimise performance across the board.

The year 2020 is both euphonic to the ear and a metaphor for perfect eyesight. It is a great launchpad for major actions, serendipitously for the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA). Announced in the first week of February, the MEA has embarked upon major reform. This is both timely and welcome.

It is being handled exclusively as an internal process, personally driven by external affairs minister S. Jaishankar. This is, quite literally, the first comprehensive reorganisation in MEA’s history. The few details revealed cover MEA’s higher management; nearly 60 divisions will be clustered in ‘verticals’, each headed by one of ten additional secretaries, many in new posts. This is part of a comprehensive process being implemented in the coming weeks and months.

However, there remain issues and areas of reform, like the structure of the ministry, resources – human and material – performance management and operation of embassies which necessitate a deeper examination.

Consider the operational environment confronting foreign ministries (MFAs). Work in today’s globalised diplomacy has multiplied exponentially, abroad and at home. Heads of government are peripatetic as never before; issues in global debate have multiplied and are more complex – at regional and bilateral levels. Domestically, MFAs must coordinate intensively with other ministries and agencies, and reach out to thinktanks, business, the media and a host of other non-state actors.

The MEA starts with real assets: a lean structure; a cadre of dedicated officials; an ethos of excellence, and consistently strong leadership. Its peers view it as one of the most effective diplomatic systems. The challenge is to optimise performance across the board, and get the best out of its human resources.

Also read: A Visual Guide to the External Affairs Ministry’s Share of the Budget 2020 Pie

Structure

Appointing 10 additional secretaries (redesignated as ‘political directors’) creates a new senior management layer across the ministry, but does not really address the top management challenges at the MEA. Plainly put, the work distribution between the foreign secretary and the other three secretaries is skewed, and leaves the former heavily overloaded. Vivek Katju who retired as an MEA Secretary wrote about this in 2013:

“The Foreign Secretary is the administrator of the foreign office and also handles critical bilateral relationships as well as multilateral work…All this work leaves him no time to plan and execute a vision for the foreign office or the IFS.”

PM Modi’s welcome personal engagement in foreign affairs has further multiplied the foreign secretary’s work; simply put, the urgent overtakes the important. He needs a ‘political director’, to help manage the divisions under his direct charge. And at the bottom of the pyramid, there is scope for entrusting more responsibility to desk officers, the undersecretaries.

S. Jaishankar. Photo: PTI/Ravi Choudhary

MEA’s economic divisions total about seven, including the units that constitute the ‘Development Partnership Administration’ (DPA) created in 2012, a splendid initiative that manages Indian foreign aid. In any other ministry that would be a separate ‘department’. Hiving it off in this manner would improve its focus and credibility with other economic ministries and departments, and add to MEA’s stature. Such a move would retain the foreign secretary’s overall primary role in the MEA, while lightening his direct load.

Human resources

The sanctioned strength of the Indian Foreign Service is 960; in March 2019 the actual strength was 795, and the current figure is perhaps around 820. If we add to this those in Grade I of ‘IFS B’ (who hold diplomatic rank), the total is around 1050. Taken together with the commerce department officials assigned to embassies and experts sent on contract assignments (e.g. for aid projects), the number approaches 1200. That is a low figure for a diplomatic system that extends to 123 embassies, but the steady increase implemented 2007 onwards (by expanding the annual intake to around 35) is working well. We are better off with a lean system.

The challenge is in HR management, especially to apply greater selectivity for promotion to the top grades, and in training. Clearly, ‘merit-based promotions’ cannot work in the Indian ethos; that would surely lead to partisan manipulation. But even with promotions handled through sequentially taking up a full annual batch (as is our civil service custom), those judged to be inadequate performers should be left out, especially for the rank of joint secretaries and upwards.

Also read: How Consistent Has Our Diplomacy Been in Pursuit of Economic Objectives?

The IFS also has to abandon the bizarre practice under which a person not promoted with that batch, if promoted a year or two later gets back the original seniority; that is not equitable, and we can learn from the armed forces.

