What Has Happened To Western Europe’s Centre Right?

Christian democracy, in Germany and elsewhere, is a very different beast to conservatism and liberalism.

As a species, we humans are inveterate pattern makers. We’re also plagued by recency bias – the tendency to give more weight to things that have only just happened. Hardly surprising, then, that when analysing party politics, we tend to take the results of the latest elections and try to fit them into a trend.

That’s why the results of the recent election in Germany have caused a tailspin. The country looks set to have its first social democratic chancellor since 2005 after Olaf Scholz’s party emerged as the biggest in the Bundestag. That, in turn, has led at some point to the fact that the centre-left now governs a whole bunch of countries we’re very familiar with – and to wonder whether conservatives everywhere are in trouble.

It’s a good question. But to answer it, we need to first qualify what we mean by “conservative”. All too often it’s used to describe parties who would reject the label themselves. That’s certainly the case for the Christian Democratic Union of Germany and the Christian Social Union in Bavaria (CDU/CSU) – the big losers in the German election.

Christian democracy, in Germany and elsewhere, such as the Netherlands, Spain and Ireland, is a very different beast to conservatism and liberalism. It is as concerned with the “social” as it is with the “market” side of the social market. It is profoundly internationalist and with a view of society ultimately rooted in notions of community and family rather than the sovereign individual.

That’s why, when we’re trying to analyse trends, it’s arguably more helpful to talk about the mainstream right. This portmanteau term allows us to pick out those parties which (unlike parties of the left) have tended to govern in the interests of more comfortably off and/or socially traditional voters, but which (in contrast to the far-right parties on their flanks) regard the norms of both liberal democracy and the liberal international order as givens.

Looking at the trends for western Europe over the last four decades with this in mind, it’s clear that parties on the far right have become more popular over time, although not perhaps as much as some scare-story headlines are prone to suggest. Liberal parties have held fairly steady but it is the Christian democrats who’ve fared worst of all. As the chart shows, their performance across western Europe has declined more steadily than other conservatives since the 1980s.

A graph showing that the popularity of Christian democratic parties has declined more sharply than other types of conservative party since the 1980s

The reasons for the trajectories of mainstream conservatives of all kinds are complex and obviously each country has its own story to tell. One cannot hope to appreciate the difficulties experienced by the mainstream right in Italy, for instance, without taking account of the post-cold war implosion of the country’s entire party system and the rise of Silvio Berlusconi’s hyper-personalist political outfits. Nor is it possible to understand the problems encountered by the Partido Popular in Spain without realising how big as issues that corruption and Catalan and Basque nationalism have each become.

However, as the research included in our new book shows, a useful way to frame the difficulties faced by the mainstream right more generally is to think of its members as facing two ongoing challenges.

One is the so-called silent revolution which, since the 1970s, has seen more and more people in Europe adopt what we might term cosmopolitan, progressive-individualist values. Their move away from the more traditional, and sometimes nationalistic and authoritarian, values associated (rightly or wrongly) with the right of the political spectrum has helped kickstart green and new left parties.

The other challenge is the so-called silent counter revolution: a backlash against that value-shift gathered pace in the 1990s and helped to fuel the rise of populist radical-right parties. Ever since, these have threatened to eat into the support of their more conventional counterparts on the right.

In fact, as the contributors to our book make clear, the mainstream right has indeed sometimes struggled to adapt – although some parties have coped better than others. But since their response has often involved adopting, over time, more socially liberal policies on issues like gender and sexuality while taking an increasingly nationalistic and restrictive stance on immigration, it is perhaps predictable that it is Europe’s Christian democratic parties (already coping with the decline of religious observance in a more secular world) which have struggled more than most.

German Chancellor Angela Merkel in Aachen, Germany, September 25, 2021. Photo: Reuters/Wolfgang Rattay

Survival at what price?

But if liberal and conservative parties haven’t generally run into quite so much trouble, might that have come at a heavy cost, both to their reputations and to the longer-term health of liberal democracy? To take just one example, the British Conservative party, in its desperation to see off Nigel Farage’s various vehicles, has adopted Europhobic and anti-immigration stances and seems determined to undermine the role of the judiciary and the independence of the Electoral Commission. Little wonder that some warn that it is going the way of Hungary and Poland.

That said, we need to be careful, as humans, not to over-interpret. And, recency bias aside, what’s just happened can sometimes still provide a useful reminder not to do so. In Austria, Sebastian Kurz – in some ways the poster boy for the idea that mainstream right parties can win by hugging the far right close – seems to have come unstuck, undone by allegations of corruption. Over the border in the Czech Republic, the mainstream right seems to have performed better than expected in their elections.

