Statue Politics and the Myth of Ramanuja’s Equality

The name given to the statue is meant to mislead the Shudra/Dalit/Adivasis, who have their own spiritual symbols in Telangana and also have major spiritual icons like Mahatma Phule, Savitribai Phule & Dr. B.R. Ambedkar.

Earlier this month,  a 216-foot high statue of Ramanujacharya – founder of the Vishishta Advaita school of Vaishnavism in 11 century South India – was unveiled by Prime Minister Narendra Modi. The statue is named ‘Statue of Equality’,  presumably on the lines of the Statue of Liberty in New York. Modi said Ramanuja’s Statue of Equality and Sardar Vallabh Bhai Patel’s Statue of Unity will change India.

The main institutionaliser of the latest statue is Chinna Jeeyar Swamy, said to be the guru of Telangana chief minister K. Chandrasekhara Rao. Jeeyar Swamy’s background is not mentioned anywhere but he is from East Godavari district of Andhra Pradesh. Indications are that he himself comes from a Brahmin family background.

Though Ramanuja established his sect of Vaishnavism with the idea of human equality about 1000 years ago, the impact of this drive for equality ought to have been visible in present day Tamil Nadu and Kerala – the region he taught his philosophy and lived his long life. Especially since we know there was no elite or violent counter-reaction of the kind which Buddhism faced. Ramanuja’s main preaching happened around the Srirangam Ranganatha temple in Tamil Nadu. For about 900 years after his death, by the time Periyar, Ramasamy Naikar, Sri Ayyankali and Srinarayana Guru started their struggles for equality in the same region, the Tamil and Kerala Dalits and Shudras experienced little socio-spiritual equality. If anything, their condition was worse than any other part of the country.

If the Vaishnavite Ramanuja opposed the Shaiva casteist tradition of Adi-Shankara and started a movement for equality, what does the caste-cultural history of that region tell us? Chinna Jeeyar Swamy claims and the prime minister of India affirms, that a great spiritual movement of equality was launched, but then why was untouchability in those areas even more widespread than the rest of India – with even some of the Shudra castes like the Nadars of Tamil Nadu and Ezahvas of Kerala too being treated as untouchable and unseeable?  This was only region where the Shudras were treated as untouchable till the early 20th century.

For those looking to build statues, there is no shortage of true icons of equality. Ayyankali (1863-1941), who was a Dalit himself, started a movement for allowing Dalits of that region to be allowed to walk in the village streets. Narayana Guru (1856-1928), who came from a toddy tapper community, started a movement to fight for the Shudra ‘Right to Religion’ by establishing his Linga and finally established a mutt of his own. Periyar Ramasamy (1879-1973) a Shudra agri-businessman, finally delivered a major blow to the forces of inequality in the region. Where was the influence of Ramanuja’s equality in all this? If the ‘equality’ claims being made today were true even in the spiritual domain, why were Dalits not even allowed to walk on the roads where Vaishnava temples like the Padmanabha temple of Kerala stood?

It is a known fact that Ramanuja was by birth a Brahmin and never left the Brahminic socio-spiritual practices within temple and outside. He was the opposite of Basaveswara, a Brahmin by birth who rebelled against Brahmanism to establish a spiritual system of human equality in Karnataka.

Adi Shankara started his Shaivite movement in the 8th century CE in the context of the inroads Buddhism, Islam and Christianity had made.  But that did not stop the growth of these religions. The Brahmins of that region thought that promoting Vaishnavism would stop religious migrations as the Ramayana and Mahabharata were more usable mythological texts. In the absence of any concrete Shaivite mythological text, they promoted Vaishnavism. Both the Ramayana and Mahabharata were composed around Vishnu’s avatar narratives. Ramanuja in that situation worked to promote the Vaishnava cult with vague talk of human equality – in the hope that it would stop the Shudra/Dalit migration to other religions. But the rigidity of Brahminism did not allow any change and untouchability and Shudra inequality were rampant till reformers like Narayana Guru, Ayyankali and Periyar emerged.

The philosophical discourse of Ramanuja did not raise the issue of dignity of labour and respect to production in the Vaishnava system as well. After all, caste inequalities and human untouchability were rooted in productive occupational discrimination. He tried to re-define Brahmanism without differentiating between Brahma the God and Brahmin the human, with a new form of worship but it had nothing to do with equality.

Why then have Chinna Jeeyar, KCR and Rameshwar Rao (the richest Velama real estate business man) planned to establish a Rs 1200 crore spiritual centre with a huge statue in Hyderabad? Does Jeeyar himself believe in human and cultural equality?

Since KCR comes from a Velama landlord family, which also thinks that the Velamas have Kshatriya heritage, they started promoting the Vaishnava sect of Hinduism in Telangana. However, the relationship between Jeeyar Swamy and the RSS/BJP is well established. The financial supporter of this project is Jupally Rameshwar Rao, a billionaire, and real estate monopolist of Telangana. Since there is no political support to Ramanuja’s ideology in Tamil Nadu and Kerala, they chose Telangana but the ‘Statue of Equality’ name is meant to mislead the Shudra/Dalit/Adivasis, who have their own spiritual symbols in Telangana and also have major spiritual icons like Mahatma Phule, Savitribai Phule and Dr. B.R. Ambedkar.