The Foreign Service Institute (FSI) has done well in cutting back the duration of entry-level training, but needs to add ambassador and senior management training courses, going beyond the mandatory pre-promotion training courses that the Manmohan Singh government introduced across all civil services in 2008. And MEA’s top management needs to devote attention to the training function, to supervise better FSI’s working.

As for financial shortages facing the MEA, the parliamentary committee headed by Shashi Tharoor has written eloquently on the issue. It criticised the MEA’s ‘failure to convince Ministry of Finance for higher allocation in consonance with the ever increasing foreign policy mandate…(and) the mismatch in demand and allocation and further recurrent budgetary cuts imposed by the Ministry of Finance at all stages of budgetary allocation’. The real problem: the finance establishment fails to envision the diplomatic system as the country’s first line of defence. This problem has persisted with the Union Budget announced on 1 February 2020.

Resource shortage cripples the system.

Performance management

Foreign ministries traditionally don’t broadcast their work methods, but material emerges from reform plans, such as UK’s Future FCO, 2016, and a 2014 report Modernising Dutch Diplomacy. Canadian diplomat Darryl Copeland’s Guerilla Diplomacy is especially insightful. Broadly, three methods are used: annual action plans (Australia, New Zealand, US); ‘ambassador’s instructions’ (France, Italy, Germany); ‘Key Performance Indicators’, or ‘KPIs’ as known in the corporate world (China, UK and several African and European countries).

The MEA nominally uses annual plans, but more than half our embassies do not bother, and since Rajiv Gandhi’s days, no one at MEA monitors these. It is not difficult to apply one of the above methods; perhaps some action on this is now in the pipeline.

Greater India-China engagement on many fronts should – logically – be in the interest of the people in both countries. Credit: PTI

Photot: PTI

The oldest performance supervision is inspections of embassies, used with other methods by major diplomatic services; the US and Canada even publish major parts of their embassy reports. We use this, but five or more years may pass before a set of inspectors lands up at a typical Indian embassy.

Also read: Will Shashi Tharoor’s Recommendations Reform the MEA for the Better?

The Germans have the most rigorous system, supplemented by parallel internet-based annual feedback from all home-based personnel, security guards upwards; it is especially effective in spotting emerging staff crisis, plus guiding ambassadors to improve embassy management, avoiding financial lapses. Even in our age of instant global communication, this remains a critical challenge for all countries. We cannot afford laxity.

Process and methods: Listed below are some of many actions that are feasible and should be a priority.

  • Breaking silos: EAM Jaishankar has spoken persuasively of his commitment to breaking a silo mentality and engaging with other domestic ministries to advance the MEA’s external economic agenda. For example, major and minor Indian aid projects, including those in our vital neighbourhood, Myanmar, Nepal or elsewhere, languish years beyond their deadlines, because other ministries don’t see them as vital. The MEA also finds it hard to harmonise actions with the economic ministries; an MEA ‘economic department’ can be advantageous here. Other ministries often fail to use the Indian embassy networks to advance their agendas.
  • Outreach to non-state actors: Why doesn’t a forum for thinktanks, for regular, structured dialogue, and a similar forum for economic diplomacy (involving industry and commerce chambers and leading businessmen), exist? We have been inhibited for too long when it comes to initiating sustained conversations with such key domestic actors.
  • Public diplomacy: After establishing a Public Diplomacy (PD) Division in 2006, some years later this was folded into the External Publicity Division, headed by a joint secretary who also has his hands as full as the MEA’s ‘Official Spokesman’. Public communication is a good ‘vertical’ that can be headed by an additional secretary, who remains the spokesman, overseeing two divisions, i.e. the traditional external publicity and the mainly internet-driven public diplomacy unit. This is one area in which MEA’s performance has been outstanding, despite a minuscule $5 million PD budget.
  • A comprehensive ‘intranet’: Fear of snooping by other countries has inhibited us from establishing a fullscale intranet of the kind long common in most major diplomatic systems, also used widely across our own government, including the intelligence services and the armed forces. Global distribution of diplomatic missions makes this all the more vital; other countries deploy secure conferencing as well as political and administrative networking, at a level that traditional communication does not permit. For instance, the US State Department’s ‘diplopedia’, used to refine work templates via ‘crowdsourcing’; UK’s FCO interviews shortlisted candidates, for every single assignment third secretary upwards.