Finally, in Germany, as a flow-of-the-vote analysis shows, although the CDU/CSU did suffer net losses to the Greens, it may well have lost more voters to the grim reaper than it did to the far-right AfD, given that an estimated 7% of its voters have died since the last election. At least this time anyway, it was the good old fashioned SPD, rather than the products of the silent revolution and counter revolution, that did it by far the most damage.

Radical right-wing populism and social liberalism, then, remain a significant dual threat to Europe’s mainstream right, but they should still keep a weather eye on their traditional rivals too.The Conversation

Tim Bale, Professor of Politics, Queen Mary University of London and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, Professor at the School of Political Science, Diego Portales University.

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Some Homage but Not Enough for Independence in Catalonia

Though inconclusive, the latest election results in Catalonia suggest the Spanish establishment’s credibility continues to be low.

Though inconclusive, the latest election results suggest the Spanish establishment’s credibility continues to be low

View of the Sagrada Familia with the Catalan flag in Barcelona. Credit: Jordi Boixareu/Flickr CC BY-NC-ND 2.0

View of Barcelona’s landmark Sagrada Familia with the Catalan flag fluttering in the foreground. Credit: Jordi Boixareu/Flickr CC BY-NC-ND 2.0

Reading the tea leaves of Sunday’s elections in Catalonia, which accounts for a fifth of Spain’s GDP, it can be safely divined that the ruling Partido Popular (People’s Party, PP) will lose its majority in the December general elections. Though the elections were for the regional parliament, it was seen as a plebiscite for Catalan independence after the Madrid government and the country’s Supreme Court disallowed an independence referendum.

The turnout was a record 77.4%, up 10% since the last elections three years ago. The pro-independence parties together won 72 of the 135 seats and will keep governing the province, as they have for decades. Of these, the Junts pel Sí (Together for Yes) coalition – consisting of the centre-right Convergencia and leftist Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC) – won 62 seats, losing seats and votes compared to what they won earlier, while the radical pro-independence and anti-capitalist Popular Unity Candidacy (CUP) won 10 seats. The two groupings together received 48% of the votes.

Catalonia in Spain. Credit: Wikimedia Commons

Catalonia in Spain. Credit: Wikimedia Commons

The Citizens Party (C’s), a Right-wing Catalan political brand that has gone national, emerged at the head of the pro-Madrid opposition with 25 seats compared to nine in 2012. The PP and the PSOE (Spanish Socialist Workers Party), which alternate in the national government, lost votes and seats, especially the former. The pro-Madrid establishment parties received 40% of the votes, principally from the elderly and the normally apathetic poorer Spanish working class voters in Catalonia who seem to have turned out this time, fearing independence.

The clearly identifiable loser on the Left was Sí que es Pot (Yes we can), the regional derivative of Podemos, which won 11 seats, about a third of its own worst estimates. The Podemos-led third way coalition supported an independence referendum but wanted the province to stay in Spain. It was squeezed out by the polarised vote but was also given a more generalised warning that it will not emulate Syriza in the December elections. Spain is tiring of Podemos leader Pablo Iglesias’ constant attention-seeking theatrics.

Tea leaf reading at this point gives way to the sharper (Donald) Rumsfeldian logic. The “known knowns” of the situation (things we know we know) are that Catalonia has become a highly politicised part of Spain even as apathy runs strong in the rest of the country. The pro-independence segment of the population has stabilised at about half the population and it could squeak through with a referendum victory if Madrid allows one – which it won’t.

This suits the Catalan regional leader Artur Mas and his Convergencia, a pro-business party tainted by charges of corruption and misgovernance. Keeping the Catalan independence issue on the boil distracts attention. The PP government in Madrid is not too displeased either. Aware that it is losing support, which is heading the way of the party of the C’s, it will hope that a running verbal battle with Barcelona will pay electoral dividends.

File photo of Artur Mas. Credit: Agencia Catalana de Noticias/Flickr CC 2.0

File photo of Artur Mas. Credit: Agencia Catalana de Noticias/Flickr CC 2.0

The “known unknown” (knowing there are some things we do not know) is if the Catalan nationalists, without a little less than 50% of the popular vote, will push through with the route map of unilateral independence as they had warned before the elections. The government of Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy has said it will use all judicial means to stop that from happening. Retired generals have warned that the military will not watch Spain crumble. The Catholic Church hierarchy has opposed Catalan independence. Neo-Nazi and pro-Franco groups have been hitting the streets to whip up nationalist passions.