Modi’s assertion that Ambedkar was a follower of Ramanuja is totally misleading. He was never a follower of Ramanuja.

What KCR also did not understand is that Chinna Jeeyar is an RSS supporter. If he is really opposed to the RSS/BJP he would not have supported the whole agenda of Chinna Jeeyar. In 2013, he “presided over inaugural ceremony of the 32nd state conferences of the Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad (ABVP),” the student wing of the RSS, where he said that “the ABVP was guiding the student community and inculcating patriotism among them.”

The country knows what kind of educational values and patriotism the ABVP promotes across Indian universities. In Telangana,, the ABVP was born in Osmania University before the Bharatiya Janata Party was formed in the late 1960s. However, not a single serious scholar has emerged from this organisation so far. The situation in the rest of India is not different.

Jeeyar himself does not believe in human and cultural equality. A key component of equality is respect for the food and work culture of different caste-community people.

Jeeyar said in one of his sermons just before the inauguration of the Statue of Equality:

“If you eat pork, you would only think like a pig. If you eat mutton, you would only follow the herd like a goat as your own brain stops working. If you take eggs, you would only behave like a chicken – peck in the dirt, place to place, and eat from it”.

With this statement, Jeevar Swamy insulted the food culture of the majority of Indians. He disrespected the blood in the body of Shudras, Dalits and Adivasis, apart from Christians, Muslims, Sikhs, Lingayats and so on. Even his own follower, KCR,  eats meat.

Is this the kind of equality that Ramanuja practiced and taught? Even after a thousand-year-long spiritual and cultural legacy, this kind of human intolerance and inhuman cultural traits survive among followers of Ramanuja whose statue is now called ‘Statue of Equality’.

This means they are coming out with a new meaning for the concept. Equality now means the practice of Varna Dharma, casteism and untouchability.

Kancha Ilaiah Shepherd is a political theorist, social activist and writer: His well known books are: God As Political Philosopher – Buddha’s Challenge to Brahminsm, Buffalo Nationalism –A Critique, and Spiritual Fascism and the Shudras –Vision For a New Path, co-edited with Karthik Raja Kuruppusamy

Tamil Nadu: Vandals Smear Periyar’s Statue With Saffron Paint

The defilement, suspected to have occurred during the early hours at Sundarapuram in the city, led to tension and anxiety and a posse of policemen was deployed at the spot.

Coimbatore: A life-size statue of social reformer E.V. Ramasamy, also known as ‘Periyar’, was found daubed with saffron colour at Coimbatore on Friday and police are on the lookout for the miscreants behind it.

After the incident came to light, workers of Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK), Marumalarchi Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (MDMK) and Viduthalai Chiruthaigal Katchi (VCK) held protests demanding action against the perpetrators. Parties, including the ruling All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (AIADMK) and main opposition DMK which strongly condemned the desecration.

Police said they were probing the matter and assured immediate action.

The defilement, suspected to have occurred during the wee hours at Sundarapuram in the city, led to tension and anxiety and a posse of policemen – including two sporting protective gear against coronavirus – was deployed at the spot.

The colour, on a portion of the statue, around the right arm and waist, was removed by Periyar’s followers with police help.

The workers, who cleaned the statue, demanded the arrest of the culprits and warned that they would intensify their agitation if such incidents recurred, police said. The activists dispersed after police assured them that action would be taken.

Also read: Debate: Periyar’s Followers Are Endowing Him With Attributes He Never Had

Senior AIADMK leader and the state’s fisheries minister D. Jayakumar said such despicable acts can never be accepted, adding that it was a punishable offence.

DMK president M.K. Stalin said Periyar had slogged for “small men” as well, (seen as a reference to those behind sullying the statue by pouring paint) and that was why he was being hailed as periyar (great man).

MDMK chief Vaiko demanded that the government act “responsibly” and take action.

He condemned the “continuous targeting of Periyar’s statues in Tamil Nadu.”

Periyar’s statue had been previously vandalised in 2018, in March and September.

The Pattali Makkal Katchi (PMK), an ally of the ruling AIADMK, demanded stern action against the miscreants and described the desecration as an act of cowardice.

The desecration by miscreants comes against the backdrop of the arrest of two men, followers of Periyar’s atheist ideology, for their alleged denigration of ‘Kanda Shasti Kavasam’, a popular Tamil hymn held sacred and recited every day by millions of devotees in Tamil Nadu in praise of Lord Muruga.

The desecrated statue, unveiled in 1995, was one of the three statues of the social reformer in the city.

Communist Party of India’s district secretary, V.S, Sundaram, said defacing the statue of Periyar was not acceptable and urged police to take immediate action and arrest the ‘anti-social elements’.

DMK MLA N. Karthik also condemned the incident and said that this could be an attempt to destroy peace in Tamil Nadu.