Also read: Diplomacy in the Age of Social Media

  • Forward planning: As a few others have done, it would pay to identify some 30-odd bilateral priority countries and map out where we can take each relationship over the next 5 years, in political, economic and other sectors. This can be blended with identification each year of two or three countries for special cultivation – doing this jointly with, for instance, the Departments of Commerce and Industrial Promotion. Ambassadors in countries that are at the periphery of our priorities can also be encouraged to come up with innovative ideas, be it via ITEC cooperation, promotion of new trade products or bringing foreign students. Planning is integral to improved performance.

Embassies: Our official agencies view the current network of 123 embassies and around 40 plus consulates as belonging to one ministry. True, the MEA directly controls them, but it belongs to all Indian agencies and is also answerable to the public. It is not just the economic ministries that need to make better use of a network, that should better serve all manner of entities that have a vocation and requirement for external connections. Consular and diaspora work has become a vital connector with publics. Should we not have a ‘citizen charter’ for the services that this network can provide?

Offered here is an incomplete catalogue of MEA reforms that lie in the domain of the possible, the practical. EAM Jaishanker is to be complimented for initiating a broad reform process. It is best that remains an in-house, initiative, undertaken incrementally. Yet, wider discussion might furnish ideas, to help this process.

Kishan S. Rana is a former Indian diplomat.

Gotabaya Visit: India, Sri Lanka Look for Common Ground in Security Cooperation

India also extended two additional lines of credit worth $450 million for infrastructure and counter-terrorism.

New Delhi: On the first foreign visit by Sri Lankan President Gotabaya Rajapaksa, India on Friday extended two additional lines of credit worth $450 million for infrastructure and counter-terrorism, with both sides putting priority on security cooperation.

Rajapaksa won the presidential election two weeks ago by obtaining 52% of the votes, largely from the Sinhala majority population. Since China’s footprint in Sri Lanka had spread during his elder brother’s presidential tenure, India had rushed external affairs minister S. Jaishankar to visit Colombo and invite the president-elect to New Delhi for his first state visit abroad.

Gotabaya Rajapaksa with S. Jaishankar. Photo: Twitter/@DrSJaishankar

Ten days later, Gotabaya Rajapaksa landed in the Indian capital to hold talks with his host, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, at Hyderabad House.

Emerging from the talks, Rajapaksa claimed that discussions were “extremely cordial and reassuring”.

In total, the discussions went on for 90 minutes. This included about an hour of one-on-one talks between Modi and Rajapaksa, without any accompanying officials.

The visiting Sri Lankan leader described India as “our closest neighbour and long-standing friend”.

Also seeking to ameliorate Indian concerns vis-à-vis China, Rajapaksa assured, “Whilst with India the cooperation is multifaceted with priority given to security-related matters, with other counties the initiatives for cooperation are by and large, economic and commercial.”

According to sources, Rajapaksa told the Indian PM that he had considered relations with India as a priority since “his young days”.

Rajapaksa also apparently told the Indian PM that “he would not allow any third force to come in between cooperation with India”.

Also read: Sri Lanka: Gotabaya’s Triumph Is Constrained by Circumstances Beyond His Control

The former defence secretary told the media on Friday that security issues “took priority” in his talks with India. “Since our recent experience in April this year, we have had to rethink our national security strategy and assistance from India in this regard would be most appreciated,” he said.

Rajapaksa was referring to the Easter Sunday bombing of churches and hotel which left over 250 dead. According to Sri Lankan authorities, all the suicide bombers were Sri Lankan nationals belonging to a homegrown Islamist group. Syrian-based ISIS has claimed responsibility for the attack.

The Sri Lankan president’s election campaign was based on the national security platform, which resonated among the Sinhalas. The minorities in the north and eastern provinces voted largely in favour of his rival, ruling party candidate.