There are no “unknown unknowns” (the ones we don’t know we don’t know) to report of at the moment. Perhaps the only way to find one is by falling off the Rumsfeldian epistemological cliff.

Spanish nationhood is creaking with Catalonia, the Basque country, Valencia and Galicia all seeking in different degrees to wrest free of central control. Franco’s ghost still haunts Spanish federalism. The dictator tried to crush vernacular languages, cultures and identities in his obsession with a hegemonic Spain, held together by nationalism, military, the Church and violence. The past was never exorcised after his death and the Spanish establishment unmistakably bears Franco’s imprint.

The subprime crisis hit Spain hard with high unemployment, precarious jobs, poor wages and inadequate labour laws. Hundreds of thousands have lost their homes for failing to pay the banks. Its gag law (ley mordaza), aimed at curtailing popular protest, is the most retrograde in Europe. The results of the Catalan elections are perhaps an indication that many of its citizens have reached a point where they think they could do better without Madrid.

Tired of Politics as Usual, Spanish Voters Jolt ‘The Caste’

With general elections due in November, the Spanish establishment and its European allies have less than six months to work out the Podemos conundrum.

London: The results of Sunday’s elections to 13 of Spain’s 17 regional governments and more than 8,000 councils – seen as a test of public standing for the parties before the November 2015 general elections – have come as a kick in the teeth for the country’s bi-party system. They have confirmed that Podemos (We Can), a political formation born only 18 months ago from the anti-austerity protests of 2011 and an ally of Greece’s Syriza movement, has interrupted the happy siesta of Spanish politics.

The ruling Right-wing Partido Popular (Popular Party, PP) has seen its power evaporate in the regions, though even with a 10% drop it still gained the largest vote share, at 27 %. At these levels, it will not get a parliamentary majority in November. Its current Prime Minister, Mariano Rajoy, is deeply unpopular among young voters and an election liability for his party, which nevertheless remains paralysed before him.

Another party that did well on Sunday was Ciudadanos (Citizens), originally a Catalan party and a Right-wing mirror image of Podemos with another young, intelligent and telegenic leader, Albert Rivera, in charge.

File photo of Ada Colau (Credit: Fernanda LeMarie - Cancillería del Ecuador)

File photo of the Podemos-backed Ada Colau (Credit: Fernanda LeMarie – Cancillería del Ecuador)

The Socialists, PP’s nominal adversary and furtive collaborator at critical moments, too lost votes but seem to have recovered their standing in the provinces, polling around 25% overall. The biggest upset was in Barcelona where a woman anti-eviction activist, Ada Colau, will be the next mayor. She described the results in her city as the start of an “unstoppable democratic revolution”. Madrid might also have a former woman judge as its next mayor, though that will depend on Podemos and the Socialists agreeing on an alliance.

The elections are being compared in significance to the municipal elections of 1931 in which the people voted heavily against the monarchist parties, forcing the abdication of King Alfonso and the founding of the Second Republic. The new government, which tried to redistribute land and wealth, was overthrown by Francisco Franco in the Spanish Civil War of 1936-39, and this was followed by almost four decades of dictatorship.

Under Franco, low taxes, ultra-light business regulation and the absence of labour rights turned Spain into a manufacturing base. In effect, it was an early application of the neoliberal shock doctrine that Pinochet would reprise in Chile in the 1970s.

The dictator’s death in 1975 triggered a wave of labour strikes and the transition government realised it could not fall back on a military regime if it were to join the European Union. Its solution was to draw up a Constitution in 1978, ratified in a referendum, that is heavily tilted in favour of the larger parties and which sets the entry bar for the smaller parties very high. This has allowed the Spanish political establishment – disparagingly known as the ‘Regime of ’78’ – to develop a seamless two-party system, greased with institutionalised corruption, and keep social peace for close to four decades.

Spain first civilian governments from 1982 onwards were led by the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE), which promoted social mobility and a social security system but also kept to Franco’s light touch with big business. Anthony Giddens, Tony Blair’s ideological guru, took Spain’s example in developing his thesis of the Third Way in politics. When the PSOE was voted out of power in 1996 for the rampant corruption of its leaders, it was replaced by the rightist PP.

The subprime mortgage crisis hit Spain hard in 2008, burst the construction bubble and led to a banking collapse. As its economy entered into recession, Spain asked for a Eurozone bail-out in 2012 to rescue its failing banks and assumed their bad loans. The state, economically hollowed out by decades of neoliberal policies, had no appetite for higher taxation targeted at the wealthy and the tax-dodgers. Instead, it started making swingeing cuts to social spending, hurting the most vulnerable sectors such as the young, the pensioners, the immigrants and the disabled.