(With PTI inputs)

The DMK Has Been Two-Faced in Its Commitment Towards Social Justice

A critique of the Dravidian movement largely focusing on DMK and particularly on Karunanidhi’s regime from a Dalit perspective.

It is quite common to read and listen to hagiographies when a prominent leader passes away. Given Karunanidhi’s stature as a leader who has been in public life for more than 60 years, it is fitting that there has been an outpouring of comment since his demise. Referred to as Kalaignar (artiste), he was a multifaceted personality who had a strong political acumen and possessed an incomparable rhetorical and oratory flourish that was autodidactic. Karunanidhi was a highly skilled administrator and a fierce political competitor who stood his ground even after suffering numerous setbacks and succeeded in making several comebacks.

All the above is unmistakably true and there is a ready consensus on his political acumen and standing. However, what is somewhat questionable is the glorification of him as an uncompromising champion of social justice. There is no denial that, as a legatee of Periyar E.V. Ramasamy, he was committed towards social justice but to address him as a lieutenant of the icon of equality B. R. Ambedkar is quite unwarranted. This essay looks at Karunanidhi’s and the DMK’s commitment towards social justice and Dalit rights to offer a more rounded evaluation of his time in office.

After capitalising on the anti-Hindi agitations, the DMK swept to power in the 1967 elections promising the creation of a new social order with commitments towards social justice, democracy and devolution of power to the subaltern classes. C.N. Annadurai, DMK’s first chief minister, among various achievements, amended the law to permit self-respect and reformist marriages, provided gold medals to encourage inter-caste marriage, successfully renamed Madras State as Tamil Nadu and also organised the second International Tamil Conference. However his tenure was tarnished by the infamous Kilvenmani massacre where 44 agricultural labourers belonging to the Scheduled Caste were burnt to death over wage struggles.

It is not that the DMK played an active role in the slaughter so much as its reaction to it that is telling. What irked activists of that time was the callous attitude of the government and its representatives who had come to power promising to be a voice of the subaltern. Women’s rights activist and writer Mythily Sivaraman’s accounts compiled in a volume Haunted By Fire tell us how the ruling DMK downplayed the incident and tried to erase it from public memory. Fearful of alienating Backward Caste (BC) votes, condemnations were conspicuous by their absence and it was left to the Communist movement in Tamil Nadu to commemorate and memorialise the event.

Also read: Caste and Social Mobility: Karunanidhi’s Dravidian Century

Following Annadurai’s demise, M. Karunanidhi became the chief minister in 1969 and numerous schemes aimed towards the upliftment of BC and SC were implemented during this time. Prominent among them were the free concrete houses for SCs under the slum clearance board, the increase in the percentage of reservation from 16% to 18% for SCs and from 25% to 31% for BCs. This was remarkable insofar as the first BC (A. N. Sattanathan) Commission appointed by DMK in 1969 actually recommended 33% for BCs and the continuation of 16% for SCs, but Karunanidhi increased reservation for SCs to 18%.

It was during Karunanidhi’s second term as chief minister from 1971 to 1976, that the influential senior DMK Dalit woman leader and the then minister for Harijan welfare, Sathyavani Muthu resigned from the ministry in 1974 accusing Karunanidhi of being prejudiced against Dalits. In her words “After Dr. Ambedkar, nobody has taken the cudgels in real earnest … We will form a new party, sit on the opposition benches, and fight for the rights of Schedules Castes. We will not let them be exploited and humiliated endlessly.” Later, she formed her own party Thazthapattor Munnetra Kazhagam (Federation for the Progress of the Depressed Classes) before merging it with MGR’s AIADMK in 1977. It is certainly instructive that a politician of her stature and ability was pigeon-holed as Dalit and never accorded more prominent cabinet portfolios.

Commenting on Sathyavani Muthu’s revolt, a 1974 Times of India report opined that Muthu’s exit would not cost the DMK much as the Harijan community was never a significant factor either for DMK or its parent Dravidar Kazhagam or even its precursor, the Justice Party as all three were dominated by high caste non-Brahmins. It also reported that, following Muthu’s exit, ten MLAs and two MLCs and an MP jointly signed a resignation letter in support of her before recanting in the face of political pressure.

Interestingly, Parithi Ilamvazhuthi the young Dalit face of DMK who defeated Sathyavani Muthu in the 1984 elections, shifted to AIADMK in 2013 citing lack of respect in the DMK. This lack of respect for Dalit leaders within the DMK is not uncommon. For example, Coimbatore-based senior DMK leader (contemporary of Annadurai) and former MP, the late C. T. Dhandapani who belonged to the Dalit community was once publicly insulted on the basis of his caste by the then local minister Pongalur Palanisamy and his wife, both of whom belong to the powerful OBC Kongu Vellala Gounder caste. It may be recalled here that even during the times of Justice Party, Dalit leader M.C. Rajah quit the party citing lack of adequate interest on the issue of untouchability and the general welfare of the Depressed Classes. So, Dalits receiving stepmotherly treatment or experiencing lesser concern on issues affecting Dalits was not uncommon within the DMK.