His win marked the return to power of the Rajapaksa family. His brother, Mahinda Rajapaksa had been friendly towards India, but had seemingly turned towards China in last few years. Mahinda Rajapaksa had overseen the entry of China in key strategic infrastructure projects, including Hambantota port project and Colombo port city project.

“We will continue to work closely with India to ensure that Indian ocean remain as a zone of peace,” said Rajapakse.

The Indian prime minister was clearly looking at security cooperation to find a common ground with the new Sri Lankan president.

Also read: Sri Lanka’s New President Gotabaya: The View From New Delhi

“The security and development of our two countries are inseparable. Therefore, it is natural that we should be aware of each other’s safety and sensibilities,” said Modi.

He noted that his first visit after winning the general elections this year had been to Colombo to “express India’s unwavering support in the Sri Lankan fight against terrorist and extremist forces” following the April attacks.

“I have discussed in detail with the President Rajapaksa for mutual security and to further strengthen mutual cooperation against terrorism. Sri Lankan police officers in major Indian institutions are already receiving the benefit of counter terrorist training,” he added.

As per sources, Rajapaksa had expressed interest in training and intelligence sharing.

Modi announced that India has extended a special Line of Credit of $50 million dollars to Sri Lanka “to combat terrorism”.

Alongside, he also extended a new $400 million line of credit to “give a boost to infrastructure and development in Sri Lanka”.

Also read: Jaishankar Rushes to Colombo, India Announces Dates of New Sri Lankan President’s Visit

The Indian prime minister also claimed that both of them “openly exchanged views on reconciliation in Sri Lanka”.

“President Rajapaksa told me about his inclusive political outlook on ethnic harmony,” he added.

Indian government sources insisted that there was a “meeting of minds” on the issue of reconciliation with the Sri Lankan Tamils. Rajapaksa apparently reiterated his previous statement that he will be “president of all Sri Lankans irrespective of ethnicity or religion or voting choices”.

“I am confident that the Government of Sri Lanka will carry forward the process of reconciliation, to fulfill the aspirations of the Tamils for equality, justice, peace and respect. It also includes the implementation of the 13th amendment,” Modi said in his press statement. He also added that India “will become a trusted partner for development throughout Sri Lanka including North and East”.

This was the first time in several years that India had referred to the 13th amendment which is about devolution of powers to the provinces.

This is the second time in a month that India has brought up the Tamil issue. Earlier, the Indian ministry of external affairs had claimed that Jaishankar had also urged Rajapaksa to meet the aspirations of the Tamil people last month.

Also read: How the Easter Bombings Left Sri Lanka’s Muslims With No Path Forward

Rajapakse, however, did not refer to the Tamil issue in his own statement. In contrast, he did mention the Indian fishermen issue – which also figured in Modi’s public remarks.

He announced that Sri Lanka will “take steps to release the boats belonging to India in our custody”. Indian sources claimed that Sri Lankan President had gone “an extra mile” on this subject.

Due to depleting fish stocks at home, Indian fishermen often cross the international border and are taken into custody by Sri Lankan navy. While Sri Lanka releases the Indian fishermen, their boats are usually held.

The visiting Sri Lankan leader also brought up the matter of increasing trade. “I discussed with the PM how Sri Lanka could benefit from certain economic sectors where India is strongly positioned,” he said.

In the end, Rajapaksa extended an invitation to Modi to visit Sri Lanka as the first head of state since the presidential election.

Sri Lankan President Gotabaya Rajapaksa Appoints Interim Cabinet

Rajapaksa as the president cannot hold ministries although he is the head of the Cabinet.

Colombo: Sri Lankan President Gotabaya Rajapaksa on Friday appointed an interim Cabinet which is aimed to run the government until the next parliamentary election.

The 16-member Cabinet included the president’s brothers – Mahinda Rajapaksa, 74, and Chamal Rajapaksa, 77, two Tamils and a woman.

This is an interim government, Gotabaya Rajapaksa said during the swearing-in ceremony. He said that the ministers of state would be appointed next week.