Hundreds of thousands have been thrown out of their homes, often violently, for defaulting on mortgage payments while public health and education have been crippled by budget cuts. Spain is now one of the most unequal European societies with a fifth of its population below the poverty line, 30% of its children growing up in poverty and a high unemployment rate that hovers above 50% for the young. The number of Spanish emigrants exceeds the intake of immigrants and its population has registered a net decline.

While the people suffer, its financial and political elite have profited. There is a daily drip of scandal. Many leaders, cutting across the political divide, who held high offices have been charged with enriching themselves with public funds.

The crisis of legitimacy has affected almost every Spanish institution including the monarchy. Juan Carlos, who was installed as King by Franco before his death, made way for his son Felipe last year after being discovered hunting elephants in Botswana in 2012 with his German mistress while public cuts were being enforced at home in the name of austerity. His son-in-law and his youngest daughter are facing criminal charges.

Enter the ‘Outraged’

The Indignados (Outraged), an anti-austerity movement, led a short but tumultuous protest movement in 2011, occupying Madrid’s downtown plaza of Puerta del Sol on May 15. Tens of thousands of young Spaniards flocked to the occupied square and millions marched nationwide with the cry of “we are not merchandise in the hands of politicians and bankers”.

Picture of protest at Plaza del Sol, Madrid, 2011 (Credit: Wiki Images)

Picture of protest at Plaza del Sol, Madrid, 2011 (Credit: Wiki Images)

They were inspired by 94-year-old Stephane Hessel’s book, Time for Outrage. Hessel, who died in 2013, was a member of the French Resistance. He was captured by the Gestapo and sent to various concentration camps, narrowly surviving execution after a fellow prisoner and camp overseer changed Hessel’s uniform for that of someone who had died of typhus. Hessel argued in his book that indifference was the worst crime in the current climate. The Indignados, in turn, inspired the Occupy Wall Street movement of 2011.

When the spontaneous social mobilisation ran out of steam after a few months, Spain seemed to have slipped back into its customary political stupor. At this point, Pablo Iglesias, a ponytailed university professor at Madrid’s Complutense University, all 36 years of age, decided to cross the line from academia to activism.

File photo of Pablo Iglesias Turrión by Olaf Kosinsky / Wikipedia

File photo of Pablo Iglesias Turrión by Olaf Kosinsky / Wikipedia

At first, he started courting small television and radio stations to argue against austerity and for a new paradigm in Spanish politics. Iglesias and his closest collaborators, almost all of them fellow academics, created a small television channel, La Tuerka (Screw), which began attracting large online audiences.

Talk shows have a large audience share in Spain that increased when Iglesias was invited. He cut a strikingly different figure with his youth, his casual attire and his critical analyses always delivered simply in contrast to the pontificating studio pundits. Iglesias believed that television was to politics in Spain what gunpowder was to war in earlier epochs.

The Spanish media owners were slow to realise that Iglesias would use his television popularity to gain market recognition and create Podemos in January 2014. He promoted his new party as an alternative to the two traditional ones, on whom he pinned the label of La Casta (‘The Caste’) for their shared networks of patronage and portrayed them as the evil Siamese twins of Spanish politics. Within months, Podemos took 8% of the vote share in European elections and won five seats, among them Iglesias’s.

The ideological inspiration of Podemos came from Antonio Gramsci, who died in Mussolini’s prison, two U.K.-based academics, the Argentinean Ernesto Laclau, and Chantal Mouffe, a Belgian political theorist, and political movements in Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela.

In many ways, Podemos mirrors the Aam Aadmi Party, or least the version that existed before it split. It is media savvy, has a centralised leadership around Iglesias, which was ratified in national assemblies and through secret voting, and refuses to situate itself on the traditional Left-Right fault line. It prefers to locate the struggle as between those above (los arribas) and those below (los abajos)

Podemos campaigned on a platform of transparent government in which citizens have a say, and the rejection of public spending cuts. Like Syriza, it attacked Germany for imposing harsh anti-austerity measures that have benefited German banks but will probably balk at its earlier radicalism of taking Spain out of Europe and NATO.

The Spanish establishment and its European allies have less than six months to work out the Podemos conundrum. The country’s centre of gravity might have suffered a wobble but it is not in any pre-revolutionary fervour. The ruling elites might still bet on riding out with PP and inducing a post-electoral coalition with the PSOE and/or Ciudadanos to stall this subaltern menace.