After being in the political wilderness for a long time during MGR’s heydays, Karunanidhi’s third term from 1989 to 1991 was quite promising on the social justice front. During this tenure, he also played an important role in national politics and was instrumental in bringing V.P. Singh to power through the formation of a National Front, leading to the realisation of implementation of Mandal Commission recommendations for reservation for OBCs.

He also fulfilled the Vanniyar demand for a separate reservation which was earlier denied by MGR. However, the 1987 Vanniyar agitation for separate reservations resulted in violence targeted against Dalits as the ‘Most Backward’ Vanniyars sought to assert their superiority. As many as 5,000 huts were burned down and properties worth thousands of rupees destroyed. The state response was pitiful. Instead, as part of the celebrations to commemorate Ambedkar centenary in 1990, Karunanidhi renamed the Madras Law College as Dr. Ambedkar Law College, and in 1997 as CM for the fourth time he also established the Tamil Nadu Dr Ambedkar Law University.

Coming back to power in 1996, Karunanidhi had the toughest time in his political career as he had to tackle the Dalit renaissance that was not only proving to be an ideological challenge but also posed challenges in the political arena and everyday life. Militant Dalit social movements with slogans exhorting followers to ‘Refuse to Submit’ and to ‘Hit Back’ were gaining momentum, drawing hordes of Dalit youth to move out of Dravidian and Left parties to join Puthiya Tamilagam and the Dalit Panthers of India.

This period saw southern Tamil Nadu witness the worst clashes between the intermediate caste collective of Mukkulathors and upwardly mobile Pallars (Devendra Kula Vellalars) along with other Dalits. These clashes were popularly then referred to as ‘Then Maavatta Kalavarangal’ (Southern District Riots), which changed the political landscape in the region. Karunanidhi was unable to handle caste clashes and was caught between the competing demands of the different caste blocs. Pallars raised calls to rename districts and government run transport corporations after their caste heroes, demanding a share in the political practice centered on symbolism mastered by Karunanidhi to appease certain dominant castes in the form of monuments, statues and other visual iconography. Both DMK and AIADMK engaged in competitive symbolic investments to ‘appease’ certain dominant castes.

Karunanidhi acceded to the Pallar demands and unveiled the Veeran Sundaralingam Transport Corporation but he soon became embroiled in a bitter conflict over caste symbolism. The announcement sparked largescale violence and Thevars demanded a bus corporation to be named after Pulithevan. Karunanidhi acknowledged their demand but this sparked numerous demands to name districts after leaders which ultimately led to a situation where the DMK was compelled to organise an All-Party meeting at which it was agreed not to name any district or university or transport corporations after leaders. The party then changed both the district names and transport corporations which were named after various leaders.

Puthiya Tamilagam workers and villagers performing rituals to welcome the first bus from the newly created Veeran Sundaralingam Transport Corporation in Virudhunagar on May 1, 1997. Photograph copyright: PT Media

This effort alienated disgruntled Pallar youth who felt that the government endorsed the demands of each caste group in turn and commemorated their leaders but lacked the spine to control the unruly caste mobs when Dalit leaders were finally accorded recognition. This feeling was accentuated when the massive labour agitation by tea plantation workers demanding an increase in wages, led by PT in Tirunelveli, ended up in state violence in which 17 people including women and a one-year-old child died. A police baton charge drove several to their deaths in the Tamirabarani river in what is annually remembered as the ‘Tamirabarani Massacre’. As with Kilvenmani above, the state response further irked activists, as protestors were condemned for unruly behavior and the police were exonerated despite numerous reports pointing towards an excessive use of force.

A police officer and his team looking at an estate worker’s body that has drifted ashore after drowning to death. Photograph copyright: PT Media

Following the caste clashes and a smoldering unrest in south Tamil Nadu the government came up with the novel idea to establish ‘samathuvapurams’ (equality villages) in the name of Periyar.  The idea to create such forms of spatial equality was unique and speaks to the desire for social justice, but it was poorly thought through and remained most potent as a symbolic gesture rather than actually fostering harmony. I recall the words of Tamil writer and intellectual Stalin Rajangam, who told me during an interview that ‘Samathuvapurams both as an idea and structure stand as signs of social justice on the surface level and also provide an opportunity for the DMK leader to claim lineage to social justice through spatial symbolism’. Going further still, while presiding over a self-respect marriage in Chennai Karunanidhi criticised the party’s top leaders and prominent faces for not setting an example. He insisted that they should replicate these reformatory practices first, for the whole state to become an equal space. Indeed, his son, the politician Azhagiri was married to a Devendra Kula Vellalar, and so one could say that he led by example in this instance.