Gotabhaya Rajapaksa as the President cannot hold ministries although he is the head of the Cabinet.

The Tamil minority members came from the Tamil dominated north and from the central tea plantations areas of Tamils of Indian origin.

Mahinda Rajapaksa, who is appointed on the post of the Prime Minister in the new Cabinet, was also named as the Minister of Defence and Finance while the eldest of the brothers Chamal Rajapaksa was named the Minister of Trade and Food Security.

Also read: Jaishankar Told Rajapaksa to Meet Aspirations of Sri Lankan Tamils: India

Dinesh Gunawardena, 70, a veteran Marxist politician has been named as the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

The Cabinet appointment is seen as interim until the President dissolves the current parliament and go for a fresh parliamentary election.

The next parliamentary poll is scheduled only after August 2020. Constitutionally, a sitting prime minister cannot be removed unless he resigns. But following Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s win, the need for a fresh parliamentary poll to allow the new president to form his own government has gained ground.

Gotabaya Rajapaksa could dissolve the current Parliament to call for early elections after February 2020.

Speaker Karu Jayasuriya on Tuesday said that the country faces the possibility of a snap parliamentary poll.

Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe is also under pressure to quit.

“As a party which honours democracy, we will discuss with the parliamentary group, the Speaker and party leaders about parliamentary elections,” a statement from Wickremesinghe’s office said on Monday.

Gotabaya Rajapaksa was on Monday sworn in as Sri Lanka’s seventh President. He defeated Sajith Premadasa, 52, by more than 13 lakh votes.

Jaishankar Urges Gujarat HC to Quash Congress Leader’s Plea on RS Bypoll

Gaurav Pandya, who lost to Jaishankar in bypoll, said in his petition that holding separate elections for Rajya Sabha seats violated constitutional provisions.

Ahmedabad: External affairs minister S. Jaishankar filed an affidavit in the Gujarat high court on Monday defending his election to the Rajya Sabha from the state, claiming that the Election Commission broke no rules by holding separate elections for two seats.

Congress leader Gaurav Pandya, who had lost to BJP candidate Jaishankar in the Rajya Sabha by-election held in July this year, had filed an election petition in the Gujarat high court, claiming that the EC’s decision to hold separate bypolls to two Rajya Sabha seats violated constitutional provisions.

Another Congress candidate, Chandrika Chudasama, had filed a similar petition after losing to the BJP’s Jugalji Thakor.

In his affidavit, filed in the court of Justice Bela Trivedi, Jaishankar contended that Pandya’s petition deserves to be dismissed as it fails to explain precisely how and which provisions of the Constitution or the Representation of the People Act were violated by the EC in holding by-elections.

Jaishankar stated that it has been a consistent practice by the EC since 2009 to issue separate notifications for holding bypolls for casual vacancies in the Rajya Sabha.

The EC, therefore, rightly issued separate notifications for separate seats that have fallen vacant, the reply stated.

Further, the affidavit contended that different seats falling vacant at the same time were required to be treated as one is a misplaced interpretation by the petitioner.

The reply stated that there is no bar on issuance of separate notifications by the EC under the provisions of Section 12 of the RP Act.

Notably, a similar affidavit was filed on Monday by second BJP candidate Jugalji Thakor.

Thakor’s election to Rajya Sabha was challenged by Congress candidate Chandrika Chudasama on the same grounds.

The elections to the two Rajya Sabha seats of Gujarat, which fell vacant after BJP leaders Amit Shah and Smriti Irani were elected to the Lok Sabha, were held on July 5.

In his petition, Pandya sought the court’s direction to quash the election and notification issued by the EC announcing the holding of polls separately.

He has also sought the court’s direction to the poll panel to hold polls to the two seats afresh simultaneously through a single ballot, and not through two ballots.

It claimed that the EC notification was unconstitutional and violated the Representation of People Act, 1951.

As per the Constitution, election to the vacant seats of the Rajya Sabha should be held together so that the system of proportional representation by means of single transferable vote can be applied, he said in his petition.

The Supreme Court had earlier rejected a plea by the Gujarat Congress just after the EC notification was issued.