People caught unaware when baton-wielding police charged them can be seen running towards the Tamirabarani river in which 17 died. Photograph copyright: PT Media

Following the institutionalisation of Dalit social movements into political parties in the late 1990s they underwent a phase of deradicalisation and got subsumed within Dravidian politics. Karunanidhi’s fifth term from 2006-2011 saw the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal Katchi (Liberation Panthers) work so closely with the DMK that Dalit critics started to term them as the SC/ST wing of the party. Whilst this appears like a further instance of the commitment to the Dalit cause, the relationship did not result in a significant change in policy. Small measures were adopted around land-reform and the Special Component Plan, but these remained more impressive on paper than in practice. Dalit critics, indeed, argue that Karunanidhi astutely used alliances not only to thwart independent and autonomous Dalit mobilisation, but to suffocate the Dalit counter-hegemonic discourse of the 1990s through his politics of accommodation. ‘The time worn response to dissent’ in India, as Ashish Nandy asserts, ‘is to neutralise it by absorbing it into the mainstream’ (1998: 51).

K.Krishnasamy founder president of Puthiya Tamilagam and Tamil Maanila Congress leader S. Balakrishnan during the Manjolai estate workers rally in Tirunelveli on July 23, 1997. Photograph copyright: PT Media.

The ambivalent relationship between the DMK and Dalit parties was further witnessed in 2009 when Karunanidhi, following a lot of struggles by the Left and Arunthathiyar organisations, introduced the Tamil Nadu Arunthathiyars Special Reservation Act, 2009 to ensure representation for the most marginalised among the SCs, providing them a sub-quota of 3% within the SC quota. Though welcomed by many, this Act was challenged and cited as an effort to split Dalit unity. Again, the commitment to justice here is largely symbolic and requires few extra resources. Critics largely agreed that the Arunthathiyars deserved a special quota for their uplift, but argued that the government should have carved out a separate quota rather than providing compartmental reservation. It is also notable that the concession here was wrung from the party through sustained struggle rather than being granted by a party commitment to the values of equality.

Silencing the Dalit question

Most commentators find it hard to grasp the argument that the rhetorical commitment to social justice masks an underlying neglect of Dalits. Tamil Nadu is often seen as the cradle of the self-respect movement and as influenced by the anti-caste politics of Periyar. We are familiar with the silencing of the Dalit question in Bengal and Kerala, but fail to see that Tamil Nadu was not an exception to this rule. Dalit intellectuals played a major role in the creation of anti-caste consciousness and were the precursors of the Dravidian intellectual tradition, but Karunanidhi himself never acknowledged this, neither did the Dravidian ideologues. For example the idea of a Dravidian identity was conceived in 1886 when Rev. John Rathinam (a Dalit) of the Wesleyan Mission founded ‘the Dravidar Kazhagam.’ Likewise, The Dravida Mahajana Sabha was formed in 1891 under the leadership of Iyothee Thass in Ootacamund in Madras Presidency. None of these efforts were acknowledged in the Dravidian discourse.

The Madras United League, an organisation of non-Brahmins, was formed in 1912 under the leadership of C. Natesa Mudaliar. It was later renamed the ‘Dravidian Association.’ The Dravidian parties take this point to be the inception of Dravidianism and celebrated its centenary in 1912 without acknowledging the Dalit contributions. Thirumavalavan, the leader of the VCK, in an interview lamented to me on how Dalit history was suppressed by the Dravidian movement. He noted how the conceptualisation of ‘Dravidian’ emerged in the 1880s spearheaded by Dalit intellectuals, predating the ‘centenary’ year. Thirumavalavan also said that Dalit leaders like Rettamalai Srinivasan, M.C. Rajah, N. Sivaraj and Meenambal Sivaraj had been neglected in the modern Tamil Nadu mainstream history and it was all the more shocking to see that the Periyarists and Tamil nationalists, who propagated an inclusive Dravidian or non-Brahmin identity, were behind this suppression.

The neglect and suppression of Dalit history and contributions do not happen in the political domain alone, in other words, but also in the intellectual domain. Recently, scholars working on Dravidian movement and culture organised a two-day conference in Delhi to commemorate the centenary of the Dravidian Movement and there was not a single paper or scholar working on Dalits to provide a Dalit perspective of the Dravidian movement.

DMK’s caste majoritarianism

In seeking to understand this conundrum it is important to understand the politics of the DMK. The DMK under Karunanidhi pioneered a political practice of caste majoritarianist politics leading towards the concentration of power among particular dominant intermediate castes who are perceived to be better placed to swing elections. For example the Thevars are the lynchpin of contemporary Dravidian politics, they along with Kongu Vellalars and Vanniyars enjoy greater political power and influence in Dravidian rule. This power has yet to trickle down to other lower castes in the social order. This was particularly evident during Karunanidhi’s last term when DMK ministers were acting akin to feudal lords in each district with Madurai under the complete control of his son M.K. Azhagiri.

In districts like Salem, Coimbatore, Tirunelveli, Tuticorin, Karur, Thanjavur the ministers from locally dominant castes ruled them as their provinces and even Karunanidhi was not able to control them. Though it is often said that DMK has intraparty democracy while AIADMK right from MGR’s days to Jayalalithaa’s was authoritarian, there is a flipside to this in how politics is performed in everyday life. Such democracy is strictly curtailed by caste considerations. The possibility of a Dalit becoming district secretary competing against powerful intermediate castes was almost impossible in the case of the DMK.

Even in allocation of ministerial berths it is always members of these three intermediate castes who get important portfolios whilst Dalits would be given insignificant ones. VCK leader Thirumavalavan in an interview in 2011 described this as political discrimination and a form of hidden untouchability on the part of Dravidian parties to confine elected Dalit representatives to the lesser departments of Adi-Dravidar Welfare or Animal Husbandry. It is also instructive how, despite claims to castelessness, Dalits are almost never fielded as candidates in non-reserved constituencies. This was a common practice among Dravidian parties with some exceptions.

The Dravidian parties from the 1960s onwards encouraged the powerful and populous intermediate castes. Such castes were the Dalits’ most immediate oppressors but provided the support base for the Dravidian parties to extend and exert social and political dominance in rural Tamil Nadu. It is against this backdrop that we can comprehend the reluctance of the DMK – despite being in opposition at the time – to openly condemn the brutal and brazen murder of Shankar, the 22-year-old Dalit chopped down in broad daylight for the ‘crime’ of marrying a woman from a higher caste.

Championing social justice or mere tokenism

For all the rhetoric hailing Tamil Nadu as a land of social justice, the reality is that there is a continued neglect of Dalit interests in the state. For example, take the case of Ambedkar who remains a contested symbol; his statues in Tamil Nadu are often put in iron cages. This was because Dravidian parties only took symbolic efforts to incorporate him and that too largely due to the compulsions of electoral politics where he remains a symbol representing their concern about social justice. For most of Dravidian movement’s history, Ambedkar was never an integral part of the Dravidian rhetoric of anti-Brahmanism or egalitarianism. Periyar formed its centre, and Ambedkar, where he featured at all, was relegated to the position of a leader of Dalits who fought for the rights of the SCs. Not only DMK, even other parties and social movements only paid lip service to Ambedkar and never propagated Ambedkar’s contribution to non-Dalits which was phenomenal.

Political parties, particularly DMK, which thrive on concepts of social justice and democracy have failed to give proper recognition to Ambedkar and his ideology in their rhetoric or interventions despite the fact that Tamil Nadu is a state that has more reservation benefits for the intermediate castes than any other. This failure by the Dravidian parties to take Ambedkar along with them is one of the key reasons why Ambedkar statues get desecrated and confined to cages. Ambedkar is seen by certain intermediate castes as a caste-based challenge to the supremacy of their own leaders and icons. As elsewhere, Ambedkar statues are perceived as a threat, often invoking contests over public space. Ambedkar’s absence from the language of Dravidianism, according to Stalin Rajangam, reinforces his image as the symbol of the conflict between Dalits and non-Dalits.

In Tamil Nadu, except for a few Dalit parties, annihilation of caste does not feature as central to party ideologies. Instead, ‘appeasing’ castes with a majoritarian approach has become the dominant political practice of the major parties including the DMK. The DMK, as we have seen, is Janus-faced in its commitments towards social justice, except for a few important schemes it has been largely symbolic in nature. Whilst Karunanidhi was undoubtedly a giant of Tamil – and Indian – politics, therefore, we introduce a note of caution in assessing his legacy in terms of social justice. In the leadership struggle that followed Annadurai’s demise in 1969, Marguerite Ross Barnett (1976: 268) observes that ‘the majority of the Untouchable members of the DMK General Council were members’ of his faction. The portents for Dalit uplift were promising on his ascension to power, in other words, but as Barnett concludes: ‘A structural realignment of caste alliances is taking place that will increasingly isolate Untouchables … Thus far, the DMK has shown little creativity, commitment, or special competence in handling so crucial an aspect of social reform’ (1976: 268).

References:

Barnett, M. R. 1976. The Politics of Cultural Nationalism in South India. Princeton University Press

Nandy, A. 1998. Exiled At Home. Delhi: Oxford University Press

Karthikeyan Damodaran is a Visiting Fellow, Centre for Modern Indian Studies, University of Goettingen, Germany.

Hugo Gorringe is a Senior Lecturer in Sociology at the University of Edinburgh and is the author of ‘ Panthers in Parliament’ Oxford University Press 2017.

Caste and Social Mobility: Karunanidhi’s Dravidian Century

Behind the DMK and AIADMK’s durable support was their enabling of mobility to some lower-middle and middling strata and adopting egalitarian welfare policies that especially aided the poorest, along with sustained focus on language identity.

Since his teens, the late “Kalaignar” Mu. Karunanidhi was associated with the Dravidian movement, initially with the Self Respect Association, the Justice Party, the Dravidar Kazhagam (DK) and later with the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam, which he led for five decades. His public career of eight decades was intimately connected with various trends in Tamil Nadu’s politics and society. How might we regard the directions Kalaignar gave the DMK? How far might his passing change Tamil politics?

Building plebeian parties

The Dravidian movement is among Asia’s most durable ethnic movements. It initially claimed to represent a Dravidian community consisting of South Indians, primarily Tamil-speakers, other than Brahmins. While the Justice Party was led by elites from upper non-Brahmin castes and the DK’s founding leader, Periyar E.V. Ramasamy, was from a wealthy mercantile caste (Kavarai Naidu), the DMK’s leaders were born in underprivileged middle- and lower-middle-caste families – C.N. Annadurai, a Kaikola Mudaliar (a weaver caste) from a weaver-temple servant family and Kalaignar, an Isai Vellalar (a musician-dancer-temple servant caste) from a middling farmer family. (Karunanidhi’s family, however, acquired immense wealth over the course of his career and his son and political successor, Mu. Ka. Stalin, hardly had an underprivileged upbringing.) The AIADMK, like the early Congress Party, had upper caste leaders – M.G. Ramachandran, a Malayalam-speaking Nair and J. Jayalalithaa, a Malliyam Iyengar, who nevertheless built close links with lower strata.

The DK associated Dravidian identity mainly with middle castes and the DMK with those who primarily communicated in Tamil. Dravidianism upheld a popular community distinguished from elites based on caste, language use, dialect and occupation. Such a populist discourse helped the Dravidian parties attract various plebeian groups, enabled the DMK to become the second ethnic party (after the National Conference) to win a post-colonial state election.


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It also contributed to marginalising Indian nationalist parties far more than in other big states, although attachment to Indian nationalism remained strong in Tamil Nadu. Karunanidhi and other leaders built the DMK through close engagement with middling and lower status groups, such as small shopkeepers, smaller farmers, artisans and first-generation white-collar workers, drawn especially from the middle and lower-middle castes who were attracted to their promises to redistribute resources and challenge caste inequality. The DMK and the AIADMK changed status relations and public culture much more than property and income distribution. They increased voter participation, which has been higher in Tamil Nadu since the 1960s than in all but a few states and dominated Tamil Nadu politics from the 1970s.

M. Karunanidhi (front row, third from left) and Periyar (fourth). Source: YouTube

M. Karunanidhi (front row, third from left) and Periyar (fourth). Source: YouTube

Politics of ethnic belonging

The early Dravidian movement opposed certain ethnic groups, especially Brahmins and “north Indians”, which denoted speakers of the significantly Sanskrit-based languages of western, northern and parts of eastern India. Annadurai built bridges with these groups and Indian nationalism, by upholding Gandhi, abandoning secession in the early 1960s and clarifying that he opposed the caste inequalities associated with Brahmanism rather than Brahmins. Thus, the DMK under his leadership, asserted Tamil and middle-caste pride without promoting much ethnic antagonism.

Karunanidhi confronted his opponents more sharply. A bigamist whose literary writings and speeches frequently included racy sexual references, he justified the coarser elements of DMK culture as characteristic of a plebeian party. He opposed the AIADMK soon after it was formed on nativist grounds, abandoning this tactic only because it did not stem DMK’s decline. Karunanidhi’s political style and competition from the AIADMK limited party support among upper castes, Dalits and language minorities. As a result, he was consistently one of the two most popular politicians in Tamil Nadu, but also the one who evoked strongest opposition, especially through the 1970s and 1980s.

Hindu nationalist parties have been weakest in Tamil Nadu, polling no more than 3.2% of the vote in state assembly elections. This was crucially because DMK leaders promoted norms contrary to those Hindutvavadis valued – Tamil specificity based in middle caste cultures, rather than Hindu/ Indian homogeneity based on Sanskritic upper caste norms; and because, except when it was allied with the BJP from 1999 to 2004, the DMK built cooperative links between OBC Hindus, Muslims and to some extent OBC Christians.

Such networks impeded Hindutva growth and inter-religious violence, both of which were most limited in the DMK strongholds in northern and central Tamil Nadu. Many Muslims found in the DK’s and the early DMK’s criticisms of caste inequality and Hindu polytheism greater political acceptance than Indian nationalism offered them. As the AIADMK leaders more readily accepted various forms of Hindu religiosity and assertions of Hindu supremacy, Hindu nationalists gained more support and promoted more violence in the AIADMK strongholds in southern and western Tamil Nadu.

As it was closely associated with the middle castes and gave Dalits limited autonomous voice, the DMK did not impede middle caste violence toward Dalits much. In the Kaveri delta, it initially built middle caste-Dalit alliances, the upward mobility of some of whose members it enabled through minor land reforms. In its northern bases, it gained some support among Dalits, but less than among other groups. Where it was weaker until the 1970s, in the southern and western plains, it forged links with the most politically assertive castes, the Mukkulathor and the Kongu Vellala Gounder and therefore did not oppose their periodic anti-Dalit violence. This was for instance the case with the violence centered around Mudukulathur in 1958, elsewhere in the southern plains since the 1990s, and in parts of the western plains since the 2000s. Moreover, once entrenched in power, the DMK and the AIADMK became more closely aligned with dominant castes everywhere and local party cadre initiated caste violence at times, for instance in Villupuram in 1978, Pulliyur in 1998, Sankaralingapuram in 2001 and Nayakkankottai in 2012.

Jayalalithaa

J. Jayalalithaa paying tributes to MGR. Credit: PTI

Policies of social mobility

The DMK’s policies had a complicated relationship with the party’s egalitarian rhetoric. Karunanidhi arranged for a son of his to marry a Dalit woman, appearing thereby to personalise a commitment to caste equality in ways rather unusual among non-Dalits. However, Tamil Nadu’s educational and job reservations, which are higher (69%) than in other states, benefitted OBCs more extensively than Dalits and Adivasis. The Congress Party introduced an OBC quota of 25% in 1951, which the DMK raised to 31% in 1971 and the AIADMK to 50% in 1980. Less widely noted is the entitlement to OBC reservations under Dravidianist rule of a further 27% of the population, including better-off castes such as the Kongu Vellala Gounder, that were the predominant beneficiaries thereafter. This creamy layer is at its thickest in Tamil Nadu.

By comparison, the Dravidian parties raised the SC-ST quota by less than a fifth, from 16% to 19%, below these groups’ population share of 21% (which understates the number who experience Dalit-Adivasi deprivation because Christian Dalits are not deemed SCs). The OBC job quotas are filled more than the SC-ST quotas, especially in higher posts.

However, the introduction of a 1% tier for the STs in 1989 and a 3% tier within the SC quota for Arunthathiyar in 2009 helped some of the lowest status groups and the two 10% tiers created within the OBC quota in 1989 for MBCs and denotified communities helped less advantaged OBCs. Thus, caste-targeted policies primarily aided better-off middle castes, but also offered some Dalits, Adivasis, and worse-off OBCs the slimmer pickings.

Some Dravidianist welfare and development programs had a wide range of beneficiaries. The lunch scheme, whose success inspired its adoption in other states and a similar though less effective national program, particularly improved nutrition, health, and education among the poorest. Along with high government educational investments and SC/ST educational subsidies, it significantly increased primary school enrollment to the third highest level in India and helped Dalits nearly equal others in this regard though not in the higher educational tiers. High investments in primary health, the wide distribution of subsidised food grains, homestead land and housing, a successful rural employment program and the proliferation of women’s self-help groups extensively benefitted the underprivileged.

Dayalu Ammal, M. Karunanidhi and M.K. Stalin. Credit: PTI

However, the Dravidian parties distributed productive assets mainly to the upwardly mobile rather than to the poorest and to Dalits and Adivasis. This was particularly noticeable in land ownership and tenurial reform, which primarily aided middling tenant farmers largely drawn from the middle castes whose secure tenure helped them buy land. The generous subsidies for agrarian inputs such as fertilizers, pesticides and water pumps, and extensive availability of agrarian credit and loan waivers further aided such mobility. Only a small section of SCs and STs benefitted thereby. Although Dalits and Adivasis remain predominantly rural and agricultural, their presence remains negligible among middling and larger landowners.

Thus, the DMK and AIADMK enabled the mobility of some lower-middle and middling strata and adopted somewhat egalitarian welfare policies that especially aided the poorest. Along with sustained attention to language identity, these policies gained the Dravidian parties more widespread and durable support than managed by other caste-focused parties, such as the socialist, middle-caste and Dalit parties of northern and western India and language-based parties, such as the Telugu Desam and the Asom Gana Parishad. They helped contain challenges to class and caste inequality without major property redistribution.

Prospects

How might the DMK and the AIADMK fare after their preeminent leaders’ recent demise? The leader’s charisma was central to the AIADMK’s support under both MGR’s and Jayalalithaa’s leadership. This makes the absence of a credible successor a serious problem for sustaining the AIADMK. By contrast, DMK support was always based more on the party’s ethnic and populist orientations than on its leaders’ perceived qualities. Along with Karunanidhi having groomed Stalin as his successor over three decades, this makes the DMK’s electoral and organisational prospects much stronger than the AIADMK’s over the coming decade.

Karunanidhi speaks in the Tamil Nadu assembly. Credit: Facebook/www.kalaignarkarunanidhi.com

How far might society and politics change in Tamil Nadu now? Civil society mobilisation has pressed significantly beyond Dravidianist social visions since the 1980s, a trend that is likely to accentuate. Many caste associations pressed to change caste policies and various other associations opposed certain neo-liberal policies. Some of these civil society initiatives led to the emergence of new parties that mobilised certain MBCs (Vanniar), denotified communities (Mukkulathor) and Dalit groups (Parayar, Pallar and Arunthathiyar), but polled no more than 8.1% of the vote although they influenced popular aspirations more. Other new parties, notably the DMDK, gained support across group boundaries, but did not poll over 8.4% of the vote. These developments of the past generation suggest that the Dravidian parties’ influence in civil society is less secure than their electoral support.

Narendra Subramanian is Professor of Political Science at McGill University, Montreal, Canada and the author of
Ethnicity and Populist Mobilization: Political Parties, Citizens and Democracy in South India (Oxford University Press, 1999).